Wednesday, May 5, 2010

Alberta to analyze cost-benefits of additional BSE testing in cattle

Alberta to analyze cost-benefits of additional BSE testing in cattle

by: Government of Alberta May 5th, 2010

An agriculture-based think-tank will do an analysis of whether the cost of conducting client-driven optional BSE testing in animals before or after slaughter would be beneficial in the marketplace. The work which is being done by the George Morris Centre will help to determine whether pre or post-slaughter testing would allow Canadian products access to export markets that are currently not available, potentially creating a greater demand for Canadian beef.

“In Alberta, in accordance with internationally accepted standards, we currently test those animals that meet the criteria for BSE testing,” said Jack Hayden, Minister of Agriculture and Rural Development. “This study is separate from our world-class surveillance system and the other steps that we already take to ensure the safety of our beef products for consumers. Alberta’s beef industry is market-driven, however, we need to constantly be evolving as science and technology progresses in order to further enhance our market opportunities.”

“At this time, Canadian products are still restricted in certain markets that could be important to industry,” said Dr. Kevin Keough, Executive Director, Alberta Prion Research Institute. “This study will provide an independent look at the issue, as well as reliable data and analysis.”

“Canada’s economic losses stemming from the 2003 BSE crisis are significant and research like this is needed to support Canada’s beef industry,” said Dr. Neil Cashman, Scientific Director of PrioNet Canada. “This analysis plays an important part in the process to determine how we can help restore international consumer’s confidence in Canadian beef.”

The Alberta Prion Research Institute and PrioNet Canada, in partnership with the Alberta Livestock and Meat Agency, requested submissions for proposals in November 2009, and selected the George Morris Centre.

“We submitted a proposal for the project because the cost-benefit analysis of BSE testing in cattle is a significant issue and we thought we would make a good contribution to it,” said Al Mussell, Senior Research Associate, George Morris Centre.

The cost of the project is approximately $179,000 with the Alberta Livestock and Meat Agency contributing 50 per cent of the funds. PrioNet Canada and The Alberta Prion Research Institute are each contributing the remaining amount equally.

The Alberta Livestock and Meat Agency, a provincial government agency, contributes ideas, information and investment as it works with industry partners towards achieving the goal of a sustainable, profitable and internationally respected livestock and meat industry. For more information on ALMA, visit

The Alberta Prion Research Institute is committed to the prevention, mitigation and treatment of prion and protein misfolding diseases in animals and humans. APRI invests in fundamental and applied research that takes an interdisciplinary approach to solving the prion mystery. It supports projects that focus on innovation and invention.

PrioNet Canada is a Network of Centres of Excellence for research into prions and prion diseases. Prion diseases are untreatable, transmissible, and fatal neurodegenerative diseases of both humans and animals. -30- Editors’ note: Backgrounder attached.

For more information contact:

TEST, and they will come.

NO need to spend 10's of thousands of dollars on a think tank about that.

TEST all agriculture producing livestock animals for TSE, and Country's all around the globe will come for your product. but it must be done right.

MOST of the world knows of the USDA et al's blunder on testing and surveillance for BSE in the USA.

Personally, up until this last mad cow in Canada, I trusted, and was fairly pleased with Canada's effort to eradicate BSE. However, since the attempted cover-up for economic purposes of the last mad cow in Canada, sadly, it seems they finally said to hell with it, and just started taking pages out of the USDA's et al book of deceit on TSE.

Hidden from Public for Almost 2 Weeks: Canada’s 18th BSE-Infected Cow

Feb. 25 Confirmation of BSE-Positive Cow Kept Secret

March 10, 2010 Billings, Mont. – Yet again, R-CALF USA learned through the rumor mill yesterday that Canada had detected the country’s 18th case of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) in a 72-month-old Angus cow. Although Canadian officials were purported to have notified the World Organization for Animal Health (OIE) last week, a phone call this morning to OIE revealed that Canada had not yet notified OIE of this latest discovery. However, R-CALF USA Communications Coordinator Shae Dodson was told via telephone by the Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA) that Canada, indeed, had discovered yet another case of BSE. The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) later verified CFIA’s report.

“The CFIA said the BSE-positive case was confirmed Feb. 25, 2010, which means the CFIA and all other governments who knew about this latest BSE case kept it a secret from the public for almost two weeks, said R-CALF USA CEO Bill Bullard. “If we had not discovered this information, the public may never have known.”

At six years of age, this particular animal would have been born in 2003 or 2004, making her the 18th Canadian-born BSE case and the 11th BSE-positive animal eligible to be exported to the United States. In November 2007, USDA implemented the OTM (over-30-months) Rule that allows the U.S. to import into the U.S. these high-risk Canadian cattle over 30 months of age, as long as such cattle were born after March 1, 1999.

Already this year, well over 40,000 older Canadian cows and bulls have been imported into the United States for domestic slaughter.

“Consumers – now more than ever – should be telling their grocers they want the products in the meat counter labeled with country-of-origin information so they can decide on their own whether to avoid products from countries with ongoing disease problems, particularly now that USDA chooses not to disclose such important disease information,” said R-CALF USA President/Region VI Director Max Thornsberry, a Missouri veterinarian who also chairs the group’s animal health committee.

“Forty organizations representing consumers, the cattle industry and other livestock and farming interests sent a joint letter to USDA in November 2009 urging the new Administration to restore the United States’ weakened import standards that are exposing the U.S. to a heightened risk of BSE,” said Thornsberry. “It’s well past time for Agriculture Secretary Tom Vilsack to listen to U.S. citizens and overturn the OTM Rule that is allowing the continuous introduction of BSE into the United States.

“There are no restrictions on these higher-risk OTM cattle when they enter the United States,” he continued. “These higher-risk cattle are allowed to commingle with the U.S. herd, enter the U.S. food supply and enter the non-ruminant U.S. animal feed system. USDA has an absolute duty to protect the U.S. cattle herd as well as U.S. consumers from the introduction of BSE that is known to be occurring under the OTM Rule, and R-CALF is again calling on USDA to immediately rescind the OTM Rule.”

“Since implementation of the 2007 OTM Rule, Canada has detected seven new cases of BSE, six of which met USDA’s age requirement to be imported into the United States,” Bullard said. “It is alarming that while Canada’s BSE problem is ongoing, Canada has significantly reduced its surveillance testing and likely is detecting only a fraction of the BSE cases in the Canadian herd. This haphazard approach to BSE is endangering not only U.S. beef consumers, but the U.S. cattle herd, and we want USDA to immediately halt Canadian cattle imports.”

According to Canadian data, Canada tested only 34,617 cattle for BSE in 2009. In 2008, 48,804 cattle were tested. In 2007, approximately 59,000 head were tested, and in January 2010, only 3,536 Canadian cattle were tested for the disease.

“Canada’s BSE testing is voluntary, and based on the significant numbers of BSE-positive cattle detected under very limited testing, Canada’s BSE prevalence rate is likely far higher than USDA estimated when it predicted that the OTM Rule would result in the importation of 19 BSE-infected cattle during the 20 years covered by USDA’s risk modeling,” Bullard pointed out. “The result is that the United States is assuming a much higher risk for the introduction of BSE than the negligible risk that USDA claims.”

R-CALF USA, the South Dakota Stockgrowers Association, five national consumer groups and several individual ranchers have a pending lawsuit against USDA’s OTM Rule in a South Dakota federal court. As a result of this litigation, the court ordered USDA to reopen the OTM Rule and “to revise any provisions of the OTM Rule it deems necessary.”

Thursday, October 18, 2007


Friday, August 29, 2008




Date: June 21, 2007 at 2:49 pm PST

Owner and Corporation Plead Guilty to Defrauding Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Surveillance Program

An Arizona meat processing company and its owner pled guilty in February 2007 to charges of theft of Government funds, mail fraud, and wire fraud. The owner and his company defrauded the BSE Surveillance Program when they falsified BSE Surveillance Data Collection Forms and then submitted payment requests to USDA for the services. In addition to the targeted sample population (those cattle that were more than 30 months old or had other risk factors for BSE), the owner submitted to USDA, or caused to be submitted, BSE obex (brain stem) samples from healthy USDA-inspected cattle. As a result, the owner fraudulently received approximately $390,000. Sentencing is scheduled for May 2007.


Topics that will be covered in ongoing or planned reviews under Goal 1 include:

soundness of BSE maintenance sampling (APHIS), implementation of Performance-Based Inspection System enhancements for specified risk material (SRM) violations and improved inspection controls over SRMs (FSIS and APHIS),


The findings and recommendations from these efforts will be covered in future semiannual reports as the relevant audits and investigations are completed.


-MORE Office of the United States Attorney District of Arizona FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE For Information Contact Public Affairs February 16, 2007 WYN HORNBUCKLE Telephone: (602) 514-7625 Cell: (602) 525-2681


PHOENIX -- Farm Fresh Meats, Inc. and Roland Emerson Farabee, 55, of Maricopa, Arizona, pleaded guilty to stealing $390,000 in government funds, mail fraud and wire fraud, in federal district court in Phoenix. U.S. Attorney Daniel Knauss stated, “The integrity of the system that tests for mad cow disease relies upon the honest cooperation of enterprises like Farm Fresh Meats. Without that honest cooperation, consumers both in the U.S. and internationally are at risk. We want to thank the USDA’s Office of Inspector General for their continuing efforts to safeguard the public health and enforce the law.” Farm Fresh Meats and Farabee were charged by Information with theft of government funds, mail fraud and wire fraud. According to the Information, on June 7, 2004, Farabee, on behalf of Farm Fresh Meats, signed a contract with the U.S. Department of Agriculture (the “USDA Agreement”) to collect obex samples from cattle at high risk of mad cow disease (the “Targeted Cattle Population”). The Targeted Cattle Population consisted of the following cattle: cattle over thirty months of age; nonambulatory cattle; cattle exhibiting signs of central nervous system disorders; cattle exhibiting signs of mad cow disease; and dead cattle. Pursuant to the USDA Agreement, the USDA agreed to pay Farm Fresh Meats $150 per obex sample for collecting obex samples from cattle within the Targeted Cattle Population, and submitting the obex samples to a USDA laboratory for mad cow disease testing. Farm Fresh Meats further agreed to maintain in cold storage the sampled cattle carcasses and heads until the test results were received by Farm Fresh Meats.

Evidence uncovered during the government’s investigation established that Farm Fresh Meats and Farabee submitted samples from cattle outside the Targeted Cattle Population. Specifically, Farm Fresh Meats and Farabee submitted, or caused to be submitted, obex samples from healthy, USDA inspected cattle, in order to steal government moneys.

Evidence collected also demonstrated that Farm Fresh Meats and Farabee failed to maintain cattle carcasses and heads pending test results and falsified corporate books and records to conceal their malfeasance. Such actions, to the extent an obex sample tested positive (fortunately, none did), could have jeopardized the USDA’s ability to identify the diseased animal and pinpoint its place of origin. On Wednesday, February 14, 2007, Farm Fresh Meats and Farabee pleaded guilty to stealing government funds and using the mails and wires to effect the scheme. According to their guilty pleas:

(a) Farm Fresh Meats collected, and Farabee directed others to collect, obex samples from cattle outside the Targeted Cattle Population, which were not subject to payment by the USDA;

(b) Farm Fresh Meats 2 and Farabee caused to be submitted payment requests to the USDA knowing that the requests were based on obex samples that were not subject to payment under the USDA Agreement;

(c) Farm Fresh Meats completed and submitted, and Farabee directed others to complete and submit, BSE Surveillance Data Collection Forms to the USDA’s testing laboratory that were false and misleading;

(d) Farm Fresh Meats completed and submitted, and Farabee directed others to complete and submit, BSE Surveillance Submission Forms filed with the USDA that were false and misleading;

(e) Farm Fresh Meats falsified, and Farabee directed others to falsify, internal Farm Fresh Meats documents to conceal the fact that Farm Fresh Meats was seeking and obtaining payment from the USDA for obex samples obtained from cattle outside the Targeted Cattle Population; and

(f) Farm Fresh Meats failed to comply with, and Farabee directed others to fail to comply with, the USDA Agreement by discarding cattle carcasses and heads prior to receiving BSE test results. A conviction for theft of government funds carries a maximum penalty of 10 years imprisonment. Mail fraud and wire fraud convictions carry a maximum penalty of 20 years imprisonment. Convictions for the above referenced violations also carry a maximum fine of $250,000 for individuals and $500,000 for organizations. In determining an actual sentence, Judge Earl H. Carroll will consult the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, which provide appropriate sentencing ranges. The judge, however, is not bound by those guidelines in determining a sentence.

Sentencing is set before Judge Earl H. Carroll on May 14, 2007. The investigation in this case was conducted by Assistant Special Agent in Charge Alejandro Quintero, United States Department of Agriculture, Office of Inspector General. The prosecution is being handled by Robert Long, Assistant U.S. Attorney, District of Arizona, Phoenix. CASE NUMBER: CR-07-00160-PHX-EHC RELEASE NUMBER: 2007-051(Farabee) # # #

Monday, April 12, 2010

Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison says NO to safer food and S. 510 FDA Food Safety Modernization Act of 2009

Saturday, April 10, 2010


Wednesday, April 28, 2010




I find it appauling that in 2010, the O.I.E. is still going by science on Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy that is decades old. New emerging strains of Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy have emerged, in different species, along with new science that shows these new strains of T.S.E. are more virulent than the c-B.S.E. MOST every Country that went by the O.I.E. B.S.E. guidelines, most all came down with B.S.E. THE O.I.E. has now shown they are nothing more than a National Trading Brokerage for all strains of animal T.S.E. AS i said before, O.I.E. should hang up there jock strap now, since it appears they will buckle every time a country makes some political hay about trade protocol, commodities and futures. IF they are not going to be science based, they should do everyone a favor and dissolve there organization. ...

still disgusted in Bacliff, Texas USA 77518

Sunday, April 4, 2010


Wednesday, February 24, 2010

Transmissible Spongiform encephalopathy (TSE) animal and human TSE in North America

Wednesday, May 5, 2010

Scientific Opinion on Analytical sensitivity of approved TSE rapid tests – new data for assessment of two rapid tests

Terry S. Singeltary Sr.
P.O. Box 42
Bacliff, Texas USA 77518

Scientific Opinion on Analytical sensitivity of approved TSE rapid tests – new data for assessment of two rapid tests

Scientific Opinion on Analytical sensitivity of approved TSE rapid tests – new data for assessment of two rapid tests Question number: EFSA-Q-2010-00114

Adopted: 22 April 2010

Summary (0.1 Mb)

Opinion (0.1 Mb)

Annex (2.5 Mb)


Following a request from the European Commission, the Panel on Biological Hazards (BIOHAZ) was asked to deliver a scientific opinion on analytical sensitivity of approved TSE rapid tests – new data for assessment of two rapid tests.

On 18 December 2009 EFSA published a Scientific Opinion on analytical sensitivity of approved TSE rapid tests. With regard to approved rapid tests for the detection of BSE in cattle, the Opinion concluded that, during a comparative analytical sensitivity study performed by the Community Reference Laboratory (CRL) for TSEs, the two rapid tests, Prionics®-Check LIA and Prionics®-Check PrioSTRIP, gave unexplained and unresolved specificity problems which hampered the interpretation of their analytical sensitivity. On this basis, the BIOHAZ Panel recommended that the analytical sensitivity of those two tests with cattle BSE samples should be re-assessed by appropriate experiments, under the supervision of the CRL. Following this recommendation, a new study (“re-assessment study”) was submitted for evaluation by the European Commission to EFSA. This Opinion provides a scientific assessment of the re-assessment study and provides conclusions on the analytical sensitivity of the two above rapid tests with regard to cattle BSE.

The BIOHAZ Panel concludes that the experimental design used in the new study is scientifically sound and can be considered equivalent to that applied during the first CRL study. The study was not hampered by specificity problems and allowed the re-assessment of the analytical sensitivity of Prionics®-Check LIA and Prionics®-Check PrioSTRIP with cattle BSE samples. The two tests performed within a maximal 2 log10 inferiority range as compared to the most sensitive test system identified in the first CRL study, as set out in the current EFSA protocols for the evaluation of TSE rapid post mortem tests.

The BIOHAZ Panel further concludes that the precise causes of the initial reactives in negative control samples observed in the first CRL study with the two rapid tests remain unidentified, since the re-assessment study was not designed for investigating them.

Published: 29 April 2010

Wednesday, December 23, 2009

Scientific Opinion on Analytical sensitivity of approved TSE rapid tests Scientific Opinion on Analytical sensitivity of approved TSE rapid tests Question number: EFSA-Q-2009-00687 Adopted: 10 December 2009 Summary (32 KB)

Opinion (417 KB)

Annex – Report of the CRL study (762 KB)

Thursday, October 18, 2007


Subject: Re: USDA VS CREEKSTONE BSE/BASE/TSE TESTING Civil Action No. 06-0544

From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."

Reply-To: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy

Date: Wed, 5 Sep 2007 09:00:11 -0500

Content-Type: text/plain

Parts/Attachments: text/plain (554 lines)


-------- Original Message --------

Subject: RE: Questions on your testing plans.
Date: Mon, 9 Apr 2007 13:01:30 -0500
From: Joe B. Meng To: CC: References:


As of our most recent conversations, it is still our intent to test every animal.

The testing would be uniform for all programs.

Our certification for all Creekstone brands (Premium, Natural and International) currently requires an "A" maturity animal. These are considered to be 30 months and younger as determined by detention. It has been our experience that this system errs on the side of caution as we have had numerous age-verified animals well under 30 months to be excluded based on detention. All countries to which we export, except Japan, require under 30 months and have approved the detention process.

We are asking that USDA and FSIS supervise all testing at our expense and any inconclusive would be sent to Ames, IA for confirmatory testing. Once they have a questionable sample, the same procedures will be followed that are currently approved. In the past, that has included announcing the inconclusive as well as the final result. As you know, the two native born cases were determined to be atypical, but I don't believe that was announced at the same time as the positive results were announced, so I'm not certain on USDA policy for announcing the strain.

We have had conversations with both BioRad and IDEXX, both of which are approved by USDA. Most of the equipment in the lab is from BioRad, but some of that would need to be replaced with updated equipment. I have met with representatives of both companies and they tell me we could have the new equipment in place and personnel training updated inside of two weeks. Both companies would keep people on site for the early stages of testing. The lab has already been approved so we could be ready fairly quickly unless USDA finds a way to complicate the process. Additionally, both BioRad and IDEXX have looked at the facility and tell us it is superior to the currently approved facilities.

Joe Bill


Friday, August 29, 2008



14th International Congress on Infectious Diseases H-type and L-type Atypical BSE January 2010 (special pre-congress edition)

18.173 page 189

Experimental Challenge of Cattle with H-type and L-type Atypical BSE

A. Buschmann1, U. Ziegler1, M. Keller1, R. Rogers2, B. Hills3, M.H. Groschup1. 1Friedrich-Loeffler-Institut, Greifswald-Insel Riems, Germany, 2Health Canada, Bureau of Microbial Hazards, Health Products & Food Branch, Ottawa, Canada, 3Health Canada, Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy Secretariat, Ottawa, Canada

Background: After the detection of two novel BSE forms designated H-type and L-type atypical BSE the question of the pathogenesis and the agent distribution of these two types in cattle was fully open. From initial studies of the brain pathology, it was already known that the anatomical distribution of L-type BSE differs from that of the classical type where the obex region in the brainstem always displays the highest PrPSc concentrations. In contrast in L-type BSE cases, the thalamus and frontal cortex regions showed the highest levels of the pathological prion protein, while the obex region was only weakly involved.

Methods:We performed intracranial inoculations of cattle (five and six per group) using 10%brainstemhomogenates of the two German H- and L-type atypical BSE isolates. The animals were inoculated under narcosis and then kept in a free-ranging stable under appropriate biosafety conditions.At least one animal per group was killed and sectioned in the preclinical stage and the remaining animals were kept until they developed clinical symptoms. The animals were examined for behavioural changes every four weeks throughout the experiment following a protocol that had been established during earlier BSE pathogenesis studies with classical BSE.

Results and Discussion: All animals of both groups developed clinical symptoms and had to be euthanized within 16 months. The clinical picture differed from that of classical BSE, as the earliest signs of illness were loss of body weight and depression. However, the animals later developed hind limb ataxia and hyperesthesia predominantly and the head. Analysis of brain samples from these animals confirmed the BSE infection and the atypical Western blot profile was maintained in all animals. Samples from these animals are now being examined in order to be able to describe the pathogenesis and agent distribution for these novel BSE types. Conclusions: A pilot study using a commercially avaialble BSE rapid test ELISA revealed an essential restriction of PrPSc to the central nervous system for both atypical BSE forms. A much more detailed analysis for PrPSc and infectivity is still ongoing.

14th ICID International Scientific Exchange Brochure -

Final Abstract Number: ISE.114

Session: International Scientific Exchange

Transmissible Spongiform encephalopathy (TSE) animal and human TSE in North America

update October 2009

T. Singeltary

Bacliff, TX, USA


An update on atypical BSE and other TSE in North America. Please remember, the typical U.K. c-BSE, the atypical l-BSE (BASE), and h-BSE have all been documented in North America, along with the typical scrapie's, and atypical Nor-98 Scrapie, and to date, 2 different strains of CWD, and also TME. All these TSE in different species have been rendered and fed to food producing animals for humans and animals in North America (TSE in cats and dogs ?), and that the trading of these TSEs via animals and products via the USA and Canada has been immense over the years, decades.


12 years independent research of available data


I propose that the current diagnostic criteria for human TSEs only enhances and helps the spreading of human TSE from the continued belief of the UKBSEnvCJD only theory in 2009. With all the science to date refuting it, to continue to validate this old myth, will only spread this TSE agent through a multitude of potential routes and sources i.e. consumption, medical i.e., surgical, blood, dental, endoscopy, optical, nutritional supplements, cosmetics etc.


I would like to submit a review of past CJD surveillance in the USA, and the urgent need to make all human TSE in the USA a reportable disease, in every state, of every age group, and to make this mandatory immediately without further delay. The ramifications of not doing so will only allow this agent to spread further in the medical, dental, surgical arena's. Restricting the reporting of CJD and or any human TSE is NOT scientific. Iatrogenic CJD knows NO age group, TSE knows no boundaries. I propose as with Aguzzi, Asante, Collinge, Caughey, Deslys, Dormont, Gibbs, Gajdusek, Ironside, Manuelidis, Marsh, et al and many more, that the world of TSE Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy is far from an exact science, but there is enough proven science to date that this myth should be put to rest once and for all, and that we move forward with a new classification for human and animal TSE that would properly identify the infected species, the source species, and then the route.

see page 114 ;

Sunday, April 4, 2010


position: Post Doctoral Fellow Atypical BSE in Cattle

Closing date: December 24, 2009

Anticipated start date: January/February 2010

Employer: Canadian and OIE Reference Laboratories for BSE CFIA Lethbridge Laboratory, Lethbridge/Alberta


To date the OIE/WAHO assumes that the human and animal health standards set out in the BSE chapter for classical BSE (C-Type) applies to all forms of BSE which include the H-type and L-type atypical forms. This assumption is scientifically not completely justified and accumulating evidence suggests that this may in fact not be the case. Molecular characterization and the spatial distribution pattern of histopathologic lesions and immunohistochemistry (IHC) signals are used to identify and characterize atypical BSE. Both the L-type and H-type atypical cases display significant differences in the conformation and spatial accumulation of the disease associated prion protein (PrPSc) in brains of afflicted cattle. Transmission studies in bovine transgenic and wild type mouse models support that the atypical BSE types might be unique strains because they have different incubation times and lesion profiles when compared to C-type BSE. When L-type BSE was inoculated into ovine transgenic mice and Syrian hamster the resulting molecular fingerprint had changed, either in the first or a subsequent passage, from L-type into C-type BSE. In addition, non-human primates are specifically susceptible for atypical BSE as demonstrated by an approximately 50% shortened incubation time for L-type BSE as compared to C-type. Considering the current scientific information available, it cannot be assumed that these different BSE types pose the same human health risks as C-type BSE or that these risks are mitigated by the same protective measures.


Wednesday, March 31, 2010

Atypical BSE in Cattle

Monday, October 19, 2009

Atypical BSE, BSE, and other human and animal TSE in North America Update October 19, 2009


I ask Professor Kong ;

Thursday, December 04, 2008 3:37 PM Subject: RE: re--Chronic Wating Disease (CWD) and Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathies (BSE): Public Health Risk Assessment

''IS the h-BSE more virulent than typical BSE as well, or the same as cBSE, or less virulent than cBSE? just curious.....''

Professor Kong reply ;


''As to the H-BSE, we do not have sufficient data to say one way or another, but we have found that H-BSE can infect humans. I hope we could publish these data once the study is complete.

Thanks for your interest.''

Best regards,

Qingzhong Kong, PhD Associate Professor Department of Pathology Case Western Reserve University Cleveland, OH 44106 USA


I look forward to further transmission studies, and a true ENHANCED BSE/atypical BSE surveillance program put forth testing all cattle for human and animal consumption for 5 years. a surveillance program that uses the most sensitive TSE testing, and has the personnel that knows how to use them, and can be trusted. I look forward to a stringent mad cow feed ban being put forth, and then strictly enforced. we need a forced, not voluntary feed ban, an enhanced feed ban at that, especially excluding blood. we need some sort of animal traceability. no more excuses about privacy. if somebody is putting out a product that is killing folks and or has the potential to kill you, then everybody needs to know who they are, and where that product came from. same with hospitals, i think medical incidents in all states should be recorded, and made public, when it comes to something like a potential accidental transmission exposure event. so if someone is out there looking at a place to go have surgery done, if you have several hospitals having these type 'accidental exposure events', than you can go some place else. it only makes sense. somewhere along the road, the consumer lost control, and just had to take whatever they were given, and then charged these astronomical prices. some where along the line the consumer just lost interest, especially on a long incubating disease such as mad cow disease i.e. Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy. like i said before, there is much more to the mad cow story than bovines and eating a hamburger, we must start focusing on all TSE in all species. ...TSS

Archive Number 20100405.1091 Published Date 05-APR-2010

Subject PRO/AH/EDR> Prion disease update 1010 (04)


[Terry S. Singeltary Sr. has added the following comment:

"According to the World Health Organisation, the future public health threat of vCJD in the UK and Europe and potentially the rest of the world is of concern and currently unquantifiable. However, the possibility of a significant and geographically diverse vCJD epidemic occurring over the next few decades cannot be dismissed


The key word here is diverse. What does diverse mean? If USA scrapie transmitted to USA bovine does not produce pathology as the UK c-BSE, then why would CJD from there look like UK vCJD?",F2400_P1001_PUB_MAIL_ID:1000,82101

Monday, March 29, 2010


> Up until about 6 years ago, the pt worked at Tyson foods where she worked

> on the assembly line, slaughtering cattle and preparing them for

> packaging. She was exposed to brain and spinal cord matter when she would

> euthanize the cattle.


2008 - 2010

The statistical incidence of CJD cases in the United States has been revised to reflect that there is one case per 9000 in adults age 55 and older. Eighty-five percent of the cases are sporadic, meaning there is no known cause at present.


5 Includes 41 cases in which the diagnosis is pending, and 17 inconclusive cases; 6 Includes 46 cases with type determination pending in which the diagnosis of vCJD has been excluded.

Saturday, January 2, 2010

Human Prion Diseases in the United States January 1, 2010 ***FINAL***

my comments to PLosone here ;

please see full text ;

Friday, February 05, 2010

New Variant Creutzfelt Jakob Disease case reports United States 2010 A Review

Wednesday, April 28, 2010