tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-45959565195326185382024-03-08T14:21:57.828-08:00BSE BASE MAD COW TESTING TEXAS, USA, AND CANADABovine Spongiform Encephalopathy BSE Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy TSE Prion PRPTerry S. Singeltary Sr.http://www.blogger.com/profile/06986622967539963260noreply@blogger.comBlogger66125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4595956519532618538.post-84452995498048735542015-06-23T14:05:00.003-07:002015-06-23T14:05:25.582-07:00Report on the monitoring and testing of ruminants for the presence of transmissible spongiform encephalopathies (TSEs) in the EU in 2013 Final version 18 May 2015<div>
Tuesday, June 23, 2015 </div>
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Report on the monitoring and testing of ruminants for the presence of
transmissible spongiform encephalopathies (TSEs) in the EU in 2013 Final version
18 May 2015<br />
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<a href="http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2015/06/report-on-monitoring-and-testing-of.html" title="http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2015/06/report-on-monitoring-and-testing-of.html">http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2015/06/report-on-monitoring-and-testing-of.html</a><br />
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kind regards, terry<br />
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Terry S. Singeltary Sr.http://www.blogger.com/profile/06986622967539963260noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4595956519532618538.post-57323048190412259122013-10-05T09:37:00.000-07:002013-10-05T09:37:19.927-07:00 Prospective Grant of Exclusive License: Use of Quaking-Induced Conversion (QUIC) for Detection of Prions<div>
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<b>From:</b> <a href="mailto:flounder9@verizon.net" title="flounder9@verizon.net">Terry S. Singeltary Sr.</a> </div>
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<b>Sent:</b> Saturday, October 05, 2013 11:33 AM</div>
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<b>To:</b> <a href="mailto:BSE-L@LISTS.AEGEE.ORG" title="BSE-L@LISTS.AEGEE.ORG">BSE-L BSE-L</a> </div>
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<b>Cc:</b> <a href="mailto:CJD-L@LISTS.AEGEE.ORG" title="CJD-L@LISTS.AEGEE.ORG">CJD-L</a> ; <a href="mailto:cjdvoice@yahoogroups.com" title="cjdvoice@yahoogroups.com">CJDVOICE
CJDVOICE</a> ; <a href="mailto:bloodcjd@yahoogroups.com" title="bloodcjd@yahoogroups.com">bloodcjd bloodcjd</a> </div>
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<b></b> </div>
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<b>Subject:</b> Prospective Grant of Exclusive License: Use of
Quaking-Induced Conversion (QUIC) for Detection of Prions</div>
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[Federal Register Volume 78, Number 192 (Thursday, October 3, 2013)]</div>
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[Notices]</div>
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[Page 61375]</div>
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From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office
[www.gpo.gov]</div>
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[FR Doc No: 2013-24141] </div>
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DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES</div>
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National Institutes of Health </div>
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Prospective Grant of Exclusive License: Use of Quaking-Induced Conversion
(QUIC) for Detection of Prions</div>
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AGENCY: National Institutes of Health, HHS.</div>
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ACTION: Notice.</div>
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SUMMARY: This is notice, in accordance with 35 U.S.C. 209 and 37 CFR part
404, that the National Institutes of Health (NIH), Department of Health and
Human Services, is contemplating the grant of an exclusive license to practice
the inventions embodied in U.S. provisional Application 60/961,364 filed July
20, 2007 [E-109-2007/0-US-01], PCT/ US2008/070656, filed July 21, 2008;
[E-109-2007/1-PCT-01], EPC application No 08796382.3 filed July 21, 2008
[E-109-2007/1-EP-03], US Application No. 12/177,012, filed July 21, 2008 and
issued as US patent 8,216,788 on July 10, 2012 [E-109-2007/1-US-02], and US
Application No. 13/489,321, filed June 5, 2012 [E-109-2007/1-US-04]; Each
entitled ``Detection of Infectious Prion Protein by Seeded Conversion of
Recombinant Prion Protein'' By Byron Caughey et al. to Prionics AG having a
place of business at Wagistrasse 27a CH-8952 Schlieren-Zurich, Switzerland. The
patent rights in this invention have been assigned to the United States of
America.</div>
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DATES: Only written comments and/or application for a license that are
received by the NIH Office of Technology Transfer on or before November 4, 2013
will be considered.</div>
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ADDRESSES: Requests for a copy of the patent application, inquiries,
comments and other materials relating to the contemplated license should be
directed to: Tedd Fenn, Office of Technology Transfer, National Institutes of
Health, 6011 Executive Boulevard, Suite 325, Rockville, MD 20852-3804; Email:
Tedd.Fenn@mail.nih.gov; Telephone: 301-435-5031; Facsimile: 301-402-0220.</div>
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SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: </div>
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The prospective worldwide exclusive license will be royalty bearing and
will comply with the terms and conditions of 35 U.S.C. 209 and 37 CFR part 404.
The prospective exclusive license may be granted unless, within thirty (30) days
from the date of this published Notice, NIH receives written evidence and
argument that establishes that the grant of the license would not be consistent
with the requirements of 35 U.S.C. 209 and 37 CFR part 404.</div>
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The invention relates to methods and compositions for the detection of
infectious proteins or prions and diagnosis of prion related diseases. Prion
diseases are neurodegenerative diseases of great public concern because humans
may be infected from hoofed animals used as food, food products such as milk, or
blood products. Currently available tests for disease-causing prions are either
incapable of detecting low concentrations of prions and must be used post-mortem
or are incapable of detecting low concentrations of prions economically or
accurately. This technology enables rapid and economical detection of sub-lethal
concentrations of prions by using recombinant, normal, prion protein (rPrP-sen)
as a marker or indicator of infectious prions in a sample. Specifically, prions
(contained in a sample) seed the polymerization of rPrP-sen, and polymerized
rPrP-sen is detected as an amplified indicator of prions in the sample. This
assay differs from the protein-misfolding cyclic amplification assay (PMCA)
because it enables the effective use of rPrP-sen and does not require multiple
amplification cycles unless a higher degree of sensitivity is required. It is
anticipated that this technology can be combined with additional prion-detection
technologies to further improve the sensitivity of the assay. In its current
embodiment, this assay has been used to detect prions in brain tissue or
cerebral spinal fluid (CSF) from humans (variant CJD), sheep (scrapie), and
hamsters (scrapie). The proposed field of exclusivity may be limited to
diagnostics requiring premarket approval by a U.S. or a foreign regulatory
agency.</div>
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Properly filed competing applications for a license filed in response to
this notice will be treated as objections to the contemplated license. Comments
and objections submitted in response to this notice will not be made available
for public inspection, and, to the extent permitted by law, will not be released
under the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. 552.</div>
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Dated: September 27, 2013.</div>
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Richard U. Rodriguez, Director, Division of Technology Development &
Transfer, Office of Technology Transfer, National Institutes of Health. [FR Doc.
2013-24141 Filed 10-2-13; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 4140-01-P </div>
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<a href="http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2013-10-03/html/2013-24141.htm">http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2013-10-03/html/2013-24141.htm</a>
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CREEKSTONE FARMS
PREMIUM BEEF, L.L.C., Plaintiff, v. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, et al.,
Defendants. ::::::::::: Civil Action No. 06-0544 (JR)</div>
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snip...</div>
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JAMES ROBERTSON United States District Judge</div>
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The government's additional argument, that private testing 14 somehow would
interfere with USDA's surveillance program, is unexplained and therefore
rejected. Of greater concern is the possibility that private testing 15 could
produce a false positive result, which might trigger unnecessary public alarm.
USDA has asserted this possibility as a reason to avoid private testing. Indeed,
the Bio-Rad kits that Creekstone proposes using are used throughout the world,
including as part of the USDA's own surveillance testing. - 18 - </div>
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<a href="https://ecf.dcd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/show_public_doc?2006cv0544-22">https://ecf.dcd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/show_public_doc?2006cv0544-22</a>
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Invited.16: Studies of chronic wasting disease transmission in
cervid and non-cervid species </div>
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Edward A, Hoover,1 Candace K. Mathiason,1 Davin M. Henderson,1
Nicholas J. Haley,1 Davis M. Seelig,1 Nathaniel D. Denkers,1 Amy V. Nalls,1 Mark
D. Zabe,1 Glenn C. Telling,1 Fernando Goni2 and Thomas Wisniewski,2 </div>
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1Prion Research Center; Colorado State University; Fort Collins, CO
USA; 2New York University School of Medicine; New York, NY USA </div>
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How and why some misfolded proteins become horizontally transmitted
agents and occasionally cross species barriers are issues fundamental to
understanding prion disease. Chronic wasting disease (CWD) of cervids is perhaps
a prototype of horizontal prion transmission, encompassing efficient mucosal
uptake, lymphoid amplification, neuroinvasion, peripheralization, and
dissemination via mucosal excretion. Efficient mucosal transmission of CWD in
deer has been demonstrated by oral, nasal, aerosol, and indirect contact
exposure. In addition, other studies (Mathiason CK, et al.) reported at the
symposium support a significant role for pre- and/or postnatal transmission of
CWD from doe to offspring. Accumulating, yet still incomplete, evidence also
suggests that the period of relatively covert CWD infection may be longer than
originally thought. Given the above, minimally invasive sensitive assays based
on body fluids from live animals would aid substantially in understanding the
biology of CWD. We have been applying seeded realtirne quaking-induced
amplification of recombinant PrP substrates (i.e., RT-QuIC methodology) to: (1)
investigate antemortem CWD detection, and (2) model PrP-based species barriers
and trans-species adaptation-topics we previously explored using sPMCA and in
vivo bioassays. At this symposium, we report sensitive and specific detection
CWD prions in saliva, urine, blood (Mathiason lab), and rectal and pharyngeal
lymph node samples (Haley NJ, et al.) from pre-symptomatic and symptomatic
experimentally and naturally exposed deer. Other ongoing studies are employing
RT-QuIC methodology to model amplification barriers among CWD, FSE, BSE, and CJD
prions using cervine, feline, bovine, human, and promiscuous rPrP substrates and
the above species prion seeds, cellular co-factors, and transgenic mice.
Finally, in collaboration with the Wisniewski laboratory, we are conducting of
experimental CWD vaccination studies in deer employing oral administration of an
attenuated Salmonella vector expressing cervid PrP epitopes. </div>
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AD.06: Detecting prions in the brain and blood of TSE-infected deer
and hamsters </div>
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Alan Elder,1 Davin Henderson,1 Anca Selariu,1 Amy Nalls,1 Byron
Caughey,2 Richard Bessen,1 Jason Bartz3 and Candace Mathiason1 </div>
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1Colorado State University; Fort Collins, CO USA; 2NIH Rocky
Mountain Laboratories; Hamilton, MT USA; 3Creighton University; Omaha, NE USA
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While large quantities of protease resistant prion protein (PrPres)
can be demonstrated by western blot or IHC in lymphoid biopsies or post-mortem
brain tissues harvested from prion-infected animals, these conventional assays
are less reliable as means to detect the small quantities of prions thought to
be present in bodily fluids or associated with early and asymptomatic phases of
TSE disease. The Real Time-Quaking Induced Conversion (RT-QuIC) assay is capable
of detecting prions at concentrations below the level of sensitivity of
conventional assays and provides a real-time fluorescent readout negating the
use of proteases. We have made modifications to the RT-QuIC assay to utilize it
for the detection of PrPres in brain and blood harvested from various species
infected with prions. In this study, we analyzed CWD-infected deer and
CWD/TME-infected hamster whole blood to determine the effect of: </div>
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(1) various anticoagulants, </div>
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(2) freezing and </div>
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(3) NaPTA precipitation. </div>
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Brain tissue and blood collected from naive deer and hamsters
served as negative controls. </div>
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We were able to demonstrate amplifiable prions in </div>
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(1) brain and blood samples harvested from CWD/TME-infected
animals, </div>
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(2) heparinized blood, </div>
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(3) frozen vs. fresh blood and </div>
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(4) NaPTA treated samples. </div>
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The RT-QuIC assay is able to detect PrPres in various species of
animals and shows promise as an antemortem diagnostic tool for blood-borne TSEs.
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Oral.08: Mother to offspring transmission of chronic wasting
disease in Reeve's Muntjac deer </div>
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Amy Nalls,1 Erin McNulty,1 Jenny Powers,2 Davis Seelig,1 Clare
Hoover,1 Nicholas Haley,1 Jeanette Hayes-Klug,1 Kelly Anderson,1 Paula Stewart,3
Wilfred Goldmann,3 Edward A. Hoover1 and Candace K. Mathiason1 </div>
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1Colorado State University; Fort Collins, CO USA; 2National Park
Service; Fort Collins, CO USA; 3The Roslin Institute and Royal School of
Veterinary Studies; Edinburgh, UK </div>
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To investigate the role mother to offspring transmission plays in
chronic wasting disease (CWD), we have developed a cervid model employing the
Reeve's muntjac deer (Muntiacus reevesi). Eight muntjac doe were orally
inoculated with CWD and tested PrPCWD lymphoid positive by 4 mo post infection.
Fourteen fawns were born to these eight CWD-infected doe-3 were born viable, 6
were born non-viable and 5 were harvested as fetuses from early or end-stage
CWD-infected doe. All three viable fawns have demonstrated CWD IHC lymphoid
biopsy positivity between 43 d post birth and 11 mo post birth. Two of these
three CWD positive viable offspring have developed clinical signs consistent
with TSE disease (28-33 mo post birth). Moreover, CWD prions have been detected
by sPMCA in 11 of 16 tissues harvested from 6 full-term non-viable fawns and in
7 of 11 fetal tissues harvested in utero from the second and third trimester
fetuses. Additional tissues and pregnancy related fluids from doe and offspring
are being analyzed for CWD prions. In summary, using the muntjac deer model we
have demonstrated CWD clinical disease in offspring born to CWD-infected doe,
and in utero transmission of CWD from mother to offspring. These studies provide
basis to further investigate the mechanisms of maternal transfer of prions.
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AD.63: Susceptibility of domestic cats to chronic wasting disease
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Amy V.Nalls,1 Candace Mathiason,1 Davis Seelig,2 Susan Kraft,1
Kevin Carnes,1 Kelly Anderson,1 Jeanette Hayes-Klug1 and Edward A. Hoover1
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1Colorado State University; Fort Collins, CO USA; 2University of
Minnesota; Saint Paul, MN USA </div>
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Domestic and nondomestic cats have been shown to be susceptible to
feline spongiform encephalopathy (FSE), almost certainly caused by consumption
of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE)-contaminated meat. Because domestic
and free-ranging nondomestic felids scavenge cervid carcasses, including those
in areas affected by chronic wasting disease (CWD), we evaluated the
susceptibility of the domestic cat (Felis catus) to CWD infection
experimentally. Cohorts of 5 cats each were inoculated either intracerebrally
(IC) or orally (PO) with CWD-infected deer brain. At 40 and 42 mo
post-inoculation, two IC-inoculated cats developed signs consistent with prion
disease, including a stilted gait, weight loss, anorexia, polydipsia, patterned
motor behaviors, head and tail tremors, and ataxia, and progressed to terminal
disease within 5 mo. Brains from these two cats were pooled and inoculated into
cohorts of cats by IC, PO, and intraperitoneal and subcutaneous (IP/SC) routes.
Upon subpassage, feline-adapted CWD (FelCWD) was transmitted to all
IC-inoculated cats with a decreased incubation period of 23 to 27 mo. FelCWD was
detected in the brains of all the symptomatic cats by western blotting and
immunohistochemistry and abnormalities were seen in magnetic resonance imaging,
including multifocal T2 fluid attenuated inversion recovery (FLAIR) signal
hyper-intensities, ventricular size increases, prominent sulci, and white matter
tract cavitation. Currently, 3 of 4 IP/SQ and 2 of 4 PO inoculared cats have
developed abnormal behavior patterns consistent with the early stage of feline
CWD. These results demonstrate that CWD can be transmitted and adapted to the
domestic cat, thus raising the issue of potential cervid-to- feline transmission
in nature. </div>
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<a href="http://www.prion2013.ca/tiny_uploads/forms/Scientific-Program.pdf">http://www.prion2013.ca/tiny_uploads/forms/Scientific-Program.pdf</a>
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<a href="http://www.landesbioscience.com/">www.landesbioscience.com</a></div>
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Sunday, August 25, 2013 </div>
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Prion2013 Chronic Wasting Disease CWD risk factors, humans, domestic cats,
blood, and mother to offspring transmission</div>
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<a href="http://chronic-wasting-disease.blogspot.com/2013/08/prion2013-chronic-wasting-disease-cwd.html" title="http://chronic-wasting-disease.blogspot.com/2013/08/prion2013-chronic-wasting-disease-cwd.html">http://chronic-wasting-disease.blogspot.com/2013/08/prion2013-chronic-wasting-disease-cwd.html</a></div>
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Thursday, June 07, 2012 </div>
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RT-QuIC analysis of cerebrospinal fluid in sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob
disease </div>
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<a href="http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2012/06/rt-quic-analysis-of-cerebrospinal-fluid.html" title="http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2012/06/rt-quic-analysis-of-cerebrospinal-fluid.html">http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2012/06/rt-quic-analysis-of-cerebrospinal-fluid.html</a></div>
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Friday, August 29, 2008</div>
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CREEKSTONE VS USDA COURT OF APPEALS, BUSH SAYS, NO WAY, NO HOW </div>
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<a href="http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2008/08/creekstone-vs-usda-court-of-appeals.html">http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2008/08/creekstone-vs-usda-court-of-appeals.html</a>
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<div class="date-posts" style="-ms-word-wrap: break-word;">
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<ol>
<li><a href="http://www.blogger.com/null" name="16"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman;">BSE TESTING CREEKSTONE VS
USDA</span></a>
<ul type="disc">
<li><a href="http://lists.ifas.ufl.edu/cgi-bin/wa.exe?A2=ind0611&L=sanet-mg&T=0&F=&S=&P=23270"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman;">BSE TESTING CREEKSTONE VS USDA</span></a><span style="font-family: Times New Roman;"> <i>(7872 lines)</i> <br /><b>From:</b> Terry S. Singeltary
Sr. <</span><a href="http://lists.ifas.ufl.edu/cgi-bin/wa.exe?LOGON=A1%3Dind0611%26L%3Dsanet-mg" target="_parent"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman;">[log in to unmask]</span></a><span style="font-family: Times New Roman;">><br /><b>Date:</b> Sat, 11 Nov 2006 10:23:42 –0600
</span>
<li><span style="font-family: Times New Roman;"></span></li>
</li>
</ul>
<li><a href="http://www.blogger.com/null" name="17"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman;">BSE TESTING CREEKSTONE VS USDA
DECLARATION OF PAUL W. BROWN, M.D.</span></a>
<ul type="disc">
<li><a href="http://lists.ifas.ufl.edu/cgi-bin/wa.exe?A2=ind0611&L=sanet-mg&T=0&F=&S=&P=23740"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman;">BSE TESTING CREEKSTONE VS USDA DECLARATION OF PAUL W.
BROWN, M.D.</span></a><span style="font-family: Times New Roman;"> <i>(7319 lines)</i>
<br /><b>From:</b> Terry S. Singeltary Sr. <</span><a href="http://lists.ifas.ufl.edu/cgi-bin/wa.exe?LOGON=A1%3Dind0611%26L%3Dsanet-mg" target="_parent"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman;">[log in to unmask]</span></a><span style="font-family: Times New Roman;">><br /><b>Date:</b> Sat, 11 Nov 2006 10:24:12 -0600
</span>
<li><a href="http://lists.ifas.ufl.edu/cgi-bin/wa.exe?A2=ind0611&L=sanet-mg&T=0&F=&S=&P=49465"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman;">Re: BSE TESTING CREEKSTONE VS USDA DECLARATION OF PAUL W.
BROWN, M.D.</span></a><span style="font-family: Times New Roman;"> <i>(7629 lines)</i>
<br /><b>From:</b> Terry S. Singeltary Sr. <</span><a href="http://lists.ifas.ufl.edu/cgi-bin/wa.exe?LOGON=A1%3Dind0611%26L%3Dsanet-mg" target="_parent"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman;">[log in to unmask]</span></a><span style="font-family: Times New Roman;">><br /><b>Date:</b> Mon, 20 Nov 2006 12:07:39 –0600
</span>
<li><span style="font-family: Times New Roman;"></span></li>
</li>
</li>
</ul>
<li><a href="http://www.blogger.com/null" name="18"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman;">BSE TESTING CREEKSTONE VS USDA WILD
OATS FILES FRIEND OF COURT BRIEFING</span></a>
<ul type="disc">
<li><a href="http://lists.ifas.ufl.edu/cgi-bin/wa.exe?A2=ind0611&L=sanet-mg&T=0&F=&S=&P=24441"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman;">BSE TESTING CREEKSTONE VS USDA WILD OATS FILES FRIEND OF
COURT BRIEFING</span></a><span style="font-family: Times New Roman;"> <i>(1295 lines)</i>
<br /><b>From:</b> Terry S. Singeltary Sr. <</span><a href="http://lists.ifas.ufl.edu/cgi-bin/wa.exe?LOGON=A1%3Dind0611%26L%3Dsanet-mg" target="_parent"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman;">[log in to unmask]</span></a><span style="font-family: Times New Roman;">><br /><b>Date:</b> Sat, 11 Nov 2006 10:25:13 -0600
</span></li>
</ul>
</li>
</li>
</li>
</ol>
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<a href="http://lists.ifas.ufl.edu/cgi-bin/wa.exe?A1=ind0611&L=sanet-mg" title="http://lists.ifas.ufl.edu/cgi-bin/wa.exe?A1=ind0611&L=sanet-mg">http://lists.ifas.ufl.edu/cgi-bin/wa.exe?A1=ind0611&L=sanet-mg</a></div>
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<div>
BSE BASE MAD COW TESTING TEXAS, USA, AND CANADA </div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
<a href="http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/">http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/</a>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; MRR </div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
<a href="http://docket-aphis-2006-0041.blogspot.com/2008/06/bovine-spongiform-encephalopathy.html">http://docket-aphis-2006-0041.blogspot.com/2008/06/bovine-spongiform-encephalopathy.html</a>
</div>
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</div>
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</div>
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</div>
<div>
Tuesday, September 24, 2013 </div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
NORDION (US), INC., AND BIOAXONE BIOSCIENCES, INC., Settles $90M Mad Cow
TSE prion Contamination Suit Cethrin(R) </div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
Case 0:12-cv-60739-RNS Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/26/2012 Page 1
of 15 </div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
<a href="http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2013/09/nordion-us-inc-and-bioaxone-biosciences.html" title="http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2013/09/nordion-us-inc-and-bioaxone-biosciences.html">http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2013/09/nordion-us-inc-and-bioaxone-biosciences.html</a></div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
Wednesday, September 25, 2013 </div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
Inspections, Compliance, Enforcement, and Criminal Investigations BSE TSE
PRION 2013 </div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
<a href="http://madcowusda.blogspot.com/2013/09/inspections-compliance-enforcement-and.html" title="http://madcowusda.blogspot.com/2013/09/inspections-compliance-enforcement-and.html">http://madcowusda.blogspot.com/2013/09/inspections-compliance-enforcement-and.html</a></div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
Monday, September 2, 2013 </div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
PRION2013 AD.22: Bovine spongiform encephalopathy, chronic wasting disease
and scrapie (TSE surveillance) programs in Alberta, Canada </div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
<a href="http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2013/09/prion2013-ad22-bovine-spongiform.html" title="http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2013/09/prion2013-ad22-bovine-spongiform.html">http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2013/09/prion2013-ad22-bovine-spongiform.html</a></div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
Tuesday, July 2, 2013 </div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
APHIS USDA Administrator Message to Stakeholders: Agency Vision and Goals
Eliminating ALL remaining BSE barriers to export market</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
<a href="http://madcowusda.blogspot.com/2013/07/aphis-usda-administrator-message-to.html">http://madcowusda.blogspot.com/2013/07/aphis-usda-administrator-message-to.html</a>
</div>
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</div>
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</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
Tuesday, May 21, 2013 </div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
Canada, USA, Bad feed, mad cows: Why we know three BSE cases had a common
origin and why the SSS policy is in full force $$$ </div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
<a href="http://madcowusda.blogspot.com/2013/05/canada-usa-bad-feed-mad-cows-why-we.html">http://madcowusda.blogspot.com/2013/05/canada-usa-bad-feed-mad-cows-why-we.html</a>
</div>
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</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
Monday, August 26, 2013 </div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
***The Presence of Disease-Associated Prion Protein in Skeletal Muscle of
Cattle Infected with Classical Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy </div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
<a href="http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2013/08/the-presence-of-disease-associated.html">http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2013/08/the-presence-of-disease-associated.html</a>
</div>
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</div>
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</div>
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</div>
<div>
Monday, September 02, 2013 </div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
Atypical BSE: role of the E211K prion polymorphism </div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
Research Project: TRANSMISSION, DIFFERENTIATION, AND PATHOBIOLOGY OF
TRANSMISSIBLE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHIES </div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
Location: Virus and Prion Research Unit </div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
<a href="http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2013/09/atypical-bse-role-of-e211k-prion.html">http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2013/09/atypical-bse-role-of-e211k-prion.html</a>
</div>
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</div>
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</div>
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</div>
<div>
Sunday, September 1, 2013 </div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
Evaluation of the Zoonotic Potential of Transmissible Mink Encephalopathy
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
We previously described the biochemical similarities between PrPres derived
from L-BSE infected macaque and cortical MM2 sporadic CJD: those observations
suggest a link between these two uncommon prion phenotypes in a primate model
(it is to note that such a link has not been observed in other models less
relevant from the human situation as hamsters or transgenic mice overexpressing
ovine PrP [28]). We speculate that a group of related animal prion strains
(L-BSE, c-BSE and TME) would have a zoonotic potential and lead to prion
diseases in humans with a type 2 PrPres molecular signature (and more
specifically type 2B for vCJD)</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
snip...</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
Together with previous experiments performed in ovinized and bovinized
transgenic mice and hamsters [8,9] indicating similarities between TME and
L-BSE, the data support the hypothesis that L-BSE could be the origin of the TME
outbreaks in North America and Europe during the mid-1900s. </div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
<a href="http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2013/09/evaluation-of-zoonotic-potential-of.html">http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2013/09/evaluation-of-zoonotic-potential-of.html</a>
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</div>
<div>
Sunday, August 11, 2013 </div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease CJD cases rising North America updated report
August 2013 </div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease CJD cases rising North America with Canada seeing
an extreme increase of 48% between 2008 and 2010 </div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
<a href="http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2013/08/creutzfeldt-jakob-disease-cjd-cases.html">http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2013/08/creutzfeldt-jakob-disease-cjd-cases.html</a>
</div>
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</div>
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</div>
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</div>
<div>
Friday, August 16, 2013 </div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (CJD) biannual update August 2013 U.K. and
Contaminated blood products induce a highly atypical prion disease devoid of
PrPres in primates </div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
<a href="http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2013/08/creutzfeldt-jakob-disease-cjd-biannual.html">http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2013/08/creutzfeldt-jakob-disease-cjd-biannual.html</a>
</div>
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</div>
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</div>
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</div>
<div>
Thursday, September 26, 2013 </div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
Minimise transmission risk of CJD and vCJD in healthcare settings Guidance
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
<a href="http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2013/09/minimise-transmission-risk-of-cjd-and.html">http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2013/09/minimise-transmission-risk-of-cjd-and.html</a>
</div>
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</div>
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</div>
<div>
TSS</div>
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</div>
Terry S. Singeltary Sr.http://www.blogger.com/profile/06986622967539963260noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4595956519532618538.post-28843866083515623562013-06-06T08:00:00.001-07:002013-06-06T08:00:06.343-07:00FSA MORE BSE MAD COW CONTROL BREACHES JUNE 2013<div>
FSA MORE BSE MAD COW CONTROL BREACHES JUNE 2013</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Last updated on 6 June 2013 . </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
The FSA has published an update of BSE control breaches </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
The Food Standards Agency has investigated three incidents in which meat
from cattle over 72 months of age has entered the food chain without the animals
being tested for BSE. . </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
All of the incidents predate changes to the BSE testing rules that came in
on 1 March 2013. Before then it was mandatory for all cattle slaughtered for
human consumption and aged over 72 months to have a negative BSE test result
before they entered the food supply. Since 1 March this has no longer been a
requirement.</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
The health risk from eating the meat associated with any of these incidents
is very low as it is extremely unlikely that any of the cattle involved had BSE.
In addition, the parts of the animals most likely to contain BSE, the specified
risk material, had been removed and destroyed.</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Under the BSE regulations, as a precaution, the animal slaughtered
immediately before the untested cattle and the two immediately after it are also
stopped from entering the food supply. ..</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
First incident </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
In the first incident, a cow aged 72 months and 3 days was slaughtered on
23 July 2012 at J A Jewitt (Meat) Ltd, a combined abattoir and cutting plant in
Co. Durham. The missed test was discovered in September during routine
cross-checks of slaughter and BSE testing data.</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
The carcass slaughtered immediately before the untested animal was rejected
for other reasons and was disposed of. The untested carcass and two associated
carcasses were dispatched as part of a consignment of 52 sides to a meat
processor. All the sides were then processed and mixed with other consignments
of beef and dispatched to eight different food businesses as both fresh and
frozen product. Much of the product was sold on and consumed. However, 21 cases
of frozen meat associated with the untested animal were traced, detained and
destroyed. ..</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Second incident </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
In the second incident, a cow aged 77 months and 18 days was slaughtered
on 11 September 2012 at Simply Halal (Banham), a combined abattoir and cutting
plant in Norfolk. The missed test was discovered in November during routine
cross-checks of slaughter and BSE testing data.</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Meat from the untested carcass and three associated carcasses was sold to
five separate food businesses. The local authorities for the food businesses
that received the meat confirmed that it had all had been sold, in chilled form,
and most likely consumed. ..</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Third incident </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
In the third incident, the animal, aged 72 months and 193 days, was
slaughtered on 29 November 2012, at Anglo Dutch Meats (Charing), a combined
abattoir and cutting plant in Kent. A batch of 70 animals was processed that
day. Of these, 41 required testing. Forty animals were tested and all found to
be negative. The one remaining untested carcass went into the food supply.</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
The missed test was discovered in January following routine cross-checks of
slaughter and BSE testing data. The untested carcass, together with the three
associated carcasses, was sold to Alec Jarrett Ltd, a combined slaughterhouse
and cutting plant in Bristol as part of a consignment of 108 sides. The meat was
then cut at Alec Jarrett alongside a second consignment from Anglo Dutch Meats.
Some of the cut meat was sold as chilled product to a number of businesses. The
remaining frozen meat was voluntarily detained at the cold store and
subsequently sent for disposal by Alec Jarrett Ltd. The breach was not the
responsibility of Alec Jarrett Ltd. ..</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Goats test positive for scrapie </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Two goats that tested positive for scrapie entered the food supply
following an error at the testing laboratory.</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Scrapie is a disease found in sheep and goats and is similar to BSE.
However, there is no known risk to humans from eating meat from scrapie infected
animals. In addition, the parts of the animal most likely to contain infectivity
were removed before entering the human food chain.</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
The two animals were slaughtered as part of a batch of 26 goats on 21
January 2013 at Melton Meat Ltd, a slaughterhouse in Leicestershire. This was
part of the Compulsory Scrapie Flocks Scheme, which allows undiagnosed animals
from flocks affected by scrapie to be monitored for the disease at
slaughter.</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
The slaughterhouse took the required samples from all the goats slaughtered
that day and received the test results from LGC Runcorn, an approved testing
laboratory, on 22 January. On 23 January, the results identified two positive
samples and those carcasses were destroyed. The remaining carcasses were
immediately released for sale. However, on 25 January LGC notified the FSA that
an error had occurred at the laboratory and the wrong carcasses were identified
as positive. The two positive carcasses were sold direct to two private
customers from Melton Meat Ltd’s on site shop. These were cash sales and it was
not possible to identify the customers and retrieve the meat.</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
LGC has carried out their its internal investigation regarding the reasons
for the error at its laboratory. Melton Meat Ltd was not responsible for the
positive animals entering the food chain. </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
<a href="http://www.food.gov.uk/news-updates/news/2013/jun/bsebreaches">http://www.food.gov.uk/news-updates/news/2013/jun/bsebreaches</a>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
EURO QUALITY RECALLS ITS LAMBS' BRAINS</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Euro Quality Lambs Ltd is recalling its lambs’ brains, which have entered
the food chain without being inspected properly. The Food Standards Agency is
asking all local authority enforcement officers to ensure that the product is
withdrawn from sale and destroyed. The Agency has issued a Food Alert for
Action.</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
<a href="http://www.food.gov.uk/news-updates/recalls-news/2012/oct/eurolamb">http://www.food.gov.uk/news-updates/recalls-news/2012/oct/eurolamb</a>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Tuesday, March 5, 2013 </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
FSA notified of BSE control breaches again and again 5 March 2013 </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
<a href="http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2013/03/fsa-notified-of-bse-control-breaches.html">http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2013/03/fsa-notified-of-bse-control-breaches.html</a>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Thursday, January 17, 2013 </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
FSA notified of two breaches of BSE testing regulations 14 January 2013
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
<a href="http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2013/01/fsa-notified-of-two-breaches-of-bse.html">http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2013/01/fsa-notified-of-two-breaches-of-bse.html</a>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
BREACHES OF BSE CONTROLS IN CONSIGNMENTS OF BEEF</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Due to an oversight, four breaches of BSE controls in British beef
identified last year were not publicised immediately on the Agency’s website in
the normal manner. </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
<a href="http://www.food.gov.uk/news-updates/news/2012/sep/bse">http://www.food.gov.uk/news-updates/news/2012/sep/bse</a>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
COW AGED OVER 72 MONTHS ENTERS FOOD SUPPLY WITHOUT BEING TESTED FOR BSE
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
The Agency has been notified that meat has entered the food supply from a
cow aged over 72 months that had not been tested for BSE. A negative BSE test
result is mandatory for cattle slaughtered for human consumption at over 72
months of age.</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
<a href="http://www.food.gov.uk/news/newsarchive/2012/mar/605602">http://www.food.gov.uk/news/newsarchive/2012/mar/605602</a>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
UNTESTED COW ENTERS THE FOOD SUPPLY</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
The Agency has been notified that meat from a cow that did not have the
required BSE test has entered the food supply. The 62 month old cow had been
slaughtered on farm for welfare reasons. </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
<a href="http://www.food.gov.uk/news/newsarchive/2012/mar/jarrettcow">http://www.food.gov.uk/news/newsarchive/2012/mar/jarrettcow</a>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Friday, November 30, 2012 </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
PROPOSED DECISION TO STOP BSE TESTING OF HEALTHY CATTLE SLAUGHTERED FOR
HUMAN CONSUMPTION FSA 12/12/04 Open Board – 11 December 2012</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
<a href="http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2012/11/proposed-decision-to-stop-bse-testing.html">http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2012/11/proposed-decision-to-stop-bse-testing.html</a>
</div>
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<div>
</div>
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<div>
</div>
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<div>
</div>
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<div>
</div>
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<div>
Thursday, September 6, 2012 </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
UK Breaches of BSE controls in consignments of beef 2011 communications
missing four reports </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
<a href="http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2012/09/uk-breaches-of-bse-controls-in.html">http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2012/09/uk-breaches-of-bse-controls-in.html</a>
</div>
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<div>
</div>
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<div>
</div>
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<div>
</div>
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<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Wednesday, December 21, 2011</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Potential mad cows that entered food supply without being tested for BSE
2011: UK END OF YEAR REVIEW </div>
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<a href="http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2011/12/potential-mad-cows-that-entered-food.html">http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2011/12/potential-mad-cows-that-entered-food.html</a>
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Monday, November 14, 2011 </div>
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Bullock aged over 72 months enters food supply without being tested for
BSE</div>
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<a href="http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2011/11/bullock-aged-over-72-months-enters-food.html">http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2011/11/bullock-aged-over-72-months-enters-food.html</a>
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Monday, June 3, 2013 </div>
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Unsuccessful oral transmission of scrapie from British sheep to
cattle</div>
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<a href="http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2013/06/unsuccessful-oral-transmission-of.html">http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2013/06/unsuccessful-oral-transmission-of.html</a>
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Sunday, June 2, 2013 </div>
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Characterisation of an Unusual TSE in a Goat by Transmission in Knock-in
Transgenic Mice </div>
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<a href="http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2013/06/characterisation-of-unusual-tse-in-goat.html">http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2013/06/characterisation-of-unusual-tse-in-goat.html</a>
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Thursday, May 30, 2013 </div>
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World Organization for Animal Health (OIE) has upgraded the United States'
risk classification for mad cow disease to "negligible" from "controlled", and
risk further exposing the globe to the TSE prion mad cow type disease U.S. gets
top mad-cow rating from international group and risk further exposing the globe
to the TSE prion mad cow type disease </div>
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<a href="http://madcowusda.blogspot.com/2013/05/world-organization-for-animal-health.html">http://madcowusda.blogspot.com/2013/05/world-organization-for-animal-health.html</a>
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<a href="http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2013/05/statement-from-agriculture-secretary.html">http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2013/05/statement-from-agriculture-secretary.html</a>
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Tuesday, May 21, 2013 </div>
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Canada, USA, Bad feed, mad cows: Why we know three BSE cases had a common
origin and why the SSS policy is in full force $$$ </div>
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<a href="http://madcowusda.blogspot.com/2013/05/canada-usa-bad-feed-mad-cows-why-we.html">http://madcowusda.blogspot.com/2013/05/canada-usa-bad-feed-mad-cows-why-we.html</a>
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Friday, May 10, 2013 </div>
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Evidence of effective scrapie transmission via colostrum and milk in
sheep</div>
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<a href="http://scrapie-usa.blogspot.com/2013/05/evidence-of-effective-scrapie.html">http://scrapie-usa.blogspot.com/2013/05/evidence-of-effective-scrapie.html</a>
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Tuesday, April 30, 2013 </div>
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Transmission of classical scrapie via goat milk </div>
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Veterinary Record2013;172:455 doi:10.1136/vr.f2613 </div>
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<a href="http://scrapie-usa.blogspot.com/2013/04/transmission-of-classical-scrapie-via.html">http://scrapie-usa.blogspot.com/2013/04/transmission-of-classical-scrapie-via.html</a>
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Monday, May 6, 2013 </div>
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Warning of mad cow disease threat to blood transfusions </div>
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<a href="http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2013/05/warning-of-mad-cow-disease-threat-to.html">http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2013/05/warning-of-mad-cow-disease-threat-to.html</a>
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Thursday, April 4, 2013</div>
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Variably protease-sensitive prionopathy in the UK: a retrospective review
1991–2008 </div>
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Brain (2013) 136 (4): 1102-1115. doi: 10.1093/brain/aws366 </div>
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<a href="http://prionopathy.blogspot.com/2013/04/variably-protease-sensitive-prionopathy.html">http://prionopathy.blogspot.com/2013/04/variably-protease-sensitive-prionopathy.html</a>
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*** The discovery of previously unrecognized prion diseases in both humans
and animals (i.e., Nor98 in small ruminants) demonstrates that the range of
prion diseases might be wider than expected and raises crucial questions about
the epidemiology and strain properties of these new forms. We are investigating
this latter issue by molecular and biological comparison of VPSPr, GSS and
Nor98. </div>
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VARIABLY PROTEASE-SENSITVE PRIONOPATHY IS TRANSMISSIBLE ...price of prion
poker goes up again $ </div>
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OR-10: Variably protease-sensitive prionopathy is transmissible in bank
voles </div>
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<div>
Romolo Nonno,1 Michele Di Bari,1 Laura Pirisinu,1 Claudia D’Agostino,1
Stefano Marcon,1 Geraldina Riccardi,1 Gabriele Vaccari,1 Piero Parchi,2 Wenquan
Zou,3 Pierluigi Gambetti,3 Umberto Agrimi1 1Istituto Superiore di Sanità; Rome,
Italy; 2Dipartimento di Scienze Neurologiche, Università di Bologna; Bologna,
Italy; 3Case Western Reserve University; Cleveland, OH USA </div>
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Background. Variably protease-sensitive prionopathy (VPSPr) is a recently
described “sporadic”neurodegenerative disease involving prion protein
aggregation, which has clinical similarities with non-Alzheimer dementias, such
as fronto-temporal dementia. Currently, 30 cases of VPSPr have been reported in
Europe and USA, of which 19 cases were homozygous for valine at codon 129 of the
prion protein (VV), 8 were MV and 3 were MM. A distinctive feature of VPSPr is
the electrophoretic pattern of PrPSc after digestion with proteinase K (PK).
After PK-treatment, PrP from VPSPr forms a ladder-like electrophoretic pattern
similar to that described in GSS cases. The clinical and pathological features
of VPSPr raised the question of the correct classification of VPSPr among prion
diseases or other forms of neurodegenerative disorders. Here we report
preliminary data on the transmissibility and pathological features of VPSPr
cases in bank voles. </div>
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Materials and Methods. Seven VPSPr cases were inoculated in two genetic
lines of bank voles, carrying either methionine or isoleucine at codon 109 of
the prion protein (named BvM109 and BvI109, respectively). Among the VPSPr cases
selected, 2 were VV at PrP codon 129, 3 were MV and 2 were MM. Clinical
diagnosis in voles was confirmed by brain pathological assessment and western
blot for PK-resistant PrPSc (PrPres) with mAbs SAF32, SAF84, 12B2 and 9A2.
</div>
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Results. To date, 2 VPSPr cases (1 MV and 1 MM) gave positive transmission
in BvM109. Overall, 3 voles were positive with survival time between 290 and 588
d post inoculation (d.p.i.). All positive voles accumulated PrPres in the form
of the typical PrP27–30, which was indistinguishable to that previously observed
in BvM109 inoculated with sCJDMM1 cases. </div>
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In BvI109, 3 VPSPr cases (2 VV and 1 MM) showed positive transmission until
now. Overall, 5 voles were positive with survival time between 281 and 596
d.p.i.. In contrast to what observed in BvM109, all BvI109 showed a GSS-like
PrPSc electrophoretic pattern, characterized by low molecular weight PrPres.
These PrPres fragments were positive with mAb 9A2 and 12B2, while being negative
with SAF32 and SAF84, suggesting that they are cleaved at both the C-terminus
and the N-terminus. Second passages are in progress from these first successful
transmissions. </div>
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Conclusions. Preliminary results from transmission studies in bank voles
strongly support the notion that VPSPr is a transmissible prion disease.
Interestingly, VPSPr undergoes divergent evolution in the two genetic lines of
voles, with sCJD-like features in BvM109 and GSS-like properties in BvI109.
</div>
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</div>
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<div>
The discovery of previously unrecognized prion diseases in both humans and
animals (i.e., Nor98 in small ruminants) demonstrates that the range of prion
diseases might be wider than expected and raises crucial questions about the
epidemiology and strain properties of these new forms. We are investigating this
latter issue by molecular and biological comparison of VPSPr, GSS and Nor98.
</div>
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<a href="http://www.landesbioscience.com/journals/prion/01-Prion6-2-OralPresentations.pdf?nocache=1216084967">http://www.landesbioscience.com/journals/prion/01-Prion6-2-OralPresentations.pdf?nocache=1216084967</a>
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Wednesday, March 28, 2012 </div>
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VARIABLY PROTEASE-SENSITVE PRIONOPATHY IS TRANSMISSIBLE, price of prion
poker goes up again $ </div>
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</div>
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<a href="http://prionopathy.blogspot.com/2012/03/variably-protease-sensitve-prionopathy.html">http://prionopathy.blogspot.com/2012/03/variably-protease-sensitve-prionopathy.html</a>
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Sunday, March 31, 2013 </div>
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Creutzfeldt Jakob Disease CJD worlds youngest documented victim, 11 years
old, shall we pray </div>
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<a href="http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2013/03/creutzfeldt-jakob-disease-cjd-worlds.html">http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2013/03/creutzfeldt-jakob-disease-cjd-worlds.html</a>
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Volume 33, Issue 3, Article first published online: 20 JAN 2013</div>
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Special Lecture</div>
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Human prion diseases: Molecular, cellular and population biology</div>
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Mark W. Head</div>
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National CJD Research & Surveillance Unit, Centre for Clinical Brain
Sciences, School of Clinical Sciences,</div>
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The University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, UK </div>
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snip... </div>
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Potential future zoonoses </div>
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<div>
Scrapie is endemic in many countries around the world, yet there is no
evidence to suggest that it is pathogenic for humans. The intense investigations
of ruminant TSEs that followed the BSE epidemic have resulted in the
identification of several distinct animal prion diseases, atypical or Nor98
scrapie in sheep and H-type and L-type BSE in cattle.32 Moreover, BSE is
experimentally transmissible to sheep and there are concerns that if BSE were to
have infected the national flock in the UK its presence might be masked by
endemic scrapie, but it might retain its pathogenicity for humans.33,34 Another
concern, particularly for the North American countries, is the spread of chronic
wasting disease in farmed and free-ranging deer and elk.35 There is no known
epidemiological link between any of these animal prion diseases and human
disease, but there are active efforts to try to quantify strain-related species
barriers between the diseases known to be a risk (BSE/ vCJD), those thought not
to represent a risk (scrapie) and those for which data is lacking (atypical
scrapie, H- and L-type BSE and BSE in sheep).36 In assessing whether or not
human prion diseases might have an animal origin, it is important to have a
proper understanding of the clinicopathological heterogeneity of the sporadic
human prion diseases, because it is against this backdrop that any new acquired
forms of the disease will be seen and from which it will need to be
distinguished. </div>
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Sporadic CJD and variably protease-sensitive prionopathy </div>
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</div>
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<div>
Sporadic CJD is the most commonly occurring human prion disease; it occurs
world-wide and it has long been known to be clinically and pathologically
heterogeneous. The molecular basis for this heterogeneity is currently thought
to reside in a combination of the PRNP codon 129 polymorphic status of the
patient (MM, MV, or VV) and the type (type 1 or type 2) of the
protease-resistant component of PrPSc determined by protease K digestion and
Western blotting (termed PrPres).37,38 The original sCJD sub-classification
system of Parchi et al. that recognized six sCJD subtypes (MM1/MV1, MM2c, MM2t,
MV2,VV2 and VV1) has had to be modified to accommodate the growing number of
cases recognized to contain both type 1 and type 2 PrPres in different or
sometimes the same regions of the brain.39,40 Moreover, intensive surveillance
and investigation of forms of human prion disease that lack PRNP mutation and
known risk factors has identified another sporadic human prion disease, termed
protease-sensitive prionopathy (VPSPr).41While intensively investigated, the
etiology and diversity of the sporadic human prion diseases remain poorly
understood. </div>
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snip... </div>
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There is also a potentially important practical corollary to the idea of
prion-like spread, which may affect future stem cell therapies for
neurodegenerative diseases. Presumably therapeutic stem cell-derived neurons
would be equally susceptible to “infection” (with misfolded protein aggregates)
as the patient’s own cells, unless steps were taken to prevent this,55 the most
obvious of which would be to prevent expression of the gene product that can be
converted to a pathological prion-like isoform.The suggestion that a prion-like
mechanism of spread of molecular pathology underlies diseases as diverse as
Alzheimer’s disease and Parkinson’s disease has led some researchers to explore
whether the molecular pathology of these diseases is transmissible in an
experimental setting56–58 and to suggest that perhaps some cases of these more
common neurodegenerative illnesses might, like CJD, be acquired.58,59 </div>
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snip... </div>
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<div>
MOLECULAR BASIS OF HUMAN PRION DISEASES Molecular strain typing Molecular
strain typing in the form of classifying the mobility and glycoform ratio of
protease-resistant prion protein byWestern blotting is a remarkably useful
adjunct to neuropathological assessment during the post-mortem diagnosis of
human prion diseases (Fig. 1). The glycoform ratio difference between vCJD and
all forms of sCJD is a remarkably robust phenomenon, although the mechanism
underlying it remains obscure. All cases of vCJD examined show type 2B PrPres,
irrespective of brain region assayed and the PrPres type is also found in
lymphoreticular tissues, albeit with presumably tissue-specific minor
modification of mobility and an accentuation of the glycoform ratio. Similarly
sCJD cases are characterized by a narrow range of glycoform ratios, distinct
from vCJD, and the presence of either type 1 or type 2 PrPres (type 1A and type
2A).The PrPres types found in the brain in iCJD and kuru resemble those found in
sCJD (type 1A and type 2A), from which they were presumably derived. Individual
cases of gCJD, GSS and FFI usually have type 1 or type 2 PrPres, but with a
glycoform ratio in which the non-glycosylated component is under-represented
(which we have termed A/B). However, this is not always true and a broad
spectrum of glycoform ratios can be found in genetic prion diseases. Moreover,
some cases of GSS are characterized by an approximately 8 kDa (N- and
C-terminally truncated) PrPres fragment, and some cases of FFI have little
detectable PrPres at all. Despite the diagnostic utility, a simple one-to-one
correspondence between PrPres type and disease phenotype (and by implication to
agent strain) seems unlikely in principle and is complicated by the facts.
First, the choice of analyzing only that fraction of PrPSc which survives a
particular concentration of protease may seem arbitrary. Second, the
interpretation of a molecular population variable, such as glycosylation site
occupancy, as conforming to two or three discrete types, could be seen as
simplistic. Lastly, protease digestion may be considered to be a somewhat blunt
instrument to distinguish secondary and higherorder conformational differences
in PrPSc. Even when genotype (mutations and polymorphisms) is taken into
account, three major types (1, 2, 8 kDa) and three wild-type genotypes (MM,MV
and VV) provide insufficient molecular variation to account for all the
phenotypic variations observed. For example, two forms of sCJD share methione
homozygosity and type 2A PrPres but one form closely resembles FFI (without the
causative mutation) and the other is CJD-like.8 Two more substantial problems,
which may point toward a more subtle and perhaps informative approach to PrPSc
analysis, are discussed below. The co-occurrence of PrPres types 1 and 2 Once
controversial, the idea that PrPSc in individual cases might be composed of
mixtures (or different types co-occurring) is now well recognized and
accepted.40,70 There are probably two phenomena at play here. One is the finding
of different predominant types in individual samples from different parts of the
brain or more rarely approximately equal amounts of type 1A and type 2A in the
same sCJD brain samples.The other is the observation made using antibodies that
specifically recognize type 1 or type 2 PrPres, that a minority type always
accompanies a majority type in sCJD and vCJD, albeit at sub-detectable levels
when conventional antibodies are used.71–75 The former issue is more tractable
and a consensus is beginning to emerge that when multiple brain sampling and
sensitive co-detection is performed on cohorts of sCJD cases, a plateau is
reached at between 30–40% of cases showing co-occurrence. Our own data examining
four regions (temporal cortex, parietal cortex, occipital cortex and thalamus)
instead of frontal cortex only, shows a rise in detected co-occurrence from 3%
to 24% of cases.76 Interestingly, only very rarely did this re-analysis involve
a change in the predominant type found in the brain overall. Parchi et al. have
offered a revised version of their 1999 sporadic CJD classification system that
adds mixed type to the original “pure” types and have shown that the most common
of these 12 sCJD subtypes can be recognized on histological grounds, without
reference to biochemical analysis.39,40,77 It will be interesting to see in the
fullness of time whether this additional complexity reflects a more refined
series of discrete clinicopathological phenotypes or whether it is indicative of
a spectrum of phenotypes depending on the spacio-temporal accumulation of PrPSc
types set against the patient genotype.78 </div>
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<div>
</div>
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<div>
Variably protease-sensitive prionopathy The phenotypic complexity of the
sporadic forms of human prion disease has increased with the report of a new
sporadic human prion disease, termed variably proteasesensitive prionopathy
(VPSPr) that is distinct from previously recognized sub-types of sCJD.41,79
There are no mutations in the open reading frame of PRNP. The patients have no
known risk factors for the disease, but the disease is most common in theVV
genotype, as opposed to sCJD, which is most common in the MM genotype. The
neuropathology involves medium-sized vacuolation and characteristic
microplaques. Durations of illness can be very long and this coupled with
symptoms that do not conform well to CJD have prompted speculation that the
condition may be under-ascertained. The most interesting aspect of the disease
from a biochemical perspective is that although PrPSc is abundantly present in
the brain, PrPres is difficult to detect because of its sensitivity to
proteolysis and because what remains after proteinase K (PK) digestion is both
C- and N-terminally cleaved by PK digestion and seen as a faint 8 kDa band on
Western blots (Fig. 2). The degree of protease resistance is reported to reflect
the codon 129 genotype, withVV being least resistant andMM being most resistant,
despite having the same 8 kDa PrPres fragment predominating.79We have identified
two cases of VPSPr prospectively in the UK80,81 and recently completed a
retrospective review for such cases confirming many of the original observations
by Gambetti and colleagues.41,79 Our work has shown that some areas of the VPSPr
brain contain PrPres similar in appearance to that found in sCJD and conversely
that some cases of sCJD have a very minor PrPres band similar to the 8 kDa
PrPres band that typifies VPSPr.82 </div>
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snip...</div>
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<div>
The biochemical basis of the strain phenomenon The results of transmission
of individual samples from single examples of the six different Parchi et al.39
sCJD subtypes (MM1/MV1, VV1, MM2c, MV2, VV2) into humanized transgenic mice
suggest the existence of four distinct sCJD agents, termed M1, M2, V1 and V2,
and a fifth strain corresponding to MM2t or sporadic fatal insomnia.99,100
Interestingly, when we performed formally analogous experiments in the cell-free
PMCA reaction, similar results were obtained: The PrPres type of the seed was
conserved in the PMCA product and the efficiency of conversion appeared to be
determined by compatibility at codon 129 of PRNP.101 The behavior of the seeds
from heterozygous patients were particularly interesting, in that MV1 sCJD seeds
selectively amplified in MM substrate producing type 1 PrPres and MV2 sCJD seeds
selectively amplified in VV substrate producing type 2 PrPres (Fig. 6). These
results reinforce the association between methionine at codon 129 and the
production of type 1 PrPres and valine at codon 129 and the production of type 2
PrPres. </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
EMERGING RISKS Zoonotic disease BSE is the only animal prion strain with
demonstrated pathogenicity for humans.While it is tempting to suggest that
scrapie might represent the animal reservoir that results in some cases of sCJD,
there is no epidemiological evidence to support this hypothesis. The
pathogenicity of new or newly described animal prion diseases for humans is
unclear and this is particularly true for H- and L-type BSE, atypical scrapie
and for chronic wasting disease (CWD), all of which are probably consumed. Human
susceptibility has been modeled by attempted transmission to (humanized)
transgenic mice with sometimes conflicting results, depending on the transgenic
model used and depending upon whether central or peripheral tissues are
examined.102–106 We have attempted to establish whether PMCA can model the
molecular component of these hypothetical cross-species transmission events.107
The existing data correspond well with the established facts. First, PrPSc in
vCJD brain samples amplifies most efficiently in humanized mouse MM substrate,
less efficiently in MV substrate and not at all in VV. Cattle BSE PrPres is less
efficient than vCJD, but shows the same substrate genotypic preference. Sheep
scrapie fails to amplify detectably in any of the three substrates; however,
sheep BSE PrPres does amplify, again with a codon 129 preference for methionine
(Fig. 7). We are currently extending this approach to encompass atypical
scrapie, H- and L-type BSE and CWD using human rather than humanized PMCA
substrates. </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Secondary infection </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
In the same way that animal reservoirs cannot be completely excluded as
causes of individual sCJD cases, neither can other environmental sources, such
as medical procedures. The known routes of iatrogenic CJD acquisition are
historically growth hormone therapy, dura mater grafting, corneal grafting and
certain highly specialized neurosurgical procedures. The secondary transmission
of vCJD by blood transfusion and experimental evidence showing the efficiency of
the transfusion of viable blood cells between scrapie and BSE-infected and naive
sheep have prompted a reappraisal of transfusion-transmitted CJD, including
consideration being given to the possibility of prion blood testing or
filtration.25,26,108,109</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Blood transfusion is the original and most extensively used cellular
therapy, but we may be on the threshold of a new era of cellular therapies based
on embryonic stem cell and induced pluripotent stem cell technologies. Although
the potential for stem cell therapy-mediated prion transmission might be judged
remote, this was also considered to be the case for transfusion transmission of
CJD before 2004. </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
snip... </div>
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</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
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<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
SUMMARY AND PERSPECTIVE </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
While the prospect of a major epidemic of vCJD in the UK and elsewhere
seems to be receding, there remain a series of uncertainties surrounding the
eventual numbers of individuals that will suffer from this devastating
condition.The issues include the effects of genotype on susceptibility and the
possible existence of substantial numbers of asymptomatic infected individuals
that may pose risks of onward transmission. sCJD remains the most frequently
occurring human prion disease and arguably the least well understood. Other
idiopathic forms of human prion disease (such as VPSPr), characterized by
protease-sensitive forms of the prion protein, also exist and their true
prevalence may be hard to ascertain. The possible risks from newly described
animal prion diseases and from emerging cellular therapies are currently poorly
quantified. On a more theoretic level the prion hypothesis has provided a
unifying conceptual framework for TSE research and provided a paradigm to
interrogate the similarities and differences between the diverse
neurodegenerative conditions involving prion-like mechanisms of molecular
pathology. </div>
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<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
<a href="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/neup.12016/pdf">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/neup.12016/pdf</a>
</div>
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</div>
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<div>
SNIP...see more here ; </div>
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</div>
<br />
<div>
Tuesday, June 4, 2013 </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
INTERPRETING RESULTS OF FSIS VERIFICATION SAMPLING OF DOMESTIC BEEF PRODUCT
DERIVED FROM ADVANCED MEAT RECOVERY SYSTEMS (AMR01/FAMR01) FSIS Notice
38-12</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
<a href="http://madcowusda.blogspot.com/2013/06/interpreting-results-of-fsis.html">http://madcowusda.blogspot.com/2013/06/interpreting-results-of-fsis.html</a>
</div>
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</div>
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<div>
Thursday, February 21, 2013 </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
National Prion Disease Pathology Surveillance Center Cases Examined January
16, 2013 </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
<a href="http://prionunitusaupdate2008.blogspot.com/2013/02/national-prion-disease-pathology.html">http://prionunitusaupdate2008.blogspot.com/2013/02/national-prion-disease-pathology.html</a>
</div>
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</div>
<br />
<div>
16 YEAR OLD SPORADIC FFI ? </div>
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</div>
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<div>
Monday, January 14, 2013 </div>
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<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Gambetti et al USA Prion Unit change another highly suspect USA mad cow
victim to another fake name i.e. sporadic FFI at age 16 CJD Foundation goes
along with this BSe </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
<a href="http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2013/01/gambetti-et-al-usa-prion-unit-change.html">http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2013/01/gambetti-et-al-usa-prion-unit-change.html</a>
</div>
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</div>
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<div>
Monday, December 31, 2012 </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Creutzfeldt Jakob Disease and Human TSE Prion Disease in Washington State,
2006–2011-2012 </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
<a href="http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2012/12/creutzfeldt-jakob-disease-and-human-tse.html">http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2012/12/creutzfeldt-jakob-disease-and-human-tse.html</a>
</div>
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</div>
<br />
<div>
Tuesday, December 25, 2012 </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
CREUTZFELDT JAKOB TSE PRION DISEASE HUMANS END OF YEAR REVIEW DECEMBER 25,
2012 </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
<a href="http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2012/12/creutzfeldt-jakob-tse-prion-disease.html">http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2012/12/creutzfeldt-jakob-tse-prion-disease.html</a>
</div>
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</div>
<br />
<div>
Tuesday, June 26, 2012 </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Creutzfeldt Jakob Disease Human TSE report update North America, Canada,
Mexico, and USDA PRION UNIT as of May 18, 2012 </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
type determination pending Creutzfeldt Jakob Disease (tdpCJD), is on the
rise in Canada and the USA </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
<a href="http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2012/06/creutzfeldt-jakob-disease-human-tse.html">http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2012/06/creutzfeldt-jakob-disease-human-tse.html</a>
</div>
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</div>
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<div>
Wednesday, June 13, 2012 </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
MEXICO IS UNDER or MIS DIAGNOSING CREUTZFELDT JAKOB DISEASE AND OTHER PRION
DISEASE SOME WITH POSSIBLE nvCJD </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
<a href="http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2012/06/mexico-is-under-or-mis-diagnosing.html">http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2012/06/mexico-is-under-or-mis-diagnosing.html</a>
</div>
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<div>
</div>
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</div>
<br />
<div>
Monday, October 10, 2011 </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
EFSA Journal 2011 The European Response to BSE: A Success Story </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
snip... </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
EFSA and the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC)
recently delivered a scientific opinion on any possible epidemiological or
molecular association between TSEs in animals and humans (EFSA Panel on
Biological Hazards (BIOHAZ) and ECDC, 2011). This opinion confirmed Classical
BSE prions as the only TSE agents demonstrated to be zoonotic so far but the
possibility that a small proportion of human cases so far classified as
"sporadic" CJD are of zoonotic origin could not be excluded. Moreover,
transmission experiments to non-human primates suggest that some TSE agents in
addition to Classical BSE prions in cattle (namely L-type Atypical BSE,
Classical BSE in sheep, transmissible mink encephalopathy (TME) and chronic
wasting disease (CWD) agents) might have zoonotic potential. </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
snip... </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
<a href="http://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/efsajournal/pub/e991.htm?emt=1">http://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/efsajournal/pub/e991.htm?emt=1</a>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
<a href="http://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/efsajournal/doc/e991.pdf">http://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/efsajournal/doc/e991.pdf</a>
</div>
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<div>
</div>
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<div>
</div>
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<div>
</div>
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<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Tuesday, May 28, 2013 </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Late-in-life surgery associated with Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease: a
methodological outline for evidence-based guidance </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
<a href="http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2013/05/late-in-life-surgery-associated-with.html">http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2013/05/late-in-life-surgery-associated-with.html</a>
</div>
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<div>
</div>
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<div>
</div>
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<div>
</div>
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<div>
</div>
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<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Thursday, August 12, 2010</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Seven main threats for the future linked to prions</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
First threat</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
The TSE road map defining the evolution of European policy for protection
against prion diseases is based on a certain numbers of hypotheses some of which
may turn out to be erroneous. In particular, a form of BSE (called atypical
Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy), recently identified by systematic testing in
aged cattle without clinical signs, may be the origin of classical BSE and thus
potentially constitute a reservoir, which may be impossible to eradicate if a
sporadic origin is confirmed.</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
***Also, a link is suspected between atypical BSE and some apparently
sporadic cases of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease in humans. These atypical BSE cases
constitute an unforeseen first threat that could sharply modify the European
approach to prion diseases.</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Second threat</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
snip... </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
<a href="http://www.neuroprion.org/en/np-neuroprion.html">http://www.neuroprion.org/en/np-neuroprion.html</a>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
<a href="http://prionpathy.blogspot.com/2010/08/seven-main-threats-for-future-linked-to.html">http://prionpathy.blogspot.com/2010/08/seven-main-threats-for-future-linked-to.html</a>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
<a href="http://prionpathy.blogspot.com/">http://prionpathy.blogspot.com/</a>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport References Committee</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
The possible impacts and consequences for public health, trade and
agriculture of the Government's decision to relax import restrictions on beef
Final report June 2010</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
2.65 At its hearing on 14 May 2010, the committee heard evidence from Dr
Alan Fahey who has recently submitted a thesis on the clinical neuropsychiatric,
epidemiological and diagnostic features of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease.48 Dr Fahey
told the committee of his concerns regarding the lengthy incubation period for
transmissible spongiform encephalopathies, the inadequacy of current tests and
the limited nature of our current understanding of this group of
diseases.49</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
2.66 Dr Fahey also told the committee that in the last two years a link has
been established between forms of atypical CJD and atypical BSE. Dr Fahey said
that: They now believe that those atypical BSEs overseas are in fact causing
sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease. They were not sure if it was due to mad
sheep disease or a different form. If you look in the textbooks it looks like
this is just arising by itself. But in my research I have a summary of a
document which states that there has never been any proof that sporadic
Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease has arisen de novo-has arisen of itself. There is no
proof of that. The recent research is that in fact it is due to atypical forms
of mad cow disease which have been found across Europe, have been found in
America and have been found in Asia. These atypical forms of mad cow disease
typically have even longer incubation periods than the classical mad cow
disease.50 </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
<a href="http://www.aph.gov.au/senate/committee/rrat_ctte/mad_cows/report/report.pdf">http://www.aph.gov.au/senate/committee/rrat_ctte/mad_cows/report/report.pdf</a>
</div>
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<div>
</div>
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<div>
</div>
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<div>
</div>
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<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Wednesday, March 31, 2010</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Atypical BSE in Cattle</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
To date the OIE/WAHO assumes that the human and animal health standards set
out in the BSE chapter for classical BSE (C-Type) applies to all forms of BSE
which include the H-type and L-type atypical forms. This assumption is
scientifically not completely justified and accumulating evidence suggests that
this may in fact not be the case. Molecular characterization and the spatial
distribution pattern of histopathologic lesions and immunohistochemistry (IHC)
signals are used to identify and characterize atypical BSE. Both the L-type and
H-type atypical cases display significant differences in the conformation and
spatial accumulation of the disease associated prion protein (PrPSc) in brains
of afflicted cattle. Transmission studies in bovine transgenic and wild type
mouse models support that the atypical BSE types might be unique strains because
they have different incubation times and lesion profiles when compared to C-type
BSE.</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
When L-type BSE was inoculated into ovine transgenic mice and Syrian
hamster the resulting molecular fingerprint had changed, either in the first or
a subsequent passage, from L-type into C-type BSE. In addition, non-human
primates are specifically susceptible for atypical BSE as demonstrated by an
approximately 50% shortened incubation time for L-type BSE as compared to
C-type. Considering the current scientific information available, it cannot be
assumed that these different BSE types pose the same human health risks as
C-type BSE or that these risks are mitigated by the same protective
measures.</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
This study will contribute to a correct definition of specified risk
material (SRM) in atypical BSE. The incumbent of this position will develop new
and transfer existing, ultra-sensitive methods for the detection of atypical BSE
in tissue of experimentally infected cattle. </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
<a href="http://www.prionetcanada.ca/detail.aspx?menu=5&dt=293380&app=93&cat1=387&tp=20&lk=no&cat2">http://www.prionetcanada.ca/detail.aspx?menu=5&dt=293380&app=93&cat1=387&tp=20&lk=no&cat2</a>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
*** The potential impact of prion diseases on human health was greatly
magnified by the recognition that interspecies transfer of BSE to humans by beef
ingestion resulted in vCJD. While changes in animal feed constituents and
slaughter practices appear to have curtailed vCJD, there is concern that CWD of
free-ranging deer and elk in the U.S. might also cross the species barrier.
Thus, consuming venison could be a source of human prion disease. Whether BSE
and CWD represent interspecies scrapie transfer or are newly arisen prion
diseases is unknown. Therefore, the possibility of transmission of prion disease
through other food animals cannot be ruled out. There is evidence that vCJD can
be transmitted through blood transfusion. There is likely a pool of unknown size
of asymptomatic individuals infected with vCJD, and there may be asymptomatic
individuals infected with the CWD equivalent. These circumstances represent a
potential threat to blood, blood products, and plasma supplies. </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
<a href="http://cdmrp.army.mil/prevfunded/nprp/NPRP_Summit_Final_Report.pdf">http://cdmrp.army.mil/prevfunded/nprp/NPRP_Summit_Final_Report.pdf</a>
</div>
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<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
The chances of a person or domestic animal contracting CWD are “extremely
remote,” Richards said. The possibility can’t be ruled out, however. “One could
look at it like a game of chance,” he explained. “The odds (of infection)
increase over time because of repeated exposure. That’s one of the downsides of
having CWD in free-ranging herds: We’ve got this infectious agent out there that
we can never say never to in terms of (infecting) people and domestic
livestock.” </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
<a href="https://www.avma.org/News/JAVMANews/Pages/121201a.aspx">https://www.avma.org/News/JAVMANews/Pages/121201a.aspx</a>
</div>
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<div>
</div>
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</div>
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</div>
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</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
TSS </div>
Terry S. Singeltary Sr.http://www.blogger.com/profile/06986622967539963260noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4595956519532618538.post-20126381631364606782013-03-05T08:40:00.001-08:002013-03-05T08:40:28.024-08:00FSA notified of BSE control breaches again and again 5 March 2013 <div>
Last updated on 5 March 2013 </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
FSA notified of BSE control breaches </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
The FSA has been notified of a series of BSE control breaches that took
place last year. The risk to human health is very low as it is very unlikely
that any of the animals would have been infected. </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Goats from slaughterhouse in Belgium On 5 July 2012, during a routine
inspection at London Central Markets (Smithfield), a goat carcass with spleen
attached was discovered. Goat spleen is specified risk material (SRM) and must
be removed at the slaughterhouse. SRM consists of the the parts of the animal
most likely to carry BSE infection.</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
The goat was in a consignment of 41 goat and kid carcasses slaughtered at
Profoods bvba, a slaughterhouse in Antwerp, Belgium. There were also a
significant number of hygiene issues with the consignment. All of the carcasses
were detained and none of the meat entered the food supply. There was no public
health risk resulting from this incident.</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Consignments of beef from a Belgian abattoir On 1 October 2012, the Agency
was informed by the Belgian authorities that consignments of beef that may have
contained meat from six cattle over 72 months of age, which were not tested for
BSE, had been exported to the UK. At the time it was mandatory for all cattle
slaughtered for human consumption and aged over 72 months to have a negative BSE
test result.</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
The untested cattle were slaughtered at Slachtgroep Leieland (BE185), an
abattoir in Harelbeke, Belgium. Meat from the consignments associated with the
untested animals was sent to three businesses in the UK. Investigations revealed
that most had already been sold to the final consumer and been eaten, but 11
pallets of meat were traced to a UK coldstore and subsequently destroyed.</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
It is very unlikely that any of the untested animals would have been
infected with BSE. Belgium has not reported a case since 2006. In addition the
SRM had been removed so any risk to human health is extremely low.</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Breaches in UK-produced meat SRM On 7 December 2012, during a routine
inspection by Food Standards Agency staff at Simply Halal (Banham) Ltd, a
combined slaughterhouse and cutting premises in Norfolk, it was discovered that
25 beef quarters had left the premises without the vertebral column being
removed. </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Simply Halal sold the quarters to a meat wholesaler. The wholesaler's
records were incomplete and as a result it was only possible to trace and detain
one of the quarters. This was destroyed. It is probable that meat from all the
other quarters was consumed.</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
The quarters were from cattle over 30 months of age. The vertebral column
of cattle over 30 months is specified risk material (SRM) and must be removed.
The risk from the meat that entered the food chain is very low, as it is
extremely unlikely that any of the animals involved had BSE. Only three cases of
BSE were recorded in the UK in 2012. None of these animals entered the food
chain.</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
BSE testing Meat from a cow over 72 months of age entered the food chain
without being tested for BSE. </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
The animal, aged 73 months and 4 days, was slaughtered on 11 October 2012,
at Woolley Bros (Wholesale Meats) Ltd, a combined abattoir and cutting plant in
Sheffield. The error was discovered on 4 December 2012 during routine
cross-checks of slaughter and BSE testing data.</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
According to regulations any cattle that have not been tested, along with
the animal slaughtered immediately before it and the two immediately after
should not enter the food supply.</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
The four affected carcasses were sold as part of consignment of 90 beef
sides to a food business operator in the Netherlands. In addition, cheek meat
from the same batch of animals was sold to a business in Germany. No meat from
the animals entered the UK food supply and the Agency notified the Dutch and
German authorities of the breach of controls and that meat from the affected
animals had entered their countries.</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
It should be noted that since 1 March 2013 there is no longer a requirement
to test healthy slaughtered cattle over 72 months of age for BSE before they
enter the food supply. </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
<a href="http://www.food.gov.uk/news-updates/news/2013/mar/bse-breaches">http://www.food.gov.uk/news-updates/news/2013/mar/bse-breaches</a>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Thursday, January 17, 2013 </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
FSA notified of two breaches of BSE testing regulations 14 January 2013
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
<a href="http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2013/01/fsa-notified-of-two-breaches-of-bse.html">http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2013/01/fsa-notified-of-two-breaches-of-bse.html</a>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
EURO QUALITY RECALLS ITS LAMBS' BRAINS</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Euro Quality Lambs Ltd is recalling its lambs’ brains, which have entered
the food chain without being inspected properly. The Food Standards Agency is
asking all local authority enforcement officers to ensure that the product is
withdrawn from sale and destroyed. The Agency has issued a Food Alert for
Action.</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
<a href="http://www.food.gov.uk/news-updates/recalls-news/2012/oct/eurolamb">http://www.food.gov.uk/news-updates/recalls-news/2012/oct/eurolamb</a>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
sheep, brains, cow brains, lamb brains, did they make sure this time
???</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
see the potential for Scrapie transmission to man, see studies here ;</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Thursday, January 17, 2013 </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
FSA notified of two breaches of BSE testing regulations 14 January 2013
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
<a href="http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2013/01/fsa-notified-of-two-breaches-of-bse.html">http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2013/01/fsa-notified-of-two-breaches-of-bse.html</a>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
BREACHES OF BSE CONTROLS IN CONSIGNMENTS OF BEEF</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Due to an oversight, four breaches of BSE controls in British beef
identified last year were not publicised immediately on the Agency’s website in
the normal manner. </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
<a href="http://www.food.gov.uk/news-updates/news/2012/sep/bse">http://www.food.gov.uk/news-updates/news/2012/sep/bse</a>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
COW AGED OVER 72 MONTHS ENTERS FOOD SUPPLY WITHOUT BEING TESTED FOR
BSE</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
The Agency has been notified that meat has entered the food supply from a
cow aged over 72 months that had not been tested for BSE. A negative BSE test
result is mandatory for cattle slaughtered for human consumption at over 72
months of age.</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
<a href="http://www.food.gov.uk/news/newsarchive/2012/mar/605602">http://www.food.gov.uk/news/newsarchive/2012/mar/605602</a>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
UNTESTED COW ENTERS THE FOOD SUPPLY</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
The Agency has been notified that meat from a cow that did not have the
required BSE test has entered the food supply. The 62 month old cow had been
slaughtered on farm for welfare reasons. </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
<a href="http://www.food.gov.uk/news/newsarchive/2012/mar/jarrettcow">http://www.food.gov.uk/news/newsarchive/2012/mar/jarrettcow</a>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Monday, November 14, 2011 </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Bullock aged over 72 months enters food supply without being tested for
BSE</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
<a href="http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2011/11/bullock-aged-over-72-months-enters-food.html">http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2011/11/bullock-aged-over-72-months-enters-food.html</a>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Monday, February 18, 2013 </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
EU Reauthorisation of non-ruminant processed animal proteins for fish feed
and welcomes the likely potential for more TSE prion disease </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
<a href="http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2013/02/eu-reauthorisation-of-non-ruminant.html">http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2013/02/eu-reauthorisation-of-non-ruminant.html</a>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Friday, November 30, 2012 </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
PROPOSED DECISION TO STOP BSE TESTING OF HEALTHY CATTLE SLAUGHTERED FOR
HUMAN CONSUMPTION FSA 12/12/04 Open Board – 11 December 2012</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
<a href="http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2012/11/proposed-decision-to-stop-bse-testing.html">http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2012/11/proposed-decision-to-stop-bse-testing.html</a>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
ANY RELAXING OF ANY BSE TESTING RULES WOULD NOT BE BASED ON SOUND SCIENCE,
BUT BASED ON INDUSTRY LED SCIENCE AND MONEY $$$ </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
we now know that indeed atypical BSE is transmissible to cattle and other
species, and atypical BSE have been documented in older cattle to date. so
relaxing any BSE testing on older cattle would be a huge step backwards, and
could risk everything that has been done over the past 27 years to try and
eradicate BSE. ... </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
TSS </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Wednesday, February 20, 2013 </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
World Organization for Animal Health Recommends United States' BSE Risk
Status Be Upgraded </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Statement from Agriculture Secretary Tom Vilsack: </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
<a href="http://madcowusda.blogspot.com/2013/02/world-organization-for-animal-health.html">http://madcowusda.blogspot.com/2013/02/world-organization-for-animal-health.html</a>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Thursday, February 14, 2013 </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
The Many Faces of Mad Cow Disease Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy BSE and
TSE prion disease </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
<a href="http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2013/02/the-many-faces-of-mad-cow-disease.html">http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2013/02/the-many-faces-of-mad-cow-disease.html</a>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Monday, February 11, 2013 </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
APHIS USDA Letter to Stakeholders: Trade Accomplishments and failures (BSE,
SCRAPIE, TSE, PRION, AKA MAD COW TYPE DISEASE) </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
<a href="http://madcowusda.blogspot.com/2013/02/aphis-usda-letter-to-stakeholders-trade.html">http://madcowusda.blogspot.com/2013/02/aphis-usda-letter-to-stakeholders-trade.html</a>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Friday, November 23, 2012 </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease update As at 5th November 2012 UK, USA,
AND CANADA </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
<a href="http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2012/11/sporadic-creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.html">http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2012/11/sporadic-creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.html</a>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Monday, January 14, 2013 </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Gambetti et al USA Prion Unit change another highly suspect USA mad cow
victim to another fake name i.e. sporadic FFI at age 16 CJD Foundation goes
along with this BSe </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
<a href="http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2013/01/gambetti-et-al-usa-prion-unit-change.html">http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2013/01/gambetti-et-al-usa-prion-unit-change.html</a>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Thursday, February 21, 2013 </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
National Prion Disease Pathology Surveillance Center Cases Examined January
16, 2013 </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
<a href="http://prionunitusaupdate2008.blogspot.com/2013/02/national-prion-disease-pathology.html">http://prionunitusaupdate2008.blogspot.com/2013/02/national-prion-disease-pathology.html</a>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Sunday, February 10, 2013 </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (CJD) biannual update (February 2013) Infection
report/CJD </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
<a href="http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2013/02/creutzfeldt-jakob-disease-cjd-biannual.html">http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2013/02/creutzfeldt-jakob-disease-cjd-biannual.html</a>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Thursday, August 12, 2010 </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Seven main threats for the future linked to prions </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
First threat </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
The TSE road map defining the evolution of European policy for protection
against prion diseases is based on a certain numbers of hypotheses some of which
may turn out to be erroneous. In particular, a form of BSE (called atypical
Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy), recently identified by systematic testing in
aged cattle without clinical signs, may be the origin of classical BSE and thus
potentially constitute a reservoir, which may be impossible to eradicate if a
sporadic origin is confirmed. </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
***Also, a link is suspected between atypical BSE and some apparently
sporadic cases of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease in humans. These atypical BSE cases
constitute an unforeseen first threat that could sharply modify the European
approach to prion diseases. </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Second threat </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
snip... </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
<a href="http://www.neuroprion.org/en/np-neuroprion.html">http://www.neuroprion.org/en/np-neuroprion.html</a>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
EFSA Journal 2011 The European Response to BSE: A Success Story </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
This is an interesting editorial about the Mad Cow Disease debacle, and
it's ramifications that will continue to play out for decades to come ; </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Monday, October 10, 2011 </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
EFSA Journal 2011 The European Response to BSE: A Success Story </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
snip... </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
EFSA and the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC)
recently delivered a scientific opinion on any possible epidemiological or
molecular association between TSEs in animals and humans (EFSA Panel on
Biological Hazards (BIOHAZ) and ECDC, 2011). This opinion confirmed Classical
BSE prions as the only TSE agents demonstrated to be zoonotic so far but the
possibility that a small proportion of human cases so far classified as
"sporadic" CJD are of zoonotic origin could not be excluded. Moreover,
transmission experiments to non-human primates suggest that some TSE agents in
addition to Classical BSE prions in cattle (namely L-type Atypical BSE,
Classical BSE in sheep, transmissible mink encephalopathy (TME) and chronic
wasting disease (CWD) agents) might have zoonotic potential. </div>
<br />
<div>
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snip... </div>
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<a href="http://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/efsajournal/pub/e991.htm?emt=1">http://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/efsajournal/pub/e991.htm?emt=1</a>
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<a href="http://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/efsajournal/doc/e991.pdf">http://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/efsajournal/doc/e991.pdf</a>
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see follow-up here about North America BSE Mad Cow TSE prion risk factors,
and the ever emerging strains of Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy in many
species here in the USA, including humans ; </div>
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<a href="http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/10/efsa-journal-2011-european-response-to.html">http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/10/efsa-journal-2011-european-response-to.html</a>
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Terry S. Singeltary Sr.http://www.blogger.com/profile/06986622967539963260noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4595956519532618538.post-56938354223203255072013-02-28T12:57:00.001-08:002013-02-28T13:08:10.426-08:00Revision of the Norwegian annual monitoring programme for BSE<div>
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EFSA Journal 2013;11(2):3119 [46 pp.]. doi:10.2903/j.efsa.2013.3119 </div>
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European Food Safety AuthorityAcknowledgment Contact </div>
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Type: Scientific Report of EFSA On request from: European Free Trade
Association (EFTA) Surveillance Authority Question number: EFSA-Q-2012-00577
Approved: 20 February 2013 Published: 25 February 2013 Affiliation: European
Food Safety Authority (EFSA) Parma Italy </div>
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Abstract </div>
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This Scientific Report of EFSA provides scientific and technical assistance
to the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) Surveillance Authority in
evaluating i) if the Norwegian continuous use of fishmeal in feed for ruminants
until 30 April 2010 has had an impact on the overall risk of BSE in the country;
and ii) if a proposed Norwegian revised annual monitoring programme for BSE
allows the detection of BSE with a yearly design prevalence of at least one case
per 100,000 in the adult population at a confidence level of 95%. Data related
to the implementation of the Norwegian feed ban were collected and assessed. The
Cattle TSE Monitoring Model (C-TSEMM) was used in order to answer the second
term of reference of the mandate received. It is concluded that the use of
fishmeal in feed for ruminants might have had a potential impact on the risk of
cattle exposure to BSE in Norway. While it is not possible to quantitatively
assess this risk, the lack of detection of BSE cases by the Norwegian monitoring
system (in spite of its sensitivity limits) suggests that BSE has not
significantly spread in the Norwegian cattle population. The proposed revised
Norwegian BSE monitoring regime would not be able to meet a yearly design
prevalence of at least one case per 100,000 in the adult cattle population at a
confidence level of 95%. Moreover, in statistical terms it is not feasible for
Norway to achieve the requested design prevalence. It is furthermore highlighted
that passing from a sample-based to an exhaustive monitoring scheme (i.e.
testing all animals over a certain age that are slaughtered or dead) would
provide the most sensitive BSE surveillance system currently possible. </div>
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© European Food Safety Authority, 2013 </div>
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Summary </div>
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Following a request from the European Free Trade Association (EFTA)
Surveillance Authority, the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) was asked to
provide scientific and technical assistance on a revision of the Norwegian
annual monitoring programme for Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE). The
current Norwegian monitoring programme for BSE is based on a specific adaptation
of the Agreement on the European Economic Area (EEA) to Regulation (EC) No
999/2001, allowing Norway to test a random sample of 10,000 healthy slaughtered
cattle over 30 months of age per year. The Norwegian legislation is currently in
line with the European Union’s (EU)5 one as regards to the feedban. However, the
use of fishmeal for ruminants was legally allowed in Norway until 30 April 2010.
Within this context, and taking into consideration the animal age limits set in
Commission Decision 2009/719/EC (72 and 48 months of age, respectively, for
healthy slaughtered and at risk animals), Norway requested to the EFTA
Surveillance Authority the agreement for a revised annual monitoring programme
for BSE prescribing i) the testing of a random sample of 2,000 healthy
slaughtered cattle over 72 months of age per year, ii) the testing of all
at-risk cattle above 48 months of age and iii) the mandatory notification and
examination of any animal clinically suspected of being infected by a TSE. EFTA
Surveillance Authority asked EFSA: i) to undertake an assessment of whether
Norway’s continuous use of fishmeal in feed for ruminants until 30 April 2010
has had an impact on the overall risk of BSE in the country; and ii) to evaluate
whether the design of the proposed annual regime of 2,000 randomly selected
samples in the subpopulation of healthy slaughtered animals over 72 months of
age allows the detection of BSE with a yearly design prevalence of at least one
case per 100,000 in the adult population at a confidence level of 95% in Norway.
In case Norway’s proposed regime would fail meeting this criterion, EFSA was
requested to propose a minimum annual sample size in the subpopulation of
healthy slaughtered animals over 72 months of age allowing to reach the proposed
criterion. Data related to the implementation of the Norwegian feed ban were
collected and assessed. In Norway the only way by which fishmeal could have
represented a risk for BSE infection in ruminants was due to the potential
cross-contamination with infected Meat and Bone Meal (MBM). The monitoring of
ruminant feed and fishmeal for the presence of MBM in Norway did not give rise
to positive results. However, considering the number of tests and the total
amount of terrestrial animal feed and fishmeal produced and used in Norway the
significance of these results is probably limited. Moreover, according to the
reports of the missions carried out by the EFTA Surveillance Authority in Norway
there were insufficient measures in place to prevent the potential for
cross-contamination of fishmeal with MBM. The results of the BSE monitoring
system carried out during the period 2001 – 2011 were considered. Overall
200,165 BSE screening tests were performed in Norway with no positive results.
The lack of detection of BSE cases by the Norwegian monitoring system (in spite
of its sensitivity limits) suggests that BSE has not significantly spread in the
Norwegian cattle population. It was then concluded that the use of fishmeal in
feed for ruminants might have had a potential impact on the risk of cattle
exposure to BSE in Norway. However, the lack of detection of BSE cases by the
Norwegian monitoring system suggests that BSE has not significantly spread in
the Norwegian cattle population. The Cattle TSE Monitoring Model (C-TSEMM) was
used in order to answer the second term of reference of the mandate. According
to C-TSEMM the proposed revised Norwegian BSE monitoring regime would not be
able to meet a yearly design prevalence of at least one case per 100,000 in the
adult cattle population at a confidence level of 95% in Norway. Moreover, the
results of the model indicate that in statistical terms it is not feasible for
Norway to achieve the proposed design prevalence. The results of C-TSEMM have to
be interpreted in the light of its assumptions, uncertainties and limitations.
However, they can be considered to be an overestimation of what is achievable by
the Norwegian regimes considered. It is furthermore highlighted that passing
from a sample-based to an exhaustive monitoring scheme (i.e. testing all animals
over a certain age that are slaughtered or dead) would provide the most
sensitive BSE surveillance system currently possible. </div>
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CONCLUSIONS </div>
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The use of fishmeal in feed for ruminants might have had a potential impact
on the risk of cattle exposure to BSE in Norway. While it is not possible to
quantitatively assess this risk, the lack of detection of BSE cases by the
Norwegian monitoring system (in spite of its sensitivity limits) suggests that
BSE has not significantly spread in the Norwegian cattle population. According
to the model applied (C-TSEMM): – the proposed revised Norwegian BSE monitoring
regime would not be able to meet a yearly design prevalence of at least one case
per 100,000 in the adult cattle population at a confidence level of 95% in
Norway; and – even in a scenario in which all healthy slaughtered and all at
risk cattle above 72 and 48 months respectively would be tested for BSE, in
statistical terms it is not feasible to achieve the design prevalence of one
case per 100,000 in the adult cattle population at a confidence level of 95% in
Norway. The results of C-TSEMM have to be interpreted in the light of its
assumptions, uncertainties and limitations. However, they can be considered to
be an overestimation of what is achievable by the Norwegian regimes considered.
Passing from a sample-based to an exhaustive monitoring scheme (i.e. testing all
animals over a certain age that are slaughtered or dead) would provide the most
sensitive BSE surveillance system currently possible. </div>
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<a href="http://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/efsajournal/doc/3119.pdf">http://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/efsajournal/doc/3119.pdf</a>
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Keywords </div>
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BSE, Norway, monitoring, revision, design prevalence </div>
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<a href="http://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/efsajournal/pub/3119.htm?utm_source=newsletter&utm_medium=email&utm_content=pub&utm_campaign=20130226">http://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/efsajournal/pub/3119.htm?utm_source=newsletter&utm_medium=email&utm_content=pub&utm_campaign=20130226</a>
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2004 </div>
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Scientific Report of the European Food Safety Authority on the Assessment
of the Geographical BSE Risk (GBR) of Norway </div>
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doi:10.2903/j.efsa.2004.8r </div>
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Type: Scientific Report of EFSA Question number: EFSA-Q-2003-083F Approved:
01 July 2004 Published: 20 August 2004 Last updated: 08 September 2004. This
version replaces the previous one/s. </div>
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Summary </div>
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The European Food Safety Authority and its Scientific Expert Working Group
on the Assessment of the Geographical Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy ( BSE)
Risk (GBR) were asked by the European Commission (EC) to provide an up-to-date
scientific report on the GBR in Norway, i.e. the likelihood of the presence of
one or more cattle being infected with BSE, pre-clinically as well as
clinically, in Norway. This scientific report addresses the GBR of Norway as
assessed in 2004 based on data covering the period 1980-2003. </div>
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Between 1980 and 1990, an extremely unstable system was exposed to a
negligible/very low challenge. Between 1991 and 1999, the stability of the
system increased to very unstable and then to unstable in 2000, while the
challenge increased to moderate and subsequently decreased to negligible in
1996. Under such low/intermediate levels of risk (as judged by
challenge/stability alone), the fact that no BSE case was detected by the very
extensive surveillance carried out in Norway since 2001, makes the possibility
that BSE-infectivity could have been recycled and amplified unlikely although it
cannot be excluded. </div>
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EFSA concludes that the current geographical BSE-risk (GBR) level is II, as
it is unlikely but can not be excluded that domestic cattle are (clinically or
pre-clinically) infected with the BSE-agent. The Norwegian BSE/cattle system is
now regarded to be very stable. This implies that the probability of cattle to
become newly infected with the BSE-agent is very low. Assuming that measures in
place continue to be appropriately implemented the GBR will decrease over time
at the rate at which already infected animals leave the system. If the measures
in place are effectively implemented, the import of live animals cannot increase
the risk because the infectivity that could theoretically be harbored by them
would not reach domestic cattle.</div>
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Since recent improvements in the safety of Meat and Bone Meal (MBM)
production in many countries or significant recent reductions in the incidence
of BSE have not been taken into account for the assessment of the external
challenge in the present report, the external challenge assessed after 2001
could be overestimated and is the worst case assumption. However, all current
GBR conclusions are not dependent on these assumptions in any of the countries
assessed. For future assessments and when the impact of the production,
surveillance and true incidence changes has been fully quantified, these
developments should be taken into account. Keywords</div>
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Scientific Report of the European Food Safety Authority on the Assessment
of the Geographical BSE Risk (GBR) of Norway </div>
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<a href="http://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/efsajournal/pub/8r.htm">http://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/efsajournal/pub/8r.htm</a>
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snip... </div>
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5. CONCLUSION ON THE GEOGRAPHICAL BSE-RISK</div>
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5.1 The current GBR as function of the past stability and challenge</div>
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• The current geographical BSE-risk (GBR) level is II, i.e. it is unlikely
but can not be excluded that domestic cattle are (clinically or pre-clinically)
infected with the BSE-agent.</div>
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• This assessment deviates from the previous assessment (SSC opinion, 2000)
because at that time several exporting countries were not considered a potential
risk.</div>
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5.2 The expected development of the GBR as a function of the past and
present stability and challenge</div>
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• The Norway BSE/cattle system is now regarded to be very stable. This
implies that the probability of cattle to become newly infected with the
BSE-agent is very low. Assuming that measures in place continue to be
appropriately implemented the GBR will decrease over time at the rate at which
already infected animals leave the system.</div>
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• If the measures in place are effectively implemented, the import of live
animals cannot increase the risk because the infectivity that could
theoretically be harboured by them would not reach domestic cattle.</div>
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• Since recent improvements in the safety of MBM production in many
countries or significant recent reductions in the incidence of BSE have not been
taken into account for the assessment of the external challenge in the present
report, the external challenge assessed after 2001 could be overestimated and is
the worst case assumption. However, all current GBR conclusions are not
dependent on these assumptions in any of the countries assessed. For future
assessments and when the impact of the production, surveillance and true
incidence changes has been fully quantified, these developments should be taken
into account. </div>
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2000 </div>
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Report on the assessment of the Geographical BSE-risk of NORWAY July 2000
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OVERALL ASSESSMENT The current geographical BSE-risk (GBR) of Norway is
level I, i.e. it is highly unlikely that domestic cattle are infected
(clinically or pre-clinically) with the BSE agent. </div>
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Note: This assessment leading to GBR level I is mainly based on the fact
that Norway was not exposed to significant external challenges before 1995 when
the system became stable. </div>
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Should this be proven wrong, a GBR level II would have to be assumed.
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<a href="http://ec.europa.eu/food/fs/sc/ssc/out134_en.pdf">http://ec.europa.eu/food/fs/sc/ssc/out134_en.pdf</a>
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Annual Reports 2011</div>
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The surveillance and control programme for scrapie in Norway 2011 </div>
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Sviland Ståle, Benestad Lafond Sylvie, Eikenæs Olav, Norström Madelaine
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In 2011, Nor98 scrapie was diagnosed in 6 sheep coming from 6 different
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Introduction </div>
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Scrapie was first diagnosed in indigenous Norwegian sheep in 1981.
Increasing numbers of scrapieinfected flocks were identified in the 1990s,
culminating with 31 detected flocks in 1996 (Figure 1). By the end of 2009,
scrapie had been diagnosed in a total of 148 sheep flocks and one goat herd (1).
Scrapie has been a notifiable disease in Norway since 1965, and control measures
have involved destruction of all sheep in affected flocks and in close contact
flocks until 2004. The Norwegian scrapie surveillance and control programme was
launched in 1997 (2). In 1998 a new type of scrapie, Nor98 scrapie, was
identified in Norway. The diagnosis of Nor98 scrapie is verified by Western
blot. Nor98 scrapie differs from classical scrapie in several aspects, including
the Western blot profile, the distribution of protease resistant prion protein
(PrPSc) in the brain, and absence of detectable PrPSc in lymphoid tissues (3).
The main clinical sign observed in Nor98 scrapie cases has been ataxia. The PrP
genotype distribution among Nor98 scrapie cases differs markedly from that of
the previous cases with classical scrapie (4). The Norwegian Food Safety
Authority is responsible for carrying out the surveillance and control programme
for scrapie. The samples are collected at the abattoirs or in the herds by
inspectors from the Norwegian Food Safety Authority. The Norwegian Food Safety
Authority also carries out inspections of sheep flocks and goat herds, all of
which should be inspected every second or third year. The Norwegian Veterinary
Institute is performing the laboratory examinations and the reporting of the
results.</div>
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Materials and methods</div>
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In 2011, the surveillance programme was performed according to the European
Union Regulations,</div>
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Regulation (EC) No. 999/2001 Annex III, with amendments and included
examination of the following categories of small ruminants:</div>
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* all small ruminants with clinical signs consistent with scrapie,
irrespective of age</div>
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* 10,000 sheep older than 18 months, which had died or been killed on the
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* 10,000 randomly sampled healthy sheep older than 18 months slaughtered
for human consumption</div>
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* 500 goats older than 18 months which had died or been killed on the farm,
but not slaughtered for</div>
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human consumption (fallen stock)</div>
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Prevalence </div>
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The classical scrapie and Nor98 scrapie prevalences in the fallen stock and
abattoir populations were estimated assuming an exact binominal
distribution.</div>
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Results </div>
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Sheep </div>
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Nor98 scrapie was diagnosed in 6 sheep from 6 flocks. One Nor98 scrapie
case was identified in fallen stock, five cases were apparently healthy animals
slaughtered for human consumption (Table 1). </div>
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The individual age and breed were registered, and the prion protein
genotype examined for all six scrapie cases (Table 2). Four sheep had PrP
genotypes with at least one allele with polymorphisms at codon 141 (AF141RQ) or
154 (AHQ), whereas two sheep had the PrP genotype ARR/ARR. </div>
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In total, 13,486 samples from sheep were received. Of these, 13 (0.09%)
samples were unsuitable for examination. The numbers of animals examined within
each category are presented in Table 1. The prevalence of Nor98 scrapie in the
fallen stock of sheep was estimated to 0.02% (0.0-0.12%), (95% confidence
interval [CI]) (Figure 2), and the prevalence of Nor98 scrapie in sheep
slaughtered for human consumption was estimated to 0.06% (0.0-0.13%), (95% CI)
(Figure 3). </div>
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For 135 (1.0%) samples (111 healthy slaughtered, 22fallen stock and one
from the ante mortem control), the flock of origin was not reported. In the
event of a positive sample from slaughtered animals, the flock identity could be
traced using the carcass number. The remaining 13,352 samples were collected
from carcasses originating in 5,596 different sheep flocks. The mean number of
animals tested per flock was 2.3 (range 1-29), flocks eradicated due to scrapie
are excluded. From 1,746 flocks more than two samples were tested. The samples
were obtained throughout the year, with approximately 26% of the samples
collected in September and October, which is the main slaughtering season for
sheep in Norway. </div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
PrP genotyping was performed on 639 sheep randomly sampled from the healthy
slaughtered population examined in Harstad. The PrP genotypes are grouped in
accordance with the British National Scrapie Plan (NSP) (Table 3). </div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
Goat </div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
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</div>
<div>
Scrapie was not detected in any goat in 2011. </div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
In total, 390 samples from goats were received. In six of these the flock
of origin was not reported. None of these were unsuitable for examination. The
numbers of animals examined within each category are presented in Table 1.
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
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</div>
<div>
The samples were collected from carcasses originating from 168 different
herds. The mean number of animals tested per herd was two (range 1-13). From 51
herds more than two samples were tested.</div>
<div>
</div>
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snip...</div>
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</div>
<div>
Scrapie was not detected in goats in 2011. The first and only scrapie case
in naturally infected goats in Norway was diagnosed in 2006 and originated from
a county with a large goat population. Both classical and atypical scrapie in
goats has been diagnosed in several countries in Europe (5).</div>
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snip...</div>
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end...</div>
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<cite style="list-style-type: decimal;"><span style="color: #222222; font-family: Arial;"><a href="http://www.vetinst.no/content/download/9376/.../2011_Scrapie.pdf">www.vetinst.no/content/download/9376/.../<b>2011</b>_<b>Scrapie</b>.pdf</a></span></cite></div>
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<div blobref="ADGEESi3W2B1dVbEQkabUTwRDh_YqQUK8axo734iiBwCUnfeCw-dNjfhyZ-Yo09CODpjgtAV18uEiyOj8bkE9OPZex7pLXAaKl8t3j4krunvqWqq-5n-Zvsk8FPgjJf3n-7qqFsuZHGv" class="vsc" sig="YUv" style="list-style-type: decimal;">
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postmottak@<strong>vetinst</strong>.<strong>no
www.vetinst</strong>.<strong>no</strong>. ISSN 1890-9973. Title: The
<strong>surveillance and control programme for scrapie in Norway 2011</strong>
<b>...</b></span></span></span></div>
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<div>
Atypical scrapie in a swiss goat and implications for transmissible
spongiform encephalopathy surveillance </div>
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Seuberlich T, Botteron C, Benestad SL, Brunisholz H, Wyss R, Kihm U,
Schwermer H, Friess M, Nicolier A, Heim D, Zurbriggen A. Atypical scrapie in a
swiss goat and implications for transmissible spongiform encephalopathy
surveillance. J Vet Diagn Invest 2007; 19: 2-8. </div>
<div>
</div>
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</div>
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</div>
<div>
Different types of transmissible spongiform encephalopathies (TSEs) affect
sheep and goats. In addition to the classical form of scrapie, both species are
susceptible to experimental infections with the bovine spongiform encephalopathy
(BSE) agent, and in recent years atypical scrapie cases have been reported in
sheep from different European countries. Atypical scrapie in sheep is
characterized by distinct histopathologic lesions and molecular characteristics
of the abnormal scrapie prion protein (PrPsc). Characteristics of atypical
scrapie have not yet been described in detail in goats. A goat presenting
features of atypical scrapie was identified in Switzerland. Although there was
no difference between the molecular characteristics of PrPsc in this animal and
those of atypical scrapie in sheep, differences in the distribution of
histopathologic lesions and PrPsc deposition were observed. In particular the
cerebellar cortex, a major site of PrPsc deposition in atypical scrapie in
sheep, was found to be virtually unaffected in this goat. In contrast, severe
lesions and PrPsc deposition were detected in more rostral brain structures,
such as thalamus and midbrain. Two TSE screening tests and PrPsc
immunohistochemistry were either negative or barely positive when applied to
cerebellum and obex tissues, the target samples for TSE surveillance in sheep
and goats. These findings suggest that such cases may have been missed in the
past and could be overlooked in the future if sampling and testing procedures
are not adapted. The epidemiological and veterinary public health implications
of these atypical cases, however, are not yet known. </div>
<div>
</div>
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</div>
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</div>
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</div>
<div>
<a href="http://www.vetinst.no/Publikasjoner/Vitenskapelige-artikler/Vitenskapelige-artikler-2007/Atypical-scrapie-in-a-swiss-goat-and-implications-for-transmissible-spongiform-encephalopathy-surveillance/(language)/nor-NO" title="http://www.vetinst.no/Publikasjoner/Vitenskapelige-artikler/Vitenskapelige-artikler-2007/Atypical-scrapie-in-a-swiss-goat-and-implications-for-transmissible-spongiform-encephalopathy-surveillance/(language)/nor-NO">http://www.vetinst.no/Publikasjoner/Vitenskapelige-artikler/Vitenskapelige-artikler-2007/Atypical-scrapie-in-a-swiss-goat-and-implications-for-transmissible-spongiform-encephalopathy-surveillance/(language)/nor-NO</a></div>
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<div>
The surveillance and control programme for Chronic Wasting Disease (CWD) in
wild and captive cervids in Norway </div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
21.09.2009 11:12 </div>
<div>
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<div>
Introduction</div>
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</div>
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</div>
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</div>
<div>
Chronic wasting disease (CWD) was not detected in any of the animals tested
in 2008. </div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
CWD is a transmissible spongiform encephalopathy (TSE) of cervids (1, 2,
3). A few species of the family Cervidae are known to be naturally susceptible
to the disease: mule deer (Odocoileus hemionus), white-tailed deer (O.
virginianus), elk (Cervus elaphus), and moose (Alces alces). CWD was first
described as a clinical syndrome termed “chronic wasting disease” in captive
mule deer in Colorado, USA in the late 1960s and subsequently identified as a
TSE in 1978 (1). Chronic wasting disease is so far only diagnosed in
free-ranging and captive cervids in North America, and is yet to be diagnosed in
cervids in Europe. </div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
Four cervid species are prevalent in natural populations in Norway: moose
(Alces alces), red deer (Cervus elaphus), roe deer (Capreolus capreolus), and
reindeer (Rangifer tarandus). Red deer predominate along the west coast, whereas
moose and roe deer mainly inhabit other areas of the country. The wild reindeer
live in dispersed populations in separate high mountain areas in southern
Norway. The number officially hunted in 2008 was: 35,600 moose, 35,700 red deer,
29,800 roe deer, and 5,200 wild reindeer. Additionally, Norway has a
semi-domestic reindeer population, mainly kept in the northern parts of the
country, presently counting about 200,000 animals.</div>
<div>
</div>
</div>
<br />
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
<div>
There are 75 cervid farms in Norway. Most of the farms keep red deer, and
only a few keep fallow deer (Dama dama).</div>
<div>
</div>
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</div>
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</div>
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</div>
<div>
Based on the fact that Norway has large free-ranging populations of various
cervids, a number of them grazing in regions where scrapie is detected, a
passive surveillance programme for CWD in Norwegian wild and captive cervids has
been running from 2003. In addition, samples from slaughtered semi-domestic
reindeer from several regions in the country have been tested for CWD. </div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
Norway performed an EC survey for CWD in cervids in 2006 and 2007 according
to Commission decision 2007/182/EC. The target species relevant for Norway was
wild red deer and the survey implied sampling of a) clinical/sick, euthanized
animals, b) traffic killed animals, c) animals found dead, and d) healthy
animals shot during hunting. Additionally, for moose, roe deer, reindeer, and
farmed deer the categories a) – c) were sampled. All samples were negative for
CW</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
A small population of approximately 200 free-ranging musk ox (Ovibus
moschatus, belonging to the Bovidae), inhabits the Dovre high mountain plateau
in Mid-Norway. TSE has not been diagnosed in the musk ox, but the species has
been included in the programme from 2004.</div>
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</div>
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</div>
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Aim</div>
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</div>
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</div>
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</div>
<div>
The aim of the programme is to detect the possible occurrence of CWD in the
Norwegian cervid population.</div>
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</div>
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</div>
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</div>
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</div>
<div>
Material and methods</div>
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Material</div>
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<div>
Tested animals included captive deer and wild cervids older than 18 months
that died or were euthanized due to disease or injuries. Additionally, cervids
older than 18 months necropsied at the National Veterinary Institute were
examined for CWD. Twelve ordinary hunted roe deer from Vestby in the county of
Akershus and one musk ox found dead were also tested. The number and species
analysed for CWD in 2008 are given in Table 1.</div>
<div>
</div>
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</div>
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</div>
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<div>
Methods</div>
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</div>
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</div>
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</div>
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</div>
<div>
A rapid test (either TeSeE ® Bio-Rad or TeSeE Sheep & Goat ® ELISA,
Bio-Rad) was used to screen brain samples for detection of the PrPCWD. All the
samples were analysed at the National Veterinary Institute, which is the
National Reference Laboratory for TSEs in Norway.</div>
<div>
</div>
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</div>
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</div>
<div>
Results</div>
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</div>
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</div>
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</div>
<div>
None of the 47 samples analysed tested positive for CWD in the rapid test
(Table 1).</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
Totally 25 of the tested animals were exclusively examined for CWD, and the
majority was healthy hunted and traffic killed roe deer (Table 1). The remaining
22 animals represent cases received at the National Veterinary Institute for
routine necropsy.</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
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</div>
<div>
A total of two of the tested animals were captive red deer. One
semi-domestic reindeer was sampled because of showing clinical signs before it
dropped dead.</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
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</div>
<div>
Table 1. The number of cervids tested in the Norwegian surveillance and
control programme for Chronic wasting disease (CWD) 2008, distributed by reason
for submission. </div>
<div>
</div>
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<div>
snip...</div>
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<div>
Discussion</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
No animals were positive for CWD in 2008. A large part of the tested
animals in 2008 was roe deer collected in Vestby, comprising hunted and traffic
killed animals. Very few captive red deer were tested. </div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
Among the Norwegian cervid species, a higher risk for CWD can be assumed
for red deer and moose since these species are among those known to be naturally
susceptible to the disease (1, 2, 3). Regarding moose, so far, only a few
positive CWD cases has been diagnosed in hunted animals in CWD-endemic areas in
Colorado, USA (3), thus they probably represent preclinical CWD. Also, the
disease has been transmitted experimentally to moose by oral inoculation of
brain tissue from a CWD affected mule deer (4). Roe deer, reindeer and musk ox
has so far not been found naturally infected with CWD. </div>
<div>
</div>
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</div>
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</div>
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</div>
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</div>
<div>
<a href="http://www.vetinst.no/Helseovervaaking/Overvaakingsprogrammer/Chronic-Wasting-Disease-CWD/Surveillance-program-CWD/(language)/nor-NO" title="http://www.vetinst.no/Helseovervaaking/Overvaakingsprogrammer/Chronic-Wasting-Disease-CWD/Surveillance-program-CWD/(language)/nor-NO">http://www.vetinst.no/Helseovervaaking/Overvaakingsprogrammer/Chronic-Wasting-Disease-CWD/Surveillance-program-CWD/(language)/nor-NO</a></div>
<div>
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</div>
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</div>
<div>
Monday, June 18, 2012 </div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
natural cases of CWD in eight Sika deer (Cervus nippon) and five Sika/red deer crossbreeds captive Korea and Experimental oral transmission to red deer (Cervus elaphus elaphus) </div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
<a href="http://chronic-wasting-disease.blogspot.com/2012/06/natural-cases-of-cwd-in-eight-sika-deer.html">http://chronic-wasting-disease.blogspot.com/2012/06/natural-cases-of-cwd-in-eight-sika-deer.html</a> </div>
<div>
</div>
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<br />
<br />
</div>
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</div>
<div>
Friday, February 11, 2011</div>
<div>
</div>
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</div>
<div>
Atypical/Nor98 Scrapie Infectivity in Sheep Peripheral Tissues</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
Abstract<br />
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
Atypical/Nor98 scrapie was first identified in 1998 in Norway. It is now
considered as a worldwide disease of small ruminants and currently represents a
significant part of the detected transmissible spongiform encephalopathies (TSE)
cases in Europe. Atypical/Nor98 scrapie cases were reported in ARR/ARR sheep,
which are highly resistant to BSE and other small ruminants TSE agents. The
biology and pathogenesis of the Atypical/Nor98 scrapie agent in its natural host
is still poorly understood. However, based on the absence of detectable abnormal
PrP in peripheral tissues of affected individuals, human and animal exposure
risk to this specific TSE agent has been considered low. In this study we
demonstrate that infectivity can accumulate, even if no abnormal PrP is
detectable, in lymphoid tissues, nerves, and muscles from natural and/or
experimental Atypical/Nor98 scrapie cases. Evidence is provided that, in
comparison to other TSE agents, samples containing Atypical/Nor98 scrapie
infectivity could remain PrPSc negative. This feature will impact detection of
Atypical/Nor98 scrapie cases in the field, and highlights the need to review
current evaluations of the disease prevalence and potential transmissibility.
Finally, an estimate is made of the infectivity loads accumulating in peripheral
tissues in both Atypical/Nor98 and classical scrapie cases that currently enter
the food chain. The results obtained indicate that dietary exposure risk to
small ruminants TSE agents may be higher than commonly believed. </div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
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</div>
<div>
snip...</div>
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</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
In 1998 an Atypical/Nor98 Scrapie was identified in Norwegian sheep; the
PrPSc signature was partially PK resistant and displayed a multi-band pattern as
showed by Western Blot (WB) that contrasted with those normally observed in
small ruminants TSE cases [5]. After 2001 and the implementation of active TSE
surveillance plans, a number of similar cases were identified in most EU members
states as well in other countries, like Canada, USA and New Zealand [6]. The
transmissibility of Atypical/Nor98 agent has been demonstrated in both rodent
models (transgenic animals expressing the ovine Prnp gene) [7] and sheep [8],
[9]. Currently Atypical/Nor98 Scrapie represents a significant part of the TSE
cases identified in the EU small ruminant population, where its prevalence was
estimated to range between 5 to 8 positive small ruminants per 10,000 tested per
year [10]. </div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
snip...</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
Atypical/Nor98 cases are identified in older animals in comparison to
classical scrapie [6], [40]. The lack of PrPSc detection in peripheral tissues
of reported cases suggested that Atypical/Nor98 scrapie agent could be
restricted to CNS. This is supportive of the hypothesis that Atypical/Nor98
scrapie could be a spontaneous disorder of PrP folding and metabolism occurring
in aged animals without external cause [6], [38].</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
However, this hypothesis is questioned by the evidence reported here that a
negative PrPSc testing result could be observed in animals harbouring high
infectious titre in their brain and that the infectious agent can be present in
peripheral tissues of Atypical/Nor98 scrapie incubating sheep. TSE are
considered to be transmitted following oral exposure; initial uptake is followed
by a peripheral replication phase which is generally associated with a
dissemination of the agent in the lymphoid system and the deposition of large
amounts of PrPSc. This peripheral replication phase is later followed by the
entry of the infectious agent into the CNS through the autonomic nervous system
[25], [27], [35], [36]. However, in several situations, like BSE in cattle [41],
[42], [43] or classical scrapie in ARR heterozygote sheep [44], [45], the
involvement of secondary lymphoid system is marginal, which does not preclude
central neuro-invasion through the autonomic nervous system [46]. It could be
proposed that Atypical Scrapie/Nor98 might occur following oral exposure to a
TSE agent, which would spread marginally in lymphoid tissues before
neuro-invasion. The slow propagation of Atypical Scrapie/Nor98 in its host (long
incubation period) and the impaired detection sensitivity level of PrPSc based
assays would explain the apparent old age of detected cases.</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
The results presented here are insufficient to rule out the hypothesis of a
spontaneous/non contagious disorder or to consider this alternative scenario as
a plausible hypothesis. Indeed, the presence of Atypical scrapie/Nor98
infectivity in peripheral tissues could be alternatively due to the centripetal
spreading of the agent from the CNS. However, our findings point out that
further clarifications on Atypical/Nor98 scrapie agent biology are needed before
accepting that this TSE is a spontaneous and non contagious disorder of small
ruminants. Assessing Atypical/Nor98 scrapie transmissibility through oral route
in natural host and presence in placenta and in colostrum/milk (which are
considered as major sources for TSE transmission between small ruminants) [28],
[32] will provide crucial data.</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
The presence of infectivity in peripheral tissues that enter the food chain
clearly indicates that the risk of dietary exposure to Atypical/Nor98 scrapie
cannot be disregarded. However, according to our observations, in comparison to
the brain, the infectious titres in the peripheral tissues were five log10 lower
in Atypical/Nor98 scrapie than in classical scrapie. Therefore, the reduction of
the relative exposure risk following SRM removal (CNS, head, spleen and ileum)
is probably significantly higher in Atypical/Nor98 scrapie cases than in
classical scrapie cases. However, considering the currently estimated prevalence
of Atypical/Nor98 scrapie in healthy slaughtered EU population [10], it is
probable that atypical scrapie infectivity enters in the food chain despite the
prevention measures in force.</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
Finally, the capacity of Atypical/Nor98 scrapie agent (and more generally
of small ruminants TSE agents) to cross species barrier that naturally limits
the transmission risk is insufficiently documented. Recently, the transmission
of an Atypical/Nor98 scrapie isolate was reported into transgenic mice
over-expressing the porcine PrP [47]. Such results cannot directly be
extrapolated to natural exposure conditions and natural hosts. However, they
underline the urgent need for further investigations on the potential capacity
of Atypical/Nor98 scrapie to propagate in other species than small
ruminants.</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
<a href="http://www.plospathogens.org/article/info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.ppat.1001285" title="http://www.plospathogens.org/article/info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.ppat.1001285">http://www.plospathogens.org/article/info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.ppat.1001285</a></div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
please see more transmissions studies here ;</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
Friday, February 11, 2011</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
Atypical/Nor98 Scrapie Infectivity in Sheep Peripheral Tissues</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
<a href="http://nor-98.blogspot.com/2011/02/atypicalnor98-scrapie-infectivity-in.html">http://nor-98.blogspot.com/2011/02/atypicalnor98-scrapie-infectivity-in.html</a>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
Monday, April 25, 2011</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
Experimental Oral Transmission of Atypical Scrapie to Sheep</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
Volume 17, Number 5-May 2011</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
<a href="http://nor-98.blogspot.com/2011/04/experimental-oral-transmission-of.html">http://nor-98.blogspot.com/2011/04/experimental-oral-transmission-of.html</a>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
Tuesday, July 17, 2012 </div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
O.I.E. BSE, CWD, SCRAPIE, TSE PRION DISEASE Final Report of the 80th
General Session, 20 - 25 May 2012 </div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
<a href="http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2012/07/oie-bse-cwd-scrapie-tse-prion-disease.html">http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2012/07/oie-bse-cwd-scrapie-tse-prion-disease.html</a>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
<br />
<br />
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
Thursday, December 20, 2012 </div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
OIE GROUP RECOMMENDS THAT SCRAPE PRION DISEASE BE DELISTED AND SAME OLD BSe
WITH BOVINE MAD COW DISEASE </div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
<a href="http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2012/12/oie-group-recommends-that-scrape-prion.html">http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2012/12/oie-group-recommends-that-scrape-prion.html</a>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
***The pathology features of Nor98 in the cerebellum of the affected sheep
showed similarities with those of sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease in
humans.</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
<br />
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
<a href="http://www.prion2007.com/pdf/Prion%20Book%20of%20Abstracts.pdf">http://www.prion2007.com/pdf/Prion%20Book%20of%20Abstracts.pdf</a>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
<br />
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
*** Intriguingly, these conclusions suggest that some pathological features
of Nor98 are reminiscent of Gerstmann-Sträussler-Scheinker disease. </div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
119</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
<a href="http://www.neuroprion.com/pdf_docs/conferences/prion2006/abstract_book.pdf">http://www.neuroprion.com/pdf_docs/conferences/prion2006/abstract_book.pdf</a>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
*** These observations support the view that a truly infectious TSE agent,
unrecognized until recently, infects sheep and goat flocks and may have
important implications in terms of scrapie control and public health.</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
<a href="http://www.pnas.org/content/102/44/16031.abstract">http://www.pnas.org/content/102/44/16031.abstract</a>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
Furthermore, after adaptation in the porcine mouse model this prion showed
similar biological and biochemical characteristics than BSE adapted to this
porcine mouse model. Altogether these data indicate.</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
(i) the unsuspected potential abilities of atypical scrapie to cross
species barriers</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
(ii) the possible capacity of this agent to acquire new characteristics
when crossing species barrier</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
<br />
</div>
<div>
These findings raise some interrogation on the concept of TSE strain and on
the origin of the diversity of the TSE agents and could have consequences on
field TSE control measures.</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
<br />
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
<a href="http://www.neuroprion.org/resources/pdf_docs/conferences/prion2008/abstract-book-prion2008.pdf">http://www.neuroprion.org/resources/pdf_docs/conferences/prion2008/abstract-book-prion2008.pdf</a>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
<br />
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
Wednesday, January 18, 2012 </div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
Selection of Distinct Strain Phenotypes in Mice Infected by Ovine Natural
Scrapie Isolates Similar to CH1641 Experimental Scrapie </div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
Journal of Neuropathology & Experimental Neurology: </div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
February 2012 - Volume 71 - Issue 2 - p 140–147 </div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
<br />
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
<a href="http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2012/01/selection-of-distinct-strain-phenotypes.html">http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2012/01/selection-of-distinct-strain-phenotypes.html</a></div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
Thursday, March 29, 2012 </div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
atypical Nor-98 Scrapie has spread from coast to coast in the USA 2012
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
NIAA Annual Conference April 11-14, 2011San Antonio, Texas </div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
<a href="http://nor-98.blogspot.com/2012/03/atypical-nor-98-scrapie-has-spread-from.html">http://nor-98.blogspot.com/2012/03/atypical-nor-98-scrapie-has-spread-from.html</a>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
<br />
<br />
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
Monday, November 30, 2009 </div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
USDA AND OIE COLLABORATE TO EXCLUDE ATYPICAL SCRAPIE NOR-98 ANIMAL HEALTH
CODE </div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
<a href="http://nor-98.blogspot.com/2009/11/usda-and-oie-collaborate-to-exclude.html">http://nor-98.blogspot.com/2009/11/usda-and-oie-collaborate-to-exclude.html</a>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
Thursday, December 20, 2012 </div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
OIE GROUP RECOMMENDS THAT SCRAPE PRION DISEASE BE DELISTED </div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
<br />
</div>
<div>
<a href="http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2012/12/oie-group-recommends-that-scrape-prion.html">http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2012/12/oie-group-recommends-that-scrape-prion.html</a></div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
why do we not want to do TSE transmission studies on chimpanzees $ </div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
5. A positive result from a chimpanzee challenged severly would likely
create alarm in some circles even if the result could not be interpreted for
man. I have a view that all these agents could be transmitted provided a large
enough dose by appropriate routes was given and the animals kept long enough.
Until the mechanisms of the species barrier are more clearly understood it might
be best to retain that hypothesis. </div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
snip... </div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
R. BRADLEY </div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
<a href="http://collections.europarchive.org/tna/20080102222950/http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/yb/1990/09/23001001.pdf">http://collections.europarchive.org/tna/20080102222950/http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/yb/1990/09/23001001.pdf</a>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
Wednesday, February 16, 2011 </div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
IN CONFIDENCE </div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
SCRAPIE TRANSMISSION TO CHIMPANZEES </div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
IN CONFIDENCE </div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
<a href="http://scrapie-usa.blogspot.com/2011/02/in-confidence-scrapie-transmission-to.html">http://scrapie-usa.blogspot.com/2011/02/in-confidence-scrapie-transmission-to.html</a>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
<br />
<br />
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
Sunday, December 12, 2010 </div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
EFSA reviews BSE/TSE infectivity in small ruminant tissues News Story 2
December 2010 </div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
<a href="http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2010/12/efsa-reviews-bsetse-infectivity-in.html">http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2010/12/efsa-reviews-bsetse-infectivity-in.html</a>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
Sunday, April 18, 2010 </div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
SCRAPIE AND ATYPICAL SCRAPIE TRANSMISSION STUDIES A REVIEW 2010 </div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
<a href="http://scrapie-usa.blogspot.com/2010/04/scrapie-and-atypical-scrapie.html">http://scrapie-usa.blogspot.com/2010/04/scrapie-and-atypical-scrapie.html</a> </div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
Thursday, December 23, 2010 </div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
Molecular Typing of Protease-Resistant Prion Protein in Transmissible
Spongiform Encephalopathies of Small Ruminants, France, 2002-2009 </div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
Volume 17, Number 1 January 2011 </div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
<a href="http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2010/12/molecular-typing-of-protease-resistant.html">http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2010/12/molecular-typing-of-protease-resistant.html</a>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
<br />
<br />
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
Thursday, November 18, 2010 </div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
Increased susceptibility of human-PrP transgenic mice to bovine spongiform
encephalopathy following passage in sheep </div>
<div>
<br />
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
<a href="http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2010/11/increased-susceptibility-of-human-prp.html">http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2010/11/increased-susceptibility-of-human-prp.html</a>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
<br />
<br />
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
Michigan and California have had a high spike in Goat Scrapie cases,
compared to elsewhere ??? </div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
three is a serious problem with scrapie in goats around Michigan, Ohio, and
California, that no one can explain, and it’s not because I have not tried to
make them aware of it ;</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
----- Original Message ----- </div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
From: "BioMed Central Comments" </div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
To: </div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
Sent: Wednesday, February 16, 2011 4:13 AM </div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
Subject: Your comment on BMC Veterinary Research 2011, 7:7</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
Your discussion posting "Scrapie cases Goats from same herd USA Michigan"
has been rejected by the moderator as not being appropriate for inclusion on the
site.</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
Dear Mr Singeltary,</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
Thank you for submitting your comment on BMC Veterinary Research article
(2011, 7:7). We have read your comment with interest but we feel that only the
authors of the article can answer your question about further investigation of
the route of infection of the five goats in Michigan. We advise that you contact
the authors directly rather than post a comment on the article.</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
With best wishes,</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
Maria</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
Maria Kowalczuk, PhD Deputy Biology Editor BMC-series Journals</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
BioMed Central 236 Gray's Inn Road London, WC1X 8HB</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
+44 20 3192 2000 (tel) +44 20 3192 2010 (fax)</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
W: www.biomedcentral.com E: Maria.Kowalczuk@biomedcentral.com</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
Any queries about this decision should be sent to
comments@biomedcentral.com</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
Regards</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
BMC Veterinary Research</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
=========END...TSS=========</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
<a href="http://scrapie-usa.blogspot.com/2011/02/sparse-prp-sc-accumulation-in-placentas.html">http://scrapie-usa.blogspot.com/2011/02/sparse-prp-sc-accumulation-in-placentas.html</a></div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
Tuesday, February 01, 2011 </div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
<br />
</div>
<div>
Sparse PrP-Sc accumulation in the placentas of goats with naturally
acquired scrapie </div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
<br />
</div>
<div>
(Figure 6) including five goat cases in FY 2008 that originated from the
same herd in Michigan. This is highly unusual for goats, and I strenuously urge
that there should be an independent investigation into finding the common
denominator for these 5 goats in the same herd in Michigan with Scrapie. ...
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
<a href="http://scrapie-usa.blogspot.com/2011/02/sparse-prp-sc-accumulation-in-placentas.html">http://scrapie-usa.blogspot.com/2011/02/sparse-prp-sc-accumulation-in-placentas.html</a>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
Wednesday, February 20, 2013 </div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
World Organization for Animal Health Recommends United States' BSE Risk
Status Be Upgraded </div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
Statement from Agriculture Secretary Tom Vilsack: </div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
<a href="http://madcowusda.blogspot.com/2013/02/world-organization-for-animal-health.html">http://madcowusda.blogspot.com/2013/02/world-organization-for-animal-health.html</a>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
<br />
<br />
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
Thursday, February 14, 2013 </div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
The Many Faces of Mad Cow Disease Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy BSE and
TSE prion disease </div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
<br />
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
<a href="http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2013/02/the-many-faces-of-mad-cow-disease.html">http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2013/02/the-many-faces-of-mad-cow-disease.html</a>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
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<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
Friday, February 08, 2013 </div>
<div>
<br />
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
*** Behavior of Prions in the Environment: Implications for Prion Biology </div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
<a href="http://chronic-wasting-disease.blogspot.com/2013/02/behavior-of-prions-in-environment.html">http://chronic-wasting-disease.blogspot.com/2013/02/behavior-of-prions-in-environment.html</a>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
Friday, November 09, 2012 </div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
*** Chronic Wasting Disease CWD in cervidae and transmission to other
species </div>
<div>
<br />
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
<a href="http://chronic-wasting-disease.blogspot.com/2012/11/chronic-wasting-disease-cwd-in-cervidae.html">http://chronic-wasting-disease.blogspot.com/2012/11/chronic-wasting-disease-cwd-in-cervidae.html</a>
</div>
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</div>
<div>
Sunday, November 11, 2012 </div>
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<br />
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
*** Susceptibilities of Nonhuman Primates to Chronic Wasting Disease
November 2012 </div>
<div>
<br />
<br />
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
<a href="http://chronic-wasting-disease.blogspot.com/2012/11/susceptibilities-of-nonhuman-primates.html">http://chronic-wasting-disease.blogspot.com/2012/11/susceptibilities-of-nonhuman-primates.html</a>
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</div>
<div>
Friday, December 14, 2012 </div>
<div>
<br />
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
Susceptibility Chronic Wasting Disease (CWD) in wild cervids to Humans 2005
- December 14, 2012 </div>
<div>
<br />
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
<a href="http://chronic-wasting-disease.blogspot.com/2012/12/susceptibility-chronic-wasting-disease.html">http://chronic-wasting-disease.blogspot.com/2012/12/susceptibility-chronic-wasting-disease.html</a>
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<div>
>>>There are 75 cervid farms in Norway. Most of the farms keep red deer, and only a few keep fallow deer (Dama dama).<<<<</div>
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</div>
<div>
<br />
<br />
<br />
</div>
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</div>
<div>
Tuesday, December 18, 2012 </div>
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<br />
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
*** A Growing Threat How deer breeding could put public trust wildlife at
risk </div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
<a href="http://chronic-wasting-disease.blogspot.com/2012/12/a-growing-threat-how-deer-breeding.html">http://chronic-wasting-disease.blogspot.com/2012/12/a-growing-threat-how-deer-breeding.html</a>
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<div>
NORWAY HUMAN TSE PRION DISEASE </div>
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<div>
EUROCJD Surveillance Data</div>
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</div>
<div>
Total Cases of CJD/GSS (Deaths)</div>
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</div>
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</div>
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<div>
All Definite And Probable Cases: </div>
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</div>
<div>
Sporadic, Familial/Genetic, FFI, GSS and Iatrogenic Deaths (excluding vCJD)
</div>
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</div>
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</div>
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</div>
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</div>
<div>
Country 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Total </div>
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</div>
<div>
Norway - - - - 6 2 2 4 6 3 6 8 4 4 5 3 5 2 4 64 </div>
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</div>
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</div>
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</div>
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</div>
<div>
All CJD (excluding vCJD): Annual Mortality Rates Per Million </div>
<div>
</div>
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</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
Norway - - - - 1.37 0.45 0.45 0.89 1.33 0.66 1.32 1.75 0.87 0.86 1.07 0.63
1.04 0.41 0.81 0.92 </div>
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<div>
<a href="http://www.eurocjd.ed.ac.uk/surveillance%20data%202.htm">http://www.eurocjd.ed.ac.uk/surveillance%20data%202.htm</a>
</div>
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</div>
<div>
Creutzfeldt-Jacob disease</div>
<div>
</div>
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<div>
Incidence / incidence rate 2006</div>
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</div>
<div>
4 / 0.9 per 1 million population</div>
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</div>
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</div>
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</div>
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</div>
<div>
All four cases of Creutzfeldt-Jacob disease (CJD) reported in 2006 were
classified as sporadic CJD following autopsies.</div>
<div>
</div>
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</div>
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</div>
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</div>
<div>
Trends</div>
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</div>
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</div>
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</div>
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</div>
<div>
Suspected and confirmed cases of human transmissible spongiform
encephalopathies were made notifiable conditions in 1997.</div>
<div>
</div>
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</div>
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</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
All cases of CJD registered in Norway so far have been sporadic CJD
confirmed by autopsy. One of the cases is suspected to be a hereditary case.
Cases of iatrogenic or variant CJD have never been registered in Norway. BSE has
never been identified in Norwegian cattle. </div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
Table 35. Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease notifications in Norway 2000-2006 by
year of death. </div>
<div>
</div>
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</div>
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</div>
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</div>
<div>
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 </div>
<div>
</div>
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</div>
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</div>
<div>
3 5 3 5 7 4 4 </div>
<div>
</div>
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</div>
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</div>
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</div>
<div>
<a href="http://www.fhi.no/dokumenter/3d326fd31e.pdf">http://www.fhi.no/dokumenter/3d326fd31e.pdf</a>
</div>
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</div>
<div>
*** The discovery of previously unrecognized prion diseases in both humans
and animals (i.e., Nor98 in small ruminants) demonstrates that the range of
prion diseases might be wider than expected and raises crucial questions about
the epidemiology and strain properties of these new forms. We are investigating
this latter issue by molecular and biological comparison of VPSPr, GSS and
Nor98. </div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
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</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
VARIABLY PROTEASE-SENSITVE PRIONOPATHY IS TRANSMISSIBLE ...price of prion
poker goes up again $ </div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
OR-10: Variably protease-sensitive prionopathy is transmissible in bank
voles </div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
Romolo Nonno,1 Michele Di Bari,1 Laura Pirisinu,1 Claudia D’Agostino,1
Stefano Marcon,1 Geraldina Riccardi,1 Gabriele Vaccari,1 Piero Parchi,2 Wenquan
Zou,3 Pierluigi Gambetti,3 Umberto Agrimi1 1Istituto Superiore di Sanità; Rome,
Italy; 2Dipartimento di Scienze Neurologiche, Università di Bologna; Bologna,
Italy; 3Case Western Reserve University; Cleveland, OH USA </div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
Background. Variably protease-sensitive prionopathy (VPSPr) is a recently
described “sporadic”neurodegenerative disease involving prion protein
aggregation, which has clinical similarities with non-Alzheimer dementias, such
as fronto-temporal dementia. Currently, 30 cases of VPSPr have been reported in
Europe and USA, of which 19 cases were homozygous for valine at codon 129 of the
prion protein (VV), 8 were MV and 3 were MM. A distinctive feature of VPSPr is
the electrophoretic pattern of PrPSc after digestion with proteinase K (PK).
After PK-treatment, PrP from VPSPr forms a ladder-like electrophoretic pattern
similar to that described in GSS cases. The clinical and pathological features
of VPSPr raised the question of the correct classification of VPSPr among prion
diseases or other forms of neurodegenerative disorders. Here we report
preliminary data on the transmissibility and pathological features of VPSPr
cases in bank voles. </div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
Materials and Methods. Seven VPSPr cases were inoculated in two genetic
lines of bank voles, carrying either methionine or isoleucine at codon 109 of
the prion protein (named BvM109 and BvI109, respectively). Among the VPSPr cases
selected, 2 were VV at PrP codon 129, 3 were MV and 2 were MM. Clinical
diagnosis in voles was confirmed by brain pathological assessment and western
blot for PK-resistant PrPSc (PrPres) with mAbs SAF32, SAF84, 12B2 and 9A2.
</div>
<div>
</div>
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</div>
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</div>
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</div>
<div>
Results. To date, 2 VPSPr cases (1 MV and 1 MM) gave positive transmission
in BvM109. Overall, 3 voles were positive with survival time between 290 and 588
d post inoculation (d.p.i.). All positive voles accumulated PrPres in the form
of the typical PrP27–30, which was indistinguishable to that previously observed
in BvM109 inoculated with sCJDMM1 cases. </div>
<div>
</div>
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</div>
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</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
In BvI109, 3 VPSPr cases (2 VV and 1 MM) showed positive transmission until
now. Overall, 5 voles were positive with survival time between 281 and 596
d.p.i.. In contrast to what observed in BvM109, all BvI109 showed a GSS-like
PrPSc electrophoretic pattern, characterized by low molecular weight PrPres.
These PrPres fragments were positive with mAb 9A2 and 12B2, while being negative
with SAF32 and SAF84, suggesting that they are cleaved at both the C-terminus
and the N-terminus. Second passages are in progress from these first successful
transmissions. </div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
Conclusions. Preliminary results from transmission studies in bank voles
strongly support the notion that VPSPr is a transmissible prion disease.
Interestingly, VPSPr undergoes divergent evolution in the two genetic lines of
voles, with sCJD-like features in BvM109 and GSS-like properties in BvI109.
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
The discovery of previously unrecognized prion diseases in both humans and
animals (i.e., Nor98 in small ruminants) demonstrates that the range of prion
diseases might be wider than expected and raises crucial questions about the
epidemiology and strain properties of these new forms. We are investigating this
latter issue by molecular and biological comparison of VPSPr, GSS and Nor98.
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
<a href="http://www.landesbioscience.com/journals/prion/01-Prion6-2-OralPresentations.pdf?nocache=1216084967">http://www.landesbioscience.com/journals/prion/01-Prion6-2-OralPresentations.pdf?nocache=1216084967</a>
</div>
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</div>
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</div>
<div>
Wednesday, March 28, 2012 <br />
<br />
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
VARIABLY PROTEASE-SENSITVE PRIONOPATHY IS TRANSMISSIBLE, price of prion
poker goes up again $ </div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
<a href="http://prionopathy.blogspot.com/2012/03/variably-protease-sensitve-prionopathy.html">http://prionopathy.blogspot.com/2012/03/variably-protease-sensitve-prionopathy.html</a>
</div>
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<div>
Thursday, February 21, 2013 </div>
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</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
National Prion Disease Pathology Surveillance Center Cases Examined January
16, 2013 </div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
<a href="http://prionunitusaupdate2008.blogspot.com/2013/02/national-prion-disease-pathology.html">http://prionunitusaupdate2008.blogspot.com/2013/02/national-prion-disease-pathology.html</a>
</div>
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<div>
tss </div>
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</div>
Terry S. Singeltary Sr.http://www.blogger.com/profile/06986622967539963260noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4595956519532618538.post-42494824860671687582013-01-17T14:09:00.001-08:002013-01-17T14:23:16.854-08:00FSA notified of two breaches of BSE testing regulations 14 January 2013<div id="pageMeta">
<div>
14 January 2013 </div>
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<div>
FSA notified of two breaches of BSE testing regulations <br />
<br />
<br />
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
There have been two separate incidents in which cattle aged over 72 months
entered the food chain without being tested for BSE. The incidents involved a
total of three animals. <br />
<br />
<br />
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
The risk to human health is very low as it is very unlikely that any of the
cattle would have been infected. The specified risk material (SRM), parts of the
cattle most likely to carry BSE infection, had been removed in each case. </div>
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<div>
Bridport </div>
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<div>
On 20 August 2012, two cattle over 72 months of age were slaughtered at S J
Norman and Sons abattoir in Bridport and were not tested for BSE before leaving
the premises. One animal was 332 days over the 72 month age limit; the other by
1,383 days. The error was discovered on 22 October during routine cross-checks
of slaughter and BSE data. </div>
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</div>
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<div>
It is mandatory for all cattle slaughtered for human consumption and aged
over 72 months to have a negative BSE test result. According to regulations any
cattle that has not been tested, along with the animal slaughtered immediately
before it and the two immediately after, should not enter the food supply.
</div>
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<div>
In total, seven carcasses had to be traced in this instance, because of the
sequence of the two kills. Meat from these animals was mixed up with other
consignments. Most of the meat had been processed or sold on to the end consumer
and was no longer in the food supply chain. Of the remaining meat, 1,720 kg was
traced to a cold storage facility in Essex. It was disposed of and did not enter
the food supply. A further 233 kg had been exported to Malta and the Maltese
authorities were informed. <br />
<br />
<br />
</div>
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<div>
Nantwich </div>
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<div>
Separately, on 2 March 2012 a bovine that was 89 months and 27 days of age
was slaughtered at High Peak Meat Exports abattoir in Nantwich. Again it was not
tested before leaving the premises. The error was discovered during routine data
checks on 25 May. </div>
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<div>
The investigation found that only three animals were slaughtered on 2
March. The carcasses, along with six others slaughtered later that month, were
dispatched to the Netherlands on 6 March. The Dutch authorities were notified of
the breach. No edible meat or offal from the animals slaughtered on 2 March was
sold as food in the UK. </div>
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<div>
<a href="http://www.food.gov.uk/news-updates/news/2013/jan/bsetests">http://www.food.gov.uk/news-updates/news/2013/jan/bsetests</a>
</div>
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<div>
Wednesday, December 21, 2011 <br />
<br />
<br />
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
Potential mad cows that entered food supply without being tested for BSE
2011: UK END OF YEAR REVIEW </div>
<div>
</div>
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</div>
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</div>
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</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
<a href="http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2011/12/potential-mad-cows-that-entered-food.html">http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2011/12/potential-mad-cows-that-entered-food.html</a>
</div>
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<div>
Thursday, September 6, 2012 <br />
<br />
<br />
</div>
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</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
UK Breaches of BSE controls in consignments of beef 2011 communications
missing four reports </div>
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</div>
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</div>
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</div>
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</div>
<div>
<a href="http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2012/09/uk-breaches-of-bse-controls-in.html">http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2012/09/uk-breaches-of-bse-controls-in.html</a>
</div>
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<div>
Friday, December 21, 2012 </div>
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</div>
<div>
Four BSE cases with an L-BSE molecular profile in cattle from Great Britain
Veterinary Record doi:10.1136/vr.101158 Paper </div>
<div>
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</div>
<div>
<a href="http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2012/12/four-bse-cases-with-l-bse-molecular.html">http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2012/12/four-bse-cases-with-l-bse-molecular.html</a>
</div>
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<div>
Friday, November 30, 2012 </div>
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<div>
</div>
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</div>
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</div>
<div>
PROPOSED DECISION TO STOP BSE TESTING OF HEALTHY CATTLE SLAUGHTERED FOR
HUMAN CONSUMPTION FSA 12/12/04 Open Board – 11 December 2012</div>
<div>
</div>
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</div>
<div>
<a href="http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2012/11/proposed-decision-to-stop-bse-testing.html">http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2012/11/proposed-decision-to-stop-bse-testing.html</a>
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<div>
EURO QUALITY RECALLS ITS LAMBS' BRAINS <br />
<br />
<br />
</div>
<div>
</div>
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</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
Euro Quality Lambs Ltd is recalling its lambs’ brains, which have entered
the food chain without being inspected properly. The Food Standards Agency is
asking all local authority enforcement officers to ensure that the product is
withdrawn from sale and destroyed. The Agency has issued a Food Alert for
Action. </div>
<div>
</div>
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</div>
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</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
<a href="http://www.food.gov.uk/news-updates/recalls-news/2012/oct/eurolamb">http://www.food.gov.uk/news-updates/recalls-news/2012/oct/eurolamb</a>
</div>
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</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
Wednesday, February 16, 2011</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
IN CONFIDENCE</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
SCRAPIE TRANSMISSION TO CHIMPANZEES</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
IN CONFIDENCE <br />
<br />
<br />
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
<a href="http://scrapie-usa.blogspot.com/2011/02/in-confidence-scrapie-transmission-to.html">http://scrapie-usa.blogspot.com/2011/02/in-confidence-scrapie-transmission-to.html</a>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
why do we not want to do TSE transmission studies on chimpanzees $ </div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
snip... </div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
5. A positive result from a chimpanzee challenged severly would likely
create alarm in some circles even if the result could not be interpreted for
man. I have a view that all these agents could be transmitted provided a large
enough dose by appropriate routes was given and the animals kept long enough.
Until the mechanisms of the species barrier are more clearly understood it might
be best to retain that hypothesis. <br />
<br />
<br />
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
snip... <br />
<br />
<br />
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
R. BRADLEY </div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
<a href="http://collections.europarchive.org/tna/20080102222950/http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/yb/1990/09/23001001.pdf">http://collections.europarchive.org/tna/20080102222950/http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/yb/1990/09/23001001.pdf</a>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
Friday, February 11, 2011</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
Atypical/Nor98 Scrapie Infectivity in Sheep Peripheral Tissues <br />
<br />
<br />
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
<a href="http://nor-98.blogspot.com/2011/02/atypicalnor98-scrapie-infectivity-in.html">http://nor-98.blogspot.com/2011/02/atypicalnor98-scrapie-infectivity-in.html</a>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
Monday, April 25, 2011</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
Experimental Oral Transmission of Atypical Scrapie to Sheep<br />
<br />
<br />
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
Volume 17, Number 5-May 2011 </div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
<a href="http://nor-98.blogspot.com/2011/04/experimental-oral-transmission-of.html">http://nor-98.blogspot.com/2011/04/experimental-oral-transmission-of.html</a>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
Sunday, April 18, 2010</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
SCRAPIE AND ATYPICAL SCRAPIE TRANSMISSION STUDIES A REVIEW 2010 </div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
<a href="http://scrapie-usa.blogspot.com/2010/04/scrapie-and-atypical-scrapie.html">http://scrapie-usa.blogspot.com/2010/04/scrapie-and-atypical-scrapie.html</a>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
Thursday, November 18, 2010 </div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
Increased susceptibility of human-PrP transgenic mice to bovine spongiform
encephalopathy following passage in sheep </div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
<a href="http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2010/11/increased-susceptibility-of-human-prp.html">http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2010/11/increased-susceptibility-of-human-prp.html</a>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
Wednesday, January 19, 2011</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
EFSA and ECDC review scientific evidence on possible links between TSEs in
animals and humans Webnachricht 19 Januar 2011 </div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
<a href="http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/01/efsa-and-ecdc-review-scientific.html">http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/01/efsa-and-ecdc-review-scientific.html</a>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
Monday, June 27, 2011</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
Comparison of Sheep Nor98 with Human Variably Protease-Sensitive
Prionopathy and Gerstmann-Sträussler-Scheinker Disease </div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
<a href="http://prionopathy.blogspot.com/2011/06/comparison-of-sheep-nor98-with-human.html">http://prionopathy.blogspot.com/2011/06/comparison-of-sheep-nor98-with-human.html</a>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
Friday, December 14, 2012 </div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
DEFRA U.K. What is the risk of Chronic Wasting Disease CWD being introduced
into Great Britain? A Qualitative Risk Assessment October 2012 </div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
<a href="http://chronic-wasting-disease.blogspot.com/2012/12/defra-uk-what-is-risk-of-chronic.html">http://chronic-wasting-disease.blogspot.com/2012/12/defra-uk-what-is-risk-of-chronic.html</a>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
ANY RELAXING OF ANY BSE TESTING RULES WOULD NOT BE BASED ON SOUND SCIENCE,
BUT BASED ON INDUSTRY LED SCIENCE AND MONEY $$$ </div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
we now know that indeed atypical BSE is transmissible to cattle and other
species, and atypical BSE have been documented in older cattle to date. so
relaxing any BSE testing on older cattle would be a huge step backwards, and
could risk everything that has been done over the past 27 years to try and
eradicate BSE. ... </div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
on a lighter note, seems anything goes now $$$ </div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
16 January 2013 </div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
FSA investigation into horse DNA found in some burgers</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
The Food Standards Agency is investigating urgently how a number of beef
products on sale in the UK and Republic of Ireland came to contain some traces
of horse and pig DNA. </div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
The Food Safety Authority of Ireland reported yesterday (Tuesday, 15
January) that an analysis they carried out into the authenticity, or labelling
accuracy, of a number of burger products revealed that some contained horse and
pig DNA. </div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
In particular, 27 beefburger products were analysed, with 10 of the 27
products (37%) testing positive for horse DNA and 23 (85%) testing positive for
pig DNA. In nine of the ten beefburger samples, horse DNA was found at very low
levels. In one sample from Tesco, the level of horse DNA indicated that horse
meat was present and accounted for approximately 29% of the total meat content
of the burger. <br />
<br />
<br />
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
All of the retailers involved so far have removed potentially affected
products from their shelves. </div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
The FSA has been in contact overnight with the retailers and producers
named in the FSAI survey and has called a meeting this afternoon with a wider
range of food industry representatives to discover the extent of the potential
problem and to investigate how this contamination might have occurred. </div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
<a href="http://www.food.gov.uk/news-updates/news/2013/jan/horse">http://www.food.gov.uk/news-updates/news/2013/jan/horse</a>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
Thursday, January 5, 2012</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
Horse Meat, slaughter for consumption USA </div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
snip... </div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
Greetings, </div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
for what it’s worth. </div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
I am against horse slaughter for consumption or any other purpose i.e.
fertilizer, plastic, fuel, etc. </div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
I am against the use of primates in scientific studies. because arguments
will always persist on proof of human relation from any given study. However, I
am for Human use in place of Primates in these studies. I said it long ago.
Death Row inmates. compensate the families and do the studies on these death row
inmates. it could be the last good thing they ever do. just my opinion. </div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
For horses, they should use the same policy they use in the USA for old
diseased mad cows, i.e. SSS policy. shoot, shovel, and shut up. either bury them
or incinerate them. again, just my opinion. </div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
there is no humanity anymore $$$ <br />
<br />
<br />
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
It brings me to the old movie. how many times do old movies come true?
strange... </div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
'soyent green'. </div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
see ; </div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
Soylent Green is a 1973 dystopian science fiction movie depicting a future
in which overpopulation lead to depleted resources, which in turn leads to
widespread unemployment and poverty. Real fruit, vegetables, and meat are rare,
commodities are expensive, and much of the population survives on processed food
rations, including "soylent green" wafers. </div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
The film overlays the science fiction and police procedural genres as it
depicts the efforts of New York City police detective Robert Thorn (Charlton
Heston) and elderly police researcher Sol Roth (Edward G. Robinson) to
investigate the brutal murder of a wealthy businessman named William R. Simonson
(Joseph Cotten). Thorn and Roth uncover clues which suggest that it is more than
simply a bungled burglary. <br />
<br />
<br />
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
snip... </div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
After Roth dies, Thorn sneaks into the basement of the government-assisted
suicide facility, where he sees corpses being loaded onto waste disposal trucks.
He secretly hitches a ride on one of the trucks, which is driven to a heavily
guarded waste disposal plant. Once inside the plant, Thorn sees how the corpses
are processed into Soylent Green wafers. After Thorn escapes from the plant and
heads for the supreme exchange with the information, he is ambushed by Fielding
and several other gunmen. In the shootout, Thorn kills some of the gunmen, but
is himself wounded. He retreats into a cathedral filled with homeless people.
After a desperate fight, Thorn stabs and kills Fielding. </div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
When police backup arrives, the seriously wounded and nearly hysterical
Thorn confides to Hatcher the horrible secret behind Soylent Green and urges him
to spread the word: "Soylent Green is people! We've got to stop them somehow!" <br />
<br />
<br />
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
<a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Soylent_Green">http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Soylent_Green</a> <br />
<br />
<br />
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
don’t believe me, were almost there ; </div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
<a href="http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/08/creating-plastic-from-beef-and-what.html">http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/08/creating-plastic-from-beef-and-what.html</a>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
IN CONFIDENCE </div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
SUSPECT BSE IN A HORSE </div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
CYO BSE 1 9 </div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
IN CONFIDENCE <br />
<br />
<br />
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
SUSPECT BSE IN A HORSE </div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
The Parliamentary Secretary (Mr Maclean) will wish to be aware that, in
making his differential diagnosis, a veterinary surgeon in the Reading area has
included the possibility of BSE in a horse under his care. Although it is
unlikely to be BSE, because of the symptoms exhibited the veterinarian believes
that he cannot exclude the possibility. The case was brought to the notice of
one of the veterinary staff at the CVL by the owner's veterinary surgeon and
liaison is being maintained. </div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
The horse in question is a five-year old eventing gelding which was
purchased by the present owner about four months ago. Approximately two months
after purchase the animal became a little apprehensive, developed mild nervous
symptoms and became over-sensitive to noise. The nervous symptoms have increased
and the horse is now practically impossible to ride. Investigations by the
owner's private veterinary surgeon are continuing but it is likely that the
animal will have to be destroyed. </div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
If the horse should die or be destroyed, a full post-mortem examination
will be required for insurance purposes and will probably be carried out at a
non-Ministry laboratory. However, Mr Bradley of the Pathology Department, CVL,
has informed the private veterinary surgeon that he is willing to provide a
second opinion on the brain histology if requested. <br />
<br />
<br />
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
I will keep the Parliamentary Secretary informed of any further
developments in the case. </div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
I CRAWFORD </div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
14 May 1990 <br />
<br />
<br />
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
Mr M P H Hill, PS/Parliamentary secretary (Mr Maclean) - by FAX </div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
cc: </div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
Private Offices </div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
Mr K C Meldrum </div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
Mrs E A J Attridge D J Evans Mr K C Taylor Mr R Lawson Mr R Bradley. CVL
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
(hand written notes i cannot read all (cut short) as follows...tss) </div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
The Parliamentary Secretary (Mr Maclean was grateful for this. He said that
we must keep very close to ...on it, and when the horse dies, or is put down we
must be told immediately. He also feels it is very important that our veterinary
staff be involved in the brain examination. .........(cannot read the rest
.............TSS) </div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
90/05.14/10.1 </div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
<a href="http://collections.europarchive.org/tna/20090114125643/http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/yb/1990/05/14010001.pdf">http://collections.europarchive.org/tna/20090114125643/http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/yb/1990/05/14010001.pdf</a>
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Mr A Huws Principal WOAD2A CP2 </div>
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SUSPECT BSE IN A HORSE <br />
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<div>
You will wish to be aware that on Thursday afternoon 25 June the T/DVO
Powys received a phone call from a veterinary Surgeon reporting his suspicion
that a horse had ___contracted BSE after having been fed cattle cake___. </div>
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The clinical symptoms described were similar to those shown by cattle there
___being a similar case some months ago on the same premises___. </div>
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The owner' s name and address is: </div>
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Irene Thomas J Thomas & Company Riding Stables Penybryn Llangorse
Brecon </div>
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The horse is a 12 year old gelding used for pony trekking. </div>
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By yesterday evening the horse was in a comatose state and on humane
grounds was destroyed by the veterinary Surgeon. At his request a full post
mortem and laboratory investigation will be carried out at the Carmarthen
Veterinary Investigation Centre this morning to ascertain the exact cause; I
have been told this will take at least two weeks. Charges to the veterinary
Surgeon have been waived in this instance. <br />
<br />
<br />
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I will inform you immediately I receive a diagnosis. </div>
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26 June 1990 </div>
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D SUMMERS DRVO </div>
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cc </div>
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Mr D R Williams, RVO <br />
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Mr A R Hunter, SVIO </div>
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90/06.26/10.1 </div>
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<a href="http://collections.europarchive.org/tna/20090505194948/http://bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/yb/1990/06/26009001.pdf">http://collections.europarchive.org/tna/20090505194948/http://bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/yb/1990/06/26009001.pdf</a>
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Mr A Huws Principal WOAD2A CP2 </div>
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<div>
SUSPECT BSE IN A HORSE </div>
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You will wish to be aware that on Thursday afternoon 25 June the T/DVO
Powys received a phone call from a veterinary Surgeon reporting his suspicion
that a horse had contracted BSE after having been fed cattle cake. The clinical
symptoms described were similar to those shown by cattle there being a similar
case some months ago on the same premises. </div>
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The owner' s name and address is: </div>
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<div>
Irene Thomas J Thomas & Company Riding Stables Penybryn Llangorse
Brecon </div>
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The horse is a 12 year old gelding used for pony trekking. </div>
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By yesterday evening the horse was in a comatose state and on humane
grounds was destroyed by the veterinary Surgeon. At his request a full post
mortem and laboratory investigation will be carried out at the Carmarthen
Veterinary Investigation Centre this morning to ascertain the exact cause; I
have been told this will take at least two weeks. Charges to the veterinary
Surgeon have been waived in this instance. </div>
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I will inform you immediately I receive a diagnosis. </div>
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26 June 1990 </div>
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D SUMMERS DRVO </div>
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cc <br />
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<div>
Mr D R Williams, RVO </div>
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<div>
Mr A R Hunter, SVIO </div>
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90/06.26/10.1 <br />
<br />
<br />
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<div>
<a href="http://collections.europarchive.org/tna/20090505194948/http://bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/yb/1990/06/26010001.pdf">http://collections.europarchive.org/tna/20090505194948/http://bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/yb/1990/06/26010001.pdf</a>
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full text ; </div>
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<a href="http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/03/detection-of-prion-protein-in-urine.html">http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/03/detection-of-prion-protein-in-urine.html</a>
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we know that horses, especially quarter horses and show horses are fed feed
with high animal protein content, and it’s perfectly legal. </div>
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see ; <br />
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<div>
Nonprohibited Materials: <br />
<br />
<br />
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<div>
These feed materials CAN be fed to ruminants. <br />
<br />
<br />
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<div>
A. The following protein products derived from mammals, including
ruminants, are exempt from the Ruminant Feed Ban rule and CAN be fed to
ruminants: </div>
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</div>
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Blood and blood products <br />
<br />
<br />
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</div>
<div>
Milk products (milk and milk protein) </div>
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</div>
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Pure porcine (pork) protein </div>
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Pure equine (horse) protein </div>
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Gelatin Inspected meat products, such as plate waste, which have been
cooked and offered for human food and further heat processed for animal feed. <br />
<br />
<br />
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<div>
snip... see full text ; </div>
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<a href="http://agr.wa.gov/foodanimal/animalfeed/Publications/ProhibMatDefs.pdf">http://agr.wa.gov/foodanimal/animalfeed/Publications/ProhibMatDefs.pdf</a>
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From: TSS </div>
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Subject: MAD COW/HORSE FEED BAN VIOLATIONS WARNING LETTER July 20, 2001 USA
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Date: August 14, 2001 at 11:36 am PST </div>
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DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICE <br />
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July 20, 2001 </div>
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CERTIFIED MAIL RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED </div>
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WARNING LETTER Ref. KAN 2001-028 </div>
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Mr. Eric N. Blomkuist, CEO Farnam Companies, Inc. 301 W. Osborn P.O. Box
34820 Phoenix, AZ 85013 </div>
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Dear Mr. Blomkuist: </div>
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An inspection of your Council Bluffs, Iowa facility that serves as a
manufacturing/repackaging site for animal feed and as a distribution operation
for animal drugs and feeds conducted on June 13-20, 2001 by an Investigator
representing this office found significant deviations from the requirements set
forth in Title 21, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 589.2000 - Animal Proteins
Prohibited in Ruminant Feed. This regulation is intended to prevent the
establishment and amplification of Bovine Spongiform Encephalophathy (BSE)
within the borders of the United States. Such deviations cause products being
manufactured and/or distributed by your facility to be adulterated within the
meaning of Section 402(a)(4) and misbranded within the meaning of Section 403(F)
of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (the Act). </div>
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The inspection revealed the following: </div>
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There are no written procedures demonstrating the clean-out process used to
prevent the cross- contamination of product. Your firm uses common equipment for
product manufactured with prohibited material and for feed and/or drugs that are
not. </div>
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Your firm distributes products that may contain prohibited material,
specifically Flex Free, Equinyl, Generation and Max Flex, that are not labeled
with the required cautionary statement "Do Not Feed to Cattle or Other
Ruminants" <br />
<br />
<br />
</div>
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</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
The above is not intended to be an all-inclusive list of violations. As a
manufacturer of products intended for animal feed use you are responsible for
assuring that your overall operation and the products you manufacture and
distribute are in compliance with the law. At the conclusion of the inspection
Form FDA483, List of Inspectional Observations was issued to Ronald G. Adler,
Plant Manager identifying these and other deviations. A copy is enclosed for
your information. </div>
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<div>
Our Investigator reported a telephone discussion with Mr. Barry G. Harrison
who identified himself as the Corporate Counsel of the Farnam Companies, Inc.
During this discussion Mr. Harrison, reportedly, claimed the products in
question are exempt from the cautionary statement requirement. This claimed
exemption is based on the fact the products are intended only for the equine
market and your firm defines horses as pets. We cannot accept this claimed
exemption because while some horses may be held as pets, horses are also working
animals and in some parts of North America, food animals. </div>
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Based on our knowledge of working ranches, horse feed is often stored in
the same general area as ruminant feed making a conspicuous cautionary statenmit
vital on feeds and supplements, containing prohibited materials. </div>
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You should take prompt action to correct the above violations and to
establish procedures whereby such violations do not recur. Failure to make
immediate and lasting corrections may result in regulatory actions without
further notice including but not limiting to product seizure and/or injunction. <br />
<br />
<br />
</div>
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</div>
<div>
You should respond, in writing, Within 15 working days of the steps you
have taken to bring your firm into compliance with the law. Please include all
the steps you plan to take, the timeframe for completing these actions and any
documentation demonstrating the action's completion. </div>
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Your response should be directed to Ralph J. Gray, Compliance Officer at
the above address. </div>
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<div>
Sincerely, Charles W. Sedgwick District Director Kansas City District
Office </div>
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<div>
Cc: Mr. John C. Williams CEO, Manufacturing and Distribution Farnam
Companies, Inc, 1302 Law Ross Road Council Bluffs, IA 51501 </div>
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<div>
<a href="http://www.fda.gov/foi/warning_letters/g1573d.pdf">http://www.fda.gov/foi/warning_letters/g1573d.pdf</a>
</div>
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<div>
Subject: Re: MAD COW/HORSE FEED BAN VIOLATIONS WARNING LETTER July 20, 2001
</div>
<div>
</div>
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<div>
Date: Tue, 14 Aug 2001 23:43:26 –0400 </div>
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<div>
From: "Robert A. LaBudde" </div>
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<div>
Reply-To: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy </div>
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To: <a href="mailto:BSE-L@uni-karlsruhe.de">BSE-L@uni-karlsruhe.de</a> <br />
<br />
<br />
</div>
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</div>
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<div>
######## Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy ######### </div>
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<div>
At 01:41 PM 8/14/01 -0700, </div>
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<div>
Terry wrote: <br />
<br />
<br />
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
>DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICE <br />
<br />
<br />
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
> >July 20, 2001 </div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
> >Our Investigator reported a telephone discussion with Mr. Barry G. <br />
<br />
<br />
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
>Harrison who identified himself as the Corporate Counsel of the Farnam <br />
<br />
<br />
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
>Companies, Inc. During this discussion Mr. Harrison, reportedly,
claimed <br />
<br />
<br />
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
>the products in question are exempt from the cautionary statement <br />
<br />
<br />
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
>requirement. This claimed exemption is based on the fact the products
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
>are intended only for the equine market and your firm defines horses as
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
>pets. We cannot accept this claimed exemption because while some horses
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
>may be held as pets, horses are also working animals and in some parts <br />
<br />
<br />
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
>of North America, food animals. <br />
<br />
<br />
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
> >Based on our knowledge of working ranches, horse feed is often
stored in </div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
>the same general area as ruminant feed making a conspicuous cautionary
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
>statenmit vital on feeds and supplements, <br />
<br />
<br />
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
>containing prohibited materials. </div>
<div>
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<div>
Terry: </div>
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<div>
Perhaps you should pester FDA about this "loophole". Apparently, "pet food"
does not have to bear the warning labels specified for food animals. </div>
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<div>
I can't see any serious objection to expanding the label requirement to ALL
animal food, not just food animals. <br />
<br />
<br />
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
Also, horses are "ruminants", so it's disturbing that they might escape the
feed ban by being classified as "pets". Another good reason to extend the
warning labels and regulation to all animal foods. </div>
<div>
</div>
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</div>
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</div>
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<div>
Perhaps you could submit a request for ruling to the FDA on this issue to
propose amending the regulation to include all animal foods, including pet
foods. <br />
<br />
<br />
</div>
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</div>
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</div>
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</div>
<div>
================================================================ </div>
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<div>
Robert A. LaBudde, PhD, PAS, Dpl. ACAFS e-mail: ral@lcfltd.com Least Cost
Formulations, Ltd. URL: <a href="http://lcfltd.com/">http://lcfltd.com/</a> 824
Timberlake Drive Tel: 757-467-0954 Virginia Beach, VA 23464-3239 Fax:
757-467-2947 </div>
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"Vere scire est per causas scire" </div>
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================================================================ </div>
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Subject: Re: Horses & ruminants </div>
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Date: Wed, 15 Aug 2001 12:41:29 +0200 </div>
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From: Roland Heynkes </div>
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Reply-To: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy </div>
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To: <a href="mailto:BSE-L@uni-karlsruhe.de">BSE-L@uni-karlsruhe.de</a> <br />
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######## Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy ######### </div>
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Dear Robert and Oz, <br />
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>> Also, horses are "ruminants", so it's disturbing that they <br />
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>> might escape the feed ban by being classified as "pets". <br />
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>> Another good reason to >extend the warning labels and <br />
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>> regulation to all animal foods. </div>
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> > Just a note that horses are NOT ruminants, as I am sure <br />
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> robert knows from the quotes. </div>
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> They are however herbivores. <br />
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> It's also worth noting problems with x-infection found <br />
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> in the EU. </div>
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> although horses are not ruminants, it is of course a very poor idea to
exclude them from a feed ban. Unfortunately exactly this is the case even in
Germany, where horses are still excluded from the ban, if they are not intended
to become human food. As Oz mentioned, this opens an absolutely unnecessary
possibility for cross contaminations. Of course I repeatedly informed the
involved German politicians and authorities about this problem, but they are not
interested. <br />
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This perfectly fits to the fact, that most German authorities are still not
prepared to inform the public about the German BSE cases. If you are interested
in some information about this cases, you have to visit private Internet sites.
Instead most German authorities provide the public with down playing statements
and links to meat industry and marketing agencies. Links to sites with
scientific information about TSE safety problems are not allowed on this
official sites. Official sites with useful information comparable with those
that we all know from the UK, are not wanted in Germany. </div>
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This also perfectly fits to the fact, that it is at least in Germany well
known since 5 days for those who are interested in such information, that Dr.
Margit Herbst won the Whistleblower-Prize. You may be not surprised to learn,
that this prize is from a scientific association, not from politics. She gets
it, because she lost her job, just because she informed the public about the
fact that her superiors were not prepared to run the necessary pathological
examinations with more than 20 cattle, that she had found to show BSE symptoms
between 1990 and 1994 in just one German abattoir. At that time this was the
political signal for all German vets not to find any German BSE cases. And as
you know, the Bavarian vets were not prepared to let my speak about German BSE
risks even in May 2001. </div>
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I was interested to see, if any of the German members of this list would
forward this good news about Dr. Margrit Herbst. In my opinion it is absolutely
typical that this was not the case and that again I had to do this. <br />
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By the way, studying the British BSE statistics I found that the risk to
become infected, was sharply declining from birth to the age of about 6 months
and that for a given period of time the risk of infection was about 5-times as
high for a calf in comparison to adult animals. It is therefore clear, that many
cattle became infected only as adults. The detailed analysis will be on my site
until the end of this week. </div>
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kind regards </div>
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Roland <br />
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########### <a href="http://mailhost.rz.uni-karlsruhe.de/warc/bse-l.html">http://mailhost.rz.uni-karlsruhe.de/warc/bse-l.html</a>
############ </div>
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Subject: Re: MAD COW/HORSE FEED BAN VIOLATIONS WARNING LETTER </div>
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July 20, 200 1 Date: Thu, 16 Aug 2001 13:52:58 –0400 </div>
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From: "Cook, Nancy" Reply-To: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy <br />
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To: <a href="mailto:BSE-L@uni-karlsruhe.de">BSE-L@uni-karlsruhe.de</a> </div>
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######## Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy ######### </div>
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Robert, just wanted to comment on your request that the "Do not feed to
Cattle or other Ruminants" statement be placed on all animal feeds. In 1997, we
undertook a broad, five city survey to determine what effect that statement
might have in the marketplace if it occurred on pet food labels. </div>
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Overwhelmingly, and in all locations, an immediate and severe effect was
projected, not only into pet food, but into the Meat Counter as well, as people
struggled with the idea that "if it's not good for ruminants (whatever they
are?), why should I feed it to my pets, and oh, by the way, why should I eat
beef at all if it's a problem?" <br />
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The Office of Management and Budget agreed with our findings and advised
FDA that the labeling was not needed on pet food for retail sale or for
laboratory animal feed. However, salvage products are required to bear the
statement, since those products are often used for swine feed. </div>
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In most states, pets are classified as dogs and cats. Specialty pets are
other caged and "aquariumed" critters. Horses and rabbits are classified as
livestock. </div>
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Hope this is helpful. </div>
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Nancy K. Cook Pet Food Institute 2025 M Street, Suite 800 Washington, DC
20036 202-367-1120 202-367-2120 (fax) </div>
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Subject: Re: MAD COW/HORSE FEED BAN VIOLATIONS WARNING LETTER July 20, 2001
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Date: Fri, 17 Aug 2001 14:37:50 –0700 </div>
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From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr." </div>
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Reply-To: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy </div>
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To: BSE-L@uni-karlsruhe.de References: 1 </div>
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######## Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy ######### </div>
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Greetings again List Members, </div>
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here is a bit of what was thought of pet foods and TSEs in the early days
of the BSE Inquiry; </div>
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What is meat and other material from scrapie-infected sheep used for - does
it include pet food and material for biological products? </div>
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Pet Food </div>
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As initial preclinical multiplication of the agent takes place in the
spleen and other parts of the lympho-reticular system (LRS) there is obviously
the possibility that scrapie infected material is used for pet food in addition
to material from clinically affected sheep. Sheep spleens are used exclusively
for pet foods and processed sheep heads are undoubtedly included. <br />
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Commercial canned pet food is subject to heat treatment. The following
treatments are employed by . . . </div>
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[A table has been deleted here for commercial-in-confidence reasons.]
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snip... </div>
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<a href="http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/report/volume4/annex.htm#899259">http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/report/volume4/annex.htm#899259</a>
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18. As it will probably be some months before the answer to No. 17 is
known, what steps if any would it be prudent to take in the meantime in
clinically affected animals covering a) meat, offal and meat products for human
consumption, b) milk, c) material used in the preparation of biologicals and d)
pet food? <br />
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snip... </div>
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Given the difficulties in abattoirs of identifying parts of a given carcass
it may be prudent to condemn, for any use, the whole carcass of affected
animals. This would seem to be politic given the possible fears from the public
of the risk of consuming products from affected animals and therefore unfairly
bring all animal products into disrepute. </div>
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<a href="http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/report/volume4/annex.htm#899383">http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/report/volume4/annex.htm#899383</a>
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6. Might there be a human risk from other animals, eg domestic pets? <br />
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If scrapie-infected sheep offal is the source of infection for cows, and
similar material has gone into pet food, what is the chance of dogs/cats also
being infected? Even if they do not show symptoms of disease (say because the
incubation period is longer than the natural life span) might they still be
infectious? Would there be any chance of transmission to humans through
scratches or bites? </div>
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<a href="http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/report/volume4/annex.htm#899480">http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/report/volume4/annex.htm#899480</a>
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snip...see more here; </div>
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Thursday, January 5, 2012 </div>
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Horse Meat, slaughter for consumption USA <br />
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<a href="http://equinespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2012/01/horse-meat-slaughter-for-consumption.html">http://equinespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2012/01/horse-meat-slaughter-for-consumption.html</a>
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Saturday, January 05, 2013 </div>
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Immunohistochemical Detection of Disease- Associated Prion Protein in the
Peripheral Nervous System in Experimental H-Type Bovine Spongiform
Encephalopathy </div>
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<a href="http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2013/01/immunohistochemical-detection-of.html">http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2013/01/immunohistochemical-detection-of.html</a>
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Saturday, December 15, 2012 </div>
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Bovine spongiform encephalopathy: the effect of oral exposure dose on
attack rate and incubation period in cattle -- an update 5 December 2012 </div>
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<a href="http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2012/12/bovine-spongiform-encephalopathy-effect.html">http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2012/12/bovine-spongiform-encephalopathy-effect.html</a>
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2012 atypical L-type BSE BASE California reports </div>
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SUMMARY REPORT CALIFORNIA BOVINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY CASE
INVESTIGATION JULY 2012 </div>
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Summary Report BSE 2012 <br />
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Executive Summary </div>
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<a href="http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2012/08/summary-report-california-bovine.html">http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2012/08/summary-report-california-bovine.html</a>
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Saturday, August 4, 2012 </div>
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Update from APHIS Regarding Release of the Final Report on the BSE
Epidemiological Investigation <br />
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<a href="http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2012/08/update-from-aphis-regarding-release-of.html">http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2012/08/update-from-aphis-regarding-release-of.html</a>
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Saturday, August 4, 2012 <br />
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*** Final Feed Investigation Summary - California BSE Case - July 2012
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<a href="http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2012/08/final-feed-investigation-summary.html">http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2012/08/final-feed-investigation-summary.html</a> <br />
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HISTORY F.O.I.A. PET FOOD <br />
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Saturday, August 29, 2009<br />
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FOIA REQUEST FEED RECALL 2009 Product may have contained prohibited materials Bulk Whole Barley, Recall # V-256-2009 <br />
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<a href="http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2009/08/foia-request-feed-recall-2009-product.html">http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2009/08/foia-request-feed-recall-2009-product.html</a> <br />
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Thursday, September 3, 2009 <br />
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429,128 lbs. feed for ruminant animals may have been contaminated with prohibited material Recall # V-258-2009<br />
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<a href="http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2009/09/429128-lbs-feed-for-ruminant-animals.html">http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2009/09/429128-lbs-feed-for-ruminant-animals.html</a> <br />
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Friday, September 4, 2009 <br />
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FOIA REQUEST ON FEED RECALL PRODUCT 429,128 lbs. feed for ruminant animals may have been contaminated with prohibited material Recall # V-258-2009 <br />
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<a href="http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2009_09_01_archive.html">http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2009_09_01_archive.html</a> <br />
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Tuesday, November 3, 2009 <br />
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re-FOIA REQUEST ON FEED RECALL PRODUCT contaminated with prohibited material Recall # V-258-2009 and Recall # V-256-2009 <br />
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<a href="http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2009/11/re-foia-request-on-feed-recall-product.html">http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2009/11/re-foia-request-on-feed-recall-product.html</a> <br />
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From: Terry S. Singeltary Sr. <br />
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To: <a href="mailto:CVMHomeP@cvm.fda.gov">CVMHomeP@cvm.fda.gov</a> <br />
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Cc: <a href="mailto:FOIASTAFF@oig.usda.gov">FOIASTAFF@oig.usda.gov</a> ; <a href="mailto:paffairs@oig.hhs.gov">paffairs@oig.hhs.gov</a> ; <a href="mailto:HHSTips@oig.hhs.gov">HHSTips@oig.hhs.gov</a> ; <a href="mailto:phyllis.fong@oig.usda.gov">phyllis.fong@oig.usda.gov</a> <br />
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FOIA REQUEST ON FEED RECALL PRODUCT 429,128 lbs. feed for ruminant animals may have been contaminated with prohibited material Recall # V-258-2009 <br />
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September 4, 2009 <br />
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TO: <br />
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Food and Drug Administration<br />
Division of Freedom of Information (HFI-35) <br />
Office of Shared Services<br />
Office of Public Information and Library Services<br />
5600 Fishers Lane <br />
Rockville, MD 20857 <br />
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Or requests may be sent via fax to: fax number 301-443-1726 or 301-443-1719. If experience difficulty sending a fax, please call (301) 443-2414. <br />
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FROM: <br />
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Terry S. Singeltary Sr.<br />
<br />
P.O. Box 42<br />
<br />
Bacliff, Texas USA 77518 <br />
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Greetings FDA FOIE, and the Honorable Phyllis Fong et al @ OIG FOIA, <br />
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ANOTHER FOIA REQUEST PLEASE ! <br />
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PLEASE SEE FULL TEXT ; <br />
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Canine Spongiform Encephalopathy CSE TSE<br />
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>>> Is anybody even looking at the dogs..especially with CWD now so widespread? <<<<br />
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NA, na, na........they know what they will find, Canine Spongiform Encephalopathy, and it was documented, but then they decided not to push the issue anymore, they had enough mad cow disease in different species to deal with. so they screwed the brains up with dogs and deer in the UK. then we took a page or two from the UKs testing protocols and USDA screwed the brains up with cattle, again, and again, and again. then played the stupid card. ya can't fix stupid. ... TSS<br />
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Monday, March 8, 2010<br />
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Canine Spongiform Encephalopathy aka MAD DOG DISEASE<br />
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Greetings,<br />
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Another Big Myth about Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy, is that TSE will not transmit to dogs. This is simply NOT TRUE. IT is perfectly legal to feed dogs and cats here in the USA bovine meat and bone meal. Canine dementia is real. how many dogs and cats here in the USA are tested for mad cow disease ? I just received this F.O.I.A. request, and thought I would post it here with a follow up on MAD DOG DISEASE. This is a follow up with additional data I just received on a FOIA request in 2009 ;<br />
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see full text, and be sure to read the BSE Inquiry documents toward the bottom ; <br />
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<a href="http://caninespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2010/03/canine-spongiform-encephalopathy-aka.html">http://caninespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2010/03/canine-spongiform-encephalopathy-aka.html</a> <br />
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Monday, March 8, 2010 <br />
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UPDATE 429,128 lbs. feed for ruminant animals may have been contaminated with prohibited material Recall # V-258-2009 <br />
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<a href="http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2010/03/update-429128-lbs-feed-for-ruminant.html">http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2010/03/update-429128-lbs-feed-for-ruminant.html</a> <br />
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Monday, March 1, 2010<br />
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ANIMAL PROTEIN I.E. MAD COW FEED IN COMMERCE A REVIEW 2010<br />
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<a href="http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2010/03/animal-protien-ie-mad-cow-feed-in.html">http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2010/03/animal-protien-ie-mad-cow-feed-in.html</a> <br />
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Friday, November 23, 2012 </div>
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<div>
sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease update As at 5th November 2012 UK, USA,
AND CANADA <br />
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<a href="http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2012/11/sporadic-creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.html">http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2012/11/sporadic-creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.html</a>
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Tuesday, June 26, 2012 </div>
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Creutzfeldt Jakob Disease Human TSE report update North America, Canada,
Mexico, and USDA PRION UNIT as of May 18, 2012 </div>
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type determination pending Creutzfeldt Jakob Disease (tdpCJD), is on the
rise in Canada and the USA </div>
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<a href="http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2012/06/creutzfeldt-jakob-disease-human-tse.html">http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2012/06/creutzfeldt-jakob-disease-human-tse.html</a>
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Monday, December 31, 2012 </div>
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<div>
Creutzfeldt Jakob Disease and Human TSE Prion Disease in Washington State,
2006–2011-2012 </div>
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<a href="http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2012/12/creutzfeldt-jakob-disease-and-human-tse.html">http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2012/12/creutzfeldt-jakob-disease-and-human-tse.html</a></div>
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Monday, January 14, 2013 </div>
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<div>
Gambetti et al USA Prion Unit change another highly suspect USA mad cow
victim to another fake name i.e. sporadic FFI at age 16 CJD Foundation goes
along with this BSe </div>
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<a href="http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2013/01/gambetti-et-al-usa-prion-unit-change.html">http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2013/01/gambetti-et-al-usa-prion-unit-change.html</a>
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TSS</div>
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Terry S. Singeltary Sr.http://www.blogger.com/profile/06986622967539963260noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4595956519532618538.post-42268750657629482742013-01-17T11:35:00.002-08:002013-01-17T11:35:30.149-08:00Canada, U.S. agree on animal-disease measures to protect trade, while reducing human and animal health protection<div>
Canada, U.S. agree on animal-disease measures to protect trade, while
reducing human and animal health protection</div>
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tell us something we don’t already know $$$</div>
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Canada, U.S. agree on animal-disease measures to protect trade Wed Jan 16,
2013 11:40am EST By Rod Nickel</div>
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WINNIPEG, Manitoba (Reuters) - Canada and the United States have agreed to
maintain livestock and meat trade during animal disease outbreaks using a new
system that targets trade bans more precisely by region, Canadian Agriculture
Minister Gerry Ritz said on Wednesday.</div>
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In 2003, the United States and many other countries halted beef imports
from Canada after the discovery of bovine spongiform encephalopathy, or BSE, on
a Western Canada farm. The trade bans caused prices for Canadian cattle to
collapse, resulting in severe financial losses for ranchers.</div>
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Under the new system, which won't take effect until after consultation with
industry groups and details are worked out, each country would only restrict
trade within designated disease-control zones where the animal disease breaks
out. If it had been in place in 2003, the U.S. would likely only have restricted
imports of beef from Western Canada, not the entire country, Ritz said at a
press conference in Winnipeg.</div>
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"The new agreement will help prevent or limit the introduction of highly
contagious foreign animal diseases from one country to the other," he said. "At
the same time, this agreement will help avoid unnecessary trade
disruptions.</div>
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"This is a sensible approach."</div>
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Along with BSE, other animal diseases with potential to disrupt trade
include foot-and-mouth disease, H1N1 flu and avian influenza.</div>
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The United States is the biggest market by far for Canadian exports of
cattle, pigs, beef and pork.</div>
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The system comes out of a U.S.-Canada agreement in December 2011 to align
regulatory systems in order to increase efficiency, reduce manufacturing and
retail costs, and boost North American trade.</div>
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(Reporting by Rod Nickel in Winnipeg, Manitoba; Editing by David
Gregorio)</div>
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<a href="http://ca.reuters.com/article/domesticNews/idCABRE90F13G20130116" title="http://ca.reuters.com/article/domesticNews/idCABRE90F13G20130116">http://ca.reuters.com/article/domesticNews/idCABRE90F13G20130116</a></div>
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when i thought it could not get any worse, it does.</div>
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In my opinion, Canada and the USA have done nothing BUT protect trade,
instead of strict BSE TSE prion disease protocols, and some protocols were put
into place, they were all bent and broken. the did it with the BSE MRR, when
they replaced the BSE GBRs with it. this has gone on since 1997, and before
really. so this announcement surprises no one. just more BSeee. you folks in the
industry just continue to keep kidding yourselves, because the consumer is
getting smarter every day, and you can't fool all of us, all of the time. test,
test, test, and they will come...or not. </div>
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Monday, January 14, 2013 </div>
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<div>
Gambetti et al USA Prion Unit change another highly suspect USA mad cow
victim to another fake name i.e. sporadic FFI at age 16 CJD Foundation goes
along with this BSe </div>
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<a href="http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2013/01/gambetti-et-al-usa-prion-unit-change.html">http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2013/01/gambetti-et-al-usa-prion-unit-change.html</a>
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Monday, December 31, 2012 </div>
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Creutzfeldt Jakob Disease and Human TSE Prion Disease in Washington State,
2006–2011-2012</div>
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<a href="http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2012/12/creutzfeldt-jakob-disease-and-human-tse.html">http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2012/12/creutzfeldt-jakob-disease-and-human-tse.html</a>
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Saturday, December 29, 2012 </div>
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MAD COW USA HUMAN TSE PRION DISEASE DECEMBER 29 2012 CJD CASE LAB
REPORT</div>
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<a href="http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2012/12/mad-cow-usa-human-tse-prion-disease.html">http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2012/12/mad-cow-usa-human-tse-prion-disease.html</a>
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Saturday, December 15, 2012 </div>
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Bovine spongiform encephalopathy: the effect of oral exposure dose on
attack rate and incubation period in cattle -- an update 5 December 2012</div>
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<a href="http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2012/12/bovine-spongiform-encephalopathy-effect.html">http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2012/12/bovine-spongiform-encephalopathy-effect.html</a>
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Friday, November 23, 2012 </div>
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sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease update As at 5th November 2012 UK, USA,
AND CANADA </div>
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<a href="http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2012/11/sporadic-creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.html">http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2012/11/sporadic-creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.html</a>
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Tuesday, June 26, 2012 </div>
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Creutzfeldt Jakob Disease Human TSE report update North America, Canada,
Mexico, and USDA PRION UNIT as of May 18, 2012 </div>
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type determination pending Creutzfeldt Jakob Disease (tdpCJD), is on the
rise in Canada and the USA </div>
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<a href="http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2012/06/creutzfeldt-jakob-disease-human-tse.html">http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2012/06/creutzfeldt-jakob-disease-human-tse.html</a>
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2012 atypical L-type BSE BASE California reports </div>
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Saturday, August 4, 2012 </div>
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*** Final Feed Investigation Summary - California BSE Case - July 2012
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<a href="http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2012/08/final-feed-investigation-summary.html">http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2012/08/final-feed-investigation-summary.html</a>
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SUMMARY REPORT CALIFORNIA BOVINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY CASE
INVESTIGATION JULY 2012 </div>
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Summary Report BSE 2012 </div>
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Executive Summary </div>
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<a href="http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2012/08/summary-report-california-bovine.html">http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2012/08/summary-report-california-bovine.html</a>
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Saturday, August 4, 2012 </div>
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Update from APHIS Regarding Release of the Final Report on the BSE
Epidemiological Investigation </div>
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<a href="http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2012/08/update-from-aphis-regarding-release-of.html">http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2012/08/update-from-aphis-regarding-release-of.html</a>
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CENSORSHIP IS A TERRIBLE THING $$$ </div>
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Canada has had a COVER-UP policy of mad cow disease since about the 17th
case OR 18th case of mad cow disease. AFTER THAT, all FOIA request were ignored
$$$ </div>
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THIS proves there is indeed an epidemic of mad cow disease in North
America, and it has been covered up for years and years, if not for decades, and
it’s getting worse $$$ </div>
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Thursday, February 10, 2011 </div>
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TRANSMISSIBLE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY REPORT UPDATE CANADA FEBRUARY 2011
and how to hide mad cow disease in Canada Current as of: 2011-01-31 </div>
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<a href="http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2011/02/transmissible-spongiform-encephalopathy.html">http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2011/02/transmissible-spongiform-encephalopathy.html</a>
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Wednesday, August 11, 2010 </div>
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<div>
REPORT ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE SIXTEENTH CASE OF BOVINE SPONGIFORM
ENCEPHALOPATHY (BSE) IN CANADA </div>
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<a href="http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2010/08/report-on-investigation-of-sixteenth.html">http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2010/08/report-on-investigation-of-sixteenth.html</a>
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Thursday, August 19, 2010 </div>
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REPORT ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE SEVENTEENTH CASE OF BOVINE SPONGIFORM
ENCEPHALOPATHY (BSE) IN CANADA </div>
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<a href="http://bseusa.blogspot.com/2010/08/report-on-investigation-of-seventeenth.html">http://bseusa.blogspot.com/2010/08/report-on-investigation-of-seventeenth.html</a>
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Friday, March 4, 2011 </div>
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Alberta dairy cow found with mad cow disease </div>
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<a href="http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/03/alberta-dairy-cow-found-with-mad-cow.html">http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/03/alberta-dairy-cow-found-with-mad-cow.html</a>
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2005</div>
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GREETINGS AGAIN APHIS ET AL, </div>
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FURTHERMORE, WE HAVE FAILED TO EVEN STOP THE SRMs FROM WHOLE CUTS OF
BONELESS BEEF IMPORTED FROM CANADA IN THE VERY ONSET OF THE NEW BSE MRR (MINIMAL
RISK REGION). THIS IS THE VERY REASON I HAVE SAID TIME AND TIME AGAIN THAT BY
THIS ADMINISTRATION ABANDONING THE BSE GBR RISK ASSESSMENTS BECAUSE THEY DID NOT
LIKE THE ASSESSMENT OF BSE GBR III, AND ADHERING TO A NEW BSE MRR POLICY THAT
WAS DESIGNED NOT FOR HUMAN HEALTH, BUT ONLY FOR COMMODITIES AND FUTURES, WILL
FURTHER EXPOSE NEEDLESSLY MILLIONS AND MILLIONS OF HUMANS AND ANIMALS VIA THE
FREE TRADING OF ALL STRAINS OF TSE GLOBALLY. references as follow ; </div>
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Wisconsin Firm Recalls Beef Products </div>
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Recall Release CLASS II RECALL </div>
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FSIS-RC-032-2005 HEALTH RISK: LOW </div>
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Congressional and Public Affairs</div>
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(202) 720-9113</div>
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Steven Cohen </div>
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WASHINGTON, Aug. 19, 2005 - Green Bay Dressed Beef, a Green Bay, Wis.,
establishment, is voluntarily recalling approximately 1,856 pounds of beef
products that may contain portions of the backbone from a cow just over 30
months old, the U.S. Department of Agriculture's Food Safety and Inspection
Service announced today. The product was from a cow imported directly for
slaughter from Canada. </div>
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Based on information provided by Canada, the products subject to this Class
II recall are from a cow that is approximately one month older than the 30-month
age limit. Both ante-mortem and post-mortem inspection were done on the cow in
question. FSIS inspection program personnel determined the cow to be healthy and
fit for human food. FSIS' designation of this recall as Class II is because it
is a situation where there is a remote probability of adverse health
consequences from the use of the product. </div>
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FSIS learned about this as a result of a Canadian audit of their health
certificate that accompanied the imported cow. Prior to slaughter, the health
certificate accompanying the cow was presented to the establishment, and it
appeared complete and accurate. However, a subsequent audit of information
related to the health certificate by Canadian officials found that it was not
accurate. Action has been taken by Canadian Food Inspection Agency officials in
response to findings from the audit. The products subject to recall are: </div>
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Five boxes of 243 lb. vacuum pouched packages of "American Foods Group,
NECKBONE UNTRIM'D, USDA CHOICE OR HIGHER" with the case code of 77333; One box
of 50 lb. vacuum pouched package of "American Foods Group, SHORTLOIN 2X2, USDA
SELECT OR HIGHER" with the case code of 75231; One box of 60 lb. vacuum pouched
package of "American Foods Group, SHORTLOIN 2X2, USDA CHOICE OR HIGHER" with the
case code of 75060; Five boxes of 258 lb. vacuum pouched packages of "Dakota
Supreme Beef, SHORTLOIN 0X11/4, USDA SELECT OR HIGHER" with the case code of
75442; Sixteen boxes of 811 lb. vacuum pouched packages of "American Foods
Group, BLADE BI N/O CHUCK, USDA CHOICE OR HIGHER" with the case code of 75955;
Nine boxes of 435 lb. vacuum pouched packages of "American Foods Group, BLADE BI
N/O CHUCK, USDA SELECT OR HIGHER" with the case code of 75952. Each box bears
the establishment number "410" inside the USDA seal of inspection. The products
were produced on August 4, and were distributed to wholesale distributors in
Pennsylvania, Florida, Illinois, Maryland, Minnesota and Wisconsin. </div>
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Under the interim final rules FSIS implemented on January 12, 2004, certain
specified risk materials must be removed from all cattle depending on the age of
the animal. On this animal all specified risk materials for cattle 30 months and
over were removed, with the exception of the vertebral column. At the time of
slaughter, the animal was certified to be under 30 months of age and removal of
the vertebral column was not required. A subsequent audit determined the animal
was just over 30 months of age; therefore, the vertebral column is required to
be removed. This is the reason for the recall of the selected products. </div>
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Consumers with questions about the recall may contact Sally VandeHei,
Executive Assistant at 1-877-894-3927. National media with questions may contact
Jim Mulhern at (202) 496-2468. Local media with questions may contact Susan
Finco at (920) 965-7750 ext.158. </div>
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Consumers with other food safety questions can phone the toll-free USDA
Meat and Poultry Hotline at 1-888-MPHotline (1-888-674-6854). The hotline is
available in English and Spanish and can be reached from 10 a.m. to 4 p.m.
(Eastern Time), Monday through Friday. Recorded food safety messages are
available 24 hours a day. </div>
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Sample Product Labels: These are similar to, but not identical to, labels
on the recalled product. </div>
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# </div>
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USDA Recall Classifications </div>
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Class I This is a health hazard situation where there is a reasonable
probability that the use of the product will cause serious, adverse health
consequences or death. </div>
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Class II This is a health hazard situation where there is a remote
probability of adverse health consequences from the use of the product. </div>
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Class III This is a situation where the use of the product will not cause
adverse health consequences. </div>
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<a href="http://www.fsis.usda.gov/News_&_Events/Recall_032_2005_Release/index.asp">http://www.fsis.usda.gov/News_&_Events/Recall_032_2005_Release/index.asp</a>
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<a href="http://docket-aphis-2006-0041.blogspot.com/" title="http://docket-aphis-2006-0041.blogspot.com/">http://docket-aphis-2006-0041.blogspot.com/</a></div>
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<div>
Docket No. 03-080-1 -- USDA ISSUES PROPOSED RULE TO ALLOW LIVE ANIMAL
IMPORTS FROM CANADA [TSS SUBMISSION 11/03/2003 01:19 PM To:
regulations@aphis.usda.gov ]</div>
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<div>
<a href="https://web01.aphis.usda.gov/BSEcom.nsf/0/b78ba677e2b0c12185256dd300649f9d?OpenDocument&AutoFramed">https://web01.aphis.usda.gov/BSEcom.nsf/0/b78ba677e2b0c12185256dd300649f9d?OpenDocument&AutoFramed</a></div>
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OIG REPORT ON IMPORTS FROM CANADA </div>
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<div>
<a href="http://www.usda.gov/oig/webdocs/33601-01-HY.pdf">http://www.usda.gov/oig/webdocs/33601-01-HY.pdf</a>
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Tuesday, October 2, 2012 </div>
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Canadian veterinarian fined after approving banned BSE high risk cattle for
export to U.S.A. </div>
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<a href="http://madcowusda.blogspot.com/2012/10/canadian-veterinarian-fined-after.html">http://madcowusda.blogspot.com/2012/10/canadian-veterinarian-fined-after.html</a></div>
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Saturday, January 21, 2012 </div>
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</div>
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Quick facts about mad cow disease </div>
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<a href="http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2012/01/quick-facts-about-mad-cow-disease.html">http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2012/01/quick-facts-about-mad-cow-disease.html</a>
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<div>
CANADA MBM LIVE CATTLE BSE TSE PRION TO USA </div>
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Date: Sat, 14 Jun 2003 02:23:12 +0200</div>
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<a href="http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2013/01/canada-mbm-live-cattle-bse-tse-prion-to.html" title="http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2013/01/canada-mbm-live-cattle-bse-tse-prion-to.html">http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2013/01/canada-mbm-live-cattle-bse-tse-prion-to.html</a></div>
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layperson</div>
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mom dod 12/14/97 confirmed hvCJD </div>
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TSS </div>
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</div>
Terry S. Singeltary Sr.http://www.blogger.com/profile/06986622967539963260noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4595956519532618538.post-62740687349979360702013-01-17T11:13:00.000-08:002013-01-17T11:30:59.888-08:00CANADA MBM LIVE CATTLE BSE TSE PRION TO USA<div>
Date: Sat, 14 Jun 2003 02:23:12 +0200</div>
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</div>
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<div>
Reply-To: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy </div>
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</div>
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Sender: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy </div>
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</div>
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From: Karin.Irgens@DYREHELSETILSYNET.NO</div>
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</div>
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Subject: BSE Canada USA </div>
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######## Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy ######### </div>
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Hello all </div>
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</div>
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<div>
Terry Singletary has provided the official US import and export statistics
for the USA in 2002 and the first 3 months of 2003, for live cattle and MBM
(meat and bone meal) </div>
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</div>
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<div>
I have tried to figure out how many 'risk units' (external challenge) the
USA has imported from Canada during 2002-2003. </div>
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</div>
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<div>
The GBR (geographical BSE risk) assessment-method and criteria of the EU
SSC are described in detail in the latest GBR opinion of the EU Scientific
Sterring Committee. </div>
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</div>
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<div>
<a href="http://europa.eu.int/comm/food/fs/sc/ssc/out363_en.pdf">http://europa.eu.int/comm/food/fs/sc/ssc/out363_en.pdf</a>
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(See table 5, page 14, for the lists of countries _already_ assessed in
category 3 by the EU-SSC. </div>
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</div>
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<div>
For each country, the SSC defines the first years of periods 'R1' and 'R2'.
R2 is the period when BSE risk is _likely_ in a given risk-country. R1 is the
period where BSE infection in a risk-country is considered only as "possible".
</div>
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</div>
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Risks from exports from a risk-country (country assessed in category 3) are
considered as 10 times higher in R2-years than in R1-years.) </div>
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</div>
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This latest GBR opinion will have to be revised to include Canada among the
"BSE source countries" and determine R1 and R2-years for Canada. </div>
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</div>
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<div>
Risks from exports of cattle and MBM in R2-years (from BSE affected
countries in category 3) are, according to SSC's methodology: - 0,01 risk unit
for each live bovine, (at least for cattle imported "for breeding"). - 0,1 risk
unit per ton MBM (meat/bone meal). </div>
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</div>
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<div>
"External challenges" from risk imports are classified on a scale from
negligible risk, very low, low, moderate, high, very high, extremely high risk.
To hope for a category 2-classification, the external challenge from a country's
risky imports must not exceed a "moderate" risk (100 risk units) in the whole
potential risk period 1980 to 2001. </div>
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</div>
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<div>
For the USA, there is no point in trying to determine the first "R1 or
R2-years" in Canada, since imports from Canada to the USA _only in 2002_ are
more than sufficient to assess the external challenge to the USA as _very_ high.
The resulting classification of the USA in category 3 now seems absolutely
unavoidable. </div>
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</div>
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<div>
1. US imports of MBM from Canada: </div>
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</div>
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<div>
In 2002 the USA imported 43.671 tons MBM from Canada. In 2003
(january-march) the USA imported 13.138 tons MBM from Canada. Total for 15
months: 56.809 tons (5.680 risk units). </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Average > 45.000 tons/year = average 4.500 risk units/year </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
If we _assume_ similar quantities of MBM imported from Canada in previous
years, this would add up to 6 X 4.500 = 27.000 risk units for the years
1996-2001 (1996 was probably the year of birth of the Albertan BSE-cow). </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Total 27.000 + 5.600 = 32.600 risk units for the period 1996 to March 2003
(if this assumption on 'similar' quantities in 1996-2001 holds true) </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
2. US imports of live cattle from Canada. </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
According to the media, the USA has imported approx. 9 million live cattle
from Canada in the years 1996-2002. </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
According to a 'worst case scenario', if all these 9 million cattle had
been imported _for breeding purposes_, this would represent 90.000 risk units.
However, this is certainly not the case. Most of these 9.000.000 cattle were
probably imported for immediate slaughter, or for a fattening period of a few
months before slaughter. </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
The SSC does not precisely quantify the corresponding risk reduction, but
they say (page 15): </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
"... imported animals slaughtered young (e.g. < 24 months of age) can
only carry a fraction of the infectivity found in a clinical case, even if
infected prior to export. Imported calves that are immediately slaughtered
before 2 years of age therefore represent _no or only a very small_ external
challenge". </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Again, we have detailed statistics for cattle imports to USA only from year
2002, provided by Terry. Maybe Terry later can provide statistics for earlier
years, either directly or by means of the "Freedom of informations Act". </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
For live cattle, the US import statistics (2002) are more complicated,
because the USA uses lots of different codes for live cattle. For some code
numbers, it is clearly indicated "for breeding" and other code numbers clearly
indicate "for immediate slaughter". Some other code numbers indicate the weights
of imported cattle, which does not allow to draw any conclusions as to the
future fate of the animals (immediate slaughter or survival 1-2-3 or more years
in the US before slaughter.) </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
The USA imported in 2002 from Canada: </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
- 166 bovine animals, purebred breeding, dairy, male - 6.237 purebred
breeding, dairy, female - 217 purebred breeding, 'except dairy', male (= beef
breeds) - 576 purebred breeding, 'except dairy', female - 2.409 males for
breeding, unspecified - 7.695 females for breeding, unspecified </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Total 17.300 cattle 'for breeding' in 2002 (= 173 risk units) </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Also in 2002, 61.628 live young cattle were imported "specially for dairy
purposes". I would think that this means that they would be used as dairy cows
and have maybe 3 calves or even more. The first calf might be born when these
heifers were around 22 months old. Add _at least_ 2 X 9 months for the next two
pregnancies, then they would be at least 22 + 18 = 40 months old at
slaughter...( probably older). </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
_If_ these assumptions are correct, this would represent 616 additional
risk units imported in 2002. </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Then there are many other cattle imports from Canada on several other code
numbers specifying only the animals' weights, not their final use or destination
: From Canada, 162 + 7812 + 93.678 + 34.536 + 114.662 + 107.120 + 143.151 +
81.901 </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Total 583.022 live cattle from Canada in 2002, for which age at slaughter
in the USA is unknown. Maybe most were slaughtered very young, but we dont know.
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
A great number of cattle imported to the USA from Canada in 2002 were
registered on code numbers specifying "for immediate slaughter": 346.237 +
57.448 + 372.294 + 248.399 = 1.024.378 cattle that should be considered as very
low or negligible risk _if we were sure_ that they were all very young at the
date of import. The risk would mainly be from rendered intestines if all these
cattle were very young. But we dont really know how many % were very young. We
know only that they weighed 320 kg _or more_ at the time of import (according to
code definitions). </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
If 320 kg at the date of import, it means they might be around 5-6 months
at the time of import (negligible risk if slaughtered immediately or soon). If
much heavier than 320 kg at the time of import, they might be of various 'adult'
ages. </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
The total, counting _all_ "cattle customs tariff codes" amounts to 1, 686
million cattle from Canada to USA in 2002, a figure in good agreement with
figures presented in Canadian newspapers (1, 7 million cattle exported to the
USA in 2002) </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
3. Total US risk from 'risk imports' from Canada _only in 2002_: </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
I prefer not to speculate on unknown ages at slaughter of _most_ imported
cattle from Canada in 2002. </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
If we add all quantitatively "real and known" external challenges from
Canada to the USA in 2002, we can consider _at least_: </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
- 4.500 risk units from Canadian MBM. - 173 risk units from live cattle
imported for breeding purposes - 616 additional risk units from cattle imported
"specially for dairy purposes" in 2002 </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Total 5.289 risk units for _one_ year (2002), if we ignore any potential
risk from most of the other Canadian cattle. </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
4. If we assume similar yearly risks in previous years, at least the period
1996-2001, we could add 5.298 X 6 = 31.788 risk units. </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
If this is a correct assumption, total risk (from 1996 to 2002 included )
would be: </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
5.298 + 31.788 = approx 37.000 risk units. </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Of course, Canada might have been already in the R2 period long before
1996, I would guess at R1= 1991 = 5 years (one mean incubation) before the
assumed birth of the BSE-Alberta-cow. If so, the risk for the USA is even
higher. </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
The risk of _amplification_ of BSE or other TSE's in North America has, to
my knowledge, not been notably reduced since July 2000 (date of first SSC
reports on USA and Canada). As far as I know, fallen stock and SRM may still be
legally incorporated in US and Canadian MBM. As far as I know, there have been
no real improvements in heat treatment parameters for US or Canadian ruminant
slaughter waste since 2000. As far as I know, the problem was (and still is)
that slaughter waste was heat-treated without pressure, or far below 3 bar
pressure, and if so, without (or almost without) any inactivating effects on TSE
agents. </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
The risk of _propagation_ to cattle by cross contaminated feeds would have
been _reduced_ in North America by the end of 1997 (incomplete feed ban), but
this propagation risk _did certainly not cease_ in 1997. I would have believed
in the effectivity of the feed ban if this ban had been total/complete (all
animal proteins/all species) _or_ if this North-American ruminant feed ban had
required _totally separate_ production plants for ruminant feeds. However, this
is not the case in Canada or USA. </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Experience from Europe, especially from the UK (44.000 BAB-cases born after
the first UK ruminant feed ban in 1988), has clearly shown that cross
contaminations must be _completely_ avoided to stop propagation of BSE in any
BSE infected country. Recommendations of "flushing" feed-mix production lines
with a few batches of "pure vegetable feed"-productions will give no guarantee
at all. </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
We all know that many US feed manufacturers have been found guilty of
non-compliance to "the rules". But even if they had been totally compliant, they
would still be at risk of cross-contaminating ruminant feeds, as long as feed
mills production lines + storage facilities + delivery/transport for ruminant
feeds are not _totally_ separate. </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
As far as I can see from the US import statistics 2002-2003 provided by
Terry, the Canadian external challenge to the USA is very or extremely high,
_even considering only the challenge from year 2002_. BSE-classification depends
on external challenge from all years since 1980. Probably, the external
challenge to North America before 1990 was very low, low, or moderate. But it
would have been amplified by very poor 'stability'. Maybe/probably some
additional external challenge occurred later, from Japan or East European
countries. </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Will we ever knowfrom which country, from which import(s), how, when, where
in North America the first BSE propagation/amplification was started ? In my
opinion, the first 'indigenous north american' cattle infection might have been
either in the USA or Canada, and we will never know where/when/how. The
USA/Canada-trade in MBM and cattle has gone both ways for so many years. </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Today it seems irrelevant to try to determine whether North American BSE
started in Canada or USA. Both countries should be considered at comparable or
equivalent BSE-risk. Both countries should introduce regulations to protect
North American consumers... and to protect North American cattle and other
ruminants. </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
In my opinion, the US ban on Canadian beef should cease immediately and
totally, and this ban is in my opinion an unjustified obstacle to trade between
two countries at very similar risk. </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
70 to 80 % of Canadian beef exports went to the USA before May 20th.
Without the unjustified US ban, Canadian producers would have lost "only" 25% of
their exports, not 100%. </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
USDA's import restrictions on EU-beef should also cease immediately,
especially for beef from young bovines born after 1.1.2001 when all feeding of
all kinds of animal proteins to all food-producing species was prohibited in all
EU countries. Or at least from 1.7.2001 (allowing for a 6 months period to
ensure full compliance). Very few feed samples were found positive for traces of
mammalian MBM in Norway in the first semester 2001, none later. Those "guilty"
feed mills were temporarily shut down until their problems were resolved. </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
"Non-compliant" feed mills in the USA receive one, two or more "warning
letters", but are not shut down. </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Today, beef from young EU-bovines (< 24-30 months), even from countries
officially affected with BSE, would provide far better guarantees of
non-BSE-infection than North American beef, since North America has not even
started to control or avoid the cross-contamination problem. </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
I would however agree that any country should be allowed to prohibit
imports of live cattle for breeding, of any age. It is well known that risks are
almost zero from semen and embryos, compared to live cattle imports, not only
for BSE but for other cattle diseases such as paratuberculosis. </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
But when I look at the US official export statistics, there are worse
problems. North America, especially the USA, may have spread BSE to several
other countries, mainly Mexico and several Asian countries, by enormous
quantities of exported US- MBM, which will be the subject of my next posting.
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Best regards </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Karin Irgens </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
########### <a href="http://mailhost.rz.uni-karlsruhe.de/warc/bse-l.html">http://mailhost.rz.uni-karlsruhe.de/warc/bse-l.html</a>
############ </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
-------- Original Message --------</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Subject: risk from US exports of cattle and MBM</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Date: Sat, 14 Jun 2003 23:10:28 +0200</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
From: Karin.Irgens@DYREHELSETILSYNET.NO</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Reply-To: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
To: BSE-L@uni-karlsruhe.de </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
######## Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy #########</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Hello all</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Terry has now provided US export figures for 'breeding cattle' for 1999, in
addition to export statistics for 2002 that he had already provided. On the
basis of US export statistics for 1999 and 2002 for live cattle for breeding,
and US export statistics for 2002 and 2003 for meat and bone meal (code
23.01.1000), we could try to calculate external challenge from the USA to
importing countries. </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
However, _we dont really know_ the situations in most of these importing
countries (at least I dont know...). </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
If live cattle from a BSE-infected country are imported to a country that
does not have a rendering system for slaughter waste, there would be no
resulting BSE-risk to the importing country. If an importing country decides to
exclude waste from imported cattle from rendering, or to BSE-test all imported
cattle slaughtered at > 30 months age, the risk will be considerably reduced.
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Canadian and US cattle exported for breeding in recent years may still be
alive in the importing countries, and may now be excluded from rendering.</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
We dont know if all US exports of meat and bone meal "code 23.01.1000" were
"mammalian" MBM or if some of it was poultry meal or MBM derived only from pigs.
The same code 23.01.1000 can be used for registrations of exports/imports of
mammalian MBM and poultry meal. </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
The EU SSC does not consider poultry meal as a BSE-risk, but each country
must prove how much of the imports really were poultry meal. It is possible that
some countries, for religious reasons, would accept only MBM not derived from
pig waste. If such countries imported only poultry meal, the risk would be very
low. </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
We dont know if all registered US exports were correctly coded. It is
possible and probable that some exports were in fact other products that shoud
not have been coded as 23.01.1000. </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
And of course we dont know the final destination of "23.01.1000"-products
exported by the US, whether or not the MBM reached cattle through feeding in the
importing country. </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
It is therefore not possible to make any real risk estimate, not knowing
what happened in each importing country. For countries already assessed by the
SSC, such knowledge may be found in the already publisehd GBR assessments.
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Here I can only add up exports from US to each country, and only for years
1999 and 2002 (+ january-march 2003), and roughly calculate the numbers of risk
units _if_ these imports really represented a risk to cattle in the importing
countries. (see list country list below). </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
It appears that the countries most at risk from US imports, especially MBM
would be Bangladesh, Egypt, China, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, Philippines,
Taiwan, Thailand, Venezuela, Vietnam. </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Some other countries have imported much lower amounts of US cattle + MBM in
1999 and 2002/2003, but I dont know if these countries have imported similar (or
higher) amounts from the USA in previous years. </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
According to Rev Sci Tech. 2003 Apr;22(1):237-49. Risk management of
transmissible spongiform encephalopathies in Asia - Ozawa Y : </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
" ...significant quantities of feedstuffs of ruminant origin have been
imported into Asia, which may mean that the BSE agent could have reached
domestic cattle in most countries... Recycling of BSE through rendering plants
is unlikely but cannot be totally excluded in some countries such as the
People's Republic of China, India, Japan, Pakistan and Taipei China... " </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
"...The external challenge has been considerably reduced in recent years as
most countries in Asia banned the importation of feedstuffs from _countries with
BSE _ ..." </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
(my comments: but they did not ban MBM from the USA... I think China has
the world's largest cattle population...) </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
quoted from a series of articles on CWD, in 2002 :</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
<a href="http://cfapp.rockymountainnews.com/cwd/killer/">http://cfapp.rockymountainnews.com/cwd/killer/</a>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
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<div>
</div>
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<div>
</div>
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<div>
</div>
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<div>
" ...the FDA has not imposed the same restrictions on exported MBM. In
fact, since the American ban went into effect, annual U.S. exports of MBM have
jumped from 291,000 tons to 467,000 tons, a 60 percent increase. American
renderers aren't required to warn their foreign customers about feeding ruminant
protein -- that rendered from sheep or cattle -- to cattle. However, three large
renderers contacted by the News say they label their products that way
regardless of the lack of regulations. </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Denver's National By-Products said it ships its MBM to China and Indonesia
in large shipping containers, not in individually marked bags. But it stamps on
its bills of lading a warning against feeding the product to ruminants. The
stamp is in English. Once American meat and bone meal arrives in the purchasing
country, the manufacturer has no further control over how it is labeled, said
National By-Products district manager Ken Kage. A spokesman for the USDA and
officials with the National Renderers Association say that foreign trade in U.S.
MBM is not a problem because there have been no cases of mad cow disease in this
country. </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Some countries importing MBM have had few if any rules concerning its use
as cattle feed. Mexico, for example, implemented labeling rules only this year
(2002), according to Alberto Celis, the National Renderers Association regional
director for Latin America. </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
That was news to many agricultural business people attending an animal feed
trade show in Guadalajara in March. Representatives from three animal feed bag
manufacturers said they had heard of no such regulations and that their bags
remain warning free. Mexico exports over a million live cattle a year to the
United States. Mexican cattlemen said these "feeder" cows are not typically fed
animal protein, though there is little evidence that the government has an
adequate inspection program to make certain. Mexican government officials
responded that MBM rules were promulgated last summer, and that they will be
vigorously enforced. They said Mexico stopped importing MBM from countries with
a BSE problem in 1991 and that there are no known cases of BSE in the country.
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
The World Health Organization says Mexico's experience with American MBM is
reflected throughout the world. The United Nations agency was "concerned that
some countries which received (MBM) materials do not have surveillance systems
to detect the disease in animals or the human population," said WHO's Dr. Maura
Ricketts at a news conference in December 2000. She said once the MBM leaves one
country, it begins a "murky movement" that is almost impossible to track. Taking
heed of such warnings, the European Union (EU) decided that the risk to public
health was too great even if an importing country insisted that it would use MBM
only as poultry feed -- which, along with pet food, is its major use in the U.S.
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
The EU adopted the ban of all exports of MBM in 2000. Instead of adopting a
similar policy, the USDA saw the ban as a golden opportunity. "Importing
countries of EU MBM may be forced to seek alternative suppliers of animal
protein meals, such as the United States," said a December 2000 report by the
USDA. "The United States should be well positioned to take advantage of that
situation to increase its own exports of MBM." </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
And it has. Render, the magazine of the National Renderers Association,
noted in its April issue that exports of many products were under competitive
pressure from vegetable oils. But it noted "a bright spot is meat and bone meal
exports that continue to increase." The chief foreign markets for American MBM,
in order of sales amounts, were Indonesia, Mexico, Egypt, China, Canada,
Thailand, Bangladesh, the Philippines and Venezuela. In 1998, Egypt imported
96,000 metric tons of MBM from the EU, and only 3,100 metric tons from the U.S.
By 2001, the U.S dominated the Egyptian market, selling over 73,000 metric
tons..." </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
(r.u = risk unit) (2003 = US exports of "23.01.1000"-products in the period
January through March 2003)</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Argentina 1999: 9 cattle for breeding (0,09 r.u.)</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Australia 1999: 81 breeding cattle from USA (0,8 risk units) 2003: 5 tons
MBM from USA (0,5 r.u.)</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Bangladesh 2003: 2.217 tons MBM 2002: 12.630 tons MBM (1.484 r.u)</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Belize: 2002: 27 cattle for breeding (0,27 r.u.) </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Brazil 1999: 440 breeding cattle 2002: 134 breeding cattle (5,7 r.u.) 2002:
12 tons MBM 2003: 12 tons MBM (2,4 r.u.)</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
China 1999: 84 breeding cattle 2002: 40 + 190 + 26 breeding cattle (2,8
r.u.) 2002: 104.784 tons MBM 2003: 19.552 tons MBM (12.433 r.u)</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Colombia 1999: 251 cattle for breeding 2002: 2.363 cattle for breeding (26
r.u.) 2002: 882 tons MBM 2003: 80 tons MBM (96 r.u.)</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Colombia has > 100 r.u. from recent imports from the USA. Colombia was
previously assessed in category II and might now be re-assessed in category III,
unless there is proof that the additional external challenge from USA did not
reach Colombian cattle.</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Costa Rica 2002: 19 cattle for breeding (0,19 r.u.)</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Dominican Republic: 1999: 45 cattle for breeding 2002: 220 cattle for
breeding (2, 65 r.u.) 2003: 77 tons MBM (7,7 r.u.)</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Ecuador 1999: 120 cattle for breeding (1,2 r.u.) 2002: 14 tons MBM (1,4
r.u.)</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Egypt: 2002: 104.408 tons MBM 2003: 15.796 tons MBM (12.019 r.u.) Egypt
would already have a high external challenge from previous imports from
Europe.</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Ghana: 2003: 41 tons MBM (4,1 r.u.)</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Guatemala 1999: 23 cattle for breeding 2002: 26 cattle for breeding (0,49
r.u.)</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Honduras 2002: 51 cattle for breeding (0,51 r.u.)</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Hong Kong: 2002: 41 tons MBM 2003: 61 tons MBM (10 r.u.) </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Indonesia 2002: 148.558 tons MBM 2003: 36.999 tons MBM (18.555 r.u.)
(according to various figures from newspapers, Indonesia would prevously have
been a major importer of British MBM)</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Korea, South 1999: 248 cattle for breeding (2, 48 r.u.) 2002: 262 tons MBM
(26 r.u.)</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Lebanon 1999: 2.228 cattle for breeding (22, 3 r.u.)</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Malaysia 2002: 7 cattle for breeding (0,07 r.u.) 2002: 12.646 tons MBM
2003: 2.209 tons MBM (1485 r.u.)</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Mexico 1999: 8.780 cattle for breeding 2002: 10.888 cattle for breeding
(196 r.u.) 2002: 93.685 other cattle ?? 2002: 62.204 tons MBM 2003: 14.756 tons
MBM (7.696 r.u.)</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
New Zealand 2002: 21 tons MBM (2,1 r.u.)</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Niger 2002: 57 tons MBM (5,7 r.u.)</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Panama 1999: 17 cattle for breeding 2002: 59 cattle for breeding (0,76
r.u.) 2002: 172 tons MBM 2003: 57 tons MBM (23 r.u.) Panama, previously assessed
in category I, might have 23 additonal risk units from recent US imports, and
might be re-assessed in category II if this could have reached cattle.</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Pakistan 1999: 11 cattle for breeding (0,11 r.u.)</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Philippines 2002: 5.585 tons MBM 2003: 1.215 tons MBM (680 r.u.)</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Russia: 2002: 390 tons MBM 2003: 1.520 tons MBM (191 r.u.) Russia would
probably already be at risk from imports from EU and/or east-European
countries.</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Saudi Arabia 1999: 884 cattle for breeding (8, 84 r.u.)</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Singapore 2003: 4 tons MBM (0, 4 r.u.)</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
South Africa: 2002: 40 tons MBM (4 r.u.)</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Sri Lanka 2002: 351 tons MBM (35 r.u.)</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Suriname 2002: 45 cattle for breeding (0,45 r.u.)</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Taiwan 2002: 12.421 tons MBM 2003: 1.719 tons MBM (1.414 r.u.)</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Thailand 2002: 36.476 tons MBM 2003: 7.314 tons MBM (4.379 r.u.)</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
United Arab Emirates 2003: 39 tons MBM (3,9 r.u.)</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Uruguay: 1999: 7 cattle for breeding (0,07 r.u.)</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Venezuela 1999: 473 cattle for breeding 2002: 169 cattle for breeding (6, 4
r.u.) 2002: 1.998 tons MBM (199 r.u.) </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Vietnam 2002: 7.618 tons MBM 2003: 2.229 tons MBM (1.048 r.u.)</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Best regards Karin Irgens</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
########### <a href="http://mailhost.rz.uni-karlsruhe.de/warc/bse-l.html">http://mailhost.rz.uni-karlsruhe.de/warc/bse-l.html</a>
############ </div>
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<div>
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<div>
</div>
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<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Date: Fri, 15 Aug 2003 17:35:49 +0200 </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Reply-To: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Sender: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
From: <a href="mailto:Karin.Irgens@DYREHELSETILSYNET.NO">Karin.Irgens@DYREHELSETILSYNET.NO</a>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Subject: SV: BOVINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY IN CANADA Follow-up report
No. 3 (final report OIE) </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
######## Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy ######### </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Hello </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
I just found today the Canadian risk assessment for BSE, a 150 pages text
from December 2002. </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
<a href="http://www.inspection.gc.ca/english/sci/ahra/bseris/bserise.pdf">http://www.inspection.gc.ca/english/sci/ahra/bseris/bserise.pdf</a>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
All details on Canadian risk imports from UK and other countries should be
found there. </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Best regards </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Karin Irgens </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
> -----Opprinnelig melding----- > </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Fra: Terry S. Singeltary Sr. [SMTP:flounder@WT.NET] > </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Sendt: 15. august 2003 16:57 > </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Til: BSE-L@uni-karlsruhe.de > </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Emne: Re: BOVINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY IN CANADA Follow-up report No.
> 3 (final report OIE) > > </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
######## Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy > ######### > > </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
greetings list members, </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
> > > The most likely source of contamination of the feed was
asymptomatic </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
> > animals imported into North America from the United Kingdom
between </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
> > 1982 and 1989 that entered the food chain through natural
attrition. </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
> > N America imported MBM/Greaves by the boatloads, but now </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
> are they admitting that the _live_ cattle imported to N America </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
> is the cause? how can they be sure it was the live cattle and not
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
> some of the tons and tons of MBM from the UK that caused </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
> the only mad cow case in N America? and why is it so far fetched
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
> to believe that more than just one got infected? and how many more
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
> were rendered into 'food for consumption' for any species? </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
> > my records show Canada imported 83 METRIC TONS of MBM from the
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
> UK in the years 1993, 1994, and 1995 </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
> > <a href="http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/mb/m12/tab12.pdf">http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/mb/m12/tab12.pdf</a>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
> > HOWEVER, the Times reports 125 metric tons; </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
> --------------------------------------------------------------------
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
> Exports of Meat and Bone > Meal in tons (1000 kg) from </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
> UK </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
> > Source - Sunday Times </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
> > Country 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
> > Canada 30 22 31 42 > > U.S.A. 20 0 </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
> ================ </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
> look at the live cattle they imported from UK from 86 on. </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
> 399 of i counted correctly. .1 gram lethal, amplification etc. </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
> > <a href="http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/mb/m11f/tab11.pdf">http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/mb/m11f/tab11.pdf</a>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
> > MY RECORDS SHOW USA IMPORTED 44 TONS AND CANADA IMPORTED 83 TONS
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
> OF UK MBM; </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
> > Date: Tue, 8 Feb 2000 14:03:16 +0000 > X400-Originator: <a href="mailto:S.J.Pearsall@ESG.maff.gsi.gov.uk">S.J.Pearsall@ESG.maff.gsi.gov.uk</a>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
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<div>
> X400-Recipients: non-disclosure:; </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
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<div>
> X400-MTS-Identifier: [/PRMD=MAFF400/ADMD=ATTmail/C=GB/;
m1570208140657aa] </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
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<div>
> X400-Content-Type: P2-1984 (2) </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
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</div>
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<div>
> Content-Identifier: m1570208140657aa </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
> Alternate-Recipient: Allowed </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
> Message-ID: </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
> To: flounder@wt.net (Receipt Notification Requested) (Non Receipt
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
> Notification > Requested) </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
> In-Reply-To: </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
> Subject: Re: exports from the U.K. of it's MBM to U.S.??? </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
> X-Mozilla-Status2: 00000000 </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
> > Terry </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
> > Meat and bonemeal is not specifically classified for overseas
trade </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
> purposes. The nearest equivalent is listed as "flours and meals of
meat </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
> or offals (including tankage), unfit for human consumption; greaves".
UK </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
> exports of this to the US are listed below: </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
> > Country Tonnes </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
> 1980 </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
> 1981 12 </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
> 1982 </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
> 1983 </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
> 1984 10 </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
> 1985 2 </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
> 1986 </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
> 1987 </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
> 1988 </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
> 1989 20 </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
> 1990 </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
> > Data for exports between 1975 and 1979 are not readily available.
These </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
> can be obtained (at a charge) from data retailers appointed by HM
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
> Customs and Excise: BTSL (Tel: 01372 463121) or Abacus (01245 252222).
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
> > Best wishes </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
> Simon Pearsall </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
> Overseas trade statistics Stats (C&F)C </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
> > Simon </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
> as discussed </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
> thanks </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
> Julie </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
> --- > Forwarded message: </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
> Sent: Fri Feb 04 21:47:01 2000 </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
> Received: Fri Feb 04 21:45:15 2000 </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
> > To: > helpline ou=inf o=maff p=maff400 a=attmail c=gb </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
> From: </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
> d=flounder@wt.net ou=smtp o=maff p=maff400 a=attmail c=gb </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
> > Subject: exports from the U.K. of it's MBM to U.S.??? </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
> > Hello, </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
> where could I locate data, on the exportation of the U.K.'s meat and
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
> bone </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
> meal, to the U.S., between the years 1975 to 1990? </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
> Thank You > Terry </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
> > ======================================= </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
> > USA AND CANADA IMPORTS OF UK CATTLE BETWEEN 1986-1996 </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
> > USA = 697 </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
> > CANADA = 293 </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
> > <a href="http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/mb/m11f/tab11.pdf">http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/mb/m11f/tab11.pdf</a></div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
> > TSS </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
> > </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
########### <a href="http://mailhost.rz.uni-karlsruhe.de/warc/bse-l.html">http://mailhost.rz.uni-karlsruhe.de/warc/bse-l.html</a>
############ </div>
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</div>
<br />
<div>
<a href="https://lists.aegee.org/cgi-bin/wa?A2=ind0306&L=BSE-L&P=R21551&X=1ABE7910CF6C11F2D0&Y=flounder9%40verizon.net&m=10864">https://lists.aegee.org/cgi-bin/wa?A2=ind0306&L=BSE-L&P=R21551&X=1ABE7910CF6C11F2D0&Y=flounder9%40verizon.net&m=10864</a>
</div>
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<div>
</div>
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<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Subject: risk from US exports of cattle and MBM </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
From: Karin.Irgens@DYREHELSETILSYNET.NO </div>
<br />
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</div>
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<div>
</div>
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Reply-To: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy </div>
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Date: Sat, 14 Jun 2003 23:10:28 +0200 Content-Type: text/plain
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######## Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy ######### </div>
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Hello all </div>
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Terry has now provided US export figures for 'breeding cattle' for 1999, in
addition to export statistics for 2002 that he had already provided. On the
basis of US export statistics for 1999 and 2002 for live cattle for breeding,
and US export statistics for 2002 and 2003 for meat and bone meal (code
23.01.1000), we could try to calculate external challenge from the USA to
importing countries. However, _we dont really know_ the situations in most of
these importing countries (at least I dont know...). If live cattle from a
BSE-infected country are imported to a country that does not have a rendering
system for slaughter waste, there would be no resulting BSE-risk to the
importing country. If an importing country decides to exclude waste from
imported cattle from rendering, or to BSE-test all imported cattle slaughtered
at > 30 months age, the risk will be considerably reduced. Canadian and US
cattle exported for breeding in recent years may still be alive in the importing
countries, and may now be excluded from rendering. </div>
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We dont know if all US exports of meat and bone meal "code 23.01.1000" were
"mammalian" MBM or if some of it was poultry meal or MBM derived only from pigs.
The same code 23.01.1000 can be used for registrations of exports/imports of
mammalian MBM and poultry meal. The EU SSC does not consider poultry meal as a
BSE-risk, but each country must prove how much of the imports really were
poultry meal. It is possible that some countries, for religious reasons, would
accept only MBM not derived from pig waste. If such countries imported only
poultry meal, the risk would be very low. </div>
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We dont know if all registered US exports were correctly coded. It is
possible and probable that some exports were in fact other products that shoud
not have been coded as 23.01.1000. </div>
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And of course we dont know the final destination of "23.01.1000"-products
exported by the US, whether or not the MBM reached cattle through feeding in the
importing country. </div>
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It is therefore not possible to make any real risk estimate, not knowing
what happened in each importing country. For countries already assessed by the
SSC, such knowledge may be found in the already publisehd GBR assessments.
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Here I can only add up exports from US to each country, and only for years
1999 and 2002 (+ january-march 2003), and roughly calculate the numbers of risk
units _if_ these imports really represented a risk to cattle in the importing
countries. (see list country list below). </div>
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It appears that the countries most at risk from US imports, especially MBM
would be Bangladesh, Egypt, China, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, Philippines,
Taiwan, Thailand, Venezuela, Vietnam. Some other countries have imported much
lower amounts of US cattle + MBM in 1999 and 2002/2003, but I dont know if these
countries have imported similar (or higher) amounts from the USA in previous
years. </div>
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According to Rev Sci Tech. 2003 Apr;22(1):237-49. Risk management of
transmissible spongiform encephalopathies in Asia - Ozawa Y : </div>
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" ...significant quantities of feedstuffs of ruminant origin have been
imported into Asia, which may mean that the BSE agent could have reached
domestic cattle in most countries... Recycling of BSE through rendering plants
is unlikely but cannot be totally excluded in some countries such as the
People's Republic of China, India, Japan, Pakistan and Taipei China... " </div>
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"...The external challenge has been considerably reduced in recent years as
most countries in Asia banned the importation of feedstuffs from _countries with
BSE _ ..." </div>
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(my comments: but they did not ban MBM from the USA... I think China has
the world's largest cattle population...) </div>
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quoted from a series of articles on CWD, in 2002 : <a href="http://cfapp.rockymountainnews.com/cwd/killer/">http://cfapp.rockymountainnews.com/cwd/killer/</a>
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" ...the FDA has not imposed the same restrictions on exported MBM. In
fact, since the American ban went into effect, annual U.S. exports of MBM have
jumped from 291,000 tons to 467,000 tons, a 60 percent increase. American
renderers aren't required to warn their foreign customers about feeding ruminant
protein -- that rendered from sheep or cattle -- to cattle. However, three large
renderers contacted by the News say they label their products that way
regardless of the lack of regulations. </div>
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Denver's National By-Products said it ships its MBM to China and Indonesia
in large shipping containers, not in individually marked bags. But it stamps on
its bills of lading a warning against feeding the product to ruminants. The
stamp is in English. Once American meat and bone meal arrives in the purchasing
country, the manufacturer has no further control over how it is labeled, said
National By-Products district manager Ken Kage. A spokesman for the USDA and
officials with the National Renderers Association say that foreign trade in U.S.
MBM is not a problem because there have been no cases of mad cow disease in this
country. </div>
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Some countries importing MBM have had few if any rules concerning its use
as cattle feed. Mexico, for example, implemented labeling rules only this year
(2002), according to Alberto Celis, the National Renderers Association regional
director for Latin America. </div>
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That was news to many agricultural business people attending an animal feed
trade show in Guadalajara in March. Representatives from three animal feed bag
manufacturers said they had heard of no such regulations and that their bags
remain warning free. Mexico exports over a million live cattle a year to the
United States. Mexican cattlemen said these "feeder" cows are not typically fed
animal protein, though there is little evidence that the government has an
adequate inspection program to make certain. Mexican government officials
responded that MBM rules were promulgated last summer, and that they will be
vigorously enforced. They said Mexico stopped importing MBM from countries with
a BSE problem in 1991 and that there are no known cases of BSE in the country.
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The World Health Organization says Mexico's experience with American MBM is
reflected throughout the world. The United Nations agency was "concerned that
some countries which received (MBM) materials do not have surveillance systems
to detect the disease in animals or the human population," said WHO's Dr. Maura
Ricketts at a news conference in December 2000. She said once the MBM leaves one
country, it begins a "murky movement" that is almost impossible to track. Taking
heed of such warnings, the European Union (EU) decided that the risk to public
health was too great even if an importing country insisted that it would use MBM
only as poultry feed -- which, along with pet food, is its major use in the U.S.
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The EU adopted the ban of all exports of MBM in 2000. Instead of adopting a
similar policy, the USDA saw the ban as a golden opportunity. "Importing
countries of EU MBM may be forced to seek alternative suppliers of animal
protein meals, such as the United States," said a December 2000 report by the
USDA. "The United States should be well positioned to take advantage of that
situation to increase its own exports of MBM." </div>
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And it has. Render, the magazine of the National Renderers Association,
noted in its April issue that exports of many products were under competitive
pressure from vegetable oils. But it noted "a bright spot is meat and bone meal
exports that continue to increase." The chief foreign markets for American MBM,
in order of sales amounts, were Indonesia, Mexico, Egypt, China, Canada,
Thailand, Bangladesh, the Philippines and Venezuela. In 1998, Egypt imported
96,000 metric tons of MBM from the EU, and only 3,100 metric tons from the U.S.
By 2001, the U.S dominated the Egyptian market, selling over 73,000 metric
tons..." </div>
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(r.u = risk unit) (2003 = US exports of "23.01.1000"-products in the period
January through March 2003)</div>
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Argentina 1999: 9 cattle for breeding (0,09 r.u.)</div>
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Australia 1999: 81 breeding cattle from USA (0,8 risk units) 2003: 5 tons
MBM from USA (0,5 r.u.)</div>
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Bangladesh 2003: 2.217 tons MBM 2002: 12.630 tons MBM (1.484 r.u)</div>
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Belize: 2002: 27 cattle for breeding (0,27 r.u.) </div>
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Brazil 1999: 440 breeding cattle 2002: 134 breeding cattle (5,7 r.u.) 2002:
12 tons MBM 2003: 12 tons MBM (2,4 r.u.)</div>
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China 1999: 84 breeding cattle 2002: 40 + 190 + 26 breeding cattle (2,8
r.u.) 2002: 104.784 tons MBM 2003: 19.552 tons MBM (12.433 r.u)</div>
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Colombia 1999: 251 cattle for breeding 2002: 2.363 cattle for breeding (26
r.u.) 2002: 882 tons MBM 2003: 80 tons MBM (96 r.u.)</div>
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Colombia has > 100 r.u. from recent imports from the USA. Colombia was
previously assessed in category II and might now be re-assessed in category III,
unless there is proof that the additional external challenge from USA did not
reach Colombian cattle.</div>
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Costa Rica 2002: 19 cattle for breeding (0,19 r.u.)</div>
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Dominican Republic: 1999: 45 cattle for breeding 2002: 220 cattle for
breeding (2, 65 r.u.) 2003: 77 tons MBM (7,7 r.u.)</div>
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Ecuador 1999: 120 cattle for breeding (1,2 r.u.) 2002: 14 tons MBM (1,4
r.u.)</div>
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Egypt: 2002: 104.408 tons MBM 2003: 15.796 tons MBM (12.019 r.u.) Egypt
would already have a high external challenge from previous imports from
Europe.</div>
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Ghana: 2003: 41 tons MBM (4,1 r.u.)</div>
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Guatemala 1999: 23 cattle for breeding 2002: 26 cattle for breeding (0,49
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Honduras 2002: 51 cattle for breeding (0,51 r.u.)</div>
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Hong Kong: 2002: 41 tons MBM 2003: 61 tons MBM (10 r.u.) </div>
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Indonesia 2002: 148.558 tons MBM 2003: 36.999 tons MBM (18.555 r.u.)
(according to various figures from newspapers, Indonesia would prevously have
been a major importer of British MBM)</div>
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Korea, South 1999: 248 cattle for breeding (2, 48 r.u.) 2002: 262 tons MBM
(26 r.u.)</div>
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Lebanon 1999: 2.228 cattle for breeding (22, 3 r.u.)</div>
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Malaysia 2002: 7 cattle for breeding (0,07 r.u.) 2002: 12.646 tons MBM
2003: 2.209 tons MBM (1485 r.u.)</div>
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Mexico 1999: 8.780 cattle for breeding 2002: 10.888 cattle for breeding
(196 r.u.) 2002: 93.685 other cattle ?? 2002: 62.204 tons MBM 2003: 14.756 tons
MBM (7.696 r.u.)</div>
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New Zealand 2002: 21 tons MBM (2,1 r.u.)</div>
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Niger 2002: 57 tons MBM (5,7 r.u.)</div>
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Panama 1999: 17 cattle for breeding 2002: 59 cattle for breeding (0,76
r.u.) 2002: 172 tons MBM 2003: 57 tons MBM (23 r.u.) Panama, previously assessed
in category I, might have 23 additonal risk units from recent US imports, and
might be re-assessed in category II if this could have reached cattle.</div>
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Pakistan 1999: 11 cattle for breeding (0,11 r.u.)</div>
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Philippines 2002: 5.585 tons MBM 2003: 1.215 tons MBM (680 r.u.)</div>
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Russia: 2002: 390 tons MBM 2003: 1.520 tons MBM (191 r.u.) Russia would
probably already be at risk from imports from EU and/or east-European
countries.</div>
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Saudi Arabia 1999: 884 cattle for breeding (8, 84 r.u.)</div>
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Singapore 2003: 4 tons MBM (0, 4 r.u.)</div>
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South Africa: 2002: 40 tons MBM (4 r.u.)</div>
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Sri Lanka 2002: 351 tons MBM (35 r.u.)</div>
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Suriname 2002: 45 cattle for breeding (0,45 r.u.)</div>
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Taiwan 2002: 12.421 tons MBM 2003: 1.719 tons MBM (1.414 r.u.)</div>
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Thailand 2002: 36.476 tons MBM 2003: 7.314 tons MBM (4.379 r.u.)</div>
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United Arab Emirates 2003: 39 tons MBM (3,9 r.u.)</div>
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Uruguay: 1999: 7 cattle for breeding (0,07 r.u.)</div>
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Venezuela 1999: 473 cattle for breeding 2002: 169 cattle for breeding (6, 4
r.u.) 2002: 1.998 tons MBM (199 r.u.) </div>
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Vietnam 2002: 7.618 tons MBM 2003: 2.229 tons MBM (1.048 r.u.)</div>
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Best regards Karin Irgens</div>
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<a href="https://lists.aegee.org/cgi-bin/wa?A2=ind0306&L=BSE-L&F=&S=&X=46995873C7A76ACDD7&Y=flounder9%40verizon.net&P=11693">https://lists.aegee.org/cgi-bin/wa?A2=ind0306&L=BSE-L&F=&S=&X=46995873C7A76ACDD7&Y=flounder9%40verizon.net&P=11693</a>
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<a href="https://lists.aegee.org/cgi-bin/wa?A2=ind0306&L=BSE-L&F=&S=&X=46995873C7A76ACDD7&Y=flounder9%40verizon.net&P=17066">https://lists.aegee.org/cgi-bin/wa?A2=ind0306&L=BSE-L&F=&S=&X=46995873C7A76ACDD7&Y=flounder9%40verizon.net&P=17066</a>
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<a href="https://lists.aegee.org/cgi-bin/wa?A2=ind0306&L=BSE-L&F=&S=&X=46995873C7A76ACDD7&Y=flounder9%40verizon.net&P=15580">https://lists.aegee.org/cgi-bin/wa?A2=ind0306&L=BSE-L&F=&S=&X=46995873C7A76ACDD7&Y=flounder9%40verizon.net&P=15580</a>
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######## Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy <bse-l>
######### </bse-l></div>
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Hello all </div>
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Concerning the introduction of testing of all fallen stock in Canada,
Robert wrote: </div>
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"...What is the scientific basis for the movement? So far, vastly more
cases of BSE have been found by clinical referral than by any other testing
program." </div>
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This is not quite true, at least not since 2001. Of course, historically,
most BSE-cases (1986-2003) have been found by clinical referral, in the UK. But
before the second semester 2001, there was almost no active surveillance in the
UK, and before 1999, there was no EU-validated rapid test method available.
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Active surveillance with the Prionics test startet in 1999 in Switzerland,
then in France in the summer of 2000, then started in _all_ EU countries in
January 2001. Three validated methods are used in the EU: Prionics, Biorad and
Enfer. </div>
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In 2001, when active suveillance started late in the UK, only 375
BSE-positive cattle were found in the UK by rapid tests, while 781 cases were
found among clincal suspects. </div>
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In 2002, when UK active surveillance started in January, 613 BSE-positive
were found by active surveillance in the UK - and "only" 467 cases were
confirmed among clinical suspects. </div>
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In 2001, 2.126 BSE-positive cattle were found in the EU, of which 1.086
were clinical cases. Most clinical cases (781) were found in the UK. </div>
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In 2002, 2.081 BSE-positive cattle were found in the EU, of which 673 were
clinical cases (467 of which were UK cases) - and 1.408 were found by active
surveillance. </div>
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As the numbers of clinical cases continue to decrease, the relative % of
detection by active surveillance increases. </div>
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In 2002, 51 % of cases (total all EU countries) were detected by active
surveillance of 'risk cattle', and 13 % by active surveillance of clinically
normal cattle. </div>
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see Monthly reports of Member States on BSE and Scrapie (updated) <a href="http://europa.eu.int/comm/food/fs/bse/testing/bse_results_en.html">http://europa.eu.int/comm/food/fs/bse/testing/bse_results_en.html</a>
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The % of confirmed positive among clinical suspects is very different among
EU countries. It is highest in the UK (60%) much lower in Spain, Ireland, France
(around 20%) and even lower in Germany, Netherlands, Belgium (around 2-5%)
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In some countries, the vast majority of BSE-positive cattle are detected by
active surveillance. </div>
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Some examples: </div>
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- Denmark had no clinical case in 2002, but detected 2 BSE-positive among
33.116 risk cattle and one positive among 239.900 clinically normal cattle.
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- the Netherlands found one clinical case in 2002, and 23 positive by
active surveillance. </div>
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- Belgium had 5 clinical cases in 2002, and 33 BSE-positive detected by
active surveillance (16 among 37.929 risk cattle and 17 among 408.934 clinically
normal) </div>
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- Germany found 11 clinical cases and 92 BSE-positive by active
surveillance (50 among 257.940 risk cattle, and 42 among 2.758.351 clinically
normal) </div>
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Passive surveillance seems to give the best results in countries where BSE
prevalence is highest and in countries whith the earliest detections of BSE (UK
1986, Ireland 1989, France 1991). If Canada and the USA have a low or very low
BSE-prevalence, I would expect active surveillance to be the most efficient.
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- Austria and Finland found no BSE in 2002. Their first and only BSE cases
were discovered in 2001 by active surveillance. Had Finland not tested risk
animals, they would have found nothing. Had Austria not tested clinically normal
cattle, they would not have detected the first and only Austrian case. The level
of active surveillance has notably increased since 2001, but no more positive
cattle have been detected either in Austria or Finland. </div>
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One might wonder how many sub-clinical positive cases would have been
detected in the UK before 2001, if rapid tests for active surveillance had been
available in the early BSE-years. The last estimations by Donnelly et al.
indicate that the total number of infected UK cattle could have been closer to 2
million than to ½ or one million in previous estimates. Most of approx 180.000
detected cases were found by passive clinical surveillance, and of course most
UK-cases occurred long before active surveillance started. </div>
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In 2002, over 10 million cattle were tested for BSE in all EU countries.
Over 9 million of these were clinically normal cattle > 30 months (or, in
some countries, > 24 months ... France, Germany). </div>
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The following "risk cattle"populations (> 24 months) were tested in 2002
(all EU contries): </div>
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- 981.910 "fallen stock" (dead on farm) </div>
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- 182.873 "emergency slaughter" (comparable to "downer cattle") </div>
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- 70.557 "selected at ante-morten control", for various states of disease
or general condition disorders </div>
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- 57.601 age cohort cattle and offspring, from farms where BSE had been
detected. </div>
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(the total EU adult cattle population (>24 months) is approx 40 million,
comparable to the total adult cattle population in the US. ) </div>
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- Only 2.558 defined as 'clinically suspect' cattle were tested, but in
fact clinical suspects cannot always be clearly differentiated from fallen stock
and other risk cattle. Investigations in France have shown that many "fallen" or
emergency slaughtered cattle had presented symptoms compatible with BSE before
death or slaughter. </div>
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The results in different risk groups (all EU countries) in 2002 are: </div>
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- 510 positive among 182.873 emergency slaghtered (ratio 27, 89 + per
10.000 tested) </div>
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- 607 positive among 981.910 "fallen stock" (6, 18 + per 10.000 tested)
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- 25 positive among 70.557 "selected at ante-mortem control" (3, 54 + per
10.000 tested) </div>
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- 17 positive among 57.601 cohort animals/offspring from BSE-farms (2, 95 +
per 10,000). </div>
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- 287 positive among 9.087.901 healthy cattle (0,32 per 10.000 tested)
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Clearly, testing of healthy cattle is the least efficient per number
tested. However, it should be noted that Germany and France test all cattle
older than 24 months at slaughter, and there are many cattle slaughtered at
24-29 months. Efficiency would increase if the age limit for testing of
"healthy" cattle was set higher (> 3 or 4 years). It should be noted that the
group "selected at ante-mortem control" is _not_ selected because of
neurological symptoms but for 'any reason' of loss of condition (loss of weight,
diarrhea, reduced milk production ... etc...) Even so, this group has a higher
positivity ratio than age cohort animals culled in BSE-eradications schemes.
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When Canada has tested a few hundred cattle from the Alberta cow's _last_
herd of residence with negative results, this is not at all surprising,
especially if the cow had lived there only 1 or 3 (?) years !) If Canada culls
and tests a few thousand cattle from several quarantined farms, with negative
results, the negative results will prove nothing: </div>
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Belgium, Denmark, Italy and the Netherlands found no positive among total
12.829 tested culled cohort/offspring cattle in 2002. Germany found 3 positive
among 2.629 - Spain found 6 positive among 5.473 - France found 3 positive among
15.881, Ireland 4+ out of 18.659 and Portugal 1 + out of 1.163. </div>
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The % positive among clinically healthy cattle tested in 2002 was highest
in Portugal (5,7 per 10.000) - and lowest in Denmark (0, 04 per 10.000) (the UK
tests very few cattle in this group, because cattle > 30 months are not
allowed into the British food chain. If the UK decides to allow consumption of
cattle > 30 months, they will have to test this group.) </div>
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The % positive among fallen stock was highest in Portugal (57, 5 per
10.000) and Ireland (24 per 10,000) and lowest in Denmark (0,48 per 10.000)
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The % positive among emergency slaughtered was highest in the UK (35,5 per
10,000) and Ireland (20,9 per 10.000). </div>
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The % positive among "cattle selected at ante-mortem control" was highest
in Spain (71 per 10.000) and the UK (38 per 10.000). </div>
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I would recommend that both Canada _and the USA_ start testing all
emergency slaughtered (downer) adult cattle immediately, and require testing of
"as many as possible" of fallen stock as soon as possible (sampling of fallen
stock would take some time to organise). I would also recommend testing as many
as possible of adult cattle selected at ante-mortem control and healthy cattle
> 3-4 years, starting with cattle > 4 years. </div>
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Considering the extensive trade of live cattle and MBM beteween Canada and
the USA, it does not seem credible today that only Canada would be BSE-infected
and not the USA. The USA have imported around 10 million Canadian cattle during
the last 13 years. These 10 million would have been rendered in the USA, and
would represent 100.000 risk units (according to the latest GBR opinion of the
EU SSC of january 11th 2002). </div>
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10.000 risk units is a very high external challenge. What makes it even
worse is that the systems in North America are very unstable, with few
precautionary measures in place to avoid amplification and propagation of
TSE/BSE. US and Canadian MBM still contain SRM, and heat treatment is below
standard, with low efficiency for TSE-inactivation (unless rendering parameters
have been notably increased since 2000 ?). </div>
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The RMBM ban introduced in Canada and the USA in 1997 was an incomplete ban
and as long as there is no requirement for complete separation of plants
producing feeds for ruminants, cross contaminations are unavoidable. Cross
contaminations were a big problem in EU-countries before January 2001 when the
total ban on all animal proteins to all foood producing species was decided. At
least 44.000 'BAB-cases' (born after the ban) were born in the UK after July
1988, the first (incomplete) feed ban. Hundreds of BSE-cases were born in other
EU countries after their first (incomplete) feed bans. </div>
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The idea of a "one case-one herd" also seems very unrealistic at the
present time in Canada/USA. It might have been more credible had the USA/Canada
had > 2 years of high level active surveillance like Austria and Finland, and
an optimally stable rendering-feeding system. Today, North America lacks both.
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Best regards </div>
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Karin Irgens </div>
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> -----Opprinnelig melding----- </div>
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> Fra: Robert A. LaBudde [SMTP:ral@LCFLTD.COM] </div>
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> Sendt: 1. juni 2003 20:31 </div>
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> Til: <a href="mailto:BSE-L@uni-karlsruhe.de">BSE-L@uni-karlsruhe.de</a> </div>
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> Emne: Re: BSE-CWD-canada </div>
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> > >There is a strong movement here to encourage the Canadian
Food Inspection </div>
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> >Agency (CFIA) to introduce testing on all fallen stock using
EU-style </div>
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> >pre-clinical test. So far the rate is similar to the USA- a sample
of </div>
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> >fallen cases are taken. And none as far as I am aware from animals
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> >destined for human food. </div>
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> > What is the scientific basis for the movement? So far, vastly
more c... </div>
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<a href="https://lists.aegee.org/cgi-bin/wa?A2=ind0306&L=BSE-L&F=&S=&X=46995873C7A76ACDD7&Y=flounder9%40verizon.net&P=937">https://lists.aegee.org/cgi-bin/wa?A2=ind0306&L=BSE-L&F=&S=&X=46995873C7A76ACDD7&Y=flounder9%40verizon.net&P=937</a>
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######## Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy <bse-l>
######### </bse-l></div>
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Hello Robert </div>
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> What about the breeding sows and boars? </div>
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I dont know the situation in other countries, but in Norway we slaughter
about 1,3 million young pigs/year (around 6 months) and very few breeder pigs.
There are approx. 55.000 breeder pigs in Norway and most of these are not very
old (around 2 ½ years old) when slaughtered. However, a few may live much
longer, there was one example of an 8 years old Norwegian breeding sow. </div>
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I suppose the intestines would be discarded, since Norway does not produce
casings. </div>
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Best regards </div>
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Karin Irgens </div>
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> -----Opprinnelig melding----- </div>
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> Fra: Robert A. LaBudde [SMTP:ral@LCFLTD.COM] </div>
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> Sendt: 3. juni 2003 02:44 > Til: <a href="mailto:BSE-L@uni-karlsruhe.de">BSE-L@uni-karlsruhe.de</a> </div>
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> Emne: Re: SV: BSE-CWD-canada </div>
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> > ######## Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy </div>
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<a href="mailto:BSE-L@UNI-KARLSRUHE.DE">BSE-L@UNI-KARLSRUHE.DE</a></div>
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> ######### </div>
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> > At 10:20 PM 6/2/03 +0200, Karin wrote: </div>
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> >In my posting yesterday I wrote: > ></div>
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<snip> </snip></div>
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> >Robert wrote: </div>
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> >Canada has a 3.5 M cattle population </div>
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> > > >According to Lyle Vanclief </div>
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> >(<a href="http://www.inspection.gc.ca/english/anima/heasan/disemala/bseesb/debatee">http://www.inspection.gc.ca/english/anima/heasan/disemala/bseesb/debatee</a>
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> .sh </div>
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> >tml </div>
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> >Statement by The Honourable Lyle Vanclief to the House of Commons
- May > 26, > >2003)</div>
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> > > >"...there are over 13 million cattle in Canada and 3.6
million that are </div>
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> >slaughtered each year in Canada" </div>
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> >I would assume that the Canadian 'adult' cattle population is
somewhere </div>
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> >around 40% of 13 million. > </div>
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> Thanking for pointing out this error. I have been using the slaughter
> number instead of the total population in these posts. You are, of course,
> correct. </div>
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> > ><snip> </snip></div>
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> >Robert: > >"...By the way, all of your arguments could
equally be applied to swine > >production: Are you advocating that EU
countries start massive sample and > >test programs for swine? How do we
know BSE is not present in these > >animals, which were not protected
until a complete feed ban was put into > >place? ..." </div>
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> > > >comment: </div>
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> >Most pigs are slaughtered around the age of 6 months. If BSE
infectivity > was > >present in pigs (from feeding), it would be in the
intestine at that > age, > >and presumably at concentrations far too
low for detection by any of the > >validated rapid tests - although pig
intestines used as casings might > >represent a risk. > >However,
pigs slaughtered in the EU today are born long after the total > feed >
>ban in January 2001. > </div>
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> What about the breeding sows and boars? > </div>
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> >I would be more worried about feeding of North American cattle
with </div>
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> 'poultry </div>
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> >offal meal' and MBM produced from pigs, with intestines and
intestinal </div>
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> >contents from pigs and poultry that have been fed ruminant-derived
MBM. </div>
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> Not </div>
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> >to mention 'poultry litter', still used in the USA in cattle feed
(but > not > >in Canada, they say) : </div>
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> >"... Manure is not on the list of approved ingredients for animal
feed in </div>
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> >Canada, but U.S. regulations permit the use of poultry litter."
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> ><a href="http://cnews.canoe.ca/CNEWS/Canada/2003/06/01/101175-cp.html">http://cnews.canoe.ca/CNEWS/Canada/2003/06/01/101175-cp.html</a>
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> > Yes, the feed ban is not yet complete here. It should be. </div>
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> > PS. Thank you for a professional, informative and cogent
response. Very > refreshing on BSE-L! </div>
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> > ================================================================
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> Robert A. LaBudde, PhD, PAS, Dpl. ACAFS e-mail: ral@lcfltd.com >
Least Cost Formulations, Ltd. URL: <a href="http://lcfltd.co/">http://lcfltd.co</a> </div>
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<a href="https://lists.aegee.org/cgi-bin/wa?A2=ind0306&L=BSE-L&F=&S=&X=46995873C7A76ACDD7&Y=flounder9%40verizon.net&P=2457">https://lists.aegee.org/cgi-bin/wa?A2=ind0306&L=BSE-L&F=&S=&X=46995873C7A76ACDD7&Y=flounder9%40verizon.net&P=2457</a>
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<a href="https://lists.aegee.org/cgi-bin/wa?A1=ind0306&L=BSE-L&X=46995873C7A76ACDD7&Y=flounder9%40verizon.net#126">https://lists.aegee.org/cgi-bin/wa?A1=ind0306&L=BSE-L&X=46995873C7A76ACDD7&Y=flounder9%40verizon.net#126</a>
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<a href="http://madcowusda.blogspot.com/2012/10/canadian-veterinarian-fined-after.html">http://madcowusda.blogspot.com/2012/10/canadian-veterinarian-fined-after.html</a>
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<a href="http://madcowusda.blogspot.com/">http://madcowusda.blogspot.com/</a>
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Wednesday, April 16, 2008 </div>
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MBM, greaves, meat offal, live cattle, imports from UK to USA vs Canada
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<a href="http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2008/04/mbm-greaves-meat-offal-live-cattle.html">http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2008/04/mbm-greaves-meat-offal-live-cattle.html</a>
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Docket No. 03-080-1 -- USDA ISSUES PROPOSED RULE TO ALLOW LIVE ANIMAL
IMPORTS FROM CANADA </div>
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<a href="http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2008/07/docket-no-03-080-1-usda-issues-proposed.html">http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2008/07/docket-no-03-080-1-usda-issues-proposed.html</a>
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Importation of Whole Cuts of Boneless Beef from Japan [Docket No. 05-004-1]
RIN 0579-AB93 TSS SUBMISSION Date: August 24, 2005 at 2:47 pm PST </div>
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<a href="http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2008/07/importation-of-whole-cuts-of-boneless.html">http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2008/07/importation-of-whole-cuts-of-boneless.html</a>
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BSE BASE MAD COW TESTING TEXAS, USA, AND CANADA </div>
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<a href="http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/">http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/</a>
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SNIP... </div>
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Another problem in testing fallen stock for BSE may arise from unequal
distribution of PrPSc in BSE-affected brains. Spongiform changes and
accumulation of PrPSc are most frequently observed in the obex region [15,18],
but, it could be quite difficult to collect the obex region precisely from
extensively deteriorated and liquefied brain tissue. Furthermore, in such cases
it would be difficult to perform IHC as a confirmation test. </div>
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It has been shown that sample autolysis does not affect detection of
PrPScby means of WB [3, 5, 13]. Our WB results also demonstrated no reduction
inthe PrPSc signal as a result of deterioration at 30*C or 37*C for up to 4days,
as so far examined (Figs. 2A and 3A). In this study, we showed that several
problems undermine the utility of the ELISA with deteriorated samples, whereas
WB remains very dependable. Therefore, WB might be the only reliable procedure
to detect PrPSc in severely damaged samples from fallen stock... </div>
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FULL TEXT 6 PAGES; </div>
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<a href="http://www.jstage.jst.go.jp/article/jvms/66/5/515/_pdf">http://www.jstage.jst.go.jp/article/jvms/66/5/515/_pdf</a>
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Karin writes; </div>
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> I would be more worried about the latest USA suspect where no WB can
be done, due to formalin fixation of the sample. I don’t know if the“reference”
laboratory in Weybridge has ever missed any BSE-positive cattle (or atypical
bovine TSEs), but they have certainly failed to confirm several cases of
atypical scrapie, because they insisted on using the so-called validated methods
recommended by the OIE before 2003. I hope they now have solved this
problem.> </div>
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Tuesday, November 02, 2010 </div>
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BSE - ATYPICAL LESION DISTRIBUTION (RBSE 92-21367) statutory (obex only)
diagnostic criteria CVL 1992 </div>
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<a href="http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2010/11/bse-atypical-lesion-distribution-rbse.html">http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2010/11/bse-atypical-lesion-distribution-rbse.html</a>
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R-CALF 2012 </div>
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2. There have been numerous examples where parts of Canadian cattle banned
from importation by the OTM Rule were intercepted at the U.S. border, or where
parts of U.S. cattle prohibited in exports to Asian countries were intercepted
during importation into those countries, further supporting Plaintiffs’
assertion that USDA must consider the risk that the mitigation measures it
relied on in the OTM Rule to protect U.S. consumers and the U.S. cattle herd
from potential BSE infection in Canadian cattle may not be complied with
uniformly in practice. (For example, in February 2012 a Canadian veterinarian
and the owners of several Canadian livestock operations were charged with
illegally exporting possibly hundreds of cattle to the U.S. that were banned
under the OTM Rule because they were born before March 1, 1999.) There also have
been numerous events at U.S. slaughterhouses that call into question USDA’s
assumption in support of the OTM Rule that specified risk materials (SRMs)
potentially harboring BSE infectivity will be removed when Canadian cattle are
slaughtered in the United States. (For example, in October 2009 there were
recalls of 33,000 pounds of beef tongues from an Omaha meatpacker and 5,522
pounds of beef tongues from a Cargill Meat Solutions Corporation plant in
Wisconsin, in both cases because tonsils—an SRM required to be removed under the
OTM Rule because of their potential for containing infectious BSE prions—may not
have been completely removed, and in 2008 USDA’s Food Safety Inspection Service
issued four recall notices covering almost 1.4 million pounds of cattle heads
from which the SRMs had not been removed.) </div>
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government on February 26, 2008 and was reported in the Feb. 29, 2008
Post-hearing Comments of Amicus Curiae the Government of Canada (Doc. # 112),
and one was reported by the Canadian government on June 27, 2008 and was
identified to the Court in Plaintiffs’ July 1, 2008 Notice of Supplemental
Authority (Doc. # 131). </div>
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3. A new case of BSE was discovered in the United States (the first since
March 2006), in a California dairy cow that died on the farm in April 2012. That
case is still being investigated by USDA and others, and its significance for
U.S. BSE risk mitigation measures is not yet known. Although USDA announced the
cow was infected with a different strain of BSE than was previously identified
in the United States, among other things, USDA has not yet determined, or at
least has not released to the public, where the cow was born, when and how she
became infected, and whether she bore any markings or was accompanied by any
records suggesting she was imported. </div>
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See</div>
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<a href="http://www.aphis.usda.gov/newsroom/2012/05/bse_update_050212.shtml;">http://www.aphis.usda.gov/newsroom/2012/05/bse_update_050212.shtml;</a>
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see also</div>
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<a href="http://www.usda.gov/wps/portal/usda/usdahome?contentid=2012/04/0136.xml&contentidonly=true">http://www.usda.gov/wps/portal/usda/usdahome?contentid=2012/04/0136.xml&contentidonly=true]</a>.
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4. There have been additional scientific studies showing the potential for
BSE prions in a wider range of bovine organs. For example, a 2010 study of the
particular strain of BSE that USDA stated had infected the California cow
detected in April 2012 (see </div>
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<div>
<a href="http://www.aphis.usda.gov/newsroom/2012/05/bse_update_statement.shtml">http://www.aphis.usda.gov/newsroom/2012/05/bse_update_statement.shtml</a>,
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(“index cow was positive for atypical (L-type) BSE”) discovered
infectivity in a variety of peripheral nerves, including the nerves of the
forelimbs of cattle, albeit at very low levels. See </div>
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<a href="http://wwwnc.cdc.gov/eid/article/16/7/09-1882_article.htm">http://wwwnc.cdc.gov/eid/article/16/7/09-1882_article.htm</a>.
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Results from a 2008 study suggest that in humans, this new strain of BSE is
a more virulent strain. </div>
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See </div>
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<a href="http://jvi.asm.org/content/82/7/3697.full.pdf">http://jvi.asm.org/content/82/7/3697.full.pdf</a>.
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SNIP...</div>
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SEE FULL TEXT R-CALF 2012 ON MAD COW DISEASE </div>
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<a href="http://r-calfusa.com/BSE/120619PlaintiffsResponseToMay30Order.pdf">http://r-calfusa.com/BSE/120619PlaintiffsResponseToMay30Order.pdf</a>
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Sunday, August 29, 2010 </div>
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Prion Disease Round Table Conducted Wednesday December 11, 2003 at Denver,
Colorado R-CALF-USA Sponsored (REVISITED AUGUST 2010) </div>
<br />
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</div>
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</div>
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<a href="http://bseusa.blogspot.com/2010/08/prion-disease-round-table-conducted.html">http://bseusa.blogspot.com/2010/08/prion-disease-round-table-conducted.html</a>
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Friday, November 23, 2012 </div>
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</div>
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<div>
sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease update As at 5th November 2012 UK, USA,
AND CANADA </div>
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</div>
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<a href="http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2012/11/sporadic-creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.html">http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2012/11/sporadic-creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.html</a>
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Tuesday, June 26, 2012 </div>
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</div>
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Creutzfeldt Jakob Disease Human TSE report update North America, Canada,
Mexico, and USDA PRION UNIT as of May 18, 2012 </div>
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</div>
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<div>
type determination pending Creutzfeldt Jakob Disease (tdpCJD), is on the
rise in Canada and the USA </div>
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<a href="http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2012/06/creutzfeldt-jakob-disease-human-tse.html">http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2012/06/creutzfeldt-jakob-disease-human-tse.html</a>
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2012 atypical L-type BSE BASE California reports </div>
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</div>
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Saturday, August 4, 2012 </div>
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</div>
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<div>
Final Feed Investigation Summary - California BSE Case - July 2012 </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
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<div>
<a href="http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2012/08/final-feed-investigation-summary.html">http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2012/08/final-feed-investigation-summary.html</a>
</div>
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SUMMARY REPORT CALIFORNIA BOVINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY CASE
INVESTIGATION JULY 2012 </div>
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</div>
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<div>
Summary Report BSE 2012 </div>
<br />
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</div>
<br />
<div>
Executive Summary </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
<a href="http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2012/08/summary-report-california-bovine.html">http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2012/08/summary-report-california-bovine.html</a>
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Saturday, August 4, 2012 </div>
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</div>
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<div>
Update from APHIS Regarding Release of the Final Report on the BSE
Epidemiological Investigation </div>
<br />
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</div>
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<div>
<a href="http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2012/08/update-from-aphis-regarding-release-of.html">http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2012/08/update-from-aphis-regarding-release-of.html</a>
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CENSORSHIP IS A TERRIBLE THING $$$ </div>
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Canada has had a COVER-UP policy of mad cow disease since about the 17th
case OR 18th case of mad cow disease. AFTER THAT, all FOIA request were ignored
$$$ </div>
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<div>
THIS proves there is indeed an epidemic of mad cow disease in North
America, and it has been covered up for years and years, if not for decades, and
it’s getting worse $$$ </div>
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<div>
Thursday, February 10, 2011 </div>
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</div>
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<div>
TRANSMISSIBLE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY REPORT UPDATE CANADA FEBRUARY 2011
and how to hide mad cow disease in Canada Current as of: 2011-01-31 </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
<a href="http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2011/02/transmissible-spongiform-encephalopathy.html">http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2011/02/transmissible-spongiform-encephalopathy.html</a>
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Wednesday, August 11, 2010 </div>
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</div>
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<div>
REPORT ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE SIXTEENTH CASE OF BOVINE SPONGIFORM
ENCEPHALOPATHY (BSE) IN CANADA </div>
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</div>
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<div>
<a href="http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2010/08/report-on-investigation-of-sixteenth.html">http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2010/08/report-on-investigation-of-sixteenth.html</a>
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Thursday, August 19, 2010 </div>
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</div>
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<div>
REPORT ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE SEVENTEENTH CASE OF BOVINE SPONGIFORM
ENCEPHALOPATHY (BSE) IN CANADA </div>
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</div>
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<div>
<a href="http://bseusa.blogspot.com/2010/08/report-on-investigation-of-seventeenth.html">http://bseusa.blogspot.com/2010/08/report-on-investigation-of-seventeenth.html</a>
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Friday, March 4, 2011 </div>
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</div>
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<div>
Alberta dairy cow found with mad cow disease </div>
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</div>
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<div>
<a href="http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/03/alberta-dairy-cow-found-with-mad-cow.html">http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/03/alberta-dairy-cow-found-with-mad-cow.html</a>
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2005 </div>
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<div>
GREETINGS AGAIN APHIS ET AL, </div>
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<div>
FURTHERMORE, WE HAVE FAILED TO EVEN STOP THE SRMs FROM WHOLE CUTS OF
BONELESS BEEF IMPORTED FROM CANADA IN THE VERY ONSET OF THE NEW BSE MRR (MINIMAL
RISK REGION). THIS IS THE VERY REASON I HAVE SAID TIME AND TIME AGAIN THAT BY
THIS ADMINISTRATION ABANDONING THE BSE GBR RISK ASSESSMENTS BECAUSE THEY DID NOT
LIKE THE ASSESSMENT OF BSE GBR III, AND ADHERING TO A NEW BSE MRR POLICY THAT
WAS DESIGNED NOT FOR HUMAN HEALTH, BUT ONLY FOR COMMODITIES AND FUTURES, WILL
FURTHER EXPOSE NEEDLESSLY MILLIONS AND MILLIONS OF HUMANS AND ANIMALS VIA THE
FREE TRADING OF ALL STRAINS OF TSE GLOBALLY. references as follow ; </div>
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<div>
Wisconsin Firm Recalls Beef Products </div>
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Recall Release CLASS II RECALL </div>
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FSIS-RC-032-2005 HEALTH RISK: LOW </div>
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Congressional and Public Affairs </div>
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</div>
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(202) 720-9113 </div>
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Steven Cohen </div>
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<div>
WASHINGTON, Aug. 19, 2005 - Green Bay Dressed Beef, a Green Bay, Wis.,
establishment, is voluntarily recalling approximately 1,856 pounds of beef
products that may contain portions of the backbone from a cow just over 30
months old, the U.S. Department of Agriculture's Food Safety and Inspection
Service announced today. The product was from a cow imported directly for
slaughter from Canada. </div>
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Based on information provided by Canada, the products subject to this Class
II recall are from a cow that is approximately one month older than the 30-month
age limit. Both ante-mortem and post-mortem inspection were done on the cow in
question. FSIS inspection program personnel determined the cow to be healthy and
fit for human food. FSIS' designation of this recall as Class II is because it
is a situation where there is a remote probability of adverse health
consequences from the use of the product. </div>
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<div>
FSIS learned about this as a result of a Canadian audit of their health
certificate that accompanied the imported cow. Prior to slaughter, the health
certificate accompanying the cow was presented to the establishment, and it
appeared complete and accurate. However, a subsequent audit of information
related to the health certificate by Canadian officials found that it was not
accurate. Action has been taken by Canadian Food Inspection Agency officials in
response to findings from the audit. The products subject to recall are: </div>
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<div>
Five boxes of 243 lb. vacuum pouched packages of "American Foods Group,
NECKBONE UNTRIM'D, USDA CHOICE OR HIGHER" with the case code of 77333; One box
of 50 lb. vacuum pouched package of "American Foods Group, SHORTLOIN 2X2, USDA
SELECT OR HIGHER" with the case code of 75231; One box of 60 lb. vacuum pouched
package of "American Foods Group, SHORTLOIN 2X2, USDA CHOICE OR HIGHER" with the
case code of 75060; Five boxes of 258 lb. vacuum pouched packages of "Dakota
Supreme Beef, SHORTLOIN 0X11/4, USDA SELECT OR HIGHER" with the case code of
75442; Sixteen boxes of 811 lb. vacuum pouched packages of "American Foods
Group, BLADE BI N/O CHUCK, USDA CHOICE OR HIGHER" with the case code of 75955;
Nine boxes of 435 lb. vacuum pouched packages of "American Foods Group, BLADE BI
N/O CHUCK, USDA SELECT OR HIGHER" with the case code of 75952. Each box bears
the establishment number "410" inside the USDA seal of inspection. The products
were produced on August 4, and were distributed to wholesale distributors in
Pennsylvania, Florida, Illinois, Maryland, Minnesota and Wisconsin. </div>
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Under the interim final rules FSIS implemented on January 12, 2004, certain
specified risk materials must be removed from all cattle depending on the age of
the animal. On this animal all specified risk materials for cattle 30 months and
over were removed, with the exception of the vertebral column. At the time of
slaughter, the animal was certified to be under 30 months of age and removal of
the vertebral column was not required. A subsequent audit determined the animal
was just over 30 months of age; therefore, the vertebral column is required to
be removed. This is the reason for the recall of the selected products. </div>
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<div>
Consumers with questions about the recall may contact Sally VandeHei,
Executive Assistant at 1-877-894-3927. National media with questions may contact
Jim Mulhern at (202) 496-2468. Local media with questions may contact Susan
Finco at (920) 965-7750 ext.158. </div>
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</div>
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<div>
Consumers with other food safety questions can phone the toll-free USDA
Meat and Poultry Hotline at 1-888-MPHotline (1-888-674-6854). The hotline is
available in English and Spanish and can be reached from 10 a.m. to 4 p.m.
(Eastern Time), Monday through Friday. Recorded food safety messages are
available 24 hours a day. </div>
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Sample Product Labels: These are similar to, but not identical to, labels
on the recalled product. </div>
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# </div>
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<div>
USDA Recall Classifications </div>
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<div>
Class I This is a health hazard situation where there is a reasonable
probability that the use of the product will cause serious, adverse health
consequences or death. </div>
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</div>
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</div>
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</div>
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<div>
Class II This is a health hazard situation where there is a remote
probability of adverse health consequences from the use of the product. </div>
<br />
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</div>
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</div>
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</div>
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<div>
Class III This is a situation where the use of the product will not cause
adverse health consequences. </div>
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</div>
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</div>
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<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
<a href="http://www.fsis.usda.gov/News_&_Events/Recall_032_2005_Release/index.asp">http://www.fsis.usda.gov/News_&_Events/Recall_032_2005_Release/index.asp</a>
</div>
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</div>
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</div>
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</div>
<br />
<div>
<a href="http://docket-aphis-2006-0041.blogspot.com/">http://docket-aphis-2006-0041.blogspot.com/</a>
</div>
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</div>
<br />
<div>
Docket No. 03-080-1 -- USDA ISSUES PROPOSED RULE TO ALLOW LIVE ANIMAL
IMPORTS FROM CANADA [TSS SUBMISSION 11/03/2003 01:19 PM To:
regulations@aphis.usda.gov ]</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
<a href="https://web01.aphis.usda.gov/BSEcom.nsf/0/b78ba677e2b0c12185256dd300649f9d?OpenDocument&AutoFramed">https://web01.aphis.usda.gov/BSEcom.nsf/0/b78ba677e2b0c12185256dd300649f9d?OpenDocument&AutoFramed</a>
</div>
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</div>
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</div>
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<div>
OIG REPORT ON IMPORTS FROM CANADA </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
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<div>
<a href="http://www.usda.gov/oig/webdocs/33601-01-HY.pdf">http://www.usda.gov/oig/webdocs/33601-01-HY.pdf</a>
</div>
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</div>
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<div>
Tuesday, October 2, 2012 </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Canadian veterinarian fined after approving banned BSE high risk cattle for
export to U.S.A. </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
<a href="http://madcowusda.blogspot.com/2012/10/canadian-veterinarian-fined-after.html">http://madcowusda.blogspot.com/2012/10/canadian-veterinarian-fined-after.html</a>
</div>
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<div>
Saturday, January 21, 2012 </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Quick facts about mad cow disease </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
<a href="http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2012/01/quick-facts-about-mad-cow-disease.html">http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2012/01/quick-facts-about-mad-cow-disease.html</a>
</div>
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tss </div>
Terry S. Singeltary Sr.http://www.blogger.com/profile/06986622967539963260noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4595956519532618538.post-68716401381929519222012-12-02T18:43:00.001-08:002012-12-02T18:43:46.560-08:00CANADA 19 cases of mad cow disease SCENARIO 4: ‘WE HAD OUR CHANCE AND WE BLEW IT’<div>
CANADA 19 cases of mad cow disease SCENARIO 4: ‘WE HAD OUR CHANCE AND WE BLEW IT’</div>
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10/31/2012</div>
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Managing Future Risks from BSE and other Emerging Issues</div>
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Summary Report of a Foresight Exercise</div>
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Background Canada’s cattle industry experienced a severe shock with the
finding of several cases of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) in
native-born cattle starting in 2003. The first case in a Canadian-born animal
was reported in May 2003. Since then, a total of 19 cases of BSE have been found
in Canadian cattle, with the latest case detected in February 2011 in a dairy
cow born in 2004. </div>
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Lucrative export markets proved fragile resulting in very significant
economic losses despite the industry’s success maintaining reasonable stability
in domestic markets. The cost of market closures and the subsequent actions
taken to sustain the Canadian cattle and beef industries has been variously
estimated to exceed $10 billion.</div>
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Seventeen of Canada’s BSE cases (10 dairy, three beef-cross and four beef)
were of the “classical” type of BSE (c-BSE), the form responsible for the vast
majority of cases in most BSE-affected countries. The other two (both beef
animals) were “atypical” cases as they occurred in significantly older animals,
but had slightly different biochemical characteristics from the classic form.
Observations in other BSE-affected countries and ongoing research indicate that
that atypical cases might represent spontaneous forms of BSE. Uncertainties
remain regarding the implications of these atypical cases for both the human
food supply and the animal feed chain. </div>
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While the situation has improved significantly, Canada faces ongoing
challenges to the design and costs of its BSE prevention programs and to
international recognition of its BSE status: </div>
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1. Two major beef exporting countries (Mexico and the USA) that now share
Canada’s “controlled risk” status for BSE might advance to “negligible risk”
status some years before Canada, thereby gaining trade advantages. Brazil, the
world`s largest beef exporting country, recently was reclassified by the World
Organization for Animal Health (OIE) from ``controlled risk`` to ``negligible
risk`` status for BSE.</div>
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2. There are unresolved conflicts between pressures on the one hand to
harmonize feed control standards with the USA in order to stay cost-competitive
and, on the other hand, to accelerate measures to gain international recognition
of Canada’s BSE status as ``negligible risk``:</div>
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a. Canada’s regime to safely dispose of specified risk materials (SRM) is
more demanding and costly than that of the USA, but it is still less stringent
than those of the most demanding countries (EU, Japan).</div>
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b. Canada’s feed control regime is less rigorous than some others (EU,
Japan) and has been criticized by the OIE for its lack of a testing program and
for limited stringency of rendering practices.</div>
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3. BSE surveillance in Canada has declined from 55,000 animals tested in
2007 to about 35,000 animals per year more recently. Is this level sufficiently
robust to support the case that will need to be made for recognition of Canada
as a “negligible risk” country? </div>
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4. There remain uncertainties about other prion diseases that are known to
occur in Canada: chronic wasting disease (CWD) and scrapie. In the case of CWD,
uncertainties about the potential host range combined with the ongoing spread of
the CWD agent in the environment of Western Canada may provide arguments for
trading partners who might wish to maintain or raise protective barriers. </div>
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The Foresight Exercise To assist in planning for the management of these
and future risks to the industries of similar magnitude, two Workshops were
convened to explore possible future scenarios using a Foresight process.
Participants were drawn from the cattle and beef industries, academia and
governments, including regulatory agencies. Further information on these
Workshops is provided in Appendices 1 to 4.</div>
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snip... </div>
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Appendix 4: Scenario Stories</div>
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The following is a summary of the scenarios developed by Workshop 1
participants.</div>
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SCENARIO 1: ‘BLUE SKIES’</div>
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Sustainable Production and Robust Markets</div>
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Canada </div>
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Science</div>
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- Affirmed the health benefits of beef in balanced diets.</div>
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- Produced a cost-effective test for BSE and other diseases that is widely
used, providing input for a nation-wide data system. The system enables
comprehensive surveillance of the health of Canada’s herd, increasing consumer
confidence.</div>
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- Developed and validated more cost-effective methods to safely manage
SRM</div>
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- Government and private investment from industries, led to significant
breakthroughs in TSE (transmissible spongiform encephalopathy) science and
genetic research in feed grains, forage and cattle. </div>
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SCENARIO 2: ‘BOVINE SITUATION EXTREME’</div>
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Unsustainable Production and Fragile Markets</div>
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Canada </div>
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Science</div>
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- Financial support has weakened due to financial problems of Government
and the industries, leading to sharp curtailments of research.</div>
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- Work on a vaccine for the variant TSE continues feverishly.</div>
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- No major scientific breakthroughs related to the prevention and cure of
prion diseases occurred. </div>
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SCENARIO 3: ‘THE THIN STEMMED GLASS’</div>
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Sustainable Production and Fragile Markets </div>
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Canada</div>
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Science</div>
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- BSE is not linked to classical CJD, but a TSE is found that is linked to
Alzheimer’s disease.</div>
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- Science breakthroughs in neurodegenerative diseases.</div>
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- New product development continues. </div>
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SCENARIO 4: ‘WE HAD OUR CHANCE AND WE BLEW IT’</div>
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Unsustainable Production and Robust Markets </div>
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Canada</div>
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Science</div>
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- Experimental evidence indicates that abnormal prions may persist for
undetermined periods of time in buried materials.</div>
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- A new prion disease has occurred in cattle, possibly originated from CWD.
Research funds are not available to investigate its nature and origin.</div>
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- The origin, transmission and prevalence of atypical BSE remain
unclear.</div>
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- L-type atypical BSE has been demonstrated to be transmissible to
humans.</div>
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- New testing procedures indicate the presence of sub-clinical carriers in
the cattle population.</div>
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- New scientific knowledge provides no evidence that CWD is transmissible
from Cervids to humans. </div>
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<a href="http://www.prioninstitute.ca/forms/BSE_Foresight_Managing_Future_Risks.pdf">http://www.prioninstitute.ca/forms/BSE_Foresight_Managing_Future_Risks.pdf</a>
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Tuesday, November 6, 2012 </div>
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Transmission of New Bovine Prion to Mice, Atypical Scrapie, BSE, and
Sporadic CJD, November-December 2012 update </div>
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<a href="http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2012/11/transmission-of-new-bovine-prion-to.html">http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2012/11/transmission-of-new-bovine-prion-to.html</a>
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SUMMARY REPORT CALIFORNIA BOVINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY CASE
INVESTIGATION JULY 2012 </div>
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Summary Report BSE 2012</div>
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Executive Summary </div>
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<a href="http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2012/08/summary-report-california-bovine.html">http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2012/08/summary-report-california-bovine.html</a>
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Saturday, August 4, 2012 </div>
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Final Feed Investigation Summary - California BSE Case - July 2012 </div>
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<a href="http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2012/08/final-feed-investigation-summary.html">http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2012/08/final-feed-investigation-summary.html</a>
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Saturday, August 4, 2012 </div>
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Update from APHIS Regarding Release of the Final Report on the BSE
Epidemiological Investigation </div>
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<a href="http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2012/08/update-from-aphis-regarding-release-of.html">http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2012/08/update-from-aphis-regarding-release-of.html</a>
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Tuesday, November 02, 2010 </div>
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BSE - ATYPICAL LESION DISTRIBUTION (RBSE 92-21367) statutory (obex only)
diagnostic criteria CVL 1992 </div>
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<a href="http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2010/11/bse-atypical-lesion-distribution-rbse.html">http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2010/11/bse-atypical-lesion-distribution-rbse.html</a>
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Thursday, June 14, 2012 </div>
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R-CALF USA Calls USDA Dishonest and Corrupt; Submits Fourth Request for
Extension </div>
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R-CALF United Stockgrowers of America</div>
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<a href="http://madcowusda.blogspot.com/2012/06/r-calf-usa-calls-usda-dishonest-and.html" title="http://madcowusda.blogspot.com/2012/06/r-calf-usa-calls-usda-dishonest-and.html">http://madcowusda.blogspot.com/2012/06/r-calf-usa-calls-usda-dishonest-and.html</a></div>
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Monday, June 18, 2012 R-CALF </div>
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Submits Incomplete Comments Under Protest in Bizarre Rulemaking “Bovine
Spongiform Encephalopathy; Importation of Bovines and Bovine Products” </div>
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<a href="http://madcowusda.blogspot.com/2012/06/r-calf-submits-incomplete-comments.html">http://madcowusda.blogspot.com/2012/06/r-calf-submits-incomplete-comments.html</a>
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CENSORSHIP IS A TERRIBLE THING $$$ </div>
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Canada has had a COVER-UP policy of mad cow disease since about the 17th
case OR 18th case of mad cow disease. AFTER THAT, all FOIA request were ignored
$$$ </div>
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THIS proves there is indeed an epidemic of mad cow disease in North
America, and it has been covered up for years and years, if not for decades, and
it’s getting worse $$$ </div>
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<a href="http://www.inspection.gc.ca/english/anima/disemala/bseesb/comenqe.shtml" title="http://www.inspection.gc.ca/english/anima/disemala/bseesb/comenqe.shtml">http://www.inspection.gc.ca/english/anima/disemala/bseesb/comenqe.shtml</a></div>
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Thursday, February 10, 2011 </div>
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TRANSMISSIBLE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY REPORT UPDATE CANADA FEBRUARY 2011
and how to hide mad cow disease in Canada Current as of: 2011-01-31 </div>
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<a href="http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2011/02/transmissible-spongiform-encephalopathy.html">http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2011/02/transmissible-spongiform-encephalopathy.html</a>
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Wednesday, August 11, 2010 </div>
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REPORT ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE SIXTEENTH CASE OF BOVINE SPONGIFORM
ENCEPHALOPATHY (BSE) IN CANADA </div>
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<a href="http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2010/08/report-on-investigation-of-sixteenth.html">http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2010/08/report-on-investigation-of-sixteenth.html</a>
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Thursday, August 19, 2010 </div>
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REPORT ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE SEVENTEENTH CASE OF BOVINE SPONGIFORM
ENCEPHALOPATHY (BSE) IN CANADA </div>
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<a href="http://bseusa.blogspot.com/2010/08/report-on-investigation-of-seventeenth.html">http://bseusa.blogspot.com/2010/08/report-on-investigation-of-seventeenth.html</a>
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Friday, March 4, 2011 </div>
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Alberta dairy cow found with mad cow disease </div>
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<a href="http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/03/alberta-dairy-cow-found-with-mad-cow.html">http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/03/alberta-dairy-cow-found-with-mad-cow.html</a>
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Tuesday, June 26, 2012 </div>
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Creutzfeldt Jakob Disease Human TSE report update North America, Canada,
Mexico, and USDA PRION UNIT as of May 18, 2012 </div>
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type determination pending Creutzfeldt Jakob Disease (tdpCJD), is on the
rise in Canada and the USA </div>
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<a href="http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2012/06/creutzfeldt-jakob-disease-human-tse.html">http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2012/06/creutzfeldt-jakob-disease-human-tse.html</a>
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Wednesday, June 13, 2012 </div>
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MEXICO IS UNDER or MIS DIAGNOSING CREUTZFELDT JAKOB DISEASE AND OTHER PRION
DISEASE SOME WITH POSSIBLE nvCJD </div>
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<a href="http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2012/06/mexico-is-under-or-mis-diagnosing.html">http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2012/06/mexico-is-under-or-mis-diagnosing.html</a>
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Wednesday, April 4, 2012 </div>
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Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Importation of Bovines and Bovine
Products APHIS-2008-0010-0008 RIN:0579-AC68 </div>
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<a href="http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2012/04/bovine-spongiform-encephalopathy.html">http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2012/04/bovine-spongiform-encephalopathy.html</a>
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Thursday, February 16, 2012</div>
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Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy BSE </div>
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31 USA SENATORS ASK PRESIDENT OBAMA TO HELP SPREAD MAD COW DISEASE 2012
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<div>
<a href="http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2012/02/bovine-spongiform-encephalopathy-bse-31.html">http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2012/02/bovine-spongiform-encephalopathy-bse-31.html</a>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Wednesday, February 16, 2011 </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
IN CONFIDENCE </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
SCRAPIE TRANSMISSION TO CHIMPANZEES </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
IN CONFIDENCE </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
<a href="http://scrapie-usa.blogspot.com/2011/02/in-confidence-scrapie-transmission-to.html">http://scrapie-usa.blogspot.com/2011/02/in-confidence-scrapie-transmission-to.html</a>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Sunday, April 18, 2010 </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
SCRAPIE AND ATYPICAL SCRAPIE TRANSMISSION STUDIES A REVIEW 2010 </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
<a href="http://scrapie-usa.blogspot.com/2010/04/scrapie-and-atypical-scrapie.html">http://scrapie-usa.blogspot.com/2010/04/scrapie-and-atypical-scrapie.html</a>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Thursday, March 29, 2012 </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
atypical Nor-98 Scrapie has spread from coast to coast in the USA 2012
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
NIAA Annual Conference April 11-14, 2011San Antonio, Texas </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
<a href="http://nor-98.blogspot.com/2012/03/atypical-nor-98-scrapie-has-spread-from.html">http://nor-98.blogspot.com/2012/03/atypical-nor-98-scrapie-has-spread-from.html</a>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Thursday, February 23, 2012 </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Atypical Scrapie NOR-98 confirmed Alberta Canada sheep January 2012 </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
<a href="http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2012/02/atypical-scrapie-nor-98-confirmed.html">http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2012/02/atypical-scrapie-nor-98-confirmed.html</a>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Wednesday, April 4, 2012 </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
20120402 - Breach of quarantine/Violation de la mise en quarantaine of an
ongoing Scrapie investigation </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
<a href="http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2012/04/20120402-breach-of-quarantineviolation.html">http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2012/04/20120402-breach-of-quarantineviolation.html</a>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Monday, June 11, 2012</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
another atypical Nor-98 Scrapie case documented in Canada for 2012 </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
<a href="http://nor-98.blogspot.com/2012/06/another-atypical-nor-98-scrapie-case.html">http://nor-98.blogspot.com/2012/06/another-atypical-nor-98-scrapie-case.html</a>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Monday, April 25, 2011</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Experimental Oral Transmission of Atypical Scrapie to Sheep</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Volume 17, Number 5-May 2011 However, work with transgenic mice has
demonstrated the potential susceptibility of pigs, with the disturbing finding
that the biochemical properties of the resulting PrPSc have changed on
transmission (40). </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
<a href="http://nor-98.blogspot.com/2011/04/experimental-oral-transmission-of.html">http://nor-98.blogspot.com/2011/04/experimental-oral-transmission-of.html</a>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
***The pathology features of Nor98 in the cerebellum of the affected sheep
showed similarities with those of sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease in humans.
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
<a href="http://www.prion2007.com/pdf/Prion%20Book%20of%20Abstracts.pdf">http://www.prion2007.com/pdf/Prion%20Book%20of%20Abstracts.pdf</a>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
*** Intriguingly, these conclusions suggest that some pathological features
of Nor98 are reminiscent of Gerstmann-Sträussler-Scheinker disease.</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
119</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
<a href="http://www.neuroprion.com/pdf_docs/conferences/prion2006/abstract_book.pdf">http://www.neuroprion.com/pdf_docs/conferences/prion2006/abstract_book.pdf</a>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
*** These observations support the view that a truly infectious TSE agent,
unrecognized until recently, infects sheep and goat flocks and may have
important implications in terms of scrapie control and public health.</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
<a href="http://www.pnas.org/content/102/44/16031.abstract">http://www.pnas.org/content/102/44/16031.abstract</a>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Surprisingly the TSE agent characteristics were dramatically different
v/hen passaged into Tg bovine mice. The recovered TSE agent had biological and
biochemical characteristics similar to those of atypical BSE L in the same mouse
model. Moreover, whereas no other TSE agent than BSE were shown to transmit into
Tg porcine mice, atypical scrapie was able to develop into this model, albeit
with low attack rate on first passage.</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Furthermore, after adaptation in the porcine mouse model this prion showed
similar biological and biochemical characteristics than BSE adapted to this
porcine mouse model. Altogether these data indicate.</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
(i) the unsuspected potential abilities of atypical scrapie to cross
species barriers</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
(ii) the possible capacity of this agent to acquire new characteristics
when crossing species barrier</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
These findings raise some interrogation on the concept of TSE strain and on
the origin of the diversity of the TSE agents and could have consequences on
field TSE control measures. </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
<a href="http://www.neuroprion.org/resources/pdf_docs/conferences/prion2008/abstract-book-prion2008.pdf">http://www.neuroprion.org/resources/pdf_docs/conferences/prion2008/abstract-book-prion2008.pdf</a>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Friday, February 11, 2011</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Atypical/Nor98 Scrapie Infectivity in Sheep Peripheral Tissues</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
<a href="http://nor-98.blogspot.com/2011/02/atypicalnor98-scrapie-infectivity-in.html">http://nor-98.blogspot.com/2011/02/atypicalnor98-scrapie-infectivity-in.html</a>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Monday, November 30, 2009</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
USDA AND OIE COLLABORATE TO EXCLUDE ATYPICAL SCRAPIE NOR-98 ANIMAL HEALTH
CODE</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
<a href="http://nor-98.blogspot.com/2009/11/usda-and-oie-collaborate-to-exclude.html">http://nor-98.blogspot.com/2009/11/usda-and-oie-collaborate-to-exclude.html</a>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
I strenuously urge the USDA and the OIE et al to revoke the exemption of
the legal global trading of atypical Nor-98 scrapie TSE. ...TSS </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Thursday, November 29, 2012 </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Chronic wasting disease on the Canadian prairies </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
<a href="http://chronic-wasting-disease.blogspot.com/2012/11/chronic-wasting-disease-on-canadian.html">http://chronic-wasting-disease.blogspot.com/2012/11/chronic-wasting-disease-on-canadian.html</a>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Tuesday, November 13, 2012 </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
PENNSYLVANIA 2012 THE GREAT ESCAPE OF CWD </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
<a href="http://chronic-wasting-disease.blogspot.com/2012/11/pennsylvania-2012-great-escape-of-cwd.html">http://chronic-wasting-disease.blogspot.com/2012/11/pennsylvania-2012-great-escape-of-cwd.html</a>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Wednesday, November 14, 2012 </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
PENNSYLVANIA 2012 THE GREAT ESCAPE OF CWD INVESTIGATION MOVES INTO
LOUISIANA and INDIANA </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
<a href="http://chronic-wasting-disease.blogspot.com/2012/11/pennsylvania-2012-great-escape-of-cwd_14.html">http://chronic-wasting-disease.blogspot.com/2012/11/pennsylvania-2012-great-escape-of-cwd_14.html</a>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Friday, November 09, 2012 </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Chronic Wasting Disease CWD in cervidae and transmission to other species
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
<a href="http://chronic-wasting-disease.blogspot.com/2012/11/chronic-wasting-disease-cwd-in-cervidae.html">http://chronic-wasting-disease.blogspot.com/2012/11/chronic-wasting-disease-cwd-in-cervidae.html</a>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
<a href="http://chronic-wasting-disease.blogspot.com/">http://chronic-wasting-disease.blogspot.com/</a>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
OR-10: Variably protease-sensitive prionopathy is transmissible in bank
voles </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Romolo Nonno,1 Michele Di Bari,1 Laura Pirisinu,1 Claudia D’Agostino,1
Stefano Marcon,1 Geraldina Riccardi,1 Gabriele Vaccari,1 Piero Parchi,2 Wenquan
Zou,3 Pierluigi Gambetti,3 Umberto Agrimi1 1Istituto Superiore di Sanità; Rome,
Italy; 2Dipartimento di Scienze Neurologiche, Università di Bologna; Bologna,
Italy; 3Case Western Reserve University; Cleveland, OH USA</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Background. Variably protease-sensitive prionopathy (VPSPr) is a recently
described “sporadic”neurodegenerative disease involving prion protein
aggregation, which has clinical similarities with non-Alzheimer dementias, such
as fronto-temporal dementia. Currently, 30 cases of VPSPr have been reported in
Europe and USA, of which 19 cases were homozygous for valine at codon 129 of the
prion protein (VV), 8 were MV and 3 were MM. A distinctive feature of VPSPr is
the electrophoretic pattern of PrPSc after digestion with proteinase K (PK).
After PK-treatment, PrP from VPSPr forms a ladder-like electrophoretic pattern
similar to that described in GSS cases. The clinical and pathological features
of VPSPr raised the question of the correct classification of VPSPr among prion
diseases or other forms of neurodegenerative disorders. Here we report
preliminary data on the transmissibility and pathological features of VPSPr
cases in bank voles. </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Materials and Methods. Seven VPSPr cases were inoculated in two genetic
lines of bank voles, carrying either methionine or isoleucine at codon 109 of
the prion protein (named BvM109 and BvI109, respectively). Among the VPSPr cases
selected, 2 were VV at PrP codon 129, 3 were MV and 2 were MM. Clinical
diagnosis in voles was confirmed by brain pathological assessment and western
blot for PK-resistant PrPSc (PrPres) with mAbs SAF32, SAF84, 12B2 and 9A2.
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Results. To date, 2 VPSPr cases (1 MV and 1 MM) gave positive transmission
in BvM109. Overall, 3 voles were positive with survival time between 290 and 588
d post inoculation (d.p.i.). All positive voles accumulated PrPres in the form
of the typical PrP27–30, which was indistinguishable to that previously observed
in BvM109 inoculated with sCJDMM1 cases.</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
In BvI109, 3 VPSPr cases (2 VV and 1 MM) showed positive transmission until
now. Overall, 5 voles were positive with survival time between 281 and 596
d.p.i.. In contrast to what observed in BvM109, all BvI109 showed a GSS-like
PrPSc electrophoretic pattern, characterized by low molecular weight PrPres.
These PrPres fragments were positive with mAb 9A2 and 12B2, while being negative
with SAF32 and SAF84, suggesting that they are cleaved at both the C-terminus
and the N-terminus. Second passages are in progress from these first successful
transmissions. </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Conclusions. Preliminary results from transmission studies in bank voles
strongly support the notion that VPSPr is a transmissible prion disease.
Interestingly, VPSPr undergoes divergent evolution in the two genetic lines of
voles, with sCJD-like features in BvM109 and GSS-like properties in
BvI109.</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
The discovery of previously unrecognized prion diseases in both humans and
animals (i.e., Nor98 in small ruminants) demonstrates that the range of prion
diseases might be wider than expected and raises crucial questions about the
epidemiology and strain properties of these new forms. We are investigating this
latter issue by molecular and biological comparison of VPSPr, GSS and Nor98.
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
<a href="http://www.landesbioscience.com/journals/prion/01-Prion6-2-OralPresentations.pdf?nocache=1216084967">http://www.landesbioscience.com/journals/prion/01-Prion6-2-OralPresentations.pdf?nocache=1216084967</a>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Wednesday, March 28, 2012</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
VARIABLY PROTEASE-SENSITVE PRIONOPATHY IS TRANSMISSIBLE, price of prion
poker goes up again $ </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
<a href="http://prionopathy.blogspot.com/2012/03/variably-protease-sensitve-prionopathy.html">http://prionopathy.blogspot.com/2012/03/variably-protease-sensitve-prionopathy.html</a>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
*** The discovery of previously unrecognized prion diseases in both humans
and animals (i.e., Nor98 in small ruminants) demonstrates that the range of
prion diseases might be wider than expected and raises crucial questions about
the epidemiology and strain properties of these new forms. We are investigating
this latter issue by molecular and biological comparison of VPSPr, GSS and
Nor98. </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
AS OF AUGUST 2012 ; </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
CJD UPDATE USA</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
1 Listed based on the year of death or, if not available, on year of
referral; 2 Cases with suspected prion disease for which brain tissue and/or
blood (in familial cases) were submitted; 3 Disease acquired in the United
Kingdom; 4 Disease was acquired in the United Kingdom in one case and in Saudi
Arabia in the other case; *** 5 Includes 8 cases in which the diagnosis is
pending, and 18 inconclusive cases; *** 6 Includes 10 (9 from 2012) cases with
type determination pending in which the diagnosis of vCJD has been excluded. ***
The Sporadic cases include 16 cases of sporadic Fatal Insomnia (sFI) and 42
cases of Variably Protease-Sensitive Prionopathy (VPSPr) and 2224 cases of
sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (sCJD). </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
<a href="http://www.cjdsurveillance.com/pdf/case-table.pdf">http://www.cjdsurveillance.com/pdf/case-table.pdf</a>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Tuesday, November 6, 2012 </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Transmission of New Bovine Prion to Mice, Atypical Scrapie, BSE, and
Sporadic CJD, November-December 2012 update </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
<a href="http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2012/11/transmission-of-new-bovine-prion-to.html">http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2012/11/transmission-of-new-bovine-prion-to.html</a>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Friday, November 23, 2012 </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease update As at 5th November 2012 UK, USA,
AND CANADA </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
snip... </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Greetings BSE-L members et al, and others, </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Confucius is confused again on the infamous ‘classification pending
sporadic creutzfeldt jakob disease’ cpsCJD, (because nvCJD has been ruled out).
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Confucius is confused about why the increase of these cpsCJD cases in the
USA and Canada which we have been seeing, but I saw no reports in the UK
surveillance reports of the infamous North American Classification Pending
Sporadic Creutzfeldt Jakob disease cases. </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
if truly a supposedly sporadic spontaneous disease, would you not see these
cpsCJD cases popping up all over the world in random ??? </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
or, could these cpsCJD cases be of a North American zoonotic or iatrogenic
from North American zoonoses sub-clinical source ??? </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
or both ??? </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
with so many documented Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy TSE prion
disease in so many different species here in North America, and consumption
there from, I believe that this should be at the forefront of research. ...
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Confused Confucius...flounder </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
snip...see full text ;</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Friday, November 23, 2012 </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease update As at 5th November 2012 UK, USA,
AND CANADA </div>
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<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
<a href="http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2012/11/sporadic-creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.html">http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2012/11/sporadic-creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.html</a>
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</div>
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<div>
Saturday, October 6, 2012 </div>
<br />
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</div>
<br />
<div>
TRANSMISSION, DIFFERENTIATION, AND PATHOBIOLOGY OF TRANSMISSIBLE SPONGIFORM
ENCEPHALOPATHIES 2011 Annual Report </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
<a href="http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2012/10/transmission-differentiation-and.html">http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2012/10/transmission-differentiation-and.html</a>
</div>
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</div>
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<div>
Wednesday, May 16, 2012 </div>
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</div>
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<div>
Alzheimer’s disease and Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy prion
disease, Iatrogenic, what if ? </div>
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<div>
</div>
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<div>
Proposal ID: 29403 </div>
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</div>
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<div>
<a href="http://betaamyloidcjd.blogspot.com/2012/05/alzheimers-disease-and-transmissible.html">http://betaamyloidcjd.blogspot.com/2012/05/alzheimers-disease-and-transmissible.html</a>
</div>
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</div>
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</div>
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<div>
see the Duke, Pa, Yale, and Mexican study here, showing the misdiagnosis of
CJD TSE prion disease as Alzheimers ; </div>
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<div>
</div>
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</div>
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<div>
<a href="http://betaamyloidcjd.blogspot.com/2012/05/diagnosing-dementia-in-dark-who-really.html">http://betaamyloidcjd.blogspot.com/2012/05/diagnosing-dementia-in-dark-who-really.html</a>
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<div>
Monday, August 20, 2012 </div>
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</div>
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</div>
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<div>
CASE REPORTS CREUTZFELDT-JAKOB DISEASE: AN UNDER-RECOGNIZED CAUSE OF
DEMENTIA </div>
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</div>
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</div>
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<div>
<a href="http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2012/08/case-reports-creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.html">http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2012/08/case-reports-creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.html</a>
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<div>
Thursday, August 02, 2012 </div>
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</div>
<br />
<div>
CJD case in Saint John prompts letter to patients </div>
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<div>
</div>
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<div>
Canada CJD case in Saint John prompts letter to patients </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
<a href="http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2012/08/cjd-case-in-saint-john-prompts-letter.html">http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2012/08/cjd-case-in-saint-john-prompts-letter.html</a>
</div>
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layperson</div>
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TSS</div>
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</div>
Terry S. Singeltary Sr.http://www.blogger.com/profile/06986622967539963260noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4595956519532618538.post-83901682303829951452012-11-30T10:42:00.001-08:002012-11-30T10:42:11.590-08:00PROPOSED DECISION TO STOP BSE TESTING OF HEALTHY CATTLE SLAUGHTERED FOR HUMAN CONSUMPTION FSA 12/12/04 Open Board – 11 December 2012<div>
PROPOSED DECISION TO STOP BSE TESTING OF HEALTHY CATTLE SLAUGHTERED FOR
HUMAN CONSUMPTION </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Food Standards Agency FSA 12/12/04 Open Board – 11 December 2012 </div>
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<div>
david.carruthers@foodstandards.gsi.gov.uk </div>
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<div>
1 SUMMARY 1.1 </div>
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</div>
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<div>
The current system for monitoring Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) in
cattle includes BSE testing of all healthy cattle aged over 72 months
slaughtered for human consumption. The European Commission is proposing to allow
qualifying Member States (MS), including the UK, to decide to stop testing these
cattle. 1.2 The Board is recommended to agree to advise Ministers that it would
be acceptable on grounds of negligible risk to consumers and proportionality to
stop BSE testing of all healthy cattle aged over 72 months slaughtered for human
consumption in the UK. </div>
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snip... </div>
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<div>
Food Standards Agency FSA 12/12/04 Open Board – 11 December 2012 16 </div>
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</div>
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<div>
Annexe F </div>
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</div>
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<div>
Ability of BSE test to detect different forms of BSE </div>
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</div>
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<div>
1. Testing is carried out using approved commercial diagnostic tests for
the disease-specific, abnormal form of the prion protein (PrP). A sample of the
brainstem of the animal at the level of the obex is required to be used for the
test. Studies have established that in Classical BSE abnormal PrP deposition in
the brainstem first occurs at the obex level, where a substantial amount of this
protein accumulates during the late incubation phase. Consequently, as described
in the EFSA Report, targeting the obex for testing is considered to be the most
sensitive approach for detecting cases of Classical BSE. </div>
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<div>
</div>
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<div>
</div>
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<div>
*** 2. In relation to the two forms of atypical BSE (H and L types) that
have been reported, the EFSA Report points out that, while these conditions are
detectable by the current approved tests, a full evaluation of their performance
in detecting atypical BSE cases has not been carried out and the suitability of
the obex as the target tissue for early and sensitive detection of these
conditions remains largely unknown. </div>
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<div>
</div>
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</div>
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<div>
*** 3. The impact of stopping testing of healthy slaughtered cattle on the
ability of the monitoring system to detect the emergence of a hypothetical new
type of TSE disease in cattle is unknown, since the characteristics of any such
new TSE disease and whether the current testing system would detect it are
necessarily unknown. By definition, novel TSEs with forms of PrP substantially
different from the currently-recognised forms may evade the existing tests.
</div>
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</div>
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<div>
<a href="http://www.food.gov.uk/multimedia/pdfs/board/fsa121204.pdf">http://www.food.gov.uk/multimedia/pdfs/board/fsa121204.pdf</a>
</div>
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<div>
</div>
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</div>
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<div>
<a href="http://veterinaryrecord.bmj.com/content/171/22/546.1.extract?etoc">http://veterinaryrecord.bmj.com/content/171/22/546.1.extract?etoc</a>
</div>
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<div>
RCVS Response Consultation on BSE Testing</div>
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</div>
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<div>
12 May 2011</div>
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</div>
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53kb PDF </div>
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<div>
Joint consultation by Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs,
Welsh Assembly Government and Food Standards Agency on proposals for changes to
BSE testing of cattle slaughtered for human consumption 1. The following
response is made on behalf of the Royal College of Veterinary Surgeons (RCVS).
The RCVS is the regulatory body for veterinary surgeons in the UK. The role of
the RCVS is to safeguard the health and welfare of animals committed to
veterinary care through the regulation of the education, and ethical and
clinical standards, of veterinary surgeons and nurses, thereby protecting the
interests of those dependent on animals, and assuring public health. It also
acts as an impartial source of informed opinion on relevant veterinary matters.
</div>
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<div>
</div>
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<div>
2. The RCVS considers that in relation to Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy
(BSE), monitoring and controlling the epidemic and protecting the public and
animals from exposure to the agents that cause BSE are of paramount importance.
Nevertheless, it is important that controls and testing regimes are appropriate
and proportionate to the current risks of the disease. </div>
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<div>
</div>
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<div>
3. The RCVS commends the launch of this non-formal consultation before
adopting the proposed changes to BSE testing made possible by the amendment to
Commission Directive 719/2009/EC and the decision of Ministers to seek the
opinion of the Food Standards Agency (FSA) and independent expert advice of the
Spongiform Encephalopathy Advisory Committee (SEAC) on any potential risks
before adopting changes. </div>
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<div>
</div>
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<div>
4. SEAC comprises experts at the forefront of Transmissible Spongiform
Encephalopathy (TSE) research and has provided independent expert scientific
advice to the Government in a transparent fashion for 20 years. The RCVS
therefore supports the recommendations and observations of SEAC in relation to
the proposed changes to the BSE testing of healthy cattle and strongly urges the
Government to take account of its views. </div>
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<div>
</div>
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<div>
5. SEAC advises that in the short-term the additional risk to human health
of raising the age for the slaughter of healthy cattle to 72 months is
insignificant and notes that the Veterinary Laboratories Agency (VLA) modelling
concurs with the conclusion. In presenting their advice, however, SEAC sounds an
important note of caution: that such conclusions are only valid if the
prevalence of BSE in UK cattle continues to fall or remains the same and that
the validity of the analysis depends upon the quality of surveillance and its
ability to detect any re-emergence of the disease. </div>
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<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
6. The RCVS therefore considers it imperative that the testing and
surveillance programme is kept under review and that measures are implemented to
ensure that the programme is capable of identifying any changes in BSE
prevalence. To this end, the RCVS considers that provision should be made for
the random testing of apparently healthy animals being slaughtered between the
ages of 48 months and 72 months to verify the science behind the new testing
regime and to ensure that health of the public is safeguarded appropriately. In
this regard, the RCVS also supports the proposal of SEAC that the VLA model
should be used ‘to examine a range of hypothetical rates of increase of BSE
infection and the ability of current surveillance measures to detect the
change’. </div>
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<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
7. As SEAC notes, changes in the prevalence of BSE are most likely to be
detected in fallen stock and casualty animals. The RCVS therefore considers that
assessments should be made to ensure the adequacy and sensitivity of such
testing for identifying any emerging trends in BSE. </div>
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<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
8. The RCVS regards the removal of Specified Risk Material (SRM) as the
primary means via which the public are protected from agents that cause BSE.
Whilst there are no proposals to change SRM measures, the RCVS wishes to express
its strong belief that current SRM measures should not be relaxed. </div>
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<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
9. Given recent evidence of fraud relating to cattle that are found to be
TB test-positive and the Government’s moves to tackle this by requiring that DNA
tags are applied immediately to cattle that test positive for TB, the RCVS
considers that provisions need to be made to ensure that any fraud in relation
to BSE testing is tackled and that cattle over the age of 72 months are not
passed off as being younger at the time of slaughter. Such fraud could be
addressed by linking the passport and ear tag to some form of biological
indicator of age such as the ossification of the vertebrae or appropriate dental
changes. </div>
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<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
10. If you require any clarification on the above comments, please do not
hesitate to contact me. Alternatively, representatives from the RCVS would be
happy to meet with you to discuss and expand upon our position </div>
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<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Anthony Roberts</div>
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</div>
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<div>
RCVS Policy and Public Affairs Officer </div>
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<a href="https://www.rcvs.org.uk/document-library/rcvs-response-consultation-on-bse-testing/">https://www.rcvs.org.uk/document-library/rcvs-response-consultation-on-bse-testing/</a>
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<div>
Tuesday, November 02, 2010</div>
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</div>
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<div>
BSE - ATYPICAL LESION DISTRIBUTION (RBSE 92-21367) statutory (obex only)
diagnostic criteria CVL 1992</div>
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</div>
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<div>
<a href="http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2010/11/bse-atypical-lesion-distribution-rbse.html">http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2010/11/bse-atypical-lesion-distribution-rbse.html</a>
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<div>
Beckett admits BSE test blunder</div>
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</div>
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<div>
Margaret Beckett last night admitted she blundered over how the Government
announced the news that scientists seeking evidence of BSE in sheep had actually
used cows' brains. The original statement about the bungled research failed to
explain one of the gravest errors ever made by Government scientists researching
the disease, and did not even mention the word 'cow'. As opposition MPs demanded
an explanation of how £217,000 had been wasted, the Environment, Food and Rural
Affairs Minister conceded that the way she had announced the mix-up was '
perhaps in error'. Mrs Beckett said: 'I gave instructions, perhaps in error,
that the statement drafted to explain what we knew - and that was a limited
amount - should be put into the public domain as soon as possible.' Shadow
Minister Peter Ainsworth said the handling of the publication of the error had
been 'despicable' and called on whoever made the decision to be sacked. Fingers
had pointed to Lucian Hudson, the Government's new Director of Communications,
who oversaw the release. But last night it emerged that Mrs Beckett had
overruled advisers and drafted a statement herself, and insisted it be released
late on Wednesday. A Whitehall insider said: 'She should have waited until the
morning and held a full specialist briefing. But she was nervous that the news
would leak and the department would look as if it had tried to cover something
up. News releases are never done by one person and scientists were consulted on
this one. But the wording was Mrs Beckett's own.' Mrs Beckett yesterday wrote to
Mr Ainsworth to 'set the record straight'. If she had not made the news
immediate, she said, his party would have 'accused me of trying to conceal the
information for as long as possible'. The Department for Environment, Food and
Rural Affairs (Defra) was first alerted to the error on Wednesday morning. A
Government laboratory had been sent a sample of the brains by the Institute of
Animal Health, which was carrying out the research, to ensure there was no
crosscontamination. There was horror when it appeared the scientists had been
studying cows' brains rather than sheep. There followed an afternoon briefing
with officials to inform them of the blunder, before Ministers were told in the
early evening. Mrs Beckett said: 'We immediately put in hand a scientific audit,
which people are carrying out this weekend, to try to find out what happened,
what went wrong and whether there's still anything to learn from the
experiment.' Government scientists have called for immediate new research into
the risks of eating British lamb, although the Food Standards Agency has not
changed its advice, which is that the risk of BSE in sheep 'remains
theoretical'. Last night Liberal Democrat agriculture spokesman Colin Breed
said: 'Mrs Beckett must now outline what she intends to do to allay fears about
potential BSE in sheep. She has some awkward questions to answer over Defra's
scientific policy.' </div>
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<div>
</div>
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<div>
</div>
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<div>
<a href="http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-79611/Beckett-admits-BSE-test-blunder.html">http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-79611/Beckett-admits-BSE-test-blunder.html</a>
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<div>
Wednesday, December 21, 2011</div>
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</div>
<br />
<div>
Potential mad cows that entered food supply without being tested for BSE
2011: UK END OF YEAR REVIEW </div>
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<div>
</div>
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<div>
<a href="http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2011/12/potential-mad-cows-that-entered-food.html">http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2011/12/potential-mad-cows-that-entered-food.html</a>
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<div>
Thursday, September 6, 2012 </div>
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<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
UK Breaches of BSE controls in consignments of beef 2011 communications
missing four reports </div>
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<div>
</div>
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<div>
<a href="http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2012/09/uk-breaches-of-bse-controls-in.html">http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2012/09/uk-breaches-of-bse-controls-in.html</a>
</div>
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<div>
ATYPICAL BSE AND SPORADIC CJD NOVEMBER-DECEMBER 2012 </div>
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</div>
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</div>
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<div>
Dispatch </div>
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</div>
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<div>
Transmission of New Bovine Prion to Mice </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Thierry G.M. Baron* , Anne-Gaëlle Biacabe*, Anna Bencsik*, and Jan P.M.
Langeveld† Author affiliations: *Agence Française de Sécurité Sanitaire des
Aliments, Lyon, France; †Central Institute for Animal Disease Control, Lelystad,
the Netherlands </div>
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<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Abstract </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
We previously reported that cattle were affected by a prion disorder that
differed from bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) by showing distinct
molecular features of disease-associated protease-resistant prion protein
(PrPres). We show that intracerebral injection of such isolates into C57BL/6
mice produces a disease with preservation of PrPres molecular features distinct
from BSE. </div>
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<div>
</div>
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<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Conclusions Our data show that the recently identified bovine H-type
isolates involve an infectious agent that can induce development of a disease
across a species barrier, while maintaining the specific associated PrPres
molecular signature. This evidence in favor of a new bovine prion strain in
cattle suggests that BSE is not the only transmissible prion disease in cattle.
The origin of such cases has not been determined (7). These cases suggest either
the existence of alternative origins of such diseases in cattle or phenotypic
changes of PrPres after infection with the BSE agent. However, based on analysis
of molecular features of prion diseases in cattle, this situation is similar to
that in humans (5), in which different subtypes of sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob
disease agents are found.</div>
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<div>
</div>
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<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Dr Baron is head of the Unité Agents Transmissibles Non Conventionnels,
Agence Française de Sécurité Sanitaire des Aliments, in Lyon. His research
focuses on diagnosis of prion diseases of ruminants and characterization of the
disease-</div>
<br />
<div>
associated prion protein and infectious agents, with particular emphasis on
atypical forms of these diseases. </div>
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<div>
</div>
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</div>
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</div>
<br />
<div>
<a href="http://wwwnc.cdc.gov/eid/article/12/7/06-0107_article.htm">http://wwwnc.cdc.gov/eid/article/12/7/06-0107_article.htm</a>
</div>
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</div>
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<div>
Tuesday, November 6, 2012 </div>
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<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Transmission of New Bovine Prion to Mice, Atypical Scrapie, BSE, and
Sporadic CJD, November-December 2012 update </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
<a href="http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2012/11/transmission-of-new-bovine-prion-to.html">http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2012/11/transmission-of-new-bovine-prion-to.html</a>
</div>
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</div>
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</div>
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</div>
<br />
<div>
SPORADIC CJD RISING IN MANY COUNTRIES, INCLUDING THE U.K. ??? ZOONOSIS
???</div>
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<div>
</div>
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<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
SEE STEADY RISE OF SPORADIC CJD IN THE U.K. WHERE IN 1990, IT WENT FROM 28
SPORADIC CJD CASES, TO 2011, WITH A RECORD HIGH OF 90 CASES OF SPORADIC CJD, THE
MOST EVER DOCUMENTED IN ONE YEAR IN THE U.K. ...TSS</div>
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<div>
</div>
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<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
<a href="http://www.cjd.ed.ac.uk/documents/figs.pdf">http://www.cjd.ed.ac.uk/documents/figs.pdf</a>
</div>
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<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
SEE STEADY RISE OF SPORADIC CJD IN THE U.S.A. WHERE IN 1996 AND BEFORE,
THERE WERE 28 CASES OF SPORADIC CJD, TO 2010, WITH A RECORD HIGH OF 216 CASES OF
SPORADIC CJD, THE MOST EVER DOCUMENTED IN ONE YEAR IN THE U.S.A., WITH 2011,
COMING IN A CLOSE SECOND, AT 214 CASES OF SPORADIC CJD, AND STILL COUNTING.
ALSO, MOST DISTURBING, IS THE TYPE DETERMINATION PENDING CLASSIFICATION OF CJD,
WHICH I CALL cpsCJD, ON THE RISE AS WELL, AND OF COURSE, THE INFAMOUS VPSPr
SPORADIC CJD, IS ALSO RISING, PLEASE SEE MORE BELOW ; </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
<a href="http://www.cjdsurveillance.com/pdf/case-table.pdf">http://www.cjdsurveillance.com/pdf/case-table.pdf</a>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
SEE ALSO CANADA WITH THE SAME SPORADIC TYPE CJD PROBLEMS, AND RISE THERE
FROM ; </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
3. Final classification of 48 cases from 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012 is
pending. </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
<a href="http://www.phac-aspc.gc.ca/hcai-iamss/cjd-mcj/cjdss-ssmcj/pdf/stats_1012-eng.pdf">http://www.phac-aspc.gc.ca/hcai-iamss/cjd-mcj/cjdss-ssmcj/pdf/stats_1012-eng.pdf</a>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Friday, November 23, 2012 </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease update As at 5th November 2012 UK, USA,
AND CANADA </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
<a href="http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2012/11/sporadic-creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.html">http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2012/11/sporadic-creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.html</a>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Alternatively, other yet unknown routes of transmission or genetic
determinants must be considered. This said, H-type BSE might persist after
eradication of C-type BSE. What are the implications of this scenario? Studies
in mice provided experimental evidence that H-type BSE may shift its disease
phenotype to that of C-type BSE (3) upon transmission. It has therefore been
hypothesized that the C-type BSE epidemic originated from spontaneously
occurring H-type BSE cases. If this was the case there would be a constant risk
that C-type BSE re-emerges in the cattle population once the feed-ban is
discontinued. Consequently, some measures of disease control would need to be
maintained indefinitely. Since the standards for the determination of a
countries’ BSE risk status currently do not differentiate between BSE subtypes
(28), BSE risk assessments will certainly need to take such considerations into
account. This highlights the need for continuing research into the relationship
between classical and atypical BSE variants to provide the scientific basis for
future disease surveillance and control policies. </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
<a href="http://jcm.asm.org/content/early/2012/09/28/JCM.02178-12.abstract">http://jcm.asm.org/content/early/2012/09/28/JCM.02178-12.abstract</a>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Saturday, October 6, 2012 </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
TRANSMISSION, DIFFERENTIATION, AND PATHOBIOLOGY OF TRANSMISSIBLE SPONGIFORM
ENCEPHALOPATHIES 2011 Annual Report </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
<a href="http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2012/10/transmission-differentiation-and.html">http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2012/10/transmission-differentiation-and.html</a>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Subject: Atypical BSE (BASE) Transmitted from Asymptomatic Aging Cattle to
a Primate </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Atypical BSE (BASE) Transmitted from Asymptomatic Aging Cattle to a Primate
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Emmanuel E. Comoy1*, Cristina Casalone2, Nathalie Lescoutra-Etchegaray1,
Gianluigi Zanusso3, Sophie Freire1, Dominique Marcé1, Frédéric Auvré1,
Marie-Magdeleine Ruchoux1, Sergio Ferrari3, Salvatore Monaco3, Nicole Salès4,
Maria Caramelli2, Philippe Leboulch1,5, Paul Brown1, Corinne I. Lasmézas4,
Jean-Philippe Deslys1 </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
1 Institute of Emerging Diseases and Innovative Therapies, CEA,
Fontenay-aux-Roses, France, 2 Istituto Zooprofilattico Sperimentale del
Piemonte, Turin, Italy, 3 Policlinico G.B. Rossi, Verona, Italy, 4 Scripps
Florida, Jupiter, Florida, United States of America, 5 Genetics Division,
Brigham & Women's Hospital, Harvard Medical School, Boston, Massachusetts,
United States of America </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Abstract </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Human variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (vCJD) results from foodborne
transmission of prions from slaughtered cattle with classical Bovine Spongiform
Encephalopathy (cBSE). Atypical forms of BSE, which remain mostly asymptomatic
in aging cattle, were recently identified at slaughterhouses throughout Europe
and North America, raising a question about human susceptibility to these new
prion strains. </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Methodology/Principal Findings </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Brain homogenates from cattle with classical BSE and atypical (BASE)
infections were inoculated intracerebrally into cynomolgus monkeys (Macacca
fascicularis), a non-human primate model previously demonstrated to be
susceptible to the original strain of cBSE. The resulting diseases were compared
in terms of clinical signs, histology and biochemistry of the abnormal prion
protein (PrPres). The single monkey infected with BASE had a shorter survival,
and a different clinical evolution, histopathology, and prion protein (PrPres)
pattern than was observed for either classical BSE or vCJD-inoculated animals.
Also, the biochemical signature of PrPres in the BASE-inoculated animal was
found to have a higher proteinase K sensitivity of the octa-repeat region. We
found the same biochemical signature in three of four human patients with
sporadic CJD and an MM type 2 PrP genotype who lived in the same country as the
infected bovine. </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Conclusion/Significance </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Our results point to a possibly higher degree of pathogenicity of BASE
than classical BSE in primates and also raise a question about a possible link
to one uncommon subset of cases of apparently sporadic CJD. Thus, despite the
waning epidemic of classical BSE, *** the occurrence of atypical strains should
temper the urge to relax measures currently in place to protect public health
from accidental contamination by BSE-contaminated products. </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Citation: Comoy EE, Casalone C, Lescoutra-Etchegaray N, Zanusso G, Freire
S, et al. (2008) Atypical BSE (BASE) Transmitted from Asymptomatic Aging Cattle
to a Primate. PLoS ONE 3(8): e3017. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0003017 </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Editor: Neil Mabbott, University of Edinburgh, United Kingdom </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Received: April 24, 2008; Accepted: August 1, 2008; Published: August 20,
2008 </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Copyright: © 2008 Comoy et al. This is an open-access article distributed
under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits
unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the
original author and source are credited. </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Funding: This work has been supported by the Network of Excellence
NeuroPrion. </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Competing interests: CEA owns a patent covering the BSE diagnostic tests
commercialized by the company Bio-Rad. </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
* E-mail: emmanuel.comoy@cea.fr </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
snip... </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
In summary, we have transmitted one atypical form of BSE (BASE) to a
cynomolgus macaque monkey that had a shorter incubation period than monkeys
infected with classical BSE, with distinctive clinical, neuropathological, and
biochemical features; and have shown that the molecular biological signature
resembled that seen in a comparatively uncommon subtype of sporadic CJD. We
cannot yet say whether BASE is more pathogenic for primates (including humans)
than cBSE, nor can we predict whether its molecular biological features
represent a clue to one cause of apparently sporadic human CJD. However, the
evidence presented here and by others justifies concern about a potential human
health hazard from undetected atypical forms of BSE, and despite the waning
epizoonosis of classical BSE, it would be premature to abandon the precautionary
measures that have been so successful in reversing the impact of cBSE. We would
instead urge a gradual, staged reduction that takes into account the evolving
knowledge about atypical ruminant diseases, and both a permanent ban on the use
of bovine central nervous system tissue for either animal or human use, and its
destruction so as to eliminate any risk of environmental contamination. </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
<a href="http://www.plosone.org/article/info:doi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pone.0003017">http://www.plosone.org/article/info:doi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pone.0003017</a>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Monday, July 9, 2012</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Spread of Classic BSE Prions from the Gut via the Peripheral Nervous System
to the Brain </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Study Finds "Mad Cow Disease" in Cattle Can Spread Widely in Autonomic
Nervous System before Detectable in the Central Nervous System </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
<a href="http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2012/07/spread-of-classic-bse-prions-from-gut.html">http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2012/07/spread-of-classic-bse-prions-from-gut.html</a>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Thursday, August 12, 2010</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Seven main threats for the future linked to prions</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
First threat </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
The TSE road map defining the evolution of European policy for protection
against prion diseases is based on a certain numbers of hypotheses some of which
may turn out to be erroneous. In particular, a form of BSE (called atypical
Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy), recently identified by systematic testing in
aged cattle without clinical signs, may be the origin of classical BSE and thus
potentially constitute a reservoir, which may be impossible to eradicate if a
sporadic origin is confirmed. ***Also, a link is suspected between atypical BSE
and some apparently sporadic cases of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease in humans. These
atypical BSE cases constitute an unforeseen first threat that could sharply
modify the European approach to prion diseases. </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Second threat </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
snip... </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
<a href="http://www.neuroprion.org/en/np-neuroprion.html">http://www.neuroprion.org/en/np-neuroprion.html</a>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
EFSA Journal 2011 The European Response to BSE: A Success Story </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
This is an interesting editorial about the Mad Cow Disease debacle, and
it's ramifications that will continue to play out for decades to come ; </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Monday, October 10, 2011 </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
EFSA Journal 2011 The European Response to BSE: A Success Story </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
snip... </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
EFSA and the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC)
recently delivered a scientific opinion on any possible epidemiological or
molecular association between TSEs in animals and humans (EFSA Panel on
Biological Hazards (BIOHAZ) and ECDC, 2011). This opinion confirmed Classical
BSE prions as the only TSE agents demonstrated to be zoonotic so far but the
possibility that a small proportion of human cases so far classified as
"sporadic" CJD are of zoonotic origin could not be excluded. Moreover,
transmission experiments to non-human primates suggest that some TSE agents in
addition to Classical BSE prions in cattle (namely L-type Atypical BSE,
Classical BSE in sheep, transmissible mink encephalopathy (TME) and chronic
wasting disease (CWD) agents) might have zoonotic potential. </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
snip... </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
<a href="http://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/efsajournal/pub/e991.htm?emt=1">http://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/efsajournal/pub/e991.htm?emt=1</a>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
<a href="http://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/efsajournal/doc/e991.pdf">http://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/efsajournal/doc/e991.pdf</a>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
see follow-up here about North America BSE Mad Cow TSE prion risk factors,
and the ever emerging strains of Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy in many
species here in the USA, including humans ; </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
<a href="http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/10/efsa-journal-2011-european-response-to.html">http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/10/efsa-journal-2011-european-response-to.html</a>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Saturday, May 26, 2012 </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Are USDA assurances on mad cow case 'gross oversimplification'? </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
SNIP...</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
What irks many scientists is the USDA’s April 25 statement that the rare
disease is “not generally associated with an animal consuming infected
feed.”</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
The USDA’s conclusion is a “gross oversimplification,” said Dr. Paul Brown,
one of the world’s experts on this type of disease who retired recently from the
National Institutes of Health. "(The agency) has no foundation on which to base
that statement.”</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
“We can’t say it’s not feed related,” agreed Dr. Linda Detwiler, an
official with the USDA during the Clinton Administration now at Mississippi
State.</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
In the May 1 email to me, USDA’s Cole backed off a bit. “No one knows the
origins of atypical cases of BSE,” she said</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
The argument about feed is critical because if feed is the cause, not a
spontaneous mutation, the California cow could be part of a larger outbreak.
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
SNIP... </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
<a href="http://bseusa.blogspot.com/2012/05/are-usda-assurances-on-mad-cow-case.html">http://bseusa.blogspot.com/2012/05/are-usda-assurances-on-mad-cow-case.html</a>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Monday, August 6, 2012</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
TAFS BSE in USA August 6, 2012 </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
BSE in USA</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
<a href="http://bseusa.blogspot.com/2012/08/tafs-bse-in-usa-august-6-2012.html">http://bseusa.blogspot.com/2012/08/tafs-bse-in-usa-august-6-2012.html</a>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Sunday, May 6, 2012</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Mad Cow Disease, BSE May 2, 2012 IOWA
State University OIE </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
<a href="http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2012/05/bovine-spongiform-encephalopathy-mad.html">http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2012/05/bovine-spongiform-encephalopathy-mad.html</a>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
2009 UPDATE ON ALABAMA AND TEXAS MAD COWS 2005 and 2006 </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
<a href="http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2006/08/bse-atypical-texas-and-alabama-update.html">http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2006/08/bse-atypical-texas-and-alabama-update.html</a>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Comments on technical aspects of the risk assessment were then submitted to
FSIS. </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Comments were received from Food and Water Watch, Food Animal Concerns
Trust (FACT), Farm Sanctuary, R-CALF USA, Linda A Detwiler, and Terry S.
Singeltary. </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
This document provides itemized replies to the public comments received on
the 2005 updated Harvard BSE risk assessment. Please bear the following points
in mind: </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
<a href="http://www.fsis.usda.gov/PDF/BSE_Risk_Assess_Response_Public_Comments.pdf">http://www.fsis.usda.gov/PDF/BSE_Risk_Assess_Response_Public_Comments.pdf</a>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Owens, Julie </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
From: Terry S. Singeltary Sr. [flounder9@verizon.net] </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Sent: Monday, July 24, 2006 1:09 PM </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
To: FSIS RegulationsComments </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Subject: [Docket No. FSIS-2006-0011] FSIS Harvard Risk Assessment of Bovine
Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Page 1 of 98 </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
<a href="http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/Comments/2006-0011/2006-0011-1.pdf">http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/Comments/2006-0011/2006-0011-1.pdf</a>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
FSIS, USDA, REPLY TO SINGELTARY </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
<a href="http://www.fsis.usda.gov/PDF/BSE_Risk_Assess_Response_Public_Comments.pdf">http://www.fsis.usda.gov/PDF/BSE_Risk_Assess_Response_Public_Comments.pdf</a>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
U.S.A. 50 STATE BSE MAD COW CONFERENCE CALL Jan. 9, 2001 </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
<a href="http://tseac.blogspot.com/2011/02/usa-50-state-bse-mad-cow-conference.html">http://tseac.blogspot.com/2011/02/usa-50-state-bse-mad-cow-conference.html</a>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
<a href="http://madcowusda.blogspot.com/2012/02/eight-former-secretaries-of-agriculture.html">http://madcowusda.blogspot.com/2012/02/eight-former-secretaries-of-agriculture.html</a>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
2012 atypical L-type BSE BASE California reports </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Saturday, August 4, 2012 </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Final Feed Investigation Summary - California BSE Case - July 2012 </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
<a href="http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2012/08/final-feed-investigation-summary.html">http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2012/08/final-feed-investigation-summary.html</a>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
SUMMARY REPORT CALIFORNIA BOVINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY CASE
INVESTIGATION JULY 2012 </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Summary Report BSE 2012 </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Executive Summary </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
<a href="http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2012/08/summary-report-california-bovine.html">http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2012/08/summary-report-california-bovine.html</a>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Saturday, August 4, 2012 </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Update from APHIS Regarding Release of the Final Report on the BSE
Epidemiological Investigation </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
<a href="http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2012/08/update-from-aphis-regarding-release-of.html">http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2012/08/update-from-aphis-regarding-release-of.html</a>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
CENSORSHIP IS A TERRIBLE THING $$$ </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Canada has had a COVER-UP policy of mad cow disease since about the 17th
case OR 18th case of mad cow disease. AFTER THAT, all FOIA request were ignored
$$$ </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
THIS proves there is indeed an epidemic of mad cow disease in North
America, and it has been covered up for years and years, if not for decades, and
it’s getting worse $$$ </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Thursday, February 10, 2011 </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
TRANSMISSIBLE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY REPORT UPDATE CANADA FEBRUARY 2011
and how to hide mad cow disease in Canada Current as of: 2011-01-31 </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
<a href="http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2011/02/transmissible-spongiform-encephalopathy.html">http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2011/02/transmissible-spongiform-encephalopathy.html</a>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Wednesday, August 11, 2010 </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
REPORT ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE SIXTEENTH CASE OF BOVINE SPONGIFORM
ENCEPHALOPATHY (BSE) IN CANADA </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
<a href="http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2010/08/report-on-investigation-of-sixteenth.html">http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2010/08/report-on-investigation-of-sixteenth.html</a>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Thursday, August 19, 2010 </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
REPORT ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE SEVENTEENTH CASE OF BOVINE SPONGIFORM
ENCEPHALOPATHY (BSE) IN CANADA </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
<a href="http://bseusa.blogspot.com/2010/08/report-on-investigation-of-seventeenth.html">http://bseusa.blogspot.com/2010/08/report-on-investigation-of-seventeenth.html</a>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Friday, March 4, 2011 </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Alberta dairy cow found with mad cow disease </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
<a href="http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/03/alberta-dairy-cow-found-with-mad-cow.html">http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/03/alberta-dairy-cow-found-with-mad-cow.html</a>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Reasons for the New Regulation Order No. 23 (as well as amending Order No.
149) of the State Committee for Veterinary Medicine name BSE as the reason for
new import requirement. The legal title for Order No. 23 is "On Urgent Measures
Aimed at Prevention and Elimination of BSE and Other Prion Infections in
Cattle”. Neither Order explains how the threat of introduction of BSE can be
addressed through the inspection of producers of all products of animal origin
including fish, dairy products, poultry and pork. It is not clear what other
concerns are addressed through the proposed inspections. Formal Notification of
Trading Partners On August 3rd, Ukraine's Notification and Enquiry Point issued
a legal Notification G/SPS/N/UKR/3/Rev.1 found on the Official WTO Website
(Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures) </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
<a href="http://gain.fas.usda.gov/Recent%20GAIN%20Publications/Ukraine%20Proposes%20Restrictive%20Import%20Regulations%20for%20Animal%20Products%20_Kiev_Ukraine_8-17-2009.pdf">http://gain.fas.usda.gov/Recent%20GAIN%20Publications/Ukraine%20Proposes%20Restrictive%20Import%20Regulations%20for%20Animal%20Products%20_Kiev_Ukraine_8-17-2009.pdf</a>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Thursday, March 29, 2012 </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
atypical Nor-98 Scrapie has spread from coast to coast in the USA 2012
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
NIAA Annual Conference April 11-14, 2011San Antonio, Texas </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
<a href="http://nor-98.blogspot.com/2012/03/atypical-nor-98-scrapie-has-spread-from.html">http://nor-98.blogspot.com/2012/03/atypical-nor-98-scrapie-has-spread-from.html</a>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Monday, November 30, 2009 </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
USDA AND OIE COLLABORATE TO EXCLUDE ATYPICAL SCRAPIE NOR-98 ANIMAL HEALTH
CODE </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
<a href="http://nor-98.blogspot.com/2009/11/usda-and-oie-collaborate-to-exclude.html">http://nor-98.blogspot.com/2009/11/usda-and-oie-collaborate-to-exclude.html</a>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
ANY RELAXING OF ANY BSE TESTING RULES WOULD NOT BE BASED ON SOUND SCIENCE,
BUT BASED ON INDUSTRY LED SCIENCE AND MONEY $$$ </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
we now know that indeed atypical BSE is transmissible to cattle and other
species, and atypical BSE have been documented in older cattle to date. so
relaxing any BSE testing on older cattle would be a huge step backwards, and
could risk everything that has been done over the past 27 years to try and
eradicate BSE. ...</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
TSS </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
Terry S. Singeltary Sr.http://www.blogger.com/profile/06986622967539963260noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4595956519532618538.post-53178016848578440152012-11-14T08:59:00.001-08:002012-11-14T08:59:25.782-08:00Prionics: New test to combat scrapie and mad cow disease in sheep and goats<div>
MEDIA RELEASE</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Schlieren-Zurich, November 14, 2012</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Prionics: New test to combat scrapie and mad cow disease in sheep and
goats</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
An innovative new test is now available to detect TSE (scrapie and mad cow
disease) in sheep and goats. With the Prionics®-Check PrioSTRIP SR, Prionics
brings to the market the first test to achieve high diagnostic sensitivity on
preclinical TSE cases. The test was approved today by the European Commission
for use in TSE testing in small ruminants*. The Prionics®-Check PrioSTRIP SR can
detect scrapie earlier than conventional tests and will therefore significantly
contribute to TSE control programs.</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
The Prionics®-Check PrioSTRIP SR was extensively tested in a laboratory
evaluation directed by the European Commission. The product fulfilled all the
requirements of the EU evaluation and has now been approved as a rapid test for
detection of TSE in the central nervous system of small ruminants (i.e. sheep
and goats).</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Superior detection of preclinical scrapie</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
The Prionics®-CHECK PrioSTRIP SR detected EU reference samples of classical
and atypical scrapie in sheep and goats as well as BSE in sheep with a
sensitivity and specificity of 100%. The Prionics®- CHECK PrioSTRIP SR also
proved to be the first test kit to achieve a high diagnostic sensitivity on
preclinical TSE cases. Most importantly, the test can detect infection as early
as 7 months post exposure, which is earlier - during the incubation period -
than the reference tests. “Early detection of scrapie is a critical factor in
disease control programs” says Ernst Zollinger, Head of Marketing and Sales at
Prionics. “In contrast to BSE, scrapie is an outbreak disease which could not be
eliminated for centuries. The earlier the infection is detected means that the
costs associated with managing scrapie can be minimized.”</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
PrioSTRIP®SR: Fast and simple</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
The Prionics®-Check PrioSTRIP SR is not only the most sensitive test, but
is also the fastest and simplest sheep TSE test on the market, making it an
excellent tool to monitor the incidence of TSE in small ruminants. This fast
high throughput laboratory assay delivers results in just over one hour and is
based on immunochromatography, using antibody-mediated detection of scrapie and
BSE prions. The Prionics®-Check PrioSTRIP SR is an economical test as it
requires only minimal laboratory equipment and produces little waste. This fast
and convenient test uses the same technology as the established and successful
PrioSTRIP® test for BSE in cattle, meaning that the same test principle can be
used for the detection of BSE in cattle and TSE in small ruminants.</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
About TSE in small ruminants</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Small ruminants (sheep and goats) can be infected with scrapie or BSE under
natural circumstances. While scrapie is thought to be non-infectious to humans,
it is unclear whether BSE in sheep and goats could cause Creutzfeldt-Jakob
disease in humans, similar to that of BSE in cattle. Small ruminant testing
programs, initiated by the European Community to identify the incidence of TSE
in sheep and goats, are ongoing.</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
About Prionics</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Prionics AG, based in Zurich, Switzerland, is a leading provider of farm
animal diagnostics and is a recognized center of expertise in BSE and prion
diseases. Prionics produces and markets innovative diagnostic solutions for
major farm animal diseases, aiding in the protection of consumer health.</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Prionics is the main sponsor of the 16th International Symposium of the
World Association of Veterinary Laboratory Diagnosticians in Berlin June 5-8,
2013.</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
For more information please visit www.prionics.com or contact:</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Marjan van der Haar, PhD</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Marketing Communications</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Tel: +41 44 200 20 57 / +41 79 352 53 16</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Email: media@prionics.com </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
<a href="http://www.prionics.com/fileadmin/user_upload/data/doc/news/121114_Prionics_media_release__PrioSTRIP_SR_E.pdf">http://www.prionics.com/fileadmin/user_upload/data/doc/news/121114_Prionics_media_release__PrioSTRIP_SR_E.pdf</a>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
<a href="http://www.prionics.com/diseases-solutions/tse/Prionics-Check_PrioSTRIP_SR/">http://www.prionics.com/diseases-solutions/tse/Prionics-Check_PrioSTRIP_SR/</a>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
New test to combat scrapie and mad cow disease in sheep and goats </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Zurich, November 14, 2012 - An innovative new test is now available to
detect TSE (scrapie and mad cow disease) in sheep and goats. With the
Prionics®-Check PrioSTRIP SR, Prionics brings to the market the first test to
achieve high diagnostic sensitivity on preclinical TSE cases. The test was
approved today by the European Commission for use in TSE testing in small
ruminants*. The Prionics®-Check PrioSTRIP SR can detect scrapie earlier than
conventional tests and will therefore significantly contribute to TSE control
programs. </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
The Prionics®-Check PrioSTRIP SR was extensively tested in a laboratory
evaluation directed by the European Commission. The product fulfilled all the
requirements of the EU evaluation and has now been approved as a rapid test for
detection of TSE in the central nervous system of small ruminants (i.e. sheep
and goats). </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Superior detection of preclinical scrapie </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
The Prionics®-CHECK PrioSTRIP SR detected EU reference samples of classical
and atypical scrapie in sheep and goats as well as BSE in sheep with a
sensitivity and specificity of 100%. The Prionics®-CHECK PrioSTRIP SR also
proved to be the first test kit to achieve a high diagnostic sensitivity on
preclinical TSE cases. Most importantly, the test can detect infection as early
as 7 months post exposure, which is earlier - during the incubation period -
than the reference tests. “Early detection of scrapie is a critical factor in
disease control programs” says Ernst Zollinger, Head of Marketing and Sales at
Prionics. “In contrast to BSE, scrapie is an outbreak disease which could not be
eliminated for centuries. The earlier the infection is detected means that the
costs associated with managing scrapie can be minimized.” </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
PrioSTRIP® SR: Fast and simple </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
The Prionics®-Check PrioSTRIP SR is not only the most sensitive test, but
is also the fastest and simplest sheep TSE test on the market, making it an
excellent tool to monitor the incidence of TSE in small ruminants. This fast
high throughput laboratory assay delivers results in just over one hour and is
based on immunochromatography, using antibody-mediated detection of scrapie and
BSE prions. The Prionics®-Check PrioSTRIP SR is an economical test as it
requires only minimal laboratory equipment and produces little waste. This fast
and convenient test uses the same technology as the established and successful
PrioSTRIP® test for BSE in cattle, meaning that the same test principle can be
used for the detection of BSE in cattle and TSE in small ruminants. </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
About TSE in small ruminants </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Small ruminants (sheep and goats) can be infected with scrapie or BSE under
natural circumstances. While scrapie is thought to be non-infectious to humans,
it is unclear whether BSE in sheep and goats could cause Creutzfeldt-Jakob
disease in humans, similar to that of BSE in cattle. Small ruminant testing
programs, initiated by the European Community to identify the incidence of TSE
in sheep and goats, are ongoing. </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
<a href="http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2012:314:0013:0014:EN:PDF">http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2012:314:0013:0014:EN:PDF</a>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
>>> Superior detection of preclinical scrapie The Prionics®-CHECK
PrioSTRIP SR detected EU reference samples of classical and atypical scrapie in
sheep and goats as well as BSE in sheep with a sensitivity and specificity of
100%. </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
a test is only as good as the ones giving that test. your country can be
full of TSEs, and you can have a TSE prion test with a specificity of 100%, and
still not find much of anything, only by chance, when part of your 2004 enhanced
BSE surveillance program consisted of only testing healthy cattle brains. case
in point ; </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Owner and Corporation Plead Guilty to Defrauding Bovine Spongiform
Encephalopathy (BSE) Surveillance Program </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
An Arizona meat processing company and its owner pled guilty in February
2007 to charges of theft of Government funds, mail fraud, and wire fraud. The
owner and his company defrauded the BSE Surveillance Program when they falsified
BSE Surveillance Data Collection Forms and then submitted payment requests to
USDA for the services. In addition to the targeted sample population (those
cattle that were more than 30 months old or had other risk factors for BSE), the
owner submitted to USDA, or caused to be submitted, BSE obex (brain stem)
samples from healthy USDA-inspected cattle. As a result, the owner fraudulently
received approximately $390,000. Sentencing is scheduled for May 2007. </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
snip... </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Topics that will be covered in ongoing or planned reviews under Goal 1
include: </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
soundness of BSE maintenance sampling (APHIS), </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
implementation of Performance-Based Inspection System enhancements for
specified risk material (SRM) violations and improved inspection controls over
SRMs (FSIS and APHIS), </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
snip... </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
The findings and recommendations from these efforts will be covered in
future semiannual reports as the relevant audits and investigations are
completed. </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
4 USDA OIG SEMIANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS FY 2007 1st Half </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
<a href="http://www.usda.gov/oig/webdocs/sarc070619.pdf">http://www.usda.gov/oig/webdocs/sarc070619.pdf</a>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
-MORE Office of the United States Attorney District of Arizona FOR
IMMEDIATE RELEASE For Information Contact Public Affairs February 16, 2007 WYN
HORNBUCKLE Telephone: (602) 514-7625 Cell: (602) 525-2681 </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
CORPORATION AND ITS PRESIDENT PLEAD GUILTY TO DEFRAUDING GOVERNMENTS MAD
COW DISEASE SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
PHOENIX -- Farm Fresh Meats, Inc. and Roland Emerson Farabee, 55, of
Maricopa, Arizona, pleaded guilty to stealing $390,000 in government funds, mail
fraud and wire fraud, in federal district court in Phoenix. U.S. Attorney Daniel
Knauss stated, The integrity of the system that tests for mad cow disease relies
upon the honest cooperation of enterprises like Farm Fresh Meats. Without that
honest cooperation, consumers both in the U.S. and internationally are at risk.
We want to thank the USDAs Office of Inspector General for their continuing
efforts to safeguard the public health and enforce the law. Farm Fresh Meats
and Farabee were charged by Information with theft of government funds, mail
fraud and wire fraud. According to the Information, on June 7, 2004, Farabee, on
behalf of Farm Fresh Meats, signed a contract with the U.S. Department of
Agriculture (the USDA Agreement) to collect obex samples from cattle at high
risk of mad cow disease (the Targeted Cattle Population). The Targeted Cattle
Population consisted of the following cattle: cattle over thirty months of age;
nonambulatory cattle; cattle exhibiting signs of central nervous system
disorders; cattle exhibiting signs of mad cow disease; and dead cattle. Pursuant
to the USDA Agreement, the USDA agreed to pay Farm Fresh Meats $150 per obex
sample for collecting obex samples from cattle within the Targeted Cattle
Population, and submitting the obex samples to a USDA laboratory for mad cow
disease testing. Farm Fresh Meats further agreed to maintain in cold storage the
sampled cattle carcasses and heads until the test results were received by Farm
Fresh Meats. </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Evidence uncovered during the governments investigation established that
Farm Fresh Meats and Farabee submitted samples from cattle outside the Targeted
Cattle Population. Specifically, Farm Fresh Meats and Farabee submitted, or
caused to be submitted, obex samples from healthy, USDA inspected cattle, in
order to steal government moneys. </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Evidence collected also demonstrated that Farm Fresh Meats and Farabee
failed to maintain cattle carcasses and heads pending test results and falsified
corporate books and records to conceal their malfeasance. Such actions, to the
extent an obex sample tested positive (fortunately, none did), could have
jeopardized the USDAs ability to identify the diseased animal and pinpoint its
place of origin. On Wednesday, February 14, 2007, Farm Fresh Meats and Farabee
pleaded guilty to stealing government funds and using the mails and wires to
effect the scheme. According to their guilty pleas: </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
(a) Farm Fresh Meats collected, and Farabee directed others to collect,
obex samples from cattle outside the Targeted Cattle Population, which were not
subject to payment by the USDA; </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
(b) Farm Fresh Meats 2 and Farabee caused to be submitted payment requests
to the USDA knowing that the requests were based on obex samples that were not
subject to payment under the USDA Agreement; </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
(c) Farm Fresh Meats completed and submitted, and Farabee directed others
to complete and submit, BSE Surveillance Data Collection Forms to the USDAs
testing laboratory that were false and misleading; </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
(d) Farm Fresh Meats completed and submitted, and Farabee directed others
to complete and submit, BSE Surveillance Submission Forms filed with the USDA
that were false and misleading; </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
(e) Farm Fresh Meats falsified, and Farabee directed others to falsify,
internal Farm Fresh Meats documents to conceal the fact that Farm Fresh Meats
was seeking and obtaining payment from the USDA for obex samples obtained from
cattle outside the Targeted Cattle Population; and </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
(f) Farm Fresh Meats failed to comply with, and Farabee directed others to
fail to comply with, the USDA Agreement by discarding cattle carcasses and heads
prior to receiving BSE test results. A conviction for theft of government funds
carries a maximum penalty of 10 years imprisonment. Mail fraud and wire fraud
convictions carry a maximum penalty of 20 years imprisonment. Convictions for
the above referenced violations also carry a maximum fine of $250,000 for
individuals and $500,000 for organizations. In determining an actual sentence,
Judge Earl H. Carroll will consult the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, which provide
appropriate sentencing ranges. The judge, however, is not bound by those
guidelines in determining a sentence. </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Sentencing is set before Judge Earl H. Carroll on May 14, 2007. The
investigation in this case was conducted by Assistant Special Agent in Charge
Alejandro Quintero, United States Department of Agriculture, Office of Inspector
General. The prosecution is being handled by Robert Long, Assistant U.S.
Attorney, District of Arizona, Phoenix. CASE NUMBER: CR-07-00160-PHX-EHC RELEASE
NUMBER: 2007-051(Farabee) # # # </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
<a href="http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/az/">http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/az/</a>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Friday, May 4, 2012 </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
May 2, 2012: Update from APHIS Regarding a Detection of Bovine Spongiform
Encephalopathy (BSE) in the United States </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
<a href="http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2012/05/may-2-2012-update-from-aphis-regarding.html">http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2012/05/may-2-2012-update-from-aphis-regarding.html</a>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
PAUL BROWN COMMENT TO ME ON THIS ISSUE </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Tuesday, September 12, 2006 11:10 AM </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
"Actually, Terry, I have been critical of the USDA handling of the mad cow
issue for some years, and with Linda Detwiler and others sent lengthy detailed
critiques and recommendations to both the USDA and the Canadian Food Agency."
........TSS </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
<a href="http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2009/07/mad-cow-cover-up-usa-masked-as-sporadic.html">http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2009/07/mad-cow-cover-up-usa-masked-as-sporadic.html</a>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
OR, what the Honorable Phyllis Fong of the OIG found ; </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Audit Report Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service Bovine Spongiform
Encephalopathy (BSE) Surveillance Program  Phase II and Food Safety and
Inspection Service </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Controls Over BSE Sampling, Specified Risk Materials, and Advanced Meat
Recovery Products - Phase III </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Report No. 50601-10-KC January 2006 </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Finding 2 Inherent Challenges in Identifying and Testing High-Risk Cattle
Still Remain </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
<a href="http://www.usda.gov/oig/webdocs/50601-10-KC.pdf">http://www.usda.gov/oig/webdocs/50601-10-KC.pdf</a>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Tuesday, January 1, 2008 </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
BSE OIE USDA </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Subject: OIE BSE RECOMMENDATION FOR USA, bought and paid for by your local
cattle dealers i.e. USDA </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Date: May 14, 2007 at 9:00 am PST </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
OIE BSE RECOMMENDATION FOR USA, bought and paid for by your local cattle
dealers i.e. USDA </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
STATEMENT BY DR. RON DEHAVEN REGARDING OIE RISK RECOMMENDATION </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
March 9, 2007 </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
<a href="http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2008/01/bse-oie-usda.html">http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2008/01/bse-oie-usda.html</a>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Tuesday, November 02, 2010 </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
IN CONFIDENCE </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
The information contained herein should not be disseminated further except
on the basis of "NEED TO KNOW". </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
BSE - ATYPICAL LESION DISTRIBUTION (RBSE 92-21367) statutory (obex only)
diagnostic criteria CVL 1992 </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
<a href="http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2010/11/bse-atypical-lesion-distribution-rbse.html">http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2010/11/bse-atypical-lesion-distribution-rbse.html</a>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
2009 UPDATE ON ALABAMA AND TEXAS MAD COWS 2005 and 2006 </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
<a href="http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2006/08/bse-atypical-texas-and-alabama-update.html">http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2006/08/bse-atypical-texas-and-alabama-update.html</a>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Comments on technical aspects of the risk assessment were then submitted to
FSIS. </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Comments were received from Food and Water Watch, Food Animal Concerns
Trust (FACT), Farm Sanctuary, R-CALF USA, Linda A Detwiler, and Terry S.
Singeltary. </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
This document provides itemized replies to the public comments received on
the 2005 updated Harvard BSE risk assessment. Please bear the following points
in mind: </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
<a href="http://www.fsis.usda.gov/PDF/BSE_Risk_Assess_Response_Public_Comments.pdf">http://www.fsis.usda.gov/PDF/BSE_Risk_Assess_Response_Public_Comments.pdf</a>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Owens, Julie </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
From: Terry S. Singeltary Sr. [flounder9@verizon.net] </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Sent: Monday, July 24, 2006 1:09 PM </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
To: FSIS RegulationsComments </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Subject: [Docket No. FSIS-2006-0011] FSIS Harvard Risk Assessment of Bovine
Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Page 1 of 98 </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
<a href="http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/Comments/2006-0011/2006-0011-1.pdf">http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/Comments/2006-0011/2006-0011-1.pdf</a>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
FSIS, USDA, REPLY TO SINGELTARY </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
<a href="http://www.fsis.usda.gov/PDF/BSE_Risk_Assess_Response_Public_Comments.pdf">http://www.fsis.usda.gov/PDF/BSE_Risk_Assess_Response_Public_Comments.pdf</a>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
U.S.A. 50 STATE BSE MAD COW CONFERENCE CALL Jan. 9, 2001 </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
<a href="http://tseac.blogspot.com/2011/02/usa-50-state-bse-mad-cow-conference.html">http://tseac.blogspot.com/2011/02/usa-50-state-bse-mad-cow-conference.html</a>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
<a href="http://madcowusda.blogspot.com/2012/02/eight-former-secretaries-of-agriculture.html">http://madcowusda.blogspot.com/2012/02/eight-former-secretaries-of-agriculture.html</a>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
2012 atypical L-type BSE BASE California reports </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Saturday, August 4, 2012 </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Final Feed Investigation Summary - California BSE Case - July 2012 </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
<a href="http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2012/08/final-feed-investigation-summary.html">http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2012/08/final-feed-investigation-summary.html</a>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
SUMMARY REPORT CALIFORNIA BOVINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY CASE
INVESTIGATION JULY 2012 </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Summary Report BSE 2012 </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Executive Summary </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
<a href="http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2012/08/summary-report-california-bovine.html">http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2012/08/summary-report-california-bovine.html</a>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Saturday, August 4, 2012 </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Update from APHIS Regarding Release of the Final Report on the BSE
Epidemiological Investigation </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
<a href="http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2012/08/update-from-aphis-regarding-release-of.html">http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2012/08/update-from-aphis-regarding-release-of.html</a>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
CENSORSHIP IS A TERRIBLE THING $$$ </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Canada has had a COVER-UP policy of mad cow disease since about the 17th
case OR 18th case of mad cow disease. AFTER THAT, all FOIA request were ignored
$$$ </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
THIS proves there is indeed an epidemic of mad cow disease in North
America, and it has been covered up for years and years, if not for decades, and
it’s getting worse $$$ </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Thursday, February 10, 2011 </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
TRANSMISSIBLE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY REPORT UPDATE CANADA FEBRUARY 2011
and how to hide mad cow disease in Canada Current as of: 2011-01-31 </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
<a href="http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2011/02/transmissible-spongiform-encephalopathy.html">http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2011/02/transmissible-spongiform-encephalopathy.html</a>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Wednesday, August 11, 2010 </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
REPORT ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE SIXTEENTH CASE OF BOVINE SPONGIFORM
ENCEPHALOPATHY (BSE) IN CANADA </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
<a href="http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2010/08/report-on-investigation-of-sixteenth.html">http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2010/08/report-on-investigation-of-sixteenth.html</a>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Thursday, August 19, 2010 </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
REPORT ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE SEVENTEENTH CASE OF BOVINE SPONGIFORM
ENCEPHALOPATHY (BSE) IN CANADA </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
<a href="http://bseusa.blogspot.com/2010/08/report-on-investigation-of-seventeenth.html">http://bseusa.blogspot.com/2010/08/report-on-investigation-of-seventeenth.html</a>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Friday, March 4, 2011 </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Alberta dairy cow found with mad cow disease </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
<a href="http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/03/alberta-dairy-cow-found-with-mad-cow.html">http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/03/alberta-dairy-cow-found-with-mad-cow.html</a>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Reasons for the New Regulation Order No. 23 (as well as amending Order No.
149) of the State Committee for Veterinary Medicine name BSE as the reason for
new import requirement. The legal title for Order No. 23 is "On Urgent Measures
Aimed at Prevention and Elimination of BSE and Other Prion Infections in
Cattle”. Neither Order explains how the threat of introduction of BSE can be
addressed through the inspection of producers of all products of animal origin
including fish, dairy products, poultry and pork. It is not clear what other
concerns are addressed through the proposed inspections. Formal Notification of
Trading Partners On August 3rd, Ukraine's Notification and Enquiry Point issued
a legal Notification G/SPS/N/UKR/3/Rev.1 found on the Official WTO Website
(Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures) </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
<a href="http://gain.fas.usda.gov/Recent%20GAIN%20Publications/Ukraine%20Proposes%20Restrictive%20Import%20Regulations%20for%20Animal%20Products%20_Kiev_Ukraine_8-17-2009.pdf">http://gain.fas.usda.gov/Recent%20GAIN%20Publications/Ukraine%20Proposes%20Restrictive%20Import%20Regulations%20for%20Animal%20Products%20_Kiev_Ukraine_8-17-2009.pdf</a>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Thursday, March 29, 2012 </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
atypical Nor-98 Scrapie has spread from coast to coast in the USA 2012
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
NIAA Annual Conference April 11-14, 2011San Antonio, Texas </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
<a href="http://nor-98.blogspot.com/2012/03/atypical-nor-98-scrapie-has-spread-from.html">http://nor-98.blogspot.com/2012/03/atypical-nor-98-scrapie-has-spread-from.html</a>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Monday, November 30, 2009 </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
USDA AND OIE COLLABORATE TO EXCLUDE ATYPICAL SCRAPIE NOR-98 ANIMAL HEALTH
CODE </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
<a href="http://nor-98.blogspot.com/2009/11/usda-and-oie-collaborate-to-exclude.html">http://nor-98.blogspot.com/2009/11/usda-and-oie-collaborate-to-exclude.html</a>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Thursday, August 12, 2010 </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Seven main threats for the future linked to prions </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
First threat </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
The TSE road map defining the evolution of European policy for protection
against prion diseases is based on a certain numbers of hypotheses some of which
may turn out to be erroneous. In particular, a form of BSE (called atypical
Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy), recently identified by systematic testing in
aged cattle without clinical signs, may be the origin of classical BSE and thus
potentially constitute a reservoir, which may be impossible to eradicate if a
sporadic origin is confirmed. ***Also, a link is suspected between atypical BSE
and some apparently sporadic cases of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease in humans. These
atypical BSE cases constitute an unforeseen first threat that could sharply
modify the European approach to prion diseases. </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Second threat </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
snip... </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
<a href="http://www.neuroprion.org/en/np-neuroprion.html">http://www.neuroprion.org/en/np-neuroprion.html</a>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
EFSA Journal 2011 The European Response to BSE: A Success Story </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
This is an interesting editorial about the Mad Cow Disease debacle, and
it's ramifications that will continue to play out for decades to come ; </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Monday, October 10, 2011 </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
EFSA Journal 2011 The European Response to BSE: A Success Story </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
snip... </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
EFSA and the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC)
recently delivered a scientific opinion on any possible epidemiological or
molecular association between TSEs in animals and humans (EFSA Panel on
Biological Hazards (BIOHAZ) and ECDC, 2011). This opinion confirmed Classical
BSE prions as the only TSE agents demonstrated to be zoonotic so far but the
possibility that a small proportion of human cases so far classified as
"sporadic" CJD are of zoonotic origin could not be excluded. Moreover,
transmission experiments to non-human primates suggest that some TSE agents in
addition to Classical BSE prions in cattle (namely L-type Atypical BSE,
Classical BSE in sheep, transmissible mink encephalopathy (TME) and chronic
wasting disease (CWD) agents) might have zoonotic potential. </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
snip... </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
<a href="http://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/efsajournal/pub/e991.htm?emt=1">http://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/efsajournal/pub/e991.htm?emt=1</a>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
<a href="http://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/efsajournal/doc/e991.pdf">http://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/efsajournal/doc/e991.pdf</a>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
see follow-up here about North America BSE Mad Cow TSE prion risk factors,
and the ever emerging strains of Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy in many
species here in the USA, including humans ; </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
<a href="http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/10/efsa-journal-2011-european-response-to.html">http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/10/efsa-journal-2011-european-response-to.html</a>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
2011 Monday, September 26, 2011 </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
L-BSE BASE prion and atypical sporadic CJD </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
<a href="http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2011/09/l-bse-base-prion-and-atypical-sporadic.html">http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2011/09/l-bse-base-prion-and-atypical-sporadic.html</a>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Saturday, March 5, 2011 </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
MAD COW ATYPICAL CJD PRION TSE CASES WITH CLASSIFICATIONS PENDING ON THE
RISE IN NORTH AMERICA </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
<a href="http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/03/mad-cow-atypical-cjd-prion-tse-cases.html">http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/03/mad-cow-atypical-cjd-prion-tse-cases.html</a>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Wednesday, August 01, 2012 </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Behavioural and Psychiatric Features of the Human Prion Diseases:
Experience in 368 Prospectively Studied Patients </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
<a href="http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2012/08/behavioural-and-psychiatric-features-of.html">http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2012/08/behavioural-and-psychiatric-features-of.html</a>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Monday, August 06, 2012 </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Atypical neuropathological sCJD-MM phenotype with abundant white matter
Kuru-type plaques sparing the cerebellar cortex </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
<a href="http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2012/08/atypical-neuropathological-scjd-mm.html">http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2012/08/atypical-neuropathological-scjd-mm.html</a>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Tuesday, June 26, 2012 </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Creutzfeldt Jakob Disease Human TSE report update North America, Canada,
Mexico, and USDA PRION UNIT as of May 18, 2012 </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
type determination pending Creutzfeldt Jakob Disease (tdpCJD), is on the
rise in Canada and the USA </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
<a href="http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2012/06/creutzfeldt-jakob-disease-human-tse.html">http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2012/06/creutzfeldt-jakob-disease-human-tse.html</a>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Friday, August 24, 2012 </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Iatrogenic prion diseases in humans: an update </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
<a href="http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2012/08/iatrogenic-prion-diseases-in-humans.html">http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2012/08/iatrogenic-prion-diseases-in-humans.html</a>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Monday, July 23, 2012 </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
The National Prion Disease Pathology Surveillance Center July 2012 </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
<a href="http://prionunitusaupdate2008.blogspot.com/2012/07/the-national-prion-disease-pathology.html">http://prionunitusaupdate2008.blogspot.com/2012/07/the-national-prion-disease-pathology.html</a>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
OR-10: Variably protease-sensitive prionopathy is transmissible in bank
voles </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Romolo Nonno,1 Michele Di Bari,1 Laura Pirisinu,1 Claudia D’Agostino,1
Stefano Marcon,1 Geraldina Riccardi,1 Gabriele Vaccari,1 Piero Parchi,2 Wenquan
Zou,3 Pierluigi Gambetti,3 Umberto Agrimi1 1Istituto Superiore di Sanità; Rome,
Italy; 2Dipartimento di Scienze Neurologiche, Università di Bologna; Bologna,
Italy; 3Case Western Reserve University; Cleveland, OH USA</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Background. Variably protease-sensitive prionopathy (VPSPr) is a recently
described “sporadic”neurodegenerative disease involving prion protein
aggregation, which has clinical similarities with non-Alzheimer dementias, such
as fronto-temporal dementia. Currently, 30 cases of VPSPr have been reported in
Europe and USA, of which 19 cases were homozygous for valine at codon 129 of the
prion protein (VV), 8 were MV and 3 were MM. A distinctive feature of VPSPr is
the electrophoretic pattern of PrPSc after digestion with proteinase K (PK).
After PK-treatment, PrP from VPSPr forms a ladder-like electrophoretic pattern
similar to that described in GSS cases. The clinical and pathological features
of VPSPr raised the question of the correct classification of VPSPr among prion
diseases or other forms of neurodegenerative disorders. Here we report
preliminary data on the transmissibility and pathological features of VPSPr
cases in bank voles. </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Materials and Methods. Seven VPSPr cases were inoculated in two genetic
lines of bank voles, carrying either methionine or isoleucine at codon 109 of
the prion protein (named BvM109 and BvI109, respectively). Among the VPSPr cases
selected, 2 were VV at PrP codon 129, 3 were MV and 2 were MM. Clinical
diagnosis in voles was confirmed by brain pathological assessment and western
blot for PK-resistant PrPSc (PrPres) with mAbs SAF32, SAF84, 12B2 and 9A2.
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Results. To date, 2 VPSPr cases (1 MV and 1 MM) gave positive transmission
in BvM109. Overall, 3 voles were positive with survival time between 290 and 588
d post inoculation (d.p.i.). All positive voles accumulated PrPres in the form
of the typical PrP27–30, which was indistinguishable to that previously observed
in BvM109 inoculated with sCJDMM1 cases.</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
In BvI109, 3 VPSPr cases (2 VV and 1 MM) showed positive transmission until
now. Overall, 5 voles were positive with survival time between 281 and 596
d.p.i.. In contrast to what observed in BvM109, all BvI109 showed a GSS-like
PrPSc electrophoretic pattern, characterized by low molecular weight PrPres.
These PrPres fragments were positive with mAb 9A2 and 12B2, while being negative
with SAF32 and SAF84, suggesting that they are cleaved at both the C-terminus
and the N-terminus. Second passages are in progress from these first successful
transmissions. </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Conclusions. Preliminary results from transmission studies in bank voles
strongly support the notion that VPSPr is a transmissible prion disease.
Interestingly, VPSPr undergoes divergent evolution in the two genetic lines of
voles, with sCJD-like features in BvM109 and GSS-like properties in
BvI109.</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
The discovery of previously unrecognized prion diseases in both humans and
animals (i.e., Nor98 in small ruminants) demonstrates that the range of prion
diseases might be wider than expected and raises crucial questions about the
epidemiology and strain properties of these new forms. We are investigating this
latter issue by molecular and biological comparison of VPSPr, GSS and Nor98.
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
<a href="http://www.landesbioscience.com/journals/prion/01-Prion6-2-OralPresentations.pdf?nocache=1216084967">http://www.landesbioscience.com/journals/prion/01-Prion6-2-OralPresentations.pdf?nocache=1216084967</a>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Wednesday, March 28, 2012</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
VARIABLY PROTEASE-SENSITVE PRIONOPATHY IS TRANSMISSIBLE, price of prion
poker goes up again $ </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
<a href="http://prionopathy.blogspot.com/2012/03/variably-protease-sensitve-prionopathy.html">http://prionopathy.blogspot.com/2012/03/variably-protease-sensitve-prionopathy.html</a>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
*** The discovery of previously unrecognized prion diseases in both humans
and animals (i.e., Nor98 in small ruminants) demonstrates that the range of
prion diseases might be wider than expected and raises crucial questions about
the epidemiology and strain properties of these new forms. We are investigating
this latter issue by molecular and biological comparison of VPSPr, GSS and
Nor98. </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
AS OF AUGUST 2012 ; </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
CJD UPDATE USA</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
1 Listed based on the year of death or, if not available, on year of
referral; 2 Cases with suspected prion disease for which brain tissue and/or
blood (in familial cases) were submitted; 3 Disease acquired in the United
Kingdom; 4 Disease was acquired in the United Kingdom in one case and in Saudi
Arabia in the other case; *** 5 Includes 8 cases in which the diagnosis is
pending, and 18 inconclusive cases; *** 6 Includes 10 (9 from 2012) cases with
type determination pending in which the diagnosis of vCJD has been excluded. ***
The Sporadic cases include 16 cases of sporadic Fatal Insomnia (sFI) and 42
cases of Variably Protease-Sensitive Prionopathy (VPSPr) and 2224 cases of
sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (sCJD). </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
<a href="http://www.cjdsurveillance.com/pdf/case-table.pdf">http://www.cjdsurveillance.com/pdf/case-table.pdf</a>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Sunday, September 23, 2012 </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
EU-Approved Rapid Tests for Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Detect
Atypical Forms: A Study for Their Sensitivities </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
<a href="http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2012/09/eu-approved-rapid-tests-for-bovine.html" title="http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2012/09/eu-approved-rapid-tests-for-bovine.html">http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2012/09/eu-approved-rapid-tests-for-bovine.html</a></div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
**** Tuesday, November 6, 2012 </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Transmission of New Bovine Prion to Mice, Atypical Scrapie, BSE, and
Sporadic CJD, November-December 2012 update </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
<a href="http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2012/11/transmission-of-new-bovine-prion-to.html">http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2012/11/transmission-of-new-bovine-prion-to.html</a>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
TSS</div>
Terry S. Singeltary Sr.http://www.blogger.com/profile/06986622967539963260noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4595956519532618538.post-88744726694371796132012-09-23T11:10:00.001-07:002012-09-23T11:10:10.984-07:00EU-Approved Rapid Tests for Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Detect Atypical Forms: A Study for Their Sensitivities<div>
EU-Approved Rapid Tests for Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Detect
Atypical Forms: A Study for Their Sensitivities</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Daniela Meloni1, Aart Davidse2, Jan P. M. Langeveld2, Katia Varello1,
Cristina Casalone1, Cristiano Corona1, Anne Balkema-Buschmann3, Martin H.
Groschup3, Francesco Ingravalle1, Elena Bozzetta1*</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
1 Centro di Referenza Nazionale per le Encefalopatie Animali, Istituto
Zooprofilattico Sperimentale del Piemonte, Liguria e Valle d'Aosta, Turin,
Italy, 2 Central Veterinary Institute of Wageningen UR, Lelystad, The
Netherlands, 3 Friedrich-Loeffler Institut, Federal Research Institute for
Animal Health, Insel Riems, Germany </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Abstract Top Since 2004 it become clear that atypical bovine spongiform
encephalopthies (BSEs) exist in cattle. Whenever their detection has relied on
active surveillance plans implemented in Europe since 2001 by rapid tests, the
overall and inter-laboratory performance of these diagnostic systems in the
detection of the atypical strains has not been studied thoroughly to date. To
fill this gap, the present study reports on the analytical sensitivity of the
EU-approved rapid tests for atypical L- and H-type and classical BSE in
parallel. Each test was challenged with two dilution series, one created from a
positive pool of the three BSE forms according to the EURL standard method of
homogenate preparation (50% w/v) and the other as per the test kit
manufacturer's instructions. Multilevel logistic models and simple logistic
models with the rapid test as the only covariate were fitted for each BSE form
analyzed as directed by the test manufacturer's dilution protocol. The same
schemes, but excluding the BSE type, were then applied to compare test
performance under the manufacturer's versus the water protocol. The IDEXX
HerdChek ® BSE-scrapie short protocol test showed the highest sensitivity for
all BSE forms. The IDEXX® HerdChek BSE-scrapie ultra short protocol, the
Prionics® - Check WESTERN and the AJ Roboscreen® BetaPrion tests showed similar
sensitivities, followed by the Roche® PrionScreen, the Bio-Rad® TeSeE™ SAP and
the Prionics® - Check PrioSTRIP in descending order of analytical sensitivity.
Despite these differences, the limit of detection of all seven rapid tests
against the different classes of material set within a 2 log10 range of the
best-performing test, thus meeting the European Food Safety Authority
requirement for BSE surveillance purposes. These findings indicate that not many
atypical cases would have been missed surveillance since 2001 which is important
for further epidemiological interpretations of the sporadic character of
atypical forms.</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Citation: Meloni D, Davidse A, Langeveld JPM, Varello K, Casalone C, et al.
(2012) EU-Approved Rapid Tests for Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Detect
Atypical Forms: A Study for Their Sensitivities. PLoS ONE 7(9): e43133.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0043133</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Editor: Corinne Ida Lasmezas, The Scripps Research Institute Scripps
Florida, United States of America </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Received: March 19, 2012; Accepted: July 16, 2012; Published: September 11,
2012</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Copyright: © 2012 Meloni et al. This is an open-access article distributed
under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits
unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the
original author and source are credited.</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Funding: The authors have no funding or support to report.</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Competing interests: The authors have declared that no competing interests
exist.</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
* E-mail: elena.bozzetta@izsto.it </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
snip... </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Discussion </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
In this study we have evaluated the analytical sensitivity of approved
rapid tests for the current known atypical BSEs detection. It is to be noted
that Seuberlich et al. [38] raised the possibility that a new prion disease not
previously encountered and distinct from the known types of BSEs exists.
Nevertheless, the information is really limited and the puzzle of the different
observations has still to be assembled, considering that the results described
remind the features of poorly digested normal PrP (known as the physiologically
C2 fragment of PrP [39], [40]).</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Referring to the tissues origin, is to be remarked that the investigated
H-BSE tissues originated from intracranially challenged cattle, whereas the
three other forms derived from field cases. Nevertheless, recent studies showed
that biochemical and histopathological features of experimental H-type BSE
animals were identical to that found with field H-type [12], [24], [41].</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
According to our results, all tests were able to detect both H- and L-BSE
types at a 1:16 dilution prepared as directed by the manufacturer's
instructions, with the same performance as for classical BSE.</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
The LOD varied across the tests. The IDEXX® HerdCheck BSE-scrapie short
protocol showed the highest analytical sensitivity, as previously reported in a
EURL study on classical BSE [21]. The performance of the AJ Roboscreen®
BetaPrion, IDEXX® HerdCheck BSE-scrapie ultra short protocol, and Prionics® -
Check WESTERN compared favourably with one another at our statistical analysis.
The Prionics® - Check PrioSTRIP, Bio-Rad® TeSeE™ SAP and Roche® PrionScreen
tests showed the lowest sensitivities for all the BSE types analyzed. These
results were confirmed also using other explorative statistical approaches
(e.g., Poisson models for number of positive replicates, receiver operating
characteristic [ROC] curves) which we had initially applied (results not
reported).</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
The analytical sensitivity of the tests was investigated in accordance with
the requirements set by the relevant evaluation protocols established by the
European Commission, the SSC and EFSA, using serial dilutions of sample
replicates.</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Test differences between the last positive dilutions of weak and strong
C-BSE samples varies among the different systems from two to four factors (2
base logarithm) for buffer dilutions and from two to five factors for water
dilutions. In this context, the different tests showed parallel results between
the dilutions prepared following the two protocols. The dynamic range of each
rapid test or rather the concentration range of PrPres that results in a change
in response is a specific peculiarity of each diagnostic system.</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
The rate of conversion of substrate to coloured product should be
proportional to the amount of PrPres within the well, but there are many limits
to this depending on the analyte itself, that tends to aggregate rapidly in
solution, and on the combination of methods and materials used within the test
kits other than on the equipments.</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
A gradual stratification of the signal represents a surplus value for TSE
rapid assays.</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
In our study, the Bio-Rad® TeSeE™ SAP test could surprisingly detect only
the 1:2 dilution when challenged with positive C BSE weak samples. A loss of
analytical sensitivity for this test was observed also during the active
surveillance activity carried out from 2004 to 2008 by the Italian Reference
Center for TSEs applying Bio-Rad® TeSeE™ test. In that context, a National batch
testing was performed on every new batch prior to commercialization to provide
reassurance that BSE rapid test kits were fit for the survey purpose. As a
consequence, distribution of some kit batches was precluded because of the lack
of signal showed on positive reference samples. Further to the unexpected poor
performance of Bio-Rad® TeSeE™ within this study even after test repetition, the
same Bio-Rad® homogenate sample set, according to previous studies in which its
suitability for the IDEXX test was shown, was challenged with the last test
revealing signals miming the ones reported for IDEXX test (data not shown). The
question of whether the specific kit batch affected the test performance is of
concern, but it is noteworthy that all producers were asked to provide a kit for
this evaluation. Thereby, our results represent a picture of the kits available
on the market.</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
The seven simple logistic models showed a meaningful difference between the
dilution protocols only for the AJ Roboscreen® BetaPrion and Bio-Rad® TeSeE™
SAP. The lower bounds of the 95% confidence intervals for the Roche® PrionScreen
and Prionics® - Check WESTERN tests approached 1 (0.9528 and 0.9755,
respectively); for the remaining tests, there was no statistical evidence of a
higher test sensitivity between the manufacturer's dilution protocol and the 50%
w/v protocol (Figure 2).</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Whenever in order to evaluate the field performances of BSE rapid post
mortem tests the manufacturers' protocol represents the term of reference, the
relevance of water dilution-based results relies on the specific Annex X of
Regulation (EC) 999/2001 requirements. NRLs for TSE periodically have to verify
national diagnostic standards and methods by means of comparative trials. The
objectives are to monitor national rapid test activity and to demonstrate to the
EC that the rapid surveillance system is effective. EURL itself annually
verifies the interlaboratory agreement of the rapid systems used by the
NRLs.</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
As previously reported in the EURL study [20], the analytical sensitivity
values obtained under the 50% w/v protocol were from one to three dilutions
inferior to those obtained under the specific homogenization protocol. For all
the tests except one, the discrepancies between the two modes of dilutions were
similar whatever the sample tested. Particularly with the Bio-Rad test the
strong positive C -BSE sample was four factors lower when the water protocol was
applied. Anyway, this is congruent with the EFSA 2009 results [21], where the
discrepancy set at three logarithms. This difference needs to be taken into
account when organizing ring trials, during which a less sensitive test could be
penalized.</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
To rule out a possible decrement of the signal related to the storage of
the water aliquots, and because of the scarcity of atypical BSE material, the
laboratory test exercise was completed within a 15-day period. This
precautionary approach was taken as no data exist on the stability of atypical
BSE homogenates, whereas differences in stability have been observed for
atypical versus classical scrapie [21], [42], [43], [44]. Further, as it is
indeed known that the results of some tests can lapse while approaching the
expiring date of kit batches, the kits provided for the evaluation were expected
to expire from three to six months after the date of testing. Table S1 lists the
kit batches used, the expiring dates and the days of testing.</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
With regard to the homogeneity of serial dilutions, as PrPres is
amyloidogenic, the fibrils tend to aggregate in solution [45], thus potentially
hindering a real homogeneity of dilution series. In our study, the ICC of the
replicates was higher than 0.99. This ensured that, whenever the amounts of BSE
tissues available were extremely limited, the material tested was
homogeneous.</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
When considering the working principle of rapid tests, summarized in the
Text S1, all approved tests include a PK digestion step to unmask cryptic
epitopes, except for the IDEXX HerdChek® BSE-scrapie EIA, which relies on
conformational detection technology using a specific aggregate specific capture
ligand on a dextran polymer (Seprion ligand technology, Microsens
Biotechnologies, London, UK) [46]. The severe effects of proteinase K (PK) in
digesting atypical PrPres are well known. Depending on the PK concentration,
signal loss after atypical BSE-related PrPres PK digestion varies from less than
20% for the C-type isolates to more than 50% for both L- and H-type BSE tissues
[4]. This could be the reason for the higher sensitivity of the IDEXX test in
detecting atypical BSEs compared to the others. However, the type of detergent
used in homogenates and the type of TSE strain used do affect the extent of
PrPres degradation, and this remains a matter of further study [47].</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
With regard to the interpretation of results, five of the rapid tests in
this study are based on semi-quantitative ELISA methods that produce a
qualitative result relative to a cut-off value. To minimize subjectivity, the
study's Prionics® - Check PrioSTRIP results were interpreted with the use of the
computerized PrioSCAN® software, although visual interpretation by two
independent readers was also validated. The Prionics® - Check Western is both a
qualitative and quantitative test, as it distinguishes PrPres in non-, mono-,
and diglycoforms while expressing their respective quantitative ratio and
migration positions. The diagnostic criteria for positive results are based on
the exhibition of a three-band signal, the top one corresponding to a protein
with an approximate molecular weight of 30 kD. Signal intensity decreases from
top to bottom, but the higher band should be clearly visible immediately under
the PK band. Significant blot images of atypical BSE dilution series obtained on
in the frame of this study are presented in the Figure S1. In addition,
extremely weak samples, notably for atypical BSE strains, can vary in their
conventional blot pattern that fit positive criteria. Glycoform separation on
the Sodium Dodecyl Sulphate PolyAcrylamide gel by electrophoresis causes the
PrPres signal to thin out along the migration line rather than concentrate in a
narrow area, as occurs with ELISA and immunochromatographic methods. This means
that if the relative non-, mono-, and diglycoform immunoreactivity ratios of
L-BSE are taken as corresponding roughly to 39%, 35%, and 26% [48], the blot
signal characterizing the last tissue ratio meeting the non-negative criteria
generates from only 39% of the total prion protein on the migration line.
Despite this, the Prionics® - Check Western was found to be among the more
sensitive systems, indicating that the interpretation of a specific PrPres
marker by an expert reader can increase the test's sensitivity.</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
In conclusion, despite the evidence of clear differences in relative
analytical sensitivity, the LOD of all seven rapid tests included in this study,
against all the classes of material used, was within a 2 log10 range of the
best-performing test, thus meeting EFSA criteria for rapid tests for BSE
monitoring.</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
No certain conclusions on the field of diagnostic performance of these
rapid-test kits can be drawn from our results on their analytical sensitivity,
as the two parameters are not directly linked, anyway samples from animals
exhibiting subclinical signs [24], could be expected to behave similarly to
extremely diluted CNS tissues used in analytical sensitivity studies.</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
The outcome of this study endorses the current epidemiological follow up
and interpretation of all three BSE forms prevalence [49], [50] and means that
for epidemiological studies the data obtained in the different countries and
regions of EU can be considered equally, as plausibly, most stronger atypical
cases have been detected by the different rapid tests. </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
see full text ; </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
<a href="http://www.plosone.org/article/info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pone.0043133">http://www.plosone.org/article/info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pone.0043133</a>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Performance analysis of rapid diagnostic tests on atypical bovine
spongiform encephalopathy </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
John G. Gray Sandor Dudas Catherine Graham Stefanie Czub1 Canadian Food
Inspection Agency, Lethbridge Laboratory, Lethbridge, Alberta, Canada ↵1
Stefanie Czub, Canadian Food Inspection Agency, Lethbridge Laboratory. Box 640,
Township Road 9-1, Lethbridge, Alberta, Canada T1J 3Z4. <a href="mailto:Stefanie.Czub@inspection.gc.ca">Stefanie.Czub@inspection.gc.ca</a>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Abstract </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
The preferred method to determine the prevalence of bovine spongiform
encephalopathy (BSE) in a country is to use immunology-based rapid-tests. Though
these tests are validated to detect C-type BSE disease–associated prion (PrPsc),
test-specific properties may influence their ability to detect H- and/or L-type
BSE PrPsc, where both are atypical from C-type PrPsc. Molecular characterization
shows atypical BSE PrPsc to have a different sensitivity to proteinase activity
and different affinities for certain prion-specific antibodies. It is important
to understand how atypical BSE PrPsc may affect the performance of rapid-tests,
which are typically dependant on the use of specific proteases and antibodies.
The current study used experimentally generated C-, H-, and L-type BSE PrPsc to
evaluate 3 tests used in various national BSE surveillance programs: an
immunochromatographic assay, a standard sandwich enzyme-linked immunosorbent
assay (stndELISA), and a PrPsc-conformation–specific ELISA (confELISA). Although
BSE PrPsc type had some effects on rapid-test performance, analytical
sensitivity for atypical BSE PrPsc on all 3 platforms was not significantly
compromised. When testing for atypical BSE PrPsc, the 3 tests were able to meet
the same requirements that the European Food Safety Authority set when
evaluating the tests for C-type BSE PrPsc. </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
<a href="http://vdi.sagepub.com/content/24/5/976.abstract">http://vdi.sagepub.com/content/24/5/976.abstract</a>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Tuesday, September 11, 2012 </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Japan Moves Closer To Raising 20-Month Age Limit For Beef Imports, and
further risk consumer to CJD </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
<a href="http://bseusa.blogspot.com/2012/09/japan-moves-closer-to-raising-20-month.html">http://bseusa.blogspot.com/2012/09/japan-moves-closer-to-raising-20-month.html</a>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Monday, September 3, 2012 </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
2012 JAPAN BANS DEER AND ELK MEAT AND ALLOWS SOME BEEF PRODUCTS, what about
TSE prion concerns ? </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
<a href="http://docket-aphis-2006-0041.blogspot.com/2012/09/2012-japan-bans-deer-and-elk-meat-and.html">http://docket-aphis-2006-0041.blogspot.com/2012/09/2012-japan-bans-deer-and-elk-meat-and.html</a>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Sunday, August 26, 2012 </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Detection of PrPSc in peripheral tissues of clinically affected cattle
after oral challenge with BSE </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
<a href="http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2012/08/detection-of-prpsc-in-peripheral.html">http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2012/08/detection-of-prpsc-in-peripheral.html</a>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Sunday, August 19, 2012 </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Susceptibility of cattle to the agent of chronic wasting disease from elk
after intracranial inoculation 2012 </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Research Project: TRANSMISSION, DIFFERENTIATION, AND PATHOBIOLOGY OF
TRANSMISSIBLE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHIES Location: Virus and Prion Research
Unit </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
<a href="http://chronic-wasting-disease.blogspot.com/2012/08/susceptibility-of-cattle-to-agent-of.html">http://chronic-wasting-disease.blogspot.com/2012/08/susceptibility-of-cattle-to-agent-of.html</a>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Friday, February 24, 2012 </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
SAMPLE COLLECTION FROM CATTLE UNDER THE BOVINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY
(BSE) ONGOING SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM 2/14/12 </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE FOOD SAFETY AND INSPECTION SERVICE
WASHINGTON, DC FSIS NOTICE </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
<a href="http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2012/02/sample-collection-from-cattle-under.html">http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2012/02/sample-collection-from-cattle-under.html</a>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
U.S.A. 50 STATE BSE MAD COW CONFERENCE CALL Jan. 9, 2001 </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Subject: BSE--U.S. 50 STATE CONFERENCE CALL Jan. 9, 2001 </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Date: Tue, 9 Jan 2001 16:49:00 -0800 </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr." </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Reply-To: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
To: BSE-L@uni-karlsruhe.de </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
######### Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy ######### </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Greetings List Members, </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
I was lucky enough to sit in on this BSE conference call today and even
managed to ask a question. that is when the trouble started. </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
I submitted a version of my notes to Sandra Blakeslee of the New York
Times, whom seemed very upset, and rightly so. </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
"They tell me it is a closed meeting and they will release whatever
information they deem fit. Rather infuriating." </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
and i would have been doing just fine, until i asked my question. i was
surprised my time to ask a question so quick. </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
(understand, these are taken from my notes for now. the spelling of names
and such could be off.) </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
[host Richard Barns] and now a question from Terry S. Singeltary of CJD
Watch. </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
[TSS] yes, thank you, U.S. cattle, what kind of guarantee can you give for
serum or tissue donor herds? </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
[no answer, you could hear in the back ground, mumbling and 'we can't. have
him ask the question again.] </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
[host Richard] could you repeat the question? </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
[TSS] U.S. cattle, what kind of guarantee can you give for serum or tissue
donor herds? </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
[not sure whom ask this] what group are you with? </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
[TSS] CJD Watch, my Mom died from hvCJD and we are tracking CJD world-wide.
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
[not sure who is speaking] could you please disconnect Mr. Singeltary
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
[TSS] you are not going to answer my question? </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
[not sure whom speaking] NO </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
from this point, i was still connected, got to listen and tape the whole
conference. at one point someone came on, a woman, and ask again; </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
[unknown woman] what group are you with? </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
[TSS] CJD Watch and my Mom died from hvCJD we are trying to tract down CJD
and other human TSE's world wide. i was invited to sit in on this from someone
inside the USDA/APHIS and that is why i am here. do you intend on banning me
from this conference now? </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
at this point the conference was turned back up, and i got to finish
listening. They never answered or even addressed my one question, or even
addressed the issue. BUT, i will try and give you a run-down for now, of the
conference. </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
IF i were another Country, I would take heed to my notes, BUT PLEASE do not
depend on them. ask for transcript from; </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
RBARNS@ORA.FDA.GOV 301-827-6906 </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
he would be glad to give you one ;-) </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Rockville Maryland, Richard Barns Host </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
BSE issues in the U.S., How they were labelling ruminant feed? Revising
issues. </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
The conference opened up with the explaining of the U.K. BSE epidemic
winding down with about 30 cases a week. </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
although new cases in other countries were now appearing. </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Look at Germany whom said NO BSE and now have BSE. </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
BSE increasing across Europe. </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Because of Temporary Ban on certain rendered product, heightened interest
in U.S. </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
A recent statement in Washington Post, said the New Administration (old GW)
has a list of issues. BSE is one of the issues. </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
BSE Risk is still low, minimal in U.S. with a greater interest in MBM not
to enter U.S. </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
HOWEVER, if BSE were to enter the U.S. it would be economically disastrous
to the render, feed, cattle, industries, and for human health. </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
(human health-they just threw that in cause i was listening. I will now jot
down some figures in which they told you, 'no need to write them down'. just
hope i have them correct. hmmm, maybe i hope i don't ???) </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
80% inspection of rendering </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
*Problem-Complete coverage of rendering HAS NOT occurred. </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
sizeable number of 1st time FAILED INITIAL INSPECTION, have not been
reinspected (70% to 80%). </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Compliance critical, Compliance poor in U.K. and other European Firms.
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Gloria Dunason Major Assignment 1998 goal TOTAL compliance. This _did not_
occur. Mixed level of compliance, depending on firm. </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Rendering FDA license and NON FDA license </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
system in place for home rendering & feed 76% in compliance 79% cross
contamination 21% DID NOT have system 92% record keeping less than 60% total
compliance </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
279 inspectors 185 handling prohibited materials </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Renderer at top of pyramid, significant part of compliance. 84% compliance
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
failed to have caution statement render 72% compliance & cross
contamination caution statement on feed, 'DO NOT FEED TO CATTLE' </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
56 FIRMS NEVER INSPECTED </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
1240 FDA license feed mills 846 inspected </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
"close to 400 feed mills have not been inspected" </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
80% compliance for feed. </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
10% don't have system. </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
NON-FDA licensed mills There is NO inventory on non licensed mills.
approximately 6000 to 8000 Firms ??? 4,344 ever inspected. "FDA does not have a
lot of experience with" </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
40% do NOT have caution statement 'DO NOT FEED'. </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
74% Commingling compliance </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
"This industry needs a lot of work and only half gotten to" </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
"700 Firms that were falitive, and need to be re-inspected, in addition to
the 8,000 Firms." </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Quote to do BSE inspection in 19 states by end of January or 30 days, and
other states 60 days. to change feed status??? Contract check and ask questions
and pass info. </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
At this time, we will take questions. </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
[I was about the third or fourth to ask question. then all B.S.eee broke
loose, and i lost my train of thought for a few minutes. picked back up here]
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
someone asking about nutritional supplements and sourcing, did not get
name. something about inspectors not knowing of BSE risk??? the conference
person assuring that Steve Follum? and the TSE advisory Committee were handling
that. </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Some other Dr. Vet, whom were asking questions that did not know what to
do??? </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
[Dennis Wilson] California Food Agr. Imports, are they looking at imports?
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
[Conference person] they are looking at imports, FDA issued imports
Bulletin. </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
[Linda Singeltary ??? this was a another phone in question, not related i
don't think] Why do we have non-licensed facilities? </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
(conference person) other feed mills do not handle as potent drugs???
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Dennis Blank, Ken Jackson licensed 400 non FDA 4400 inspected of a total of
6000 to 8000, (they really don't know how many non licensed Firms in U.S. they
guess 6000 to 8000??? TSS) </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Linda Detwiler asking everyone (me) not to use emergency BSE number, unless
last resort. (i thought of calling them today, and reporting the whole damn U.S.
cattle herd ;-) 'not' </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Warren-Maryland Dept. Agr. Prudent to re-inspect after 3 years. concerned
of Firms that have changed owners. </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
THE END </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
TSS </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
############ <a href="http://mailhost.rz.uni-karlsruhe.de/warc/bse-l.html">http://mailhost.rz.uni-karlsruhe.de/warc/bse-l.html</a>
############ </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
snip...see full text and more here on tissue donor herds and the TSE Prion
disease ; </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
U.S.A. 50 STATE BSE MAD COW CONFERENCE CALL Jan. 9, 2001 </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
<a href="http://tseac.blogspot.com/2011/02/usa-50-state-bse-mad-cow-conference.html">http://tseac.blogspot.com/2011/02/usa-50-state-bse-mad-cow-conference.html</a>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Tuesday, November 02, 2010 </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
IN CONFIDENCE </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
The information contained herein should not be disseminated further except
on the basis of "NEED TO KNOW". </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
BSE - ATYPICAL LESION DISTRIBUTION (RBSE 92-21367) statutory (obex only)
diagnostic criteria CVL 1992 </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
<a href="http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2010/11/bse-atypical-lesion-distribution-rbse.html">http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2010/11/bse-atypical-lesion-distribution-rbse.html</a>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<div>
<div>
APHIS Factsheet</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service April 2012</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
BSE Confirmatory Tests</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
Immunohistochemistry (IHC)</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
• Primary confirmatory test for USDA’s BSE surveillance program.</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
• Recognized by the World Organization for Animal Health, or OIE.</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
• Allows scientists to determine if a sample is positive for BSE in two
distinct ways: visually (spongiform changes), and through a staining technique
(presence of abnormal prion protein).</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
• Involves looking at an intact portion of the brain, the obex, to see if
there are lesions (holes or a “spongy” appearance) present that are
characteristic for BSE, and using a staining process using antibodies that
detect the abnormal protein prion.</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
• Takes four to seven days to run.</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
• Freezing samples does not interfere with performing the IHC test as long
as the sample is confirmed as obex. Western Blot</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
• Several types, with the SAF Immunoblot and commercially available Western
blot kits recognized by OIE.</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
• Used under USDA protocol when a sample is “not suitable for IHC”, i.e.,
if it is autolyzed (or degraded) or brain stem architecture is not evident
microscopically.</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
• Uses a large portion of obex brain tissue; the abnormal prion protein in
brain material is enriched, and the sample is exposed to protease, an enzyme, to
destroy any normal prion proteins that may be present, leaving only abnormal
prion proteins. Remaining sample is then run through a gel to separate the
abnormal prion protein components by molecular weight. After the transfer of the
proteins to a membrane, proteins are stained using antibodies that can identify
a specific banding pattern associated with prion diseases including BSE. A
diagnosis is made by recognizing three distinctive bands that are identified as
a result of a reaction with the anti-prion protein antibody.</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
• Freezing samples does not interfere with the performance of western blot
tests.</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
Similarities/Differences</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
• Both IHC and the Immunblot (Western blot) are internationally recognized
as confirmatory tests for BSE.</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
• The tests use different methods to determine if the abnormal prion
protein is present in brain tissue of an animal.</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
• The IHC test additionally allows for the viewing of brain tissue to
determine if lesions characteristic to BSE are present.</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
• Both tests are equally effective at detecting the classical form of
BSE.</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
United States Department of Agriculture • Animal and Plant Health
Inspection Service • Safeguarding American Agriculture</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
USDA is an equal opportunity provider and employer.</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
<a href="http://www.aphis.usda.gov/animal_health/animal_diseases/bse/downloads/bse_tests_update.pdf">http://www.aphis.usda.gov/animal_health/animal_diseases/bse/downloads/bse_tests_update.pdf</a>
</div>
<div>
</div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
2009 UPDATE ON ALABAMA AND TEXAS MAD COWS 2005 and 2006 </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
<a href="http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2006/08/bse-atypical-texas-and-alabama-update.html">http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2006/08/bse-atypical-texas-and-alabama-update.html</a>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
in the url that follows, I have posted </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
SRM breaches first, as late as 2011. </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
then</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
MAD COW FEED BAN BREACHES AND TONNAGES OF MAD COW FEED IN COMMERCE up until
2007, when they ceased posting them.</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
then, </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
MAD COW SURVEILLANCE BREACHES. </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Friday, May 18, 2012 </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Update from APHIS Regarding a Detection of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy
(BSE) in the United States Friday May 18, 2012 </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
<a href="http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2012/05/update-from-aphis-regarding-detection.html">http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2012/05/update-from-aphis-regarding-detection.html</a>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Saturday, May 26, 2012 </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Are USDA assurances on mad cow case 'gross oversimplification'? </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
SNIP...</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
What irks many scientists is the USDA’s April 25 statement that the rare
disease is “not generally associated with an animal consuming infected
feed.”</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
The USDA’s conclusion is a “gross oversimplification,” said Dr. Paul Brown,
one of the world’s experts on this type of disease who retired recently from the
National Institutes of Health. </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
"(The agency) has no foundation on which to base that statement.”</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
“We can’t say it’s not feed related,” agreed Dr. Linda Detwiler, an
official with the USDA during the Clinton Administration now at Mississippi
State.</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
In the May 1 email to me, USDA’s Cole backed off a bit. “No one knows the
origins of atypical cases of BSE,” she said</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
The argument about feed is critical because if feed is the cause, not a
spontaneous mutation, the California cow could be part of a larger outbreak.
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
SNIP...</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
<a href="http://bseusa.blogspot.com/2012/05/are-usda-assurances-on-mad-cow-case.html">http://bseusa.blogspot.com/2012/05/are-usda-assurances-on-mad-cow-case.html</a>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
============================================== </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Saturday, August 4, 2012 </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Final Feed Investigation Summary - California BSE Case - July 2012 </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
<a href="http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2012/08/final-feed-investigation-summary.html">http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2012/08/final-feed-investigation-summary.html</a>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
============================================= </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
SUMMARY REPORT CALIFORNIA BOVINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY CASE
INVESTIGATION JULY 2012</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Summary Report BSE 2012</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Executive Summary </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
<a href="http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2012/08/summary-report-california-bovine.html">http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2012/08/summary-report-california-bovine.html</a>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Saturday, August 4, 2012 </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Update from APHIS Regarding Release of the Final Report on the BSE
Epidemiological Investigation </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
<a href="http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2012/08/update-from-aphis-regarding-release-of.html">http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2012/08/update-from-aphis-regarding-release-of.html</a>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Sunday, August 26, 2012 </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Detection of PrPSc in peripheral tissues of clinically affected cattle
after oral challenge with BSE </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
<a href="http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2012/08/detection-of-prpsc-in-peripheral.html">http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2012/08/detection-of-prpsc-in-peripheral.html</a>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
2011 Monday, September 26, 2011 </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
L-BSE BASE prion and atypical sporadic CJD </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
<a href="http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2011/09/l-bse-base-prion-and-atypical-sporadic.html">http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2011/09/l-bse-base-prion-and-atypical-sporadic.html</a>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Tuesday, June 26, 2012 </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Creutzfeldt Jakob Disease Human TSE report update North America, Canada,
Mexico, and USDA PRION UNIT as of May 18, 2012 </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
type determination pending Creutzfeldt Jakob Disease (tdpCJD), is on the
rise in Canada and the USA </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
<a href="http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2012/06/creutzfeldt-jakob-disease-human-tse.html">http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2012/06/creutzfeldt-jakob-disease-human-tse.html</a>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Monday, July 23, 2012</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
The National Prion Disease Pathology Surveillance Center July 2012 </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
<a href="http://prionunitusaupdate2008.blogspot.com/2012/07/the-national-prion-disease-pathology.html">http://prionunitusaupdate2008.blogspot.com/2012/07/the-national-prion-disease-pathology.html</a>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
TSS</div>
Terry S. Singeltary Sr.http://www.blogger.com/profile/06986622967539963260noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4595956519532618538.post-23333200701444336282012-09-12T19:02:00.001-07:002012-09-12T19:10:21.647-07:00Blood test closer for mad cow disease, Alzheimers and Parkinson's <div>
Blood test closer for mad cow disease, Alzheimers and Parkinson's </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
by: Pia Akerman From:The Australian</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
September 12, 201210:51AM </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
BLOOD tests to diagnose Alzheimers disease, Parkinson's and the human form
of mad cow disease could be closer thanks to new Australian research. </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Research by University of Melbourne scientists, published in the Nucleic
Acids Research journal this week, has identified specific particles (exosomes)
released by cells infected with prions, the pathogen that causes diseases such
as human variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease. </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
It raises the possibility of a diagnostic blood test identifying the
exosomes in the blood stream. </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Thousands of Australians are currently banned from donating blood because
they lived in the UK when mad cow disease was present in local beef and there is
no easy test to identify the risk. </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Since 2004 a small number of British residents have been diagnosed with
vCJD transmitted through blood transfusion. </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
University of Melbourne associate professor Andrew Hill, who worked on the
research, said further testing was needed. </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
He said while Alzheimer's and Parkinson's were not transmissible like prion
diseases such as vCJD, they similarly released the exosome particles. </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
"Our thinking is that they might too have a unique signature on them that
we could potentially pick up in blood as well," he said. </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
"Obviously these brain diseases are hard to diagnose because you need very
extensive imaging tests to see what's going on inside the brain." </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
The Red Cross has previously said its ban on blood donations from people
who lived in the UK between 1980 and 1996 for more than six months, or received
blood transfusions there, would remain until there was a reliable blood
screening test for vCJD. </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
<a href="http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/health-science/blood-test-closer-for-mad-cow-disease-alzheimers-and-parkinsons/story-e6frg8y6-1226472453324">http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/health-science/blood-test-closer-for-mad-cow-disease-alzheimers-and-parkinsons/story-e6frg8y6-1226472453324</a>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Nucleic Acids Research Advance Access published September 10, 2012 </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Nucleic Acids Research, 2012, 1–13 doi:10.1093/nar/gks832 </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Small RNA deep sequencing reveals a distinct miRNA signature released in
exosomes from prion-infected neuronal cells </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Shayne A. Bellingham1,2, Bradley M. Coleman1,2 and Andrew F. Hill1,2,3,*
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
1Department of Biochemistry and Molecular Biology, </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
2Bio21 Molecular Science and Biotechnology Institute and </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
3Mental Health Research Institute, The University of Melbourne, Parkville,
Victoria 3010, Australia </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Received December 8, 2011; Revised and Accepted August 9, 2012 </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
ABSTRACT </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
Prion diseases are transmissible neurodegenerative disorders affecting both
humans and animals. The cellular prion protein, PrPC, and the abnormal
infectious form, PrPSc, are found associated with exosomes, which are small
50–130nm vesicles released from cells. Exosomes also contain microRNAs (miRNAs),
a class of non-coding RNA, and have been utilized to identify miRNA signatures
for diagnosis of disease. While some miRNAs are deregulated in prion-infected
brain tissue, the role of miRNA in circulating exosomes released during prion
disease is unknown. Here, we investigated the miRNA profile in exosomes released
from prion-infected neuronal cells. We performed the first small RNA deep
sequencing study of exosomes and demonstrated that neuronal exosomes contain a
diverse range of RNA species including retroviral RNA repeat regions, messenger
RNA fragments, transfer RNA fragments, noncoding RNA, small nuclear RNA, small
nucleolar RNA, small cytoplasmic RNA, silencing RNA as well as known and novel
candidate miRNA. Significantly, we show that exosomes released by prion-infected
neuronal cells have increased let-7b, let-7i, miR-128a, miR-21, miR-222,
miR-29b, miR-342-3p and miR-424 levels with decreased miR-146 a levels compared
to non-infected exosomes. Overall, these results demonstrate that circulating
exosomes released during prion infection have a distinct miRNA signature that
can be utilized for diagnosis and understanding pathogenic mechanisms in prion
disease. </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
snip... </div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
<br />
<div>
While this hypothesis remains to be tested, these observations leave open
the possibility that miRNAs are packaged into exosomes as a result of PrPC
binding AGO1 and AGO2 promoting formation of miRISCs on the MVB, which functions
as checkpoint for scanning mRNAs. Therefore selecting AGO-bound complementary
mRNA:miRNAs that are to be repressed, while non-complementary miRNAs are
packaged into ILVs along with PrPC and released with exosomes. Whether
misfolding of PrPC into PrPSc during prion disease infection alters its ability
to bind to Argonaute proteins, modulates the function of miRISC on the MVB and
subsequent release of miRNA in exosomes during prion diseases certainly deserves
investigation. Given that, we have identified significant changes in particular
miRNA species released in association with exosomes from prion-infected cells,
its plausible to suggest that miRNAs are selectively packaged as a direct result
of PrPC and PrPSc and its influence on the miRNA biogenesis pathway. In summary,
our results strongly support the hypothesis that exosomes released from
prion-infected neuronal cells have a distinct miRNA signature that may be
utilized for the identification of prion infection. This signature comprises
significant increases in let-7 b, let-7i, miR-128 a, miR-21, miR-222, miR-29 b,
miR-342-3 p and miR-424 with decreased miR-146 a detection and agrees to some
extent to previously reported miRNA changes detected in brains of terminally
infected mouse and primate models of prion disease, and sporadic CJD samples
(17,18). Evaluation of our exosomal miRNA signature in circulating exosomes
derived from clinical plasma samples from sporadic and variant forms of human
prion disease and in animal models infected with different prion strains will be
the subject of our further studies. Importantly, it has been shown the miRNAs
deregulated in prion-infected exosomes identified in this study have also been
detected in circulating exosomes isolated from human serum samples (14), and
that neither have currently been detected in disease-associated exosomes in the
current literature and a search of ExoCarta database (58), suggesting that this
miRNA signature has significant and specific diagnostic potential. However, it
should be noted that our study also identified other ncRNAs and mRNA fragments
(Supplementary Figure S1) that may also be deregulated in exosomes released from
prioninfected neuronal cells. Furthermore, it has been identified that
extracellular miRNA released from cells into plasma can associate in two
populations, both dependent and independent of exosomes either bound to AGO2
(59–61) or high-density lipoproteins (62). Therefore, targeted exosomal
purification strategies for enrichment of circulating miRNA biomarkers may be
required to increase biomarker sensitivity (14,15,23). This research also has
potential diagnostic implications for other neurodegenerative diseases in which
exosomes have been identified to play a role including Alzheimer’s disease (63–
65), amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (66) and Parkinson’s disease (67). </div>
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snip... </div>
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<div>
<a href="http://nar.oxfordjournals.org/content/early/2012/09/08/nar.gks832.full.pdf+html">http://nar.oxfordjournals.org/content/early/2012/09/08/nar.gks832.full.pdf+html</a>
</div>
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<div>
Endogenous Viral Etiology of Prion Diseases</div>
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<div>
<a href="http://virusprion.blogspot.com/">http://virusprion.blogspot.com/</a></div>
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Thursday, August 16, 2012</div>
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Blood products, collected from a donor who was at risk for variant
Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease ( vCJD) USA JUNE, JULY, AUGUST 2012 </div>
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<a href="http://vcjdtransfusion.blogspot.com/2012/08/blood-products-collected-from-donor-who.html">http://vcjdtransfusion.blogspot.com/2012/08/blood-products-collected-from-donor-who.html</a>
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<a href="http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/">http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/</a></div>
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<br />
<br />
Wednesday, May 16, 2012 <br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
Alzheimer’s disease and Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy prion disease, Iatrogenic, what if ? <br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
Proposal ID: 29403 <br />
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<br />
<a href="http://betaamyloidcjd.blogspot.com/2012/05/alzheimers-disease-and-transmissible.html">http://betaamyloidcjd.blogspot.com/2012/05/alzheimers-disease-and-transmissible.html</a> <br />
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<div>
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TSS</div>
Terry S. Singeltary Sr.http://www.blogger.com/profile/06986622967539963260noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4595956519532618538.post-51968457041479814832012-09-06T11:17:00.001-07:002012-09-06T11:17:11.200-07:00UK Breaches of BSE controls in consignments of beef 2011 communications missing four reports<div>
UK Breaches of BSE controls in consignments of beef 2011 communications
missing four reports</div>
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Last updated on 6 September 2012 </div>
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Breaches of BSE controls in consignments of beef </div>
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Due to an oversight, four breaches of BSE controls in British beef
identified last year were not publicised immediately on the Agency’s website in
the normal manner. . </div>
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As all specified risk material (SRM) was removed from the beef carcasses it
is highly unlikely that there was any health risk to members of the public. SRM
is those parts of the animal most likely to contain BSE infectivity. Under
European law, SRM must be removed from the carcass after slaughter, stained and
disposed of safely. </div>
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In the interests of transparency, the Agency is now issuing reports on
these incidents. .. </div>
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BSE breaches August 2011 </div>
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During routine inspections in August 2011 by staff in the Department of
Agriculture and Rural Affairs in Northern Ireland (DARD), breaches of BSE
controls were discovered in three separate consignments of beef sides received
at Omagh Meats, an approved slaughterhouse and cutting plant in Northern
Ireland. </div>
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On 17 August 2011, a consignment of 76 beef sides was received from West
Devon Meat Ltd, an approved slaughterhouse near Okehampton. The documentation
accompanying this consignment did not separately identify sides originating from
animals aged over 30 months (OTM) and animals under 30 months of age (UTM).
</div>
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On 23 August 2011, two other consignments of beef sides were received from
West Scottish Lamb, an approved slaughterhouse in Carlisle. </div>
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The first of these consignments contained 108 sides, 52 originating from
OTM animals and 56 from UTM animals. Six of the OTM sides were labelled
incorrectly as being from UTM cattle. </div>
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The second consignment consisted of 118 sides. Sixteen of the sides listed
in the documentation as being from OTM animals were found to be labelled
incorrectly as UTM. In addition, two OTM sides were listed incorrectly as UTM on
the accompanying documentation. </div>
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<div>
The vertebral column of OTM cattle is SRM. The European Union transmissible
spongiform encephalopathy controls require that UTM and OTM carcasses are
identified separately on consignment documentation and are also labelled
differently. Although the sides in these consignments were identified correctly
by DARD inspectors and Omagh Meats, in accordance with normal practice at Omagh
Meats, all the sides were treated as originating from OTM cattle and the
vertebral column was removed and treated as SRM. </div>
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The receiving business, Omagh Meats, was not responsible for the breaches.
.. </div>
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BSE breaches September 2011 </div>
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In a separate incident, on 1 September 2011, during routine inspection at a
different approved slaughterhouse and cutting plant in Northern Ireland, spinal
cord was found in a health-marked beef quarter received in a consignment of 224
quarters from ABP Sturminster Newton, an approved slaughterhouse in Dorset. All
the other quarters were checked and no further SRM was discovered. </div>
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The spinal cord in cattle over 12 months of age is SRM and must be removed.
The non-compliant quarter was destroyed and no SRM entered the food chain.
</div>
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The receiving business was not responsible for the breach. </div>
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<div>
The official vets in all the originating plants have been informed of the
breaches and steps have been taken, in collaboration with the plant management,
to prevent a recurrence. </div>
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</div>
<br />
<div>
<a href="http://www.food.gov.uk/news-updates/news/2012/sep/bse">http://www.food.gov.uk/news-updates/news/2012/sep/bse</a>
</div>
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<div>
Wednesday, March 7, 2012 </div>
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<div>
ANOTHER COW NOT TESTED FOR BSE AKA MAD COW LIKELY TO HAVE BEEN EATEN UK
2012 </div>
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<div>
<a href="http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2012/03/another-cow-not-tested-for-bse-aka-mad.html">http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2012/03/another-cow-not-tested-for-bse-aka-mad.html</a>
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Wednesday, December 21, 2011</div>
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</div>
<br />
<div>
Potential mad cows that entered food supply without being tested for BSE
2011: UK END OF YEAR REVIEW </div>
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</div>
<br />
<div>
<a href="http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2011/12/potential-mad-cows-that-entered-food.html">http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2011/12/potential-mad-cows-that-entered-food.html</a>
</div>
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Monday, August 13, 2012 </div>
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</div>
<br />
<div>
Summary results of the second national survey of abnormal prion prevalence
in archived appendix specimens August 2012 </div>
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</div>
<br />
<div>
<a href="http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2012/08/summary-results-of-second-national.html">http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2012/08/summary-results-of-second-national.html</a>
</div>
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TSS</div>
<br />
<div>
</div>
Terry S. Singeltary Sr.http://www.blogger.com/profile/06986622967539963260noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4595956519532618538.post-3822645479754602882012-08-08T08:41:00.001-07:002012-08-08T08:44:11.822-07:00Performance analysis of rapid diagnostic tests on atypical bovine spongiform encephalopathy<div>
Performance analysis of rapid diagnostic tests on atypical bovine
spongiform encephalopathy<br />
<br />
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
John G. Gray Sandor Dudas Catherine Graham Stefanie Czub, DVM, PhD
<a href="mailto:stefanie.czub@inspection.gc.ca">stefanie.czub@inspection.gc.ca</a></div>
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</div>
<div>
Abstract<br />
<br />
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</div>
<div>
The preferred method to determine the prevalence of bovine spongiform
encephalopathy (BSE) in a country is to use immunology-based rapid-tests. Though
these tests are validated to detect C-type BSE disease–associated prion (PrPsc),
test-specific properties may influence their ability to detect H- and/or L-type
BSE PrPsc, where both are atypical from C-type PrPsc. Molecular characterization
shows atypical BSE PrPsc to have a different sensitivity to proteinase activity
and different affinities for certain prion-specific antibodies. It is important
to understand how atypical BSE PrPsc may affect the performance of rapid-tests,
which are typically dependant on the use of specific proteases and antibodies.
The current study used experimentally generated C-, H-, and L-type BSE PrPsc to
evaluate 3 tests used in various national BSE surveillance programs: an
immunochromatographic assay, a standard sandwich enzyme-linked immunosorbent
assay (stndELISA), and a PrPsc-conformation–specific ELISA (confELISA). Although
BSE PrPsc type had some effects on rapid-test performance, analytical
sensitivity for atypical BSE PrPsc on all 3 platforms was not significantly
compromised. When testing for atypical BSE PrPsc, the 3 tests were able to meet
the same requirements that the European Food Safety Authority set when
evaluating the tests for C-type BSE PrPsc. </div>
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</div>
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</div>
<div>
<a href="http://vdi.sagepub.com/content/early/2012/07/23/1040638712455325.abstract">http://vdi.sagepub.com/content/early/2012/07/23/1040638712455325.abstract</a> <br />
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</div>
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</div>
<div>
============================================== <br />
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</div>
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</div>
<div>
Saturday, August 4, 2012 <br />
<br />
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
Final Feed Investigation Summary - California BSE Case - July 2012 <br />
<br />
</div>
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</div>
<div>
<a href="http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2012/08/final-feed-investigation-summary.html">http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2012/08/final-feed-investigation-summary.html</a> <br />
<br />
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
============================================= <br />
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<div>
</div>
<div>
SUMMARY REPORT CALIFORNIA BOVINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY CASE
INVESTIGATION JULY 2012<br />
<br />
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
Summary Report BSE 2012<br />
<br />
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
Executive Summary <br />
<br />
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
<a href="http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2012/08/summary-report-california-bovine.html">http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2012/08/summary-report-california-bovine.html</a> <br />
<br />
<br />
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
Saturday, August 4, 2012 <br />
<br />
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
Update from APHIS Regarding Release of the Final Report on the BSE
Epidemiological Investigation <br />
<br />
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
<a href="http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2012/08/update-from-aphis-regarding-release-of.html">http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2012/08/update-from-aphis-regarding-release-of.html</a> <br />
<br />
<br />
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
in the url that follows, I have posted <br />
<br />
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
SRM breaches first, as late as 2011. <br />
<br />
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
then</div>
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</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
MAD COW FEED BAN BREACHES AND TONNAGES OF MAD COW FEED IN COMMERCE up until
2007, when they ceased posting them.<br />
<br />
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
then, </div>
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</div>
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</div>
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</div>
<div>
MAD COW SURVEILLANCE BREACHES. <br />
<br />
<br />
</div>
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</div>
<div>
Friday, May 18, 2012 <br />
<br />
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
Update from APHIS Regarding a Detection of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy
(BSE) in the United States Friday May 18, 2012 <br />
<br />
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
<a href="http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2012/05/update-from-aphis-regarding-detection.html">http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2012/05/update-from-aphis-regarding-detection.html</a> <br />
<br />
<br />
</div>
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</div>
<div>
Thursday, June 21, 2012 <br />
<br />
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
MEATINGPLACE.COM WAVES MAGIC WAND AND EXPECTS THE USDA MAD COW FOLLIES BSE
TO BE GONE <br />
<br />
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
<a href="http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2012/06/meatingplacecom-waves-magic-wand-and.html">http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2012/06/meatingplacecom-waves-magic-wand-and.html</a> <br />
<br />
<br />
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
Thursday, June 14, 2012 <br />
<br />
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
R-CALF USA Calls USDA Dishonest and Corrupt; Submits Fourth Request for
Extension <br />
<br />
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
R-CALF United Stockgrowers of America </div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
<a href="http://madcowusda.blogspot.com/2012/06/r-calf-usa-calls-usda-dishonest-and.html">http://madcowusda.blogspot.com/2012/06/r-calf-usa-calls-usda-dishonest-and.html</a> <br />
<br />
<br />
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
Friday, May 25, 2012 </div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
R-CALF USDA’s New BSE Rule Eliminates Important Protections Needed to
Prevent BSE Spread <br />
<br />
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
<a href="http://bseusa.blogspot.com/2012/05/r-calf-usdas-new-bse-rule-eliminates.html">http://bseusa.blogspot.com/2012/05/r-calf-usdas-new-bse-rule-eliminates.html</a> <br />
<br />
<br />
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
Monday, June 18, 2012 <br />
<br />
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
R-CALF Submits Incomplete Comments Under Protest in Bizarre Rulemaking
“Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Importation of Bovines and Bovine Products” <br />
<br />
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
<a href="http://madcowusda.blogspot.com/2012/06/r-calf-submits-incomplete-comments.html">http://madcowusda.blogspot.com/2012/06/r-calf-submits-incomplete-comments.html</a> <br />
<br />
<br />
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
Monday, August 6, 2012<br />
<br />
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
TAFS BSE in USA August 6, 2012 <br />
<br />
</div>
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</div>
<div>
BSE in USA <br />
<br />
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
<a href="http://bseusa.blogspot.com/2012/08/tafs-bse-in-usa-august-6-2012.html">http://bseusa.blogspot.com/2012/08/tafs-bse-in-usa-august-6-2012.html</a>
</div>
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Monday, August 06, 2012 </div>
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</div>
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</div>
<div>
Atypical neuropathological sCJD-MM phenotype with abundant white matter
Kuru-type plaques sparing the cerebellar cortex <br />
<br />
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
<a href="http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2012/08/atypical-neuropathological-scjd-mm.html">http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2012/08/atypical-neuropathological-scjd-mm.html</a> <br />
<br />
<br />
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
Monday, July 23, 2012<br />
<br />
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
The National Prion Disease Pathology Surveillance Center July 2012 <br />
<br />
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
<a href="http://prionunitusaupdate2008.blogspot.com/2012/07/the-national-prion-disease-pathology.html">http://prionunitusaupdate2008.blogspot.com/2012/07/the-national-prion-disease-pathology.html</a> <br />
<br />
<br />
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
Wednesday, November 17, 2010 <br />
<br />
</div>
<div>
</div>
<div>
MAD COW TESTING FAKED IN USA BY Nebraska INSPECTOR <br />
<br />
</div>
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</div>
<div>
Senator Mike Johanns STATE Neb. inspector accused of faking mad cow
tests<br />
<br />
</div>
<div>
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Published November 17, 2010 <br />
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<a href="http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2010/11/mad-cow-testing-faked-in-usa-by.html">http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2010/11/mad-cow-testing-faked-in-usa-by.html</a> <br />
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<a href="http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/search?updated-min=2010-01-01T00:00:00-08:00&updated-max=2011-01-01T00:00:00-08:00&max-results=11">http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/search?updated-min=2010-01-01T00:00:00-08:00&updated-max=2011-01-01T00:00:00-08:00&max-results=11</a> <br />
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Wednesday, December 23, 2009<br />
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Scientific Opinion on Analytical sensitivity of approved TSE rapid tests <br />
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Scientific Opinion on Analytical sensitivity of approved TSE rapid tests
Question number: EFSA-Q-2009-00687 Adopted: 10 December 2009 Summary (32 KB)
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<a href="http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2009/12/scientific-opinion-on-analytical.html">http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2009/12/scientific-opinion-on-analytical.html</a> <br />
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Tuesday, July 14, 2009<br />
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U.S. Emergency Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Response Plan Summary and
BSE Red Book Date: February 14, 2000 at 8:56 am PST</div>
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WHERE did we go wrong $$$ <br />
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<a href="http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2009/07/us-emergency-bovine-spongiform.html">http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2009/07/us-emergency-bovine-spongiform.html</a> <br />
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<a href="http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2008/11/bse-case-confirmed-in-british-columbia.html">http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2008/11/bse-case-confirmed-in-british-columbia.html</a> <br />
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<a href="http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/">http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/</a> <br />
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<div>
TSS</div>Terry S. Singeltary Sr.http://www.blogger.com/profile/06986622967539963260noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4595956519532618538.post-62215602306024051282012-03-07T08:32:00.001-08:002012-03-07T08:34:06.912-08:00ANOTHER COW NOT TESTED FOR BSE AKA MAD COW LIKELY TO HAVE BEEN EATEN UK 2012ANOTHER COW NOT TESTED FOR BSE AKA MAD COW LIKELY TO HAVE BEEN EATEN UK 2012<br />
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Untested cow enters the food supply<br />
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Wednesday 7 March 2012<br />
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The Agency has been notified that meat from a cow that did not have the required BSE test has entered the food supply. The 62 month old cow had been slaughtered on farm for welfare reasons. <br />
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A negative BSE test result is mandatory for cattle intended for human consumption if slaughtered outside an authorised abattoir at over 48 months of age.<br />
<br />
The carcass was sent to Alec Jarrett Ltd abattoir in Oldland Common, Bristol, on 7 December 2011. The error was discovered on 20 February 2012 in the course of routine official checks of cattle deaths and BSE test data. However, by the time the failure was discovered, the carcass had left the premises. Subsequent checks indicate that all the meat from the carcass is no longer traceable and is likely to have been eaten.<br />
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It is unlikely that the cow was infected with BSE and, as specified risk material (SRM) was removed, any risk to human health is extremely low. SRM is those parts of the animal most likely to contain BSE infectivity.<br />
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<a href="http://www.food.gov.uk/news/newsarchive/2012/mar/jarrettcow">http://www.food.gov.uk/news/newsarchive/2012/mar/jarrettcow</a><br />
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Individual Reports of BSE Control Breaches 2010<br />
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Bull aged over 48 months enters food supply without being tested for BSE<br />
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The Agency has been notified that meat has entered the food supply from a bull aged over 48 months that had not been tested for BSE. A negative BSE test result is mandatory for cattle slaughtered for human consumption at over 48 months of age.<br />
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Bullock aged over 72 months enters food supply without being tested for BSE<br />
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The Agency has been notified that meat has entered the food supply from a bullock aged over 72 months that had not been tested for BSE. A negative BSE test result is mandatory for cattle slaughtered for human consumption at more than 72 months of age.<br />
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Bullock aged over 72 months enters food supply without being tested for BSE<br />
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The Agency has been notified that meat has entered the food supply from a bullock aged over 72 months that had not been tested for BSE. A negative BSE test result is mandatory for cattle slaughtered for human consumption at over 72 months of age.<br />
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Cow aged over 72 months enters food supply without being tested for BSE<br />
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The Agency has been notified that meat has entered the food supply from a cow aged over 72 months that had not been tested for BSE. A negative BSE test result is mandatory for cattle slaughtered for human consumption at over 72 months of age.<br />
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Two cattle aged over 48 months enter food supply without being tested for BSE<br />
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The Agency has been notified that meat has entered the food supply from two cattle aged over 48 months that had not been tested for BSE. A negative BSE test result is mandatory for cattle slaughtered for human consumption at over 48 months of age.<br />
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Two cows aged over 48 months enter food supply without being tested for BSE<br />
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The Agency has been notified that meat has entered the food supply from two cows aged over 48 months that had not been tested for BSE. A negative BSE test result is mandatory for cattle slaughtered for human consumption at over 48 months of age.<br />
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<a href="http://www.food.gov.uk/safereating/bse/bsecontrol/2011/indiv2011/">http://www.food.gov.uk/safereating/bse/bsecontrol/2011/indiv2011/</a><br />
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Wednesday, December 21, 2011<br />
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Potential mad cows that entered food supply without being tested for BSE 2011: UK END OF YEAR REVIEW <br />
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<a href="http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2011/12/potential-mad-cows-that-entered-food.html">http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2011/12/potential-mad-cows-that-entered-food.html</a><br />
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Thursday, March 01, 2012<br />
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Variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease Fact sheet N°180 Revised February 2012 W.H.O. <br />
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<a href="http://vcjd.blogspot.com/2012/03/variant-creutzfeldt-jakob-disease-fact.html">http://vcjd.blogspot.com/2012/03/variant-creutzfeldt-jakob-disease-fact.html</a><br />
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Saturday, March 03, 2012 <br />
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<br />
The contribution of different prion protein types and host polymorphisms to clinicopathological variations in Creutzfeldt–Jakob disease <br />
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<br />
Mark W. Head*, James W. Ironside Article first published online: 28 FEB 2012<br />
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<a href="http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2012/03/contribution-of-different-prion-protein.html">http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2012/03/contribution-of-different-prion-protein.html</a><br />
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Tuesday, February 28, 2012 <br />
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The 27th Colloque Médecine et Recherche of the Fondation Ipsen in the Alzheimer Disease series: “Proteopathic Seeds and Neurodegenerative Diseases” <br />
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Press release <br />
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>>> This opens up the possibility of an environmental causation for the many patients with a neurodegenerative disease who do not have hereditary links (Jucker; Soto; Westermark). <<<<br />
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snip... <br />
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<br />
where would have been today, IF INDUSTRY AND TRADE WOULD NOT HAVE RULED OVER POLICY MAKING FOR TSE PRION DISEASE $$$ <br />
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WHAT ABOUT IATROGENIC ALZHEIMERS ? <br />
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IS ALZHEIMERS JUST A LOW DOSE TSE ? <br />
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IF the following work would have been pursued 2 decades ago, where would we have been today ??? <br />
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snip...see full text ; <br />
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<a href="http://betaamyloidcjd.blogspot.com/2012/02/27th-colloque-medecine-et-recherche-of.html">http://betaamyloidcjd.blogspot.com/2012/02/27th-colloque-medecine-et-recherche-of.html</a> <br />
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Thursday, February 16, 2012<br />
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Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy BSE <br />
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31 USA SENATORS ASK PRESIDENT OBAMA TO HELP SPREAD MAD COW DISEASE 2012 <br />
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<a href="http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2012/02/bovine-spongiform-encephalopathy-bse-31.html">http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2012/02/bovine-spongiform-encephalopathy-bse-31.html</a><br />
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Thursday, February 23, 2012 <br />
<br />
EIGHT FORMER SECRETARIES OF AGRICULTURE SPEAKING AT USDA'S 2012 AGRICULTURE OUTLOOK FORUM INDUCTED INTO USA MAD COW HALL OF SHAME <br />
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<a href="http://madcowusda.blogspot.com/2012/02/eight-former-secretaries-of-agriculture.html">http://madcowusda.blogspot.com/2012/02/eight-former-secretaries-of-agriculture.html</a><br />
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TSSTerry S. Singeltary Sr.http://www.blogger.com/profile/06986622967539963260noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4595956519532618538.post-87971397914730910642011-12-21T08:56:00.000-08:002011-12-21T08:56:02.377-08:00Potential mad cows that entered food supply without being tested for BSE 2011: UK END OF YEAR REVIEWPotential mad cows that entered food supply without being tested for BSE 2011: UK END OF YEAR REVIEW<br />
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Bullock aged over 72 months enters food supply without being tested for BSE<br />
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Wednesday 21 December 2011<br />
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The Agency has been notified that meat has entered the food supply from a bullock aged over 72 months that had not been tested for BSE. A negative BSE test result is mandatory for cattle slaughtered for human consumption at over 72 months of age.<br />
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It is very unlikely that the bullock was infected with BSE and, as specified risk material (SRM) was removed, any risk to human health is extremely low. SRM is the parts of cattle most likely to carry BSE infectivity. <br />
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The bullock, aged 75 months and 28 days, was slaughtered at N Bramall & Son Ltd’s abattoir in Oxspring, Nr Sheffield, on 6 October 2011. The error was discovered on 1 December in the course of routine cross-checks of slaughter and BSE test data.<br />
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According to BSE regulations, the untested bullock, plus the one slaughtered before and the two after, should not have entered the food supply. However, by the time the failure was discovered, the associated carcasses had left the premises.<br />
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One of the carcasses was sent to the Netherlands where the authorities have been informed. The hearts and cheek meat from all the associated carcasses were traced and have since been destroyed. Other checks indicate that the rest of the meat from the carcasses is either no longer in the food supply or traceable and is likely to have been eaten. <br />
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<a href="http://www.food.gov.uk/news/newsarchive/2011/dec/bullockfoodchain">http://www.food.gov.uk/news/newsarchive/2011/dec/bullockfoodchain</a> <br />
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Bullock aged over 72 months enters food supply without being tested for BSE <br />
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Monday 14 November 2011 <br />
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The Agency has been notified that meat has entered the food supply from a bullock aged over 72 months that had not been tested for BSE. A negative BSE test result is mandatory for cattle slaughtered for human consumption at more than 72 months of age. It is very unlikely that the bullock was infected with BSE and as specified risk material (SRM) was removed, any risk to human health is extremely low. SRM is the parts of cattle most likely to carry BSE infectivity. <br />
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The bullock, aged 75 months and 7 days, was slaughtered at C&S Meats Ltd’s abattoir in Dorset, on 2 September 2011. The error was discovered on 27 October in the course of routine cross-checks of slaughter and BSE test data. According to BSE regulations, the untested bullock, plus the one slaughtered before should not have entered the food supply. However, by the time the failure was discovered, the associated carcasses had left the premises. Subsequent checks traced a 20kg piece of meat from the untested bullock that has since been destroyed and indicate that the rest of the meat from the carcasses is no longer in the food supply. <br />
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<a href="http://www.food.gov.uk/news/newsarchive/2011/nov/csmeats">http://www.food.gov.uk/news/newsarchive/2011/nov/csmeats</a> <br />
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Cow aged over 72 months enters food supply without being tested for BSE <br />
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Wednesday 26 October 2011 <br />
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The Agency has been notified that meat has entered the food supply from a cow aged over 72 months that had not been tested for BSE. A negative BSE test result is mandatory for cattle slaughtered for human consumption at over 72 months of age. It is very unlikely that the cow was infected with BSE and as specified risk material (SRM) was removed, any risk to human health is extremely low. SRM is the parts of cattle most likely to carry BSE infectivity. <br />
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The cow, aged 74 months and 11 days, was slaughtered at Anglo Dutch Meats (Charing) Ltd’s abattoir in Kent, on 11 August 2011. The error was discovered on 6 October in the course of routine cross-checks of slaughter and BSE test data. According to BSE regulations, the untested cow, plus the one slaughtered before and the two after should not have entered the food supply. However, by the time the failure was discovered, the associated carcases had left the premises. Subsequent checks indicate that the meat from the carcases was mixed with a large volume of other meat which is no longer in the food supply and is likely to have been eaten. <br />
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<a href="http://www.food.gov.uk/news/newsarchive/2011/oct/anglodutch">http://www.food.gov.uk/news/newsarchive/2011/oct/anglodutch</a> <br />
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<br />
Tuesday, April 19, 2011<br />
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Bull aged over 48 months enters food supply without being tested for BSE Monday 18 April 2011 <br />
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Bull aged over 48 months enters food supply without being tested for BSE Monday 18 April 2011 <br />
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The Agency has been notified that meat has entered the food supply from a bull aged over 48 months that had not been tested for BSE. A negative BSE test result is mandatory for cattle slaughtered for human consumption at over 48 months of age.<br />
<br />
It is very unlikely that the bull was infected with BSE and as specified risk material (SRM) was removed, any risk to human health is extremely low. SRM is that part of the animal most likely to contain BSE infectivity.<br />
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The bull, aged 88 months, was slaughtered at S J Norman & Sons’ abattoir in Bridport, Dorset on 3 February 2011. The error was discovered on 5 April in the course of routine cross-checks of slaughter and BSE test data.<br />
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According to BSE regulations, the untested bull should not have entered the food supply. However, by the time the failure was discovered, the carcass had left the premises.<br />
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Subsequent checks indicate that all the meat from the carcass is no longer traceable and is likely to have been eaten. <br />
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<a href="http://www.food.gov.uk/news/newsarchive/2011/apr/otmbull">http://www.food.gov.uk/news/newsarchive/2011/apr/otmbull</a> <br />
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Imported cow aged over 30 months not tested for BSE <br />
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Wednesday 16 February 2011 <br />
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The Agency has been notified that meat has entered the food supply from an Over Thirty Month (OTM) cow imported from Switzerland that had not been tested for BSE.It is very unlikely that the cow was infected with BSE and, as specified risk material (SRM) was removed, any risk to human health is extremely low. <br />
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SRM is those parts of an animal likely to be infected if the animal has BSE.Nevertheless, according to BSE regulations the untested cow, the one slaughtered before and the two slaughtered after must not enter the food supply. Negative BSE test results were received for the 'one before' and 'two after'.<br />
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The cow had been imported into the UK in December 2009 and was slaughtered at William Taylor & Son Ltd's abattoir in Bamber Bridge, near Preston, on 15 October 2010 at just over 41 months of age. <br />
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BSE testing is mandatory for cattle born in Switzerland if slaughtered for human consumption at over 30 months of age. The missing BSE test result was discovered on 17 November during routine cross checks of slaughter and BSE test data. By the time the failure was discovered, all of the associated carcasses had left the premises. <br />
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The Agency has established that the carcase of the Swiss-born bovine was sold as fresh meat and is likely to have been eaten. We also traced the batch of carcases that included the 'one before' and 'two after'. This showed that:<br />
<br />
the majority of the meat was no longer in the food supply and is likely to have been eaten a small portion of the batch was found in cold storage and has since been destroyed a small portion of the batch was mixed with a large quantity of meat from other batches and used in Iceland's own brand 1.4kg steak pies with 'best before' dates of 23.11.11 and 26.11.11. <br />
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Although any food safety risk from consuming these pies would be extremely low, Iceland has taken the decision to withdraw the affected pies from sale some had been exported to Ireland and the authorities there have been informed. <br />
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<a href="http://www.food.gov.uk/news/newsarchive/2011/feb/otm160211">http://www.food.gov.uk/news/newsarchive/2011/feb/otm160211</a> <br />
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<br />
Food Standards Agency - 31 Jan 2011 11:53 <br />
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Two cows aged over 48 months enter food supply without being tested for BSE <br />
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<br />
The Agency has been notified that meat has entered the food supply from two cows aged over 48 months that had not been tested for BSE. A negative BSE test result is mandatory for cattle slaughtered for human consumption at over 48 months of age.<br />
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It is very unlikely that the cows were infected with BSE and as specified risk material was removed, any risk to human health is extremely low.<br />
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One of the cows was just under 52 months of age and the other just over 52 months of age when slaughtered on 2 November 2010 at J V Richards (Reitfontein) Ltd’s abattoir in Truro. The error was discovered on 10 January in the course of routine cross-checks of slaughter and BSE test data.<br />
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According to BSE regulations, both the untested cows and the one slaughtered before them should not have entered the food supply. However, by the time the failure was discovered, all three associated carcasses had left the premises.<br />
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Subsequent checks indicate that all the meat from the carcasses is no longer in the food supply chain and is likely to have been eaten. <br />
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<a href="http://www.wired-gov.net/wg/wg-news-1.nsf/lfi/DNWA-8DMFY9">http://www.wired-gov.net/wg/wg-news-1.nsf/lfi/DNWA-8DMFY9</a> <br />
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<br />
BSE controls explained: Main controls on production <br />
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<a href="http://www.food.gov.uk/safereating/animaldiseases/bse/what/beef/controls">http://www.food.gov.uk/safereating/animaldiseases/bse/what/beef/controls</a> <br />
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Wednesday, July 28, 2010 <br />
<br />
Atypical prion proteins and IBNC in cattle DEFRA project code SE1796 FOIA Final report<br />
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<a href="http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2010/07/atypical-prion-proteins-and-ibnc-in.html">http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2010/07/atypical-prion-proteins-and-ibnc-in.html</a> <br />
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<br />
Tuesday, November 02, 2010<br />
<br />
BSE - ATYPICAL LESION DISTRIBUTION (RBSE 92-21367) statutory (obex only) diagnostic criteria CVL 1992<br />
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<a href="http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2010/11/bse-atypical-lesion-distribution-rbse.html">http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2010/11/bse-atypical-lesion-distribution-rbse.html</a> <br />
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<br />
<br />
<br />
EFSA Journal 2011 The European Response to BSE: A Success Story <br />
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This is an interesting editorial about the Mad Cow Disease debacle, and it's ramifications that will continue to play out for decades to come ; <br />
<br />
Monday, October 10, 2011 <br />
<br />
EFSA Journal 2011 The European Response to BSE: A Success Story <br />
<br />
snip... <br />
<br />
EFSA and the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) recently delivered a scientific opinion on any possible epidemiological or molecular association between TSEs in animals and humans (EFSA Panel on Biological Hazards (BIOHAZ) and ECDC, 2011). This opinion confirmed Classical BSE prions as the only TSE agents demonstrated to be zoonotic so far but the possibility that a small proportion of human cases so far classified as "sporadic" CJD are of zoonotic origin could not be excluded. Moreover, transmission experiments to non-human primates suggest that some TSE agents in addition to Classical BSE prions in cattle (namely L-type Atypical BSE, Classical BSE in sheep, transmissible mink encephalopathy (TME) and chronic wasting disease (CWD) agents) might have zoonotic potential. <br />
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snip... <a href="http://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/efsajournal/pub/e991.htm?emt=1">http://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/efsajournal/pub/e991.htm?emt=1</a> <br />
<br />
<br />
<a href="http://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/efsajournal/doc/e991.pdf">http://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/efsajournal/doc/e991.pdf</a> <br />
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<br />
<br />
see follow-up here about North America BSE Mad Cow TSE prion risk factors, and the ever emerging strains of Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy in many species here in the USA, including humans ; <br />
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<a href="http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/10/efsa-journal-2011-european-response-to.html">http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/10/efsa-journal-2011-european-response-to.html</a> <br />
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<br />
Saturday, November 19, 2011 <br />
<br />
Novel Prion Protein in BSE-affected Cattle, Switzerland <br />
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<a href="http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/11/novel-prion-protein-in-bse-affected.html">http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/11/novel-prion-protein-in-bse-affected.html</a> <br />
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<br />
<br />
<br />
Saturday, December 3, 2011<br />
<br />
<br />
Isolation of Prion with BSE Properties from Farmed Goat <br />
<br />
Volume 17, Number 12—December 2011 <br />
<br />
<a href="http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/12/isolation-of-prion-with-bse-properties.html">http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/12/isolation-of-prion-with-bse-properties.html</a> <br />
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<br />
<br />
<br />
Saturday, June 25, 2011 <br />
<br />
Transmissibility of BSE-L and Cattle-Adapted TME Prion Strain to Cynomolgus Macaque <br />
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"BSE-L in North America may have existed for decades" <br />
<br />
<a href="http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/06/transmissibility-of-bse-l-and-cattle.html">http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/06/transmissibility-of-bse-l-and-cattle.html</a> <br />
<br />
<br />
Over the next 8-10 weeks, approximately 40% of all the adult mink on the farm died from TME. <br />
<br />
snip... <br />
<br />
The rancher was a ''dead stock'' feeder using mostly (>95%) downer or dead dairy cattle... <br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<a href="http://web.archive.org/web/20030516051623/http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/mb/m09/tab05.pdf">http://web.archive.org/web/20030516051623/http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/mb/m09/tab05.pdf</a> <br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
2010-2011 <br />
<br />
When L-type BSE was inoculated into ovine transgenic mice and Syrian hamster the resulting molecular fingerprint had changed, either in the first or a subsequent passage, from L-type into C-type BSE. In addition, non-human primates are specifically susceptible for atypical BSE as demonstrated by an approximately 50% shortened incubation time for L-type BSE as compared to C-type. Considering the current scientific information available, it cannot be assumed that these different BSE types pose the same human health risks as C-type BSE or that these risks are mitigated by the same protective measures. <br />
<br />
This study will contribute to a correct definition of specified risk material (SRM) in atypical BSE. The incumbent of this position will develop new and transfer existing, ultra-sensitive methods for the detection of atypical BSE in tissue of experimentally infected cattle. <br />
<br />
<a href="http://www.prionetcanada.ca/detail.aspx?menu=5&dt=293380&app=93&cat1=387&tp=20&lk=no&cat2">http://www.prionetcanada.ca/detail.aspx?menu=5&dt=293380&app=93&cat1=387&tp=20&lk=no&cat2</a> <br />
<br />
<br />
2011 Monday, September 26, 2011 <br />
<br />
L-BSE BASE prion and atypical sporadic CJD <br />
<br />
<a href="http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2011/09/l-bse-base-prion-and-atypical-sporadic.html">http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2011/09/l-bse-base-prion-and-atypical-sporadic.html</a> <br />
<br />
<br />
SEE RISE OF SPORADIC CJD YEAR TO YEAR ; <br />
<br />
<a href="http://www.cjd.ed.ac.uk/figures.htm">http://www.cjd.ed.ac.uk/figures.htm</a> <br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
Sunday, December 18, 2011 <br />
<br />
A blood test for variant Creutzfeldt‐Jakob disease: briefing note for patients, carers and health professionals <br />
<br />
<a href="http://vcjdtransfusion.blogspot.com/2011/12/blood-test-for-variant-creutzfeldtjakob.html">http://vcjdtransfusion.blogspot.com/2011/12/blood-test-for-variant-creutzfeldtjakob.html</a> <br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
TSSTerry S. Singeltary Sr.http://www.blogger.com/profile/06986622967539963260noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4595956519532618538.post-49960170759912323992011-11-14T08:50:00.000-08:002011-11-14T08:50:46.033-08:00Bullock aged over 72 months enters food supply without being tested for BSEBullock aged over 72 months enters food supply without being tested for BSE<br />
<br />
Monday 14 November 2011<br />
<br />
The Agency has been notified that meat has entered the food supply from a bullock aged over 72 months that had not been tested for BSE. A negative BSE test result is mandatory for cattle slaughtered for human consumption at more than 72 months of age.<br />
<br />
It is very unlikely that the bullock was infected with BSE and as specified risk material (SRM) was removed, any risk to human health is extremely low. SRM is the parts of cattle most likely to carry BSE infectivity.<br />
<br />
The bullock, aged 75 months and 7 days, was slaughtered at C&S Meats Ltd’s abattoir in Dorset, on 2 September 2011. The error was discovered on 27 October in the course of routine cross-checks of slaughter and BSE test data.<br />
<br />
According to BSE regulations, the untested bullock, plus the one slaughtered before should not have entered the food supply. However, by the time the failure was discovered, the associated carcasses had left the premises.<br />
<br />
Subsequent checks traced a 20kg piece of meat from the untested bullock that has since been destroyed and indicate that the rest of the meat from the carcasses is no longer in the food supply.<br />
<br />
<a href="http://www.food.gov.uk/news/newsarchive/2011/nov/csmeats">http://www.food.gov.uk/news/newsarchive/2011/nov/csmeats</a><br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
a review of other recent bovines entering commerce without being tested for BSE. ...tss<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
Cow aged over 72 months enters food supply without being tested for BSE<br />
<br />
Wednesday 26 October 2011<br />
<br />
The Agency has been notified that meat has entered the food supply from a cow aged over 72 months that had not been tested for BSE. A negative BSE test result is mandatory for cattle slaughtered for human consumption at over 72 months of age.<br />
<br />
It is very unlikely that the cow was infected with BSE and as specified risk material (SRM) was removed, any risk to human health is extremely low. SRM is the parts of cattle most likely to carry BSE infectivity.<br />
<br />
The cow, aged 74 months and 11 days, was slaughtered at Anglo Dutch Meats (Charing) Ltd’s abattoir in Kent, on 11 August 2011. The error was discovered on 6 October in the course of routine cross-checks of slaughter and BSE test data.<br />
<br />
According to BSE regulations, the untested cow, plus the one slaughtered before and the two after should not have entered the food supply. However, by the time the failure was discovered, the associated carcases had left the premises.<br />
<br />
Subsequent checks indicate that the meat from the carcases was mixed with a large volume of other meat which is no longer in the food supply and is likely to have been eaten.<br />
<br />
<a href="http://www.food.gov.uk/news/newsarchive/2011/oct/anglodutch">http://www.food.gov.uk/news/newsarchive/2011/oct/anglodutch</a><br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
Cow aged over 48 months enters food supply without being tested for BSE<br />
<br />
Tuesday 23 February 2010<br />
<br />
The Agency has been notified that meat from a cow aged over 48 months has entered the food supply without being tested for BSE.<br />
<br />
It is very unlikely that the cow was infected with BSE and, as specified risk material (SRM) was removed, any risk to human health is extremely low. However, testing is mandatory for cattle slaughtered for human consumption at over 48 months of age.<br />
<br />
The cow was slaughtered at Pickstock Ashby Ltd's abattoir in Hartshorne, Derbyshire, on 4 November 2009 aged almost 57 months. The failure was discovered on 28 January during routine cross checks of slaughter and BSE test data. By the time the failure was discovered all of the affected carcasses and offal had left the premises.<br />
<br />
The affected carcasses, some edible co-products and offal had been exported. Some meat returned to Britain after processing and some went to other countries. Other edible co-products remained in Britain. Subsequent checks indicate that all of the meat and edible co-product that remained in Britain or that returned to Britain is no longer in the food supply chain. The authorities in the countries that received the exported material have been informed.<br />
<br />
Background to BSE testing The BSE testing age was raised to 48 months at the beginning of last year. Cattle aged over 48 months are allowed to enter the food supply provided they have tested negative for BSE. If there is no BSE test, all parts of the carcase must be condemned.<br />
<br />
Specified risk material (SRM) is those parts of the animal that contain almost all BSE infectivity, if the animal is infected with BSE.<br />
<br />
<a href="http://www.food.gov.uk/news/newsarchive/2010/feb/over48monthcow">http://www.food.gov.uk/news/newsarchive/2010/feb/over48monthcow</a><br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
Cow aged over 48 months enters food supply without being tested for BSE<br />
<br />
Tuesday 14 September 2010<br />
<br />
The Agency has been notified that meat has entered the food supply from a cow aged over 48 months that had not been tested for BSE.<br />
<br />
It is very unlikely that the cow was infected with BSE and, as specified risk material was removed, any risk to human health is extremely low. Nevertheless, a negative BSE test result is mandatory for cattle over 48 months of age slaughtered for human consumption.<br />
<br />
The cow was aged one day over 48 months when slaughtered on 9 July at G & GB Hewitt Ltd abattoir in Chester. The error was discovered on 24 August in the course of routine cross-checks of slaughter and BSE test data.<br />
<br />
According to BSE regulations, the untested cow, the animal slaughtered before and the two slaughtered after must not enter the food supply. However, by the time the failure was discovered, all of the associated carcasses had left the premises.<br />
<br />
Subsequent checks traced one small batch of meat that has since been destroyed and indicate that the rest of the meat from the carcasses is no longer in the food supply chain.<br />
<br />
<a href="http://www.food.gov.uk/news/newsarchive/2010/sep/otmuntested">http://www.food.gov.uk/news/newsarchive/2010/sep/otmuntested</a><br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
Cow aged over 48 months enters food supply without being tested for BSE<br />
<br />
Monday 2 November 2009<br />
<br />
The Agency has been notified that a 58 months old cow has entered the food supply without being tested for BSE. BSE testing is mandatory for cattle slaughtered for human consumption at over 48 months of age.<br />
<br />
However, as all the specified risk material (SRM) was removed, and it is unlikely that the cow was infected with BSE, any risk to human health is very low. SRM is those parts of the animal that contain almost all BSE infectivity.<br />
<br />
The cow was slaughtered on 28 July 2009 at Dunbia abattoir in Dungannon. The error was discovered by Northern Ireland's Department of Agriculture and Rural Development (DARD) when a routine annual herd TB test revealed that the cow had been misidentified.<br />
<br />
DARD has now established the correct identity and age of the cow slaughtered on 28 July. Checks indicate that all the meat and other products from the untested cow are likely to have been eaten.<br />
<br />
<a href="http://www.food.gov.uk/news/newsarchive/2009/nov/over48">http://www.food.gov.uk/news/newsarchive/2009/nov/over48</a><br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
Monday, May 12, 2008<br />
<br />
BSE YOUNGEST AGE STATISTICS UNDER 30 MONTHS<br />
<br />
<a href="http://bseyoungestage.blogspot.com/">http://bseyoungestage.blogspot.com/</a><br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
Tuesday, November 01, 2011<br />
<br />
Could we face the return of CJD? Experts fear it may lie dormant in thousands<br />
<br />
<a href="http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2011/11/could-we-face-return-of-cjd-experts.html">http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2011/11/could-we-face-return-of-cjd-experts.html</a><br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
EFSA Journal 2011 The European Response to BSE: A Success Story<br />
<br />
This is an interesting editorial about the Mad Cow Disease debacle, and it's ramifications that will continue to play out for decades to come ;<br />
<br />
Monday, October 10, 2011<br />
<br />
EFSA Journal 2011 The European Response to BSE: A Success Story<br />
<br />
snip...<br />
<br />
EFSA and the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) recently delivered a scientific opinion on any possible epidemiological or molecular association between TSEs in animals and humans (EFSA Panel on Biological Hazards (BIOHAZ) and ECDC, 2011). This opinion confirmed Classical BSE prions as the only TSE agents demonstrated to be zoonotic so far but the possibility that a small proportion of human cases so far classified as "sporadic" CJD are of zoonotic origin could not be excluded. Moreover, transmission experiments to non-human primates suggest that some TSE agents in addition to Classical BSE prions in cattle (namely L-type Atypical BSE, Classical BSE in sheep, transmissible mink encephalopathy (TME) and chronic wasting disease (CWD) agents) might have zoonotic potential.<br />
<br />
snip...<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<a href="http://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/efsajournal/pub/e991.htm?emt=1">http://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/efsajournal/pub/e991.htm?emt=1</a><br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<a href="http://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/efsajournal/doc/e991.pdf">http://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/efsajournal/doc/e991.pdf</a><br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
see follow-up here about North America BSE Mad Cow TSE prion risk factors, and the ever emerging strains of Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy in many species here in the USA, including humans ;<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<a href="http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/10/efsa-journal-2011-european-response-to.html">http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/10/efsa-journal-2011-european-response-to.html</a><br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
Monday, September 26, 2011<br />
<br />
L-BSE BASE prion and atypical sporadic CJD<br />
<br />
<a href="http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2011/09/l-bse-base-prion-and-atypical-sporadic.html">http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2011/09/l-bse-base-prion-and-atypical-sporadic.html</a><br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
tssTerry S. Singeltary Sr.http://www.blogger.com/profile/06986622967539963260noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4595956519532618538.post-20734792161466339342011-06-10T08:31:00.000-07:002011-06-10T08:31:07.785-07:00Board advises on increase in BSE testing age FSAThe Agency has advised Ministers that it would be acceptable to increase the age at which BSE tests are carried out on healthy cattle slaughtered for human consumption.<br />
<br />
<a href="http://www.wired-gov.net/wg/wg-news-1.nsf/lfi/DNWA-8HPHBS">http://www.wired-gov.net/wg/wg-news-1.nsf/lfi/DNWA-8HPHBS</a><br />
<br />
<br />
Food Standards Agency - 10 Jun 2011 15:15<br />
<br />
Board advises on increase in BSE testing age<br />
<br />
The Agency has advised Ministers that it would be acceptable to increase the age at which BSE tests are carried out on healthy cattle slaughtered for human consumption.<br />
<br />
The advice was given following a discussion on proposed changes to BSE testing held at the Board’s open meeting in Belfast on 25 May. The proposal is that the age threshold for healthy cattle slaughtered for human consumption born in the UK and 24 other member states should be increased from 48 to 72 months.<br />
<br />
BSE testing requirements for 'risk' cattle (those most likely to test positive for BSE, but not BSE suspects) would remain largely the same and those for BSE suspects (cattle with clinical symptoms of the disease) would not change.<br />
<br />
Commenting on the proposed change, FSA director of food safety Alison Gleadle said: 'Numbers of BSE cases have dropped dramatically since the height of the UK's BSE epidemic. In 1992 there were more than 37,000 clinical cases reported. Last year there were just 11 detected via the testing programme – none of which were in cattle slaughtered for human consumption.<br />
<br />
'Subject to effective surveillance for BSE continuing to be in place, the Agency believes that increasing the threshold for BSE testing of healthy slaughtered cattle to 72 months would be acceptable on grounds of food safety. The main protection for consumers is through the removal of specified risk material.'<br />
<br />
If Ministers agree to proceed with the change, which could take place from 1 July this year, it will be the third major relaxation in BSE controls in the last six years.<br />
<br />
In November 2005, the ban on cattle aged over thirty months (OTM) from entering the food chain was replaced with BSE testing of all OTM cattle entering the food chain.<br />
<br />
In January 2009, the age threshold at which cattle had to be tested for BSE was increased from 30 months to 48 months.<br />
<br />
The latest change would mean that almost all healthy cattle slaughtered for human consumption will not have to be tested until the age of 72 months.<br />
<br />
<a href="http://www.wired-gov.net/wg/wg-news-1.nsf/lfi/DNWA-8HPHBS">http://www.wired-gov.net/wg/wg-news-1.nsf/lfi/DNWA-8HPHBS</a><br />
<br />
<br />
SEAC<br />
<br />
POSITION STATEMENT ON THE REQUIREMENTS FOR BSE TESTING OF HEALTHY CATTLE<br />
<br />
SEAC was asked by the Food Standards Agency to consider the change in risk to consumers from exposure to BSE that would result if (a) from 2011, the age threshold for BSE testing healthy slaughter cattle was raised from 48 to 72 months and (b) BSE testing of healthy slaughter cattle was to stop altogether.<br />
<br />
FSA presented to SEAC an analysis carried out by the Veterinary Laboratories Agency (VLA) assessing the impact of reducing the level of BSE testing of healthy cattle slaughtered for human consumption, using a mathematical model developed at VLA. The model predicts the number of additional infected cattle that would be consumed if monitoring is reduced and estimates the consequent impact on the amount of infectivity entering the food supply.<br />
<br />
SEAC advises that in the short-term there is an insignificant additional risk to human health that would result from raising the age for healthy slaughter cattle from 48 to 72 months. The VLA modelling results concur with the low numbers of cattle now being identified with BSE. However, SEAC notes that this conclusion is only valid if the prevalence of BSE in the UK cattle population remains at or decreases from its current value. The current and future validity of this analysis therefore depends critically on the nature and quality of BSE surveillance within the cattle population, and in particular its capacity to ensure the early detection of any re-emerging epidemic. This assessment would equally apply to any proposal to cease altogether the testing of healthy slaughter cattle. SEAC considers that any change in the incidence of BSE is most likely to be detected in fallen stock and casualty animals because of the currently higher likelihood of detecting BSE in these sub-populations. Provided that surveillance of fallen stock and casualty animals is sufficient to provide the necessary information about disease incidence and prevalence, the additional risk to consumers of reducing testing of healthy cattle will remain small.<br />
<br />
In addition, SEAC offers the following observations that the FSA and other interested Government Departments might wish to consider:<br />
<br />
(a) Surveillance is the only effective means of monitoring changes in the incidence or prevalence of BSE. It is therefore important that current surveillance protocols are kept under review, to ensure that they are capable of detecting an increase in BSE prevalence both in an appropriate time frame and at a suitable sensitivity to detect an<br />
<br />
increase in prevalence that would warrant reintroduction of testing healthy slaughtered cattle.<br />
<br />
(b) It is not clear that testing a sample of healthy slaughter cattle older than 72 months would provide much useful information: this age group might be sub-optimal. The arguments for random testing of healthy slaughter cattle at this age, compared to other ages, should be considered carefully, taking account of the purpose of this sampling, the sample size and test sensitivity (by incubation period) amongst other considerations.<br />
<br />
(c) UK data should continue to be used to demonstrate a decline in the prevalence of BSE in the UK herd, rather than relying on EU-wide figures.<br />
<br />
(d) It is instructive to use the VLA model to examine a range of hypothetical rates of increase in BSE infection and the ability of current surveillance measures to detect the change, and this should be repeated as necessary when significant changes to current practices are envisaged.<br />
<br />
(e) Changing one BSE control measure can have knock-on effects on other control measures and it is important that the possibility of such interactions is fully taken into account when a proposal such as this is considered.<br />
<br />
30 MARCH 2011<br />
<br />
<a href="http://www.food.gov.uk/multimedia/pdfs/seacstatment.pdf">http://www.food.gov.uk/multimedia/pdfs/seacstatment.pdf</a><br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
Related links<br />
<br />
BSE<br />
<br />
<a href="http://www.food.gov.uk/safereating/animaldiseases/bse/">http://www.food.gov.uk/safereating/animaldiseases/bse/</a><br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
Chair's letters to ministers<br />
<br />
<a href="http://www.food.gov.uk/multimedia/pdfs/letterstominst.pdf">http://www.food.gov.uk/multimedia/pdfs/letterstominst.pdf</a><br />
<br />
<br />
(pdf 696KB)<br />
<br />
Letter from the Chief Medical Officer<br />
<br />
<a href="http://www.food.gov.uk/multimedia/pdfs/lettermedpfficer.pdf">http://www.food.gov.uk/multimedia/pdfs/lettermedpfficer.pdf</a><br />
<br />
<br />
(pdf 110KB)<br />
<br />
Paper considered by SEAC<br />
<br />
<a href="http://www.food.gov.uk/multimedia/pdfs/paperseac.pdf">http://www.food.gov.uk/multimedia/pdfs/paperseac.pdf</a><br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
(pdf 250KB)<br />
<br />
SEAC position statement<br />
<br />
<a href="http://www.food.gov.uk/multimedia/pdfs/seacstatment.pdf">http://www.food.gov.uk/multimedia/pdfs/seacstatment.pdf</a><br />
<br />
<br />
(pdf 23KB)<br />
<br />
END...TSS<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
Monday, May 12, 2008<br />
<br />
BSE YOUNGEST AGE STATISTICS UNDER 30 MONTHS<br />
<br />
<a href="http://bseyoungestage.blogspot.com/">http://bseyoungestage.blogspot.com/</a><br />
<br />
<br />
Wednesday, March 31, 2010<br />
<br />
Atypical BSE in Cattle<br />
<br />
To date the OIE/WAHO assumes that the human and animal health standards set out in the BSE chapter for classical BSE (C-Type) applies to all forms of BSE which include the H-type and L-type atypical forms. This assumption is scientifically not completely justified and accumulating evidence suggests that this may in fact not be the case. Molecular characterization and the spatial distribution pattern of histopathologic lesions and immunohistochemistry (IHC) signals are used to identify and characterize atypical BSE. Both the L-type and H-type atypical cases display significant differences in the conformation and spatial accumulation of the disease associated prion protein (PrPSc) in brains of afflicted cattle. Transmission studies in bovine transgenic and wild type mouse models support that the atypical BSE types might be unique strains because they have different incubation times and lesion profiles when compared to C-type BSE. When L-type BSE was inoculated into ovine transgenic mice and Syrian hamster the resulting molecular fingerprint had changed, either in the first or a subsequent passage, from L-type into C-type BSE. In addition, non-human primates are specifically susceptible for atypical BSE as demonstrated by an approximately 50% shortened incubation time for L-type BSE as compared to C-type. Considering the current scientific information available, it cannot be assumed that these different BSE types pose the same human health risks as C-type BSE or that these risks are mitigated by the same protective measures.<br />
<br />
This study will contribute to a correct definition of specified risk material (SRM) in atypical BSE. The incumbent of this position will develop new and transfer existing, ultra-sensitive methods for the detection of atypical BSE in tissue of experimentally infected cattle.<br />
<br />
<a href="http://www.prionetcanada.ca/detail.aspx?menu=5&dt=293380&app=93&cat1=387&tp=20&lk=no&cat2">http://www.prionetcanada.ca/detail.aspx?menu=5&dt=293380&app=93&cat1=387&tp=20&lk=no&cat2</a><br />
<br />
<br />
Thursday, August 12, 2010<br />
<br />
Seven main threats for the future linked to prions<br />
<br />
First threat<br />
<br />
The TSE road map defining the evolution of European policy for protection against prion diseases is based on a certain numbers of hypotheses some of which may turn out to be erroneous. In particular, a form of BSE (called atypical Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy), recently identified by systematic testing in aged cattle without clinical signs, may be the origin of classical BSE and thus potentially constitute a reservoir, which may be impossible to eradicate if a sporadic origin is confirmed.<br />
<br />
***Also, a link is suspected between atypical BSE and some apparently sporadic cases of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease in humans. These atypical BSE cases constitute an unforeseen first threat that could sharply modify the European approach to prion diseases.<br />
<br />
Second threat<br />
<br />
snip...<br />
<br />
http://www.neuroprion.org/en/np-neuroprion.html <a href="http://prionpathy.blogspot.com/2010/08/seven-main-threats-for-future-linked-to.html">http://prionpathy.blogspot.com/2010/08/seven-main-threats-for-future-linked-to.html</a><br />
<br />
<br />
Friday, May 13,<br />
<br />
2011 EFSA Joint Scientific Opinion on any possible epidemiological or molecular association between TSEs in animals and humans<br />
<br />
<a href="http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/05/efsa-joint-scientific-opinion-on-any.html">http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/05/efsa-joint-scientific-opinion-on-any.html</a><br />
<br />
<br />
Monday, May 23, 2011<br />
<br />
Atypical Prion Diseases in Humans and Animals 2011<br />
<br />
Top Curr Chem (2011)<br />
<br />
DOI: 10.1007/128_2011_161<br />
<br />
# Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2011<br />
<br />
Michael A. Tranulis, Sylvie L. Benestad, Thierry Baron, and Hans Kretzschmar<br />
<br />
Abstract<br />
<br />
Although prion diseases, such as Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (CJD) in humans and scrapie in sheep, have long been recognized, our understanding of their epidemiology and pathogenesis is still in its early stages. Progress is hampered by the lengthy incubation periods and the lack of effective ways of monitoring and characterizing these agents. Protease-resistant conformers of the prion protein (PrP), known as the "scrapie form" (PrPSc), are used as disease markers, and for taxonomic purposes, in correlation with clinical, pathological, and genetic data. In humans, prion diseases can arise sporadically (sCJD) or genetically (gCJD and others), caused by mutations in the PrP-gene (PRNP), or as a foodborne infection, with the agent of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) causing variant CJD (vCJD). Person-to-person spread of human prion disease has only been known to occur following cannibalism (kuru disease in Papua New Guinea) or through medical or surgical treatment (iatrogenic CJD, iCJD). In contrast, scrapie in small ruminants and chronic wasting disease (CWD) in cervids behave as infectious diseases within these species. Recently, however, so-called atypical forms of prion diseases have been discovered in sheep (atypical/Nor98 scrapie) and in cattle, BSE-H and BSE-L. These maladies resemble sporadic or genetic human prion diseases and might be their animal equivalents. This hypothesis also raises the significant public health question of possible epidemiological links between these diseases and their counterparts in humans.<br />
<br />
M.A. Tranulis (*)<br />
<br />
Norwegian School of Veterinary Science, Oslo, Norway<br />
<br />
e-mail: Michael.Tranulis@nvh.no<br />
<br />
S.L. Benestad<br />
<br />
Norwegian Veterinary Institute, Oslo, Norway<br />
<br />
T. Baron<br />
<br />
Agence Nationale de Se´curite´ Sanitaire, ANSES, Lyon, France<br />
<br />
H. Kretzschmar<br />
<br />
Ludwig-Maximilians University of Munich, Munich, Germany<br />
<br />
Keywords Animal Atypical Atypical/Nor98 scrapie BSE-H BSE-L Human Prion disease Prion strain Prion type<br />
<br />
<a href="http://resources.metapress.com/pdf-preview.axd?code=f433r34h34ugg617&size=largest">http://resources.metapress.com/pdf-preview.axd?code=f433r34h34ugg617&size=largest</a><br />
<br />
<br />
snip...SEE MORE HERE ;<br />
<br />
<a href="http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2011/05/atypical-prion-diseases-in-humans-and.html">http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2011/05/atypical-prion-diseases-in-humans-and.html</a><br />
<br />
<br />
Thursday, June 2, 2011<br />
<br />
USDA scrapie report for April 2011 NEW ATYPICAL NOR-98 SCRAPIE CASES Pennsylvania AND California<br />
<br />
<a href="http://nor-98.blogspot.com/2011/06/usda-scrapie-report-for-april-2011-new.html">http://nor-98.blogspot.com/2011/06/usda-scrapie-report-for-april-2011-new.html</a><br />
<br />
<br />
Scientific Report of the European Food Safety Authority on the Assessment of the Geographical BSE Risk (GBR) of the USA Question number: EFSA-Q-2003-083<br />
<br />
Adopted: 1 July 2004<br />
<br />
Summary<br />
<br />
The European Food Safety Authority and its Scientific Expert Working Group on the Assessment of the Geographical Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Risk (GBR) were asked by the European Commission (EC) to provide an up-to-date scientific report on the GBR in the United States of America, i.e. the likelihood of the presence of one or more cattle being infected with BSE, pre-clinically as well as clinically, in USA. This scientific report addresses the GBR of USA as assessed in 2004 based on data covering the period 1980-2003.<br />
<br />
The BSE agent was probably imported into USA and could have reached domestic cattle in the middle of the eighties. These cattle imported in the mid eighties could have been rendered in the late eighties and therefore led to an internal challenge in the early nineties. It is possible that imported meat and bone meal (MBM) into the USA reached domestic cattle and leads to an internal challenge in the early nineties.<br />
<br />
A processing risk developed in the late 80s/early 90s when cattle imports from BSE risk countries were slaughtered or died and were processed (partly) into feed, together with some imports of MBM. This risk continued to exist, and grew significantly in the mid 90’s when domestic cattle, infected by imported MBM, reached processing. Given the low stability of the system, the risk increased over the years with continued imports of cattle and MBM from BSE risk countries.<br />
<br />
EFSA concludes that the current GBR level of USA is III, i.e. it is likely but not confirmed that domestic cattle are (clinically or pre-clinically) infected with the BSE-agent. As long as there are no significant changes in rendering or feeding, the stability remains extremely/very unstable. Thus, the probability of cattle to be (pre-clinically or clinically) infected with the BSE-agent persistently increases.<br />
<br />
<a href="http://www.efsa.europa.eu/EFSA/efsa_locale-1178620753812_1211902594180.htm">http://www.efsa.europa.eu/EFSA/efsa_locale-1178620753812_1211902594180.htm</a><br />
<br />
<br />
Annex to the EFSA Scientific Report (2004) 3, 1-17 on the Assessment of the Geographical BSE Risk of USA - 1 - European Food Safety Authority Scientific Expert Working Group on GBR Working Group Report on the Assessment of the Geographical BSE-Risk (GBR) of UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 2004<br />
<br />
<a href="http://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/scdocs/doc/3rax1.pdf">http://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/scdocs/doc/3rax1.pdf</a><br />
<br />
<br />
Sunday, May 01, 2011<br />
<br />
STUDY OF ATYPICAL BSE 2010 Annual Report May 2011<br />
<br />
<a href="http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2011/05/study-of-atypical-bse-2010-annual.html">http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2011/05/study-of-atypical-bse-2010-annual.html</a><br />
<br />
<br />
What is the potential cost of pre- and post-slaughter testing? The estimated cost of post-mortem testing is $40 per head. This amount is comprised almost entirely of the cost of the test kit and sample analysis. It is expected that ante-mortem tests (live animal), if a test is developed, will reduce BSE testing costs to approximately $15 per head.<br />
<br />
<a href="http://www.prionetcanada.ca/detail.aspx?menu=12&dt=293720&app=70&cat1=211&tp=12&lk=no">http://www.prionetcanada.ca/detail.aspx?menu=12&dt=293720&app=70&cat1=211&tp=12&lk=no</a><br />
<br />
<br />
Monday, May 23, 2011<br />
<br />
CDC Assesses Potential Human Exposure to Prion Diseases Travel Warning<br />
<br />
<a href="http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/05/cdc-assesses-potential-human-exposure.html">http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/05/cdc-assesses-potential-human-exposure.html</a><br />
<br />
<br />
Wednesday, July 28, 2010<br />
<br />
Atypical prion proteins and IBNC in cattle DEFRA project code SE1796 FOIA Final report<br />
<br />
<a href="http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2010/07/atypical-prion-proteins-and-ibnc-in.html">http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2010/07/atypical-prion-proteins-and-ibnc-in.html</a><br />
<br />
<br />
IBNC<br />
<br />
"All of the 15 cattle tested showed that the brains had abnormally accumulated prion protein."<br />
<br />
Saturday, February 28, 2009<br />
<br />
NEW RESULTS ON IDIOPATHIC BRAINSTEM NEURONAL CHROMATOLYSIS "All of the 15 cattle tested showed that the brains had abnormally accumulated PrP" 2009<br />
<br />
SEAC 102/2<br />
<br />
<a href="http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2009/02/new-results-on-idiopathic-brainstem.html">http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2009/02/new-results-on-idiopathic-brainstem.html</a><br />
<br />
<br />
2009 UPDATE ON ALABAMA AND TEXAS MAD COWS 2005 and 2006<br />
<br />
<a href="http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2006/08/bse-atypical-texas-and-alabama-update.html">http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2006/08/bse-atypical-texas-and-alabama-update.html</a><br />
<br />
<br />
Tuesday, April 26, 2011<br />
<br />
sporadic CJD RISING Text and figures of the latest annual report of the NCJDRSU covering the period 1990-2009 (published 11th March 2011)<br />
<br />
<a href="http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2011/04/sporadic-cjd-rising-text-and-figures-of.html">http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2011/04/sporadic-cjd-rising-text-and-figures-of.html</a><br />
<br />
<br />
Saturday, March 5, 2011<br />
<br />
MAD COW ATYPICAL CJD PRION TSE CASES WITH CLASSIFICATIONS PENDING ON THE RISE IN NORTH AMERICA<br />
<br />
<a href="http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/03/mad-cow-atypical-cjd-prion-tse-cases.html">http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/03/mad-cow-atypical-cjd-prion-tse-cases.html</a><br />
<br />
<br />
Tuesday, April 26, 2011<br />
<br />
sporadic CJD RISING Text and figures of the latest annual report of the NCJDRSU covering the period 1990-2009 (published 11th March 2011)<br />
<br />
<a href="http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2011/04/sporadic-cjd-rising-text-and-figures-of.html">http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2011/04/sporadic-cjd-rising-text-and-figures-of.html</a><br />
<br />
<br />
something that disturbs me very much, iatrogenic prion TSE exposure and accumulation there from all of the above ???<br />
<br />
Tuesday, March 29, 2011<br />
<br />
TRANSMISSIBLE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY EXPOSURE SPREADING VIA HOSPITALS AND SURGICAL PROCEDURES AROUND THE GLOBE<br />
<br />
<a href="http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/03/transmissible-spongiform-encephalopathy.html">http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/03/transmissible-spongiform-encephalopathy.html</a><br />
<br />
<br />
TSSTerry S. Singeltary Sr.http://www.blogger.com/profile/06986622967539963260noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4595956519532618538.post-55918367928886871162011-05-03T10:17:00.000-07:002011-05-03T10:17:25.544-07:00Bovine spongiform encephalopathy, Switzerland O.I.E. reportBovine spongiform encephalopathy, Switzerland<br />
<br />
Information received on 03/05/2011 from Mr Hans Wyss, Chief Veterinary Officer, Schwarzenburgstrasse 161, Swiss Federal Veterinary Office, LIEBEFELD BERNE, Switzerland<br />
<br />
Summary<br />
<br />
Report type Immediate notification (Final report) Start date 08/04/2011 Date of first confirmation of the event 18/04/2011 Report date 03/05/2011 Date submitted to OIE 03/05/2011 Date event resolved 03/05/2011 Reason for notification Reoccurrence of a listed disease Date of previous occurrence 10/2006 Manifestation of disease Sub-clinical infection Causal agent Prion Nature of diagnosis Laboratory (advanced) This event pertains to the whole country<br />
<br />
New outbreaks Summary of outbreaks Total outbreaks: 1 Location(s) SANKT GALLEN (Sankt Gallen)<br />
<br />
Total animals affected Species Susceptible Cases Deaths Destroyed Slaughtered Cattle 32 1 0 1 0<br />
<br />
Outbreak statistics Species Apparent morbidity rate Apparent mortality rate Apparent case fatality rate Proportion susceptible animals lost* Cattle 3.13% 0.00% 0.00% 3.13%<br />
<br />
* Removed from the susceptible population through death, destruction and/or slaughter<br />
<br />
Epidemiology Source of the outbreak(s) or origin of infection Unknown or inconclusive<br />
<br />
Control measures Measures applied No vaccination No treatment of affected animals<br />
<br />
Measures to be applied No other measures<br />
<br />
Diagnostic test results Laboratory name and type National Reference Laboratory (National laboratory) Tests and results Species Test Test date Result Cattle western blotting 18/04/2011 Positive<br />
<br />
Future Reporting The event is resolved. No more reports will be submitted.<br />
<br />
<a href="http://web.oie.int/wahis/public.php?page=single_report&pop=1&reportid=10546">http://web.oie.int/wahis/public.php?page=single_report&pop=1&reportid=10546</a><br />
<br />
<br />
Switzerland sporadic CJD ; Swiss rise in CJD raises concerns over possible BSE link [LONDON]<br />
<br />
THE LANCET<br />
<br />
Plaque attack: Swiss patients have spongiform patterns in the brain typical of sporadic CJD. The number of people dying from Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (CJD) has risen sharply in Switzerland -- sparking fears of a possible link with bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE). BSE is thought to be the cause of a distinctive form of the brain-wasting disease known as variant CJD. The Swiss cases, in contrast, are standard 'sporadic' CJD. Each year between 1997 and 2000, no more than 11 Swiss people developed CJD. But 19 cases were reported in 2001, and seven were recorded in the first quarter of this year. This is some four times higher than the incidence elsewhere, reports a team led by Adriano Aguzzi of the University Hospital Zurich (M. Glatzel et al. Lancet 360, 139-141; 2002). The increase could be a mere statistical blip, or it may be due to increased awareness of the disease leading to more diagnoses. More disturbing is the possibility that the cases are linked to the consumption of BSE-infected meat products -- which would mean that the BSE agent can cause two distinct forms of CJD. Possible links between the Swiss CJD cases and BSE will now be explored by strain-typing experiments in which the disease is transmitted to mice. These tests will take at least a year to complete. "It's the best way to establish or exclude any suspected link," says Moira Bruce of the UK Institute for Animal Health's Neuropathogenesis Unit in Edinburgh.<br />
<br />
======================================<br />
<br />
Experiences in England and Switzerland -- two countries that discovered mad cow disease in their cattle -- have heightened concerns about the possibility some cases of sporadic CJD are due to consuming mad-cow-tainted beef. Both countries have reported increases in sporadic CJD since mad cow was first detected in British herds in 1986. Switzerland discovered last year its CJD rate was twice that of any other country in the world. Switzerland had been seeing about eight to 11 cases per year from 1997 to 2000. Then the incidence more than doubled, to 19 cases in 2001 and 18 cases in 2002.<br />
<br />
<a href="http://www.upi.com/view.cfm?StoryID=20030721-102924-4786r">http://www.upi.com/view.cfm?StoryID=20030721-102924-4786r</a><br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
Mouse model sheds new light on human prion disease<br />
<br />
snip...<br />
<br />
Professor John Collinge said We are not saying that all or even most cases of sporadic CJD are as a result of BSE exposure, but some more recent cases may be the incidence of sporadic CJD has shown an upward trend in the UK over the last decade. While most of this apparent increase may be because doctors are now more aware of CJD and better at diagnosing it, serious consideration should be given to a proportion of this rise being BSE-related. Switzerland, which has had a substantial BSE epidemic, has noted a sharp recent increase in sporadic CJD.<br />
<br />
snip...<br />
<br />
<a href="http://www.mrc.ac.uk/txt/index/public-interest/public-news-4/public-news_archive/public-news-archive_nov_dec_02/public-bse_and_sporadic_cjd.htm">http://www.mrc.ac.uk/txt/index/public-interest/public-news-4/public-news_archive/public-news-archive_nov_dec_02/public-bse_and_sporadic_cjd.htm</a><br />
<br />
<br />
Monday, May 19, 2008<br />
<br />
SPORADIC CJD IN FARMERS, FARMERS WIVES, FROM FARMS WITH BSE HERD AND ABATTOIRS<br />
<br />
<a href="http://bseinquiry.blogspot.com/">http://bseinquiry.blogspot.com/</a><br />
<br />
<br />
Thursday, August 12, 2010<br />
<br />
Seven main threats for the future linked to prions First threat The TSE road map defining the evolution of European policy for protection against prion diseases is based on a certain numbers of hypotheses some of which may turn out to be erroneous. In particular, a form of BSE (called atypical Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy), recently identified by systematic testing in aged cattle without clinical signs, may be the origin of classical BSE and thus potentially constitute a reservoir, which may be impossible to eradicate if a sporadic origin is confirmed.<br />
<br />
***Also, a link is suspected between atypical BSE and some apparently sporadic cases of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease in humans. These atypical BSE cases constitute an unforeseen first threat that could sharply modify the European approach to prion diseases.<br />
<br />
Second threat<br />
<br />
snip...<br />
<br />
<a href="http://www.neuroprion.org/en/np-neuroprion.html">http://www.neuroprion.org/en/np-neuroprion.html</a><br />
<br />
<br />
<a href="http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2011/04/sporadic-cjd-rising-text-and-figures-of.html">http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2011/04/sporadic-cjd-rising-text-and-figures-of.html</a><br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
Saturday, March 5, 2011<br />
<br />
MAD COW ATYPICAL CJD PRION TSE CASES WITH CLASSIFICATIONS PENDING ON THE RISE IN NORTH AMERICA<br />
<br />
<a href="http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/03/mad-cow-atypical-cjd-prion-tse-cases.html">http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/03/mad-cow-atypical-cjd-prion-tse-cases.html</a><br />
<br />
<br />
Sunday, May 01, 2011<br />
<br />
STUDY OF ATYPICAL BSE 2010 Annual Report May 2011<br />
<br />
<a href="http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2011/05/study-of-atypical-bse-2010-annual.html">http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2011/05/study-of-atypical-bse-2010-annual.html</a><br />
<br />
<br />
Monday, April 25, 2011<br />
<br />
Experimental Oral Transmission of Atypical Scrapie to Sheep<br />
<br />
Volume 17, Number 5–May 2011<br />
<br />
http://nor-98.blogspot.com/2011/04/experimental-oral-transmission-of.html<br />
<br />
"THE OIE has now shown they are nothing more than a National Trading Brokerage for all strains of animal TSE. AS i said before, OIE should hang up there jock strap now, since it appears they will buckle every time a country makes some political hay about trade protocol, commodities and futures. IF they are not going to be science based, they should do everyone a favor and dissolve there organization."<br />
<br />
NOW, some history on the failed OIE BSE/TSE policy, and why the OIE allowed BSE and other TSE to spread around the globe $$$<br />
<br />
while i applaud Switerland for reporting this case of BSE, i must say again that the OIE is a failed organization. to have a reporting system set up for TSE that only reports a case of TSE when a country sees fit to report a case, and only relies on the GOOD WORD of a country, is a failed system. apparently, the USA and Canada and Mexico i.e. North America, is exempt from the OIE reporting base of TSE on the OIE news feed. ...tss<br />
<br />
Scrapie<br />
<br />
The two Commissions discussed the issue of ‘atypical’ scrapie in terms of notification requirements and the issue of the host genetic resistance. In response to questions of Members, the Code Commission clarified that ‘classical’ scrapie is reportable to the OIE but that ‘atypical’ scrapie is not reportable (in accordance with the recommendations made by the ad hoc Group on Atypical Scrapie and Atypical BSE, which met in November 2007). However, the sharing of scientific information on ‘atypical’ scrapie is encouraged. At this time, the Code Commission considered that more scientific information would be needed to fully address the issues associated with host genotype.<br />
<br />
EU comment<br />
<br />
4<br />
<br />
OIE Terrestrial Animal Health Standards Commission / September 2010<br />
<br />
The EU takes note of the fact that atypical scrapie is not an OIE listed disease. Nevertheless, it will remain notifiable in the EU. Moreover it must be stressed that any emergence of this disease should be notified to the OIE by Members and that scientific data should continue to be gathered.<br />
<br />
snip...<br />
<br />
Zoonotic Potential<br />
<br />
Has transmission to humans been proven? (with the exception of artificial circumstances) AND Is human infection associated with severe consequences? (death or prolonged illness)<br />
<br />
<a href="http://ec.europa.eu/food/international/organisations/docs/EU_comments_OIE_terrestrial_animal_health_code_en.pdf">http://ec.europa.eu/food/international/organisations/docs/EU_comments_OIE_terrestrial_animal_health_code_en.pdf</a><br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
What is Nor98-Like (Nonclassical) Scrapie?<br />
<br />
Nor98-like scrapie is a prion disease. The prion diseases include classical scrapie in sheep and goats, Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) primarily of cattle, chronic wasting disease (CWD) of deer and elk, and in humans Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (CJD) and variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (vCJD). What each of these diseases has in common is that they cause a progressive and ultimately fatal degeneration of the nervous system. While the underlying cause(s) are still debated, the theory most widely accepted in the scientific community is that the agent is a prion – an abnormal form of a normally occurring cellular protein.<br />
<br />
Unlike BSE, classical scrapie and Nor98-like scrapie have not been shown to be a threat to human health. Classical scrapie has been known to exist for over 250 years, and cases have occurred in the United States since 1947. It is likely that Nor98-like scrapie has also existed for a long time; however, it was first identified in Norway in 1998, hence the name Nor98. This type of scrapie is referred to as “atypical scrapie”, “Nor98 scrapie”, “Nor98-like scrapie”, or “nonclassical scrapie” in the literature.<br />
<br />
Since 1998, almost every country in Europe, as well as the Falkland Islands, New Zealand, Canada, and the United States have found similar cases. The first cases in the United States were identified in 2007.<br />
<br />
Nor98-like (nonclassical) scrapie and classical scrapie are separate diseases with distinct features.<br />
<br />
Transmission<br />
<br />
Classical scrapie is an infectious disease that is transmitted to other sheep and goats under natural conditions.<br />
<br />
Nor98-like scrapie is either not transmitted or is poorly transmitted, under natural conditions. Many scientists believe that Nor98-like scrapie is not an infectious disease under natural conditions and that it is instead caused by a random conversion of the normal prion protein into the abnormal form (often referred to as “sporadic”).<br />
<br />
Distribution<br />
<br />
Nor98-like scrapie has been found in all countries where extensive surveillance has been conducted using sensitive test methods; whereas, classical scrapie has not been reported in some of these countries.<br />
<br />
Nor98-like scrapie cases are widely distributed and proportionate with sheep/goat populations; whereas, classical scrapie cases often occur in clusters.<br />
<br />
Number of affected sheep or goats in a flock or herd<br />
<br />
Classical scrapie usually infects more than one animal in an infected flock. In the US, approximately 18 percent of the mature, genetically susceptible sheep in an infected flock are infected.<br />
<br />
Nor98-like scrapie is rarely found in more than one animal in a flock or herd. When an additional case is found, it is usually in flocks with more than 500 sheep.<br />
<br />
Average age of onset of clinical signs in animals<br />
<br />
With classical scrapie, clinical signs typically first appear and result in death in animals that are between 3-5 years of age.<br />
<br />
In Nor98-like scrapie, clinical signs are rarely documented and the animals are typically diagnosed when they are sampled at slaughter, usually at greater than 5 years of age.<br />
<br />
Variations in protection against disease conferred by genotype<br />
<br />
Sheep with genotypes that are resistant to classical scrapie are susceptible to Nor98-like scrapie.<br />
<br />
Clinical signs associated with disease<br />
<br />
Unlike classical scrapie, clinical signs are rarely reported in Nor98-like scrapie cases.<br />
<br />
In the few Nor98-like scrapie cases where clinical signs were reported, the signs observed were indistinguishable from those described for classical scrapie. These include incoordination, gait abnormalities, collapse while running, tremors, loss of condition, leg biting, nibble response and/or behavioral changes.<br />
<br />
One potential clinical difference is that intense rubbing is a frequently occurring clinical sign in classical scrapie cases; whereas, it has not been reported in Nor98-like scrapie cases.<br />
<br />
Laboratory findings readily distinguish Nor98-like scrapie from classical scrapie.<br />
<br />
In 2009, the World Animal Health Organization (OIE) recognized Nor98-like scrapie as a separate disease from classical scrapie because of differences in laboratory findings, transmissibility, and distribution. This determination means that Nor98-like scrapie is not a reportable disease to OIE, and should be of no trade concern.<br />
<br />
How has APHIS’ policy changed regarding Nor98-like scrapie?<br />
<br />
APHIS will no longer require the depopulation or movement restriction of Nor98-like scrapie exposed sheep and goats. APHIS will propose changes to the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) in 2010 to allow the APHIS Administrator to eliminate or reduce post exposure requirements for certain scrapie types (or certain/specific types of scrapie)-- such as Nor98-like scrapie -- that are determined to pose minimal risk of lateral transmission under natural conditions.<br />
<br />
In the meantime, APHIS is conducting a national scrapie control pilot project for Nor98-like scrapie. The project is for flocks and herds in which animals positive to Nor98-like scrapie were born, lambed, or kidded.<br />
<br />
What will the pilot project do for producers?<br />
<br />
The pilot project will allow producers that have sheep and goats exposed to Nor98-like (nonclassical) scrapie to retain, sell, exhibit or move them for any purpose.<br />
<br />
What will happen if Nor98-like scrapie case is found on or traced back to an owner’s flock or herd?<br />
<br />
The owner will be contacted by a Federal or State veterinarian who will schedule a visit to the farm with the owner. The activities listed below will be performed.<br />
<br />
Confirm the identification of the positive animal.<br />
<br />
Provide the owner with information about scrapie and its control.<br />
<br />
Determine if the positive animal was born in or gave birth in the flock/herd. If so, the veterinarian will:<br />
<br />
Work with state animal health authority to ensure animals are not moved from the premises until they have been officially identified;<br />
<br />
Develop a Nor98-like scrapie flock plan and a 5 year monitoring plan with the producer;<br />
<br />
If not already officially identified, apply official eartags to sheep and goats exposed to Nor98-like scrapie; and<br />
<br />
Inventory all sheep and goats, and any sheep or goat embryos.<br />
<br />
The officially identified sheep and goats will then be classified and handled as low-risk exposed animals, allowing the owner to move the animals from the premises for any purpose including sale.<br />
<br />
<a href="http://www.aphis.usda.gov/animal_health/animal_diseases/scrapie/downloads/nor98-like_information.pdf">http://www.aphis.usda.gov/animal_health/animal_diseases/scrapie/downloads/nor98-like_information.pdf</a><br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
SCRAPIE The United States is unable to support the proposed new draft Code Chapter on Scrapie. The draft chapter, as written, departs significantly from the existing chapter, is confusing and is difficult to understand. This version of the scrapie chapter uses much of the same wording as the BSE chapter and is written as if the predominance of evidence revealed that scrapie was a food-borne disease similar to BSE in cattle which is inappropriate. Moreover, several of the new changes are not supported by current scientific evidence. As a result, detailed comments on individual articles would not meaningful at this time. The United States is not supportive of the proposed draft chapter for the following reasons: 1. Inclusion of “atypical” scrapie: The scientific evidence indicates that “atypical” scrapie, also referred to as Nor-98, Nor-98-like, or non-classical scrapie, is not the same disease as classical scrapie. Further, “atypical” scrapie does not meet the criteria for listing diseases of trade concern by the OIE, as described in Chapter 2.1.1 of the Code. The United States recommends that the scope of this chapter be limited to classical scrapie in sheep and goats. Further, the United States recommends that OIE clearly adopt the position that “atypical” scrapie represents a distinct disease entity from classical scrapie and that it not be a listed disease. • There is no evidence that “atypical” scrapie is a contagious disease. If it is contagious, available evidence suggests that it has a much lower transmission efficiency. (Hopp, et al, 2006; Green, et al, 2007; Benestad, et al 2008; McIntyre, et al, 2008) • The disease appears to be ubiquitous in that it has been found wherever sufficient surveillance has been conducted. (Buschmann et al, 2004; De Bosschere et al, 2004; Orge, et al, 2004; Everest et al, 2006; Arsac, 2007; Benestad, et al 2008; Fediaevsky, et al, 2008) • The disease does not appear to be economically significant in that the prevalence of clinical disease is low and it typically occurs in older animals. (Luhken, et al., 2007; Benestad, et al 2008). • The disease is as likely as not to be the result of a spontaneous conversion of normal prion protein. (Benestad, et al 2008, De Bosschere et al 2007) • Removal of exposed sheep is unlikely to reduce the prevalence of “atypical” scrapie infection and removing only those exposed sheep that are phenylalanine (F) at codon 141 is scientifically unsound since the disease is known to affect sheep of most other genotypes. Further, sheep with AHQ alleles have a similar risk of infection with “atypical” strains as sheep with F at codon 141. (Luhken, et al., 2007). • If “atypical” scrapie is included as a listed disease, the surveillance and diagnostic requirements which are needed to identify these cases should be described in detail in both this Chapter and the Manual of Diagnostic Tests and Vaccines for Terrestrial 2 Animals. Data from Europe illustrates that using the proper test(s) is essential for the identification of atypical scrapie (Fediaevsky et al., 2008).<br />
<br />
SNIP...<br />
<br />
6. Overemphasis on importation and use of bovine meat and bone meal as a route of scrapie transmission: Given that the draft Chapter is not intended to address risk mitigation for BSE in small ruminants, we believe there is an over-emphasis on this potential route of transmission in the current draft. The United States recommends that the requirements in this chapter be limited to the inclusion of products from sheep and goats (instead of from all ruminants) in feed or feed ingredients intended for consumption by animals • The use of products from sheep and goats as feed or feed ingredients for ruminant or non-ruminant animals represent one possible route of transmission (Philippe, et al, 2005) and a source of environmental contamination with the classical scrapie agent. However, this is not the primary route of transmission for the scrapie agent. • The need for the exclusion of cattle-derived protein or other animal protein to mitigate BSE risk should be based on a country’s BSE risk status and should be addressed in Chapter 2.3.13 of the Code.<br />
<br />
SNIP...<br />
<br />
14. Failure to provide scientific justification for the list of permitted commodities in Item 1 of Article 2.4.8.1. . We recommend that the list be re-evaluated and those items that have not been substantiated as presenting no risk be excluded or those with some risk but where the intended use mitigates the risk the use be specified. • There is no known human health risk associated with scrapie. As such, if meat and meat products for human consumption are included in this list, sheep and/or goat milk intended for human consumption should also be added to the list of permitted commodities in Item 1 of Article 2.4.8.1. • In the vast majority of sheep infected with classical scrapie, actual infectivity or PrPres has been identified in most tissues including the lymphoreticular system (tonsils, spleen, lymph nodes), the gastrointestinal tract, brain, and spinal cord (Hadlow et. al. 1979; Hadlow et al., 1980; van Kuelen et al., 1996; van Kuelen et al., 1999, Andreoletti et al., 2000; Heggebø et al., 2002; Caplazi et al., 2004). Infectivity and/or PrPres has also been identified in the placenta (see Hourrigan et al., 1979; Onodera et al., 1993; Pattison et al., 1972; Pattison et al., 1974; Race et al., 1998), blood (Hunter et al., 2002; Houston et al. 2008); peripheral nerves (Groschup et al., 1996), muscle (Pattison and Millson, 1962; Andreoletti et al., 2004; Casalone et al., 2005), salivary gland (Hadlow et al., 1980; Vascellari et al., 2007), kidney (Siso et al., 2006), and skin ( Thomzig et al., 2007). In addition, recent work has shown milk and/or colostrum from scrapie infected ewes transmitted the disease to 17 of 18 lambs (Konold et al., 2008). • The data on the risk of low protein tallow made from scrapie infected tissues particularly for use in milk replacer is limited and some epidemiologic studies suggest an association of milk replacer use with scrapie risk. Taylor et al., 1997 examined the inactivation capacity of different rendering system in regards to scrapie. The presence of infectivity was determined by bioassay into mice. From the onset of this study, it was assumed that tallow was not the vehicle for the transmission of TSE. Hence only 2 tallow samples were examined.<br />
<br />
<a href="http://www.aphis.usda.gov/import_export/animals/oie/downloads/tahc_mar-sep08/tahc-scrapie-77-mar08_cmt.pdf">http://www.aphis.usda.gov/import_export/animals/oie/downloads/tahc_mar-sep08/tahc-scrapie-77-mar08_cmt.pdf</a><br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
Increased Atypical Scrapie Detections<br />
<br />
Press reports indicate that increased surveillance is catching what otherwise would have been unreported findings of atypical scrapie in sheep. In 2009, five new cases have been reported in Quebec, Ontario, Alberta, and Saskatchewan. With the exception of Quebec, all cases have been diagnosed as being the atypical form found in older animals. Canada encourages producers to join its voluntary surveillance program in order to gain scrapie-free status. The World Animal Health will not classify Canada as scrapie-free until no new cases are reported for seven years. The Canadian Sheep Federation is calling on the government to fund a wider surveillance program in order to establish the level of prevalence prior to setting an eradication date. Besides long-term testing, industry is calling for a compensation program for farmers who report unusual deaths in their flocks.<br />
<br />
<br />
<a href="http://gain.fas.usda.gov/Recent%20GAIN%20Publications/This%20Week%20in%20Canadian%20Agriculture%20%20%20%20%20Issue%2028_Ottawa_Canada_11-6-2009.pdf">http://gain.fas.usda.gov/Recent%20GAIN%20Publications/This%20Week%20in%20Canadian%20Agriculture%20%20%20%20%20Issue%2028_Ottawa_Canada_11-6-2009.pdf</a><br />
<br />
<br />
Saturday, December 18, 2010<br />
<br />
OIE Global Conference on Wildlife Animal Health and Biodiversity - Preparing for the Future (TSE AND PRIONS) Paris (France), 23-25 February 2011<br />
<br />
<a href="http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2010/12/oie-global-conference-on-wildlife.html">http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2010/12/oie-global-conference-on-wildlife.html</a><br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
Monday, April 25, 2011<br />
<br />
Experimental Oral Transmission of Atypical Scrapie to Sheep<br />
<br />
Volume 17, Number 5–May 2011<br />
<br />
<a href="http://nor-98.blogspot.com/2011/04/experimental-oral-transmission-of.html">http://nor-98.blogspot.com/2011/04/experimental-oral-transmission-of.html</a><br />
<br />
<br />
Friday, March 4, 2011<br />
<br />
Alberta dairy cow found with mad cow disease<br />
<br />
<a href="http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/03/alberta-dairy-cow-found-with-mad-cow.html">http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/03/alberta-dairy-cow-found-with-mad-cow.html</a><br />
<br />
<br />
Wednesday, August 11, 2010<br />
<br />
REPORT ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE SIXTEENTH CASE OF BOVINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY (BSE) IN CANADA<br />
<br />
<a href="http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2010/08/report-on-investigation-of-sixteenth.html">http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2010/08/report-on-investigation-of-sixteenth.html</a><br />
<br />
<br />
Thursday, August 19, 2010<br />
<br />
REPORT ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE SEVENTEENTH CASE OF BOVINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY (BSE) IN CANADA<br />
<br />
<a href="http://bseusa.blogspot.com/2010/08/report-on-investigation-of-seventeenth.html">http://bseusa.blogspot.com/2010/08/report-on-investigation-of-seventeenth.html</a><br />
<br />
<br />
Thursday, February 10, 2011<br />
<br />
TRANSMISSIBLE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY REPORT UPDATE CANADA FEBRUARY 2011 a nd how to hide mad cow disease in Canada Current as of: 2011-01-31<br />
<br />
<a href="http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2011/02/transmissible-spongiform-encephalopathy.html">http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2011/02/transmissible-spongiform-encephalopathy.html</a><br />
<br />
<br />
i wonder if CFIA Canada uses the same OBEX ONLY diagnostic criteria as the USDA ?<br />
<br />
<br />
Tuesday, November 02, 2010<br />
<br />
BSE - ATYPICAL LESION DISTRIBUTION (RBSE 92-21367) statutory (obex only) diagnostic criteria CVL 1992<br />
<br />
<a href="http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2010/11/bse-atypical-lesion-distribution-rbse.html">http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2010/11/bse-atypical-lesion-distribution-rbse.html</a><br />
<br />
<br />
Sunday, March 27, 2011<br />
<br />
SCRAPIE USA UPDATE FEBRUARY 2011<br />
<br />
<a href="http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/03/scrapie-usa-update-february-2011.html">http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/03/scrapie-usa-update-february-2011.html</a><br />
<br />
<br />
Monday, April 25, 2011<br />
<br />
Experimental Oral Transmission of Atypical Scrapie to Sheep<br />
<br />
Volume 17, Number 5-May 2011<br />
<br />
<a href="http://nor-98.blogspot.com/2011/04/experimental-oral-transmission-of.html">http://nor-98.blogspot.com/2011/04/experimental-oral-transmission-of.html</a><br />
<br />
<br />
Wednesday, March 9, 2011<br />
<br />
27 U.S. Senators want to force feed Japan Highly Potential North America Mad Cow Beef TSE PRION CJD<br />
<br />
March 8, 2011<br />
<br />
President Barack Obama The White House<br />
<br />
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, W Washington, DC 20500<br />
<br />
Dear President Obama:<br />
<br />
<a href="http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/03/27-us-senators-want-to-force-feed-japan.html">http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/03/27-us-senators-want-to-force-feed-japan.html</a><br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
TSSTerry S. Singeltary Sr.http://www.blogger.com/profile/06986622967539963260noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4595956519532618538.post-6262100860029627792011-04-19T08:50:00.000-07:002011-04-19T08:50:55.050-07:00Bull aged over 48 months enters food supply without being tested for BSE Monday 18 April 2011Bull aged over 48 months enters food supply without being tested for BSE Monday 18 April 2011<br />
<br />
The Agency has been notified that meat has entered the food supply from a bull aged over 48 months that had not been tested for BSE. A negative BSE test result is mandatory for cattle slaughtered for human consumption at over 48 months of age.<br />
<br />
It is very unlikely that the bull was infected with BSE and as specified risk material (SRM) was removed, any risk to human health is extremely low. SRM is that part of the animal most likely to contain BSE infectivity.<br />
<br />
The bull, aged 88 months, was slaughtered at S J Norman & Sons’ abattoir in Bridport, Dorset on 3 February 2011. The error was discovered on 5 April in the course of routine cross-checks of slaughter and BSE test data.<br />
<br />
According to BSE regulations, the untested bull should not have entered the food supply. However, by the time the failure was discovered, the carcass had left the premises.<br />
<br />
Subsequent checks indicate that all the meat from the carcass is no longer traceable and is likely to have been eaten.<br />
<br />
<a href="http://www.food.gov.uk/news/newsarchive/2011/apr/otmbull">http://www.food.gov.uk/news/newsarchive/2011/apr/otmbull</a><br />
<br />
<br />
Wednesday, April 13, 2011<br />
<br />
Joint consultation by the FSA, Defra and Welsh Assembly Government on proposed changes to BSE testing of cattle slaughtered for human consumption<br />
<br />
<a href="http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2011/04/joint-consultation-by-fsa-defra-and.html">http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2011/04/joint-consultation-by-fsa-defra-and.html</a><br />
<br />
<br />
The drawbacks of allowing testing relate to the potential to negatively impact consumer attitudes toward untested beef, lack of support from regulators, and the prospect that testing, especially under a future ante mortem test, might identify positive cases and adversely impact Canada‘s BSE risk status.<br />
<br />
SEE FULL TEXT ;<br />
<br />
<a href="http://prioninstitute.ca/forms/BSE%20Testing%20Final-revised%20%20Plus%20App%20C%20AM%20Mar%2029.pdf">http://prioninstitute.ca/forms/BSE%20Testing%20Final-revised%20%20Plus%20App%20C%20AM%20Mar%2029.pdf</a><br />
<br />
<br />
Saturday, January 29, 2011<br />
<br />
Atypical L-Type Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (L-BSE) Transmission to Cynomolgus Macaques, a Non-Human Primate<br />
<br />
Jpn. J. Infect. Dis., 64 (1), 81-84, 2011<br />
<br />
<a href="http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/01/atypical-l-type-bovine-spongiform.html">http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/01/atypical-l-type-bovine-spongiform.html</a><br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
Monday, May 11, 2009<br />
<br />
Rare BSE mutation raises concerns over risks to public health<br />
<br />
<a href="http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2009/05/rare-bse-mutation-raises-concerns-over.html">http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2009/05/rare-bse-mutation-raises-concerns-over.html</a><br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
The most recent assessments (and reassessments) were published in June 2005 (Table I; 18), and included the categorisation of Canada, the USA, and Mexico as GBR III. Although only Canada and the USA have reported cases, the historically open system of trade in North America suggests that it is likely that BSE is present also in Mexico.<br />
<br />
<a href="http://www.oie.int/boutique/extrait/06heim937950.pdf">http://www.oie.int/boutique/extrait/06heim937950.pdf</a><br />
<br />
<br />
Wednesday, August 11, 2010<br />
<br />
REPORT ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE SIXTEENTH CASE OF BOVINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY (BSE) IN CANADA<br />
<br />
<a href="http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2010/08/report-on-investigation-of-sixteenth.html">http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2010/08/report-on-investigation-of-sixteenth.html</a><br />
<br />
<br />
Thursday, August 19, 2010<br />
<br />
REPORT ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE SEVENTEENTH CASE OF BOVINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY (BSE) IN CANADA<br />
<br />
<a href="http://bseusa.blogspot.com/2010/08/report-on-investigation-of-seventeenth.html">http://bseusa.blogspot.com/2010/08/report-on-investigation-of-seventeenth.html</a><br />
<br />
<br />
Thursday, February 10, 2011<br />
<br />
TRANSMISSIBLE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY REPORT UPDATE CANADA FEBRUARY 2011 and how to hide mad cow disease in Canada Current as of: 2011-01-31<br />
<br />
<a href="http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2011/02/transmissible-spongiform-encephalopathy.html">http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2011/02/transmissible-spongiform-encephalopathy.html</a><br />
<br />
<br />
Friday, March 4, 2011<br />
<br />
Alberta dairy cow found with mad cow disease<br />
<br />
<a href="http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/03/alberta-dairy-cow-found-with-mad-cow.html">http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/03/alberta-dairy-cow-found-with-mad-cow.html</a><br />
<br />
<br />
i wonder if CFIA Canada uses the same OBEX ONLY diagnostic criteria as the USDA ? they could not have found a mad cow if they were standing beside the stumbling and staggering bovine $$$, using the diagnostic criteria they were using, AND TOLD SO, but they kept on doing it anyway. ...<br />
<br />
<br />
Tuesday, November 02, 2010<br />
<br />
BSE - ATYPICAL LESION DISTRIBUTION (RBSE 92-21367) statutory (obex only) diagnostic criteria CVL 1992<br />
<br />
<a href="http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2010/11/bse-atypical-lesion-distribution-rbse.html">http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2010/11/bse-atypical-lesion-distribution-rbse.html</a><br />
<br />
<br />
Wednesday, November 17, 2010<br />
<br />
MAD COW TESTING FAKED IN USA BY Nebraska INSPECTOR Senator Mike Johanns STATE<br />
<br />
<a href="http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2010/11/mad-cow-testing-faked-in-usa-by.html">http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2010/11/mad-cow-testing-faked-in-usa-by.html</a><br />
<br />
<br />
Friday, February 18, 2011<br />
<br />
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA VS GALEN J. NIEHUES FAKED MAD COW FEED TEST ON 92 BSE INSPECTION REPORTS FOR APPROXIMATELY 100 CATTLE OPERATIONS ''PLEADS GUILTY"<br />
<br />
<a href="http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2011/02/united-states-of-america-vs-galen-j.html">http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2011/02/united-states-of-america-vs-galen-j.html</a><br />
<br />
<br />
Subject: USDA OIG SEMIANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS FY 2007 1st Half (bogus BSE sampling FROM HEALTHY USDA CATTLE) Date: June 21, 2007 at 2:49 pm PST<br />
<br />
Owner and Corporation Plead Guilty to Defrauding Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Surveillance Program<br />
<br />
An Arizona meat processing company and its owner pled guilty in February 2007 to charges of theft of Government funds, mail fraud, and wire fraud. The owner and his company defrauded the BSE Surveillance Program when they falsified BSE Surveillance Data Collection Forms and then submitted payment requests to USDA for the services. In addition to the targeted sample population (those cattle that were more than 30 months old or had other risk factors for BSE), the owner submitted to USDA, or caused to be submitted, BSE obex (brain stem) samples from healthy USDA-inspected cattle. As a result, the owner fraudulently received approximately $390,000. Sentencing is scheduled for May 2007.<br />
<br />
snip...<br />
<br />
Topics that will be covered in ongoing or planned reviews under Goal 1 include:<br />
<br />
soundness of BSE maintenance sampling (APHIS),<br />
<br />
implementation of Performance-Based Inspection System enhancements for specified risk material (SRM) violations and improved inspection controls over SRMs (FSIS and APHIS),<br />
<br />
snip...<br />
<br />
The findings and recommendations from these efforts will be covered in future semiannual reports as the relevant audits and investigations are completed.<br />
<br />
4 USDA OIG SEMIANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS FY 2007 1st Half<br />
<br />
<a href="http://www.usda.gov/oig/webdocs/sarc070619.pdf">http://www.usda.gov/oig/webdocs/sarc070619.pdf</a><br />
<br />
<br />
THE USDA JUNE 2004 ENHANCED BSE SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM WAS TERRIBLY FLAWED ;<br />
<br />
CDC DR. PAUL BROWN TSE EXPERT COMMENTS 2006<br />
<br />
In an article today for United Press International, science reporter Steve Mitchell writes:<br />
<br />
Analysis: What that mad cow means<br />
<br />
By STEVE MITCHELL UPI Senior Medical Correspondent<br />
<br />
WASHINGTON, March 15 (UPI) -- The U.S. Department of Agriculture was quick to assure the public earlier this week that the third case of mad cow disease did not pose a risk to them, but what federal officials have not acknowledged is that this latest case indicates the deadly disease has been circulating in U.S. herds for at least a decade.<br />
<br />
The second case, which was detected last year in a Texas cow and which USDA officials were reluctant to verify, was approximately 12 years old.<br />
<br />
These two cases (the latest was detected in an Alabama cow) present a picture of the disease having been here for 10 years or so, since it is thought that cows usually contract the disease from contaminated feed they consume as calves. The concern is that humans can contract a fatal, incurable, brain-wasting illness from consuming beef products contaminated with the mad cow pathogen.<br />
<br />
"The fact the Texas cow showed up fairly clearly implied the existence of other undetected cases," Dr. Paul Brown, former medical director of the National Institutes of Health's Laboratory for Central Nervous System Studies and an expert on mad cow-like diseases, told United Press International. "The question was, 'How many?' and we still can't answer that."<br />
<br />
Brown, who is preparing a scientific paper based on the latest two mad cow cases to estimate the maximum number of infected cows that occurred in the United States, said he has "absolutely no confidence in USDA tests before one year ago" because of the agency's reluctance to retest the Texas cow that initially tested positive.<br />
<br />
USDA officials finally retested the cow and confirmed it was infected seven months later, but only at the insistence of the agency's inspector general.<br />
<br />
"Everything they did on the Texas cow makes everything they did before 2005 suspect," Brown said.<br />
<br />
Despite this, Brown said the U.S. prevalence of mad cow, formally known as bovine spongiform encephalopathy, or BSE, did not significantly threaten human or cattle health.<br />
<br />
"Overall, my view is BSE is highly unlikely to pose any important risk either in cattle feed or human feed," he said.<br />
<br />
However, Jean Halloran of Consumers Union in Yonkers, N.Y., said consumers should be troubled by the USDA's secrecy and its apparent plan to dramatically cut back the number of mad cow tests it conducts.<br />
<br />
"Consumers should be very concerned about how little we know about the USDA's surveillance program and the failure of the USDA to reveal really important details," Halloran told UPI. "Consumers have to be really concerned if they're going to cut back the program," she added.<br />
<br />
Last year the USDA tested more than 300,000 animals for the disease, but it has proposed, even in light of a third case, scaling back the program to 40,000 tests annually.<br />
<br />
"They seem to be, in terms of actions and policies, taking a lot more seriously the concerns of the cattle industry than the concerns of consumers," Halloran said. "It's really hard to know what it takes to get this administration to take action to protect the public."<br />
<br />
The USDA has insisted that the safeguards of a ban on incorporating cow tissue into cattle feed (which is thought to spread the disease) and removal of the most infectious parts of cows, such as the brain and spinal cord, protect consumers. But the agency glosses over the fact that both of these systems have been revealed to be inadequately implemented.<br />
<br />
The feed ban, which is enforced by the Food and Drug Administration, has been criticized by the Government Accountability Office in two reports, the most recent coming just last year. The GAO said the FDA's enforcement of the ban continues to have weaknesses that "undermine the nation's firewall against BSE."<br />
<br />
USDA documents released last year showed more than 1,000 violations of the regulations requiring the removal of brains and spinal cords in at least 35 states, Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands, with some plants being cited repeatedly for infractions. In addition, a violation of similar regulations that apply to beef exported to Japan is the reason why Japan closed its borders to U.S. beef in January six weeks after reopening them.<br />
<br />
Other experts also question the adequacy of the USDA's surveillance system. The USDA insists the prevalence of mad cow disease is low, but the agency has provided few details of its surveillance program, making it difficult for outside experts to know if the agency's monitoring plan is sufficient.<br />
<br />
"It's impossible to judge the adequacy of the surveillance system without having a breakdown of the tested population by age and risk status," Elizabeth Mumford, a veterinarian and BSE expert at Safe Food Solutions in Bern, Switzerland, a company that provides advice on reducing mad cow risk to industry and governments, told UPI.<br />
<br />
"Everybody would be happier and more confident and in a sense it might be able to go away a little bit for (the USDA) if they would just publish a breakdown on the tests," Mumford added.<br />
<br />
UPI requested detailed records about animals tested under the USDA's surveillance plan via the Freedom of Information Act in May 2004 but nearly two years later has not received any corresponding documents from the agency, despite a federal law requiring agencies to comply within 30 days. This leaves open the question of whether the USDA is withholding the information, does not have the information or is so haphazardly organized that it cannot locate it.<br />
<br />
Mumford said the prevalence of the disease in U.S. herds is probably quite low, but there have probably been other cases that have so far gone undetected. "They're only finding a very small fraction of that low prevalence," she said.<br />
<br />
Mumford expressed surprise at the lack of concern about the deadly disease from American consumers. "I would expect the U.S. public to be more concerned," she said.<br />
<br />
Markus Moser, a molecular biologist and chief executive officer of Prionics, a Swiss firm that manufactures BSE test kits, told UPI one concern is that if people are infected, the mad cow pathogen could become "humanized" or more easily transmitted from person to person.<br />
<br />
"Transmission would be much easier, through all kinds of medical procedures" and even through the blood supply, Moser said.<br />
<br />
© Copyright 2006 United Press International, Inc. All Rights Reserved<br />
<br />
<a href="http://www.upi.com/ConsumerHealthDaily/view.php?StoryID=20060315-055557-1284r">http://www.upi.com/ConsumerHealthDaily/view.php?StoryID=20060315-055557-1284r</a><br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<a href="http://www.upi.com/Science_News/2003/12/30/Mad-Cow-Linked-to-thousands-of-CJD-cases/UPI-47861072816318/">http://www.upi.com/Science_News/2003/12/30/Mad-Cow-Linked-to-thousands-of-CJD-cases/UPI-47861072816318/</a><br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
CDC - Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy and Variant Creutzfeldt ... Dr. Paul Brown is Senior Research Scientist in the Laboratory of Central Nervous System ... Address for correspondence: Paul Brown, Building 36, Room 4A-05, ...<br />
<br />
<a href="http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/eid/vol7no1/brown.htm">http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/eid/vol7no1/brown.htm</a><br />
<br />
<br />
PAUL BROWN COMMENT TO ME ON THIS ISSUE<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
Tuesday, September 12, 2006 11:10 AM<br />
<br />
"Actually, Terry, I have been critical of the USDA handling of the mad cow issue for some years, and with Linda Detwiler and others sent lengthy detailed critiques and recommendations to both the USDA and the Canadian Food Agency." ........TSS<br />
<br />
<a href="http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2009/07/mad-cow-cover-up-usa-masked-as-sporadic.html">http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2009/07/mad-cow-cover-up-usa-masked-as-sporadic.html</a><br />
<br />
<br />
OR, what the Honorable Phyllis Fong of the OIG found ;<br />
<br />
Audit Report Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Surveillance Program  Phase II and Food Safety and Inspection Service<br />
<br />
Controls Over BSE Sampling, Specified Risk Materials, and Advanced Meat Recovery Products - Phase III<br />
<br />
Report No. 50601-10-KC January 2006<br />
<br />
Finding 2 Inherent Challenges in Identifying and Testing High-Risk Cattle Still Remain<br />
<br />
<a href="http://www.usda.gov/oig/webdocs/50601-10-KC.pdf">http://www.usda.gov/oig/webdocs/50601-10-KC.pdf</a><br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
Tuesday, January 1, 2008<br />
<br />
BSE OIE USDA<br />
<br />
STATEMENT BY DR. RON DEHAVEN REGARDING OIE RISK RECOMMENDATION<br />
<br />
March 9, 2007<br />
<br />
<a href="http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2008/01/bse-oie-usda.html">http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2008/01/bse-oie-usda.html</a><br />
<br />
<br />
2009 UPDATE ON ALABAMA AND TEXAS MAD COWS 2005 and 2006<br />
<br />
<a href="http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2006/08/bse-atypical-texas-and-alabama-update.html">http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2006/08/bse-atypical-texas-and-alabama-update.html</a><br />
<br />
<br />
10,000,000+ LBS. of PROHIBITED BANNED MAD COW FEED I.E. BLOOD LACED MBM IN COMMERCE USA 2007<br />
<br />
Date: March 21, 2007 at 2:27 pm PST<br />
<br />
RECALLS AND FIELD CORRECTIONS: VETERINARY MEDICINES -- CLASS II<br />
<br />
___________________________________<br />
<br />
PRODUCT<br />
<br />
Bulk cattle feed made with recalled Darling's 85% Blood Meal, Flash Dried, Recall # V-024-2007<br />
<br />
CODE<br />
<br />
Cattle feed delivered between 01/12/2007 and 01/26/2007<br />
<br />
RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER<br />
<br />
Pfeiffer, Arno, Inc, Greenbush, WI. by conversation on February 5, 2007.<br />
<br />
Firm initiated recall is ongoing.<br />
<br />
REASON<br />
<br />
Blood meal used to make cattle feed was recalled because it was cross- contaminated with prohibited bovine meat and bone meal that had been manufactured on common equipment and labeling did not bear cautionary BSE statement.<br />
<br />
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE<br />
<br />
42,090 lbs.<br />
<br />
DISTRIBUTION<br />
<br />
WI<br />
<br />
___________________________________<br />
<br />
PRODUCT<br />
<br />
Custom dairy premix products: MNM ALL PURPOSE Pellet, HILLSIDE/CDL Prot- Buffer Meal, LEE, M.-CLOSE UP PX Pellet, HIGH DESERT/ GHC LACT Meal, TATARKA, M CUST PROT Meal, SUNRIDGE/CDL PROTEIN Blend, LOURENZO, K PVM DAIRY Meal, DOUBLE B DAIRY/GHC LAC Mineral, WEST PIONT/GHC CLOSEUP Mineral, WEST POINT/GHC LACT Meal, JENKS, J/COMPASS PROTEIN Meal, COPPINI - 8# SPECIAL DAIRY Mix, GULICK, L-LACT Meal (Bulk), TRIPLE J - PROTEIN/LACTATION, ROCK CREEK/GHC MILK Mineral, BETTENCOURT/GHC S.SIDE MK-MN, BETTENCOURT #1/GHC MILK MINR, V&C DAIRY/GHC LACT Meal, VEENSTRA, F/GHC LACT Meal, SMUTNY, A- BYPASS ML W/SMARTA, Recall # V-025-2007<br />
<br />
CODE<br />
<br />
The firm does not utilize a code - only shipping documentation with commodity and weights identified.<br />
<br />
RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER<br />
<br />
Rangen, Inc, Buhl, ID, by letters on February 13 and 14, 2007. Firm initiated recall is complete.<br />
<br />
REASON<br />
<br />
Products manufactured from bulk feed containing blood meal that was cross contaminated with prohibited meat and bone meal and the labeling did not bear cautionary BSE statement.<br />
<br />
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE<br />
<br />
9,997,976 lbs.<br />
<br />
DISTRIBUTION<br />
<br />
ID and NV<br />
<br />
END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR MARCH 21, 2007<br />
<br />
<a href="http://www.fda.gov/Safety/Recalls/EnforcementReports/2007/ucm120446.htm">http://www.fda.gov/Safety/Recalls/EnforcementReports/2007/ucm120446.htm</a><br />
<br />
<br />
BANNED MAD COW FEED IN COMMERCE IN ALABAMA (where h-g-BSEalabama mad cow was documented)<br />
<br />
<br />
Date: September 6, 2006 at 7:58 am PST PRODUCT<br />
<br />
a) EVSRC Custom dairy feed, Recall # V-130-6;<br />
<br />
b) Performance Chick Starter, Recall # V-131-6;<br />
<br />
c) Performance Quail Grower, Recall # V-132-6;<br />
<br />
d) Performance Pheasant Finisher, Recall # V-133-6.<br />
<br />
CODE None RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER Donaldson & Hasenbein/dba J&R Feed Service, Inc., Cullman, AL, by telephone on June 23, 2006 and by letter dated July 19, 2006. Firm initiated recall is complete.<br />
<br />
REASON<br />
<br />
Dairy and poultry feeds were possibly contaminated with ruminant based protein.<br />
<br />
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 477.72 tons<br />
<br />
DISTRIBUTION AL<br />
<br />
______________________________<br />
<br />
http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/enforce/2006/ENF00968.html<br />
<br />
PRODUCT Bulk custom dairy pre-mixes,<br />
<br />
Recall # V-120-6 CODE None RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER Ware Milling Inc., Houston, MS, by telephone on June 23, 2006. Firm initiated recall is complete. REASON Possible contamination of dairy animal feeds with ruminant derived meat and bone meal.<br />
<br />
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 350 tons<br />
<br />
DISTRIBUTION AL and MS<br />
<br />
______________________________<br />
<br />
PRODUCT<br />
<br />
a) Tucker Milling, LLC Tm 32% Sinking Fish Grower, #2680-Pellet, 50 lb. bags, Recall # V-121-6;<br />
<br />
b) Tucker Milling, LLC #31120, Game Bird Breeder Pellet, 50 lb. bags, Recall # V-122-6;<br />
<br />
c) Tucker Milling, LLC #31232 Game Bird Grower, 50 lb. bags, Recall # V-123-6;<br />
<br />
d) Tucker Milling, LLC 31227-Crumble, Game Bird Starter, BMD Medicated, 50 lb bags, Recall # V-124-6;<br />
<br />
e) Tucker Milling, LLC #31120, Game Bird Breeder, 50 lb bags, Recall # V-125-6;<br />
<br />
f) Tucker Milling, LLC #30230, 30 % Turkey Starter, 50 lb bags, Recall # V-126-6;<br />
<br />
g) Tucker Milling, LLC #30116, TM Broiler Finisher, 50 lb bags, Recall # V-127-6<br />
<br />
CODE All products manufactured from 02/01/2005 until 06/20/2006 RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER Recalling Firm: Tucker Milling LLC, Guntersville, AL, by telephone and visit on June 20, 2006, and by letter on June 23, 2006. Manufacturer: H. J. Baker and Brothers Inc., Stamford, CT. Firm initiated recall is ongoing.<br />
<br />
REASON Poultry and fish feeds which were possibly contaminated with ruminant based protein were not labeled as "Do not feed to ruminants".<br />
<br />
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 7,541-50 lb bags<br />
<br />
DISTRIBUTION AL, GA, MS, and TN<br />
<br />
END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR AUGUST 9, 2006<br />
<br />
###<br />
<br />
http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/ENFORCE/2006/ENF00964.html<br />
<br />
Subject: MAD COW FEED RECALL AL AND FL VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 125 TONS Products manufactured from 02/01/2005 until 06/06/2006<br />
<br />
Date: August 6, 2006 at 6:16 pm PST PRODUCT<br />
<br />
a) CO-OP 32% Sinking Catfish, Recall # V-100-6;<br />
<br />
b) Performance Sheep Pell W/Decox/A/N, medicated, net wt. 50 lbs, Recall # V-101-6;<br />
<br />
c) Pro 40% Swine Conc Meal -- 50 lb, Recall # V-102-6;<br />
<br />
d) CO-OP 32% Sinking Catfish Food Medicated, Recall # V-103-6;<br />
<br />
e) "Big Jim's" BBB Deer Ration, Big Buck Blend, Recall # V-104-6;<br />
<br />
f) CO-OP 40% Hog Supplement Medicated Pelleted, Tylosin 100 grams/ton, 50 lb. bag, Recall # V-105-6;<br />
<br />
g) Pig Starter Pell II, 18% W/MCDX Medicated 282020, Carbadox -- 0.0055%, Recall # V-106-6;<br />
<br />
h) CO-OP STARTER-GROWER CRUMBLES, Complete Feed for Chickens from Hatch to 20 Weeks, Medicated, Bacitracin Methylene Disalicylate, 25 and 50 Lbs, Recall # V-107-6;<br />
<br />
i) CO-OP LAYING PELLETS, Complete Feed for Laying Chickens, Recall # 108-6;<br />
<br />
j) CO-OP LAYING CRUMBLES, Recall # V-109-6;<br />
<br />
k) CO-OP QUAIL FLIGHT CONDITIONER MEDICATED, net wt 50 Lbs, Recall # V-110-6;<br />
<br />
l) CO-OP QUAIL STARTER MEDICATED, Net Wt. 50 Lbs, Recall # V-111-6;<br />
<br />
m) CO-OP QUAIL GROWER MEDICATED, 50 Lbs, Recall # V-112-6 CODE<br />
<br />
Product manufactured from 02/01/2005 until 06/06/2006<br />
<br />
RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER Alabama Farmers Cooperative, Inc., Decatur, AL, by telephone, fax, email and visit on June 9, 2006. FDA initiated recall is complete.<br />
<br />
REASON Animal and fish feeds which were possibly contaminated with ruminant based protein not labeled as "Do not feed to ruminants".<br />
<br />
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 125 tons<br />
<br />
DISTRIBUTION AL and FL<br />
<br />
END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR AUGUST 2, 2006<br />
<br />
###<br />
<br />
http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/enforce/2006/ENF00963.html<br />
<br />
MAD COW FEED RECALL USA EQUALS 10,878.06 TONS NATIONWIDE Sun Jul 16, 2006 09:22 71.248.128.67<br />
<br />
RECALLS AND FIELD CORRECTIONS: VETERINARY MEDICINE -- CLASS II<br />
<br />
______________________________<br />
<br />
PRODUCT<br />
<br />
a) PRO-LAK, bulk weight, Protein Concentrate for Lactating Dairy Animals, Recall # V-079-6;<br />
<br />
b) ProAmino II, FOR PREFRESH AND LACTATING COWS, net weight 50lb (22.6 kg), Recall # V-080-6;<br />
<br />
c) PRO-PAK, MARINE & ANIMAL PROTEIN CONCENTRATE FOR USE IN ANIMAL FEED, Recall # V-081-6;<br />
<br />
d) Feather Meal, Recall # V-082-6 CODE<br />
<br />
a) Bulk<br />
<br />
b) None<br />
<br />
c) Bulk<br />
<br />
d) Bulk<br />
<br />
RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER H. J. Baker & Bro., Inc., Albertville, AL, by telephone on June 15, 2006 and by press release on June 16, 2006. Firm initiated recall is ongoing.<br />
<br />
REASON<br />
<br />
Possible contamination of animal feeds with ruminent derived meat and bone meal.<br />
<br />
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 10,878.06 tons<br />
<br />
DISTRIBUTION Nationwide<br />
<br />
END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR July 12, 2006<br />
<br />
###<br />
<br />
http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/enforce/2006/ENF00960.html<br />
<br />
Monday, January 17, 2011<br />
<br />
MAD COW Update on Feed Enforcement Activities to Limit the Spread of BSE January 13, 2011<br />
<br />
January 2011<br />
<br />
<a href="http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/01/mad-cow-update-on-feed-enforcement.html">http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/01/mad-cow-update-on-feed-enforcement.html</a><br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
Friday, January 7, 2011<br />
<br />
MEAT AND BONE MEAL AND MINERAL FEED ADDITIVES MAY INCREASE THE RISK OF ORAL PRION DISEASE TRANSMISSION<br />
<br />
Journal of Toxicology and Environmental Health, Part A, 74:161–166, 2011 Copyright © Taylor & Francis Group, LLC ISSN: 1528-7394 print / 1087-2620 online DOI: 10.1080/15287394.2011.529066<br />
<br />
<a href="http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/01/meat-and-bone-meal-and-mineral-feed.html">http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/01/meat-and-bone-meal-and-mineral-feed.html</a><br />
<br />
<br />
Saturday, November 6, 2010<br />
<br />
TAFS1 Position Paper on Position Paper on Relaxation of the Feed Ban in the EU Berne, 2010 TAFS<br />
<br />
INTERNATIONAL FORUM FOR TRANSMISSIBLE ANIMAL DISEASES AND FOOD SAFETY a non-profit Swiss Foundation<br />
<br />
<a href="http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2010/11/tafs1-position-paper-on-position-paper.html">http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2010/11/tafs1-position-paper-on-position-paper.html</a><br />
<br />
<br />
Archive Number 20101206.4364 Published Date 06-DEC-2010 Subject Prion disease update 2010 (11)<br />
<br />
PRION DISEASE UPDATE 2010 (11)<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<a href="http://www.promedmail.org/pls/apex/f?p=2400:1001:5492868805159684::NO::F2400_P1001_BACK_PAGE,F2400_P1001_PUB_MAIL_ID:1000,86129">http://www.promedmail.org/pls/apex/f?p=2400:1001:5492868805159684::NO::F2400_P1001_BACK_PAGE,F2400_P1001_PUB_MAIL_ID:1000,86129</a><br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
CJD9/10022<br />
<br />
October 1994<br />
<br />
Mr R.N. Elmhirst Chairman British Deer Farmers Association Holly Lodge Spencers Lane BerksWell Coventry CV7 7BZ<br />
<br />
Dear Mr Elmhirst,<br />
<br />
CREUTZFELDT-JAKOB DISEASE (CJD) SURVEILLANCE UNIT REPORT<br />
<br />
Thank you for your recent letter concerning the publication of the third annual report from the CJD Surveillance Unit. I am sorry that you are dissatisfied with the way in which this report was published.<br />
<br />
The Surveillance Unit is a completely independant outside body and the Department of Health is committed to publishing their reports as soon as they become available. In the circumstances it is not the practice to circulate the report for comment since the findings of the report would not be amended. In future we can ensure that the British Deer Farmers Association receives a copy of the report in advance of publication.<br />
<br />
The Chief Medical Officer has undertaken to keep the public fully informed of the results of any research in respect of CJD. This report was entirely the work of the unit and was produced completely independantly of the the Department.<br />
<br />
The statistical results reqarding the consumption of venison was put into perspective in the body of the report and was not mentioned at all in the press release. Media attention regarding this report was low key but gave a realistic presentation of the statistical findings of the Unit. This approach to publication was successful in that consumption of venison was highlighted only once by the media ie. in the News at one television proqramme.<br />
<br />
I believe that a further statement about the report, or indeed statistical links between CJD and consumption of venison, would increase, and quite possibly give damaging credence, to the whole issue. From the low key media reports of which I am aware it seems unlikely that venison consumption will suffer adversely, if at all.<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<a href="http://web.archive.org/web/20030511010117/http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/yb/1994/10/00003001.pdf">http://web.archive.org/web/20030511010117/http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/yb/1994/10/00003001.pdf</a><br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
Wednesday, February 16, 2011<br />
<br />
IN CONFIDENCE<br />
<br />
SCRAPIE TRANSMISSION TO CHIMPANZEES<br />
<br />
IN CONFIDENCE<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<a href="http://scrapie-usa.blogspot.com/2011/02/in-confidence-scrapie-transmission-to.html">http://scrapie-usa.blogspot.com/2011/02/in-confidence-scrapie-transmission-to.html</a><br />
<br />
<br />
Wednesday, March 9, 2011<br />
<br />
27 U.S. Senators want to force feed Japan Highly Potential North America Mad Cow Beef TSE PRION CJD<br />
<br />
March 8, 2011<br />
<br />
President Barack Obama The White House<br />
<br />
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, W Washington, DC 20500<br />
<br />
Dear President Obama:<br />
<br />
<a href="http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/03/27-us-senators-want-to-force-feed-japan.html">http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/03/27-us-senators-want-to-force-feed-japan.html</a><br />
<br />
<br />
Sunday, April 17, 2011<br />
<br />
Transmission of Prion Strains in a Transgenic Mouse Model Overexpressing Human A53T Mutated [alpha]-Synuclein<br />
<br />
Journal of Neuropathology & Experimental Neurology:<br />
<br />
POST AUTHOR CORRECTIONS, 8 April 2011 doi: 10.1097/NEN.0b013e318217d95f<br />
<br />
<a href="http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2011/04/transmission-of-prion-strains-in.html">http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2011/04/transmission-of-prion-strains-in.html</a><br />
<br />
<br />
Saturday, March 5, 2011<br />
<br />
MAD COW ATYPICAL CJD PRION TSE CASES WITH CLASSIFICATIONS PENDING ON THE RISE IN NORTH AMERICA<br />
<br />
<a href="http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/03/mad-cow-atypical-cjd-prion-tse-cases.html">http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/03/mad-cow-atypical-cjd-prion-tse-cases.html</a><br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
another by-product of ignorance and the industries $$$<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
Tuesday, March 29, 2011<br />
<br />
TRANSMISSIBLE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY EXPOSURE SPREADING VIA HOSPITALS AND SURGICAL PROCEDURES AROUND THE GLOBE<br />
<br />
<a href="http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/03/transmissible-spongiform-encephalopathy.html">http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/03/transmissible-spongiform-encephalopathy.html</a><br />
<br />
<br />
Friday, April 15, 2011<br />
<br />
PRION TRANSMISSIBLE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY PROJECTS, RESEARCH FUNDING, BSE VOLUNTARY TESTING UPDATE IN NORTH AMERICA 2011<br />
<br />
<a href="http://prionunitusaupdate2008.blogspot.com/2011/04/prion-transmissible-spongiform.html">http://prionunitusaupdate2008.blogspot.com/2011/04/prion-transmissible-spongiform.html</a><br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
The most recent assessments (and reassessments) were published in June 2005 (Table I; 18), and included the categorisation of Canada, the USA, and Mexico as GBR III. Although only Canada and the USA have reported cases, the historically open system of trade in North America suggests that it is likely that BSE is present also in Mexico.<br />
<br />
<a href="http://www.oie.int/boutique/extrait/06heim937950.pdf">http://www.oie.int/boutique/extrait/06heim937950.pdf</a><br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
TSSTerry S. Singeltary Sr.http://www.blogger.com/profile/06986622967539963260noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4595956519532618538.post-9174921605953528592011-04-13T11:09:00.000-07:002011-04-13T11:09:53.482-07:00Joint consultation by the FSA, Defra and Welsh Assembly Government on proposed changes to BSE testing of cattle slaughtered for human consumptionJoint consultation by the FSA, Defra and Welsh Assembly Government on proposed changes to BSE testing of cattle slaughtered for human consumption<br />
<br />
Monday 11 April 2011<br />
<br />
The FSA, Defra and the Welsh Assembly Government are consulting on (i) increasing the age above which all healthy cattle slaughtered for human consumption must be tested for bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE), from 48 to 72 months, from 1 July 2011; and (ii) from 1 January 2013, testing a sample number of healthy cattle slaughtered for human consumption aged over 72 months.<br />
<br />
All comments and views should be sent to:<br />
<br />
Katie Barnes<br />
<br />
Defra, Food and Farming Group Room 5A, 9 Millbank C/O 17 Smith Square London SW1P 3JR<br />
<br />
Tel: 020 7238 6535 Fax: 020 7238 3114 E-mail: BSETesting.ProposedChanges@defra.gsi.gov.uk<br />
<br />
Responses are requested by: 6 May 2011<br />
<br />
Audience<br />
<br />
Who will be affected by the proposals in this consultation?<br />
<br />
The cattle and meat industries, principally abattoirs that slaughter cattle aged more than 48 months for human consumption. Consumers will also have an interest.<br />
<br />
What is the purpose of this consultation?<br />
<br />
The European Union (EU) has agreed an amendment to Commission Decision 719/2009/EC to provide the United Kingdom (UK) and 21 other member states with the options of (i) increasing the age above which all healthy cattle slaughtered for human consumption must be tested for bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE), from 48 to 72 months, from 1 July 2011; and (ii) from 1 January 2013, testing a sample number of healthy cattle slaughtered for human consumption aged over 72 months.<br />
<br />
Have there been any previous consultations on this topic?<br />
<br />
Defra, the Welsh Assembly Government and the FSA consulted on changes to BSE testing in September 2008 and on the TSE Roadmap 2, in July 2010.<br />
<br />
Consultation details<br />
<br />
This consultation is being co-ordinated by Defra.<br />
<br />
The consultation package includes a partial Business and Regulatory Impact Assessment. This provides further detail on the above measures in terms of their impact on stakeholders.<br />
<br />
Separate consultations on proposals to make similar changes in Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales are being carried out in those countries.<br />
<br />
Responses:<br />
<br />
Your views and responses to specific questions are sought on the proposals described in the consultation document and Impact Assessment available on Defra’s website from the link below.<br />
<br />
Responses are required by close Friday 6 May 2011. Please state, in your response, whether you are responding as a private individual or on behalf of an organisation/company (including details of any stakeholders your organisation represents).<br />
<br />
Further information<br />
<br />
This consultation has been prepared in accordance with the HM Government Code of Practice on Consultation, which states that a consultation must follow better regulation best practice, including carrying out an Impact Assessment (Regulatory Impact Assessment in Scotland). The assessment is included in the consultation documents.<br />
<br />
We are interested in what you thought of this consultation and would therefore welcome your general feedback on both the consultation package and overall consultation process. If you would like to assist us to improve the quality of future consultations, please feel free to share your thoughts with us by using the consultation feedback questionnaire.<br />
<br />
Consultation feedback questionnaire (Word)<br />
<br />
Consultation feedback questionnaire (pdf)<br />
<br />
Publication of personal data and confidentiality of responses<br />
<br />
In accordance with the FSA principle of openness our Information Centre at Aviation House will hold a copy of the completed consultation. The FSA will publish a summary of responses, which may include personal data, such as your full name. Disclosure of any other personal data would be made only upon request for the full consultation responses. If you do not want this information to be released, please complete and return the Publication of Personal Data Form. Return of this form does not mean that we will treat your response to the consultation as confidential, just your personal data.<br />
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Data protection form (Word)<br />
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Data protection form (pdf)<br />
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Publication of response summary<br />
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Within three months of a consultation ending we aim to publish a summary of responses received and provide a link to it from this page.<br />
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If, after three months, the summary is still not showing, please contact the person who was responsible for the original consultation. Alternatively, you can contact the FSA Consultation Co-ordinator by email: consultationcoordinator@foodstandards.gsi.gov.uk<br />
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External links The Food Standards Agency has no responsibility for the content of external websites<br />
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Non-formal consultation on proposed changes to BSE testing of cattle slaughtered for human consumption<br />
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Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra) website<br />
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<a href="http://www.food.gov.uk/consultations/consulteng/2011/bsetestingeng">http://www.food.gov.uk/consultations/consulteng/2011/bsetestingeng</a><br />
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stupid is, as stupid does, and some times you just can not fix stupid $$$<br />
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Thursday, August 12, 2010<br />
<br />
Seven main threats for the future linked to prions<br />
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First threat<br />
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The TSE road map defining the evolution of European policy for protection against prion diseases is based on a certain numbers of hypotheses some of which may turn out to be erroneous. In particular, a form of BSE (called atypical Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy), recently identified by systematic testing in aged cattle without clinical signs, may be the origin of classical BSE and thus potentially constitute a reservoir, which may be impossible to eradicate if a sporadic origin is confirmed. ***Also, a link is suspected between atypical BSE and some apparently sporadic cases of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease in humans. These atypical BSE cases constitute an unforeseen first threat that could sharply modify the European approach to prion diseases.<br />
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Second threat<br />
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snip...<br />
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<a href="http://www.neuroprion.org/en/np-neuroprion.html">http://www.neuroprion.org/en/np-neuroprion.html</a><br />
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<a href="http://prionpathy.blogspot.com/2010/08/seven-main-threats-for-future-linked-to.html">http://prionpathy.blogspot.com/2010/08/seven-main-threats-for-future-linked-to.html</a><br />
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<a href="http://prionpathy.blogspot.com/">http://prionpathy.blogspot.com/</a><br />
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<a href="http://prionopathy.blogspot.com/">http://prionopathy.blogspot.com/</a><br />
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Wednesday, March 31, 2010<br />
<br />
Atypical BSE in Cattle<br />
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To date the OIE/WAHO assumes that the human and animal health standards set out in the BSE chapter for classical BSE (C-Type) applies to all forms of BSE which include the H-type and L-type atypical forms. This assumption is scientifically not completely justified and accumulating evidence suggests that this may in fact not be the case. Molecular characterization and the spatial distribution pattern of histopathologic lesions and immunohistochemistry (IHC) signals are used to identify and characterize atypical BSE. Both the L-type and H-type atypical cases display significant differences in the conformation and spatial accumulation of the disease associated prion protein (PrPSc) in brains of afflicted cattle. Transmission studies in bovine transgenic and wild type mouse models support that the atypical BSE types might be unique strains because they have different incubation times and lesion profiles when compared to C-type BSE. When L-type BSE was inoculated into ovine transgenic mice and Syrian hamster the resulting molecular fingerprint had changed, either in the first or a subsequent passage, from L-type into C-type BSE. In addition, non-human primates are specifically susceptible for atypical BSE as demonstrated by an approximately 50% shortened incubation time for L-type BSE as compared to C-type. Considering the current scientific information available, it cannot be assumed that these different BSE types pose the same human health risks as C-type BSE or that these risks are mitigated by the same protective measures.<br />
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This study will contribute to a correct definition of specified risk material (SRM) in atypical BSE. The incumbent of this position will develop new and transfer existing, ultra-sensitive methods for the detection of atypical BSE in tissue of experimentally infected cattle.<br />
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<a href="http://www.prionetcanada.ca/detail.aspx?menu=5&dt=293380&app=93&cat1=387&tp=20&lk=no&cat2">http://www.prionetcanada.ca/detail.aspx?menu=5&dt=293380&app=93&cat1=387&tp=20&lk=no&cat2</a><br />
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Saturday, January 29, 2011<br />
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Atypical L-Type Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (L-BSE) Transmission to Cynomolgus Macaques, a Non-Human Primate<br />
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Jpn. J. Infect. Dis., 64 (1), 81-84, 2011<br />
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<a href="http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/01/atypical-l-type-bovine-spongiform.html">http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/01/atypical-l-type-bovine-spongiform.html</a><br />
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Wednesday, February 16, 2011<br />
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IN CONFIDENCE<br />
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SCRAPIE TRANSMISSION TO CHIMPANZEES<br />
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IN CONFIDENCE<br />
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<a href="http://scrapie-usa.blogspot.com/2011/02/in-confidence-scrapie-transmission-to.html">http://scrapie-usa.blogspot.com/2011/02/in-confidence-scrapie-transmission-to.html</a><br />
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Tuesday, November 17, 2009<br />
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SEAC NEW RESULTS ON IDIOPATHIC BRAINSTEM NEURONAL CHROMATOLYSIS (IBNC) FROM THE VETERINARY LABORATORIES AGENCY (VLA) SEAC 103/1<br />
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<a href="http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2009/11/seac-new-results-on-idiopathic.html">http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2009/11/seac-new-results-on-idiopathic.html</a><br />
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31 March 2009 - A summary of the 102nd SEAC meeting (35 KB) held on 4th March 2009<br />
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snip...<br />
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SEAC noted that IBNC appeared to be a rare disease that occurred in older cattle, predominantly as single cases, although it is possible that surveillance may not detect all cases. Biochemical studies suggested that the prion protein may play a role in the disease. However, it is unclear whether the normal form of the protein or an abnormal form is involved. Studies are required to determine whether IBNC is transmissible or not. SEAC concluded, noting that specified risk material controls are in place to prevent cattle brain from entering the food supply, that current data on IBNC do not suggest it presents a risk to human health.<br />
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<a href="http://www.seac.gov.uk/summaries/seac102_summary.pdf">http://www.seac.gov.uk/summaries/seac102_summary.pdf</a><br />
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"All of the 15 cattle tested showed that the brains had abnormally accumulated prion protein."<br />
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Saturday, February 28, 2009<br />
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NEW RESULTS ON IDIOPATHIC BRAINSTEM NEURONAL CHROMATOLYSIS "All of the 15 cattle tested showed that the brains had abnormally accumulated PrP" 2009<br />
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SEAC 102/2<br />
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<a href="http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2009/02/new-results-on-idiopathic-brainstem.html">http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2009/02/new-results-on-idiopathic-brainstem.html</a><br />
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Wednesday, October 08, 2008<br />
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Idiopathic Brainstem Neuronal Chromatolysis (IBNC): a novel prion protein related disorder of cattle?<br />
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<a href="http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2008/10/idiopathic-brainstem-neuronal.html">http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2008/10/idiopathic-brainstem-neuronal.html</a><br />
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''THE LINE TO TAKE'' ON IBNC $$$ 1995 $$$<br />
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1995<br />
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page 9 of 14 ;<br />
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30. The Committee noted that the results were unusual. the questioned whether there could be coincidental BSE infection or contamination with scrapie. Dr. Tyrell noted that the feeling of the committee was that this did not represent a new agent but it was important to be prepared to say something publicly about these findings. A suggested line to take was that these were scientifically unpublishable results but in line with the policy of openness they would be made publicly available and further work done to test their validity. Since the BSE precautions were applied to IBNC cases, human health was protected. Further investigations should be carried out on isolations from brains of IBNC cases with removal of the brain and subsequent handling under strict conditions to avoid the risk of any contamination.<br />
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31. Mr. Bradley informed the Committee that the CVO had informed the CMO about the IBNC results and the transmission from retina and he, like the Committee was satisfied that the controls already in place or proposed were adequate. ...<br />
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snip... see full text<br />
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http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/yb/1995/06/21005001.pdf<br />
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<a href="http://collections.europarchive.org/tna/20080102204938/http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/yb/1995/06/21005001.pdf">http://collections.europarchive.org/tna/20080102204938/http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/yb/1995/06/21005001.pdf</a><br />
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<br />
SEAC MINUTES OF THE 19TH MEETING HELD ON 21 JUNE 1995 AT THE CENTRAL VETERINARY LABORATORY<br />
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31. Mr Bradley informed the Committee that the CVO had informed the CMO about the IBNC results and the transmission from retina and he, like the Committee was satisfied that the controls already in place or proposed were adequate. ...<br />
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<br />
<a href="http://web.archive.org/web/20030327015011/http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/yb/1995/06/21005001.pdf">http://web.archive.org/web/20030327015011/http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/yb/1995/06/21005001.pdf</a><br />
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Tuesday, November 02, 2010<br />
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IN CONFIDENCE<br />
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The information contained herein should not be disseminated further except on the basis of "NEED TO KNOW".<br />
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BSE - ATYPICAL LESION DISTRIBUTION (RBSE 92-21367) statutory (obex only) diagnostic criteria CVL 1992<br />
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<br />
<a href="http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2010/11/bse-atypical-lesion-distribution-rbse.html">http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2010/11/bse-atypical-lesion-distribution-rbse.html</a><br />
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Monday, May 12, 2008<br />
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BSE YOUNGEST AGE STATISTICS UNDER 30 MONTHS<br />
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<a href="http://bseyoungestage.blogspot.com/">http://bseyoungestage.blogspot.com/</a><br />
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Sunday, August 10, 2008<br />
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A New Prionopathy OR more of the same old BSe and sporadic CJD<br />
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<a href="http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2008/08/new-prionopathy-or-more-of-same-old-bse.html">http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2008/08/new-prionopathy-or-more-of-same-old-bse.html</a><br />
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NEW STRAIN OF CJD IN NORTH AMERICA cpsCJD or classification pending sporadic creutzfeldt jakob disease $$$<br />
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Saturday, March 5, 2011<br />
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MAD COW ATYPICAL CJD PRION TSE CASES WITH CLASSIFICATIONS PENDING ON THE RISE IN NORTH AMERICA<br />
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<a href="http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/03/mad-cow-atypical-cjd-prion-tse-cases.html">http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/03/mad-cow-atypical-cjd-prion-tse-cases.html</a><br />
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<br />
CANADA GREENS CALL FOR 100% BSE MAD COW TESTING<br />
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<br />
<br />
Greens call for ban on federal GMO research Apr 10, 2011 11:45 PM<br />
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snip...<br />
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The party said it would also aim to tighten Canada's testing net for bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) in slaughter cattle by implementing "100 per cent" testing of all slaughtered animals, but only "as soon as the process of detecting BSE in blood samples is perfected." The party also calls for ensuring no "animal byproducts" are used in ruminant animal feed....<br />
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snip...<br />
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<a href="http://www.albertafarmexpress.ca/issues/story.aspx?aid=1000407400">http://www.albertafarmexpress.ca/issues/story.aspx?aid=1000407400</a><br />
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Green Party MPs will develop a National Agricultural and Food Policy which:<br />
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Improves Food Safety by:<br />
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• Amending the Canadian Food Inspection Agency mandate to remove any obligation to promote Canadian agri-business, ensuring the focus is on food safety and food safety only, with enhanced resources for inspection and monitoring.<br />
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• Ensuring the quality and wholesomeness of food by strengthening the monitoring of pesticides, herbicides, fungicides, growth hormones, non-therapeutic antibiotics and insecticides in food production, processing and storage, with the goal of an orderly reduction in detectable residues of these substances until they reach undetectable limits.<br />
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• Establishing federally funded, community-guided school lunch programs across Canada to ensure that our children have daily access to healthy local food and can learn about sustainable food production and healthy eating.<br />
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• Strengthening Plant Protection and Health of Animals Programs with measures to ensure the integrity of farm food products.<br />
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• Improving and strengthening the Canadian Organic Standard.<br />
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• Providing transitional assistance for those switching to certified organic farming practices.<br />
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• Ensuring that no animal by-products are used in ruminant animal feed.<br />
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• Strengthen testing for BSE by implementing 100% testing (testing of every slaughtered animal) as soon as the process of detecting BSE in blood samples is perfected.<br />
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Vision Green April 2011<br />
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<a href="http://greenparty.ca/files/attachments/april_2011_vision_green.pdf">http://greenparty.ca/files/attachments/april_2011_vision_green.pdf</a><br />
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THANK YOU !!!<br />
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IN THE USA, we use the SSS policy, or the 'don't look, don't find' policy, or what i also call the ''obex only'' diagnostic criteria for how not to find a mad cow. The USA pollutes its oceans, bays, gulf, and rivers, and allows others to pollute them too. Allows industry to pollute the air we breath. Texas has now become the USA nuclear dumping grounds, thanks to our good gov perry. the USA federal gov. dumps all funding for the mad cow TSE prion diseases, while at the same time, human and animal TSE in North America are mutating, spreading, and cpsCJD (classification pending sporadic creutzfeldt jakob disease) is rising in young and old. i don't understand the insanity of it all. ...<br />
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All Other Emerging and Zoonotic Infectious Diseases CDC's FY 2012 request of $52,658,000 for all other emerging and zoonotic infectious disease activities is a decrease of $13,607,000 below the FY 2010 level, which includes the elimination of Prion activities ($5,473,000), a reduction for other cross-cutting infectious disease activities, and administrative savings. These funds support a range of critical emerging and zoonotic infectious disease programs such Lyme Disease, Chronic Fatigue Syndrome, and Special Pathogens, as well as other activities described below.<br />
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<a href="http://www.cdc.gov/fmo/topic/Budget%20Information/appropriations_budget_form_pdf/FY2012_CDC_CJ_Final.pdf">http://www.cdc.gov/fmo/topic/Budget%20Information/appropriations_budget_form_pdf/FY2012_CDC_CJ_Final.pdf</a><br />
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" the FY 2010 level, which includes the elimination of Prion activities ($5,473,000), "<br />
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PROBLEMS SOLVED $$$<br />
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Friday, March 4, 2011<br />
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Alberta dairy cow found with mad cow disease<br />
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<a href="http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/03/alberta-dairy-cow-found-with-mad-cow.html">http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/03/alberta-dairy-cow-found-with-mad-cow.html</a><br />
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Wednesday, August 11, 2010<br />
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REPORT ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE SIXTEENTH CASE OF BOVINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY (BSE) IN CANADA<br />
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<a href="http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2010/08/report-on-investigation-of-sixteenth.html">http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2010/08/report-on-investigation-of-sixteenth.html</a><br />
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Thursday, August 19, 2010<br />
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REPORT ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE SEVENTEENTH CASE OF BOVINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY (BSE) IN CANADA<br />
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<a href="http://bseusa.blogspot.com/2010/08/report-on-investigation-of-seventeenth.html">http://bseusa.blogspot.com/2010/08/report-on-investigation-of-seventeenth.html</a><br />
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Thursday, February 10, 2011<br />
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TRANSMISSIBLE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY REPORT UPDATE CANADA FEBRUARY 2011 and how to hide mad cow disease in Canada Current as of: 2011-01-31<br />
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<br />
<a href="http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2011/02/transmissible-spongiform-encephalopathy.html">http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2011/02/transmissible-spongiform-encephalopathy.html</a><br />
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Wednesday, December 22, 2010<br />
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Manitoba veterinarian has been fined $10,000 for falsifying certification documents for U.S. bound cattle and what about mad cow disease ?<br />
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<a href="http://usdameatexport.blogspot.com/2010/12/manitoba-veterinarian-has-been-fined.html">http://usdameatexport.blogspot.com/2010/12/manitoba-veterinarian-has-been-fined.html</a><br />
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Saturday, March 12, 2011<br />
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Variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease in a Canadian resident Infectious Diseases News Brief - March 11, 2011<br />
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<a href="http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/03/variant-creutzfeldt-jakob-disease-in.html">http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/03/variant-creutzfeldt-jakob-disease-in.html</a><br />
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Rare BSE mutation raises concerns over risks to public health<br />
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SIR - Atypical forms (known as H- and L-type) of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) have recently appeared in several European countries as well as in Japan, Canada and the United States. This raises the unwelcome possibility that variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (vCJD) could increase in the human population. Of the atypical BSE cases tested so far, a mutation in the prion protein gene (PRNP) has been detected in just one, a cow in Alabama with BSE; her healthy calf also carried the mutation (J. A. Richt and S. M. Hall PLoS Pathog. 4, e1000156; 2008). This raises the possibility that the disease could occasionally be genetic in origin. Indeed, the report of the UK BSE Inquiry in 2000 suggested that the UK epidemic had most likely originated from such a mutation and argued against the scrapierelated assumption. Such rare potential pathogenic PRNP mutations could occur in countries at present considered to be free of BSE, such as Australia and New Zealand. So it is important to maintain strict surveillance for BSE in cattle, with rigorous enforcement of the ruminant feed ban (many countries still feed ruminant proteins to pigs). Removal of specified risk material, such as brain and spinal cord, from cattle at slaughter prevents infected material from entering the human food chain. Routine genetic screening of cattle for PRNP mutations, which is now available, could provide additional data on the risk to the public. Because the point mutation identified in the Alabama animals is identical to that responsible for the commonest type of familial (genetic) CJD in humans, it is possible that the resulting infective prion protein might cross the bovine-human species barrier more easily. Patients with vCJD continue to be identified. The fact that this is happening less often should not lead to relaxation of the controls necessary to prevent future outbreaks. Malcolm A. Ferguson-Smith Cambridge University Department of Veterinary Medicine, Madingley Road, Cambridge CB3 0ES, UK e-mail: maf12@cam.ac.uk Jürgen A. Richt College of Veterinary Medicine, Kansas State University, K224B Mosier Hall, Manhattan, Kansas 66506-5601, USA<br />
<br />
NATURE|Vol 457|26 February 2009<br />
<br />
<br />
<a href="http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v457/n7233/full/4571079b.html">http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v457/n7233/full/4571079b.html</a><br />
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<br />
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August 4, 1997 partial and voluntary mad cow feed ban was nothing more than ink on paper ;<br />
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10,000,000+ LBS. of PROHIBITED BANNED MAD COW FEED I.E. BLOOD LACED MBM IN COMMERCE USA 2007<br />
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Date: March 21, 2007 at 2:27 pm PST<br />
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RECALLS AND FIELD CORRECTIONS: VETERINARY MEDICINES -- CLASS II<br />
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___________________________________<br />
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<br />
PRODUCT<br />
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Bulk cattle feed made with recalled Darling's 85% Blood Meal, Flash Dried, Recall # V-024-2007<br />
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CODE<br />
<br />
Cattle feed delivered between 01/12/2007 and 01/26/2007<br />
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RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER<br />
<br />
Pfeiffer, Arno, Inc, Greenbush, WI. by conversation on February 5, 2007.<br />
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Firm initiated recall is ongoing.<br />
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REASON<br />
<br />
Blood meal used to make cattle feed was recalled because it was cross- contaminated with prohibited bovine meat and bone meal that had been manufactured on common equipment and labeling did not bear cautionary BSE statement.<br />
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VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE<br />
<br />
42,090 lbs.<br />
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DISTRIBUTION<br />
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WI<br />
<br />
___________________________________<br />
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PRODUCT<br />
<br />
Custom dairy premix products: MNM ALL PURPOSE Pellet, HILLSIDE/CDL Prot- Buffer Meal, LEE, M.-CLOSE UP PX Pellet, HIGH DESERT/ GHC LACT Meal, TATARKA, M CUST PROT Meal, SUNRIDGE/CDL PROTEIN Blend, LOURENZO, K PVM DAIRY Meal, DOUBLE B DAIRY/GHC LAC Mineral, WEST PIONT/GHC CLOSEUP Mineral, WEST POINT/GHC LACT Meal, JENKS, J/COMPASS PROTEIN Meal, COPPINI - 8# SPECIAL DAIRY Mix, GULICK, L-LACT Meal (Bulk), TRIPLE J - PROTEIN/LACTATION, ROCK CREEK/GHC MILK Mineral, BETTENCOURT/GHC S.SIDE MK-MN, BETTENCOURT #1/GHC MILK MINR, V&C DAIRY/GHC LACT Meal, VEENSTRA, F/GHC LACT Meal, SMUTNY, A- BYPASS ML W/SMARTA, Recall # V-025-2007<br />
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CODE<br />
<br />
The firm does not utilize a code - only shipping documentation with commodity and weights identified.<br />
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RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER<br />
<br />
Rangen, Inc, Buhl, ID, by letters on February 13 and 14, 2007. Firm initiated recall is complete.<br />
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REASON<br />
<br />
Products manufactured from bulk feed containing blood meal that was cross contaminated with prohibited meat and bone meal and the labeling did not bear cautionary BSE statement.<br />
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VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE<br />
<br />
9,997,976 lbs.<br />
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DISTRIBUTION<br />
<br />
ID and NV<br />
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END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR MARCH 21, 2007<br />
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<br />
<a href="http://www.fda.gov/Safety/Recalls/EnforcementReports/2007/ucm120446.htm">http://www.fda.gov/Safety/Recalls/EnforcementReports/2007/ucm120446.htm</a><br />
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Thursday, November 18, 2010<br />
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA VS GALEN J. NIEHUES FAKED MAD COW FEED TEST ON 92 BSE INSPECTION REPORTS FOR APPROXIMATELY 100 CATTLE OPERATIONS<br />
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<a href="http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2010/11/united-states-of-america-vs-galen-j.html">http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2010/11/united-states-of-america-vs-galen-j.html</a><br />
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Wednesday, November 17, 2010<br />
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MAD COW TESTING FAKED IN USA BY Nebraska INSPECTOR Senator Mike Johanns STATE<br />
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<a href="http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2010/11/mad-cow-testing-faked-in-usa-by.html">http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2010/11/mad-cow-testing-faked-in-usa-by.html</a><br />
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Wednesday, November 17, 2010<br />
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MAD COW TESTING FAKED IN USA BY Nebraska INSPECTOR Senator Mike Johanns STATE<br />
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<a href="http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2010/11/mad-cow-testing-faked-in-usa-by.html">http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2010/11/mad-cow-testing-faked-in-usa-by.html</a><br />
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WHO IS RESPONSIBLE FOR SPREADING TSE prions AROUND THE GLOBE ???<br />
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you can thank the USDA/APHIS/FDA/CDC, MAFF/DEFRA, OIE, and WTO, in my opinion, they are responsible for this killing agent, and all strains that come with it, around the globe, and the death that come with it. this includes both the nvCJD, and the infamous sporadic CJD's, both directly, and indirectly via friendly fire. ...<br />
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England worried briefly about infecting other countries 27 Aug 00 confidential correspondence obtained by Terry S. Singeltary Sr.<br />
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BSE11/2 020;<br />
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SC1337p<br />
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DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND SOCIAL SECURITY Richmond House, 79 Whitehall, London SWIA 2NS Telephone 01-210 3000 From the Chief Medical Officer Sir Donald Achson KBE DM DSc FRCP FFCM FFOM<br />
<br />
Mr K C Meldrum Chief Veterinary Officer Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food Government Buildings Hook Rise South Tolworth Surbiton Surrey KT6 7NG 3 January 1990<br />
<br />
Dear Mr Meldrum<br />
<br />
BOVINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY<br />
<br />
You will recall that we have previously discussed the potential risks of BSE occurring in other countries as a result of the continuing export from the UK of meat and bone that may be contaminated by scrapie or possibly BSE.<br />
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I remain concerned that we are not being consistent in our attempts to contain the risks of BSE. Having banned the feeding of meat and bone meal to ruminamts in 1988, we should take steps to prevent these UK products being fed to ruminants in other countries. This could be achieved either through a ban on the export of meat and bone meal, or at least by the proper labelling of these products to make it absolutely clear they should not be fed to ruminants [or zoo animals, including rare and endangered primates -- webmaster]. Unless some such action is taken the difficult problems we have faced with BSE may well occur in other countries who import UK meat and bone meal. Surely it is short sighted for us to risk being seen in future as having been responsible for the introduction of BSE to the food chain in other countries.<br />
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I would be very interested to hear how you feel this gap in the present precautionary measures to eliminate BSE should be closed. We should be aiming at the global elimination of this new bovine disense. The export of our meat and bone meal is a continuing risk to other countries.<br />
<br />
Yours Sincerely Donald Acheson<br />
<br />
Copy: Dr Metters Dr Pickles<br />
<br />
90/1.03/1.1 ============ BSE13/3 0083<br />
<br />
Dr Pickles From: Dr J S Metters DCM0 International, Prevention and Community Services 7 June 1990 Copies to: Dr McInnes Miss Pease Mr Otley<br />
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BSE<br />
<br />
1. I spoke to Mr Capstick yesterday. Among other things, he told me that MAFF are now considering the labelling of animal foodstuffs, and in particular what detail would be required if such labelling was made compulsory. Apparently our freedom of action is constrained by EC Directives [total garbage, MAFF wants to keep exporting -- webmaster], and there is also concern about the level of detail that should be included in any foodstuff labels.<br />
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2. Mr Capstick suggested that this was not an area that DH had a particular interest. I countered by saying that we supported the principle of labelling of animal foodstuffs, particularly when these were going for export.<br />
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3. I also thanked him for keeping us informed, in a way that I hope encourage further communication of MAFF's internal deliberations.<br />
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J S METTERS Room 509 Richmond House Ext. 5591 92/YdeS 90/6.7/5.1<br />
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<a href="http://www.mad-cow.org/00/aug00_last_news.html#fff">http://www.mad-cow.org/00/aug00_last_news.html#fff</a><br />
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<br />
Subject: MBM/U.K. imports of MBM to the U.S./BSE Inquiry http://www.bse.org.uk/dfa/dfa25.htm <br />
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Date:Mon, 10 Apr 2000 15:14:21 -0700 <br />
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From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr." To: flounder@wt.net<br />
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<br />
69. On 14 February 1990, Mr Meldrum wrote a letter to the Chief Veterinary Officers of a number of countries. [76] On 15 February 1990, Mrs Attridge and other officials were sent a copy of the letter of 14 February 1990 and a list of the countries to which it had been sent. They were stated to be the countries which had imported ruminant based meat and bone meal from the United Kingdom. The countries listed were Norway; Sweden, Switzerland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Nigeria, Thailand, South Africa, Malaysia, Taiwan, Hong Kong, South Korea, Japan, Canada, USA, Turkey, Kenya, Malta, Libera, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Sri Lanka, Puerto Rico, Curacao, Finland.[77] The letter from Mr Meldrum included the following: <br />
<br />
<br />
Although we have kept the Office Internationale des Epizooties (OIE) fully informed about this new disease, and they will shortly be disseminating information and recommendations to member countries, I am writing to you on a personal basis to ensure that you are aware of all the developments in relation to BSE, including its likely cause. The majority of our findings have now been published in the Veterinary Record.?[78] 70. <br />
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On 20 February 1990, Dr Pickles wrote to Ms Verity (APS/CMO). Dr Pickles? minute included the following: <br />
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<br />
1. Mr Meldrum is arguing that MAFF have already taken all the necessary and responsible steps to warn importing countries of the BSE dangers in UK meat and bone meal. Yet the action taken so far overseas suggest the message has not got through, or where it has this has been late. The first nation that woke up to the danger did so a year after our own feed ban. It seems even now several EC countries neither ban our imports or the general feeding of ruminant protein. It also seems the OIE and CVO have yet to inform the rest of the world. <br />
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2. I do not see how this can be claimed to be responsible?. We do not need an expert group of the Scientific Veterinary Committee to tell us British meat and bone meal is unsafe for ruminants. I fail to understand why this cannot be tackled from the British end which seems to be the only sure way of doing it, preferably by banning exports. As CMO says in his letter of 3 January surely it is short sighted for us to risk being seen in future as having been responsible for the introduction of BSE to the food chain in other countries.??[79]<br />
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<a href="http://www.mad-cow.org/00/jul00_dont_eat_sheep.html#hhh">http://www.mad-cow.org/00/jul00_dont_eat_sheep.html#hhh</a><br />
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NOW, 2011, and the USA is doing the same thing the UK did back in 1985, the USA and North America are poisoning the globe with Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy aka mad cow disease, typical and atypical, from many species, including the bovine, but it's legal now thanks to the BSE MRR policy, which did away with all logic on TSE surveillance and eradication, just for trading purpose, thanks to the USDA, OIE, WTO, et al. The BSE MRR policy set us back to ground zero, 1984-1985. ...<br />
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Docket APHIS-2006-0041 Docket Title Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Minimal-Risk Regions; Importation of Live Bovines and Products Derived from Bovines Commodities Docket Type Rulemaking Document APHIS-2006-0041-0001 Document Title Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Minimal-Risk Regions; Importation of Live Bovines and Products Derived From Bovines Public Submission APHIS-2006-0041-0006 Public Submission Title Comment from Terry S Singletary Sr Views Add Comments How To Comment<br />
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snip...<br />
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MY personal belief, since you ask, is that not only the Canadian border, but the USA border, and the Mexican border should be sealed up tighter than a drum for exporting there TSE tainted products, until a validated, 100% sensitive test is available, and all animals for human and animal consumption are tested. all we are doing is the exact same thing the UK did with there mad cow poisoning when they exported it all over the globe, all the while knowing what they were doing. this BSE MRR policy is nothing more than a legal tool to do just exactly what the UK did, thanks to the OIE and GW, it's legal now. and they executed Saddam for poisoning ???<br />
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go figure....<br />
<br />
Terry S. Singeltary Sr. P.O. Box 42 Bacliff, Texas USA 77518<br />
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<a href="http://www.regulations.gov/fdmspublic/component/main?main=DocumentDetail&d=APHIS-2006-0041-0006">http://www.regulations.gov/fdmspublic/component/main?main=DocumentDetail&d=APHIS-2006-0041-0006</a><br />
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APHIS-2006-0041-0006 TSE advisory committee for the meeting December 15, <br />
2006 Singeltary Attachment<br />
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<a href="http://www.regulations.gov/fdmspublic/ContentViewer?objectId=09000064801f3413&disposition=attachment&contentType=msw8">http://www.regulations.gov/fdmspublic/ContentViewer?objectId=09000064801f3413&disposition=attachment&contentType=msw8</a><br />
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From: Terry S. Singeltary Sr. [flounder9@verizon.net] <br />
Sent: Monday, July 24, 2006 1:09 PM <br />
To: FSIS RegulationsComments <br />
Subject: [Docket No. FSIS-2006-0011] FSIS Harvard Risk Assessment of Bovine <br />
Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) <br />
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Page 1 of 98 <br />
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8/3/2006 <br />
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Greetings FSIS, <br />
<br />
I would kindly like to comment on the following ; <br />
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FULL TEXT ; <br />
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<a href="http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/Comments/2006-0011/2006-0011-1.pdf">http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/Comments/2006-0011/2006-0011-1.pdf</a><br />
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Comments on technical aspects of the risk assessment were then submitted to FSIS. Comments were received from Food and Water Watch, Food Animal Concerns Trust (FACT), Farm Sanctuary, R-CALF USA, Linda A Detwiler, and Terry S. Singeltary. This document provides itemized replies to the public comments received on the 2005 updated Harvard BSE risk assessment. Please bear the following points in mind:<br />
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snip...see full text 33 pages ;<br />
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<a href="http://www.fsis.usda.gov/PDF/BSE_Risk_Assess_Response_Public_Comments.pdf">http://www.fsis.usda.gov/PDF/BSE_Risk_Assess_Response_Public_Comments.pdf</a><br />
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Wednesday, March 9, 2011 <br />
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27 U.S. Senators want to force feed Japan Highly Potential North America Mad Cow Beef TSE PRION CJD March 8, 2011<br />
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President Barack Obama The White House<br />
<br />
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, W Washington, DC 20500<br />
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Dear President Obama:<br />
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<a href="http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/03/27-us-senators-want-to-force-feed-japan.html">http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/03/27-us-senators-want-to-force-feed-japan.html</a><br />
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Saturday, December 18, 2010<br />
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OIE Global Conference on Wildlife Animal Health and Biodiversity - Preparing for the Future (TSE AND PRIONS) Paris (France), 23-25 February 2011<br />
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<a href="http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2010/12/oie-global-conference-on-wildlife.html">http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2010/12/oie-global-conference-on-wildlife.html</a><br />
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<a href="http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/">http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/</a><br />
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<a href="http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/">http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/</a><br />
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Wednesday, April 13, 2011 <br />
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CANADA GREENS CALL FOR 100% BSE MAD COW TESTING<br />
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<a href="http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2011/04/canada-greens-call-for-100-bse-mad-cow.html">http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2011/04/canada-greens-call-for-100-bse-mad-cow.html</a><br />
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very sadly disgusted in Bacliff, Texas<br />
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TSSTerry S. Singeltary Sr.http://www.blogger.com/profile/06986622967539963260noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4595956519532618538.post-57757452841253873682011-04-13T10:19:00.000-07:002011-04-13T10:19:04.679-07:00CANADA GREENS CALL FOR 100% BSE MAD COW TESTINGCANADA GREENS CALL FOR 100% BSE MAD COW TESTING<br />
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Greens call for ban on federal GMO research Apr 10, 2011 11:45 PM<br />
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snip...<br />
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The party said it would also aim to tighten Canada's testing net for bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) in slaughter cattle by implementing "100 per cent" testing of all slaughtered animals, but only "as soon as the process of detecting BSE in blood samples is perfected." The party also calls for ensuring no "animal byproducts" are used in ruminant animal feed....<br />
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snip...<br />
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<a href="http://www.albertafarmexpress.ca/issues/story.aspx?aid=1000407400">http://www.albertafarmexpress.ca/issues/story.aspx?aid=1000407400</a><br />
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Green Party MPs will develop a National Agricultural and Food Policy which: <br />
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Improves Food Safety by: <br />
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• Amending the Canadian Food Inspection Agency mandate to remove any obligation to promote Canadian agri-business, ensuring the focus is on food safety and food safety only, with enhanced resources for inspection and monitoring. <br />
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• Ensuring the quality and wholesomeness of food by strengthening the monitoring of pesticides, herbicides, fungicides, growth hormones, non-therapeutic antibiotics and insecticides in food production, processing and storage, with the goal of an orderly reduction in detectable residues of these substances until they reach undetectable limits. <br />
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• Establishing federally funded, community-guided school lunch programs across Canada to ensure that our children have daily access to healthy local food and can learn about sustainable food production and healthy eating. <br />
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• Strengthening Plant Protection and Health of Animals Programs with measures to ensure the integrity of farm food products. <br />
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• Improving and strengthening the Canadian Organic Standard. <br />
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• Providing transitional assistance for those switching to certified organic farming practices. <br />
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• Ensuring that no animal by-products are used in ruminant animal feed. <br />
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• Strengthen testing for BSE by implementing 100% testing (testing of every slaughtered animal) as soon as the process of detecting BSE in blood samples is perfected. <br />
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Vision Green April 2011<br />
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<a href="http://greenparty.ca/files/attachments/april_2011_vision_green.pdf">http://greenparty.ca/files/attachments/april_2011_vision_green.pdf</a><br />
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THANK YOU !!!<br />
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IN THE USA, we use the SSS policy, or the 'don't look, don't find' policy, or what i also call the ''obex only'' diagnostic criteria for how not to find a mad cow. The USA pollutes its oceans, bays, gulf, and rivers, and allows others to pollute them too. Allows industry to pollute the air we breath. Texas has now become the USA nuclear dumping grounds, thanks to our good gov perry. the USA federal gov. dumps all funding for the mad cow TSE prion diseases, while at the same time, human and animal TSE in North America are mutating, spreading, and cpsCJD (classification pending sporadic creutzfeldt jakob disease) is rising in young and old. i don't understand the insanity of it all. ...<br />
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All Other Emerging and Zoonotic Infectious Diseases CDC's FY 2012 request of $52,658,000 for all other emerging and zoonotic infectious disease activities is a decrease of $13,607,000 below the FY 2010 level, which includes the elimination of Prion activities ($5,473,000), a reduction for other cross-cutting infectious disease activities, and administrative savings. These funds support a range of critical emerging and zoonotic infectious disease programs such Lyme Disease, Chronic Fatigue Syndrome, and Special Pathogens, as well as other activities described below.<br />
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<a href="http://www.cdc.gov/fmo/topic/Budget%20Information/appropriations_budget_form_pdf/FY2012_CDC_CJ_Final.pdf">http://www.cdc.gov/fmo/topic/Budget%20Information/appropriations_budget_form_pdf/FY2012_CDC_CJ_Final.pdf</a><br />
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" the FY 2010 level, which includes the elimination of Prion activities ($5,473,000), "<br />
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PROBLEMS SOLVED $$$<br />
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Friday, March 4, 2011<br />
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Alberta dairy cow found with mad cow disease<br />
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<a href="http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/03/alberta-dairy-cow-found-with-mad-cow.html">http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/03/alberta-dairy-cow-found-with-mad-cow.html</a><br />
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Wednesday, August 11, 2010<br />
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REPORT ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE SIXTEENTH CASE OF BOVINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY (BSE) IN CANADA<br />
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<a href="http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2010/08/report-on-investigation-of-sixteenth.html">http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2010/08/report-on-investigation-of-sixteenth.html</a><br />
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Thursday, August 19, 2010<br />
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REPORT ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE SEVENTEENTH CASE OF BOVINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY (BSE) IN CANADA<br />
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<a href="http://bseusa.blogspot.com/2010/08/report-on-investigation-of-seventeenth.html">http://bseusa.blogspot.com/2010/08/report-on-investigation-of-seventeenth.html</a><br />
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Thursday, February 10, 2011<br />
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TRANSMISSIBLE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY REPORT UPDATE CANADA FEBRUARY 2011 and how to hide mad cow disease in Canada Current as of: 2011-01-31<br />
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<a href="http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2011/02/transmissible-spongiform-encephalopathy.html">http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2011/02/transmissible-spongiform-encephalopathy.html</a><br />
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Saturday, March 12, 2011<br />
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Variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease in a Canadian resident Infectious Diseases News Brief - March 11, 2011<br />
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<a href="http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/03/variant-creutzfeldt-jakob-disease-in.html">http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/03/variant-creutzfeldt-jakob-disease-in.html</a><br />
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Rare BSE mutation raises concerns over risks to public health<br />
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SIR - Atypical forms (known as H- and L-type) of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) have recently appeared in several European countries as well as in Japan, Canada and the United States. This raises the unwelcome possibility that variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (vCJD) could increase in the human population. Of the atypical BSE cases tested so far, a mutation in the prion protein gene (PRNP) has been detected in just one, a cow in Alabama with BSE; her healthy calf also carried the mutation (J. A. Richt and S. M. Hall PLoS Pathog. 4, e1000156; 2008). This raises the possibility that the disease could occasionally be genetic in origin. Indeed, the report of the UK BSE Inquiry in 2000 suggested that the UK epidemic had most likely originated from such a mutation and argued against the scrapierelated assumption. Such rare potential pathogenic PRNP mutations could occur in countries at present considered to be free of BSE, such as Australia and New Zealand. So it is important to maintain strict surveillance for BSE in cattle, with rigorous enforcement of the ruminant feed ban (many countries still feed ruminant proteins to pigs). Removal of specified risk material, such as brain and spinal cord, from cattle at slaughter prevents infected material from entering the human food chain. Routine genetic screening of cattle for PRNP mutations, which is now available, could provide additional data on the risk to the public. Because the point mutation identified in the Alabama animals is identical to that responsible for the commonest type of familial (genetic) CJD in humans, it is possible that the resulting infective prion protein might cross the bovine-human species barrier more easily. Patients with vCJD continue to be identified. The fact that this is happening less often should not lead to relaxation of the controls necessary to prevent future outbreaks. Malcolm A. Ferguson-Smith Cambridge University Department of Veterinary Medicine, Madingley Road, Cambridge CB3 0ES, UK e-mail: maf12@cam.ac.uk Jürgen A. Richt College of Veterinary Medicine, Kansas State University, K224B Mosier Hall, Manhattan, Kansas 66506-5601, USA<br />
<br />
NATURE|Vol 457|26 February 2009<br />
<br />
<a href="http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v457/n7233/full/4571079b.html">http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v457/n7233/full/4571079b.html</a><br />
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Thursday, August 12, 2010<br />
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Seven main threats for the future linked to prions<br />
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The NeuroPrion network has identified seven main threats for the future linked to prions.<br />
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First threat<br />
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The TSE road map defining the evolution of European policy for protection against prion diseases is based on a certain numbers of hypotheses some of which may turn out to be erroneous. In particular, a form of BSE (called atypical Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy), recently identified by systematic testing in aged cattle without clinical signs, may be the origin of classical BSE and thus potentially constitute a reservoir, which may be impossible to eradicate if a sporadic origin is confirmed. *** Also, a link is suspected between atypical BSE and some apparently sporadic cases of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease in humans. These atypical BSE cases constitute an unforeseen first threat that could sharply modify the European approach to prion diseases.<br />
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Second threat...<br />
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see full text ;<br />
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<a href="http://www.neuroprion.org/en/np-neuroprion.html">http://www.neuroprion.org/en/np-neuroprion.html</a><br />
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Thursday, August 12, 2010<br />
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Seven main threats for the future linked to prions<br />
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<a href="http://prionpathy.blogspot.com/2010/08/seven-main-threats-for-future-linked-to.html">http://prionpathy.blogspot.com/2010/08/seven-main-threats-for-future-linked-to.html</a><br />
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<br />
14th ICID International Scientific Exchange Brochure -<br />
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Final Abstract Number: ISE.114<br />
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Session: International Scientific Exchange<br />
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Transmissible Spongiform encephalopathy (TSE) animal and human TSE in North America update October 2009<br />
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T. Singeltary<br />
<br />
Bacliff, TX, USA<br />
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Background:<br />
<br />
An update on atypical BSE and other TSE in North America. Please remember, the typical U.K. c-BSE, the atypical l-BSE (BASE), and h-BSE have all been documented in North America, along with the typical scrapie's, and atypical Nor-98 Scrapie, and to date, 2 different strains of CWD, and also TME. All these TSE in different species have been rendered and fed to food producing animals for humans and animals in North America (TSE in cats and dogs ?), and that the trading of these TSEs via animals and products via the USA and Canada has been immense over the years, decades.<br />
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Methods:<br />
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12 years independent research of available data<br />
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Results:<br />
<br />
I propose that the current diagnostic criteria for human TSEs only enhances and helps the spreading of human TSE from the continued belief of the UKBSEnvCJD only theory in 2009. With all the science to date refuting it, to continue to validate this old myth, will only spread this TSE agent through a multitude of potential routes and sources i.e. consumption, medical i.e., surgical, blood, dental, endoscopy, optical, nutritional supplements, cosmetics etc.<br />
<br />
Conclusion:<br />
<br />
I would like to submit a review of past CJD surveillance in the USA, and the urgent need to make all human TSE in the USA a reportable disease, in every state, of every age group, and to make this mandatory immediately without further delay. The ramifications of not doing so will only allow this agent to spread further in the medical, dental, surgical arena's. Restricting the reporting of CJD and or any human TSE is NOT scientific. Iatrogenic CJD knows NO age group, TSE knows no boundaries. I propose as with Aguzzi, Asante, Collinge, Caughey, Deslys, Dormont, Gibbs, Gajdusek, Ironside, Manuelidis, Marsh, et al and many more, that the world of TSE Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy is far from an exact science, but there is enough proven science to date that this myth should be put to rest once and for all, and that we move forward with a new classification for human and animal TSE that would properly identify the infected species, the source species, and then the route.<br />
<br />
<a href="http://ww2.isid.org/Downloads/14th_ICID_ISE_Abstracts.pdf">http://ww2.isid.org/Downloads/14th_ICID_ISE_Abstracts.pdf</a><br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
Thursday, October 07, 2010<br />
<br />
Experimental Transmission of H-type Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy to Bovinized Transgenic Mice<br />
<br />
<a href="http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2010/10/experimental-transmission-of-h-type.html">http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2010/10/experimental-transmission-of-h-type.html</a><br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
Tuesday, November 02, 2010<br />
<br />
IN CONFIDENCE<br />
<br />
The information contained herein should not be disseminated further except on the basis of "NEED TO KNOW".<br />
<br />
BSE - ATYPICAL LESION DISTRIBUTION (RBSE 92-21367) statutory (obex only) diagnostic criteria CVL 1992<br />
<br />
<a href="http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2010/11/bse-atypical-lesion-distribution-rbse.html">http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2010/11/bse-atypical-lesion-distribution-rbse.html</a><br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
August 4, 1997 partial and voluntary mad cow feed ban was nothing more than ink on paper ;<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
10,000,000+ LBS. of PROHIBITED BANNED MAD COW FEED I.E. BLOOD LACED MBM IN COMMERCE USA 2007<br />
<br />
Date: March 21, 2007 at 2:27 pm PST<br />
<br />
RECALLS AND FIELD CORRECTIONS: VETERINARY MEDICINES -- CLASS II<br />
<br />
___________________________________<br />
<br />
PRODUCT<br />
<br />
Bulk cattle feed made with recalled Darling's 85% Blood Meal, Flash Dried, Recall # V-024-2007<br />
<br />
CODE<br />
<br />
Cattle feed delivered between 01/12/2007 and 01/26/2007<br />
<br />
RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER<br />
<br />
Pfeiffer, Arno, Inc, Greenbush, WI. by conversation on February 5, 2007.<br />
<br />
Firm initiated recall is ongoing.<br />
<br />
REASON<br />
<br />
Blood meal used to make cattle feed was recalled because it was cross- contaminated with prohibited bovine meat and bone meal that had been manufactured on common equipment and labeling did not bear cautionary BSE statement.<br />
<br />
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE<br />
<br />
42,090 lbs.<br />
<br />
DISTRIBUTION<br />
<br />
WI<br />
<br />
___________________________________<br />
<br />
PRODUCT<br />
<br />
Custom dairy premix products: MNM ALL PURPOSE Pellet, HILLSIDE/CDL Prot- Buffer Meal, LEE, M.-CLOSE UP PX Pellet, HIGH DESERT/ GHC LACT Meal, TATARKA, M CUST PROT Meal, SUNRIDGE/CDL PROTEIN Blend, LOURENZO, K PVM DAIRY Meal, DOUBLE B DAIRY/GHC LAC Mineral, WEST PIONT/GHC CLOSEUP Mineral, WEST POINT/GHC LACT Meal, JENKS, J/COMPASS PROTEIN Meal, COPPINI - 8# SPECIAL DAIRY Mix, GULICK, L-LACT Meal (Bulk), TRIPLE J - PROTEIN/LACTATION, ROCK CREEK/GHC MILK Mineral, BETTENCOURT/GHC S.SIDE MK-MN, BETTENCOURT #1/GHC MILK MINR, V&C DAIRY/GHC LACT Meal, VEENSTRA, F/GHC LACT Meal, SMUTNY, A- BYPASS ML W/SMARTA, Recall # V-025-2007<br />
<br />
CODE<br />
<br />
The firm does not utilize a code - only shipping documentation with commodity and weights identified.<br />
<br />
RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER<br />
<br />
Rangen, Inc, Buhl, ID, by letters on February 13 and 14, 2007. Firm initiated recall is complete.<br />
<br />
REASON<br />
<br />
Products manufactured from bulk feed containing blood meal that was cross contaminated with prohibited meat and bone meal and the labeling did not bear cautionary BSE statement.<br />
<br />
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE<br />
<br />
9,997,976 lbs.<br />
<br />
DISTRIBUTION<br />
<br />
ID and NV<br />
<br />
END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR MARCH 21, 2007<br />
<br />
<a href="http://www.fda.gov/Safety/Recalls/EnforcementReports/2007/ucm120446.htm">http://www.fda.gov/Safety/Recalls/EnforcementReports/2007/ucm120446.htm</a><br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
Thursday, November 18, 2010<br />
<br />
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA VS GALEN J. NIEHUES FAKED MAD COW FEED TEST ON 92 BSE INSPECTION REPORTS FOR APPROXIMATELY 100 CATTLE OPERATIONS<br />
<br />
<a href="http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2010/11/united-states-of-america-vs-galen-j.html">http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2010/11/united-states-of-america-vs-galen-j.html</a><br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
Wednesday, November 17, 2010<br />
<br />
MAD COW TESTING FAKED IN USA BY Nebraska INSPECTOR Senator Mike Johanns STATE<br />
<br />
<a href="http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2010/11/mad-cow-testing-faked-in-usa-by.html">http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2010/11/mad-cow-testing-faked-in-usa-by.html</a><br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
Wednesday, November 17, 2010<br />
<br />
MAD COW TESTING FAKED IN USA BY Nebraska INSPECTOR Senator Mike Johanns STATE<br />
<br />
<a href="http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2010/11/mad-cow-testing-faked-in-usa-by.html">http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2010/11/mad-cow-testing-faked-in-usa-by.html</a><br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
Wednesday, December 22, 2010<br />
<br />
<br />
Manitoba veterinarian has been fined $10,000 for falsifying certification documents for U.S. bound cattle and what about mad cow disease ?<br />
<br />
<br />
<div></div><div><span style="font-family: Arial; font-size: x-small;"><a href="http://usdameatexport.blogspot.com/2010/12/manitoba-veterinarian-has-been-fined.html">http://usdameatexport.blogspot.com/2010/12/manitoba-veterinarian-has-been-fined.html</a></span></div><br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
Tuesday, November 02, 2010<br />
<br />
IN CONFIDENCE<br />
<br />
The information contained herein should not be disseminated further except on the basis of "NEED TO KNOW".<br />
<br />
BSE - ATYPICAL LESION DISTRIBUTION (RBSE 92-21367) statutory (obex only) diagnostic criteria CVL 1992<br />
<br />
<br />
<a href="http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2010/11/bse-atypical-lesion-distribution-rbse.html">http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2010/11/bse-atypical-lesion-distribution-rbse.html</a><br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
Sunday, April 12, 2009<br />
<br />
r-calf and the USA mad cow problem, don't look, don't find, and then blame Canada<br />
<br />
<br />
<a href="http://prionunitusaupdate2008.blogspot.com/2009/04/r-calf-and-usa-mad-cow-problem-dont.html">http://prionunitusaupdate2008.blogspot.com/2009/04/r-calf-and-usa-mad-cow-problem-dont.html</a><br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
Saturday, April 11, 2009<br />
<br />
CJD FOUNDATION SIDES WITH R-CALFERS NO BSE OR HUMAN TSE THERE OF IN USA 'don't be fooled'<br />
<br />
<br />
<a href="http://prionunitusaupdate2008.blogspot.com/2009/04/cjd-foundation-sides-with-r-calfers-no.html">http://prionunitusaupdate2008.blogspot.com/2009/04/cjd-foundation-sides-with-r-calfers-no.html</a><br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
P.9.21<br />
<br />
Molecular characterization of BSE in Canada<br />
<br />
Jianmin Yang1, Sandor Dudas2, Catherine Graham2, Markus Czub3, Tim McAllister1, Stefanie Czub1 1Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada Research Centre, Canada; 2National and OIE BSE Reference Laboratory, Canada; 3University of Calgary, Canada<br />
<br />
Background: Three BSE types (classical and two atypical) have been identified on the basis of molecular characteristics of the misfolded protein associated with the disease. To date, each of these three types have been detected in Canadian cattle.<br />
<br />
Objectives: This study was conducted to further characterize the 16 Canadian BSE cases based on the biochemical properties of there associated PrPres. Methods: Immuno-reactivity, molecular weight, glycoform profiles and relative proteinase K sensitivity of the PrPres from each of the 16 confirmed Canadian BSE cases was determined using modified Western blot analysis.<br />
<br />
Results: Fourteen of the 16 Canadian BSE cases were C type, 1 was H type and 1 was L type. The Canadian H and L-type BSE cases exhibited size shifts and changes in glycosylation similar to other atypical BSE cases. PK digestion under mild and stringent conditions revealed a reduced protease resistance of the atypical cases compared to the C-type cases. N terminal- specific antibodies bound to PrPres from H type but not from C or L type. The C-terminal-specific antibodies resulted in a shift in the glycoform profile and detected a fourth band in the Canadian H-type BSE.<br />
<br />
Discussion: The C, L and H type BSE cases in Canada exhibit molecular characteristics similar to those described for classical and atypical BSE cases from Europe and Japan. This supports the theory that the importation of BSE contaminated feedstuff is the source of C-type BSE in Canada. *It also suggests a similar cause or source for atypical BSE in these countries.<br />
<br />
<br />
<a href="http://www.prion2009.com/sites/default/files/Prion2009_Book_of_Abstracts.pdf">http://www.prion2009.com/sites/default/files/Prion2009_Book_of_Abstracts.pdf</a><br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
Saturday, November 6, 2010<br />
<br />
TAFS1 Position Paper on Position Paper on Relaxation of the Feed Ban in the EU Berne, 2010 TAFS<br />
<br />
INTERNATIONAL FORUM FOR TRANSMISSIBLE ANIMAL DISEASES AND FOOD SAFETY a non-profit Swiss Foundation<br />
<br />
<a href="http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2010/11/tafs1-position-paper-on-position-paper.html">http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2010/11/tafs1-position-paper-on-position-paper.html</a><br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
Saturday, June 12, 2010<br />
<br />
PUBLICATION REQUEST AND FOIA REQUEST Project Number: 3625-32000-086-05 Study of Atypical Bse<br />
<br />
<a href="http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2010/06/publication-request-and-foia-request.html">http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2010/06/publication-request-and-foia-request.html</a><br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
Wednesday, July 28, 2010<br />
<br />
re-Freedom of Information Act Project Number 3625-32000-086-05, Study of Atypical BSE UPDATE July 28, 2010<br />
<br />
<a href="http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2010/07/re-freedom-of-information-act-project.html">http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2010/07/re-freedom-of-information-act-project.html</a><br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
LET'S take a closer look at this new prionpathy or prionopathy, and then let's look at the g-h-BSEalabama mad cow.<br />
<br />
This new prionopathy in humans? the genetic makeup is IDENTICAL to the g-h-BSEalabama mad cow, the only _documented_ mad cow in the world to date like this, ......wait, it get's better. this new prionpathy is killing young and old humans, with LONG DURATION from onset of symptoms to death, and the symptoms are very similar to nvCJD victims, OH, and the plaques are very similar in some cases too, bbbut, it's not related to the g-h-BSEalabama cow, WAIT NOW, it gets even better, the new human prionpathy that they claim is a genetic TSE, has no relation to any gene mutation in that family. daaa, ya think it could be related to that mad cow with the same genetic make-up ??? there were literally tons and tons of banned mad cow protein in Alabama in commerce, and none of it transmitted to cows, and the cows to humans there from ??? r i g h t $$$<br />
<br />
ALABAMA MAD COW g-h-BSEalabama<br />
<br />
In this study, we identified a novel mutation in the bovine prion protein gene (Prnp), called E211K, of a confirmed BSE positive cow from Alabama, United States of America. This mutation is identical to the E200K pathogenic mutation found in humans with a genetic form of CJD. This finding represents the first report of a confirmed case of BSE with a potential pathogenic mutation within the bovine Prnp gene. We hypothesize that the bovine Prnp E211K mutation most likely has caused BSE in "the approximately 10-year-old cow" carrying the E221K mutation.<br />
<br />
<br />
<a href="http://www.plospathogens.org/article/info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.ppat.1000156">http://www.plospathogens.org/article/info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.ppat.1000156</a><br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<a href="http://www.plospathogens.org/article/fetchObjectAttachment.action?uri=info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.ppat.1000156&representation=PDF">http://www.plospathogens.org/article/fetchObjectAttachment.action?uri=info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.ppat.1000156&representation=PDF</a><br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
Saturday, August 14, 2010<br />
<br />
BSE Case Associated with Prion Protein Gene Mutation (g-h-BSEalabama) and VPSPr PRIONPATHY<br />
<br />
(see mad cow feed in COMMERCE IN ALABAMA...TSS)<br />
<br />
<a href="http://prionpathy.blogspot.com/2010/08/bse-case-associated-with-prion-protein.html">http://prionpathy.blogspot.com/2010/08/bse-case-associated-with-prion-protein.html</a><br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
2009 UPDATE ON ALABAMA AND TEXAS MAD COWS 2005 and 2006<br />
<br />
<a href="http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2006/08/bse-atypical-texas-and-alabama-update.html">http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2006/08/bse-atypical-texas-and-alabama-update.html</a><br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
her healthy calf also carried the mutation (J. A. Richt and S. M. Hall PLoS Pathog. 4, e1000156; 2008).<br />
<br />
This raises the possibility that the disease could occasionally be genetic in origin. Indeed, the report of the UK BSE Inquiry in 2000 suggested that the UK epidemic had most likely originated from such a mutation and argued against the scrapierelated assumption. Such rare potential pathogenic PRNP mutations could occur in countries at present considered to be free of BSE, such as Australia and New Zealand. So it is important to maintain strict surveillance for BSE in cattle, with rigorous enforcement of the ruminant feed ban (many countries still feed ruminant proteins to pigs). Removal of specified risk material, such as brain and spinal cord, from cattle at slaughter prevents infected material from entering the human food chain. Routine genetic screening of cattle for PRNP mutations, which is now available, could provide additional data on the risk to the public. Because the point mutation identified in the Alabama animals is identical to that responsible for the commonest type of familial (genetic) CJD in humans, it is possible that the resulting infective prion protein might cross the bovine–human species barrier more easily. Patients with vCJD continue to be identified. The fact that this is happening less often should not lead to relaxation of the controls necessary to prevent future outbreaks.<br />
<br />
Malcolm A. Ferguson-Smith Cambridge University Department of Veterinary Medicine, Madingley Road, Cambridge CB3 0ES, UK e-mail: maf12@cam.ac.uk Jürgen A. Richt College of Veterinary Medicine, Kansas State University, K224B Mosier Hall, Manhattan, Kansas 66506-5601, USA<br />
<br />
NATURE|Vol 457|26 February 2009<br />
<br />
<a href="http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v457/n7233/full/4571079b.html">http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v457/n7233/full/4571079b.html</a><br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
Monday, May 11, 2009<br />
<br />
Rare BSE mutation raises concerns over risks to public health<br />
<br />
<a href="http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2009/05/rare-bse-mutation-raises-concerns-over.html">http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2009/05/rare-bse-mutation-raises-concerns-over.html</a><br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
Saturday, January 29, 2011<br />
<br />
Atypical L-Type Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (L-BSE) Transmission to Cynomolgus Macaques, a Non-Human Primate<br />
<br />
Jpn. J. Infect. Dis., 64 (1), 81-84, 2011<br />
<br />
<a href="http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/01/atypical-l-type-bovine-spongiform.html">http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/01/atypical-l-type-bovine-spongiform.html</a><br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
Saturday, March 5, 2011<br />
<br />
ATYPICAL CJD PRION TSE CASES WITH CLASSIFICATIONS PENDING ON THE RISE IN NORTH AMERICA<br />
<br />
Greetings,<br />
<br />
WITH more and more atypical Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy cases showing up in more and more species here in North America, and the enormous monumental amount of banned mad cow protein in commerce since the infamous partial and voluntary mad cow feed ban inked on paper, with tons and tons crossing back and forth between the USA, Canada, and Mexico, it just does not surprise me of all these "PENDING CLASSIFICATIONS" of human TSE in Canada, and the USA. UK c-BSE transmitted to humans became nvCJD. WE now have atypical strains of BSE in cattle. Mission Texas experiments long ago showed that transmitted USA sheep scrapie to USA bovine, produced a TSE much different than the UK typical c-BSE. SO why would human TSE in the USA look like UK human TSE ? The corruption is mind boggling. The UK saw a suspicious TSE in humans, and science linked it to cattle. North America is awash with human and animal TSE, CJD is rising in young and old, with the same pathology and same symptoms, and none of it is related to the other. isn't that nice. who, what, bestowed such miracles upon North America $<br />
<br />
Archive Number 20100405.1091 Published Date 05-APR-2010<br />
<br />
Subject PRO/AH/EDR> Prion disease update 1010 (04)<br />
<br />
snip...<br />
<br />
[Terry S. Singeltary Sr. has added the following comment:<br />
<br />
"According to the World Health Organisation, the future public health threat of vCJD in the UK and Europe and potentially the rest of the world is of concern and currently unquantifiable. However, the possibility of a significant and geographically diverse vCJD epidemic occurring over the next few decades cannot be dismissed.<br />
<br />
<a href="http://whqlibdoc.who.int/publications/2003/9241545887.pdf">http://whqlibdoc.who.int/publications/2003/9241545887.pdf</a><br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
The key word here is diverse. What does diverse mean? If USA scrapie transmitted to USA bovine does not produce pathology as the UK c-BSE, then why would CJD from there look like UK vCJD?"<br />
<br />
<a href="http://www.promedmail.org/pls/apex/f?p=2400:1001:568933508083034::NO::F2400_P1001_BACK_PAGE,F2400_P1001_PUB_MAIL_ID:1000,82101">http://www.promedmail.org/pls/apex/f?p=2400:1001:568933508083034::NO::F2400_P1001_BACK_PAGE,F2400_P1001_PUB_MAIL_ID:1000,82101</a><br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
CANADA CJD UPDATE 2011<br />
<br />
CJD Deaths Reported by CJDSS1, 1994-20112 As of January 31, 2011<br />
<br />
3. Final classification of 49 cases from 2009, 2010, 2011 is pending.<br />
<br />
snip...<br />
<br />
<a href="http://www.phac-aspc.gc.ca/hcai-iamss/cjd-mcj/cjdss-ssmcj/pdf/stats_0111-eng.pdf">http://www.phac-aspc.gc.ca/hcai-iamss/cjd-mcj/cjdss-ssmcj/pdf/stats_0111-eng.pdf</a><br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
USA 2011<br />
<br />
USA<br />
<br />
National Prion Disease Pathology Surveillance Center<br />
<br />
Cases Examined1<br />
<br />
(November 1, 2010)<br />
<br />
Year Total Referrals2 Prion Disease Sporadic Familial Iatrogenic vCJD<br />
<br />
1996 & earlier 51 33 28 5 0 0<br />
<br />
1997 114 68 59 9 0 0<br />
<br />
1998 87 51 43 7 1 0<br />
<br />
1999 121 73 65 8 0 0<br />
<br />
2000 146 103 89 14 0 0<br />
<br />
2001 209 119 109 10 0 0<br />
<br />
2002 248 149 125 22 2 0<br />
<br />
2003 274 176 137 39 0 0<br />
<br />
2004 325 186 164 21 0 13<br />
<br />
2005 344 194 157 36 1 0<br />
<br />
2006 383 197 166 29 0 24<br />
<br />
2007 377 214 187 27 0 0<br />
<br />
2008 394 231 205 25 0 0<br />
<br />
2009 425 258 215 43 0 0<br />
<br />
2010 333 213 158 33 0 0<br />
<br />
TOTAL 38315 22656 1907 328 4 3<br />
<br />
1 Listed based on the year of death or, if not available, on year of referral;<br />
<br />
2 Cases with suspected prion disease for which brain tissue and/or blood (in familial cases) were submitted;<br />
<br />
3 Disease acquired in the United Kingdom;<br />
<br />
4 Disease was acquired in the United Kingdom in one case and in Saudi Arabia in the other case;<br />
<br />
5 Includes 18 cases in which the diagnosis is pending, and 18 inconclusive cases;<br />
<br />
6 Includes 23 (22 from 2010) cases with type determination pending in which the diagnosis of vCJD has been excluded.<br />
<br />
<a href="http://www.cjdsurveillance.com/pdf/case-table.pdf">http://www.cjdsurveillance.com/pdf/case-table.pdf</a><br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
Please notice where sporadic CJD cases in 1996 went from 28 cases, to 215 cases in 2009, the highest recorded year to date. sporadic CJD is on a steady rise, and has been since 1996.<br />
<br />
I also urge you to again notice these disturbing factors in lines 5 and 6 ;<br />
<br />
5 Includes 18 cases in which the diagnosis is pending, and 18 inconclusive cases;<br />
<br />
6 Includes 23 (22 from 2010) cases with type determination pending in which the diagnosis of vCJD has been excluded.<br />
<br />
<br />
========end=====tss=====2011<br />
<br />
<br />
Monday, August 9, 2010<br />
<br />
National Prion Disease Pathology Surveillance Center Cases Examined (July 31, 2010)<br />
<br />
(please watch and listen to the video and the scientist speaking about atypical BSE and sporadic CJD and listen to Professor Aguzzi)<br />
<br />
<a href="http://prionunitusaupdate2008.blogspot.com/2010/08/national-prion-disease-pathology.html">http://prionunitusaupdate2008.blogspot.com/2010/08/national-prion-disease-pathology.html</a><br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
THE steady rise of sporadic CJD cases in Canada AND USA, with many unusual cases of ''PENDING CLASSIFICATIONS" which have been pending now FOR 3 YEARS. HOW long can this cover-up continue $$$<br />
<br />
Saturday, March 5, 2011<br />
<br />
MAD COW ATYPICAL CJD PRION TSE CASES WITH CLASSIFICATIONS PENDING ON THE RISE IN NORTH AMERICA<br />
<br />
<a href="http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/03/mad-cow-atypical-cjd-prion-tse-cases.html">http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/03/mad-cow-atypical-cjd-prion-tse-cases.html</a><br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
Tuesday, March 29, 2011<br />
<br />
TRANSMISSIBLE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY EXPOSURE SPREADING VIA HOSPITALS AND SURGICAL PROCEDURES AROUND THE GLOBE<br />
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<a href="http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/03/transmissible-spongiform-encephalopathy.html">http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/03/transmissible-spongiform-encephalopathy.html</a><br />
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The most recent assessments (and reassessments) were published in June 2005 (Table I; 18), and included the categorisation of Canada, the USA, and Mexico as GBR III. Although only Canada and the USA have reported cases, the historically open system of trade in North America suggests that it is likely that BSE is present also in Mexico.<br />
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<a href="http://www.oie.int/boutique/extrait/06heim937950.pdf">http://www.oie.int/boutique/extrait/06heim937950.pdf</a><br />
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snip...see full text ;<br />
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<a href="http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/03/mad-cow-atypical-cjd-prion-tse-cases.html">http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/03/mad-cow-atypical-cjd-prion-tse-cases.html</a><br />
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Tuesday, April 5, 2011<br />
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Action Plan National Program 103 Animal Health 2012-2017 PRIONS AND TRANSMISSIBLE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY<br />
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Action Plan National Program 103 Animal Health 2012-2017<br />
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<a href="http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/04/action-plan-national-program-103-animal.html">http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/04/action-plan-national-program-103-animal.html</a><br />
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Sunday, April 3, 2011<br />
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PRION 2011 NEWWORLD MONTREAL CANADA MAY 16 - 19<br />
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<a href="http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/04/prion-2011-newworld-montreal-canada-may.html">http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/04/prion-2011-newworld-montreal-canada-may.html</a><br />
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Wednesday, March 9, 2011<br />
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27 U.S. Senators want to force feed Japan Highly Potential North America Mad Cow Beef TSE PRION CJD<br />
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March 8, 2011<br />
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President Barack Obama The White House<br />
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1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, W Washington, DC 20500<br />
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Dear President Obama:<br />
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<a href="http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/03/27-us-senators-want-to-force-feed-japan.html">http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/03/27-us-senators-want-to-force-feed-japan.html</a><br />
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Wednesday, January 5, 2011<br />
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ENLARGING SPECTRUM OF PRION-LIKE DISEASES Prusiner Colby et al 2011<br />
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Prions<br />
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David W. Colby1,* and Stanley B. Prusiner1,2<br />
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----- Original Message -----<br />
<br />
From: David Colby<br />
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To: flounder9@verizon.net<br />
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Cc: stanley@XXXXXXXX<br />
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Sent: Tuesday, March 01, 2011 8:25 AM<br />
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Subject: Re: FW: re-Prions David W. Colby1,* and Stanley B. Prusiner1,2 + Author Affiliations<br />
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Dear Terry Singeltary,<br />
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Thank you for your correspondence regarding the review article Stanley Prusiner and I recently wrote for Cold Spring Harbor Perspectives. Dr. Prusiner asked that I reply to your message due to his busy schedule. We agree that the transmission of CWD prions to beef livestock would be a troubling development and assessing that risk is important. In our article, we cite a peer-reviewed publication reporting confirmed cases of laboratory transmission based on stringent criteria. The less stringent criteria for transmission described in the abstract you refer to lead to the discrepancy between your numbers and ours and thus the interpretation of the transmission rate. We stand by our assessment of the literature--namely that the transmission rate of CWD to bovines appears relatively low, but we recognize that even a low transmission rate could have important implications for public health and we thank you for bringing attention to this matter.<br />
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Warm Regards, David Colby<br />
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--<br />
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David Colby, PhDAssistant ProfessorDepartment of Chemical EngineeringUniversity of Delaware<br />
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====================END...TSS==============<br />
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<br />
re-ENLARGING SPECTRUM OF PRION-LIKE DISEASES Prusiner Colby et al 2011 Prions<br />
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CWD to cattle figures CORRECTION<br />
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Greetings,<br />
<br />
I believe the statement and quote below is incorrect ;<br />
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"CWD has been transmitted to cattle after intracerebral inoculation, although the infection rate was low (4 of 13 animals [Hamir et al. 2001]). This finding raised concerns that CWD prions might be transmitted to cattle grazing in contaminated pastures."<br />
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Please see ;<br />
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Within 26 months post inoculation, 12 inoculated animals had lost weight, revealed abnormal clinical signs, and were euthanatized. Laboratory tests revealed the presence of a unique pattern of the disease agent in tissues of these animals. These findings demonstrate that when CWD is directly inoculated into the brain of cattle, 86% of inoculated cattle develop clinical signs of the disease.<br />
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<a href="http://www.ars.usda.gov/research/publications/publications.htm?seq_no_115=194089">http://www.ars.usda.gov/research/publications/publications.htm?seq_no_115=194089</a><br />
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"although the infection rate was low (4 of 13 animals [Hamir et al. 2001])."<br />
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shouldn't this be corrected, 86% is NOT a low rate. ...<br />
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kindest regards,<br />
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Terry S. Singeltary Sr. P.O. Box 42 Bacliff, Texas USA 77518<br />
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Thank you!<br />
<br />
Thanks so much for your updates/comments. We intend to publish as rapidly as possible all updates/comments that contribute substantially to the topic under discussion.<br />
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http://cshperspectives.cshlp.org/letters/submit<br />
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re-Prions David W. Colby1,* and Stanley B. Prusiner1,2 + Author Affiliations<br />
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1Institute for Neurodegenerative Diseases, University of California, San Francisco, San Francisco, California 94143 2Department of Neurology, University of California, San Francisco, San Francisco, California 94143 Correspondence: stanley@ind.ucsf.edu<br />
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<a href="http://cshperspectives.cshlp.org/content/3/1/a006833.full.pdf+html">http://cshperspectives.cshlp.org/content/3/1/a006833.full.pdf+html</a><br />
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snip...full text ;<br />
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Wednesday, January 5, 2011<br />
<br />
ENLARGING SPECTRUM OF PRION-LIKE DISEASES Prusiner Colby et al 2011 Prions<br />
<br />
David W. Colby1,* and Stanley B. Prusiner1,2<br />
<br />
<br />
<a href="http://cshperspectives.cshlp.org/content/3/1/a006833.full.pdf+html">http://cshperspectives.cshlp.org/content/3/1/a006833.full.pdf+html</a><br />
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<a href="http://betaamyloidcjd.blogspot.com/2011/01/enlarging-spectrum-of-prion-like.html">http://betaamyloidcjd.blogspot.com/2011/01/enlarging-spectrum-of-prion-like.html</a><br />
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<a href="http://betaamyloidcjd.blogspot.com/">http://betaamyloidcjd.blogspot.com/</a><br />
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Friday, December 24, 2010 <br />
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TEXAS NUCLEAR DUMP VOTE SET AMID HOLIDAY RUSH THANKS TO GOVERNOR RICK PERRY NUCLEAR DUMP VOTE SET AMID HOLIDAY RUSH<br />
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CRITICS PROTEST TIMING OF MEETING ON 38-STATE WASTE FACILITY IN TEXAS<br />
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Greetings fellow Texicans,<br />
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THIS is typical timing of such an event. This is how our Government gets bills and reports passed by the public. They usual do it late at night, on a Friday night at that, so it will be only late weekend news. they got it down pat too.<br />
<br />
Twas the night before Christmas, when all through the house, Not a creature was stirring, not even a mouse, but the rats they were a stirring, right in the House, Their pockets were lined, with money and greed, in hopes that St Nicholas would not have seen.<br />
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The children were nestled all snug in their beds, While visions of sugar-plums danced in there heads. And mamma in her 'kerchief, and I in my cap, Had just settled our brains for a long winter's nap, and again, our good Governor from Texas Rick Perry, stabbed us in the back.<br />
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When out on the lawn there arose such a clatter, I sprang from the bed to see what was the matter. Away to the window I flew like a flash, Tore open the shutters and threw up the sash, there was a bright glow from a far, in the west, it was a big bright flash.<br />
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The moon on the breast of the new-fallen snow, gave the lustre of mid-day to objects below. When, what to my wondering eyes should appear, but train load after train load of Nuclear Prolifer.<br />
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With a little old driver, his hair in perfect affair, all groomed and combed over, like a multi-millionaire, was atop the train of nuclear prolifer. The glow was so bright, it lit up the whole night. More rapid than eagles his coursers they came, and he whistled, and shouted, bring more, bring more, we will light up the whole game.<br />
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"Now Dasher! now, Dancer! now, Prancer and Vixen! On, Comet! On, Cupid! on, on Donner and Blitzen! To the top of the porch! to the top of the wall, thanks to Governor Rick Perry, we may all glow like a great big fire ball.<br />
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AS dry leaves that before the wild hurricane fly, When they meet with this fire ball in the sky, the money the received will be their final cry. So UP the house and the senate i say, and to you rick perry, i better not say.<br />
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end<br />
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I wrote about our good Environmental Friendly Governor Rick Perry and his willingness to bring nuclear waste from Ohio to Texas back in 2008. Seems the money is so good, he wants to now include 38 states to the list of states able to pollute the great state of Texas with Nuclear Proliferation waste. at a boy governor, you single handedly made Texas a toxic dump for nuclear waste. Course, which is worse, the air quality or the nuclear waste, which will kill you first ? This Governor has shown time and time again where his heart is, and it's NOT in Texas. ...<br />
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Wednesday, August 6, 2008<br />
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Company advances on plan for West Texas nuclear dump<br />
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(railcars loaded with MOUND COLD WAR NUCLEAR AFTER-BIRTH headed to Texas see photo)<br />
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<a href="http://sciencebushwhacked.blogspot.com/2008/08/company-advances-on-plan-for-west-texas.html">http://sciencebushwhacked.blogspot.com/2008/08/company-advances-on-plan-for-west-texas.html</a><br />
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full text ;<br />
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<a href="http://sciencebushwhacked.blogspot.com/2010/12/texas-nuclear-dump-vote-set-amid.html">http://sciencebushwhacked.blogspot.com/2010/12/texas-nuclear-dump-vote-set-amid.html</a><br />
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<a href="http://sciencebushwhacked.blogspot.com/2008/07/texas-wins-to-be-next-big-dumping.html">http://sciencebushwhacked.blogspot.com/2008/07/texas-wins-to-be-next-big-dumping.html</a><br />
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HERE in Texas, when the EPA has a regulation on the books for the protection of the people, the industry and lawmakers just add another bogus bill to the books to override it $$$<br />
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House Republicans seek to bar EPA from regulating greenhouse gases<br />
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By DAVID ESPO © 2011 The Associated Press Feb. 1, 2011, 8:42PM<br />
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WASHINGTON — In a sharp challenge to the Obama administration, House Republicans intend to unveil legislation Wednesday to ban the Environmental Protection Agency from regulating greenhouse gases under the Clean Air Act and expect to advance the bill quickly, officials disclosed Tuesday night.<br />
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The officials said the bill would nullify all of the steps the EPA has taken to date on the issue, including a threshold finding that greenhouse gases constitute a danger to the public health and welfare.<br />
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In addition, it seeks to strip the agency of its authority to use the law in any future attempts to crack down on the emissions from factories, utilities and other stationary sources.<br />
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snip...end<br />
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<a href="http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/nation/7408456.html">http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/nation/7408456.html</a><br />
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----- Original Message ----- <br />
From: Rep. Paul <br />
To: flounder9@verizon.net <br />
Sent: Monday, April 04, 2011 9:56 AM<br />
Subject: Reply from Rep. Paul<br />
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Dear Mr. Singeltary: <br />
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Thank you for taking the time to contact my office with your concerns regarding the global warming controversy. I appreciate the opportunity to address this issue. <br />
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As I serve in the 112th Congress, one of my primary goals is to embrace an agenda of limited government, as well as do all I can to remind my colleagues of the Constitution's limits on governmental power. The Constitution is very specific regarding powers delegated to the federal government, granting no authority over environmental programs. This certainly applies to global warming. <br />
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Thank you for sharing your thoughts and concerns about this important issue with me. <br />
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Sincerely,<br />
<br />
Ron Paul<br />
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I cannot guarantee the integrity of the text of this letter if it was not sent to you directly from my Congressional Email Account: rep.paul@mail.house.gov. If you have any questions about the validity of this message, please email me at: rep.paul@mail.house.gov or call my Washington, DC office at: (202) 225-2831. <br />
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got to hand it to old governor perry, if left up to him, Texas will be nothing more than a nuclear waste dump, with air not fit to breath, and a nuclear reactor in every county. ...tss<br />
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The Texas attorney general has charged BP with illegally emitting hundreds of thousands of pounds of toxic chemicals at one of its refineries in Texas City, a massive release of dangerous pollutants that lasted more than a month.<br />
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A joint investigation by ProPublica and Frontline found that, just two weeks before the Deepwater Horizon explosion in the Gulf, a key piece of equipment at BP’s Texas City refinery failed, allowing the release of toxic chemicals such as carbon monoxide and benzene, a carcinogen. Rather than halt operations to conduct repairs, BP continued production at the refinery, resulting in the release of 538,000 pounds of toxic chemicals over the span of almost 40 days.<br />
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<a href="http://www.pbs.org/wnet/need-to-know/environment/texas-sues-bp-over-huge-toxic-release-at-texas-city-refinery/2785/">http://www.pbs.org/wnet/need-to-know/environment/texas-sues-bp-over-huge-toxic-release-at-texas-city-refinery/2785/</a><br />
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Wednesday, August 6, 2008<br />
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Company advances on plan for West Texas nuclear dump<br />
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<a href="http://sciencebushwhacked.blogspot.com/2008/08/company-advances-on-plan-for-west-texas.html">http://sciencebushwhacked.blogspot.com/2008/08/company-advances-on-plan-for-west-texas.html</a><br />
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Wednesday, July 30, 2008<br />
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TEXAS WINS TO BE NEXT BIG DUMPING GROUND FOR NUCLEAR WEAPONS RADIOACTIVE WASTE<br />
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<a href="http://sciencebushwhacked.blogspot.com/2008/07/texas-wins-to-be-next-big-dumping.html">http://sciencebushwhacked.blogspot.com/2008/07/texas-wins-to-be-next-big-dumping.html</a><br />
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Wednesday, July 9, 2008<br />
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Ex-official: Cheney wanted climate change report altered<br />
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<a href="http://sciencebushwhacked.blogspot.com/2008/07/ex-official-cheney-wanted-climate.html">http://sciencebushwhacked.blogspot.com/2008/07/ex-official-cheney-wanted-climate.html</a><br />
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Friday, December 24, 2010<br />
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TEXAS NUCLEAR DUMP VOTE SET AMID HOLIDAY RUSH THANKS TO GOVERNOR RICK PERRY<br />
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<a href="http://sciencebushwhacked.blogspot.com/2010/12/texas-nuclear-dump-vote-set-amid.html">http://sciencebushwhacked.blogspot.com/2010/12/texas-nuclear-dump-vote-set-amid.html</a><br />
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IT seems a more correct headlines would have read ''Company bribes Governor Perry to bury nuclear waste and contaminate Texas''. Waste Control Specialists. The company is owned by Harold Simmons, a ''TOP DONOR TO GOV. RICK PERRY, WHO APPOINTS MEMBERS TO THE TCEQ.'' The good governor has sold out to the citizens of Texas for train car, after train car of nuclear waste from 'the mound' Monsanto plant in Miamisburg Ohio. It just so happens, my father-in-law, who is down visiting now with us, has pictures of those railroad cars just sitting and waiting to come down to Texas. Odd how I was watching the news today, about this small plane that had crashed, it had showed pictures of where it had crashed right up near a bunch of tractor-trailer cargo container boxes in a parking lot. What would keep this from happening with those radioactive toxic containers in Ohio, at 'the mound', and or in route to Texas? You see, it's been killing my father-in-law, he has been on oxygen for years, but his breathing is getting more and more labored now, even with the oxygen. He worked at 'the mound' for years and years, and he is now dying a slow death from asbestosis, among other ailments caused by working at 'the mound'. NOW here is what I just cannot understand. This material is so toxic, in trying to gain further medical assistance from the DOE, the evidence that was needed to show that indeed my father-in-law worked their i.e. work records, paperwork records, payment records etc., they told my father-in-law, that they could not dig those records up, that they were buried due to high nuclear contamination, it was just too toxic, and that he had to prove that he had worked there. In which he did finally prove, and did gain further assistance. Also, ''Soward said a contested hearing could either rebut or support allegations that the agency ignored it's own scientific evidence that the site is geologically unsuitable to store material that will remain radioactive for tens of thousands of years.'' This is typical of the Bush Administration, and it happens all the time. The only science that the Bush administration knows, is junk science, bought and paid for by industry scientist. This has been proven time and time again ;<br />
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Wednesday, July 30, 2008 <br />
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TEXAS WINS TO BE NEXT BIG DUMPING GROUND FOR NUCLEAR WEAPONS RADIOACTIVE WASTE<br />
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(railcars loaded with MOUND COLD WAR NUCLEAR AFTER-BIRTH headed to Texas see photos)<br />
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<a href="http://sciencebushwhacked.blogspot.com/2008/07/texas-wins-to-be-next-big-dumping.html">http://sciencebushwhacked.blogspot.com/2008/07/texas-wins-to-be-next-big-dumping.html</a><br />
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<a href="http://sciencebushwhacked.blogspot.com/2008/08/company-advances-on-plan-for-west-texas.html">http://sciencebushwhacked.blogspot.com/2008/08/company-advances-on-plan-for-west-texas.html</a><br />
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<br />
In Memory Of Dana (Red) Ashcraft November 10, 1927 - January 9, 2011<br />
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Another victim of the MONSANTO MOUND in Miamisburg, Ohio 45342<br />
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Beloved Husband of Myrtle M. Ashcraft for 66 years, loving father of Bonnie Singeltary and Joyce Ashcraft, grandfather of Brad, Todd, and Terry Singeltary Jr. and great grandfather of eight.<br />
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R.I.P. old fishing buddy , i'm gonna miss ya. ...<br />
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Terry S. Singeltary Sr.<br />
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Terry S. Singeltary Sr.<br />
P.O. Box 42<br />
Bacliff, Texas USA 77518Terry S. Singeltary Sr.http://www.blogger.com/profile/06986622967539963260noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4595956519532618538.post-44336482764105102732011-02-10T13:18:00.000-08:002011-02-10T13:18:06.865-08:00TRANSMISSIBLE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY REPORT UPDATE CANADA FEBRUARY 2011 and how to hide mad cow disease in CanadaCurrent as of: 2011-01-31<br />
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Date confirmed Location Animal type infected<br />
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January 19 Saskatchewan Deer<br />
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January 4 Saskatchewan Deer<br />
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<a href="http://www.inspection.gc.ca/english/anima/disemala/rep/2011cwdmdce.shtml">http://www.inspection.gc.ca/english/anima/disemala/rep/2011cwdmdce.shtml</a><br />
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Current as of: 2011-01-31<br />
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Date confirmed Location Animal type infected January 19 Ontario Sheep<br />
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*Atypical scrapie<br />
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<a href="http://www.inspection.gc.ca/english/anima/disemala/rep/2011scrtree.shtml">http://www.inspection.gc.ca/english/anima/disemala/rep/2011scrtree.shtml</a><br />
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Wednesday, August 11, 2010<br />
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REPORT ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE SIXTEENTH CASE OF BOVINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY (BSE) IN CANADA<br />
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<a href="http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2010/08/report-on-investigation-of-sixteenth.html">http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2010/08/report-on-investigation-of-sixteenth.html</a><br />
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Thursday, August 19, 2010<br />
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REPORT ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE SEVENTEENTH CASE OF BOVINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY (BSE) IN CANADA<br />
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<a href="http://bseusa.blogspot.com/2010/08/report-on-investigation-of-seventeenth.html">http://bseusa.blogspot.com/2010/08/report-on-investigation-of-seventeenth.html</a><br />
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Thursday, August 19, 2010 REPORT ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE SEVENTEENTH CASE OF BOVINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY (BSE) IN CANADA Greetings BSE-L et al,<br />
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I have sent off for a full report on the 17th case of BSE in Canada, and anymore cases since then. It now seems that the only way Canada is going to report their cases to the media, consumer, or the public, is if you ask, and be sure to be very explicit when you ask for whatever case you are referring too. I can't (well, I can) believe it's come to this. WE know the USA has systematically covered up mad cow disease in the USA (they just screwed up and got caught a couple of times), but this just seems to be acceptable now around the globe. But for Canada now to turn to these same type practices as the USDA, after such a long time of being up front with the consumer and the world on their Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy problems, I find it sad that this is what it has come to now. I had previously ask the CFIA for the ''16th case, and up'', and they only sent me the 16th case of mad cow disease. So I will await now to see if we get the full details on the 17th case of mad cow disease in Canada, and or the 18th case, and any more cases they might have found to date. I cannot believe either that this is what the OIE has let it come to be.<br />
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It says on the CFIA website ;<br />
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Completed Investigations The CFIA has completed investigations of 16 cases of BSE in Canadian cattle.<br />
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To request a copy of a BSE investigation report that is not listed below, please send an e-mail to CFIAMaster@inspection.gc.ca or call 1-800-442-2342.<br />
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<a href="http://www.inspection.gc.ca/english/anima/disemala/bseesb/comenqe.shtml">http://www.inspection.gc.ca/english/anima/disemala/bseesb/comenqe.shtml</a><br />
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Wednesday, December 22, 2010<br />
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Manitoba veterinarian has been fined $10,000 for falsifying certification documents for U.S. bound cattle and what about mad cow disease ?<br />
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<a href="http://usdameatexport.blogspot.com/2010/12/manitoba-veterinarian-has-been-fined.html">http://usdameatexport.blogspot.com/2010/12/manitoba-veterinarian-has-been-fined.html</a><br />
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i wonder if CFIA Canada uses the same OBEX ONLY diagnostic criteria as the USDA ?<br />
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Tuesday, November 02, 2010<br />
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BSE - ATYPICAL LESION DISTRIBUTION (RBSE 92-21367) statutory (obex only) diagnostic criteria CVL 1992<br />
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<a href="http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2010/11/bse-atypical-lesion-distribution-rbse.html">http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2010/11/bse-atypical-lesion-distribution-rbse.html</a><br />
<br />
<br />
PLEASE NOTE, I still have not received my request for the full report of the 17th case of BSE in Canada, and or if anymore cases have been reported since Canada started using the USDA's cloak and dagger secret BSE surveillance program of SSS. The SSS policy seems to now be the gold card for the OIE. I had great respect for Canada's BSE surveillance program and defended them greatly in the past. BUT, they have taken the low road of secrecy now, as with the USA. These actions speak louder than words, and proves in my opinion that they have more to hide than meats the eye i.e. mad cow disease $$$ for them to turn to secrecy as the USA, mad cow disease must really be bad. They still don't even list BSE mad cow # 16 and or BSE mad cow # 17 case on the CFIA site. i guess if these cases are not posted, the world thinks they are not happening. WRONG !<br />
<br />
BSE, MRR, TSS and R-CALF ON CANADA VS USA<br />
<br />
Bill Rancher<br />
<br />
Joined: 10 Feb 2005 Posts: 1418 Location: GWN Posted: Fri Jan 05, 2007 9:49 am Post subject:<br />
<br />
Texan wrote:<br />
<br />
Hey Terry, I'd like to get a little further clarification on something if/when you have time. I'm not sure if I'm reading you correctly....<br />
<br />
flounder wrote:<br />
<br />
This is what sank my battleship in regards to testifying for r-calf. they actually appoached me about it, but i told them i would be glad to testify, but i was not stopping at the Canadian border, my testimony was to come south as well if given the opportunity. and that ended that, but i did supply them with a load of data, for whatever that was worth.<br />
<br />
I highlighted the parts that confuse me. This almost makes it seem as if R-CALF was asking you to testify for them, but changed their mind when they found out that you were going to tell the WHOLE truth, instead of just the truth as regards Canadian imports.<br />
<br />
I thought that R-CALF was only interested in the WHOLE truth - not just the selected parts of the truth that fit their protectionist agenda? After reading your post, it makes a person wonder. Maybe I read it wrong...<br />
<br />
Am I reading this correctly, Terry? That can't be right, can it? Thanks.<br />
<br />
I was wondering exactly the same thing Texan.<br />
<br />
_________________<br />
<br />
Canadian Beef....A cut above the rest!<br />
<br />
my answer to big muddy from canada ;<br />
<br />
hello there Texan,<br />
<br />
yep, you read it right. don't know what ya'll gonna do without me. you know i plan on retiring from this mess soon. the pay is simply too excessive ;-( i fed them all i had at the time, and they shot the teacher. then hired old stanley i heard, go figure, must have been all those PhDs i had ;-)<br />
<br />
as with the fuji-tv, when they came here and interviewed me for a BSE show, that i don't know what happened too, or the madcowboy documentary i was asked to proofread, and did, assured i would get some credit for, to never hear from again, to the speech in south Korea i was to make Nov. 23, but was<br />
<br />
shipwrecked somehow there too, and that might have been a good thing considering all the riots, and they did get the information anyway, to the TSS documentary, that too fell apart for good reasons i suppose, to helping creekstone, and finally to the NIH attempted destruction of an historical bank of donated tissue from CJD victims, and that one i think i did manage to stop, and that thanks to a Republican John Cornyn, i simply think it's time to let you fellars and gals clear this mess up. i have wasted enough time. it will be a decade next Christmas. i just would hate to keep kicking the same old mad cow. i know what happened for the most part, and the ones that don't get it now, never will.<br />
<br />
now there Texan, as far as your question, and confusion ;-) i bet you thought i was not going to answer it, or, maybe hoping i would ;<br />
<br />
flounder wrote:<br />
<br />
This is what sank my battleship in regards to testifying for r-calf. they actually appoached me about it, but i told them i would be glad to testify, but i was not stopping at the Canadian border, my testimony was to come south as well if given the opportunity. and that ended that, but i did supply them with a load of data, for whatever that was worth.<br />
<br />
I highlighted the parts that confuse me. This almost makes it seem as if R-CALF was asking you to testify for them, but changed their mind when they found out that you were going to tell the WHOLE truth, instead of just the truth as regards Canadian imports.<br />
<br />
I thought that R-CALF was only interested in the WHOLE truth - not just the selected parts of the truth that fit their protectionist agenda? After reading your post, it makes a person wonder. Maybe I read it wrong...<br />
<br />
Am I reading this correctly, Terry? That can't be right, can it? Thanks.<br />
<br />
=========================================================<br />
<br />
hello again there Texan,<br />
<br />
i don't guess it matters anymore, i don't think ill be testifying for anyone, unless it is my own execution.<br />
<br />
i was willing to participate in good faith, and sound science, that is why i<br />
<br />
think i was never sent to testify,<br />
<br />
because in my opinion, R-Calf only wanted to cherry-pick the science, to use<br />
<br />
to there advantage, to try and<br />
<br />
claim that Canada had a worse BSE problem than the USA, and i could not conceed to that. the science did<br />
<br />
not confirm this. all one has to do is read the BSE GBR risk assessments, and that is why GW/OIE et al revised<br />
<br />
there own risk assessments ;-) the BSE MRR policy.<br />
<br />
i don't know, maybe i misinterpreted it all, maybe not, you can be the judge<br />
<br />
oh what tangled webs we weave, when all we do is practice to deceive. ...TSS<br />
<br />
SNIP...END... SEE FULL TEXT, you need to read the following ;<br />
<br />
start thread here r-calf vs TSS<br />
<br />
*** <a href="http://ranchers.net/forum/viewtopic.php?t=15704&postdays=0&postorder=asc&start=12">http://ranchers.net/forum/viewtopic.php?t=15704&postdays=0&postorder=asc&start=12</a><br />
<br />
<br />
follow thread here ;<br />
<br />
<a href="http://ranchers.net/forum/viewtopic.php?t=15704&postdays=0&postorder=asc&start=24">http://ranchers.net/forum/viewtopic.php?t=15704&postdays=0&postorder=asc&start=24</a><br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<a href="http://ranchers.net/forum/viewtopic.php?t=15704&postdays=0&postorder=asc&start=36">http://ranchers.net/forum/viewtopic.php?t=15704&postdays=0&postorder=asc&start=36</a><br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<a href="http://ranchers.net/forum/viewtopic.php?t=15704&postdays=0&postorder=asc&start=48">http://ranchers.net/forum/viewtopic.php?t=15704&postdays=0&postorder=asc&start=48</a><br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
Saturday, April 11, 2009<br />
<br />
CJD FOUNDATION SIDES WITH R-CALFERS NO BSE OR HUMAN TSE THERE OF IN USA 'don't be fooled'<br />
<br />
<a href="http://prionunitusaupdate2008.blogspot.com/2009/04/cjd-foundation-sides-with-r-calfers-no.html">http://prionunitusaupdate2008.blogspot.com/2009/04/cjd-foundation-sides-with-r-calfers-no.html</a><br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
Sunday, April 12, 2009<br />
<br />
r-calf and the USA mad cow problem, don't look, don't find, and then blame Canada<br />
<br />
<a href="http://prionunitusaupdate2008.blogspot.com/2009/04/r-calf-and-usa-mad-cow-problem-dont.html">http://prionunitusaupdate2008.blogspot.com/2009/04/r-calf-and-usa-mad-cow-problem-dont.html</a><br />
<br />
<br />
<a href="http://prionunitusaupdate2008.blogspot.com/2009/04/cjd-foundation-sides-with-r-calfers-no.html#comments">http://prionunitusaupdate2008.blogspot.com/2009/04/cjd-foundation-sides-with-r-calfers-no.html#comments</a><br />
<br />
<br />
Wednesday, November 18, 2009<br />
<br />
R-CALF: 40 Groups Disagree With USDA's Latest BSE Court Submission<br />
<br />
<a href="http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2009/11/r-calf-40-groups-disagree-with-usdas.html">http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2009/11/r-calf-40-groups-disagree-with-usdas.html</a><br />
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<br />
BSE MRR = don't look, don't find, thus keep the gold card, and BSE aka mad cow disease will continue to spread. $$$ and that's just what the OIE is all about. ...TSS<br />
<br />
<br />
Saturday, January 29, 2011<br />
<br />
Atypical L-Type Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (L-BSE) Transmission to Cynomolgus Macaques, a Non-Human Primate<br />
<br />
Jpn. J. Infect. Dis., 64 (1), 81-84, 2011<br />
<br />
<a href="http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/01/atypical-l-type-bovine-spongiform.html">http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/01/atypical-l-type-bovine-spongiform.html</a><br />
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<br />
<br />
CJD9/10022<br />
<br />
October 1994<br />
<br />
Mr R.N. Elmhirst Chairman British Deer Farmers Association Holly Lodge Spencers Lane BerksWell Coventry CV7 7BZ<br />
<br />
Dear Mr Elmhirst,<br />
<br />
CREUTZFELDT-JAKOB DISEASE (CJD) SURVEILLANCE UNIT REPORT<br />
<br />
Thank you for your recent letter concerning the publication of the third annual report from the CJD Surveillance Unit. I am sorry that you are dissatisfied with the way in which this report was published.<br />
<br />
The Surveillance Unit is a completely independant outside body and the Department of Health is committed to publishing their reports as soon as they become available. In the circumstances it is not the practice to circulate the report for comment since the findings of the report would not be amended. In future we can ensure that the British Deer Farmers Association receives a copy of the report in advance of publication.<br />
<br />
The Chief Medical Officer has undertaken to keep the public fully informed of the results of any research in respect of CJD. This report was entirely the work of the unit and was produced completely independantly of the the Department.<br />
<br />
The statistical results reqarding the consumption of venison was put into perspective in the body of the report and was not mentioned at all in the press release. Media attention regarding this report was low key but gave a realistic presentation of the statistical findings of the Unit. This approach to publication was successful in that consumption of venison was highlighted only once by the media ie. in the News at one television proqramme.<br />
<br />
I believe that a further statement about the report, or indeed statistical links between CJD and consumption of venison, would increase, and quite possibly give damaging credence, to the whole issue. From the low key media reports of which I am aware it seems unlikely that venison consumption will suffer adversely, if at all.<br />
<br />
<a href="http://web.archive.org/web/20030511010117/http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/yb/1994/10/00003001.pdf">http://web.archive.org/web/20030511010117/http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/yb/1994/10/00003001.pdf</a><br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
UPDATED DATA ON 2ND CWD STRAIN<br />
<br />
Wednesday, September 08, 2010<br />
<br />
CWD PRION CONGRESS SEPTEMBER 8-11 2010<br />
<br />
<a href="http://chronic-wasting-disease.blogspot.com/2010/09/cwd-prion-2010.html">http://chronic-wasting-disease.blogspot.com/2010/09/cwd-prion-2010.html</a><br />
<br />
<br />
Our findings demonstrate that cervid PrPSc, upon strain adaptation by serial passages in vitro or in cervid transgenic mice, is capable of converting human PrPC to produce PrPSc with unique biochemical properties, likely representing a new human prion strain. The newly generated CWD-huPrPSc material has been inoculated into transgenic mice expressing human PrP to study infectivity and disease phenotype and this data will be published elsewhere.<br />
<br />
<a href="http://www.jbc.org/content/early/2011/01/04/jbc.M110.198465.long">http://www.jbc.org/content/early/2011/01/04/jbc.M110.198465.long</a><br />
<br />
<br />
Sent: Thursday, February 03, 2011 12:15 PM<br />
<br />
Subject: NMLB and USDA allow scrapie prion infected mutton to enter food chain on the Navajo Reservation in New Mexico<br />
<br />
Greetings Honorable People of the Great Navajo Nation, and the Honorable President Ben Shelly,<br />
<br />
I send this to you with great concern. ...<br />
<br />
<a href="http://scrapie-usa.blogspot.com/2011/02/nmlb-and-usda-allow-scrapie-prion.html">http://scrapie-usa.blogspot.com/2011/02/nmlb-and-usda-allow-scrapie-prion.html</a><br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
Monday, February 7, 2011<br />
<br />
FDA's Currently-Recommended Policies to Reduce the Possible Risk of Transmission of CJD and vCJD by Blood and Blood Products 2011 ???<br />
<br />
<a href="http://tseac.blogspot.com/2011/02/fdas-currently-recommended-policies-to.html">http://tseac.blogspot.com/2011/02/fdas-currently-recommended-policies-to.html</a><br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
Terry S. Singeltary Sr. P.O. Box 42 Bacliff, Texas USA 77518 flounder9@verizon.netTerry S. Singeltary Sr.http://www.blogger.com/profile/06986622967539963260noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4595956519532618538.post-43118095496488008732010-11-17T16:38:00.000-08:002010-11-18T17:44:14.328-08:00MAD COW TESTING FAKED IN USA BY Nebraska INSPECTOR Senator Mike Johanns STATENeb. inspector accused of faking mad cow tests<br /><br />Published November 17, 2010<br /><br />Associated Press<br /><br />OMAHA, Neb. – A former Nebraska cattle inspector has been indicted on charges that he faked reports about mad cow disease, the U.S. Attorney's Office announced Wednesday.<br /><br />Galen Niehues, 41, of Cozad, was charged Tuesday in U.S. District Court in Lincoln with making false statements and mail fraud.<br /><br />Niehues was employed by the state Department of Agriculture from July 2009 through March under a U.S. Food and Drug Administration grant. The indictment says he submitted inspection reports on 92 Nebraska cattle operations, along with travel expenses, but never actually performed the inspections.<br /><br />Niehues collected about $35,500 in pay and benefits while working for the state, the indictment says.<br /><br />No number was listed for Niehues, and court records don't list his attorney.<br /><br />His first court appearance is scheduled for Dec. 2. Niehues faces up to 25 years in prison and $500,000 in fines if convicted.<br /><br />Agriculture Department spokeswoman Bobbie Kriz-Wickham referred comment to the FDA. A message left Wednesday for an FDA investigator wasn't immediately returned.<br /><br />___<br /><br />Online:<br /><br />U.S. District Court, Nebraska: <a href="http://www.ned.uscourts.gov/">http://www.ned.uscourts.gov/</a><br /><br /><br />Nebraska Department of Agriculture: <a href="http://www.agr.state.ne.us/">http://www.agr.state.ne.us/</a><br /><br /><br />U.S. Food and Drug Administration: <a href="http://www.fda.gov/">http://www.fda.gov/</a><br /><br /><br /><a href="http://www.foxnews.com/us/2010/11/17/neb-inspector-accused-faking-mad-cow-tests/">http://www.foxnews.com/us/2010/11/17/neb-inspector-accused-faking-mad-cow-tests/</a><br /><br /><br />From The Associated Press, November 17, 2010 - 4:59 PM<br /><br />Former Neb. inspector accused of faking tests for mad cow disease; no longer works for state<br /><br />OMAHA, Neb. (AP) - A former state cattle inspector has been indicted for faking tests for mad cow disease.<br /><br />The two-count indictment announced Wednesday by the U.S Attorney's Office says 41-year-old Galen Niehues, of Cozad, submitted inspection reports on 92 cattle operations in Nebraska but never actually performed the inspections. He faces federal charges of making false statements and mail fraud.<br /><br />No number was listed for Niehues, and court records don't list his attorney.<br /><br />His first court appearance is scheduled for Dec. 2. Niehues faces up to 25 years in prison if convicted.<br /><br />A message left with the Agriculture Department wasn't immediately returned. The indictment says Niehues worked for the department from July 2009 through March.<br /><br /><a href="http://www.canadianbusiness.com/markets/market_news/article.jsp?content=D9JI50D00">http://www.canadianbusiness.com/markets/market_news/article.jsp?content=D9JI50D00</a><br /><br /><br /><br /><br /><br />Thursday, November 18, 2010<br /><br />UNITED STATES OF AMERICA VS GALEN J. NIEHUES FAKED MAD COW FEED TEST ON 92 BSE INSPECTION REPORTS FOR APPROXIMATELY 100 CATTLE OPERATIONS<br /><br /><br />4:10-cr-03119-RGK -CRZ Doc # 1 Filed: 11/16/10 Page 1 of 4 - Page ID #1<br /><br />FILED<br /><br />U.S. DISTRICT COURT<br /><br />DISTRICT OF NEBRASKA<br /><br />10 NOV 16 PM 4:16<br /><br />OFFICE OF THE CLERK<br /><br />IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT<br /><br />FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEBRASKA<br /><br />UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,<br /><br />Plaintiff,<br /><br />vs.<br /><br />GALEN J. NIEHUES,<br /><br />Defendant.<br /><br />INDICTMENT<br /><br />18 U.S.C. § 1001<br /><br />18 U.S.C. § 1341<br /><br />The Grand Jury charges that:<br /><br />INTRODUCTION<br /><br /><br /><br />see full text here ;<br /><br /><br /><br /><a href="http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2010/11/united-states-of-america-vs-galen-j.html">http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2010/11/united-states-of-america-vs-galen-j.html</a><br /><br /><br /><br />Subject: USDA OIG SEMIANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS FY 2007 1st Half<br />(bogus BSE sampling FROM HEALTHY USDA CATTLE)<br />Date: June 21, 2007 at 2:49 pm PST<br /><br />Owner and Corporation Plead Guilty to Defrauding Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Surveillance Program<br /><br />An Arizona meat processing company and its owner pled guilty in February 2007 to charges of theft of Government funds, mail fraud, and wire fraud. The owner and his company defrauded the BSE Surveillance Program when they falsified BSE Surveillance Data Collection Forms and then submitted payment requests to USDA for the services. In addition to the targeted sample population (those cattle that were more than 30 months old or had other risk factors for BSE), the owner submitted to USDA, or caused to be submitted, BSE obex (brain stem) samples from healthy USDA-inspected cattle. As a result, the owner fraudulently received approximately $390,000. Sentencing is scheduled for May 2007.<br /><br />snip...<br /><br />Topics that will be covered in ongoing or planned reviews under Goal 1 include:<br /><br />soundness of BSE maintenance sampling (APHIS),<br /><br />implementation of Performance-Based Inspection System enhancements for specified risk material (SRM) violations and improved inspection controls over SRMs (FSIS and APHIS),<br /><br />snip...<br /><br />The findings and recommendations from these efforts will be covered in future semiannual reports as the relevant audits and investigations are completed.<br /><br />4 USDA OIG SEMIANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS FY 2007 1st Half<br /><br /><a href="http://www.usda.gov/oig/webdocs/sarc070619.pdf">http://www.usda.gov/oig/webdocs/sarc070619.pdf</a><br /><br /><br />Office of the United States Attorney District of Arizona<br /><br />FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE For Information Contact Public Affairs<br /><br />February 16, 2007 WYN HORNBUCKLE Telephone: (602) 514-7625 Cell: (602) 525-2681<br /><br />CORPORATION AND ITS PRESIDENT PLEAD GUILTY TO DEFRAUDING GOVERNMENT’S MAD COW DISEASE SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM<br /><br />PHOENIX -- Farm Fresh Meats, Inc. and Roland Emerson Farabee, 55, of Maricopa, Arizona, pleaded guilty to stealing $390,000 in government funds, mail fraud and wire fraud, in federal district court in Phoenix.U.S. Attorney Daniel Knauss stated, “The integrity of the system that tests for mad cow disease relies upon the honest cooperation of enterprises like Farm Fresh Meats. Without that honest cooperation, consumers both in the U.S. and internationally are at risk. We want to thank the USDA’s Office of Inspector General for their continuing efforts to safeguard the public health and enforce the law.” Farm Fresh Meats and Farabee were charged by Information with theft of government funds, mail fraud and wire fraud. According to the Information, on June 7, 2004, Farabee, on behalf of Farm Fresh Meats, signed a contract with the U.S. Department of Agriculture (the “USDA Agreement”) to collect obex samples from cattle at high risk of mad cow disease (the “Targeted Cattle Population”). The Targeted Cattle Population consisted of the following cattle: cattle over thirty months of age; nonambulatory cattle; cattle exhibiting signs of central nervous system disorders; cattle exhibiting signs of mad cow disease; and dead cattle. Pursuant to the USDA Agreement, the USDA agreed to pay Farm Fresh Meats $150 per obex sample for collecting obex samples from cattle within the Targeted Cattle Population, and submitting the obex samples to a USDA laboratory for mad cow disease testing. Farm Fresh Meats further agreed to maintain in cold storage the sampled cattle carcasses and heads until the test results were received by Farm Fresh Meats.<br /><br />Evidence uncovered during the government’s investigation established that Farm Fresh Meats and Farabee submitted samples from cattle outside the Targeted Cattle Population. Specifically, Farm Fresh Meats and Farabee submitted, or caused to be submitted, obex samples from healthy, USDA inspected cattle, in order to steal government moneys.<br /><br />Evidence collected also demonstrated that Farm Fresh Meats and Farabee failed to maintain cattle carcasses and heads pending test results and falsified corporate books and records to conceal their malfeasance. Such actions, to the extent an obex sample tested positive (fortunately, none did), could have jeopardized the USDA’s ability to identify the diseased animal and pinpoint its place of origin. On Wednesday, February 14, 2007, Farm Fresh Meats and Farabee pleaded guilty to stealing government funds and using the mails and wires to effect the scheme. According to their guilty pleas:<br /><br />(a) Farm Fresh Meats collected, and Farabee directed others to collect, obex samples from cattle outside the Targeted Cattle Population, which were not subject to payment by the USDA;<br /><br />(b) Farm Fresh Meats2 and Farabee caused to be submitted payment requests to the USDA knowing that the requests were based on obex samples that were not subject to payment under the USDA Agreement; (c) Farm Fresh Meats completed and submitted, and Farabee directed others to complete and submit, BSE Surveillance Data Collection Forms to the USDA’s testing laboratory that were false and misleading;<br /><br />(d) Farm Fresh Meats completed and submitted, and Farabee directed others to complete and submit, BSE Surveillance Submission Forms filed with the USDA that were false and misleading;<br /><br />(e) Farm Fresh Meats falsified, and Farabee directed others to falsify, internal Farm Fresh Meats documents to conceal the fact that Farm Fresh Meats was seeking and obtaining payment from the USDA for obex samples obtained from cattle outside the Targeted Cattle Population; and<br /><br />(f) Farm Fresh Meats failed to comply with, and Farabee directed others to fail to comply with, the USDA Agreement by discarding cattle carcasses and heads prior to receiving BSE test results.<br /><br />A conviction for theft of government funds carries a maximum penalty of 10 years imprisonment. Mail fraud and wire fraud convictions carry a maximum penalty of 20 years imprisonment. Convictions for the above referenced violations also carry a maximum fine of $250,000 for individuals and $500,000 for organizations. In determining an actual sentence, Judge Earl H. Carroll will consult the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, which provide appropriate sentencing ranges. The judge, however, is not bound by those guidelines in determining a sentence. Sentencing is set before Judge Earl H. Carroll on May 14, 2007. The investigation in this case was conducted by Assistant Special Agent in Charge Alejandro Quintero, United States Department of Agriculture, Office of Inspector General. The prosecution is being handled by Robert Long, Assistant U.S. Attorney, District of Arizona, Phoenix.<br /><br />CASE NUMBER: CR-07-00160-PHX-EHC RELEASE NUMBER: 2007-051(Farabee) # # #<br /><br /><a href="http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/az/press_releases/2007/2007-051(Farabee).pdf">http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/az/press_releases/2007/2007-051(Farabee).pdf</a><br /><br /><br />Nebraska Senator Mike Johanns<br /><br />Wednesday, February 11, 2009<br /><br />Atypical BSE North America Update February 2009<br /><br /><a href="http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2009/02/atypical-bse-north-america-update.html">http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2009/02/atypical-bse-north-america-update.html</a><br /><br /><br /><br />Tuesday, November 02, 2010<br /><br />BSE - ATYPICAL LESION DISTRIBUTION (RBSE 92-21367) statutory (obex only) diagnostic criteria CVL 1992<br /><br /><br />IN CONFIDENCE<br /><br /><br />The information contained herein should not be disseminated further except on the basis of "NEED TO KNOW".<br /><br /><a href="http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2010/11/bse-atypical-lesion-distribution-rbse.html">http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2010/11/bse-atypical-lesion-distribution-rbse.html</a><br /><br /><br /><br />Rare BSE mutation raises concerns over risks to public health<br /><br />SIR — Atypical forms (known as H- and L-type) of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) have recently appeared in several European countries as well as in Japan, Canada and the United States. This raises the unwelcome possibility that variant Creutzfeldt–Jakob disease (vCJD) could increase in the human population. Of the atypical BSE cases tested so far, a mutation in the prion protein gene (PRNP) has been detected in just one, a cow in Alabama with BSE;<br /><br /><a href="http://www.plospathogens.org/article/fetchObjectAttachment.action?uri=info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.ppat.1000156&representation=PDF">http://www.plospathogens.org/article/fetchObjectAttachment.action?uri=info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.ppat.1000156&representation=PDF</a><br /><br /><br /><br /><a href="http://prionpathy.blogspot.com/2010/08/bse-case-associated-with-prion-protein.html">http://prionpathy.blogspot.com/2010/08/bse-case-associated-with-prion-protein.html</a><br /><br /><br /><br /><br />her healthy calf also carried the mutation (J. A. Richt and S. M. Hall PLoS Pathog. 4, e1000156; 2008).<br /><br />This raises the possibility that the disease could occasionally be genetic in origin. Indeed, the report of the UK BSE Inquiry in 2000 suggested that the UK epidemic had most likely originated from such a mutation and argued against the scrapierelated assumption. Such rare potential pathogenic PRNP mutations could occur in countries at present considered to be free of BSE, such as Australia and New Zealand. So it is important to maintain strict surveillance for BSE in cattle, with rigorous enforcement of the ruminant feed ban (many countries still feed ruminant proteins to pigs). Removal of specified risk material, such as brain and spinal cord, from cattle at slaughter prevents infected material from entering the human food chain. Routine genetic screening of cattle for PRNP mutations, which is now available, could provide additional data on the risk to the public. Because the point mutation identified in the Alabama animals is identical to that responsible for the commonest type of familial (genetic) CJD in humans, it is possible that the resulting infective prion protein might cross the bovine–human species barrier more easily. Patients with vCJD continue to be identified. The fact that this is happening less often should not lead to relaxation of the controls necessary to prevent future outbreaks.<br /><br />Malcolm A. Ferguson-Smith Cambridge University Department of Veterinary Medicine, Madingley Road, Cambridge CB3 0ES, UK e-mail: maf12@cam.ac.uk Jürgen A. Richt College of Veterinary Medicine, Kansas State University, K224B Mosier Hall, Manhattan, Kansas 66506-5601, USA<br /><br />NATUREVol 45726 February 2009<br /><br /><a href="http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v457/n7233/full/4571079b.html">http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v457/n7233/full/4571079b.html</a><br /><br /><br />LET'S take a closer look at this new prionpathy or prionopathy, and then let's look at the g-h-BSEalabama mad cow.<br /><br />This new prionopathy in humans? the genetic makeup is IDENTICAL to the g-h-BSEalabama mad cow, the only _documented_ mad cow in the world to date like this, ......wait, it get's better. this new prionpathy is killing young and old humans, with LONG DURATION from onset of symptoms to death, and the symptoms are very similar to nvCJD victims, OH, and the plaques are very similar in some cases too, bbbut, it's not related to the g-h-BSEalabama cow, WAIT NOW, it gets even better, the new human prionpathy that they claim is a genetic TSE, has no relation to any gene mutation in that family. daaa, ya think it could be related to that mad cow with the same genetic make-up ??? there were literally tons and tons of banned mad cow protein in Alabama in commerce, and none of it transmitted to cows, and the cows to humans there from ??? r i g h t $$$<br /><br />ALABAMA MAD COW g-h-BSEalabama<br /><br />In this study, we identified a novel mutation in the bovine prion protein gene (Prnp), called E211K, of a confirmed BSE positive cow from Alabama, United States of America. This mutation is identical to the E200K pathogenic mutation found in humans with a genetic form of CJD. This finding represents the first report of a confirmed case of BSE with a potential pathogenic mutation within the bovine Prnp gene. We hypothesize that the bovine Prnp E211K mutation most likely has caused BSE in "the approximately 10-year-old cow" carrying the E221K mutation.<br /><br /><a href="http://www.plospathogens.org/article/info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.ppat.1000156">http://www.plospathogens.org/article/info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.ppat.1000156</a><br /><br /><br /><a href="http://www.plospathogens.org/article/fetchObjectAttachment.action?uri=info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.ppat.1000156&representation=PDF">http://www.plospathogens.org/article/fetchObjectAttachment.action?uri=info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.ppat.1000156&representation=PDF</a><br /><br /><br />Saturday, August 14, 2010<br /><br />BSE Case Associated with Prion Protein Gene Mutation (g-h-BSEalabama) and VPSPr PRIONPATHY<br /><br />(see mad cow feed in COMMERCE IN ALABAMA...TSS)<br /><br /><a href="http://prionpathy.blogspot.com/2010/08/bse-case-associated-with-prion-protein.html">http://prionpathy.blogspot.com/2010/08/bse-case-associated-with-prion-protein.html</a><br /><br /><br />2009 UPDATE ON ALABAMA AND TEXAS MAD COWS 2005 and 2006<br /><br /><a href="http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2006/08/bse-atypical-texas-and-alabama-update.html">http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2006/08/bse-atypical-texas-and-alabama-update.html</a><br /><br /><br />I ask Professor Kong ;<br /><br />Thursday, December 04, 2008 3:37 PM Subject: RE: re--Chronic Wating Disease (CWD) and Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathies (BSE): Public Health Risk Assessment<br /><br />''IS the h-BSE more virulent than typical BSE as well, or the same as cBSE, or less virulent than cBSE? just curious.....''<br /><br />Professor Kong reply ;<br /><br />.....snip<br /><br />''As to the H-BSE, we do not have sufficient data to say one way or another, but we have found that H-BSE can infect humans. I hope we could publish these data once the study is complete.<br /><br />Thanks for your interest.''<br /><br />Best regards,<br /><br />Qingzhong Kong, PhD Associate Professor Department of Pathology Case Western Reserve University Cleveland, OH 44106 USA<br /><br />END...TSS<br /><br />P26<br /><br />TRANSMISSION OF ATYPICAL BOVINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY (BSE) IN HUMANIZED MOUSE MODELS<br /><br />Liuting Qing1, Fusong Chen1, Michael Payne1, Wenquan Zou1, Cristina Casalone2, Martin Groschup3, Miroslaw Polak4, Maria Caramelli2, Pierluigi Gambetti1, Juergen Richt5*, and Qingzhong Kong1<br /><br />1Department of Pathology, Case Western Reserve University, Cleveland, OH 44106, USA; 2CEA, Istituto Zooprofilattico Sperimentale, Italy; 3Friedrich-Loeffler-Institut, Germany; 4National Veterinary Research Institute, Poland; 5Kansas State University, Diagnostic Medicine/Pathobiology Department, Manhattan, KS 66506, USA. *Previous address: USDA National Animal Disease Center, Ames, IA 50010, USA<br /><br />Classical BSE is a world-wide prion disease in cattle, and the classical BSE strain (BSE-C) has led to over 200 cases of clinical human infection (variant CJD). Two atypical BSE strains, BSE-L (also named BASE) and BSE-H, have been discovered in three continents since 2004. The first case of naturally occurring BSE with mutated bovine PrP gene (termed BSE-M) was also found in 2006 in the USA. The transmissibility and phenotypes of these atypical BSE strains/isolates in humans were unknown.<br /><br />We have inoculated humanized transgenic mice with classical and atypical BSE strains (BSE-C, BSE-L, BSE-H) and the BSE-M isolate. We have found that the atypical BSE-L strain is much more virulent than the classical BSE-C. The atypical BSE-H strain is also transmissible in the humanized transgenic mice with distinct phenotype, but no transmission has been observed for the BSE-M isolate so far.<br /><br /><a href="http://www.istitutoveneto.it/prion_09/Abstracts_09.pdf">http://www.istitutoveneto.it/prion_09/Abstracts_09.pdf</a><br /><br /><br />Thursday, October 07, 2010<br /><br />Experimental Transmission of H-type Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy to Bovinized Transgenic Mice<br /><br /><a href="http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2010/10/experimental-transmission-of-h-type.html">http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2010/10/experimental-transmission-of-h-type.html</a><br /><br /><br />Wednesday, July 28, 2010<br /><br />re-Freedom of Information Act Project Number 3625-32000-086-05, Study of Atypical BSE UPDATE July 28, 2010<br /><br /><a href="http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2010/07/re-freedom-of-information-act-project.html">http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2010/07/re-freedom-of-information-act-project.html</a><br /><br /><br />Wednesday, November 10, 2010 McDonald's and USA BSE aka mad cow disease McDonald's AND Seriologicals USA NOT PROTECTED FROM MAD COW<br /><br /><a href="http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2010/11/mcdonalds-and-usa-bse-aka-mad-cow.html">http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2010/11/mcdonalds-and-usa-bse-aka-mad-cow.html</a><br /><br /><br />WAKE UP AMERICA !<br /><br />with kindest regards, terry<br /><br />layperson<br /><br />FDA STATEMENT FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE May 4, 2004 Media Inquiries: 301-827-6242 Consumer Inquiries: 888-INFO-FDA<br /><br />Statement on Texas Cow With Central Nervous System Symptoms On Friday, April 30th, the Food and Drug Administration learned that a cow with central nervous system symptoms had been killed and shipped to a processor for rendering into animal protein for use in animal feed.<br /><br />FDA, which is responsible for the safety of animal feed, immediately began an investigation. On Friday and throughout the weekend, FDA investigators inspected the slaughterhouse, the rendering facility, the farm where the animal came from, and the processor that initially received the cow from the slaughterhouse.<br /><br />FDA's investigation showed that the animal in question had already been rendered into "meat and bone meal" (a type of protein animal feed). Over the weekend FDA was able to track down all the implicated material. That material is being held by the firm, which is cooperating fully with FDA.<br /><br />Cattle with central nervous system symptoms are of particular interest because cattle with bovine spongiform encephalopathy or BSE, also known as "mad cow disease," can exhibit such symptoms. In this case, there is no way now to test for BSE. But even if the cow had BSE, FDA's animal feed rule would prohibit the feeding of its rendered protein to other ruminant animals (e.g., cows, goats, sheep, bison).<br /><br />FDA is sending a letter to the firm summarizing its findings and informing the firm that FDA will not object to use of this material in swine feed only. If it is not used in swine feed, this material will be destroyed. Pigs have been shown not to be susceptible to BSE. If the firm agrees to use the material for swine feed only, FDA will track the material all the way through the supply chain from the processor to the farm to ensure that the feed is properly monitored and used only as feed for pigs.<br /><br />To protect the U.S. against BSE, FDA works to keep certain mammalian protein out of animal feed for cattle and other ruminant animals. FDA established its animal feed rule in 1997 after the BSE epidemic in the U.K. showed that the disease spreads by feeding infected ruminant protein to cattle.<br /><br />Under the current regulation, the material from this Texas cow is not allowed in feed for cattle or other ruminant animals. FDA's action specifying that the material go only into swine feed means also that it will not be fed to poultry.<br /><br />FDA is committed to protecting the U.S. from BSE and collaborates closely with the U.S. Department of Agriculture on all BSE issues. The animal feed rule provides crucial protection against the spread of BSE, but it is only one of several such firewalls. FDA will soon be improving the animal feed rule, to make this strong system even stronger.<br /><br />#<br /><br /><a href="http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/2004/ucm108292.htm">http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/2004/ucm108292.htm</a><br /><br /><br />Saturday, November 6, 2010<br /><br />TAFS1 Position Paper on Position Paper on Relaxation of the Feed Ban in the EU Berne, 2010 TAFS<br /><br />INTERNATIONAL FORUM FOR TRANSMISSIBLE ANIMAL DISEASES AND FOOD SAFETY a non-profit Swiss Foundation<br /><br /><a href="http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2010/11/tafs1-position-paper-on-position-paper.html">http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2010/11/tafs1-position-paper-on-position-paper.html</a><br /><br /><br />Seven main threats for the future linked to prions<br /><br />The NeuroPrion network has identified seven main threats for the future linked to prions.<br /><br />First threat<br /><br />The TSE road map defining the evolution of European policy for protection against prion diseases is based on a certain numbers of hypotheses some of which may turn out to be erroneous. In particular, a form of BSE (called atypical Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy), recently identified by systematic testing in aged cattle without clinical signs, may be the origin of classical BSE and thus potentially constitute a reservoir, which may be impossible to eradicate if a sporadic origin is confirmed. *** Also, a link is suspected between atypical BSE and some apparently sporadic cases of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease in humans. These atypical BSE cases constitute an unforeseen first threat that could sharply modify the European approach to prion diseases.<br /><br />Second threat<br /><br />In small ruminants, a new atypical form of scrapie currently represents up to 50% of detected cases and even involves sheep selected for resistance to classical scrapie. The consequences for animal and human health are still unknown and there may be a potential connection with atypical BSE. These atypical scrapie cases constitute a second threat not envisioned previously which could deeply modify the European approach to prion diseases.<br /><br />Third threat<br /><br />The species barrier between human and cattle might be weaker than previously expected and the risk of transmission of prion diseases between different species has been notoriously unpredictable. The emergence of new atypical strains in cattle and sheep together with the spread of chronic wasting disease in cervids renders the understanding of the species barrier critical. This constitutes a third threat not properly envisioned previously that could deeply modify the European approach to prion diseases.<br /><br />Fourth threat<br /><br />Prion infectivity has now been detected in blood, urine and milk and this has potential consequences on risk assessments for the environment and food as well as for contamination of surfaces including medical instruments. Furthermore the procedures recommended for decontamination of MBM (Meat and Bone Meal), which are based on older methodologies not designed for this purpose, have turned out to be of very limited efficacy and compromise current policies concerning the reuse of these high value protein supplements (cross-contamination of feed circuits are difficult to control). It should be noted that the destruction or very limited use of MBM is estimated to still cost 1 billion euros per year to the European economy,<br /><br />whereas other countries, including the US,<br /><br />Brazil, and Argentine do not have these constraints.<br /><br />However, many uncertainties remain concerning the guarantees that can be reasonably provided for food and feed safety and scientific knowledge about the causative agents (prions) will continue to evolve. This decontamination and environmental issue is a fourth threat that could modify deeply the European approach to prion diseases.<br /><br />Fifth threat The precise nature of prions remains elusive. Very recent data indicate that abnormal prion protein (PrPTSE) can be generated from the brains of normal animals, and under some conditions (including contaminated waste water) PrPTSE can be destroyed whereas the BSE infectious titre remains almost unchanged, a finding that underlines the possibility of having BSE without any detectable diagnostic marker. These are just two areas of our incomplete knowledge of the fundamental biology of prions which constitute a fifth threat to the European approach to prion diseases.<br /><br />Sixth threat The absence of common methods and standardisation in the evaluation of multiple in vivo models with different prion strains and different transgenic mice expressing PrP from different species (different genotypes of cattle, sheep, cervids, etc) renders a complete and comprehensive analysis of all the data generated by the different scientific groups almost impossible. This deeply impairs risk assessment. Moreover, the possibility of generating PrPTSE de novo with new powerful techniques has raised serious questions about their appropriateness for use as blood screening tests. The confusion about an incorrect interpretation of positive results obtained by these methods constitutes a sixth threat to European approach to prion diseases.<br /><br />Seventh Threat The detection of new or re-emerging prion diseases in animals or humans which could lead to a new crisis in consumer confidence over the relaxation of precautionary measures and surveillance programmes constitutes a seventh threat that could modify the European approach to prion diseases.<br /><br /><a href="http://www.neuroprion.org/en/np-neuroprion.html">http://www.neuroprion.org/en/np-neuroprion.html</a><br /><br /><br />Thursday, August 12, 2010<br /><br />Seven main threats for the future linked to prions<br /><br /><a href="http://prionpathy.blogspot.com/2010/08/seven-main-threats-for-future-linked-to.html">http://prionpathy.blogspot.com/2010/08/seven-main-threats-for-future-linked-to.html</a><br /><br /><br /><a href="http://prionpathy.blogspot.com/">http://prionpathy.blogspot.com/</a><br /><br /><br />Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport References Committee The possible impacts and consequences for public health, trade and agriculture of the Government's decision to relax import restrictions on beef Final report June 2010<br /><br />2.65 At its hearing on 14 May 2010, the committee heard evidence from Dr Alan Fahey who has recently submitted a thesis on the clinical neuropsychiatric, epidemiological and diagnostic features of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease.48 Dr Fahey told the committee of his concerns regarding the lengthy incubation period for transmissible spongiform encephalopathies, the inadequacy of current tests and the limited nature of our current understanding of this group of diseases.49<br /><br />2.66 Dr Fahey also told the committee that in the last two years a link has been established between forms of atypical CJD and atypical BSE. Dr Fahey said that: They now believe that those atypical BSEs overseas are in fact causing sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease. They were not sure if it was due to mad sheep disease or a different form. If you look in the textbooks it looks like this is just arising by itself. But in my research I have a summary of a document which states that there has never been any proof that sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease has arisen de novo-has arisen of itself. There is no proof of that. The recent research is that in fact it is due to atypical forms of mad cow disease which have been found across Europe, have been found in America and have been found in Asia. These atypical forms of mad cow disease typically have even longer incubation periods than the classical mad cow disease.50<br /><br /><a href="http://www.aph.gov.au/senate/committee/rrat_ctte/mad_cows/report/report.pdf">http://www.aph.gov.au/senate/committee/rrat_ctte/mad_cows/report/report.pdf</a><br /><br /><br />5 Includes 28 cases in which the diagnosis is pending, and 17 inconclusive cases;<br /><br />6 Includes 28 (24 from 2010) cases with type determination pending in which the diagnosis of vCJD has been excluded<br /><br /><a href="http://www.cjdsurveillance.com/pdf/case-table.pdf">http://www.cjdsurveillance.com/pdf/case-table.pdf</a><br /><br /><br />CJD TEXAS 38 YEAR OLD FEMALE WORKED SLAUGHTERING CATTLE EXPOSED TO BRAIN AND SPINAL CORD MATTER<br /><br />" Up until about 6 years ago, the pt worked at Tyson foods where she worked on the assembly line, slaughtering cattle and preparing them for packaging. She was exposed to brain and spinal cord matter when she would euthanize the cattle. "<br /><br /><a href="http://www.recordandoalinda.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=19:cjd-english-info&catid=9:cjd-ingles&Itemid=8">http://www.recordandoalinda.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=19:cjd-english-info&catid=9:cjd-ingles&Itemid=8</a><br /><br /><br />According to the World Health Organisation, the future public health threat of vCJD in the UK and Europe and potentially the rest of the world is of concern and currently unquantifiable. However, the possibility of a significant and geographically diverse vCJD epidemic occurring over the next few decades cannot be dismissed.<br /><br />The key word here is diverse. What does diverse mean?<br /><br />If USA scrapie transmitted to USA bovine does not produce pathology as the UK c-BSE, then why would CJD from there look like UK vCJD?"<br /><br />SEE FULL TEXT ;<br /><br /><a href="http://www.promedmail.org/pls/apex/f?p=2400:1001:568933508083034::NO::F2400_P1001_BACK_PAGE,F2400_P1001_PUB_MAIL_ID:1000,82101">http://www.promedmail.org/pls/apex/f?p=2400:1001:568933508083034::NO::F2400_P1001_BACK_PAGE,F2400_P1001_PUB_MAIL_ID:1000,82101</a><br /><br /><br />5 Includes 28 cases in which the diagnosis is pending, and 17 inconclusive cases;<br /><br />6 Includes 28 (24 from 2010) cases with type determination pending in which the diagnosis of vCJD has been excluded<br /><br /><a href="http://www.cjdsurveillance.com/pdf/case-table.pdf">http://www.cjdsurveillance.com/pdf/case-table.pdf</a><br /><br /><br />USA MAD COW POLICY, don't look, don't find, or screw the testing up so bad, everything comes out negative. UNLESS of course you get the end around by the Honorable Phyllis Fong of the OIG. Course, that was a one time deal. But what a coup it was. ...TSS<br /><br />-------- Original Message --------<br /><br />Subject: USA BIO-RADs INCONCLUSIVEs<br /><br />Date: Fri, 17 Dec 2004 15:37:28 -0600<br /><br />From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."<br /><br />To: susan_berg@bio-rad.com<br /><br />Hello Susan and Bio-Rad,<br /><br />Happy Holidays!<br /><br />I wish to ask a question about Bio-Rad and USDA BSE/TSE testing and there inconclusive. IS the Bio-Rad test for BSE/TSE that complicated, or is there most likely some human error we are seeing here?<br /><br />HOW can Japan have 2 positive cows with No clinical signs WB+, IHC-, HP- , BUT in the USA, these cows are considered 'negative'?<br /><br />IS there more politics working here than science in the USA?<br /><br />What am I missing?<br /><br />-------- Original Message --------<br /><br />Subject: Re: USDA: More mad cow testing will demonstrate beef's safety<br /><br />Date: Fri, 17 Dec 2004 09:26:19 -0600<br /><br />From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr." snip...end<br /><br />Experts doubt USDA's mad cow results<br /><br />snip...END<br /><br />WELL, someone did call me from Bio-Rad about this, however it was not Susan Berg. but i had to just about take a blood oath not to reveal there name. IN fact they did not want me to even mention this, but i feel it is much much to important. I have omitted any I.D. of this person, but thought I must document this ;<br /><br />Bio-Rad, TSS phone conversation 12/28/04<br /><br />SNIP...<br /><br />full text ;<br /><br /><a href="http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2008/01/bse-oie-usda.html">http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2008/01/bse-oie-usda.html</a><br /><br /><br />Saturday, August 16, 2008<br /><br />Qualitative Analysis of BSE Risk Factors in the United States February 13, 2000 at 3:37 pm PST (BSE red book)<br /><br /><a href="http://bseusa.blogspot.com/2008/08/qualitative-analysis-of-bse-risk.html">http://bseusa.blogspot.com/2008/08/qualitative-analysis-of-bse-risk.html</a><br /><br /><br />48 hour traceback for BSE mad cow disease in the USA ???<br /><br />NOT in your lifetime !<br /><br />8 YEARS IN REVIEW OF THE MAD COW DEBACLE IN THE USA ;<br /><br /><a href="http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2008/12/mad-cow-disease-usa-december-28-2008-8.html">http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2008/12/mad-cow-disease-usa-december-28-2008-8.html</a><br /><br /><br />Thursday, June 24, 2010<br /><br />Accumulation of L-type Bovine Prions in Peripheral Nerve Tissues<br /><br />Volume 16, Number 7–July 2010<br /><br /><a href="http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2010/06/accumulation-of-l-type-bovine-prions-in.html">http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2010/06/accumulation-of-l-type-bovine-prions-in.html</a><br /><br /><br />Saturday, June 19, 2010<br /><br />U.S. DENIED UPGRADED BSE STATUS FROM OIE<br /><br />see full text and reasons why here ;<br /><br /><a href="http://usdameatexport.blogspot.com/2010/06/us-denied-upgraded-bse-status-from-oie.html">http://usdameatexport.blogspot.com/2010/06/us-denied-upgraded-bse-status-from-oie.html</a><br /><br /><br />-------- Original Message --------<br /><br />Subject: TESTIMONY OF THE HONORABLE MIKE JOHANNS USDA BEFORE THE U.S. SENATE COMMITTEE ON AGRICULTURE, NUTRITION & FORESTRY FEBRUARY 3, 2005 Date: Tue, 22 Feb 2005 16:29:55 -0600<br />From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."<br />Reply-To: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy<br />To: BSE-L@LISTSERV.KALIV.UNI-KARLSRUHE.DE<br /><br />##################### Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy #####################<br /><br />TESTIMONY OF THE HONORABLE MIKE JOHANNS UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE BEFORE THE U.S. SENATE COMMITTEE ON AGRICULTURE, NUTRITION & FORESTRY FEBRUARY 3, 2005<br /><br />Chairman Chambliss, Mr. Harkin, Members of the Committee, thank you for holding this important hearing today and for the opportunity to testify before you. Accompanying me today are Dr. Keith Collins, USDA s Chief Economist and Dr. Ron DeHaven, Administrator of USDA s Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS). They will be available to assist in answering any questions you might have.<br /><br />Before I begin, I want to thank you all for the professionalism and courtesy extended to Stephanie and me during my recent confirmation process. I appreciate the close, positive working relationships that we have begun forging, and thanks to the diligence of this Committee, it was an honor and privilege for me to be the first Cabinet member confirmed during President Bush s second term. It is, therefore, a pleasure to return for my first hearing as Secretary.<br /><br />I have said frequently that addressing Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) issues, particularly as they relate to trade disruptions, would be my top priority as Secretary. I have also heard from this Committee quite clearly on this topic, and I believe very strongly that we are all on the side of American agriculture. The Committee and your constituents have also posed some useful and valid questions that deserve thorough examination, which this hearing will help provide.<br /><br />The actions that the U.S. Department of Agriculture and the federal government are taking in regard to BSE are potentially precedent-setting and could affect international trade patterns for years to come, with important economic implications for our cattle producers and the entire beef industry. Therefore, our actions must be undertaken with the utmost deliberation, using science as the basis. In the absence of that science, sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) restrictions will be used arbitrarily by many nations, without any basis of protecting human or animal health.<br /><br />Accordingly, this hearing could not be timelier. I want to be very clear that while protecting human and animal health must remain our top priorities, I am confident that we can seek to return to normal patterns of international commerce by continuing to use science as the basis for decision making by U.S. regulatory authorities and our trading partners.<br /><br />Almost exactly one year ago, Secretary Veneman appeared before this Committee to discuss BSE. In the time since then, much has transpired:<br /><br />On March 8, 2004, USDA published a notice reopening the comment period on a rule to establish minimal-risk regions for BSE (the minimal-risk rule ).<br /><br />On March 15, 2004, consistent with the recommendations of an International Review Team (IRT) of scientific advisers, USDA announced that beginning June 1 it would implement an enhanced BSE surveillance program to test as many high risk animals as possible over a 12-18 month period. We wanted once and for all to clearly ascertain whether we had BSE in our cattle herd and, if so, how prevalent it might be. USDA began the work of setting up the infrastructure required, including laboratory equipment and certification, staff training, outreach efforts, and licensing and approval of rapid tests. The plan was reviewed by the IRT, which characterized it as comprehensive, scientifically based and address[ing] the most important points regarding BSE surveillance in animals.<br /><br />On June 1, 2004, the enhanced surveillance program began. Our goal is to test as many high- risk cattle as possible in 12-18 months. If we test 268, 500 we will be able to detect the presence of as few as five targeted, high-risk cattle with BSE at a 99 percent confidence level. At the time, USDA officials consistently stated that the surveillance plan might uncover additional BSE-positive animals. To date, some eight months later, more than 200,000 animals have been tested, all of which have been negative.<br /><br />In order to help raise awareness about potential BSE cases among animal-health professionals and livestock producers, education and outreach have also been critical components of these efforts. These activities have included advertisements in industry publications, media articles, presentations at trade shows, and other materials. The role of producers, renderers and others in helping obtain samples of high-risk animals has been indispensable to the success of our surveillance program, and the cooperation we have received has been outstanding.<br /><br />On December 29, 2004, USDA announced the final minimal-risk rule, which designated Canada as the first minimal-risk region for BSE, and which will become effective on March 7, 2005.<br /><br />On January 2, 2005, Canada confirmed its second domestic case of BSE in a cow that was born in October of 1996 (the first since May 20, 2003). It was followed nine days later by a third case, an 81-month-old cow.<br /><br />On January 24, 2005, USDA dispatched a technical team to Canada. We sent the team to investigate the efficacy of Canada s ruminant to ruminant feed ban because the animal was born shortly after the implementation of that ban and to determine if there are any potential links among the positive animals. We have appreciated Canada s willingness to cooperate and assist us in these efforts.<br /><br />The technical team is focusing both on the efficacy of Canada s feed ban and its epidemiological investigation of the new BSE cases. The team is composed of experts from APHIS in the areas of epidemiology, transmissible spongiform encephalopathies (the family of diseases to which BSE belongs), and official documentation.<br /><br />An auditor from USDA s Agricultural Marketing Service (AMS) is also part of the team, which will also be joined by representatives of USDA s Foreign Agricultural Service (FAS) stationed in Canada. Technical experts from the Department of Health and Human Services Food and Drug Administration are accompanying the team in an advisory capacity.<br /><br />We have been receiving regular updates from the team. We expect a final report on feed ban issues in mid-February and the epidemiological report by the end of March. These reports will be critical as we consider whether any adjustments to current policies are warranted.<br /><br />The Minimal-Risk Rule<br /><br />As you are aware, USDA s minimal-risk rule has come under legal challenge. I will address the process of promulgating the rule, which was transparent, deliberative and science-based.<br /><br />Two rounds of public comment were conducted on the rule, with more than 3,300 comments received.<br /><br />The final rule establishes criteria for geographic regions to be recognized as presenting minimal risk of introducing BSE into the United States. It places Canada in the minimal-risk category, and defines the requirements that must be met for the import of certain ruminants and ruminant products from Canada. A minimal-risk region can include a region in which BSE-infected animals have been diagnosed, but where sufficient risk-mitigation measures have been put in place to make the introduction of BSE into the United States unlikely.<br /><br />Because the rule permits the import of live cattle under 30 months of age and ruminant products from older animals, it is useful to note the risk mitigation measures. These include: proper animal identification; accompanying animal health certification that includes information on individual animal identification, age, origin, destination, and responsible parties; the movement of the cattle to feedlots or slaughter facilities in sealed containers; the prohibition on cattle moving to more than one feedlot in the United States; and the removal of specified risk materials (SRMs) from cattle slaughtered in the United States.<br /><br />For live sheep and goats under 12 months of age, all of the same mitigation measures apply, except for the requirement that SRMs be removed from the animal at slaughter.<br /><br />We remain very confident that the combination of all of these requirements, in addition to the animal and public health measures that Canada has in place to prevent the spread of BSE, along with the extensive U.S. regulatory food-safety and animal-health systems, provide the utmost protection to U.S. consumers and livestock.<br /><br />USDA continues to undertake several steps to ensure Canada s compliance with its BSE regulations. In addition to the investigation that I already discussed, USDA s Food Safety and Inspection Service in December 2004 conducted an intensive audit of Canada s compliance with the BSE requirements of the United States, with particular attention to SRM removal. FSIS visited several facilities that slaughter only cattle under 30 months of age and determined that they are effectively implementing the BSE regulations.<br /><br />This month, FSIS will conduct a similar BSE audit of Canadian plants that slaughter cattle 30 months and older. Canada currently has only seven such plants that are certified to export meat to the United States.<br /><br />I am aware of concerns with the portion of USDA s minimal-risk rule that would allow meat from animals over 30 months of age to be imported from Canada, but continue the prohibition on the importation of live animals of the same age for processing in the United States. Some have suggested that going forward with this rule will change the historical beef-trading patterns in North America to the detriment of U.S. packers.<br /><br />As Secretary of Agriculture, I believe that the marketplace should determine cross-border trading patterns. We must make every effort to avoid policies that favor one group of packers over another. Decisions, however, related to sanitary and phytosanitary measures must be based on science.<br /><br />I can assure you that I will be reviewing this issue very carefully in the days ahead as we move closer to the March 7 implementation date.<br /><br />The Role of Science<br /><br />I simply cannot emphasize strongly enough the central role of science in this entire process, particularly with regard to the rigorous evaluation of risk.<br /><br />Since the discovery of the first case of BSE in Great Britain in 1986, we have learned a tremendous amount about this disease. That knowledge has greatly informed our regulatory systems and response efforts.<br /><br />We have learned that the single most important thing we can do to protect human health regarding BSE is the removal of SRMs from the food supply. Likewise, the most significant step we can take to prevent the spread of BSE and bring about its complete eradication is the ruminant to ruminant feed ban. It is because of the strong systems the United States has put in place, especially these two essential firewalls, that we can be confident of the safety of our beef supply and that the spread of BSE has been prevented in this nation.<br /><br />After Canada reported its first case of BSE in May 2003, USDA conducted a comprehensive risk analysis to review the potential threat it posed. The initial analysis followed the recommended structure of the World Organization for Animal Health, or OIE, and drew on findings from the Harvard-Tuskegee BSE risk assessment, findings from the epidemiological investigation of BSE in Canada, and information on Canadian BSE surveillance and feed ban, and history of imports of cattle and meat and bone meal from countries known to have BSE.<br /><br />The results of that analysis, available on the USDA Website, confirmed that Canada has the necessary safeguards in place to protect U.S. consumers and livestock against BSE. These mitigation measures include the removal of SRMs from the food chain supply, a ruminant-to-ruminant feed ban, a national surveillance program and import restrictions. The extensive risk assessment conducted as part of USDA s rulemaking process also took into careful consideration the possibility that Canada could experience additional cases of BSE.<br /><br />In the risk analysis update for the final rule, USDA also considered the additional risk protection from new slaughter procedures, such as the prohibition on the use of downer animals for food.<br /><br />The public commented on the risk assessment that accompanied the proposed rule and the Explanatory Note released following the finding of BSE in a cow in Washington State. Over a period of months, USDA carefully considered these comments, and responses were published with the final rule. The comments were beneficial to the final risk analysis. The risk analysis was reviewed internally at USDA and by Dr. William Hueston, an international expert on BSE and a member of the International Review Team.<br /><br />The OIE recommends the use of risk assessment to manage human and animal health risks of BSE. OIE guidelines, based on current scientific understanding, recognize that there are different levels of risk in countries or regions, and suggest how trade may safely occur according to the levels of risk. USDA used OIE as a basis in developing our regulations defining Canada as a minimal risk country.<br /><br />Cattle and Beef Trade Impacts<br /><br />While SPS regulations protecting human and animal health are the foremost concern, USDA also has examined the potential economic impacts of the minimal-risk rule and related BSE trade issues, as required by Executive Order 12866.<br /><br />For more than three months following the May 20, 2003, BSE discovery in Canada, all imports of Canadian ruminants and ruminant products were barred. Then, certain Canadian ruminant products for which there is inherently lower risk were allowed to enter under permit beginning September 2003.<br /><br />For all of 2003, the United States imported 336,000 metric tons of beef from Canada. Imports increased to an estimated 476,000 metric tons in 2004, up nearly 42 percent and back to about the level that prevailed in years prior to 2003. The cost-benefit analysis conducted as part of the final rule indicates that U.S. beef imports from Canada are projected to actually decrease slightly in 2005 (about 4 percent), as Canada shifts its slaughter capacity to lower-yielding older cattle not eligible for export to the United States.<br /><br />At the same time since the border has been closed to live cattle since May 2003, imports of fed and feeder cattle under 30 months are expected to increase in 2005, which is expected to drive up U.S. beef production, reduce beef prices slightly and, consequently, reduce cattle prices. Our most recent forecast for all of 2005 is that fed cattle prices are expected to average $82 per cwt, assuming the Canadian border opens on March 7, 2005, and that Asian markets do not open to our beef during 2005. The precise economic effects will depend on the timing and volume of cattle and beef imports from Canada. If USDA s price forecast turns out to be correct, that would be the third-highest annual fed cattle price on record. Cattle futures prices may be less affected than indicated by our forecast, as market prices have likely already reflected some probability of the border opening. In addition, to the extent that we can continue to open markets that are currently closed to our beef, U.S. cattle price prospects will strengthen.<br /><br />U.S. market-maintenance activities have been critical in helping restore our beef export markets. In 2003, the total export value of U.S. beef and ruminant products was $7.5 billion. After December 23, 2003, 64 percent of that market was immediately closed. Today, we have recovered well over a third of that, so that 41 percent of that market ($3.1 billion) remains closed. Two countries Japan ($1.5 billion) and Korea ($800 million) account for nearly three-quarters of the existing closures.<br /><br />Opening the Japanese Market<br /><br />As a leader in the critical Asian markets, Japan is a vital market to reopen to U.S. beef exports. We are aware that the decision to resume trade in this market will set an important precedent for trade resumption in many other markets. Therefore we have endeavored to use science in our ongoing efforts. Efforts to re-open this market have drawn on resources across the federal government and at the highest political levels. As I have previously said, this issue has occupied much of my first few days as Secretary. Just last week, I met with Ambassador Kato and also wrote to my counterpart, Minister Shimamura, on the importance of this issue. At the same time, Ambassador Baker continues to press this issue with Government of Japan officials in Tokyo, and other U.S. Government officials continue to contact their counterparts.<br /><br />These efforts are just the latest in many policy discussions and technical exchanges over the past 13 months. Indeed, the issue has been a major focus of direct discussions between President Bush and Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi.<br /><br />On October 23, 2004, Japan and the United States developed a framework to allow the resumption of bilateral beef trade following the conclusion of regulatory processes in both countries. As a step toward the resumption of normal trade, the agreement establishes an interim special marketing program, known as the Beef Export Verification (BEV) Program, to allow the United States to sell beef and beef products to Japanese importers from animals 20 months of age and under. Animal age will be determined through a combination of production records and physiological (grading) means. We are now working with Japanese officials to gain approval of the BEV under their regulatory process.<br /><br />While we are focusing on Japan because of our important trading relationship and its leadership role in the region, we are also pursuing efforts to reopen all of the markets that have been closed to us. We are actively engaged with Korea, Hong Kong, Taiwan, China, Egypt, and Russia and have specific actions underway in each market to get trade resumed. I would be pleased to provide Members upon request additional detail on these and other secondary markets. While the progress that has been made has taken far longer than we had hoped, progress is indeed being made. And, I have stated that USDA, and indeed the entire U.S. Government, will exert every effort to resolve the matter at the earliest possible time.<br /><br />Conclusion<br /><br />As traditional trade barriers such as tariffs are lowered, our focus to eliminate unjustified non-tariff barriers such as non-science based SPS regulatory measures become all the more important to maintain the flow of mutually beneficial trade. For USDA, a common touchstone across these issues is the need to maintain consistency and predictability, to base our domestic regulations on science and to encourage the use of science-based solutions within the international community. The United States has long been a leader in this regard, including negotiating the World Trade Organization Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures during the Uruguay Round.<br /><br />Even before the discovery of a single case of BSE in the United States, USDA had begun talking with other countries about the need for international trade standards to keep pace with the science, and we will redouble our efforts in this regard.<br /><br />It is also critical that domestic trade rules reflect the current state of knowledge regarding BSE, and here the United States is leading, as well. We are confident that trade can be resumed with countries where BSE has been discovered, contingent upon strong protections within those countries, as well as the robust and effective regulatory system those imports are subject to when they enter the United States. These facts are reflected in the minimal-risk rule.<br /><br />At the same time, we will continue to work with our trading partners to ensure the ongoing strength of their own BSE protection systems, especially the removal of SRMs and implementation of the feed ban. While trade opportunities are multiplying in an increasingly global marketplace, we must always remain mindful of our paramount responsibility to protect the public health and animal health.<br /><br />In summary, I am confident that we are continuing to keep the protection of public and animal health foremost in our concerns. It is critical that we continue to use science as a basis for our decisions and regulations, and that the United States maintain its leadership role in advancing our scientific understanding of these kinds of SPS-related issues and appropriate science-based responses.<br /><br />Mr. Chairman, thank you once again for holding this important hearing. I would now be pleased to take any questions you or other members may have.<br /><br />###<br /><br /><a href="http://www.usda.gov/agency/ocr/download/Johanns.BSE.020305.doc">http://www.usda.gov/agency/ocr/download/Johanns.BSE.020305.doc</a><br /><br /><br />July 14 Ann Veneman , Secretary of Agriculture Joint Hearing: House Committee on Agriculture and House Committee on Government Reform Ongoing activities related to Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE)<br /><br /><a href="http://www.usda.gov/agency/ocr/download/Veneman.BSE.071404.doc">http://www.usda.gov/agency/ocr/download/Veneman.BSE.071404.doc</a><br /><br /><br />February 24 The Honorable Elsa Murano , Under Secretary for Food Safety; Dr. Ron DeHaven , Deputy Administrator for Veterinary Services Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service; Dr. Keith Collins, Chief Economist Senate Appropriations Committee BSE<br /><br /><a href="http://www.usda.gov/agency/ocr/download/Murano.22404.doc">http://www.usda.gov/agency/ocr/download/Murano.22404.doc</a><br /><br /><br /><a href="http://www.usda.gov/agency/ocr/download/Dehaven.22404.doc">http://www.usda.gov/agency/ocr/download/Dehaven.22404.doc</a><br /><br /><br /><a href="http://www.usda.gov/agency/ocr/download/KeithCollins.22404.doc">http://www.usda.gov/agency/ocr/download/KeithCollins.22404.doc</a><br /><br /><br />January 2004 January 27 The Honorable Ann M. Veneman,<br /><br />Secretary, USDA<br /><br />Senate Agriculture<br /><br />Committee<br /><br />BSE-positive cow found in Washington State and USDA's response January 21 The Honorable Ann M. Veneman,<br /><br />Secretary, USDA<br /><br />House Agriculture<br /><br />Committee<br /><br />BSE-positive cow found in Washington State and USDA's response<br /><br /><a href="http://www.usda.gov/agency/ocr/download/BSE.Veneman.012704.doc">http://www.usda.gov/agency/ocr/download/BSE.Veneman.012704.doc</a><br /><br /><br /><a href="http://www.usda.gov/agency/ocr/download/BSE.Veneman.012104.doc">http://www.usda.gov/agency/ocr/download/BSE.Veneman.012104.doc</a><br /><br /><br />June 19 Bobby Accord, Administrator, APHIS House Resources Subcommittee on Fisheries, Conservation, Wildlife & Oceans Chronic Wasting Disease; palentological resources<br /><br />NO LINK<br /><br />May 16 Dr. Jim Butler , Duputy Under Secretary for Marketing & Regulatory Programs House Committee of Resources - Subcommittees on Forest and Forest Health , and Fishery Conservation, Wildlife and Oceans Chronic Wasting Disease<br /><br /><a href="http://www.usda.gov/agency/ocr/download/MRP-Butler-5.16.02.pdf">http://www.usda.gov/agency/ocr/download/MRP-Butler-5.16.02.pdf</a><br /><br /><br /><a href="http://resourcescommittee.house.gov/107cong/forests/2002may16/agenda.htm">http://resourcescommittee.house.gov/107cong/forests/2002may16/agenda.htm</a><br /><br /><br />ARCHIVES FROM 2001<br /><br />NOT<br /><br /><a href="http://www.usda.gov/agency/ocr/testimony2001.htm">http://www.usda.gov/agency/ocr/testimony2001.htm</a><br /><br /><br />???<br /><br />MORE on that OTHER LITTLE OLD MAD COW FROM TEXAS (real player)<br /><br />Assigned vet wanted it tested.<br /><br />Gov. insp. over rided and decided not to test.<br /><br />SYSTEM broken around the Country.<br /><br />PROBLEMS NATION WIDE!<br /><br />APHIS inspectors do not follow through.<br /><br />http://www.npr.org/dmg/dmg.php?prgCode=ME&showDate=07-May2004&segNum=8&mediaPref=RM<br /><br />May 13, 2004<br /><br />Failure To Test Staggering Cow May Reflect Wider Problems Rep. Waxman raises concerns that the recent failure of USDA to test an impaired cow for BSE may not be an isolated incident, citing the failure of USDA to monitor whether cows condemned for central nervous system symptoms are actually tested for mad cow disease.<br /><br />- Letter to USDA<br /><br /><a href="http://www.house.gov/reform/min/pdfs_108_2/pdfs_inves/pdf_food_usda_mad_cow_may_13_let.pdf">http://www.house.gov/reform/min/pdfs_108_2/pdfs_inves/pdf_food_usda_mad_cow_may_13_let.pdf</a><br /><br /><br /><a href="http://www.house.gov/reform/min/pdfs_108_2/pdfs_inves/pdf_food_usda_mad_cow_may_13_let.pdf">http://www.house.gov/reform/min/pdfs_108_2/pdfs_inves/pdf_food_usda_mad_cow_may_13_let.pdf</a><br /><br /><br />===============================================<br /><br />THAT ONE TEXAS MAD COW IS ONLY TIP OF ICE BURG;<br /><br />No mad cow results for nearly 500 cows<br /><br />By Steve Mitchell United Press International Published 8/11/2004 11:23 AM<br /><br />WASHINGTON, Aug. 11 (UPI) -- The U.S. Department of Agriculture failed to test for mad cow disease or collect the correct portion of the brain on nearly 500 suspect cows over the past two years -- including some in categories considered most likely to be infected -- according to agency records obtained by United Press International.<br /><br />The testing problems mean it may never be known with certainty whether these animals were infected with the deadly disease. Department officials said these animals were not included in the agency's final tally of mad cow tests, but the records, obtained by UPI under the Freedom of Information Act, indicate at least some of them were counted...<br /><br />snip...<br /><br />--<br /><br />Steve Mitchell is UPI's Medical Correspondent. E-mail sciencemail@upi.com Copyright © 2001-2004 United Press International<br /><br /><a href="http://www.upi.com/view.cfm?StoryID=20040810-042935-2066r">http://www.upi.com/view.cfm?StoryID=20040810-042935-2066r</a><br /><br /><br />------------------------------------------------------------------------<br /><br />Note: On Dec. 23, 2003, the U.S. Department of Agriculture reported that a cow in Washington state had tested positive for bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE, or mad cow disease). As a result, information on this Web page stating that no BSE cases had been found in the United States is now incorrect. However, because other information on this page continues to have value, the page will remain available for viewing.<br /><br />FDA ANNOUNCES TEST RESULTS FROM TEXAS FEED LOT<br /><br />Today the Food and Drug Administration announced the results of tests taken on feed used at a Texas feedlot that was suspected of containing meat and bone meal from other domestic cattle -- a violation of FDA's 1997 prohibition on using ruminant material in feed for other ruminants. Results indicate that a very low level of prohibited material was found in the feed fed to cattle.<br /><br />FDA has determined that each animal could have consumed, at most and in total, five-and-one-half grams - approximately a quarter ounce -- of prohibited material. These animals weigh approximately 600 pounds.<br /><br />It is important to note that the prohibited material was domestic in origin (therefore not likely to contain infected material because there is no evidence of BSE in U.S. cattle), fed at a very low level, and fed only once. The potential risk of BSE to such cattle is therefore exceedingly low, even if the feed were contaminated.<br /><br />According to Dr. Bernard Schwetz, FDA's Acting Principal Deputy Commissioner, "The challenge to regulators and industry is to keep this disease out of the United States. One important defense is to prohibit the use of any ruminant animal materials in feed for other ruminant animals. Combined with other steps, like U.S. Department of Agriculture's (USDA) ban on the importation of live ruminant animals from affected countries, these steps represent a series of protections, to keep American cattle free of BSE."<br /><br />Despite this negligible risk, Purina Mills, Inc., is nonetheless announcing that it is voluntarily purchasing all 1,222 of the animals held in Texas and mistakenly fed the animal feed containing the prohibited material. Therefore, meat from those animals will not enter the human food supply. FDA believes any cattle that did not consume feed containing the prohibited material are unaffected by this incident, and should be handled in the beef supply clearance process as usual.<br /><br />FDA believes that Purina Mills has behaved responsibly by first reporting the human error that resulted in the misformulation of the animal feed supplement and then by working closely with State and Federal authorities.<br /><br />This episode indicates that the multi-layered safeguard system put into place is essential for protecting the food supply and that continued vigilance needs to be taken, by all concerned, to ensure these rules are followed routinely.<br /><br />FDA will continue working with USDA as well as State and local officials to ensure that companies and individuals comply with all laws and regulations designed to protect the U.S. food supply.<br /><br />------------------------------------------------------------------------ <a href="http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/NEWS/2001/NEW00752.html">http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/NEWS/2001/NEW00752.html</a><br /><br /><br />Chapter 5<br /><br />Center for Veterinary Medicine<br /><br />Last Update: August 07, 2003<br /><br />Animal Feeds<br /><br />Warning Letters Issued for CGMP Violations<br /><br />* On March 8, 2001, the FDA s New Orleans District Office issued a Warning Letter to Prestage Farms, Inc., West Point, Mississippi. The firm manufactures medicated and non-medicated feeds for its own integrated swine enterprise. An FDA inspection of the facility on February 21 - 22, 2001, disclosed significant deviations from the Current Good Manufacturing Practice (CGMP) requirements for Medicated Feeds. These deviations included: failure to perform assays for the active drug ingredient in one product since 1999; failure to perform appropriate investigations and/or corrective actions for out of limit assays; and failure to have master production records. * The FDA s Dallas District Office issued a Warning Letter to Purina Mills, St. Louis, Missouri, on March 23, 2001. The Warning Letter followed the an FDA inspection of Purina Mills, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, on February 2-6, and 13-14, 2001. The firm failed to follow Purina's SOP for Drug Sequencing Requirements. The SOP provides for sequencing production (without flushing the mixer) of animal feeds for a species for which a drug component of a prior medicated feed is not approved. Additionally, the firm had distributed bagged medicated feeds since June 2000, with faulty tagging equipment and no control to ensure that all bagged feeds were completely labeled.<br /><br />Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE)<br /><br />To help prevent the establishment and amplification of BSE in the Unites States, FDA implemented a final rule that prohibits the use of most mammaliam protein in feeds for ruminant animals. This rule, Title 21 Part 589.2000 of the Code of Federal Regulations, became effective on August 4, 1997.<br /><br />On August 23, 2001, Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) Secretary Tommy Thompson unveiled a department-wide action plan outlining new steps to improve scientific understanding of BSE, commonly known as "mad cow disease," and related diseases known as TSEs. The plan incorporates a comprehensive approach to further strengthen surveillance, increase research resources, and expand existing inspection efforts to prevent BSE and TSEs from entering or taking hold in the U.S.<br /><br />Warning Letters for BSE Violations<br /><br />FDA Inspection Finds Numerous Violations of BSE Regulations<br /><br />* On August 8, 2001, the FDA s Seattle District Office issued a Warning Letter to the owner of an animal feed manufacturing facility located in Tualatin, Oregon. FDA investigators conducted an inspection on July 12, 2001, which disclosed violations of the bovine feed ingredient regulations. The inspection revealed that the firm failed to separate the receipt, processing, and storage of products containing prohibited material from non-prohibited material; failed to establish a written system, including clean-out and flushing procedures, to avoid commingling and cross-contamination of equipment; and failed to maintain records sufficient to track the materials. In addition, the firm failed to label products with the required cautionary statement, Do Not Feed to Cattle or Other Ruminants.<br /><br />Gamecock Feedmill Found Violating BSE Regulations<br /><br />* On July 12, 2001, the FDA s Cincinnati District Office issued a Warning Letter to the Carrollton Farmers Exchange, Carrollton, Ohio, a feed mill. FDA investigators conducted an inspection on June 25, 2001, which found the firm was manufacturing gamecock feed containing prohibited proteins. The firm was not labeling the gamecock feed with the cautionary statement, Do not Feed to Cattle or Other Ruminants; was not flushing or sequencing after manufacturing the feed, and was not maintaining distribution information.<br /><br />Warning Issued for Lack of Required BSE Cautionary Statement<br /><br />* The FDA s New Orleans District Office issued a Warning Letter to Shields Feed and Supply, Coffeeville, Alabama, on March 7, 2001. An inspection conducted on February 1, 2001, of Shields animal feed operation showed the finished product label lacked the required ruminant cautionary statement. In addition, mixing and distribution records were not maintained; no written procedures were established for mixer cleaning; and the corn used for the mixer cleaning was not labeled and quarantined.<br /><br />Firm Warned for No Measures to Avoid Commingling of Feed<br /><br />* On May 3, 2001, the FDA s Minneapolis District Office issued a Warning Letter to Adrian Elevator, Inc., a Butterfield, Minnesota, a manufacturer of animal feeds. On March 16, 2001, an inspection conducted by the State of Minnesota (on behalf of FDA) found significant deviations from the BSE regulations. The firm failed to provide adequate measures to avoid commingling or cross-contamination and failed to maintain adequate records to assure that prohibited animal proteins were not incorporated into feeds that may be used for ruminants. For example, there was no documentation to verify that the amount of "flush" being used was sufficient, and there were no procedures or documentation to verify that production was properly sequenced and that flushes were performed.<br /><br />Warned Issued for Failure to Take Adequate Steps to Prevent BSE<br /><br />* The FDA s Seattle District Office issued a Warning Letter on May 14, 2001, to Wallowa County Grain Growers, Inc., Enterprise, Oregon, for violations FDA regulations regarding Animal Proteins Prohibited in Ruminant Feed. An inspection of the firm on April 11 - 12, 2001, disclosed that the firm was not taking adequate steps to prevent the establishment and amplification of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) in that they failed to separate the receipt, processing, and storage of the product containing prohibited materials from non-prohibited material; failed to establish a written system, including clean-out, and flushing procedures to avoid commingling and cross-contamination of common equipment; and failed to maintain records sufficient to track the materials throughout the receipt, processing, and distribution of product.<br /><br />Contract Feed Manufacturer Found Violating BSE Regulations<br /><br />On May 1, 2001, the FDA s Chicago District Office issued a Warning Letter to Material Resources, a contract feed manufacturer in Washington Park, Illinois. An inspection of the firm in March 2001, disclosed several deviations from the BSE regulation. These included failure to maintain written procedures and provide adequate means to prevent commingling between feeds containing prohibited protein and all other protein products. The firm also lacked adequate records to track products that contained prohibited protein throughout their receipt and processing.<br /><br />Firm Warned for Lack of Written Procedures for Clean-Out to Prevent Commingling<br /><br />* On June 6, 2001, the FDA s Seattle District issued a Warning Letter to Superior Feeds, Chester, Montana. The firm is an animal feed manufacturing operation. An inspection of this firm on April 25, 2001, revealed that the firm failed to label their product with the required statement, Do Not Feed to Cattle or other Ruminants. In addition, the facility failed to maintain written procedures specifying the clean-out or sequencing procedures used to prevent commingling or cross-contamination of ruminant and non-ruminant containing feeds.<br /><br />FDA Inspection Discloses Hog Feed Lacks BSE Statement<br /><br />* The FDA s Minneapolis District Office issued a Warning Letter on May 30, 2001, to Round Lake Farmers Coop, Round Lake, Minnesota. The firm manufacturers animal feeds. An inspection by the State of Minnesota (on behalf of FDA) on March 30, 2001, found significant deviations from the requirements for Animal Proteins Prohibited in Animal Feed. The firm failed to label a hog feed with the required BSE caution statement. In addition, they failed to establish and implement procedures for handling prohibited animal proteins and failed to maintain records sufficient to track the receipt of products containing prohibited animal proteins.<br /><br />Import Detentions<br /><br />Possible Contamination of Fish Food Leads to Detention<br /><br />The week of March 7, 2001, the FDA s New York District Upstate Import Operations Branch detained three entries of fish food under Import Alert 99-25 (Detention Without Physical Examination of Animal Feed, Animal Feed Ingredients And Other Products For Animal Use Consisting Or Containing Ingredients of Animal Origin) due to possible contamination with the infectious agent for BSE. The country of origin for the fish food was the Federal Republic of Germany. The local USDA/Philadelphia/PPQ Office was notified.<br /><br />Vitamin Supplement for Pets Detained<br /><br />* The week of February 14, 2001, the FDA s Atlanta District reported the detention of 8,777 cartons of vitamin supplements for cats, kittens, puppies, and older dogs. The detention included both dog and cat treats. The detention was based on Import Alert 99-25 (BSE). The products were manufactured by Beaphar, Raalte, Netherlands, and were valued at approximately $63,000.<br /><br />Calf Ration Detained<br /><br />The FDA s New York District Office reported that during the week of March 21, 2001, FDA investigators detained an entry of Calf Starter Ration and Calf Finisher Ration under Import Alert 99-25, since some of the ingredients originated from France and The Netherlands (both of which are listed on IA 99-25 as BSE susceptible countries). The manufacturer of the feed was Grober Inc., Cambridge, Ontario, Canada, and the consignee was Majestic View Farms in Milan, Pennsylvania. The USDA/APHIS/PPQ Buffalo, New York office was contacted.<br /><br />Recall of Various Animal Feed Products<br /><br />* The FDA s Cincinnati District Office reported that The Hyland Company, Coalton, Kentucky, conducted a recall of various animal feed products, including Ultra Bloom and Endurance Plus horse feeds, due to cross-contamination with prohibited bovine material. The firm's corrective action involved the application of a sticker-label that contained the required BSE warning statement on the labels of their affected products. The firm initiated the recall by telephone on July 25, 201, and letters on July 31, 2001. * During an FDA inspection by the Cincinnati District Office investigators determined that Central Farm Supply of Kentucky, Inc., Louisville, Kentucky, had received poultry feed manufactured by Burkmann Mills, Bowling Green, Kentucky, that contained prohibited protein, but lacked the required caution statement. On May 3, 2001, the district and the University of Kentucky Regulatory Services Division met with the responsible parties of the mill's parent firm, Burkmann Mills London, London, Kentucky. During the meeting the firm volunteered to recall all feed products manufactured at the Bowling Green mill due to the lack of the required caution statement.<br /><br />FDA Announces Animal Feed Recall<br /><br />On January 30, 2001, FDA issued a Press Release announcing the results of tests taken on feed used at a Texas feedlot that was suspected of containing meat and bone meal from other domestic cattle -- a violation of FDA's 1997 prohibition on using ruminant material in feed for other ruminants. The results indicated that a very low level of prohibited material was found in the feed fed to cattle.<br /><br />FDA determined that each animal could have consumed, at most and in total, five-and-one-half grams - approximately a quarter ounce -- of prohibited material. These animals weigh approximately 600 pounds. It is important to note that the prohibited material was domestic in origin (therefore not likely to contain infected material because there is no evidence of BSE in U.S. cattle), fed at a very low level, and fed only once. The potential risk of BSE to such cattle was therefore exceedingly low, even if the feed were contaminated.<br /><br />According to Dr. Bernard Schwetz, FDA's Acting Principal Deputy Commissioner, "The challenge to regulators and industry is to keep this disease out of the United States. One important defense is to prohibit the use of any ruminant animal materials in feed for other ruminant animals. Combined with other steps, like U.S. Department of Agriculture's (USDA) ban on the importation of live ruminant animals from affected countries, these steps represent a series of protections, to keep American cattle free of BSE."<br /><br />Despite this negligible risk, Purina Mills, Inc., nonetheless announced that it was voluntarily purchasing all 1,222 of the animals held in Texas and mistakenly fed the animal feed containing the prohibited material. Therefore, meat from those animals would not enter the human food supply. FDA believes any cattle that did not consume feed containing the prohibited material was unaffected by this incident, and should be handled in the beef supply clearance process as usual.<br /><br />FDA believes that Purina Mills acted responsibly by first reporting the human error that resulted in the misformulation of the animal feed supplement and then by working closely with State and Federal authorities. This episode indicates that the multi-layered safeguard system put into place is essential for protecting the food supply and that continued vigilance needs to be taken, by all concerned, to ensure these rules are followed routinely. FDA continues to work with USDA as well as State and local officials to ensure that companies and individuals comply with all laws and regulations designed to protect the U.S. food supply.<br /><br />Drug Residues<br /><br />Warning Letters Issued for Illegal Drug Residues<br /><br />Gentamicin<br /><br />* The FDA s New England District Office issued a Warning Letter on February 1, 2001, to D & K Farm, Middlefield, Connecticut, for selling a dairy cow for slaughter as human food which had the presence of Gentamicin. Gentamicin is not approved for use in cattle. An FDA inspection of this dairy operation located in Wallingford, Connecticut, disclosed that in November 2000, the owner sold a dairy cow for slaughter as human to a livestock dealer. USDA analysis of tissue samples collected from that animal identified the presence of Gentamicin in the animal s kidney at a level of 4.74 ppm. The Warning Letter also noted that the owner holds animals under conditions which are so inadequate that diseased animals and/or medicated animals bearing potentially harmful drug residues are likely to enter the food supply.<br /><br />Penicillin<br /><br />* On January 31, 2001, the FDA s New York District Office issued a Warning Letter to Jay N. Martin, a producer and the owner of Jay N. Martin, a.k.a. Horizon Dairy, in Clyde, New York. An FDA inspection of the firm on November 20-22, and 27, 2000, confirmed that the firm offered two dairy cows for slaughter with drug residues. A USDA sample analyses indicated the presence of penicillin at illegal levels in the kidneys of both slaughtered cows, and streptomycin, for which there is no published tolerance. * The FDA s Minneapolis District Office issued a Warning Letter on August 28, 2001, to Paskewitz Cattle Company of Vesta,Minnesota. The Warning Letter cited adulteration of two animals (a dairy cow and a steer) with residues of penicillin that were above tolerance. The investigation conducted by the Minnesota Department of Agriculture found that Paskewitz Cattle did not keep adequate records of their own drug treatment, and they did not have an adequate system for handling purchased animals that may have been treated with drugs. * The FDA s Denver District Office issued a Warning Letter to DeJong Dairy, Greeley, Colorado, on February 23, 2001, citing adulteration charges due to the presence of penicillin residue in a cow offered for slaughter. An FDA inspection of this dairy farm on February 7 and 9, 2001, confirmed that the owner offered an animal for slaughter in violation of the FD&C Act. Specifically, on October 27, 2000, Mr. DeJong offered a cow for slaughter as human food. USDA analysis of tissue samples collected from this cow identified the presence of penicillin residues at 0.89 ppm in the kidney. A tolerance of 0.05 ppm has been established for residues of penicillin in the edible tissue of cows. The analysis also identified the presence of gentamicin residue at 13.31 ppm in the kidney. The Warning Letter also addressed poor animal husbandry practices which lead to the residue. USDA condemned this cow which was also diagnosed with septicemia, pneumonia, pleuritis, peritonitis, hepatitis, nephritis, and lymphedenitis. * The FDA s San Francisco District Office issued a Warning Letter to Parreiro-Pinheiro & Sons Dairy, Tipton, CA. The dairy consigned for sale for human food a cow that had penicillin residue in the liver and kidney that were in excess of the allowable tolerance. The FDA s San Francisco District Office s inspection found that the dairy was not keeping complete medication records and lacked an adequate drug inventory system. In addition, The FDA s San Francisco District Office s investigation found that the dairy was adulterated the drug, in that it was not being used in conformance with its labeled instructions.<br /><br />Sulfadimethoxine<br /><br />* On June 15, 2001, the FDA s Denver District Office issued a Warning Letter to North Point Dairy, Clovis, New Mexico, citing adulteration charges due to the presence of sulfadimethoxine residue in a cow offered for slaughter. An FDA inspection of this dairy farm on April 17, 2001, confirmed that a cow was offered for sale for slaughter as food in violation of the FD&C Act. USDA analysis of tissues samples collected from this cow identified the presence of sulfadimethoxine residue of 0.36 ppm in the liver and 0.34 ppm in the muscle. A tolerance of 0.10 ppm has been established for residues of sulfadimethoxine in the edible tissues of beef cows. The Warning Letter also addressed poor animal husbandry practices, which led to the residue.<br /><br />Neomycin<br /><br />* The FDA s Florida District Office issued a tissue residue Warning Letter on April 30, 2001, to Larson's Dairy, Inc., Okeechobee, Florida. The FDA conducted an inspection of the diary farm on March 27 and 28, 2001, which confirmed that the firm offered an adulterated animal for sale or slaughter as food. USDA analysis of the dairy calf confirmed the presence of Neomycin in the kidney at the level of 153.12 ppm, more than 21 times the established tolerance of 7.2 ppm. The FDA s Florida District Office's investigation found the calf was fed medicated milk containing Neomycin and Aureomycin. * On June 22, 2001, the FDA s Baltimore District Office issued a Warning Letter to Richard Edwards, owner of Oakland View Farm, Ridgely, Maryland. Mr. Edwards sold veal calves for slaughter as human food that were treated with Neomycin, a drug that is unapproved for this use. In addition, an FDA inspection on May 30 - 31, 2001, revealed that Mr. Edwards did not maintain treatment records showing the dosage rate, the date the drug was administered, or the time period to withhold treated animals from sale.<br /><br />Streptomycin<br /><br />* The FDA s New Jersey District Office issued a Warning Letter on March 8, 2001, to Frank Carper, Cranbury, New Jersey. An FDA inspection of this facility on October 24 and 27, 2000, confirmed that a horse purchased and sold by Mr. Carper for use as human food was adulterated due to the presence of streptomycin above tolerance levels. USDA analysis of tissues from the equine revealed that streptomycin in the kidney tissue at 0.38 ppm. The tolerance level for streptomycin in the edible tissue of equines is 0.0 ppm. Any animals shipped to USDA slaughter facilities are considered to be for human consumption.<br /><br />Consent Decree of Permanent Injunction Filed Against Joe Sozinho Dairies<br /><br />Firm Enjoined for Continuing to Sell Cattle With Violative Drug Residue<br /><br />On July 30, 2001, a Consent Decree of Permanent Injunction was filed in the Eastern District of California against Joe Sozinho Sr., Danny Sozinho, Dimas Sozinho, individuals d/b/a Joe Sozinho Dairy #1 and Joe Sozinho Dairy #2. The FDA s San Francisco District Office conducted six inspections in response to violative drug residues reported by USDA/FSIS of Joe Sozinho Dairies resulting in two Warning Letters sent to the firm. Despite repeated warnings during the FDA inspections, as well as nine USDA/FSIS warning letters for illegal drug residues, the Sozinho's failed to take adequate corrective action. Voluntary approaches were not successful in correcting the animal husbandry and drug adulteration problems by the Sozinho's.<br /><br />The Consent Decree permanently restrains and enjoins the Sozinho's from selling cattle for human food until all of the specifications of the Decree are met which include an animal identification system, medication record keeping system, drug inventory system, drug use system, quarantine system, and animal sales certification system. In addition, the Sozinho's reimbursed FDA's costs in the amount of $12,314.38 for investigational expenses incurred subsequent to the 1994 inspection and Warning Letter.<br /><br />On February 1, 2002, the Sozinho Dairies and the United States filed a stipulation settling a dispute concerning the Dairies' activities while they were under an order of injunction. Under the Stipulation, the Sozinhos admitted to continued violations of the law. They also admitted delivering "at least 56 animals intended for use as food during a thirty-six day period beginning on July 31, and ending on September 4, 2001." The United States had alleged in its motion for contempt that, under the injunction, such deliveries were prohibited until FDA inspected and cleared the Dairies to resume.<br /><br />The Dairies were not cleared for such sales until December 2001. The Injunction entered by the Court in July 2001 continues in effect. The defendants have paid the U.S. Treasury fines in the amount of $140,000.<br /><br />Ridge View Farms Consent Decree of Permanent Injunction<br /><br />Consent Decree Provides FDA With Future Shutdown Authority<br /><br />United States v. Ridge View Farms, Inc., Carol A. Castine, and Daniel A. Castine (N.D.N.Y.) On August 7, 2001, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of New York entered a Consent Decree of Permanent Injunction that prohibits the defendants from introducing any food-producing animal into interstate commerce until they have established a system for drug administration and record-keeping to prevent the distribution of any animal containing illegal drug residues in its edible tissues.<br /><br />The Decree also requires the defendants to provide a copy of the Decree to all persons to whom they have delivered cattle in the past year and to any person to whom they deliver cattle in the future. In addition, the Decree provides the government with the authority to require future shutdown of operations and to impose fines in the event of further violations.<br /><br />Consent Decree Filed Against H & I Dairy<br /><br />On November 28, 2000, a Consent Decree of Permanent Injunction was filed in the Eastern District of California against Heduino Brasil (dba H & I Dairy) of Tipton, California. Despite repeated warnings during FDA and the State of California inspections, including six USDA warning letters for illegal drug residue findings in cull cows sold or consigned for slaughter, Mr. Brasil failed to take adequate corrective action. The consent decree permanently restrains and enjoins Mr. Brasil from selling cattle for human food until all the specifications of the decree are met including animal identification, medication record keeping, drug inventory, quarantine, and sales certification systems.<br /><br />Arie C. Van Leeuwen Sentenced<br /><br />Violation of Probation Leads to Prison Sentence<br /><br />United States v. Arie C. Van Leeuwen, (E.D. Cal.) On July 9, 2001, United States District Judge Robert E. Coyle sentenced Arie Van Leeuwen to six months imprisonment and one year of supervised release for probation violations. In 2000, Van Leeuwen pled guilty to two charges of criminal contempt and one felony charge of introducing adulterated food into interstate commerce, resulting from his repeated violations of the statutory and regulatory requirements for administering new animal drugs to food-producing animals.<br /><br />Van Leeuwen admitted to the following probation violations: failure to obey all laws; failure to submit certain monthly report forms; failure to comply with home confinement conditions; and transporting animals to cattle auctions in violation of the probation terms. In light of Van Leeuwen's history of repeat violations, the Court sentenced him to six months in prison followed by a year of supervised release that includes mandatory attendance in dairy management classes.<br /><br />http://www.fda.gov/ora/about/enf_story/archive/2001/ch5/default.htm<br /><br />Veterinary Drugs<br /><br />Warning Letter to Veterinary Drug Firm<br /><br />The FDA s New Orleans District Office Nashville Branch issued a Warning Letter on April 10, 2001, to Classic Care Products, Inc., d.b.a. The River City Co., Chattanooga, Tennessee, as the result of an inspection of the firm on March 20 and 22, 2001. The inspection found topical veterinary drug products being manufactured under inadequate conditions. Deviations from the CGMPs included no component testing; no master production records; failure to conduct stability studies on finished products and to assign expiration dates based on these studies; and no label control. The firm also was not registered and the veterinary drug products were not listed.<br /><br />Unapproved Veterinary Drugs Promoted on the Internet<br /><br />On June 28, 2001, the FDA s Minneapolis District Office issued a Warning Letter to Vets Plus, Inc., Knapp, Wisconsin. FDA conducted an inspection of the firm s veterinary drug and nutritional supplement manufacturing facility on March 7 and 13, 2001.<br /><br />The inspection disclosed that the firm was manufacturing veterinary products that, based on the labels and well as product catalogs, contained therapeutic and structure-function claims causing the products to be unapproved new animal drugs. The firm s web sites contained numerous promotional statements and claims for four lines of products marketed by the firm that established that the firm clearly intended the product to be used as animal drugs. In addition, the firm failed to list any of the products with the Center for Veterinary Medicine, and the products were not manufactured in compliance with CGMP regulations.<br /><br />Distributor of Prescription Veterinary Drugs Receives Warning<br /><br />On August 27, 2001, the FDA s Philadelphia District Office issued a Warning Letter to the president of Equirace Health and Speed Products, Washington, Pennsylvania. The firm is an exclusive distributor of prescription veterinary and human drugs to horse owners. The FDA conducted an inspection of Equirace on December 5, 2000. The inspection and a review of information from the New Mexico Livestock Board disclosed that the firm was distributing prescription veterinary and human drugs to lay persons without a lawful order from a licensed veterinarian who has a valid veterinarian-client-patient relationship with customers.<br /><br />The Warning Letter advised the owner that Equirace s distribution business violates several sections of the FD&C Act. For example, the firm s prescription veterinary drugs are misbranded because they are not dispensed by or upon the lawful written or oral order of a licensed veterinarian in the course of the veterinarian s professional practice. Although there was a licensed veterinarian at the firm, he did not have a valid veterinarian-client-patient relationship with any of Equirace s customers. The Warning Letter also noted that certain prescription veterinary and human drugs offered for sale by Equirace were adulterated because they were new animal drugs that were not approved by the FDA for use in horses.<br /><br />Illegal Veterinary Drugs Exported<br /><br />On March 5, 2001, the FDA s San Juan District Office found that a shipment of veterinary drugs from Santo Domingo to the U.S. Virgin Islands, consisting of drugs such as antibiotics, hormones and dietary supplements, contained numerous unapproved drugs for veterinary use. The drugs were placed on hold by the U.S. Customs at the Aguadilla airport. The shipment was exported under Custom's supervision.<br /><br />FDA Assists Customs in Seizure of Illegal Vet Drugs<br /><br />On July 10, 2001, the FDA s San Juan District Office, in conjunction with U.S. Customs, detained and seized a shipment of veterinary drugs not approved for sale in the U.S. that was imported from Santo Domingo. U.S. Customs agents notified San Juan District Office that the shipment was imported as "Hair Products," but actually contained veterinary drugs. FDA s inspection of the shipment revealed that the veterinary drugs were smuggled among a variety of soaps. The shipment, which was originally thought to consist of a few bottles, contained a total of 793 bottles/pouches of a variety of illegal veterinary drugs. The shipment was detained by FDA and seized by U.S. Customs agents. The value of the shipment was approximately $7,000.<br /><br />Importer Attempts to Re-Enter Vet Drugs Previously Refused Entry<br /><br />On May 2, 2001, the FDA s San Juan District Office, in conjunction with U.S. Customs Service seized a shipment of IVOMEC-F, a veterinary drug not approved for sale in the U.S. The shipment was from importer Hacienda Las Carolinas, Santo Domingo. The San Juan District Office was notified by U.S. Customs agents that a shipment that had been refused entry on February 10, 2001, and had been exported under Customs supervision was re- introduced through the same port on March 16, 2001, by the same importer. The value of the shipment was $3,500.00.<br /><br />Seizure at Veterinary Pharmacy<br /><br />On December 20, 2000, an FDA investigator accompanied the U.S. Marshals Service in a seizure of unapproved new animal drugs at Veterinary Pharmacy Corporation (d.b.a. Vet Rx Pharmacy), St. Peter, Minnesota. The firm is a compounding pharmacy for veterinary drugs. The firm has a history of serious violations of the FD&C Act, particularly the 1994 Animal Medicinal Drug Use Clarification Act (AMDUCA). The seized drugs, valued at approximately $50,000, were intended for administration to food-producing animals, and were unapproved new drugs in that they were compounded from the bulk active ingredients. Such compounding violates AMDUCA and the implementing regulations, 21 C.F.R. Part 530. The FDA conducted inspections at the firm on June 27 - 29, and July 6 - 7, 2000. These inspections disclosed the above violations.<br /><br />Consent Decree of Condemnation and Permanent Injunction<br /><br />U.S. v. Sulfadiozie Sodium and Veterinary Pharmacy Corp. d.b.a. Vet Rx Pharmacy (D. Minn.) On February 28, 2002, a U.S. District Judge signed a Consent Decree of Condemnation and Permanent Injunction against this veterinary pharmacy and two corporate officers, as well as the drugs seized in this action. The Decree orders the defendants to destroy the seized drugs and enjoins them from engaging in compounding activities that fail to conform to the AMDUCA regulations.<br /><br /><a href="http://www.fda.gov/ora/about/enf_story/archive/2001/ch5/cvm2.htm">http://www.fda.gov/ora/about/enf_story/archive/2001/ch5/cvm2.htm</a><br /><br /><br /><a href="http://www.fda.gov/ora/about/enf_story/archive/2001/ch5/cvm3.htm">http://www.fda.gov/ora/about/enf_story/archive/2001/ch5/cvm3.htm</a><br /><br /><br /><br />Docket No. 2003N-0312 Animal Feed Safety System [TSS SUBMISSION]<br /><br /><br /><a href="http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dockets/03n0312/03N-0312_emc-000001.txt">http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dockets/03n0312/03N-0312_emc-000001.txt</a><br /><br /><br />Docket Management Docket: 02N-0273 - Substances Prohibited From Use in<br /><br />Animal Food or Feed; Animal Proteins Prohibited in Ruminant Feed<br /><br />Comment Number: EC -10<br /><br />Accepted - Volume 2<br /><br /><a href="http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dailys/03/Jan03/012403/8004be07.html">http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dailys/03/Jan03/012403/8004be07.html</a><br /><br /><br />PART 2<br /><br /><a href="http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dailys/03/Jan03/012403/8004be09.html">http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dailys/03/Jan03/012403/8004be09.html</a><br /><br /><br />APHIS Statement: June 29 Inconclusive BSE Test is Negative<br /><br />http://www.usda.gov/Newsroom/0275.04.html 07/02/2004<br /><br /><br />APHIS Statement: First Inconclusive BSE Test is Negative<br /><br />http://www.usda.gov/Newsroom/0272.04.html 06/30/2004<br /><br /><br />APHIS Statement Regarding Second Inconclusive BSE Test<br /><br />http://www.usda.gov/Newsroom/0266.04.html 06/29/2004<br /><br /><br />APHIS Statement Regarding First Inconclusive BSE Test<br /><br />http://www.usda.gov/Newsroom/0198.04.html 06/25/2004<br /><br /><br />January 14, 2005<br /><br />Dr. John R. Clifford, Deputy Administrator, Chief Veterinary Officer<br /><br />Animal Plant Health Inspection Service<br /><br />1400 Independence Ave. SW, Room 317-E<br /><br />Jamie L. Whitten Federal Building<br /><br />Washington, DC 20250<br /><br />Dear Deputy Administrator Clifford,<br /><br />We have a number of questions about your November 23, 2004 announcement that a cow, which had tested â¬Snot negative⬠in two runs of the Bio-Rad ELISA quick test for mad cow disease, was â¬Sindeed negative for BSE.⬠We are concerned because New Scientist reported last June that the false positive rate after such repeated testing is â¬Saround one in 100,000 for Bio-Rad.⬠We would appreciate a chance to meet with you this month to discuss the questions below.<br /><br />1. You have indicated that the Biorad screening test was run twice and got a positive result both times. Were the two runs conducted by the same or different technicians? Did they use the same or different brain samples?<br /><br />2. When the immunohistochemistry (IHC) test was conducted, what was the condition of the brain when it arrived at the National Veterinary Services Laboratory in Ames, Iowa? Did scientists note any deterioration?<br /><br />3. How many slides were made and examined for the IHC test? Were they from only the obex, or other areas of the brain? Atypical strains of BSE have been found in Italy and Japan where the level of PrPres in the obex was low or non-detectable, unlike in traditional BSE. What portion(s) of the brain were examined?<br /><br />4. Experienced technicians can sometimes disagree on the interpretation of IHC slides. Does one technician review the slides or more than one technician? If the latter, how many? Did they all agree on the conclusion?<br /><br />5. The World Organization of Animal Health, known as O.I.E., recognizes use of immunoblotting (also know as Western Blot) as a further confirmation of the IHC test, and it is used in Japan and most European countries. USDA used the Western Blot test in December 2003 along with IHC to confirm the first case of mad cow disease in the United States . In Japan and Belgium cows that tested positive on two quick tests (in both cases using a Bio-Rad test), negative on IHC, yet positive on Western Blot and are considered to be confirmed BSE cases. Was Western blot or any other technique besides IHC used to confirm or rule out a positive result on this November 2004 cow? If so, what was the result? If not used, why not?<br /><br />6. Were all the procedures referred to in your March 15, 2004 announcement of protocols to confirm any suspect positives utilized, particularly the reference to use of â¬Sfull battery of tests⬠that includes, but is not limited to IHC? If not, what protocol was used and what is your rationale for the differences?<br /><br />7. Does USDA still have brain material from the cow in question? If so, could it be sent to the World BSE reference laboratory in Weybridge, United Kingdom for IHC and Western Blot analysis to confirm the USDA finding? If not, why not?<br /><br />8. Canadian press has reported that â¬SCanadian authorities have been told that the cow, from Texas, didnâ¬"t have the metal ID tags that cows born here are given.⬠Is this correct? What was the age of the cow and where had it lived?<br /><br />We would like to request a meeting with you between now and the end of January about these questions, which are very important to consumer confidence in the safety of the food supply.<br /><br />Sincerely,<br /><br />Jean Halloran, Director Michael Hansen, Ph.D.<br /><br />Senior Research Associate<br /><br />From <a href="http://www.ars.usda.gov/is/AR/archive/dec04/tse1204.htm">http://www.ars.usda.gov/is/AR/archive/dec04/tse1204.htm</a><br /><br /><br />Yamakawa, Y. et al. 2003. op cit.<br /><br />De Bosschere, H., Roels, S. and E. Vanopdenbosch. 2004. Atypical case of bovine spongiform encephalopathy in an East-Flemish Cow in Belgium. The International Journal of Applied Research, 2(4). Accessed at http://www.jarvm.com/articles/Vol2Iss1/DEBOSSCHERE.htm<br /><br />In a technical briefing on the new BSE sureveillance plan, Dr. Ron DeHaven clearly stated that USDA would use multiple tests that included IHC: â¬SThe Department at NVSL will continue to use the immunohistochemistry, or IHC, for quality control testing, and in addition if any of the rapid screen test comes back with a suspect positive then NVSL will use the IHC as well as other tests necessary to confirm the results. . . Let me say up front that we expect that there will be positive results on these screening tests, and that's just the nature of the beast. That's because screening tests by design are intended to be very sensitive and not to miss any positive animals. But with that high degree of sensitivity also comes the possibility for false positive test results. And again that's to be expected. any suspect test results will be sent to NVSL for confirmatory testing with the full battery of tests. That would include the IHC. From: http://www.usda.gov/Newsroom/0106.04.html<br /><br />From <a href="http://edmonton.cbc.ca/regional/servlet/View?filename=ed-mad-cow20041122">http://edmonton.cbc.ca/regional/servlet/View?filename=ed-mad-cow20041122</a><br /><br /><br />Greetings again,<br /><br />I was told that they were to meet on Feb. 9, 2005 about these inconclusives.<br /><br />I have heard nothing of the outcome. Maybe we will hear soon.<br /><br />BUT of course we will never know the results of that first TEXAS mad<br /><br />cow they covered up, the stumbling and staggering one they refused to<br /><br />test, and decided to render, head and all...<br /><br />Experts doubt USDA's mad cow results<br /><br />By Steve Mitchell Medical Correspondent<br /><br />Published 11/24/2004 4:34 PM<br /><br />WASHINGTON, Nov. 24 (UPI) -- U.S. Department of Agriculture officials said a cow that initially tested positive for mad cow disease was found to be negative on follow-up tests, but both domestic and international experts told United Press International the way the agency handled the situation leaves them skeptical about the validity of the results.<br /><br />"The testing process does indeed make experts scratch their heads," said Markus Moser, a molecular biologist and chief executive officer of the Swiss firm Prionics, which manufactures tests for detecting mad cow disease, also known as bovine spongiform encephalopathy.<br /><br />"I think some, but not all, BSE people internationally have some degree of cynical de facto doubt about everything the United States does or doesn't do, mostly as a result of seeing so many similar situations where countries at risk deny and deny and deny and then end up having big problems," said Elizabeth Mumford, a veterinarian and BSE expert at Safe Food Solutions in Bern, Switzerland, a company that provides advice on reducing mad cow risk to industry and governments. Several countries, including Germany and Austria, that had been thought to be free of the disease, found out it was circulating in their herds after they initiated large-scale testing. The U.S. cow in question tested positive last week on two so-called rapid tests manufactured by Bio-Rad Laboratories in Hercules, Calif. The USDA said Tuesday the animal had tested negative on more sophisticated confirmatory tests called immunohistochemistry or IHC tests.<br /><br />John Clifford of the USDA said in a statement that the negative IHC results "makes us confident that the animal in question is indeed negative."<br /><br />A U.S. veterinarian knowledgeable about mad cow tests told UPI that experts she has spoken with are "very, very skeptical about" the USDA's negative test result.<br /><br />The veterinarian, who requested anonymity because she feared repercussions for speaking out against the USDA, said the skepticism arose because the agency did not run another kind of mad cow test called a Western blot. The test sometimes can pick up positive cases that IHC misses and the agency has used it in the past to rule out suspect cases. Moser said a Western blot test would make sense for the United States, where the prevalence of mad cow is thought to be low. Other countries -- including Australia, New Zealand, Canada and Mexico -- that are either free of the disease or have low rates, have elected to use the Western blot as part of their surveillance programs, he said.<br /><br />The veterinarian said concerns also have emerged because the USDA has not made a sample from the cow in question available for examination by outside experts. She added that the USDA did not notify state officials, as officials previously said they would about positive results on rapid tests. Knowledgeable people are saying "wait a minute, this doesn't add up here," the veterinarian said. At stake is the $70 billion U.S. beef industry, including a $3.3 billion export market. More than 60 countries, including Japan, closed their borders to U.S. beef last December after the first -- and so far only -- U.S. case of mad cow was detected.<br /><br />Asked whether state officials were notified, USDA spokesman Ed Loyd told UPI the agency had not released any information about the cow in question. Loyd also said the false positives on the rapid test were not unexpected. Since June, the USDA has reported three false positives out of more than 121,000 cows tested.<br /><br />Bio-Rad spokeswoman Sam Kennedy told UPI the company was unfamiliar with the details of this incident and thus could not comment.<br /><br />Mumford said experts were surprised the USDA did not send samples from the cow in question for independent analysis by one of the three worldwide labs recognized as the foremost authorities on mad cow testing by the World Animal Health Organization. One of these facilities is located in Weybridge, England, where the USDA had sent the first U.S. case of mad cow disease for confirmation in December 2003.<br /><br />Loyd said USDA officials who would know whether USDA planned to release a sample for verification by an outside party could not be reached Wednesday.<br /><br />"Full transparency and cooperation would certainly promote the idea internationally that the U.S. is doing everything it can do," Mumford said. "But somehow the U.S. consumer doesn't seem to think that way, or has been appeasable at least up until now, so there seems to be no impetus to do anything more."<br /><br />The concern is humans can contract a fatal brain illness known as variant Creutzfeldt Jakob disease from eating beef products contaminated with the mad cow pathogen.<br /><br />Moser said despite USDA's reliance on the IHC test results, repeated negatives on that test does not necessarily rule out the cow being infected.<br /><br />"The reason for this is that the IHC test ... is done on a different piece of tissue" than that used for the rapid test, he said. Prions, the pathogen thought to cause mad cow disease, tend to concentrate in a region of the brain called the obex, so the different outcomes of the different tests could be due to sampling a brain region that contains little or no prions. This could be made worse if the animal had lay dead for several days before its brain was collected. The brain might be so degraded that it would be difficult to locate the obex region for confirmatory testing and a sample might mistakenly be taken from a region that contains no prions. "So with these samples, the confirmatory testing would be even less reliable, not because of the confirmatory test itself, but because of the sampling," he said. --<br /><br />E-mail sciencemail@upi.com<br /><br />Copyright à © 2001-2004 United Press International<br /><br />Get Copyright Clearance Want to use this article? Click here for options! Copyright 2004 United Press International<br /><br />TSS<br /><br />######### https://listserv.kaliv.uni-karlsruhe.de/warc/bse-l.html ##########<br /><br />Subject: USDA VS CREEKSTONE BSE/BASE/TSE TESTING Civil Action No. 06-0544<br /><br />Date: September 4, 2007 at 9:47 am PST USDA<br /><br />AUGUST 21, 2007<br /><br />Mr. Terry S. Singeltary Sr. Post Office Box 42 Bacliff, Texas 77518-0042<br /><br />Dear Mr. Singeltary:<br /><br />This is in response to your e-mails to Secretary Johanns concerning private testing for bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) and a ruling by the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia involving Creekstone Farms Premium Beef, LLC. We regret the delay in responding.<br /><br />As you may know, the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) filed an appeal of the U.S. District Court's order on June 15,2007. While we recognize your views, we cannot comment on any matters at issue in the pending litigation. However, we can assure you that USDA remains committed to ensuring effective, scientifically sound testing for significant animal diseases and to protecting U.S. animal and public health from BSE.<br /><br />We understand that the effects of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (CJD) are devastating, and we are sorry to learn of the loss of your mother. Some of us at USDA have also lost family members to CJD and other degenerative neurological diseases. Although it is rare, the classical form of CJD does occur sporadically in the United States and worldwide. However, no cases of vCJD-the form of BSE that can be transmitted from animals to humans-are known to have originated in the United States. Because the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services' (HHS) Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) is responsible for addressing concerns about CJD and other human health issues, you may wish to contact that agency directly. The address is CDC, HHS, 200 Independence Avenue, SW., Washington, D.C. 20201.<br /><br />We also wish to clarify that the U.S. Food and Drug Administration's 1997 ban on ruminant-to-ruminant feeding is the primary measure in place to protect animal health with regard to BSE. Protection of public health from BSE is achieved by the removal from the human food supply of the animal tissues-often referred to as specified risk<br /><br />Mr. Terry S. Singeltary, Sr. Page 2<br /><br />materials-in which the BSE infective agent would be found if present, and by other controls imposed at the slaughter level. These additional controls include the Food Safety and Inspection Services' ban on nonambulatory cattle from the human food chain; a prohibition on air-injection stunning of slaughter cattle; the requirement of additional process controls in advanced meat recovery systems; and, a prohibition on the use of mechanically separated beef in human food. Additionally, protection from BSE and other diseases is achieved by conducting antemortem inspections of slaughter cattle and excluding any animals that display clinical signs of neurological disease or other abnormalities.<br /><br />We appreciate the opportunity to address your concerns. To learn more about USDA's BSE surveillance and safeguarding activities, please visit our Web site at www.aphis.usda.gov/newsroom/hot_issues/bse/index.shtml.<br /><br />Sincerely,<br /><br />Jere L. Dick Associate Deputy Administrator National Animal Health Policy and Programs Veterinary Services<br /><br />============================END=========================<br /><br />Greetings,<br /><br />LIKE going back in time 25 to 30 years with the science in this reply to me from USDA on BSE. I would kindly like to comment;<br /><br />Jere L. Dick states ;<br /><br />Some of us at USDA have also lost family members to CJD<br /><br />Although it is rare, the classical form of CJD does occur sporadically in the United States and worldwide<br /><br />THIS is very disturbing to me that even USDA officials family members are dying of sporadic CJD, but yet they refuse to acknowledge the science to date, instead to go by prehistoric science dating back some 3 decades. IN short, there is much more to this sad story than that of the UKBSEnvCJD ONLY hypothesis/myth. Evidently, USDA did not even read the most up to date science i submitted to them, or just chose to ignore it. we now know that the sporadic CJD may not be as sporadic or spontaneous as these officials would have us to believe. THE USA has had two cases of atypical BSE i.e. BASE, which is more similar to some sporadic CJD, than that of the nvCJD, plus, there are some questions pertaining to the potential of some of these sCJD case being tied to either CWD in deer and or elk, and to the scrapie in sheep and goats, and there's other science showing that friendly fire from these sources i.e. iCJD is a very real threat. ...tss<br /><br />Jere L. Dick states ;<br /><br />Protection of public health from BSE is achieved by the removal from the human food supply of the animal<br /><br />tissues-often referred to as specified risk materials-in which the BSE infective agent would be found if present,<br /><br />and by other controls imposed at the slaughter level.<br /><br />EXACTLY, and this policy has failed terribly, see recalls of 1,000's of TONS of these banned products that is suppose to protect us from all strains of mad cow disease, that are being fed out in commerce as we speak ;<br /><br />10,000,000+ LBS. of PROHIBITED BANNED MAD COW FEED I.E. BLOOD LACED MBM IN COMMERCE USA 2007<br /><br />Date: March 21, 2007 at 2:27 pm PST<br /><br />RECALLS AND FIELD CORRECTIONS: VETERINARY MEDICINES -- CLASS II<br /><br />___________________________________<br /><br />PRODUCT<br /><br />Bulk cattle feed made with recalled Darling's 85% Blood Meal, Flash Dried, Recall # V-024-2007<br /><br />CODE<br /><br />Cattle feed delivered between 01/12/2007 and 01/26/2007<br /><br />RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER<br /><br />Pfeiffer, Arno, Inc, Greenbush, WI. by conversation on February 5, 2007.<br /><br />Firm initiated recall is ongoing.<br /><br />REASON<br /><br />Blood meal used to make cattle feed was recalled because it was cross- contaminated with prohibited bovine meat and bone meal that had been manufactured on common equipment and labeling did not bear cautionary BSE statement.<br /><br />VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE<br /><br />42,090 lbs.<br /><br />DISTRIBUTION<br /><br />WI<br /><br />___________________________________<br /><br />PRODUCT<br /><br />Custom dairy premix products: MNM ALL PURPOSE Pellet, HILLSIDE/CDL Prot- Buffer Meal, LEE, M.-CLOSE UP PX Pellet, HIGH DESERT/ GHC LACT Meal, TATARKA, M CUST PROT Meal, SUNRIDGE/CDL PROTEIN Blend, LOURENZO, K PVM DAIRY Meal, DOUBLE B DAIRY/GHC LAC Mineral, WEST PIONT/GHC CLOSEUP Mineral, WEST POINT/GHC LACT Meal, JENKS, J/COMPASS PROTEIN Meal, COPPINI - 8# SPECIAL DAIRY Mix, GULICK, L-LACT Meal (Bulk), TRIPLE J - PROTEIN/LACTATION, ROCK CREEK/GHC MILK Mineral, BETTENCOURT/GHC S.SIDE MK-MN, BETTENCOURT #1/GHC MILK MINR, V&C DAIRY/GHC LACT Meal, VEENSTRA, F/GHC LACT Meal, SMUTNY, A- BYPASS ML W/SMARTA, Recall # V-025-2007<br /><br />CODE<br /><br />The firm does not utilize a code - only shipping documentation with commodity and weights identified.<br /><br />RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER<br /><br />Rangen, Inc, Buhl, ID, by letters on February 13 and 14, 2007. Firm initiated recall is complete.<br /><br />REASON<br /><br />Products manufactured from bulk feed containing blood meal that was cross contaminated with prohibited meat and bone meal and the labeling did not bear cautionary BSE statement.<br /><br />VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE<br /><br />9,997,976 lbs.<br /><br />DISTRIBUTION<br /><br />ID and NV<br /><br />END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR MARCH 21, 2007<br /><br /><a href="http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/enforce/2007/ENF00996.html">http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/enforce/2007/ENF00996.html</a><br /><br /><br />NEW URL<br /><br /><a href="http://www.fda.gov/Safety/Recalls/EnforcementReports/2007/ucm120446.htm">http://www.fda.gov/Safety/Recalls/EnforcementReports/2007/ucm120446.htm</a><br /><br /><br />Thursday, March 19, 2009<br /><br />MILLIONS AND MILLIONS OF POUNDS OF MAD COW FEED IN COMMERCE USA WITH ONGOING 12 YEARS OF DENIAL<br /><br /><a href="http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2009/03/millions-and-millions-of-pounds-of-mad.html">http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2009/03/millions-and-millions-of-pounds-of-mad.html</a><br /><br /><br />Tuesday, March 2, 2010<br /><br />Animal Proteins Prohibited in Ruminant Feed/Adulterated/Misbranded Rangen Inc 2/11/10 USA<br /><br /><a href="http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2010/03/animal-proteins-prohibited-in-ruminant.html">http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2010/03/animal-proteins-prohibited-in-ruminant.html</a><br /><br /><br />Monday, March 1, 2010<br /><br />ANIMAL PROTEIN I.E. MAD COW FEED IN COMMERCE A REVIEW 2010<br /><br /><a href="http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2010/03/animal-protien-ie-mad-cow-feed-in.html">http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2010/03/animal-protien-ie-mad-cow-feed-in.html</a><br /><br /><br />Tuesday, December 15, 2009<br /><br />NAIS, COOL, FROM FARM TO FORK, MAD COW DISEASE<br /><br /><a href="http://naiscoolyes.blogspot.com/2009/12/nais-cool-from-farm-to-fork-mad-cow.html">http://naiscoolyes.blogspot.com/2009/12/nais-cool-from-farm-to-fork-mad-cow.html</a><br /><br /><br />HARVARD BSE TSS COMMENTS AND HARVARD USDA ET AL REBUTAL<br /><br /><a href="http://www.fsis.usda.gov/PDF/BSE_Risk_Assess_Response_Public_Comments.pdf">http://www.fsis.usda.gov/PDF/BSE_Risk_Assess_Response_Public_Comments.pdf</a><br /><br /><br />Monday, October 26, 2009<br /><br />MAD COW DISEASE, AND U.S. BEEF TRADE<br /><br />MAD COW DISEASE, CJD, TSE, SOUND SCIENCE, COMMERCE, AND SELLING YOUR SOUL TO THE DEVIL<br /><br /><a href="http://usdameatexport.blogspot.com/2009/10/mad-cow-disease-and-us-beef-trade.html">http://usdameatexport.blogspot.com/2009/10/mad-cow-disease-and-us-beef-trade.html</a><br /><br /><br />Friday, March 13, 2009<br /><br />NAIS comments NCBA and R-Calf Wednesday, March 11, 2009 – 10:30 a.m. Subcommittee on Livestock, Dairy, and Poultry — Public Hearing<br /><br /><a href="http://usdameatexport.blogspot.com/2009/03/nais-comments-ncba-and-r-calf-wednesday.html">http://usdameatexport.blogspot.com/2009/03/nais-comments-ncba-and-r-calf-wednesday.html</a><br /><br /><br />Saturday, August 16, 2008<br /><br />Qualitative Analysis of BSE Risk Factors in the United States February 13, 2000 at 3:37 pm PST (BSE red book)<br /><br /><a href="http://bseusa.blogspot.com/2008/08/qualitative-analysis-of-bse-risk.html">http://bseusa.blogspot.com/2008/08/qualitative-analysis-of-bse-risk.html</a><br /><br /><br />48 hour traceback for BSE mad cow disease in the USA ???<br /><br /><br />NOT in your lifetime !<br /><br /><br />8 YEARS IN REVIEW OF THE MAD COW DEBACLE IN THE USA ;<br /><br /><br /><a href="http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2008/12/mad-cow-disease-usa-december-28-2008-8.html">http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2008/12/mad-cow-disease-usa-december-28-2008-8.html</a><br /><br /><br />The most recent assessments (and reassessments) were published in June 2005 (Table I; 1, and included the categorisation of Canada, the USA, and Mexico as GBR III. Although only Canada and the USA have reported cases, the historically open system of trade in North America suggests that it is likely that BSE is present also in Mexico.<br /><br /><a href="http://www.oie.int/boutique/extrait/06heim937950.pdf">http://www.oie.int/boutique/extrait/06heim937950.pdf</a><br /><br /><br />GOC RELEASES CONSULTATION DOCUMENT ON NEW BSE IMPORT POLICY IN LINE WITH OIE: The Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA) is inviting public comment on a proposed new Canadian Import Policy to prevent bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) in bovine animals and their products. The proposed policy would bring Canada’s approach in line with new World Organization for Animal Health (OIE) standards as well as the proposed North American import standard announced on March 29, 2005. It is based on the recognition that international knowledge of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) and me asures to mitigate its transmission have advanced significantly since Canada’s existing import policy for controlling BSE was established in 1997. The new policy would be less restrictive than the current one. Canada’s current policy permits the importation of live ruminants including, cattle, sheep and goats, and products derived from them, only after the exporting country has been officially recognized as BSE-free. Current science recognizes that the “ BSE-free” requirement is unnecessarily restrictive. The draft policy is based on a proposed new OIE three-tier system for classifying bovine-trading countries based on their BSE risk management regimes. In all cases, exporting countries would also have to continue to meet other non-BSE food safety and animal health<br /><br />GAIN Report - CA5038 Page 3 of 4<br /><br />UNCLASSIFIED USDA Foreign Agricultural Service requirements before becoming eligible to ship to Canada under any of the new BSE risk categories. A consultation period ending on July 22, 2005 is being provided to allow interested parties the opportunity to provide comments on the draft policy. Notice of this consultation is being published in the Canada Gazette.<br /><br /><a href="http://www.fas.usda.gov/gainfiles/200505/146129759.pdf">http://www.fas.usda.gov/gainfiles/200505/146129759.pdf</a><br /><br /><br />SNIP...<br /><br />Dr. DeHaven has often represented the United States in delicate and often difficult trade negotiations. As the former U.S. Chief Veterinary Officer and U.S. delegate to the OIE, he routinely used his diplomatic skills as he facilitated agreements that are science-based. He was instrumental in building consensus that led to the current OIE BSE chapter<br /><br />SNIP...<br /><br /><a href="http://www.usaha.org/meetings/2007/2007_USAHA_Proceedings.pdf">http://www.usaha.org/meetings/2007/2007_USAHA_Proceedings.pdf</a><br /><br /><br />“The U.S. has lower sanitary and phyto-sanitary standards (SPS) for imports than many other countries, especially those concerning bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE). These low standards have made the U.S. a dumping ground for beef from the countries that have experienced BSE problems. Food Safety and SPS issues continue to be problematic for our industry, as some countries comply with OIE standards, while others ignore them either for cultural reasons, or too often use them as trade barriers. The USITC October 7, 2008 release reported, ‘U.S. beef processors and beef cattle ranchers lose billions of dollars in export opportunities each year because of animal health and food safety measures in other countries that are inconsistent with international standards and vary by country.<br /><br /><a href="http://www.cattlenetwork.com/USCA-Testifies--Before-USITC/2010-03-03/Article_Latest_News.aspx?oid=996238&fid=CN-LATEST_NEWS">http://www.cattlenetwork.com/USCA-Testifies--Before-USITC/2010-03-03/Article_Latest_News.aspx?oid=996238&fid=CN-LATEST_NEWS</a>_<br /><br /><br />LIKE i said before, the OIE not only sold their soul to the devil over the BSE MRR, they sold yours too ;<br /><br />Wednesday, February 10, 2010<br /><br />NAIS MAD COW TRACEABILITY DUMPED BY USDA APHIS 2010<br /><br /><a href="http://naiscoolyes.blogspot.com/2010/02/nais-mad-cow-traceability-dumped-by.html">http://naiscoolyes.blogspot.com/2010/02/nais-mad-cow-traceability-dumped-by.html</a><br /><br /><br />The most recent assessments (and reassessments) were published in June 2005 (Table I; 1, and included the categorisation of Canada, the USA, and Mexico as GBR III. Although only Canada and the USA have reported cases, the historically open system of trade in North America suggests that it is likely that BSE is present also in Mexico.<br /><br /><a href="http://www.oie.int/boutique/extrait/06heim937950.pdf">http://www.oie.int/boutique/extrait/06heim937950.pdf</a><br /><br /><br />Scientific Report of the European Food Safety Authority on the Assessment of the Geographical BSE Risk (GBR) of the USA Question number: EFSA-Q-2003-083<br /><br />Adopted: 1 July 2004 Summary (0.1Mb)<br /><br />Report (0.2Mb)<br /><br />Summary<br /><br />The European Food Safety Authority and its Scientific Expert Working Group on the Assessment of the Geographical Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Risk (GBR) were asked by the European Commission (EC) to provide an up-to-date scientific report on the GBR in the United States of America, i.e. the likelihood of the presence of one or more cattle being infected with BSE, pre-clinically as well as clinically, in USA. This scientific report addresses the GBR of USA as assessed in 2004 based on data covering the period 1980-2003.<br /><br />The BSE agent was probably imported into USA and could have reached domestic cattle in the middle of the eighties. These cattle imported in the mid eighties could have been rendered in the late eighties and therefore led to an internal challenge in the early nineties. It is possible that imported meat and bone meal (MBM) into the USA reached domestic cattle and leads to an internal challenge in the early nineties.<br /><br />A processing risk developed in the late 80s/early 90s when cattle imports from BSE risk countries were slaughtered or died and were processed (partly) into feed, together with some imports of MBM. This risk continued to exist, and grew significantly in the mid 90’s when domestic cattle, infected by imported MBM, reached processing. Given the low stability of the system, the risk increased over the years with continued imports of cattle and MBM from BSE risk countries.<br /><br />EFSA concludes that the current GBR level of USA is III, i.e. it is likely but not confirmed that domestic cattle are (clinically or pre-clinically) infected with the BSE-agent. As long as there are no significant changes in rendering or feeding, the stability remains extremely/very unstable. Thus, the probability of cattle to be (pre-clinically or clinically) infected with the BSE-agent persistently increases.<br /><br /><a href="http://www.efsa.europa.eu/EFSA/efsa_locale-1178620753812_1211902594180.htm">http://www.efsa.europa.eu/EFSA/efsa_locale-1178620753812_1211902594180.htm</a><br /><br /><br />Monday, November 23, 2009<br /><br />BSE GBR RISK ASSESSMENTS UPDATE NOVEMBER 23, 2009 COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES AND O.I.E.<br /><br /><a href="http://docket-aphis-2006-0041.blogspot.com/2009/11/bse-gbr-risk-assessments-update.html">http://docket-aphis-2006-0041.blogspot.com/2009/11/bse-gbr-risk-assessments-update.html</a><br /><br /><br />Docket APHIS-2006-0026 Docket Title Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Animal Identification and Importation of Commodities Docket Type Rulemaking Document APHIS-2006-0026-0001 Document Title Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Minimal-Risk Regions, Identification of Ruminants and Processing and Importation of Commodities Public Submission APHIS-2006-0026-0012 Public Submission Title Comment from Terry S Singletary<br /><br /><a href="http://www.regulations.gov/fdmspublic/component/main?main=DocumentDetail&o=09000064801e47e1">http://www.regulations.gov/fdmspublic/component/main?main=DocumentDetail&o=09000064801e47e1</a><br /><br /><br />Docket APHIS-2006-0041 Docket Title Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Minimal-Risk Regions; Importation of Live Bovines and Products Derived from Bovines Commodities Docket Type Rulemaking Document APHIS-2006-0041-0001 Document Title Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Minimal-Risk Regions; Importation of Live Bovines and Products Derived From Bovines Public Submission APHIS-2006-0041-0028 Public Submission Title Comment from Terry S Singletary<br /><br />Comment 2006-2007 USA AND OIE POISONING GLOBE WITH BSE MRR POLICY<br /><br />THE USA is in a most unique situation, one of unknown circumstances with human and animal TSE. THE USA has the most documented TSE in different species to date, with substrains growing in those species (BSE/BASE in cattle and CWD in deer and elk, there is evidence here with different strains), and we know that sheep scrapie has over 20 strains of the typical scrapie with atypical scrapie documented and also BSE is very likely to have passed to sheep. all of which have been rendered and fed back to animals for human and animal consumption, a frightening scenario. WE do not know the outcome, and to play with human life around the globe with the very likely TSE tainted products from the USA, in my opinion is like playing Russian roulette, of long duration, with potential long and enduring consequences, of which once done, cannot be undone. These are the facts as I have come to know through daily and extensive research of TSE over 9 years, since 12/14/97. I do not pretend to have all the answers, but i do know to continue to believe in the ukbsenvcjd only theory of transmission to humans of only this one strain from only this one TSE from only this one part of the globe, will only lead to further failures, and needless exposure to humans from all strains of TSE, and possibly many more needless deaths from TSE via a multitude of proven routes and sources via many studies with primates and rodents and other species.<br /><br />MY personal belief, since you ask, is that not only the Canadian border, but the USA border, and the Mexican border should be sealed up tighter than a drum for exporting there TSE tainted products, until a validated, 100% sensitive test is available, and all animals for human and animal consumption are tested. all we are doing is the exact same thing the UK did with there mad cow poisoning when they exported it all over the globe, all the while knowing what they were doing. this BSE MRR policy is nothing more than a legal tool to do just exactly what the UK did, thanks to the OIE and GW, it's legal now. and they executed Saddam for poisoning ???<br /><br />go figure. ...<br /><br /><a href="http://www.regulations.gov/fdmspublic/component/main?main=DocumentDetail&o=09000064801f8151">http://www.regulations.gov/fdmspublic/component/main?main=DocumentDetail&o=09000064801f8151</a><br /><br /><br />Docket APHIS-2006-0041 Docket Title Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Minimal-Risk Regions; Importation of Live Bovines and Products Derived from Bovines Commodities Docket Type Rulemaking Document APHIS-2006-0041-0001 Document Title Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Minimal-Risk Regions; Importation of Live Bovines and Products Derived From Bovines Public Submission APHIS-2006-0041-0028.1 Public Submission Title Attachment to Singletary comment<br /><br />January 28, 2007<br /><br />Greetings APHIS,<br /><br />I would kindly like to submit the following to ;<br /><br />BSE; MRR; IMPORTATION OF LIVE BOVINES AND PRODUCTS DERIVED FROM BOVINES [Docket No. APHIS-2006-0041] RIN 0579-AC01<br /><br /><a href="http://www.regulations.gov/fdmspublic/ContentViewer?objectId=09000064801f8152&disposition=attachment&contentType=msw8">http://www.regulations.gov/fdmspublic/ContentViewer?objectId=09000064801f8152&disposition=attachment&contentType=msw8</a><br /><br /><br />Owner and Corporation Plead Guilty to Defrauding Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Surveillance Program<br /><br />An Arizona meat processing company and its owner pled guilty in February 2007 to charges of theft of Government funds, mail fraud, and wire fraud. The owner and his company defrauded the BSE Surveillance Program when they falsified BSE Surveillance Data Collection Forms and then submitted payment requests to USDA for the services. In addition to the targeted sample population (those cattle that were more than 30 months old or had other risk factors for BSE), the owner submitted to USDA, or caused to be submitted, BSE obex (brain stem) samples from healthy USDA-inspected cattle. As a result, the owner fraudulently received approximately $390,000. Sentencing is scheduled for May 2007.<br /><br />snip...<br /><br />4 USDA OIG SEMIANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS FY 2007 1st Half<br /><br /><a href="http://www.usda.gov/oig/webdocs/sarc070619.pdf">http://www.usda.gov/oig/webdocs/sarc070619.pdf</a><br /><br /><br />USDA: In 9,200 cases only one type of test could be used<br /><br />WASHINGTON (AP)--The U.S. Department of Agriculture acknowledged Aug. 17 that its testing options for bovine spongiform encephalopathy were limited in 9,200 cases despite its effort to expand surveillance throughout the U.S. herd.<br /><br />In those cases, only one type of test was used--one that failed to detect the disease in an infected Texas cow.<br /><br />The department posted the information on its website because of an inquiry from The Associated Press.<br /><br />Conducted over the past 14 months, the tests have not been included in the department's running tally of BSE tests since last summer. That total reached 439,126 on Aug. 17.<br /><br />"There's no secret program," the department's chief veterinarian, John Clifford, said in an interview. "There has been no hiding, I can assure you of that."<br /><br />Officials intended to report the tests later in an annual report, Clifford said.<br /><br />These 9,200 cases were different because brain tissue samples were preserved with formalin, which makes them suitable for only one type of test--immunohistochemistry, or IHC.<br /><br />In the Texas case, officials had declared the cow free of disease in November after an IHC test came back negative. The department's inspector general ordered an additional kind of test, which confirmed the animal was infected.<br /><br />Veterinarians in remote locations have used the preservative on tissue to keep it from degrading on its way to the department's laboratory in Ames, Iowa. Officials this year asked veterinarians to stop using preservative and send fresh or chilled samples within 48 hours.<br /><br />The department recently investigated a possible case of BSE that turned up in a preserved sample. Further testing ruled out the disease two weeks ago.<br /><br />Scientists used two additional tests--rapid screening and Western blot--to help detect BSE in the country's second confirmed case, in a Texas cow in June. They used IHC and Western blot to confirm the first case, in a Washington state cow in December 2003.<br /><br />"The IHC test is still an excellent test," Clifford said. "These are not simple tests, either."<br /><br />Clifford pointed out that scientists reran the IHC several times and got conflicting results. That happened, too, with the Western blot test. Both tests are accepted by international animal health officials.<br /><br />Date: 8/25/05<br /><br /><a href="http://www.hpj.com/archives/2005/aug05/aug29/BSEtestoptionswerelimited.cfm">http://www.hpj.com/archives/2005/aug05/aug29/BSEtestoptionswerelimited.cfm</a><br /><br /><br />""These 9,200 cases were different because brain tissue samples were preserved with formalin, which makes them suitable for only one type of test--immunohistochemistry, or IHC."<br /><br />THIS WAS DONE FOR A REASON!<br /><br />THE IHC test has been proven to be the LEAST LIKELY to detect BSE/TSE in the bovine, and these were probably from the most high risk cattle pool, the ones the USDA et al, SHOULD have been testing. ...TSS<br /><br />USDA 2003<br /><br />We have to be careful that we don't get so set in the way we do things that we forget to look for different emerging variations of disease. We've gotten away from collecting the whole brain in our systems. We're using the brain stem and we're looking in only one area. In Norway, they were doing a project and looking at cases of Scrapie, and they found this where they did not find lesions or PRP in the area of the obex. They found it in the cerebellum and the cerebrum. It's a good lesson for us. Ames had to go back and change the procedure for looking at Scrapie samples. In the USDA, we had routinely looked at all the sections of the brain, and then we got away from it. They've recently gone back. Dr. Keller: Tissues are routinely tested, based on which tissue provides an 'official' test result as recognized by APHIS.<br /><br />Dr. Detwiler: That's on the slaughter. But on the clinical cases, aren't they still asking for the brain? But even on the slaughter, they're looking only at the brainstem. We may be missing certain things if we confine ourselves to one area.<br /><br />snip.............<br /><br />Dr. Detwiler: It seems a good idea, but I'm not aware of it. Another important thing to get across to the public is that the negatives do not guarantee absence of infectivity. The animal could be early in the disease and the incubation period. Even sample collection is so important. If you're not collecting the right area of the brain in sheep, or if collecting lymphoreticular tissue, and you don't get a good biopsy, you could miss the area with the PRP in it and come up with a negative test. There's a new, unusual form of Scrapie that's been detected in Norway. We have to be careful that we don't get so set in the way we do things that we forget to look for different emerging variations of disease. We've gotten away from collecting the whole brain in our systems. We're using the brain stem and we're looking in only one area. In Norway, they were doing a project and looking at cases of Scrapie, and they found this where they did not find lesions or PRP in the area of the obex. They found it in the cerebellum and the cerebrum. It's a good lesson for us. Ames had to go back and change the procedure for looking at Scrapie samples. In the USDA, we had routinely looked at all the sections of the brain, and then we got away from it. They've recently gone back.<br /><br />Dr. Keller: Tissues are routinely tested, based on which tissue provides an 'official' test result as recognized by APHIS .<br /><br />Dr. Detwiler: That's on the slaughter. But on the clinical cases, aren't they still asking for the brain? But even on the slaughter, they're looking only at the brainstem. We may be missing certain things if we confine ourselves to one area.<br /><br />snip...<br /><br />FULL TEXT;<br /><br />Completely Edited Version PRION ROUNDTABLE<br /><br />Accomplished this day, Wednesday, December 11, 2003, Denver, Colorado<br /><br />2005<br /><br />=============================<br /><br />CDC DR. PAUL BROWN TSE EXPERT COMMENTS 2006<br /><br />The U.S. Department of Agriculture was quick to assure the public earlier this week that the third case of mad cow disease did not pose a risk to them, but what federal officials have not acknowledged is that this latest case indicates the deadly disease has been circulating in U.S. herds for at least a decade.<br /><br />The second case, which was detected last year in a Texas cow and which USDA officials were reluctant to verify, was approximately 12 years old.<br /><br />These two cases (the latest was detected in an Alabama cow) present a picture of the disease having been here for 10 years or so, since it is thought that cows usually contract the disease from contaminated feed they consume as calves. The concern is that humans can contract a fatal, incurable, brain-wasting illness from consuming beef products contaminated with the mad cow pathogen.<br /><br />"The fact the Texas cow showed up fairly clearly implied the existence of other undetected cases," Dr. Paul Brown, former medical director of the National Institutes of Health's Laboratory for Central Nervous System Studies and an expert on mad cow-like diseases, told United Press International. "The question was, 'How many?' and we still can't answer that."<br /><br />Brown, who is preparing a scientific paper based on the latest two mad cow cases to estimate the maximum number of infected cows that occurred in the United States, said he has "absolutely no confidence in USDA tests before one year ago" because of the agency's reluctance to retest the Texas cow that initially tested positive.<br /><br />USDA officials finally retested the cow and confirmed it was infected seven months later, but only at the insistence of the agency's inspector general.<br /><br />"Everything they did on the Texas cow makes everything USDA did before 2005 suspect," Brown said. ...snip...end<br /><br /><a href="http://www.upi.com/ConsumerHealthDaily/view.php?StoryID=20060315-055557-1284r">http://www.upi.com/ConsumerHealthDaily/view.php?StoryID=20060315-055557-1284r</a><br /><br /><br />CDC - Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy and Variant Creutzfeldt ... Dr. Paul Brown is Senior Research Scientist in the Laboratory of Central Nervous System ... Address for correspondence: Paul Brown, Building 36, Room 4A-05, ...<br /><br /><a href="http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/eid/vol7no1/brown.htm">http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/eid/vol7no1/brown.htm</a><br /><br /><br />Report on Food & Drug Administration Dallas District Investigation of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Event in Texas 2005 Executive Summary: On June 24, 2005, USDA informed FDA that a cow in Texas tested positive for Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE). Information provided by APHIS was that the BSE positive cow was born and raised in a herd in Texas and was approximately 12 years old. The animal was sampled for BSE at a pet food plant in Texas on November 15, 2004, as part of USDA's enhanced surveillance program.<br /><br /><a href="http://www.fda.gov/cvm/texasfeedrpt.htm">http://www.fda.gov/cvm/texasfeedrpt.htm</a><br /><br /><br />Texas even had a 'secret' test that showed that mad cow positive; experimental IHC test results, because the test was not a validated procedure, and because the two approved IHC tests came back negative, the results were not considered to be of regulatory significance and therefore were not reported beyond the laboratory. . A Western blot test conducted the week of June 5, 2005, returned positive for BSE.<br /><br /><a href="http://www.usda.gov/documents/vs_bse_ihctestvar.pdf">http://www.usda.gov/documents/vs_bse_ihctestvar.pdf</a><br /><br /><br />THIS confirms that the June 2004 Enhanced BSE cover-up, was just that. Like i said before, due to this terribly flawed system, those 388,000 testing to date for BSE in the USA were meaningless and should be retested. ...<br /><br />Subject: USDA JOHANN'S MAD ABOUT FONG, PLANS HIS OWN LAB AND HIS OWN MAD COW ANTIBODIES ;-) Date: July 29, 2005 at 2:35 pm PST<br /><br />Friday, July 29, 2005<br /><br /><a href="http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/search?updated-max=2007-12-18T12%3A13%3A00-08%3A00&max-results=7">http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/search?updated-max=2007-12-18T12%3A13%3A00-08%3A00&max-results=7</a><br /><br /><br />USDA did not test possible mad cows<br /><br />By Steve Mitchell United Press International Published 6/8/2004 9:30 PM<br /><br />WASHINGTON, June 8 (UPI) -- The U.S. Department of Agriculture claims ittested 500 cows with signs of a brain disorder for mad cow disease last year, but agency documents obtained by United Press International show the agency tested only half that number.<br /><br />USDA officials said the difference is made up in animals tested at state veterinary diagnostic laboratories, but these animals were not tested using the "gold standard" test employed by the agency for confirming acase of the deadly disease. Instead, the state labs used a less sensitive test that experts say could miss mad cow cases.<br /><br />In addition, the state lab figures were not included in a March 2004 USDA document estimating the number of animals most likely to be infected among U.S. herds, and apparently were not given to a congressional committee that had requested agency data on the number of cows with brain disorder signs that had been tested for the disease.<br /><br />"This is just adding to the demise of USDA's credibility," said Felicia Nestor, senior policy adviser to the Government Accountability Project, a group in Washington, D.C., that works with federal whistleblowers.<br /><br />"If the USDA is going to exclude from testing the animals most likely to have the disease, that would seem to have a very negative impact on there liability of their conclusion," Nestor told UPI.<br /><br />Nestor, who has monitored the USDA's mad cow surveillance program closely for several years, asked, "Are they deliberately avoiding testing animals that look like they have the disease?"<br /><br />Concerns about the number of cows in U.S. herds with brain disorder symptoms have been heightened due to the recent case in Texas, in which USDA officials failed to test an animal with such symptoms, also known as central nervous system or CNS signs. This was a violation of USDA policy, which stipulates all CNS cows should be tested because they are considered the most likely to be mad cow infected. To date, the Washington cow that tested positive last December is the only confirmed case of mad cow disease -- also known as bovine spongiform encephalopathy -- among U.S. herds.<br /><br />The Texas incident has alarmed the public and members of Congress because humans can contract a fatal brain disorder called variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease from consuming meat infected with the mad cow pathogen. If the USDA's surveillance program is allowing the riskiest cows to go untested, it raises concerns about the ability of the monitoring system to detect the disease reliably in U.S. herds, Rep.Henry Waxman, D-Calif., charged in a May 13 letter to Agriculture Secretary Ann Veneman.<br /><br />Dr. Peter Lurie, of the consumer group Public Citizen, said CNS cows should be the one category that absolutely has to be tested to have a sound surveillance system.<br /><br />"CNS animals are far and away the most important animals to test," said Lurie, who has done several analyses of the USDA's mad cow surveillance program.<br /><br />"If there's any category that needs 100 percent testing, that's it, because they would be the most likely place to find mad cow in America," he told UPI. "Any CNS cow that slips into the food supply represents a major case of malpractice by USDA, and similarly, the failure to test the brain of that animal to see if it was indeed infected is really a failure to protect the public."<br /><br />USDA officials said the agency has no estimate on how many CNS cows occur in U.S. herds. But spokesman Ed Loyd has told UPI, and at least one other media outlet, that 500 CNS cows were tested in fiscal year 2003. Yet agency testing records for the first 10 months of FY 2003, obtained by UPI under the Freedom of Information Act, show only 254 animals that fall under the CNS category -- or about half the number Loyd cited.<br /><br />After failing to respond to repeated requests from UPI for clarification of the apparent discrepancy, Loyd finally offered the explanation that an additional 45 CNS cows were tested by the USDA during the final two months of FY 2003. The remainder, he said, was made up by CNS cases tested at various state veterinary diagnostic laboratories.<br /><br />"We also include data reported to us from state veterinary diagnostic laboratories, and all of these are CNS cases that have been tested for BSE using a histological examination," Loyd said.<br /><br />"We were not using any other labs during this period, other than (the USDA lab), to run the IHC tests for BSE, which is the gold standard," he said. "This (state laboratory) information contributes important data to our surveillance effort."<br /><br />However, the state labs did not use the immunohistochemistry test, which the USDA has called the "gold standard" for diagnosing mad cow disease. Instead, the labs used a different test called histopathology, which theUSDA itself does not use to confirm a case, opting instead for the more sensitive IHC test.<br /><br />The histopathology test, unlike the IHC test, does not detect prions --misfolded proteins that serve as a marker for infection and can be spotted early on in the course of the illness. Rather, it screens forthe microscopic holes in the brain that are characteristic of advanced mad cow disease.<br /><br />According to the USDA's Web site, histopathology proves reliable only if the brain sample is removed soon after the death of the animal. If there is too much of a delay, the Web site states, it can be "very difficult to confirm a diagnosis by histopathology" because the brain structures may have begun to disintegrate.<br /><br />That is one reason the agency began using the IHC test -- it can confirm a diagnosis if the brain has begun disintegrating or been frozen for shipping.<br /><br />The state labs used histopathology to screen 266 CNS cases in FY 2003, as well as 257 cases in FY 2002, according to Loyd. He did not explain why this information was not included in the testing records the agency provided to UPI and has not responded to requests for the identity of the state labs.<br /><br />Linda Detwiler, a former USDA veterinarian who oversaw the agency's madcow testing program, told UPI the histopathology test probably is adequate for screening CNS cows. If they have mad cow disease, she said, it would likely be an advanced stage that should be obvious.<br /><br />Other mad cow disease experts, however, said having a back-up test suchas IHC would be advisable, because histopathology tests sometimes can miss evidence of infection.<br /><br />The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations offers similar recommendations in its protocol for conducing a histopathology test. The protocol states that even if histopathology is negative,"further sampling should be undertaken" in cases "where clinical signs have strongly suggested BSE" -- a criteria that includes all of the cows tested at the state labs.<br /><br />The USDA seems to agree on the need for a back-up test. Its expanded surveillance program, which began June 1, calls for using IHC -- or another test called Western blot -- to confirm any positives found on rapid tests. The March 15 document that describes the new program does not mention using histopathology to confirm cases of mad cow disease.<br /><br />"Subtle changes can be missed on histopathology that would probably not be as easy to miss using IHC," said Elizabeth Mumford, a veterinarian and BSE expert at Safe Food Solutions in Bern, Switzerland, a company that provides advice on reducing mad cow risk to industry and governments.<br /><br />"Therefore I believe it is valuable to run (histopathology)," Mumford told UPI.<br /><br />She noted that in Europe, two tests -- neither one the histopathology test -- are used to ensure no cases are missed. A rapid test is used initially for screening, followed by IHC as a confirmatory test.<br /><br />Markus Moser, a molecular biologist and chief executive officer of the Swiss firm Prionics, which manufactures tests for detecting mad cow disease, agrees about the possibility of a case being missed by histopathology.<br /><br />"There were cases which were (histopathology) negative but still clearly positive with the other (testing) methods," Moser said. "BSE testing based on histology on sub-optimal tissue was probably one of the reasons why Germany was allegedly BSE-free until our test discovered that they were not" in 2000, Moser told UPI.<br /><br />He agreed with Detwiler that histopathology should be suitable for most cases of CNS cows, but added it still can fail to detect the disease in some CNS cases -- particularly if the sample is not optimum.<br /><br />"It is difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish the subtle changes in a diseased brain from artifacts like ruptures in the tissue due to tissue damage during the sampling, transport or preparation," he said.<br /><br />Loyd asserted the additional CNS cases from the state labs actually yielded a total of 565 such cows the USDA had tested -- 65 more than his original figure of 500. Whether the USDA considers its total to be 500 or 565, however, either figure would exceed the agency's own estimates for the total number of such cows that it identifies annually.<br /><br />According to data the USDA provided to the House Committee on Government Reform, and numbers the agency included in the March document about its expanded surveillance plan, only 201 to 249 CNS cows are identified at slaughterhouses. Approximately 129 additional cases occur on farms annually. At most, that yields a combined total of 378 CNS cows, or nearly 200 less than the 565 Loyd claims the agency tested.<br /><br />The USDA surveillance plan document makes no mention of the number of CNS animals tested at state veterinary diagnostic labs. The figure also does not appear to be included in the agency's estimates of the number of high-risk animals that occur in the United States each year. The latter number was used to help the USDA calculate the number of animals it will screen for mad cow disease in its expanded surveillance plan.<br /><br />USDA officials also did not include the state lab figures in response to a question from the House Committee on Government Reform, a source close to the issue told UPI. The committee, on which Waxman is the ranking Democrat, had requested in a March 8 letter to Veneman that she provide "the number of BSE tests that were conducted on cattle exhibiting central nervous system symptoms" for each of the last five years.<br /><br />Loyd did not respond to a request from UPI asking why agency officials did not provide that information to the committee or include it in USDA's explanation of its expanded surveillance plan.<br /><br />The committee has taken note of the CNS issue and plans to delve into it further in a hearing slated for sometime in the next few months.<br /><br />"The committee will explore this and other issues surrounding USDA and BSE testing at a hearing later this summer," Drew Crockett, spokesman for the committee, told UPI.<br /><br />--<br /><br />Steve Mitchell is UPI's Medical Correspondent. E-mail sciencemail@upi.com<br /><br />Copyright © 2001-2004 United Press International<br /><br /><a href="http://www.upi.com/view.cfm?StoryID=20040608-014607-3865r">http://www.upi.com/view.cfm?StoryID=20040608-014607-3865r</a><br /><br /><br />''USDA gets a D or D minus," said Caroline Smith Dewaal of the Center for Science in the Public Interest, an advocacy group based in Washington. ''The best thing that came out of this is the work of the inspector general."<br /><br />It was the department's in-house watchdog, Inspector General Phyllis Fong, who skirted the USDA hierarchy by ordering retesting with a different method more than six months after a routine second-round test, known as the immunohistochemistry, or IHC, test proved negative for the disease.<br /><br />Agriculture Secretary Mike Johanns, who assumed office in January, has said he neither knew about nor authorized the retesting by the National Veterinary Services Laboratories in Ames, Iowa.<br /><br />BESIDES the Texas mad cow that sat on the shelf for 7+ months before the Honorable Phyllis Fong of the OIG finally did the end around Johanns et al and finally had Weybridge bring that negative cow back from the dead to finally being a confirmed mad cow (hint, hint, getting MRR implemented first), was this simply another bumbling of BSE protocol, or just same old same old;<br /><br />Jim Rogers (202) 690-4755<br /><br />USDA Press Office (202) 720-4623<br /><br />Statement by Chief Veterinary Medical Officer John Clifford Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service Regarding Non-Definitive BSE Test ResultsJuly 27, 2005<br /><br />snip...<br /><br />Our laboratory ran the IHC test on the sample and received non-definitive results that suggest the need for further testing. As we have previously experienced, it is possible for an IHC test to yield differing results depending on the "slice" of tissue that is tested. Therefore, scientists at our laboratory and at Weybridge will run the IHC test on additional "slices" of tissue from this animal to determine whether or not it was infected with BSE. We will announce results as soon as they are compiled, which we expect to occur by next week.<br /><br />I would note that the sample was taken in April, at which time the protocols allowed for a preservative to be used (protocols changed in June 2005). The sample was not submitted to us until last week, because the veterinarian set aside the sample after preserving it and simply forgot to send it in. On that point, I would like to emphasize that while that time lag is not optimal, it has no implications in terms of the risk to human health. The carcass of this animal was destroyed, therefore there is absolutely no risk to human or animal health from this animal.<br /><br />snip...<br /><br /><a href="http://www.aphis.usda.gov/lpa/news/2005/07/bsestatement_vs.html">http://www.aphis.usda.gov/lpa/news/2005/07/bsestatement_vs.html</a><br /><br /><br />In Reply to: Re: Statement by Dr. John Clifford Regarding Non-Definitive BSE Test Results posted by TSS on July 27, 2005 at 12:53 pm:<br /><br />o.k., let me get this right. i am pondering here;-)<br /><br />all the time this TEXAS positive, positive, (secret) positive, inconclusive, negative, then Weybridge confirmed 2nd BSE documented case (thanks to the Honorable Phyllis Fong),all this time this BSe going on in TEXAS, was plastered all over the news, this guy forgot about that sample, and it just sat up on some shelf wasting away for months, as to be in such bad shape, they now cannot even test it properly. r i g h t ... like ooops, sorry. ...end<br /><br />============================================<br /><br />The animal died in April, but the veterinarian forgot to send the sample to USDA until this month, Mr. Clifford said. "While that time lag is not optimal, it has no implications in terms of the risk to human health," he said.<br /><br />IHC tests returned conflicting results on the Texas cow. Use of the preservative means that the other tests commonly done when mad cow is suspected, initial rapid screening and Western blot, can't be performed on this sample, the official said. Mr. Clifford said it's possible to get different results, "depending on the slice of tissue that is tested."<br /><br />The fatal brain-wasting disease is known medically as bovine spongiform encephalopathy, or BSE. In people, eating tainted meat products has been linked to about 150 deaths from a fatal disorder called variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease. Most of the deaths were in the United Kingdom, where there was an outbreak in the 1980s and 1990s.<br /><br />The U.S. banned Canadian cattle in May 2003 following Canada's first case of mad-cow disease. The U.S. was about to lift the ban in March when U.S. District Judge Richard Cebull in Billings, Mont., granted an injunction to a ranchers' group called R-CALF United Stockgrowers of America. The ranchers had sued to keep the border closed to Canadian cattle, saying the disease presented a risk to the U.S. beef industry as well as to American consumers.<br /><br />The 9th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the injunction earlier this month, allowing cattle shipments from Canada to resume. The lifting of the ban reopens the U.S. to cattle younger than 30 months and expands the list of beef products Canada is allowed to ship to the U.S. Older animals are still banned, because infection levels are believed to increase with age.<br /><br />Copyright © 2005 Associated Press<br /><br /><a href="http://online.wsj.com/">http://online.wsj.com/</a><br /><br /><br />Greetings,<br /><br />this is what you call the 'FONG' syndrome. make sure she can't make them do a WB on this sample.<br /><br />I BEG THE OIG and the Honorable Phyllis Fong to investigate this blunder too. there is no way that sample sat on a shelf while the world waited on that Texas mad cow blunder dust to settle, and someone just forgets about it. i just don't believe this either...<br /><br />============================================<br /><br /><br /><br /><a href="http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/search?updated-max=2007-12-18T12%3A13%3A00-08%3A00&max-results=7">http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/search?updated-max=2007-12-18T12%3A13%3A00-08%3A00&max-results=7</a><br /><br /><br /><br />WAKE UP AMERICA !<br /><br /><br />with kindest regards, terry<br /><br /><br />layperson<br /><br /><br />Terry S. Singeltary Sr.<br />P.O. Box 42<br />Bacliff, Texas USA 77518<br />flounder9@verizon.netTerry S. Singeltary Sr.http://www.blogger.com/profile/06986622967539963260noreply@blogger.com0