Sunday, February 22, 2009

REPORT ON TESTING RUMINANTS FOR TSE's in the EU 2007 (2009)

Report on the monitoring and testing of ruminants for the presence of transmissible spongiform encephalopathies (TSEs) in the EU in 2007 (2009)

Directorate E — Safety of the food chain E2 — Food Hygiene, Alert System and Training

2009

snip...

1. Summary In 2007, a total of 9 711 123 bovine, 828 644 ovine and 277 196 caprine animals were tested in the EU 27 in the framework of the TSE monitoring programmes. 174 bovine, 2 253 ovine and 1272 caprine animals turned out positive. 1 445 280 risk bovine animals and 8 262 517 healthy animals slaughtered for human consumption were tested by rapid tests. 1 860 bovine animals were tested in the framework of passive surveillance (animals reported as official BSE suspects). In addition, 1 466 animals were tested in the framework of culling of animals with an epidemiological connection to a BSE case. 91 % of positive cases were detected by the active monitoring (testing of risk animals, healthy slaughtered and culled cattle) and 9 % were detected by passive surveillance. In 2007, no BSE case was found in Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, Estonia, Greece, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Romania, Finland and Sweden. The number of BSE cases and the overall prevalence in tested animals decreased by respectively 46 % and 41 % in 2007 compared to 2006. 826 730 ovine animals were tested by active monitoring, while 1 914 were animals reported as official TSE suspects and therefore subjected to laboratory examination. In caprine animals, the numbers of tests in the respective groups were 276 040 (active monitoring) and 1 156 (TSE suspects). Some 987 and 112 TSE cases in respectively sheep and goats confirmed in 2007 were subjected to discriminatory testing. None of them have been confirmed to be BSE. In addition, in the framework of a survey for chronic wasting disease (CWD) in cervids, as required by Commission Decision 2007/182/EC, 10 843 animals were tested between 2006 and 2007 hunting seasons. None of them turned out positive. All Member States submitted information on the TSE testing of bovine, ovine and caprine animals. In addition to the Member States, Norway also submitted information on their TSE testing programmes.

see full text ;



http://ec.europa.eu/food/food/biosafety/bse/preliminary_annual_report_tse2007_en.pdf



NOW, compare to USA MAD COW TESTING, or the lack of $$$ ;

USDA to cut back BSE testing program Jul 20, 2006 (CIDRAP News) – The US government's expanded testing program for bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) will be cut back soon, having shown that the nation has "no significant BSE problem," Agriculture Secretary Mike Johanns said today.

About 759,000 cattle, or more than 1,000 cattle per day, have been tested since the US Department of Agriculture (USDA) expanded BSE surveillance in June 2004, Johanns said at a news conference. Two cases were found during that time, in addition to the first US case discovered in 2003.

Starting as early as late August, testing will be reduced to about 40,000 cattle a year, or about 110 a week, Johanns announced. The reduced testing program—similar to what was done before the expansion—will cost about $8 million a year, versus about $52 million a year currently, he said.

To the suggestion that the current level of testing should continue indefinitely, Johanns said, "There simply is no scientific justification for doing so. . . . The reality is this: there is no significant BSE problem in the United States. And after all this surveillance I am able to say there never was. We've proved that with our enhanced surveillance."

Johanns said that testing 40,000 cattle a year is 10 times as many as recommended in the science-based guidelines of the World Organization for Animal Health (OIE). The USDA will continue to test cattle from high-risk populations and from a variety of places around the country, he said.

"To put it simply, we've accomplished our enhanced surveillance goals, and it's time to move forward with a level of surveillance that corresponds to the very low level of BSE in this country," he added. In a news release, he stated that the reduced testing program "will maintain our ability to detect BSE, [and] provide assurance that our interlocking safeguards are successfully preventing BSE."

The testing program was expanded in response to the first BSE case in 2003, with the aim of determining the disease's prevalence. The government originally proposed to test about 275,000 cattle over 12 to 18 months, but the program now has lasted more than 25 months.

The plan to reduce testing comes as Japan prepares to resume importing US beef, long banned because of BSE worries, and as the USDA tries to reopen South Korea and China to American beef. Japan has been inspecting US beef processing plants this month and, if the results are satisfactory, is expected to resume imports of beef from cattle younger than 20 months.

In response to questions, Johanns said the USDA told the nation's trading partners about the testing cutback in advance. He also said it would have been "enormously disingenuous, if not downright dishonest" if the USDA had waited until the foreign markets reopened and then reduced the testing program.

Johanns stressed that the testing program is not a food safety program but rather a way to assess the prevalence of BSE. The key to protecting food safety is removing the specified risk materials (SRM)—cattle parts such as the brain and spinal cord, which are likely to carry the BSE agent if an animal is infected, he said. Removal of SRM from carcasses of cattle older than 30 months has been required since early 2004.

Citing an analysis of the US surveillance program released in April, Johanns said, "Experts believe that in an adult cattle population of 42 million we might find four to seven animals with BSE." With BSE that rare and with the SRM ban in place, the risk of BSE-contaminated beef getting into the food supply is "virtually nonexistent."

Also at the news conference, Dr. Ron DeHaven, head of the USDA Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, said the USDA is considering relaxing restrictions on imports of live Canadian cattle. Canada recently identified its sixth BSE case.

Because of BSE concerns, the only live Canadian cattle allowed into the United States are those destined for slaughter before reaching the age of 30 months. In response to a question, DeHaven said the USDA is considering allowing older cattle to be imported, because the Canadian system for preventing BSE "mirrors what we have in the US."

But he also said the USDA will consider any findings about Canada's latest BSE case before making any changes in the import rules. The latest case was in a 4-year-old cow, born years after a ban on putting recycled cattle protein into cattle feed took effect in 1997.

DeHaven also commented on recent reports that the two latest US BSE cases involved a different "strain" of prion protein from that seen in the first case and in European cases.

"Both the Alabama and the Texas cows had a slightly different prion" with a higher molecular weight than in previous cases, he said. He added that researchers are working to find out what that means.

"From the regulatory standpoint we're considering those to be two cases of BSE. But we feel very comfortable that our existing program provides the appropriate level of protection," regardless of the type of prion involved, DeHaven said.



http://www.cidrap.umn.edu/cidrap/content/other/bse/news/jul2006bse.html



Owner and Corporation Plead Guilty to Defrauding Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Surveillance Program

An Arizona meat processing company and its owner pled guilty in February 2007 to charges of theft of Government funds, mail fraud, and wire fraud. The owner and his company defrauded the BSE Surveillance Program when they falsified BSE Surveillance Data Collection Forms and then submitted payment requests to USDA for the services. In addition to the targeted sample population (those cattle that were more than 30 months old or had other risk factors for BSE), the owner submitted to USDA, or caused to be submitted, BSE obex (brain stem) samples from healthy USDA-inspected cattle. As a result, the owner fraudulently received approximately $390,000. Sentencing is scheduled for May 2007.

snip...

4 USDA OIG SEMIANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS FY 2007 1st Half



http://www.usda.gov/oig/webdocs/sarc070619.pdf



full text ;



http://foiamadsheepmadrivervalley.blogspot.com/2008/09/re-foia-of-declaration-of-extraordinary.html



USDA: In 9,200 cases only one type of test could be used

WASHINGTON (AP)--The U.S. Department of Agriculture acknowledged Aug. 17 that its testing options for bovine spongiform encephalopathy were limited in 9,200 cases despite its effort to expand surveillance throughout the U.S. herd.

In those cases, only one type of test was used--one that failed to detect the disease in an infected Texas cow.

The department posted the information on its website because of an inquiry from The Associated Press.

Conducted over the past 14 months, the tests have not been included in the department's running tally of BSE tests since last summer. That total reached 439,126 on Aug. 17.

"There's no secret program," the department's chief veterinarian, John Clifford, said in an interview. "There has been no hiding, I can assure you of that."

Officials intended to report the tests later in an annual report, Clifford said.

These 9,200 cases were different because brain tissue samples were preserved with formalin, which makes them suitable for only one type of test--immunohistochemistry, or IHC.

In the Texas case, officials had declared the cow free of disease in November after an IHC test came back negative. The department's inspector general ordered an additional kind of test, which confirmed the animal was infected.

Veterinarians in remote locations have used the preservative on tissue to keep it from degrading on its way to the department's laboratory in Ames, Iowa. Officials this year asked veterinarians to stop using preservative and send fresh or chilled samples within 48 hours.

The department recently investigated a possible case of BSE that turned up in a preserved sample. Further testing ruled out the disease two weeks ago.

Scientists used two additional tests--rapid screening and Western blot--to help detect BSE in the country's second confirmed case, in a Texas cow in June. They used IHC and Western blot to confirm the first case, in a Washington state cow in December 2003.

"The IHC test is still an excellent test," Clifford said. "These are not simple tests, either."

Clifford pointed out that scientists reran the IHC several times and got conflicting results. That happened, too, with the Western blot test. Both tests are accepted by international animal health officials.

Date: 8/25/05



http://www.hpj.com/archives/2005/aug05/aug29/BSEtestoptionswerelimited.cfm



""These 9,200 cases were different because brain tissue samples were preserved with formalin, which makes them suitable for only one type of test--immunohistochemistry, or IHC."

THIS WAS DONE FOR A REASON!

THE IHC test has been proven to be the LEAST LIKELY to detect BSE/TSE in the bovine, and these were probably from the most high risk cattle pool, the ones the USDA et al, SHOULD have been testing. ...TSS

USDA 2003

We have to be careful that we don't get so set in the way we do things that we forget to look for different emerging variations of disease. We've gotten away from collecting the whole brain in our systems. We're using the brain stem and we're looking in only one area. In Norway, they were doing a project and looking at cases of Scrapie, and they found this where they did not find lesions or PRP in the area of the obex. They found it in the cerebellum and the cerebrum. It's a good lesson for us. Ames had to go back and change the procedure for looking at Scrapie samples. In the USDA, we had routinely looked at all the sections of the brain, and then we got away from it. They've recently gone back. Dr. Keller: Tissues are routinely tested, based on which tissue provides an 'official' test result as recognized by APHIS.

Dr. Detwiler: That's on the slaughter. But on the clinical cases, aren't they still asking for the brain? But even on the slaughter, they're looking only at the brainstem. We may be missing certain things if we confine ourselves to one area.

snip.............

Dr. Detwiler: It seems a good idea, but I'm not aware of it. Another important thing to get across to the public is that the negatives do not guarantee absence of infectivity. The animal could be early in the disease and the incubation period. Even sample collection is so important. If you're not collecting the right area of the brain in sheep, or if collecting lymphoreticular tissue, and you don't get a good biopsy, you could miss the area with the PRP in it and come up with a negative test. There's a new, unusual form of Scrapie that's been detected in Norway. We have to be careful that we don't get so set in the way we do things that we forget to look for different emerging variations of disease. We've gotten away from collecting the whole brain in our systems. We're using the brain stem and we're looking in only one area. In Norway, they were doing a project and looking at cases of Scrapie, and they found this where they did not find lesions or PRP in the area of the obex. They found it in the cerebellum and the cerebrum. It's a good lesson for us. Ames had to go back and change the procedure for looking at Scrapie samples. In the USDA, we had routinely looked at all the sections of the brain, and then we got away from it. They've recently gone back.

Dr. Keller: Tissues are routinely tested, based on which tissue provides an 'official' test result as recognized by APHIS .

Dr. Detwiler: That's on the slaughter. But on the clinical cases, aren't they still asking for the brain? But even on the slaughter, they're looking only at the brainstem. We may be missing certain things if we confine ourselves to one area.

snip...

FULL TEXT;

Completely Edited Version PRION ROUNDTABLE

Accomplished this day, Wednesday, December 11, 2003, Denver, Colorado

2005

=============================

CDC DR. PAUL BROWN TSE EXPERT COMMENTS 2006

The U.S. Department of Agriculture was quick to assure the public earlier this week that the third case of mad cow disease did not pose a risk to them, but what federal officials have not acknowledged is that this latest case indicates the deadly disease has been circulating in U.S. herds for at least a decade.

The second case, which was detected last year in a Texas cow and which USDA officials were reluctant to verify, was approximately 12 years old.

These two cases (the latest was detected in an Alabama cow) present a picture of the disease having been here for 10 years or so, since it is thought that cows usually contract the disease from contaminated feed they consume as calves. The concern is that humans can contract a fatal, incurable, brain-wasting illness from consuming beef products contaminated with the mad cow pathogen.

"The fact the Texas cow showed up fairly clearly implied the existence of other undetected cases," Dr. Paul Brown, former medical director of the National Institutes of Health's Laboratory for Central Nervous System Studies and an expert on mad cow-like diseases, told United Press International. "The question was, 'How many?' and we still can't answer that."

Brown, who is preparing a scientific paper based on the latest two mad cow cases to estimate the maximum number of infected cows that occurred in the United States, said he has "absolutely no confidence in USDA tests before one year ago" because of the agency's reluctance to retest the Texas cow that initially tested positive.

USDA officials finally retested the cow and confirmed it was infected seven months later, but only at the insistence of the agency's inspector general.

"Everything they did on the Texas cow makes everything USDA did before 2005 suspect," Brown said. ...snip...end



http://www.upi.com/ConsumerHealthDaily/view.php?StoryID=20060315-055557-1284r



CDC - Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy and Variant Creutzfeldt ... Dr. Paul Brown is Senior Research Scientist in the Laboratory of Central Nervous System ... Address for correspondence: Paul Brown, Building 36, Room 4A-05, ...



http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/eid/vol7no1/brown.htm



In this context, a word is in order about the US testing program. After the discovery of the first (imported) cow in 2003, the magnitude of testing was much increased, reaching a level of >400,000 tests in 2005 (Figure 4). Neither of the 2 more recently indigenously infected older animals with nonspecific clinical features would have been detected without such testing, and neither would have been identified as atypical without confirmatory Western blots. Despite these facts, surveillance has now been decimated to 40,000 annual tests (USDA news release no. 0255.06, July 20, 2006) and invites the accusation that the United States will never know the true status of its involvement with BSE.

In short, a great deal of further work will need to be done before the phenotypic features and prevalence of atypical BSE are understood. More than a single strain may have been present from the beginning of the epidemic, but this possibility has been overlooked by virtue of the absence of widespread Western blot confirmatory testing of positive screening test results; or these new phenotypes may be found, at least in part, to result from infections at an older age by a typical BSE agent, rather than neonatal infections with new "strains" of BSE. Neither alternative has yet been investigated.



http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/EID/vol12no12/06-0965.htm



Executive Summary

In June 2005, an inconclusive bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) sample from November 2004, that had originally been classified as negative on the immunohistochemistry test, was confirmed positive on SAF immunoblot (Western blot). The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) identified the herd of origin for the index cow in Texas; that identification was confirmed by DNA analysis. USDA, in close cooperation with the Texas Animal Health Commission (TAHC), established an incident command post (ICP) and began response activities according to USDA’s BSE Response Plan of September 2004. Response personnel removed at-risk cattle and cattle of interest (COI) from the index herd, euthanized them, and tested them for BSE; all were negative. USDA and the State extensively traced all at-risk cattle and COI that left the index herd. The majority of these animals entered rendering and/or slaughter channels well before the investigation began. USDA’s response to the Texas finding was thorough and effective.



http://www.aphis.usda.gov/lpa/issues/bse/epi-updates/bse_final_epidemiology_report.pdf



Friday, August 29, 2008

CREEKSTONE VS USDA COURT OF APPEALS, BUSH SAYS, NO WAY, NO HOW



http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2008/08/creekstone-vs-usda-court-of-appeals.html



see full text of this ongoing cover-up of mad cow disease in the USA. ...



http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/



Usda Certified Deadstock Downer Cow School Lunch Program Update

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Wednesday, December 10, 2008

Evaluation of FSIS Management Controls Over Pre-Slaughter Activities (Audit Report 24601-7-KC)



http://downercattle.blogspot.com/2008/12/evaluation-of-fsis-management-controls.html



Over the next 8-10 weeks, approximately 40% of all the adult mink on the farm died from TME. Since previous incidences of TME were associated with common or shared feeding practices, we obtained a careful history of feed ingredients used over the past 12-18 months. ***The rancher was a "dead stock" feeder using mostly (>95%) downer or dead dairy cattle and a few horses. Sheep had never been fed.***

snip...end



http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/mb/m09/tab05.pdf



Epidemiology Epidemiologic studies suggest that animals contract the disease by external exposure to the infectious agent, such as by eating contaminated feed. No evidence suggests that the TME agent spreads by contact between unrelated mink or from mother to nursing young. The disease has been identified in both genders and all color phases in animals greater than 1 year old. The first documented TME outbreak in the United States occurred in 1947 on one ranch in Wisconsin and then on a ranch in Minnesota that had received mink from the Wisconsin ranch. In 1961, TME outbreaks occurred on five ranches in Wisconsin. In Factsheet Veterinary Services February 2002 APHIS 1963, outbreaks occurred in Idaho, Minnesota, and Wisconsin. Epidemiologic data from the Minnesota and Wisconsin outbreaks trace the cases in those States to one common purchased food source.

snip...

The 1985 Stetsonville Outbreak The most recent TME outbreak occurred on one mink ranch in Stetsonville, WI, in 1985. In the herd of 7,300 adult mink, 60 percent of the animals died. Clinical signs included tail arching, incoordination, and hyperexcitability. At the most advanced stages of the disease, the animals were in trancelike states and eventually died. The outbreak lasted 5 months. Microscopic examination of sections of the brain confirmed the spongelike changes characteristic of TME. Diagnostic tests identified the prion protein. The following year, mink born during the outbreak showed no signs of TME. The late Richard Marsh, a veterinary virologist at the University of Wisconsin who studied the transmission of TME and other TSE's, investigated this outbreak. Marsh learned that the mink were fed a diet composed of fresh meat products from "downer cattle" and commercial sources of fish, poultry, and cereal. Downer cattle are nonambulatory and cannot rise because they are affected with a condition such as a metabolic disease, broken limbs, or a central nervous system disorder. Marsh theorized that the meat from these downer cattle introduced a TSE agent to the mink in which TME resulted. Although Marsh's hypothesis is based on speculation and anecdotal evidence, in 1993 APHIS adjusted its national BSE surveillance program to include testing downer cattle for evidence of a TSE. The brains of more than 20,141 cattle have been examined at APHIS' National Veterinary Services Laboratories and other State diagnostic laboratories. Not a single tissue sample has revealed evidence of BSE or another TSE in cattle.



http://www.aphis.usda.gov/publications/animal_health/content/printable_version/fs_ahtme.pdf



AND as everyone knows, the rest is history, those dead-stock downers, the most high risk cattle, were NOT tested, and in FACT, was a major source of YOUR CHILDRENS SCHOOL LUNCH PROGRAM, all across the Nation. sorry, these are the most high risk cattle for TSE aka mad cow disease, and i am a bit touchy about this topic. ...sorry. ...terry

DOWNER COW SCHOOL LUNCH PROGRAM



http://downercattle.blogspot.com/



IN CONFIDENCE PERCEPTION OF UNCONVENTENTIONAL SLOW VIRUS DISEASES OF ANIMALS IN THE USA 1985

The Stetsonville outbreak (farmer's name: Brecke). In addition to the downer cows and horses Brecke's mink recieved a cereal supplement. Hartsough's view was that this would contain bone meal and would be from a commercial source. If this were so and it was contaminated with a TME agent why were no other ranches affected? Many mink ranches now feed a commerical pelleted diet.

Brecke was equipped to process LARGE CARCASSES USING A CRUSHER/MIXER WHICH COULD ACCOMMODATE A WHOLE COW!

snip...

Wilbur Clarke (reference the Mission, Texas scrapie transmission transmission to cattle study) is now the State Veterinarian for Montana based at Helena. I was given confidential access to sections from the Clarke scrapie-cattle transmission experiment. Details of the experimental design were as supplied previously by Dr. Wrathall (copy of relevant information appended). Only 3 animals (2 inoculated with 2nd pass Suffolk scrapie and 1 inoculated with Angora goat passaged scrapie) showed clinical signs. Clinical signs were characterised by weakness, ''a stilted hindlimb gait'', disorientation, ataxia and, terminally, lateral recumbency. The two cattle from which I examined material were inocluated at 8 months of age and developed signs 36 months pi (goat scrapie inoculum) and 49 months pi (one of the Suffolk scrapie inoculated) respectively. This latter animal was killed at 58 months of age and so the clinical duration was only 1 month. The neuropathology was somewhat different from BSE or the Stetsonville TME in cattle. Vacuolar changes were minimal, to the extent that detection REQUIRED CAREFUL SEARCHING. Conversely astrocyte hypertrophy was a widespread and prominent feature. The material requires DETAILED NEUROPATHOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT BUT WHETHER OR NOT THIS WILL BE DONE REMAINS A QUESTION.

snip...

were there extensive neurologic lesions, which are primary for BSE, such as severe vacuolation of neurons and neuropil or neuronal necrosis and gliosis. Although some vacuolation of neuropil, chromotolysis in neurons, and gliosis were seen in the brains of some affected calves, these were industinguishable from those of controls. Vacuolated neurons in the red nucleus of both challenged and normal calves were considered normal for the bovines as previously described (50). PrP-res was found in ALL CHALLENGED CALVES REGARDLESS OF CLINCIAL SIGNS, and the amount of PrP-res positively related to the length of the incubation. ...

snip...

WE also conclude from these studies that scrapie in cattle MIGHT NOT BE RECOGNIZED BY ROUTINE HISTOPATHOLOGICAL EXAMINATION OF THE BRAIN AND SUGGEST THAT DETECTION OF PrP-res by immunohistochemistry or immunoblotting is necessary to make a definitive diagnosis. THUS, undiagnosed scrapie infection could contribute to the ''DOWNER-COW'' syndrome and could be responsible for some outbreaks of transmissible mink encephalopathy proposed by Burger and Hartsough (8) and Marsh and harsough (52). ...

snip...

Multiple sources of sheep affected with scrapie and two breeds of cattle from several sources were used inthe current study in an effort to avoid a single strain of either agent or host. Preliminary results from mouse inoculations indicate multiple strains of the agent were present in the pooled inoculum (unpublished data). ...

Transmission of the sheep scrapie to cattle was attempted in 1979 by using intracerebral, intramuscular, subcutaneous, and oral routes of inoculation of 5, 8- to 11-month old cattlw with a homologous mixture of brain from 1 affected sheep (61, 62). ONE of the 5 cattle develped neurologic signs 48 months after inoculation. Signs were disorientation, incoordination, a stiff-legged stilted gait, progressive difficulty in rising, and finally in terminal recumbency. The clinical course was 2.5 months. TWO of the 5 cattle similarly inoculated with brain tissue from a goat with scrapie exhibited similar signs 27 and 36 months after incoluation. Clinical courses were 43 an 44 days. Brain lesions of mild gliosis and vacuolation and mouse inoculation data were insufficient to confirm a diagnosis of scrapie. This work remained controversial until recent examination of the brains detected PrP-res in all 3 cattle with neurologic disease but in none of the unaffected cattle (62). Results of these studies are similar to ours and underscore the necessity of methods other than histopathology to diagnose scrapie infection in cattle. We believe that immunologic techniques for detecting PrP-res currently provide the most sensitive and reliable way to make a definitive diagnosis...



http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/sc/seac17/tab03.pdf



Visit to USA ... info on BSE and Scrapie



http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/yb/1988/10/00001001.pdf



Saturday, February 21, 2009

Renderers say industry not prepared for FDA feed ban rule ??? WHAT, IT'S 2009 FOR PETE'S SAKE $$$

Two recent articles caught my eye ;

Renderers say industry not prepared for FDA feed ban rule

Food Chemical News

February 2, 2009

and

BSE, rendering relate to human safety

Emma Struve 02/17/2009



http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2009/02/renderers-say-industry-not-prepared-for.html



OIE amending the Annex to Decision 2007/453/EC establishing the BSE status of Member States or third countries or regions thereof according to their BSE risk



http://docket-aphis-2006-0041.blogspot.com/2009/01/oie-amending-annex-to-decision.html



Saturday, January 24, 2009

Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy h-BSE ATYPICAL USA 2008 Annual Report Research Project: Study of Atypical Bse

Location: Virus and Prion Diseases of Livestock

2008 Annual Report



http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2009/01/bovine-spongiform-encephalopathy-h-bse.html



Sunday, December 28,

2008 MAD COW DISEASE USA DECEMBER 28, 2008 an 8 year review of a failed and flawed policy



http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2008/12/mad-cow-disease-usa-december-28-2008-8.html



A New Prionopathy OR more of the same old BSe and sporadic CJD



http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2008/08/new-prionopathy-or-more-of-same-old-bse.html



Communicated by: Terry S. Singeltary Sr.

[In submitting these data, Terry S. Singeltary Sr. draws attention to the steady increase in the "type unknown" category, which, according to their definition, comprises cases in which vCJD could be excluded. The total of 26 cases for the current year (2007) is disturbing, possibly symptomatic of the circulation of novel agents. Characterization of these agents should be given a high priority. - Mod.CP]



http://pro-med.blogspot.com/2007/11/proahedr-prion-disease-update-2007-07.html



http://www.promedmail.org/pls/askus/f?p=2400:1001:6833194127530602005::NO::F2400_P1001_BACK_PAGE,F2400_P1001_PUB_MAIL_ID:1010,39963



There is a growing number of human CJD cases, and they were presented last week in San Francisco by Luigi Gambatti(?) from his CJD surveillance collection.

He estimates that it may be up to 14 or 15 persons which display selectively SPRPSC and practically no detected RPRPSC proteins.



http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/06/transcripts/1006-4240t1.htm



http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/06/transcripts/2006-4240t1.pdf



sporadic Fatal Familial Insomnia



http://sporadicffi.blogspot.com/



JOURNAL OF NEUROLOGY

MARCH 26, 2003

RE-Monitoring the occurrence of emerging forms of Creutzfeldt-Jakob

disease in the United States

Email Terry S. Singeltary:

mhtml:%7B33B38F65-8D2E-434D-8F9B-8BDCD77D3066%7Dmid://00000036/!x-usc:mailto:flounder@wt.net

I lost my mother to hvCJD (Heidenhain Variant CJD). I would like to comment on the CDC's attempts to monitor the occurrence of emerging forms of CJD. Asante, Collinge et al [1] have reported that BSE transmission to the 129-methionine genotype can lead to an alternate phenotype that is indistinguishable from type 2 PrPSc, the commonest sporadic CJD. However, CJD and all human TSEs are not reportable nationally. CJD and all human TSEs must be made reportable in every state and internationally. I hope that the CDC does not continue to expect us to still believe that the 85%+ of all CJD cases which are sporadic are all spontaneous, without route/source. We have many TSEs in the USA in both animal and man. CWD in deer/elk is spreading rapidly and CWD does transmit to mink, ferret, cattle, and squirrel monkey by intracerebral inoculation. With the known incubation periods in other TSEs, oral transmission studies of CWD may take much longer. Every victim/family of CJD/TSEs should be asked about route and source of this agent. To prolong this will only spread the agent and needlessly expose others. In light of the findings of Asante and Collinge et al, there should be drastic measures to safeguard the medical and surgical arena from sporadic CJDs and all human TSEs. I only ponder how many sporadic CJDs in the USA are type 2 PrPSc?



http://www.neurology.org/cgi/eletters/60/2/176#535



THE PATHOLOGICAL PROTEIN

Hardcover, 304 pages plus photos and illustrations. ISBN 0-387-95508-9

June 2003

BY Philip Yam

CHAPTER 14 LAYING ODDS

Answering critics like Terry Singeltary, who feels that the U.S. under- counts CJD, Schonberger conceded that the current surveillance system has errors but stated that most of the errors will be confined to the older population.



http://www.thepathologicalprotein.com/



Diagnosis and Reporting of Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease Singeltary, Sr et al. JAMA.2001; 285: 733-734. Vol. 285 No. 6, February 14, 2001 JAMA

Diagnosis and Reporting of Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease

To the Editor: In their Research Letter, Dr Gibbons and colleagues1 reported that the annual US death rate due to Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (CJD) has been stable since 1985. These estimates, however, are based only on reported cases, and do not include misdiagnosed or preclinical cases. It seems to me that misdiagnosis alone would drastically change these figures. An unknown number of persons with a diagnosis of Alzheimer disease in fact may have CJD, although only a small number of these patients receive the postmortem examination necessary to make this diagnosis. Furthermore, only a few states have made CJD reportable. Human and animal transmissible spongiform encephalopathies should be reportable nationwide and internationally.

Terry S. Singeltary, Sr Bacliff, Tex

1. Gibbons RV, Holman RC, Belay ED, Schonberger LB. Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease in the United States: 1979-1998. JAMA. 2000;284:2322-2323. FREE FULL TEXT



http://jama.ama-assn.org/cgi/content/extract/285/6/733?maxtoshow=&HITS=10&hits=10&RESULTFORMAT=&fulltext=singeltary&searchid=1&FIRSTINDEX=0&resourcetype=HWCIT



http://jama.ama-assn.org/cgi/content/full/285/6/733?maxtoshow=&HITS=10&hits=10&RESULTFORMAT=&fulltext=singeltary&searchid=1&FIRSTINDEX=0&resourcetype=HWCIT



2 January 2000 British Medical Journal U.S. Scientist should be concerned with a CJD epidemic in the U.S., as well



http://www.bmj.com/cgi/eletters/320/7226/8/b#6117



15 November 1999 British Medical Journal vCJD in the USA * BSE in U.S.



http://www.bmj.com/cgi/eletters/319/7220/1312/b#5406



Creutzfeldt Jakob Disease



http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/



USA PRION UNIT BLOG



http://prionunitusaupdate2008.blogspot.com/



Sunday, April 20, 2008 Progress Report from the National Prion Disease Pathology Surveillance Center April 3, 2008

Atypical forms of BSE have emerged which, although rare, appear to be more virulent than the classical BSE that causes vCJD.

see full text ;



http://prionunitusaupdate2008.blogspot.com/2008/04/progress-report-from-national-prion.html



CJD TEXAS (cjd clusters)



http://cjdtexas.blogspot.com/



USA WRITTEN CJD QUESTIONNAIRE ???



http://cjdquestionnaire.blogspot.com/



The statistical incidence of CJD cases in the United States has been revised to reflect that there is one case per 9000 in adults age 55 and older. Eighty-five percent of the cases are sporadic, meaning there is no known cause at present.



http://www.cjdfoundation.org/fact.html



Attending Dr.: Date / Time Admitted : 12/14/97 1228

UTMB University of Texas Medical Branch Galveston, Texas 77555-0543 (409) 772-1238 Fax (409) 772-5683 Pathology Report

FINAL AUTOPSY DIAGNOSIS Autopsy' Office (409)772-2858

FINAL AUTOPSY DIAGNOSIS

I. Brain: Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease, Heidenhain variant.



http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2008/07/heidenhain-variant-creutzfeldt-jakob.html



Thursday, December 04, 2008 2:37 PM

"we have found that H-BSE can infect humans."

personal communication with Professor Kong. ...TSS

Terry S. Singeltary Sr. P.O. Box 42 Bacliff, Texas USA 77518

Wednesday, February 4, 2009

TAFS1 Position Paper on Testing of Cattle for BSE (Revision January 2009)

TAFS INTERNATIONAL FORUM FOR TRANSMISSIBLE ANIMAL

Foundation

(Revision January 2009)

TAFS1 Position Paper on Testing of Cattle for BSE – Purpose and Effectiveness © TAFS, Berne, 2009 Large scale testing of cattle for BSE has now been established in many countries, starting in Switzerland in 1999, and followed by the European Union in 2001. Similar programmes have subsequently been introduced in other countries. This position paper explains some of the background to such testing, especially in relation to its purpose and effectiveness, and possible future developments. It also emphasises the fact that the key measure to protect consumers is the removal of Specified Risk Materials, rather than testing. Further details of SRM controls and their background can be found in a separate TAFS position paper. For the purposes of this document, testing means the collection of a sample of brain tissue after death or slaughter, and its examination with a commercial “rapid test”.

Why are countries required to test cattle for BSE?

* The main purpose of testing is to identify whether BSE exists in a country, and if so, the likely numbers of infected cattle. This is to supplement compulsory reporting of clinically affected suspects, and is particularly important where farmers and veterinarians may have difficulty in recognising BSE. Diagnosis of BSE in the live animal requires experience, and early signs of abnormalities may either be missed, or their significance not recognised. Farmers may therefore slaughter or sell such animals without ever suspecting that they are affected with BSE. Testing has been effective in identifying the first case of BSE in several countries thought to be free of the disease. World-wide statistics arising from surveillance are available through the OIE or World Animal Health Organisation(16).

* By determining how much BSE exists, especially when monitored over a sufficiently long period of time, the testing can give an indication of the effectiveness of measures introduced to control BSE. In other words, a declining prevalence indicates that controls are working. If cases continue to occur for long periods after controls have been introduced, it may mean that controls are not totally effective.

1 TAFS is an international platform created by a group of scientists, food industry experts, animal health regulators, epidemiologists, diagnosticians, food producers, and consumers. Its purpose is to establish and maintain lines of communication for the dissemination of reliable information to the public that can maintain confidence in the safety of food with regard to Transmissible Animal Diseases (TAD).

TAFS 2

* The scale of testing has also enabled the detection of apparently new forms of BSE, in small numbers, colloquially referred to as “atypical BSE”. A separate TAFS position paper is available on “atypical BSE”

* In some countries testing of cattle at slaughter is also introduced to increase consumer confidence in the consumption of beef and other products produced from cattle. The removal of positive cattle from the human food chain is claimed to provide a degree of protection to consumers. Clinically suspect cattle are already excluded from the food chain.

Are all cattle tested?

* No. In Europe, the primary target for testing of cattle slaughtered for human consumption is cattle aged over 30 months at the time of slaughter. This age was chosen from experience in the British epidemic that the brain and spinal cord of infected cattle over 30 months are more likely to be infectious, and test positive, than in younger animals.

* Some countries (eg Germany, France, Italy, Spain) have at times included animals aged over 24 months in the testing programme, while Japan, tested all ages in the early days of its surveillance programme. From 2005 the Japanese government no longer required the testing of cattle under 21 months of age, but allowed local authorities to continue should they prefer to do so. That continues to be the position at the beginning of 2009.

* Two other categories of cattle are also targeted for testing. The first, called fallen stock, which are cattle that are sick and die or are culled on farm, do not enter the human food chain. They are normally destroyed by incineration or rendering, or occasionally buried on farm. Such animals over 30 months of age have been shown to have a higher probability of testing BSE positive than animals slaughtered for human consumption. Animals over 24 months in this group weretargeted for testing, but as discussed below, this can change.

* Secondly, a category of cattle called “casualties” are also considered to be a good target population for the detection of BSE. These animals may be suffering from some abnormality, but have been certified by a veterinary surgeon as being fit for human consumption. Cattle with broken legs are an example of such animals. Broken legs or other injuries can arise as a result of excessive kicking on the part of the cow due to infection with BSE. In the EU, casualties (defined as cattle subject to emergency slaughter or found sick at ante-mortem inspection) over 24 months of age were tested for BSE. Some countries ban the consumption of casualties, in which case they will then be destroyed and tested along with fallen stock.

* Testing of fallen stock and casualties is the most cost-effective approach of finding BSE infected animals in that fewer animals have to be tested for each positive detected. Together they are commonly referred to as “risk animals.” ? None of the categories and age-groups referred to above are absolute. It is essential that they are reviewed from time to time to consider whether they remain appropriate. (See below)

Is it necessary to test all ages of cattle?

* No. Some countries have at times introduced such a policy (eg Japan), but it is extremely expensive while doing little to increase the likelihood of finding positive cattle.

TAFS 3

* Experience in the United Kingdom suggests that most infected cattle die of BSE at between four and six years of age, with an average of 60 months(19) although some may be much older. Research on sheep naturally infected with a similar disease called scrapie, or mice experimentally infected with scrapie, suggested that the brain would be infected by approximately mid-way in the incubation(4, 7, 10, 14). Translated into cattle this would be approximately 30 months of age if it is assumed that calves become infected in the first few months of life. Small numbers would of course be positive before this age. Surveillance in Germany has shown this to be possible, and the age at testing in that country was reduced to 24 months as a result. Japan has had a similar experience. Indeed the youngest BSE case ever detected was clinically affected at 20 months of age in the United Kingdom, and may represent the extreme end of the age range of affected cattle.

* Brains of cattle experimentally infected with 100g of BSE-infected brain in two separate challenge studies in the United Kingdom have tested positive only at 32 and 30/33 months after infection(1,8,18,), although one of these studies also demonstrates that the brain is infectious shortly before it tests positive by rapid tests(8). A German study has confirmed however that there is considerable variation between animals challenged at the same age, and occasional animals may be positive before 30 months(11). In that study, the lower limit detected after an oral dose of 100g was 24 months post- infection. Perhaps more realistically, following a dose of 1g only, and more likely to represent natural exposure levels, brain was found to be positive at 44 months post-infection(1).

* Further research data from the United Kingdom on BSE-infected cattle suggests that the brain is actually not infectious until a much later stage of incubation than seen in sheep and mice with scrapie. It seems as if this may only be in the six to 12 months before the onset of clinical disease. This suggests that for the majority of infected cattle the selection of 30 months as the age above which cattle are tested is appropriate, and cautious. In other words, it should detect the vast majority of infected cattle that are approaching the onset of clinical disease (1, 3, 9, 18).

* Selection of just a proportion of cattle to test, such as fallen stock, casualties and healthy animals over 30 (or 24) months of age when killed, makes best use of limited resources in establishing a large testing programme, particularly in countries with low BSE risk. In other words, in order of probability of detecting positive cattle, testing could be focused on cattle exhibiting clinical signs compatible with BSE, fallen stock/casualties, or apparently healthy cattle over the age of 30 months when slaughtered. The ideal mix of cattle to be sampled will vary from country to country, but the testing of healthy cattle is not an appropriate substitute for the testing of the other categories.

What tissue is tested?

* Brain (particularly the part referred to as brain stem), or sometimes spinal cord, are the preferred tissues to test. This is because these tissues, along with the eye, are the only tissues found to be consistently positive in naturally infected cattle. The tests used have also been optimised to work on brain.

* In experimentally infected cattle, in addition to central nervous tissue, the lower small intestine is also infected, but it is inconsistently positive and it is not yet possible to perform tests with any confidence on this tissue. It has not proved possible to demonstrate this infectivity in the intestine of naturally infected cattle. Traces of infectivity have been detected in tonsil and bone marrow of experimentally infected

TAFS 4

cattle, but these results do not indicate that either tissue is an appropriate alternative for testing. ? More recently, tests carried out on peripheral nerves of cattle clinically affected with BSE(2,12,13,15) have confirmed that at late stages of incubation some nerves are positive, but much less so than brain. So again they do not represent optimal targets for testing.

Is this effective in detecting all infected cattle?

* No. Only a proportion of infected cattle will be detected by the testing of brain. As explained above in selecting the age of cattle to test, infectivity appears to reach the brain and spinal cord only relatively late in the incubation period. Consequently, an animal in the early stages of incubation will test negative despite being infected.

* This problem could be overcome if the intestine could be tested as described above, but that is not yet possible with current tests.

If all infected cattle cannot be detected by this means, why bother to test at all?

* Because the primary purpose of testing is to improve our understanding of how much BSE exists in the cattle population, the inefficiency of the testing approach is outweighed by the additional information gathered, over and above reliance on the detection of clinically affected cattle. Taken together they give a better indication of the scale of the problem, and whether or not measures introduced to control BSE are effective. Ideally surveillance results should indicate that cattle born after the introduction of control measures are either not infected or far less likely to be infected than cattle born before the measures.

If only a proportion of infected cattle can be detected, does testing provide significant consumer protection?

* The extent to which testing increases consumer protection is still open to question, especially if other protective measures are in place (see below).

* It is conceivable that tissues not previously recognised as infected may still be found as research continues. Infectivity levels are expected to be extremely low, and undetectable with the tools used so far. If these tissues were otherwise consumed then the destruction of the carcase would afford the consumer a greater degree of protection. If the tissues are not sufficiently infectious to pose a health risk, and/or are not consumed, then the additional protection provided may be nil.

* Recent results from Japan and Germany confirm this point(2,12,13,15), with positivity or infectivity being detected in some peripheral nerves that would not normally be removed as SRM. The amount of infectivity present is low, and considered be up to 1000-fold lower than the brain. Unpublished evidence suggests that these become positive only after the brain and spinal cord. This therefore confirms that testing and removal of positive animals does provide some additional, as yet unquantifiable, protection to consumers over and above that provided by removal of SRM. Given that detection of positivity or infectivity in some peripheral nerves coincides with the onset of clinical signs, it is probable that such animals would be detected before slaughter, and therefore excluded from the food chain.

What alternatives are there to testing of cattle slaughtered for human consumption?

TAFS 5

* In most countries, testing of cattle at slaughter is only one of several lines of defence to protect the consumer.

* The first critical step is the exclusion of all clinically affected cattle from the human food chain. These should be reported to the authorities, killed and destroyed. Inspection of animals as they enter the abattoir for slaughter will identify some affected cattle that may not have been detected on farm. Indeed, transportation to the abattoir often triggers more obvious clinical signs in affected animals. These will be destroyed.

* Finally, in most countries where BSE has been recognised, the key protective measure is the removal from the human food chain of tissues that are expected to contain the greatest amounts of infectivity. Such tissues are currently called Specified Risk Materials. These are described more fully in the TAFS position paper on SRM.

* When SRM are removed they are destroyed, and thereby also excluded from animal feed as well. This measure therefore protects both humans and animals.

What tests are used?

* Since 1999, when the European Commission first evaluated new rapid screening tests, there have been further rounds of evaluation and approval. In addition, the OIE has also started to offer evaluation of tests for more global use.

* All allow the completion of testing of cattle within a matter of hours from death, thus enabling abattoirs to await the results before carcases are released for human consumption. All parts of positive animals are then kept separate and destroyed.

* Although test manufacturers make claims about the relative merits of their tests, all are considered to be appropriate for the purpose. None have been shown to guarantee the detection of animals earlier in the incubation period than the others. Criteria for selection of tests for use in a particular country therefore take into account the skills and resources in that country for conducting testing, the volume of testing to be done, and test cost price.

* Because of the constantly evolving nature of this area, with approvals having taken place in the EU, Japan, USA and Canada, it is not possible to list all approvals in this document. Most of the tests used in N America and Japan are related to those approved in Europe, and are essentially identical. The OIE Reference Laboratory at the Veterinary Laboratories Agency(17), UK therefore maintains lists of approved tests, or links to approval sites in other countries where accessible, that will enable readers to further investigate what is available on the market.

* Any animals found positive by the use of such tests are subjected to further testing at National Reference Laboratories using internationally recognised confirmatory tests. Carcases will already have been removed from the food chain before this as a precautionary measure.

Will testing continue indefinitely?

* This is most unlikely as it is extremely expensive and complex to implement. In its discussion document entitled the “TSE Roadmap”(5), the European Commission estimated that between 2001 and 2004 it cost 1.56 million euros to detect each case by testing in the healthy slaughter population, but this rose to 64 million euros/case for animals aged under 48 months. As this is an average figure, for countries with very low incidence of BSE the cost was even higher.

* As control measures take effect, these costs will rise even in older testing groups, while in parallel the risk to consumers is falling towards zero.

TAFS 6

* The TSE Roadmap therefore began a public debate in Europe about planning a future strategy that will maintain protective measures for both consumers and animals, but at a cost that is proportionate to the risk.

* As anticipated by the TSE Roadmap, the review process was taken forward in 2008 when the European Commission consulted the European Food Safety Authority on options for alternative testing strategies. In recognition of the falling prevalence of BSE in EU countries where controls were tightened at the end of 2000, the Commission asked EFSA to consider the implications of raising the target age for testing in both healthy and risk categories of cattle. The EFSA Opinion offered estimates for the consequences of increasing the minimum age at testing by 12 month intervals to an upper limit of 60 months.

* In summary, the EFSA Opinion(6) considered options of raising the age at testing to 36, 48 or 60 months in healthy cattle, and 30, 36, 48 and 60 months for risk animals. As recognized earlier in this paper, falling prevalence of BSE in EU152 countries confirmed the effectiveness of measures introduced at the end of 2000 (newer Member States where control measures have not been in place for as long as in EU15 countries were excluded as further time was needed to provide evidence of effectiveness).

* For healthy cattle, the Opinion estimated that fewer than two cases would be missed in all EU15 countries if the age at testing was increased to 36 or 48 months, and fewer than three missed if the age was raised to 60 months.

* For risk animals, less than one positive animal would be missed by raising the age at testing to 30, 36 or 48 months, or fewer than three cases if raised to 60 months.

* As a result, the Commission recommended that EU15 countries could apply to increase the age at testing in both surveillance streams to 48 months in 2009. Following consultation with the European Parliament, and by national authorities, the age at testing in EU15 countries has been raised to 48 months in 2009. Some may decide not to apply this flexibility across all surveillance streams.

* In future, similar changes can be anticipated in the remaining EU countries, and the age limit may be raised further in the EU15 countries, but all changes will continue to be subject to ongoing review of surveillance and enforcement data throughout the EU.

2 EU15 countries – Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom.

TAFS 7

References:

1. Arnold, M.A., Ryan, J.B.M., Konold, T., Simmons, M.M., Spencer, Y.I., Wear, A., Chaplin, M., Stack, M., Czub, S., Mueller, R., Webb, P.R., Davis, A., Spiropoulos, J., Holdaway, J., Hawkins, S.A.C., Austin, A.R., and Wells, G.A.H. (2007) Estimating the temporal relationship between PrPSc detection and incubation period in experimental bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) of cattle. J. Gen Virol. 88: 3198-3208. 2. Buschmann A., Groschup MH. Highly BSE-sensitive transgenic mice confirm the essential restriction of infectivity to the nervous system in clinically diseased cattle. J Infect Dis. 2005 Sep 1;192(5):934-42. 3. Deslys, J.P, Comoy, E, Hawkins, S, Simon, S, Schimmel, H, Wells, G, Grassi, J and Moynagh, J. (2001). Screening of slaughtered cattle for BSE. Nature. 409, 476-478. 4. Dickinson, A.G. and Outram, G. (1979). The scrapie replication-site hypothesis and its implications for pathogenesis. In: Slow Transmissible Diseases of the Nervous System. vol.2. S.B.Prusiner and W.J.Hadlow, eds. Academic Press, New York, pp 13-31. 5. EC. 2005. The TSE Roadmap – available at


http://ec.europa.eu/food/food/biosafety/bse/roadmap_en.pdf


6. EFSA (2008). Scientific Opinion of the Panel on Biological Hazards on a request from the European Commission on the Risk for Human and Animal Health related to the revision of the BSE monitoring regime in some Member States. The EFSA Journal. 762:1-47.


http://www.efsa.europa.eu/cs/BlobServer/Scientific_Opinion/biohaz_op_ej762_bse_monitoring_en,2.pdf?ssbinary=true


7. Eklund, C.M, Kennedy, R.C. and Hadlow, W.J. (1967). Pathogenesis of scrapie virus infection in the mouse. J. Infect Dis. 117. 15-22. 8. Espinosa, J-C., Morales, ,M., Castilla, J., Rogers, M. and Torres, J.M. (2007) Progression of prion infectivity in asymptomatic cattle after oral bovine spongiform encephalopathy challenge. J. Gen. Virol. 88. 1379-1383 9. Grassi, J, Comoy, E, Simon, S, Creminon, C, Frobert, Y, Trapmann, S, Schimmel, H, Hawkins, S.A.C, Moynagh, J, Deslys, J.P and Wells, G.A.H. (2001). Rapid test for the preclinical postmortem diagnosis of BSE in central nervous system tissue. Vet Rec. 149, 577-582. 10. Hadlow, W.J, Kennedy, R.C. and Race, R.E. (1982). Natural infection of Suffolk sheep with scrapie virus. J Infect Dis. 146, 657-664. 11. Hoffmann, C., Ziegler, U., Buschmann, A., Weber, A., Kupfer, L., Oelschlegel, A., Hammerschmidt, B. and Groschup, M.J. (2007) Prions spread via the autonomic nervous system in cattle incubating bovine spongiform encephalopathy. J. Gen. Virol. 88. 1048-1055. TAFS 8 12. Iwamaru Y, Okubo Y, Ikeda T, Hayashi H, Imamura M, Yokoyama T, Shinagawa M. (2005) PrPSc distribution of a natural case of bovine spongiform encephalopathy. In: Kitamoto T, ed. Prions. Food and Drug Safety. Springer Verlag, New York. 13. Iwata, N., Sato, Y. Higuchi, Y. Nohtomi, K. Nagata, N. Hasegawa, H. Tobiume, M. Nakamura, Y., Hagiwara, K., Furuoka, H, Horiuchi, M. Yamakawa, Y & Sata.T (2006). Distribution of PrP(Sc) in Cattle with Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Slaughtered at Abattoirs in Japan. Jpn J Infect Dis. 59:100-7. 14. Kimberlin, R.H. and Walker, C.A. (1988). Pathogenesis of experimental scrapie. In: Novel Infectious Agents and the Central Nervous System. Ciba Foundation Symposium. 135. G.Boack and J. Marsh, Eds. Wiley, Chichester.pp 37-62. 15. Masujin, K., Matthews, D., Wells, G.A.H., Mohri, S and Yokoyama, T. (2007). Prions in the peripheral nerves of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) affected cattle. J. Gen. Virol. 88: 1850-1858. 16. OIE, World Animal Health Organisation, BSE statistics: available at :-


http://www.oie.int/eng/info/en_esb.htm


17. Veterinary Laboratories Agency (VLA) – TSE science home page for references on approved rapid tests, available at:-


http://www.defra.gov.uk/corporate/vla/science/science-tse-rl-intro.htm


18. Wells, G.A.H, Hawkins, S.A.C, Green, R.B, Austin, A.R, Dexter, I, Spencer, Y.I, Chaplin, M.J, Stack, M.J, and Dawson, M. (1998). Preliminary observations on the pathogenesis of experimental bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE):an update. Vet Rec. 142, 103-106. 19. Wilesmith, J.W. (1998). Manual on Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy. FAO. Rome.




http://www.tafsforum.org/position_papers/TAFS_POSITION_PAPER_ON_TESTING_OF_CATTLE_FOR_BSE_2009.pdf




Wednesday, January 28, 2009 TAFS1 Position Paper on Specified Risk Materials (January, 2009)

TAFS INTERNATIONAL FORUM FOR TRANSMISSIBLE ANIMAL DISEASES AND FOOD SAFETY a non-profit Swiss Foundation

(January 2009)

TAFS1 Position Paper on Specified Risk Materials




http://madcowspontaneousnot.blogspot.com/2009/01/tafs1-position-paper-on-specified-risk.html






Saturday, January 24, 2009

Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy h-BSE ATYPICAL USA 2008 Annual Report

Research Project: Study of Atypical Bse

Location: Virus and Prion Diseases of Livestock

2008 Annual Report




http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2009/01/bovine-spongiform-encephalopathy-h-bse.html




Research Project: Detection of Prp**d in Tissue Samples and Bodily Fluids of Cattle from the German Bse Pathogenesis Study Location: Virus and Prion Diseases of Livestock

2008 Annual Report

1a.Objectives (from AD-416) The overall objective of this cooperative project is to evaluate PrP**D tissue distribution and migration in cattle orally infected with BSE of British origin. To achieve this objective, the following specific approaches will be conducted: (1) the protein misfolding cyclic amplification (PMCA) assay will be used on blinded replicate aliquots of tissue from animals in the BSE study to independently confirm whether PrP**D can be detected in the tissue samples. The Cooperator will function as lead investigator and ARS will confirm test results for the presence or absence of PrP**D in any given sample. (2) The Cooperator will analyze the proteome in tissue samples by two dimensional SDS PAGE. (3) NADC will evaluate microscopic pathology and visual function of the retina of available animals and tissues to assess PrP**D accumulation and visual function effects.

1b.Approach (from AD-416) The German BSE oral pathogenesis study involves 56 beef cattle orally dosed with BSE containing brain tissue obtained from British cattle. The animal study is managed by the cooperator and various tissues are collected at prescribed times and at necropsy. These tissues will enable the cooperating parties to perform independent confirmation on the presence or absence of PrP**D for verification of PrP**D distribution in tissues. In addition, retinal samples will be analyzed to assess the extent of retinal pathology in infected cattle and visual system function in available remaining live cattle will be tested using electroretinography.

3.Progress Report The overall objective of this cooperative project is to evaluate PrP**d tissue distribution and migration in cattle orally infected with Bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) of British origin. The live-animal phase of this work was completed this year. Samples from this experiment will be brought to the USDA, ARS, National Animal Disease Center for further characterization in the upcoming year. Methods used for monitoring included phone contact, e-mail, and site visits. This project addresses NP 103, component 8.




http://www.ars.usda.gov/research/projects/projects.htm?ACCN_NO=411017&fy=2008




Research Project: Study of Atypical Bse Location: Virus and Prion Diseases of Livestock

Project Number: 3625-32000-086-05 Project Type: Specific Cooperative Agreement

Start Date: Sep 15, 2004 End Date: Sep 14, 2009

Objective: The objective of this cooperative research project with Dr. Maria Caramelli from the Italian BSE Reference Laboratory in Turin, Italy, is to conduct comparative studies with the U.S. bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) isolate and the atypical BSE isolates identified in Italy. The studies will cover the following areas: 1. Evaluation of present diagnostics tools used in the U.S. for the detection of atypical BSE cases. 2. Molecular comparison of the U.S. BSE isolate and other typical BSE isolates with atypical BSE cases. 3. Studies on transmissibility and tissue distribution of atypical BSE isolates in cattle and other species.

Approach: This project will be done as a Specific Cooperative Agreement with the Italian BSE Reference Laboratory, Istituto Zooprofilattico Sperimentale del Piemonte, in Turin, Italy. It is essential for the U.S. BSE surveillance program to analyze the effectiveness of the U.S diagnostic tools for detection of atypical cases of BSE. Molecular comparisons of the U.S. BSE isolate with atypical BSE isolates will provide further characterization of the U.S. BSE isolate. Transmission studies are already underway using brain homogenates from atypical BSE cases into mice, cattle and sheep. It will be critical to see whether the atypical BSE isolates behave similarly to typical BSE isolates in terms of transmissibility and disease pathogenesis. If transmission occurs, tissue distribution comparisons will be made between cattle infected with the atypical BSE isolate and the U.S. BSE isolate. Differences in tissue distribution could require new regulations regarding specific risk material (SRM) removal.



http://www.ars.usda.gov/research/projects/projects.htm?ACCN_NO=408490




CHAPTER 3 Animal Disease Eradication Programs and Control and Certification Programs

snip...

In FY 2007, two field cases, one validation study case, and two RSSS cases were consistent with a variant of the disease known as Nor98 scrapie.1 These five cases originated from flocks in California, Minnesota, Colorado, Wyoming, and Indiana, respectively.

snip...



http://www.aphis.usda.gov/publications/animal_health/content/printable_version/AHR_Web_PDF_07/D_Chapter_3.pdf




NOR-98 Scrapie FY 2008 to date 1




http://www.aphis.usda.gov/animal_health/animal_diseases/scrapie/downloads/monthly_scrapie_rpt.pps




ATYPICAL TSEs in USA CATTLE AND SHEEP ?




http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/sc/seac17/tab03.pdf





Monday, December 1, 2008

When Atypical Scrapie cross species barriers



http://nor-98.blogspot.com/2008/12/when-atypical-scrapie-cross-species.html




Tuesday, January 06, 2009

CWD Update 93 December 29, 2008



http://chronic-wasting-disease.blogspot.com/2009/01/cwd-update-93-december-29-2008.html




Sunday, December 28, 2008

MAD COW DISEASE USA DECEMBER 28, 2008 an 8 year review of a failed and flawed policy



http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2008/12/mad-cow-disease-usa-december-28-2008-8.html




[Docket No. FDA-2008-D-0597] Draft Guidance for Industry: Small Entities Compliance Guide for Renderers-Substances Prohibited From Use in Animal Food or Feed; Availability AGENCY: Food and Drug Administration, HHS. ACTION:

snip...



http://edocket.access.gpo.gov/2008/pdf/E8-28189.pdf




Greetings,

I kindly wish to submit the following to [Docket No. FDA-2008-D-0597] ;

I would kindly like to once again comment on the failed attempts of the FDA et al to stop the spread of animal TSEs, including BSE, through the legal, and illegal feeding practices, of feeding animal protein to livestock for human and animal consumption. Since the terribly flawed, partial, and voluntary August 4, 1997 ruminant to ruminant feed ban was put into place, literally 100s of thousands of tons of banned animal protein has been fed out into commerce, even as late as 2007, when some 10,000,000+ LBS. of PROHIBITED BANNED MAD COW FEED I.E. Blood meal used to make cattle feed was recalled because it was cross-contaminated with prohibited bovine meat and bone meal that had been manufactured on common equipment and labeling did not bear cautionary BSE statement. NOW, how much of that product that went out into commerce was fed out to cattle, and how much was ever recovered ? AND to think that feeding blood to livestock producing animals is still legal, when scientific study after study shows that TSEs are easily transmitted via blood. IT is absolutely unacceptable that still in 2008, the USA is still feeding highly suspect mad cow feed to USA cattle, and other livestock producing animals. Especially when the last two cases of BSE that were allowed to be tested and reported were of the atypical BSE category, of which we now know the atypical BSE is more virulent than that of the typical BSE, and when ARS research on the atypical BSE said long ago the SRM rules may need to be changed, IF the atypical BSE were to be proven to be more virulent. Why do we continue to flounder? I have submitted to these BSE feed dockets until I am blue in the face, and still to date, they still debate an issue that should have been settled long ago. IT's a fine example of how big ag, big industry, have a stranglehold on sound science and policy making thereof. How many millions of animals and humans have been needlessly exposed to this TSE agent, due to nothing more than ignorance and greed, simply because of a disease that is 100% fatal, but one that has such a long incubation period. For the government and industry as a whole, to continue to flagrantly violate said rules and regulations, in my opinion, should be regarded as criminal, and treated as such. People are dying. ...

Please see references ;

snip...



http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2008/12/docket-no-fda2008d0597-draft-guidance.html




November 25, 2008

Update On Feed Enforcement Activities To Limit The Spread Of BSE



http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2008/11/november-2008-update-on-feed.html



http://madcowspontaneousnot.blogspot.com/2008/02/specified-risk-materials-srm.html



http://madcowspontaneousnot.blogspot.com/





USDA CERTIFIED SRM BRAINS FOR EXPORT (not tested for TSE). ...TSS


0206290030: BRAINS OF BOVINE ANIMALS, EDIBLE, FROZEN

U.S. Domestic Exports: December 2004 and 2004 Year-to-Date, not Seasonally Adjusted

(FAS Value, in Thousands of Dollars) (Units of Quantity: Kilogram) December 2004 2004, through December Quantity Value Quantity Value .

World 37,727 33 363,222 344

Mexico 37,727 33 338,475 326

Romania 0 0 24,747 19


0206290010: HEARTS OF BOVINE ANIMALS, EDIBLE, FROZEN

U.S. Domestic Exports: December 2004 and 2004 Year-to-Date, not Seasonally Adjusted

(FAS Value, in Thousands of Dollars) (Units of Quantity: Kilogram) December 2004 2004, through December Quantity Value Quantity Value .

World 581,872 418 7,564,955 5,685

Angola 0 0 211,527 46

Cambodia (Kampuchea) 0 0 22,682 60

China 0 0 49,887 36

Colombia 0 0 22,657 28

Gabon 0 0 24,947 11

Hong Kong 0 0 24,494 45

Indonesia 400,639 261 4,420,683 2,747

Italy 0 0 24,494 20

Korea 0 0 124,089 71

Mexico 181,233 157 2,494,078 2,517

Poland 0 0 47,359 20

Russia 0 0 98,058 85


0206290020: KIDNEYS OF BOVINE ANIMALS, EDIBLE, FROZEN

U.S. Domestic Exports: December 2004 and 2004 Year-to-Date, not Seasonally Adjusted

(FAS Value, in Thousands of Dollars) (Units of Quantity: Kilogram)

December 2004 2004, through December Quantity Value Quantity Value .

World 303,293 175 3,009,780 1,684 Angola 0 0 60,075 15 Bahamas 0 0 11,431 8 Cayman Islands 0 0 4,450 10 China 0 0 48,988 26 Gabon 48,200 15 489,329 206 Hong Kong 0 0 48,988 26 Indonesia 0 0 47,174 17 Ivory Coast 188,414 96 1,694,772 959 Jamaica 10,546 5 78,933 37 Mexico 56,133 59 203,788 204 Moldova 0 0 295,091 166 Romania 0 0 26,761 10

0206290040: SWEATBREADS OF BOVINE ANIMALS, EDIBLE, FROZEN

U.S. Domestic Exports: December 2004 and 2004 Year-to-Date, not Seasonally Adjusted

(FAS Value, in Thousands of Dollars) (Units of Quantity: Kilogram) December 2004 2004, through December Quantity Value Quantity Value .

World 0 0 95,209 83

Bulgaria 0 0 25,243 22

Ghana 0 0 0 0

Mexico 0 0 69,859 58

Netherlands 0 0 107 4


0206290050: LIPS OF BOVINE ANIMALS, EDIBLE, FROZEN

U.S. Domestic Exports: December 2004 and 2004 Year-to-Date, not Seasonally Adjusted

(FAS Value, in Thousands of Dollars) (Units of Quantity: Kilogram) December 2004 2004, through December Quantity Value Quantity Value .World 1,389,825 2,709 7,355,294 13,917 Bahamas 0 0 40,000 5 Mexico 1,386,800 2,706 7,293,673 13,895 Montserrat 0 0 18,596 15 Namibia 3,025 3 3,025 3

0206290090: OFFAL OF BOVINE ANIMALS, EDIBLE, NESOI, FROZEN

U.S. Domestic Exports: December 2004 and 2004 Year-to-Date, not Seasonally Adjusted

(FAS Value, in Thousands of Dollars) (Units of Quantity: Kilogram) December 2004 2004, through December Quantity Value Quantity Value .World 2,386,597 2,913 22,701,393 25,320 Antigua Barbuda 2,141 6 3,162 11 Argentina 590 4 1,044 7 Aruba 1,000 4 1,476 10 Bahamas 0 0 117,929 184 Bulgaria 0 0 315,543 301 Canada 337,392 255 3,544,821 3,347 Cayman Islands 0 0 5,350 21 China 0 0 22,185 37 Colombia 0 0 24,127 36 Cyprus 0 0 25,052 20 Denmark 0 0 46,416 25 Dominican Republic 0 0 24,086 16 Egypt 0 0 145 3 Gabon 96,208 92 316,411 271 Germany 0 0 2,545,197 554 Greece 0 0 190,564 146 Guatemala 0 0 117,362 197 Haiti 0 0 13,125 25

Haiti 0 0 13,125 25 Honduras 23,940 34 23,940 34 Hong Kong 0 0 48,343 130 Indonesia 7,470 9 640,472 249 Italy 0 0 47,849 38 Ivory Coast 192,410 184 1,133,273 1,012 Jamaica 80,703 54 124,514 86 Japan 25,094 53 432,608 2,659 Korea 0 0 23,596 25 Malaysia 97,997 48 457,516 203 Mexico 1,376,419 1,977 9,425,957 13,261 Netherlands 20,229 20 245,555 129 New Zealand 0 0 0 0 Panama 23,399 44 161,425 117 Philippines 0 0 22,184 39 Poland 0 0 805,355 477 Romania 48,988 33 1,294,879 1,191 Senegal 0 0 52,909 103 Singapore 0 0 728 3 Spain 0 0 202 4 St Christopher-Nevis 0 0 1,020 3 St Lucia 0 0 5,313 8 Switzerland 0 0 6,506 35 Taiwan 46,920 86 97,268 127 Trinidad and Tobago 0 0 38,102 84 Turks and Caicos Islands 5,697 9 6,082 13 United Kingdom 0 0 291,303 76 Uruguay 0 0 499 4



http://ita.doc.gov/td/industry/otea/Trade-Detail/Latest-Month/Exports/02/020629.html





10,000,000+ LBS. of PROHIBITED BANNED MAD COW FEED I.E. MBM IN COMMERCE USA 2007

Date: March 21, 2007 at 2:27 pm PST RECALLS AND FIELD CORRECTIONS: VETERINARY MEDICINES -- CLASS II ___________________________________

PRODUCT

Bulk cattle feed made with recalled Darling’s 85% Blood Meal, Flash Dried, Recall # V-024-2007

CODE

Cattle feed delivered between 01/12/2007 and 01/26/2007

RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER

Pfeiffer, Arno, Inc, Greenbush, WI. by conversation on February 5, 2007.

Firm initiated recall is ongoing.

REASON

Blood meal used to make cattle feed was recalled because it was cross-contaminated with prohibited bovine meat and bone meal that had been manufactured on common equipment and labeling did not bear cautionary BSE statement.

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE

42,090 lbs.

DISTRIBUTION

WI

___________________________________

PRODUCT

Custom dairy premix products: MNM ALL PURPOSE Pellet, HILLSIDE/CDL Prot-Buffer Meal, LEE, M.-CLOSE UP PX Pellet, HIGH DESERT/ GHC LACT Meal, TATARKA, M CUST PROT Meal, SUNRIDGE/CDL PROTEIN Blend, LOURENZO, K PVM DAIRY Meal, DOUBLE B DAIRY/GHC LAC Mineral, WEST PIONT/GHC CLOSEUP Mineral, WEST POINT/GHC LACT Meal, JENKS, J/COMPASS PROTEIN Meal, COPPINI – 8# SPECIAL DAIRY Mix, GULICK, L-LACT Meal (Bulk), TRIPLE J – PROTEIN/LACTATION, ROCK CREEK/GHC MILK Mineral, BETTENCOURT/GHC S.SIDE MK-MN, BETTENCOURT #1/GHC MILK MINR, V&C DAIRY/GHC LACT Meal, VEENSTRA, F/GHC LACT Meal, SMUTNY, A-BYPASS ML W/SMARTA, Recall # V-025-2007

CODE

The firm does not utilize a code - only shipping documentation with commodity and weights identified.

RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER

Rangen, Inc, Buhl, ID, by letters on February 13 and 14, 2007. Firm initiated recall is complete.

REASON

Products manufactured from bulk feed containing blood meal that was cross contaminated with prohibited meat and bone meal and the labeling did not bear cautionary BSE statement.

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE

9,997,976 lbs.

DISTRIBUTION

ID and NV

END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR MARCH 21, 2007



http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/enforce/2007/ENF00996.html



2006

Subject: MAD COW FEED RECALL USA SEPT 6, 2006 1961.72 TONS IN COMMERCE AL, TN, AND WV

Date: September 6, 2006 at 7:58 am PST

PRODUCT

a) EVSRC Custom dairy feed, Recall # V-130-6; b) Performance Chick Starter, Recall # V-131-6; c) Performance Quail Grower, Recall # V-132-6; d) Performance Pheasant Finisher, Recall # V-133-6.

CODE None

RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER

Donaldson & Hasenbein/dba J&R Feed Service, Inc., Cullman, AL, by telephone on June 23, 2006 and by letter dated July 19, 2006. Firm initiated recall is complete.

REASON

Dairy and poultry feeds were possibly contaminated with ruminant based protein.

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE

477.72 tons

DISTRIBUTION

AL ______________________________

PRODUCT

a) Dairy feed, custom, Recall # V-134-6; b) Custom Dairy Feed with Monensin, Recall # V-135-6. CODE None. Bulk product

RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER

Recalling Firm: Burkmann Feed, Greeneville, TN, by Telephone beginning on June 28, 2006.

Manufacturer: H. J. Baker & Bro., Inc., Albertville, AL. Firm initiated recall is complete.

REASON

Possible contamination of dairy feeds with ruminant derived meat and bone meal.

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE

1,484 tons

DISTRIBUTION

TN and WV



http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/enforce/2006/ENF00968.html



Subject: MAD COW FEED RECALLS ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR AUGUST 9, 2006 KY, LA, MS, AL, GA, AND TN 11,000+ TONS

Date: August 16, 2006 at 9:19 am PST

RECALLS AND FIELD CORRECTIONS: VETERINARY MEDICINE - CLASS II ______________________________

PRODUCT

Bulk custom made dairy feed, Recall # V-115-6

CODE None

RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER

Hiseville Feed & Seed Co., Hiseville, KY, by telephone and letter on or about July 14, 2006. FDA initiated recall is ongoing.

REASON

Custom made feeds contain ingredient called Pro-Lak which may contain ruminant derived meat and bone meal.

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE

Approximately 2,223 tons

DISTRIBUTION

KY

______________________________

PRODUCT

Bulk custom made dairy feed, Recall # V-116-6

CODE None

RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER

Rips Farm Center, Tollesboro, KY, by telephone and letter on July 14, 2006. FDA initiated recall is ongoing.

REASON

Custom made feeds contain ingredient called Pro-Lak which may contain ruminant derived meat and bone meal.

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE

1,220 tons

DISTRIBUTION

KY

______________________________

PRODUCT

Bulk custom made dairy feed, Recall # V-117-6

CODE None

RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER

Kentwood Co-op, Kentwood, LA, by telephone on June 27, 2006. FDA initiated recall is completed.

REASON

Possible contamination of animal feed ingredients, including ingredients that are used in feed for dairy animals, with ruminant derived meat and bone meal.

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE

40 tons

DISTRIBUTION

LA and MS

______________________________

PRODUCT

Bulk Dairy Feed, Recall V-118-6

CODE None

RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER

Cal Maine Foods, Inc., Edwards, MS, by telephone on June 26, 2006. FDA initiated recall is complete.

REASON

Possible contamination of animal feed ingredients, including ingredients that are used in feed for dairy animals, with ruminant derived meat and bone meal.

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE

7,150 tons

DISTRIBUTION

MS

______________________________

PRODUCT

Bulk custom dairy pre-mixes, Recall # V-119-6

CODE None

RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER

Walthall County Co-op, Tylertown, MS, by telephone on June 26, 2006. Firm initiated recall is complete.

REASON

Possible contamination of dairy animal feeds with ruminant derived meat and bone meal.

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE

87 tons

DISTRIBUTION

MS

______________________________

PRODUCT

Bulk custom dairy pre-mixes, Recall # V-120-6

CODE None

RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER

Ware Milling Inc., Houston, MS, by telephone on June 23, 2006. Firm initiated recall is complete.

REASON

Possible contamination of dairy animal feeds with ruminant derived meat and bone meal.

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE

350 tons

DISTRIBUTION

AL and MS

______________________________

PRODUCT

a) Tucker Milling, LLC Tm 32% Sinking Fish Grower, #2680-Pellet, 50 lb. bags, Recall # V-121-6; b) Tucker Milling, LLC #31120, Game Bird Breeder Pellet, 50 lb. bags, Recall # V-122-6; c) Tucker Milling, LLC #31232 Game Bird Grower, 50 lb. bags, Recall # V-123-6; d) Tucker Milling, LLC 31227-Crumble, Game Bird Starter, BMD Medicated, 50 lb bags, Recall # V-124-6; e) Tucker Milling, LLC #31120, Game Bird Breeder, 50 lb bags, Recall # V-125-6; f) Tucker Milling, LLC #30230, 30 % Turkey Starter, 50 lb bags, Recall # V-126-6; g) Tucker Milling, LLC #30116, TM Broiler Finisher, 50 lb bags, Recall # V-127-6

CODE

All products manufactured from 02/01/2005 until 06/20/2006

RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER

Recalling Firm: Tucker Milling LLC, Guntersville, AL, by telephone and visit on June 20, 2006, and by letter on June 23, 2006. Manufacturer: H. J. Baker and Brothers Inc., Stamford, CT. Firm initiated recall is ongoing.

REASON

Poultry and fish feeds which were possibly contaminated with ruminant based protein were not labeled as "Do not feed to ruminants".

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE

7,541-50 lb bags

DISTRIBUTION

AL, GA, MS, and TN

END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR AUGUST 9, 2006

###




http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/ENFORCE/2006/ENF00964.html




Subject: MAD COW FEED RECALL MI MAMMALIAN PROTEIN VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 27,694,240 lbs

Date: August 6, 2006 at 6:14 pm PST

PRODUCT

Bulk custom dairy feds manufactured from concentrates, Recall # V-113-6

CODE

All dairy feeds produced between 2/1/05 and 6/16/06 and containing H. J. Baker recalled feed products.

RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER

Vita Plus Corp., Gagetown, MI, by visit beginning on June 21, 2006. Firm initiated recall is complete.

REASON

The feed was manufactured from materials that may have been contaminated with mammalian protein.

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE

27,694,240 lbs

DISTRIBUTION

MI

END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR AUGUST 2, 2006

###




http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/enforce/2006/ENF00963.html




Subject: MAD COW FEED RECALL AL AND FL VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 125 TONS Products manufactured from 02/01/2005 until 06/06/2006

Date: August 6, 2006 at 6:16 pm PST

PRODUCT

a) CO-OP 32% Sinking Catfish, Recall # V-100-6; b) Performance Sheep Pell W/Decox/A/N, medicated, net wt. 50 lbs, Recall # V-101-6; c) Pro 40% Swine Conc Meal -- 50 lb, Recall # V-102-6; d) CO-OP 32% Sinking Catfish Food Medicated, Recall # V-103-6; e) "Big Jim's" BBB Deer Ration, Big Buck Blend, Recall # V-104-6; f) CO-OP 40% Hog Supplement Medicated Pelleted, Tylosin 100 grams/ton, 50 lb. bag, Recall # V-105-6; g) Pig Starter Pell II, 18% W/MCDX Medicated 282020, Carbadox -- 0.0055%, Recall # V-106-6; h) CO-OP STARTER-GROWER CRUMBLES, Complete Feed for Chickens from Hatch to 20 Weeks, Medicated, Bacitracin Methylene Disalicylate, 25 and 50 Lbs, Recall # V-107-6; i) CO-OP LAYING PELLETS, Complete Feed for Laying Chickens, Recall # 108-6; j) CO-OP LAYING CRUMBLES, Recall # V-109-6; k) CO-OP QUAIL FLIGHT CONDITIONER MEDICATED, net wt 50 Lbs, Recall # V-110-6; l) CO-OP QUAIL STARTER MEDICATED, Net Wt. 50 Lbs, Recall # V-111-6; m) CO-OP QUAIL GROWER MEDICATED, 50 Lbs, Recall # V-112-6

CODE

Product manufactured from 02/01/2005 until 06/06/2006

RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER

Alabama Farmers Cooperative, Inc., Decatur, AL, by telephone, fax, email and visit on June 9, 2006. FDA initiated recall is complete.

REASON

Animal and fish feeds which were possibly contaminated with ruminant based protein not labeled as "Do not feed to ruminants".

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE

125 tons

DISTRIBUTION

AL and FL

END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR AUGUST 2, 2006

###



http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/enforce/2006/ENF00963.html




Subject: MAD COW FEED RECALL KY VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE ????? Date: August 6, 2006 at 6:19 pm PST

PRODUCT

Bulk custom made dairy feed, Recall # V-114-6

CODE None

RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER

Burkmann Feeds LLC, Glasgow, KY, by letter on July 14, 2006. Firm initiated recall is ongoing.

REASON

Custom made feeds contain ingredient called Pro-Lak, which may contain ruminant derived meat and bone meal.

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE

?????

DISTRIBUTION

KY

END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR AUGUST 2, 2006

###



http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/enforce/2006/ENF00963.html



CJD WATCH MESSAGE BOARD TSS

MAD COW FEED RECALL USA EQUALS 10,878.06 TONS NATIONWIDE

Sun Jul 16, 2006 09:22

71.248.128.67

RECALLS AND FIELD CORRECTIONS: VETERINARY MEDICINE -- CLASS II

______________________________

PRODUCT

a) PRO-LAK, bulk weight, Protein Concentrate for Lactating Dairy Animals, Recall # V-079-6; b) ProAmino II, FOR PREFRESH AND LACTATING COWS, net weight 50lb (22.6 kg), Recall # V-080-6; c) PRO-PAK, MARINE & ANIMAL PROTEIN CONCENTRATE FOR USE IN ANIMAL FEED, Recall # V-081-6; d) Feather Meal, Recall # V-082-6 CODE a) Bulk b) None c) Bulk d) Bulk

RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER

H. J. Baker & Bro., Inc., Albertville, AL, by telephone on June 15, 2006 and by press release on June 16, 2006. Firm initiated recall is ongoing.

REASON

Possible contamination of animal feeds with ruminent derived meat and bone meal.

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE

10,878.06 tons

DISTRIBUTION

Nationwide

END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR July 12, 2006

###



http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/enforce/2006/ENF00960.html



Subject: MAD COW FEED BAN WARNING LETTER ISSUED MAY 17, 2006

Date: June 27, 2006 at 7:42 am PST

Public Health Service

Food and Drug Administration

New Orleans District 297 Plus Park Blvd. Nashville, TN 37217

Telephone: 615-781-5380 Fax: 615-781-5391

May 17, 2006

WARNING LETTER NO. 2006-NOL-06

FEDERAL EXPRESS OVERNIGHT DELIVERY

Mr. William Shirley, Jr., Owner Louisiana.DBA Riegel By-Products 2621 State Street Dallas, Texas 75204

Dear Mr. Shirley:

On February 12, 17, 21, and 22, 2006, a U.S. Food & Drug Administration (FDA) investigator inspected your rendering plant, located at 509 Fortson Street, Shreveport, Louisiana. The inspection revealed significant deviations from the requirements set forth in Title 21, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 589.2000 [21 CFR 589.2000], Animal Proteins Prohibited in Ruminant Feed. This regulation is intended to prevent the establishment and amplification of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE). You failed to follow the requirements of this regulation; products being manufactured and distributed by your facility are misbranded within the meaning of Section 403(a)(1) [21 USC 343(a)(1)] of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (the Act).

Our investigation found you failed to provide measures, including sufficient written procedures, to prevent commingling or cross-contamination and to maintain sufficient written procedures [21 CFR 589.2000(e)] because:

You failed to use clean-out procedures or other means adequate to prevent carryover of protein derived from mammalian tissues into animal protein or feeds which may be used for ruminants. For example, your facility uses the same equipment to process mammalian and poultry tissues. However, you use only hot water to clean the cookers between processing tissues from each species. You do not clean the auger, hammer mill, grinder, and spouts after processing mammalian tissues.

You failed to maintain written procedures specifying the clean-out procedures or other means to prevent carryover of protein derived from mammalian tissues into feeds which may be used for ruminants.

As a result . the poultry meal you manufacture may contain protein derived from mammalian tissues prohibited in ruminant feed. Pursuant to 21 CFR 589.2000(e)(1)(i), any products containing or may contain protein derived from mammalian tissues must be labeled, "Do not feed to cattle or other ruminants." Since you failed to label a product which may contain protein derived from mammalian tissues with the required cautionary statement. the poultry meal is misbranded under Section 403(a)(1) [21 USC 343(a)(1)] of the Act.

This letter is not intended as an all-inclusive list of violations at your facility. As a manufacturer of materials intended for animal feed use, you are responsible for ensuring your overall operation and the products you manufacture and distribute are in compliance with the law. You should take prompt action to correct these violations, and you should establish a system whereby violations do not recur. Failure to promptly correct these violations may result in regulatory action, such as seizure and/or injunction, without further notice.

You should notify this office in writing within 15 working days of receiving this letter, outlining the specific steps you have taken to bring your firm into compliance with the law. Your response should include an explanation of each step taken to correct the violations and prevent their recurrence. If corrective action cannot be completed within 15 working days, state the reason for the delay and the date by which the corrections will be completed. Include copies of any available documentation demonstrating corrections have been made.

Your reply should be directed to Mark W. Rivero, Compliance Officer, U.S. Food and Drug Administration, 2424 Edenborn Avenue, Suite 410, Metairie, Louisiana 70001. If you have questions regarding any issue in this letter, please contact Mr. Rivero at (504) 219-8818, extension 103.

Sincerely,

/S

Carol S. Sanchez Acting District Director New Orleans District



http://www.fda.gov/foi/warning_letters/g5883d.htm



see full text ;



http://madcowspontaneousnot.blogspot.com/2008/02/specified-risk-materials-srm.html





OIE amending the Annex to Decision 2007/453/EC establishing the BSE status of Member States or third countries or regions thereof according to their BSE risk


snip...


IN A NUT SHELL ; $$$

(Adopted by the International Committee of the OIE on 23 May 2006)

11. Information published by the OIE is derived from appropriate declarations made by the official Veterinary Services of Member Countries.The OIE is not responsible for inaccurate publication of country disease status based on inaccurate information or changes in epidemiological status or other significant events that were not promptly reported to then Central Bureau............



http://www.oie.int/eng/Session2007/RF2006.pdf



full text ;



http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2007/10/bse-base-mad-cow-testing-texas-usa-and.html




TSS