BSE CASE CONFIRMED IN ALBERTA OTTAWA, May 15, 2009

-------------------- BSE-L@LISTS.AEGEE.ORG --------------------


BSE CASE CONFIRMED IN ALBERTA OTTAWA, May 15, 2009 -

The Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA) has confirmed bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) in an 80-month-old dairy cow from Alberta. No part of the animal's carcass entered the human food or animal feed systems.

The animal's birth farm has been identified, and an investigation is underway. The age and location of the infected animal are consistent with previous cases detected in Canada.

This case was detected through the national BSE surveillance program, which continues to play an important role in Canada's strategy to manage BSE.

Canada remains a Controlled Risk country for BSE, as recognized by the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE). Accordingly, this case should not affect exports of Canadian cattle or beef.

- 30 -

For information:

Canadian Food Inspection Agency Media relations: 613-773-6600


http://www.inspection.gc.ca/english/anima/heasan/disemala/bseesb/ab2009/16notavie.shtml



Sunday, May 10, 2009

Identification and characterization of bovine spongiform encephalopathy cases diagnosed and not diagnosed in the United States



http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2009/05/identification-and-characterization-of.html



TSS


-------------------- BSE-L@LISTS.AEGEE.ORG --------------------



The Canadian system is much better than the USA. at least they know. the USA just SHOOTS, SHOVELS, AND SHUTS UP I.E. THE SSS POLICY.

Sunday, May 10, 2009

Identification and characterization of bovine spongiform encephalopathy cases diagnosed and not diagnosed in the United States


http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2009/05/identification-and-characterization-of.html



Scientific Report of the European Food Safety Authority on the Assessment of the Geographical BSE Risk (GBR) of the United States of America (USA) Question number: EFSA-Q-2003-083 Adopted date: 1 July 2004 Summary (0.1Mb)

Document (0.2Mb)

Summary

The European Food Safety Authority and its Scientific Expert Working Group on the Assessment of the Geographical Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Risk (GBR) were asked by the European Commission (EC) to provide an up-to-date scientific report on the GBR in the United States of America, i.e. the likelihood of the presence of one or more cattle being infected with BSE, pre-clinically as well as clinically, in USA. This scientific report addresses the GBR of USA as assessed in 2004 based on data covering the period 1980-2003.

The BSE agent was probably imported into USA and could have reached domestic cattle in the middle of the eighties. These cattle imported in the mid eighties could have been rendered in the late eighties and therefore led to an internal challenge in the early nineties. It is possible that imported meat and bone meal (MBM) into the USA reached domestic cattle and leads to an internal challenge in the early nineties.

A processing risk developed in the late 80s/early 90s when cattle imports from BSE risk countries were slaughtered or died and were processed (partly) into feed, together with some imports of MBM. This risk continued to exist, and grew significantly in the mid 90’s when domestic cattle, infected by imported MBM, reached processing. Given the low stability of the system, the risk increased over the years with continued imports of cattle and MBM from BSE risk countries.

EFSA concludes that the current GBR level of USA is III, i.e. it is likely but not confirmed that domestic cattle are (clinically or pre-clinically) infected with the BSE-agent. As long as there are no significant changes in rendering or feeding, the stability remains extremely/very unstable. Thus, the probability of cattle to be (pre-clinically or clinically) infected with the BSE-agent persistently increases.


http://www.efsa.europa.eu/EFSA/efsa_locale-1178620753812_1178620779461.htm



http://www.efsa.europa.eu/EFSA/Scientific_Document/sr03_biohaz02_usa_report_annex_en1.pdf?ssbinary=true



http://www.efsa.europa.eu/EFSA/Scientific_Document/sr03_biohaz02_usa_report_v2_en1.pdf?ssbinary=true



http://www.efsa.europa.eu/EFSA/Scientific_Document/sr03_biohaz02_usa_report_summary_en1.pdf?ssbinary=true



Scientific Report of the European Food Safety Authority on the Assessment of the Geographical BSE-Risk (GBR) of CANADA Question N° EFSA-Q-2003-083 Adopted July 2004 Summary The European Food Safety Authority and its Scientific Expert Working Group on the Assessment of the Geographical Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Risk (GBR) were asked by the European Commission (EC), to provide an up-to-date scientific report on the GBR in Canada, i.e. the likelihood of the presence of one or more cattle being infected with BSE, pre-clinically as well as clinically, in Canada. This scientific report addresses the GBR of Canada as assessed in 2004 based on data covering the period 1980-2003. The BSE agent was probably imported into the country middle of the eighties and could have reached domestic cattle in the early nineties. These cattle imported in the mid eighties could have been rendered in the late eighties and therefore led to an internal challenge in the early 90s. It is possible that imported meat and bone meal (MBM) into Canada reached domestic cattle and led to an internal challenge in the early 90s. A certain risk that BSE-infected cattle entered processing in Canada, and were at least partly rendered for feed, occurred in the early 1990s when cattle imported from UK in the mid 80s could have been slaughtered. This risk continued to exist, and grew significantly in the mid 90's when domestic cattle, infected by imported MBM, reached processing. Given the low stability of the system, the risk increased over the years with continued imports of cattle and MBM from BSE risk countries. EFSA concludes that the current GBR level of Canada is III, i.e. it is confirmed at a lower level that domestic cattle are (clinically or pre-clinically) infected with the BSE-agent. As long as the system remains unstable, it is expected that the GBR continues to grow, even if no additional external challenges occur.


http://www.mvo.nl/wetgeving-dierlijk-vet/onderzoek/download/EFSA%20on%20BSE%20risk%20Canada%20jul%202004.pdf



Scientific Report of the European Food Safety Authority on the Assessment of the Geographical BSE-Risk (GBR) of MEXICO Question N° EFSA-Q-2003-083 Adopted July 2004 Summary The European Food Safety Authority and its Scientific Expert Working Group on the Assessment of the Geographical Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Risk (GBR) were asked by the European Commission (EC) to provide an up-to-date scientific report on the GBR in Mexico, i.e. the likelihood of the presence of one or more cattle being infected with BSE, pre-clinically as well as clinically, in Mexico. This scientific report addresses the GBR of Mexico as assessed in 2004 based on data covering the period 1980-2003. The BSE agent was probably imported into Mexico and could have reached domestic cattle. These cattle imported could have been rendered and therefore led to an internal challenge in the mid to late 1990's. It is possible that imported meat and bone meal (MBM) into Mexico reached domestic cattle and leads to an internal challenge around 1993. It is likely that BSE infectivity entered processing at the time of imported 'at - risk' MBM (1993) and at the time of slaughter of imported live 'at - risk' cattle (mid to late 1990s). The high level of external challenge is maintained throughout the reference period, and the system has not been made stable. Thus it is likely that BSE infectivity was recycled and propagated from approximately 1993. The risk has since grown consistently due to a maintained internal and external challenge and lack of a stable system. EFSA concludes that the current geographical BSE risk (GBR) level is III, i.e. it is likely but not confirmed that domestic cattle are (clinically or pre-clinically) infected with the BSEagent. The GBR is likely to increase due to continued internal and external challenge, coupled with a very unstable system.


http://www.mvo.nl/wetgeving-dierlijk-vet/onderzoek/download/EFSA%20on%20BSE%20risk%20Mexico%20jul%202004.pdf



Saturday, April 11, 2009

CJD FOUNDATION SIDES WITH R-CALFERS NO BSE OR HUMAN TSE THERE OF IN USA 'don't be fooled'


http://prionunitusaupdate2008.blogspot.com/2009/04/cjd-foundation-sides-with-r-calfers-no.html



Owner and Corporation Plead Guilty to Defrauding Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Surveillance Program

An Arizona meat processing company and its owner pled guilty in February 2007 to charges of theft of Government funds, mail fraud, and wire fraud. The owner and his company defrauded the BSE Surveillance Program when they falsified BSE Surveillance Data Collection Forms and then submitted payment requests to USDA for the services. In addition to the targeted sample population (those cattle that were more than 30 months old or had other risk factors for BSE), the owner submitted to USDA, or caused to be submitted, BSE obex (brain stem) samples from healthy USDA-inspected cattle. As a result, the owner fraudulently received approximately $390,000. Sentencing is scheduled for May 2007.

snip...

Topics that will be covered in ongoing or planned reviews under Goal 1 include:

soundness of BSE maintenance sampling (APHIS),

implementation of Performance-Based Inspection System enhancements for specified risk material (SRM) violations and improved inspection controls over SRMs (FSIS and APHIS),

snip...

The findings and recommendations from these efforts will be covered in future semiannual reports as the relevant audits and investigations are completed.

4 USDA OIG SEMIANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS FY 2007 1st Half


http://www.usda.gov/oig/webdocs/sarc070619.pdf



-MORE Office of the United States Attorney District of Arizona FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE For Information Contact Public Affairs February 16, 2007 WYN HORNBUCKLE Telephone: (602) 514-7625 Cell: (602) 525-2681

CORPORATION AND ITS PRESIDENT PLEAD GUILTY TO DEFRAUDING GOVERNMENT'S MAD COW DISEASE SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM

PHOENIX -- Farm Fresh Meats, Inc. and Roland Emerson Farabee, 55, of Maricopa, Arizona, pleaded guilty to stealing $390,000 in government funds, mail fraud and wire fraud, in federal district court in Phoenix. U.S. Attorney Daniel Knauss stated, "The integrity of the system that tests for mad cow disease relies upon the honest cooperation of enterprises like Farm Fresh Meats. Without that honest cooperation, consumers both in the U.S. and internationally are at risk. We want to thank the USDA's Office of Inspector General for their continuing efforts to safeguard the public health and enforce the law." Farm Fresh Meats and Farabee were charged by Information with theft of government funds, mail fraud and wire fraud. According to the Information, on June 7, 2004, Farabee, on behalf of Farm Fresh Meats, signed a contract with the U.S. Department of Agriculture (the "USDA Agreement") to collect obex samples from cattle at high risk of mad cow disease (the "Targeted Cattle Population"). The Targeted Cattle Population consisted of the following cattle: cattle over thirty months of age; nonambulatory cattle; cattle exhibiting signs of central nervous system disorders; cattle exhibiting signs of mad cow disease; and dead cattle. Pursuant to the USDA Agreement, the USDA agreed to pay Farm Fresh Meats $150 per obex sample for collecting obex samples from cattle within the Targeted Cattle Population, and submitting the obex samples to a USDA laboratory for mad cow disease testing. Farm Fresh Meats further agreed to maintain in cold storage the sampled cattle carcasses and heads until the test results were received by Farm Fresh Meats.

Evidence uncovered during the government's investigation established that Farm Fresh Meats and Farabee submitted samples from cattle outside the Targeted Cattle Population. Specifically, Farm Fresh Meats and Farabee submitted, or caused to be submitted, obex samples from healthy, USDA inspected cattle, in order to steal government moneys.

Evidence collected also demonstrated that Farm Fresh Meats and Farabee failed to maintain cattle carcasses and heads pending test results and falsified corporate books and records to conceal their malfeasance. Such actions, to the extent an obex sample tested positive (fortunately, none did), could have jeopardized the USDA's ability to identify the diseased animal and pinpoint its place of origin. On Wednesday, February 14, 2007, Farm Fresh Meats and Farabee pleaded guilty to stealing government funds and using the mails and wires to effect the scheme. According to their guilty pleas:

(a) Farm Fresh Meats collected, and Farabee directed others to collect, obex samples from cattle outside the Targeted Cattle Population, which were not subject to payment by the USDA;

(b) Farm Fresh Meats 2 and Farabee caused to be submitted payment requests to the USDA knowing that the requests were based on obex samples that were not subject to payment under the USDA Agreement;

(c) Farm Fresh Meats completed and submitted, and Farabee directed others to complete and submit, BSE Surveillance Data Collection Forms to the USDA's testing laboratory that were false and misleading;

(d) Farm Fresh Meats completed and submitted, and Farabee directed others to complete and submit, BSE Surveillance Submission Forms filed with the USDA that were false and misleading;

(e) Farm Fresh Meats falsified, and Farabee directed others to falsify, internal Farm Fresh Meats documents to conceal the fact that Farm Fresh Meats was seeking and obtaining payment from the USDA for obex samples obtained from cattle outside the Targeted Cattle Population; and

(f) Farm Fresh Meats failed to comply with, and Farabee directed others to fail to comply with, the USDA Agreement by discarding cattle carcasses and heads prior to receiving BSE test results. A conviction for theft of government funds carries a maximum penalty of 10 years imprisonment. Mail fraud and wire fraud convictions carry a maximum penalty of 20 years imprisonment. Convictions for the above referenced violations also carry a maximum fine of $250,000 for individuals and $500,000 for organizations. In determining an actual sentence, Judge Earl H. Carroll will consult the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, which provide appropriate sentencing ranges. The judge, however, is not bound by those guidelines in determining a sentence.

Sentencing is set before Judge Earl H. Carroll on May 14, 2007. The investigation in this case was conducted by Assistant Special Agent in Charge Alejandro Quintero, United States Department of Agriculture, Office of Inspector General. The prosecution is being handled by Robert Long, Assistant U.S. Attorney, District of Arizona, Phoenix. CASE NUMBER: CR-07-00160-PHX-EHC RELEASE NUMBER: 2007-051(Farabee) # # #


http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/az/press_releases/2007/2007-051(Farabee).pdf



Thu Dec 6, 2007 11:38

FDA IN CRISIS MODE, AMERICAN LIVES AT RISK


http://www.cidrap.umn.edu/cidrap/content/fs/food-disease/news/dec0407fda.html



FDA SCIENCE AND MISSION AT RISK


http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/07/briefing/2007-4329b_02_01_FDA%20Report%20on%20Science%20and%20Technology.pdf



10,000,000+ LBS. of PROHIBITED BANNED MAD COW FEED I.E. BLOOD LACED MBM IN COMMERCE USA 2007

Date: March 21, 2007 at 2:27 pm PST

RECALLS AND FIELD CORRECTIONS: VETERINARY MEDICINES -- CLASS II

___________________________________

PRODUCT

Bulk cattle feed made with recalled Darling's 85% Blood Meal, Flash Dried, Recall # V-024-2007

CODE

Cattle feed delivered between 01/12/2007 and 01/26/2007

RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER

Pfeiffer, Arno, Inc, Greenbush, WI. by conversation on February 5, 2007.

Firm initiated recall is ongoing.

REASON

Blood meal used to make cattle feed was recalled because it was cross-contaminated with prohibited bovine meat and bone meal that had been manufactured on common equipment and labeling did not bear cautionary BSE statement.

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE

42,090 lbs.

DISTRIBUTION

WI

___________________________________

PRODUCT

Custom dairy premix products: MNM ALL PURPOSE Pellet, HILLSIDE/CDL Prot-Buffer Meal, LEE, M.-CLOSE UP PX Pellet, HIGH DESERT/ GHC LACT Meal, TATARKA, M CUST PROT Meal, SUNRIDGE/CDL PROTEIN Blend, LOURENZO, K PVM DAIRY Meal, DOUBLE B DAIRY/GHC LAC Mineral, WEST PIONT/GHC CLOSEUP Mineral, WEST POINT/GHC LACT Meal, JENKS, J/COMPASS PROTEIN Meal, COPPINI - 8# SPECIAL DAIRY Mix, GULICK, L-LACT Meal (Bulk), TRIPLE J - PROTEIN/LACTATION, ROCK CREEK/GHC MILK Mineral, BETTENCOURT/GHC S.SIDE MK-MN, BETTENCOURT #1/GHC MILK MINR, V&C DAIRY/GHC LACT Meal, VEENSTRA, F/GHC LACT Meal, SMUTNY, A-BYPASS ML W/SMARTA, Recall # V-025-2007

CODE

The firm does not utilize a code - only shipping documentation with commodity and weights identified.

RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER

Rangen, Inc, Buhl, ID, by letters on February 13 and 14, 2007. Firm initiated recall is complete.

REASON

Products manufactured from bulk feed containing blood meal that was cross contaminated with prohibited meat and bone meal and the labeling did not bear cautionary BSE statement.

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE

9,997,976 lbs.

DISTRIBUTION

ID and NV

END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR MARCH 21, 2007


http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/enforce/2007/ENF00996.html



Thursday, March 19, 2009


MILLIONS AND MILLIONS OF POUNDS OF MAD COW FEED IN COMMERCE USA WITH ONGOING 12 YEARS OF DENIAL NOW, WHY IN THE WORLD DO WE TO TALK ABOUT THIS ANYMORE $$$


http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2009/03/millions-and-millions-of-pounds-of-mad.html



P04.27

Experimental BSE Infection of Non-human Primates: Efficacy of the Oral Route

Holznagel, E1; Yutzy, B1; Deslys, J-P2; Lasmézas, C2; Pocchiari, M3; Ingrosso, L3; Bierke, P4; Schulz-Schaeffer, W5; Motzkus, D6; Hunsmann, G6; Löwer, J1 1Paul-Ehrlich-Institut, Germany; 2Commissariat à l´Energie Atomique, France; 3Instituto Superiore di Sanità, Italy; 4Swedish Institute for Infectious Disease control, Sweden; 5Georg August University, Germany; 6German Primate Center, Germany

Background:

In 2001, a study was initiated in primates to assess the risk for humans to contract BSE through contaminated food. For this purpose, BSE brain was titrated in cynomolgus monkeys.

Aims:

The primary objective is the determination of the minimal infectious dose (MID50) for oral exposure to BSE in a simian model, and, by in doing this, to assess the risk for humans. Secondly, we aimed at examining the course of the disease to identify possible biomarkers.

Methods:

Groups with six monkeys each were orally dosed with lowering amounts of BSE brain: 16g, 5g, 0.5g, 0.05g, and 0.005g. In a second titration study, animals were intracerebrally (i.c.) dosed (50, 5, 0.5, 0.05, and 0.005 mg).

Results:

In an ongoing study, a considerable number of high-dosed macaques already developed simian vCJD upon oral or intracerebral exposure or are at the onset of the clinical phase. However, there are differences in the clinical course between orally and intracerebrally infected animals that may influence the detection of biomarkers.

Conclusions:

Simian vCJD can be easily triggered in cynomolgus monkeys on the oral route using less than 5 g BSE brain homogenate. The difference in the incubation period between 5 g oral and 5 mg i.c. is only 1 year (5 years versus 4 years). However, there are rapid progressors among orally dosed monkeys that develop simian vCJD as fast as intracerebrally inoculated animals.

The work referenced was performed in partial fulfilment of the study "BSE in primates" supported by the EU (QLK1-2002-01096).


http://www.prion2007.com/pdf/Prion%20Book%20of%20Abstracts.pdf



look at the table and you'll see that as little as 1 mg (or 0.001 gm) caused 7% (1 of 14) of the cows to come down with BSE;

Risk of oral infection with bovine spongiform encephalopathy agent in primates

Corinne Ida Lasmézas, Emmanuel Comoy, Stephen Hawkins, Christian Herzog, Franck Mouthon, Timm Konold, Frédéric Auvré, Evelyne Correia, Nathalie Lescoutra-Etchegaray, Nicole Salès, Gerald Wells, Paul Brown, Jean-Philippe Deslys Summary The uncertain extent of human exposure to bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE)--which can lead to variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (vCJD)--is compounded by incomplete knowledge about the efficiency of oral infection and the magnitude of any bovine-to-human biological barrier to transmission. We therefore investigated oral transmission of BSE to non-human primates. We gave two macaques a 5 g oral dose of brain homogenate from a BSE-infected cow. One macaque developed vCJD-like neurological disease 60 months after exposure, whereas the other remained free of disease at 76 months. On the basis of these findings and data from other studies, we made a preliminary estimate of the food exposure risk for man, which provides additional assurance that existing public health measures can prevent transmission of BSE to man.

snip...

BSE bovine brain inoculum

100 g 10 g 5 g 1 g 100 mg 10 mg 1 mg 0·1 mg 0·01 mg

Primate (oral route)* 1/2 (50%)

Cattle (oral route)* 10/10 (100%) 7/9 (78%) 7/10 (70%) 3/15 (20%) 1/15 (7%) 1/15 (7%)

RIII mice (ic ip route)* 17/18 (94%) 15/17 (88%) 1/14 (7%)

PrPres biochemical detection

The comparison is made on the basis of calibration of the bovine inoculum used in our study with primates against a bovine brain inoculum with a similar PrPres concentration that was

inoculated into mice and cattle.8 *Data are number of animals positive/number of animals surviving at the time of clinical onset of disease in the first positive animal (%). The accuracy of

bioassays is generally judged to be about plus or minus 1 log. ic ip=intracerebral and intraperitoneal.

Table 1: Comparison of transmission rates in primates and cattle infected orally with similar BSE brain inocula

Published online January 27, 2005


http://www.thelancet.com/journal/journal.isa



It is clear that the designing scientists must

also have shared Mr Bradley's surprise at the results because all the dose

levels right down to 1 gram triggered infection.


http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/ws/s145d.pdf



6. It also appears to me that Mr Bradley's answer (that it would take less than say 100 grams) was probably given with the benefit of hindsight; particularly if one considers that later in the same answer Mr Bradley expresses his surprise that it could take as little of 1 gram of brain to cause BSE by the oral route within the same species. This information did not become available until the "attack rate"

experiment had been completed in 1995/96. This was a titration experiment designed to ascertain the infective dose. A range of dosages was used to ensure that the actual result was within both a lower and an upper limit within the study and the designing scientists would not have expected all the dose levels to trigger infection. The dose ranges chosen by the most informed scientists at that time ranged from 1 gram to three times one hundred grams. It is clear that the designing scientists must have also shared Mr Bradley's surprise at the results because all the dose levels right down to 1 gram triggered infection.


http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/ws/s147f.pdf



Friday, November 21, 2008

Plasma & Serum Proteins Receive Continued FDA Approval


http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2008/11/plasma-serum-proteins-receive-continued.html



http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/



Thursday, November 27, 2008 Prion diseases are efficiently transmitted by blood transfusion in sheep


http://vcjdblood.blogspot.com/2008/11/prion-diseases-are-efficiently.html



Scientists warn of first ever case of human mad cow disease from blood plasma


http://vcjdtransfusion.blogspot.com/2009/02/scientists-warn-of-first-ever-case-of.html



Saturday, February 21, 2009 Renderers say industry not prepared for FDA feed ban rule ??? WHAT, IT'S 2009 FOR PETE'S SAKE $$$ Two recent articles caught my eye ;

Renderers say industry not prepared for FDA feed ban rule

Food Chemical News

February 2, 2009

and

BSE, rendering relate to human safety

Emma Struve 02/17/2009


http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2009/02/renderers-say-industry-not-prepared-for.html





Monday, May 4, 2009

Back to the Past With New TSE Testing Agricultural Research/May-June 2009



http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2009/05/back-to-past-with-new-tse-testing.html




TSS

Back to the Past With New TSE Testing Agricultural Research/May-June 2009

ARS ET AL STILL IN DENIAL ABOUT MAD COW DISEASE IN U.S.A.

Agricultural Research/May-June 2009

Back to the Past With New TSE Testing

Transmissible spongiform encephalopathies (TSEs) are rare—but lethal— neurodegenerative disorders that affect a range of mammals, including humans. Bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE)—or “mad cow disease”—is one TSE that has had significant economic and public health impact. The TSEs in the United States are found in sheep, goats, elk, and deer.

TSE epidemiology is complicated by the fact that a definitive diagnosis cannot be made until after an animal has died. ARS chemist Eric Nicholson and veterinary medical officer Robert Kunkle have found a way to facilitate postmortem TSE diagnoses—even when tissue samples are in short supply. Proteins called “prions” are produced in all animals. But the development of abnormal prions is believed to prompt the onset of TSE-related damage to brain tissue. If an animal dies from a TSE infection, both abnormal and healthy prions can be found in its body tissues.

Researchers check tissues for abnormal prions with either Western blotting (WB) or immunohistochemistry (IHC). WB is used for fresh or frozen tissues, and IHC is used to test formalin- fixed tissue that has never been frozen. Sometimes only formalin-fixed tissues are available for testing—a situation the BSE surveillance program faced in 2005, when an entire tissue sample was inadvertently preserved in formalin. In that instance, initial IHC results were not conclusive, but there were no other fresh or frozen tissue samples available for WB testing. Nicholson and Kunkle, who work at the National Animal Disease Center in Ames, Iowa, wanted to help scientists avoid similar situations in the future. They found a way to extract and identify abnormal prions in formalin-fixed tissue by using a combination of mild detergent, a series of freeze-boil cycles, and enzyme digestion. Initial results indicate that the accuracy of this method begins to decline 2 years after the tissue is first preserved, and is completely lost at the end of 6 years. “With this technique, we can easily distinguish between tissues from TSE-positive and TSE-negative animals,” Nicholson says. “And it requires only a minimal adaptation of existing Western blotting procedures.”

Nicholson and Kunkle also devised a way to use WB to test for TSE in tissues that had been fixed in formalin and preserved in paraffin. Their results equaled—and at times even exceeded— the effectiveness of WB analysis for tissues that had only been fixed in formalin.

These combined results add to the tools animal scientists can use to study the development and spread of TSEs. Their findings will facilitate WB testing of tissue samples that were originally archived for microscopy examination and should simplify preservation of samples collected in the field.

WB and IHC analyses can also be conducted on the same preserved sample—a breakthrough that could significantly enhance ongoing TSE research in the field and in the lab.—By Ann Perry, ARS.

This research is part of Animal Health, an ARS national program (#103) described on the World Wide Web at www.nps. ars.usda.gov.

Eric M. Nicholson and Robert A. Kunkle are with the USDAARS National Animal Disease Center, 2300 Dayton Ave., Ames, IA 50010; phone (515) 663-7443 [Nicholson], (515) 663-7190 [Kunkle], fax (515) 663-7458, e-mail mhtml:%7B33B38F65-8D2E-434D-8F9B-8BDCD77D3066%7Dmid://00000061/!x-usc:mailto:eric.nicholson@ars.usda. gov, mhtml:%7B33B38F65-8D2E-434D-8F9B-8BDCD77D3066%7Dmid://00000061/!x-usc:mailto:robert.kunkle@ars.usda.gov. ?

Chemist Eric Nicholson (left) and veterinary medical officer Robert Kunkle discuss a Western blot image from a TSE test of formalinfixed tissues.

Agricultural Research/May-June 2009

http://www.ars.usda.gov/is/AR/archive/may09/tse0509.pdf


>>> The TSEs in the United States are found in sheep, goats, elk, and deer. <<<


QUESTIONs PLEASE ;



IS Transmissible Mink Encephalopathy i.e. TME, not a Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy ?


DID the mad cow in TEXAS (the h-BSE atypical that WAS FINALLY confirmed), and the h-BSE atypical in Alabama, are these not confirmed cases of a Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy ?



NOW, one could also argue that this was another cases of mad cow disease in Texas, one that was cover-up ;


FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE Statement


May 4, 2004 Media Inquiries: 301-827-6242 Consumer Inquiries: 888-INFO-FDA


Statement on Texas Cow With Central Nervous System Symptoms


On Friday, April 30 th , the Food and Drug Administration learned that a cow with central nervous system symptoms had been killed and shipped to a processor for rendering into animal protein for use in animal feed. FDA, which is responsible for the safety of animal feed, immediately began an investigation. On Friday and throughout the weekend, FDA investigators inspected the slaughterhouse, the rendering facility, the farm where the animal came from, and the processor that initially received the cow from the slaughterhouse. FDA's investigation showed that the animal in question had already been rendered into "meat and bone meal" (a type of protein animal feed). Over the weekend FDA was able to track down all the implicated material. That material is being held by the firm, which is cooperating fully with FDA. Cattle with central nervous system symptoms are of particular interest because cattle with bovine spongiform encephalopathy or BSE, also known as "mad cow disease," can exhibit such symptoms. In this case, there is no way now to test for BSE. But even if the cow had BSE, FDA's animal feed rule would prohibit the feeding of its rendered protein to other ruminant animals (e.g., cows, goats, sheep, bison). FDA is sending a letter to the firm summarizing its findings and informing the firm that FDA will not object to use of this material in swine feed only. If it is not used in swine feed, this material will be destroyed. Pigs have been shown not to be susceptible to BSE. If the firm agrees to use the material for swine feed only, FDA will track the material all the way through the supply chain from the processor to the farm to ensure that the feed is properly monitored and used only as feed for pigs. To protect the U.S. against BSE, FDA works to keep certain mammalian protein out of animal feed for cattle and other ruminant animals. FDA established its animal feed rule in 1997 after the BSE epidemic in the U.K. showed that the disease spreads by feeding infected ruminant protein to cattle. Under the current regulation, the material from this Texas cow is not allowed in feed for cattle or other ruminant animals. FDA's action specifying that the material go only into swine feed means also that it will not be fed to poultry. FDA is committed to protecting the U.S. from BSE and collaborates closely with the U.S. Department of Agriculture on all BSE issues. The animal feed rule provides crucial protection against the spread of BSE, but it is only one of several such firewalls. FDA will soon be improving the animal feed rule, to make this strong system even stronger. ####


http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/news/2004/new01061.html



I wouldn't doubt that the APHIS/USDA et al even try to persuade the WHO at the next meeting to exempt atypical BSE in the USA as with the Nor-98 atypical scrapie they are trying to get exempt. they are so out of touch with reality on the true extent of mad cow disease in the USA that i think they now believe their own lies. ...TSS

Saturday, May 2, 2009

APHIS AND WHO PLAN TO EXEMPT THE ATYPICAL SCRAPIE NOR-98 FROM REGULATIONS AT MEETING THIS MONTH


http://nor-98.blogspot.com/2009/05/aphis-and-who-plan-to-exempt-atypical.html


Tuesday, April 28, 2009 Nor98-like Scrapie in the United States of America


http://nor-98.blogspot.com/2009/04/nor98-like-scrapie-in-united-states-of.html



hmm, were these not Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy cases ???



IS THERE A SCRAPIE-LIKE DISEASE IN CATTLE ?

In April of 1985, a mink rancher in Wisconsin reported a debilitating neurologic disease in his herd which we diagnosed as TME by histopathologic findings confirmed by experimental transmission to mink and squirrel monkeys.

The rancher was a ''dead stock'' feeder using mostly (>95%) downer or dead dairy cattle and a few horses. Sheep had never been fed. We believe that these findings may indicate the presence of a previously unrecognized scrapie-like disease in cattle and wish to alert dairy practitioners to this possibility.

snip...

PROCEEDINGS OF THE SEVENTH ANNUAL WESTERN CONFERENCE FOR FOOD ANIMAL VETERINARY MEDICINE, University of Arizona, March 17-19, 1986


http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/mb/m09a/tab01.pdf


Over the next 8-10 weeks, approximately 40% of all the adult mink on the farm died from TME. Since previous incidences of TME were associated with common or shared feeding practices, we obtained a careful history of feed ingredients used over the past 12-18 months. ***The rancher was a “dead stock” feeder using mostly (>95%) downer or dead dairy cattle and a few horses. Sheep had never been fed.***

snip...end


http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/mb/m09/tab05.pdf


Saturday, May 2, 2009

U.S. GOVERNMENT SUES WESTLAND/HALLMARK MEAT OVER USDA CERTIFIED DEADSTOCK DOWNER COW SCHOOL LUNCH PROGRAM


http://downercattle.blogspot.com/2009/05/us-government-sues-westlandhallmark.html


Wednesday, February 11, 2009 Atypical BSE North America Update February 2009 Both of the BSE cases ascertained in the US native-born cattle were atypical cases (H-type), which contributed to the initial ambiguity of the diagnosis. 174, 185 In Canada, there have been 2 atypical BSE cases in addition to the 14 cases of the classic UK strain of BSE2: one was the H-type, and the other was of the L-type.198 snip...end source : Enhanced Abstract Journal of the American Veterinary Medical Association January 1, 2009, Vol. 234, No. 1, Pages 59-72 Bovine spongiform encephalopathy Jane L. Harman, DVM, PhD; Christopher J. Silva, PhD


http://avmajournals.avma.org/doi/ref/10.2460/javma.234.1.59


Atypical BSE North America Update February 2009


http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2009/02/atypical-bse-north-america-update.html


I ask Professor Kong ;

Thursday, December 04, 2008 3:37 PM Subject: RE: re--Chronic Wating Disease (CWD) and Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathies (BSE): Public Health Risk Assessment

''IS the h-BSE more virulent than typical BSE as well, or the same as cBSE, or less virulent than cBSE? just curious.....''

Professor Kong reply ;

.....snip

''As to the H-BSE, we do not have sufficient data to say one way or another, but we have found that H-BSE can infect humans. I hope we could publish these data once the study is complete. Thanks for your interest.''

Best regards, Qingzhong Kong, PhD Associate Professor Department of Pathology Case Western Reserve University Cleveland, OH 44106 USA

END...TSS

I look forward to further transmission studies, and a true ENHANCED BSE/atypical BSE surveillance program put forth testing all cattle for human and animal consumption for 5 years. a surveillance program that uses the most sensitive TSE testing, and has the personnel that knows how to use them, and can be trusted. I look forward to a stringent mad cow feed ban being put forth, and then strictly enforced. we need a forced, not voluntary feed ban, an enhanced feed ban at that, especially excluding blood. we need some sort of animal traceability. no more excuses about privacy. if somebody is putting out a product that is killing folks and or has the potential to kill you, then everybody needs to know who they are, and where that product came from. same with hospitals, i think medical incidents in all states should be recorded, and made public, when it comes to something like a potential accidental transmission exposure event. so if someone is out there looking at a place to go have surgery done, if you have several hospitals having these type 'accidental exposure events', than you can go some place else. it only makes sense. somewhere along the road, the consumer lost control, and just had to take whatever they were given, and then charged these astronomical prices. some where along the line the consumer just lost interest, especially on a long incubating disease such as mad cow disease i.e. Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy. like i said before, there is much more to the mad cow story than bovines and eating a hamburger, we must start focusing on all TSE in all species. ...TSS

Month Number of Tests

Feb 2009 -- 1,891

Jan 2009 -- 4,620


http://www.aphis.usda.gov/newsroom/hot_issues/bse/surveillance/ongoing_surv_results.shtml


P02.35

Molecular Features of the Protease-resistant Prion Protein (PrPres) in H-type BSE

Biacabe, A-G1; Jacobs, JG2; Gavier-Widén, D3; Vulin, J1; Langeveld, JPM2; Baron, TGM1 1AFSSA, France; 2CIDC-Lelystad, Netherlands; 3SVA, Sweden

Western blot analyses of PrPres accumulating in the brain of BSE-infected cattle have demonstrated 3 different molecular phenotypes regarding to the apparent molecular masses and glycoform ratios of PrPres bands. We initially described isolates (H-type BSE) essentially characterized by higher PrPres molecular mass and decreased levels of the diglycosylated PrPres band, in contrast to the classical type of BSE. This type is also distinct from another BSE phenotype named L-type BSE, or also BASE (for Bovine Amyloid Spongiform Encephalopathy), mainly characterized by a low representation of the diglycosylated PrPres band as well as a lower PrPres molecular mass. Retrospective molecular studies in France of all available BSE cases older than 8 years old and of part of the other cases identified since the beginning of the exhaustive surveillance of the disease in 20001 allowed to identify 7 H-type BSE cases, among 594 BSE cases that could be classified as classical, L- or H-type BSE. By Western blot analysis of H-type PrPres, we described a remarkable specific feature with antibodies raised against the C-terminal region of PrP that demonstrated the existence of a more C-terminal cleaved form of PrPres (named PrPres#2 ), in addition to the usual PrPres form (PrPres #1). In the unglycosylated form, PrPres #2 migrates at about 14 kDa, compared to 20 kDa for PrPres #1. The proportion of the PrPres#2 in cattle seems to by higher compared to the PrPres#1. Furthermore another PK-resistant fragment at about 7 kDa was detected by some more N-terminal antibodies and presumed to be the result of cleavages of both N- and C-terminal parts of PrP. These singular features were maintained after transmission of the disease to C57Bl/6 mice. The identification of these two additional PrPres fragments (PrPres #2 and 7kDa band) reminds features reported respectively in sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease and in Gerstmann-Sträussler-Scheinker (GSS) syndrome in humans.


http://www.neuroprion.com/pdf_docs/conferences/prion2007/abstract_book.pdf


Research Project: Study of Atypical Bse Location: Virus and Prion Diseases of Livestock

Project Number: 3625-32000-086-05 Project Type: Specific Cooperative Agreement

Start Date: Sep 15, 2004 End Date: Sep 14, 2009

Objective: The objective of this cooperative research project with Dr. Maria Caramelli from the Italian BSE Reference Laboratory in Turin, Italy, is to conduct comparative studies with the U.S. bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) isolate and the atypical BSE isolates identified in Italy. The studies will cover the following areas: 1. Evaluation of present diagnostics tools used in the U.S. for the detection of atypical BSE cases. 2. Molecular comparison of the U.S. BSE isolate and other typical BSE isolates with atypical BSE cases. 3. Studies on transmissibility and tissue distribution of atypical BSE isolates in cattle and other species.

Approach: This project will be done as a Specific Cooperative Agreement with the Italian BSE Reference Laboratory, Istituto Zooprofilattico Sperimentale del Piemonte, in Turin, Italy. It is essential for the U.S. BSE surveillance program to analyze the effectiveness of the U.S diagnostic tools for detection of atypical cases of BSE. Molecular comparisons of the U.S. BSE isolate with atypical BSE isolates will provide further characterization of the U.S. BSE isolate. Transmission studies are already underway using brain homogenates from atypical BSE cases into mice, cattle and sheep. It will be critical to see whether the atypical BSE isolates behave similarly to typical BSE isolates in terms of transmissibility and disease pathogenesis. If transmission occurs, tissue distribution comparisons will be made between cattle infected with the atypical BSE isolate and the U.S. BSE isolate. Differences in tissue distribution could require new regulations regarding specific risk material (SRM) removal.


http://www.ars.usda.gov/research/projects/projects.htm?ACCN_NO=408490


Sunday, April 12, 2009 TRANSMISSION OF ATYPICAL BOVINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY (BSE) IN HUMANIZED MOUSE MODELS


http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2009/04/transmission-of-atypical-bovine.html


Saturday, January 24, 2009

Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy h-BSE ATYPICAL USA 2008 Annual Report Research Project: Study of Atypical Bse

Location: Virus and Prion Diseases of Livestock

2008 Annual Report


http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2009/01/bovine-spongiform-encephalopathy-h-bse.html


HUMAN AND ANIMAL TRANSMISSIBLE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY, the silent pandemic

April 28, 2009 11:13 AM

the mad cow feed ban i.e. ruminant to ruminant feed ban was a long time over due. since august 4, 1997, since the inception of the PARTIAL and VOLUNTARY ban, the ban has been flouted, and thought of as nothing more than a joke. the feed ban of august 4, 1997 was nothing more than ink on paper. in 2007 alone, in one weekly enforcement letter, 10 MILLION PLUS POUNDS OF BANNED, BLOOD LACED MEAT AND BONE MEAL went out in commerce, to be fed out from state to state. there were many more since the infamous fda mad cow feed ban that never was. the industry need not look any further than the mirror to find the one to blame. they have had 12 years to get their house in order, but they chose to ignore the ban, the science, and to conduct business as usual i.e. feeding SRMs to human and livestock producing animals. no good, prions kill. this is not rocket science. all one has to do is look at the transmission studies. it's what i call the 'silent pandemic'. most all of us have been exposed, some are dying, but it is the friendly fire, and the very long incubation period that is fooling everyone. sporadic CJDs are on the rise, and the UKBSEnvCJD hamburger eating adolescents only theory was nothing more than a pipe dream. it's wrong, and for those that continue to follow this bogus theory will only enhance and spread all TSEs globally in doing so. North America has documented not only the typical cBSE, but also the h-BSE, and the l-BSE atypicals have been documented. CWD rampant in deer and elk, Scrapie, and the Nor-98 atypical scrapie in sheep and goats, with the latest scrapie case documented in a goat in March 2009 in the USA. North America is awash in animal TSEs, and again, sporadic CJD is rising, with atypical cases of CJD in young in the USA, what's that ??? rest asure, the cdc/USDA et al will assure, it's nothing. i don't believe them. ...TSS

National Prion Disease Pathology Surveillance Center Cases Examined1 (December 31, 2008)


http://prionunitusaupdate2008.blogspot.com/2009/04/national-prion-disease-pathology.html


http://www.bizlex.com/Articles-c-2009-04-28-86561.113117_FDA_ruling_hits_area_animal_agriculture.html


Tuesday, April 28, 2009

TRANSMISSIBLE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY UPDATE (the silent pandemic) AND Agricultural Bioterrorism


http://madcowusda.blogspot.com/2009/04/transmissible-spongiform-encephalopathy.html


Thursday, April 9, 2009

Docket No. FDA2002N0031 (formerly Docket No. 2002N0273) RIN 0910AF46 Substances Prohibited From Use in Animal Food or Feed; Final Rule: Proposed


http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2009/04/docket-no-fda2002n0031-formerly-docket.html


http://prionunitusaupdate2008.blogspot.com/2009/04/r-calf-and-usa-mad-cow-problem-dont.html#comments


Sunday, April 12, 2009 r-calf and the USA mad cow problem, don't look, don't find, and then blame Canada


http://prionunitusaupdate2008.blogspot.com/2009/04/r-calf-and-usa-mad-cow-problem-dont.html


http://prionunitusaupdate2008.blogspot.com/2009/04/cjd-foundation-sides-with-r-calfers-no.html#comments


Docket APHIS-2006-0041 Docket Title Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Minimal-Risk Regions; Importation of Live Bovines and Products Derived from Bovines Commodities Docket Type Rulemaking Document APHIS-2006-0041-0001 Document Title Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Minimal-Risk Regions; Importation of Live Bovines and Products Derived From Bovines Public Submission APHIS-2006-0041-0028 Public Submission Title Comment from Terry S Singletary

Comment 2006-2007 USA AND OIE POISONING GLOBE WITH BSE MRR POLICY

THE USA is in a most unique situation, one of unknown circumstances with human and animal TSE. THE USA has the most documented TSE in different species to date, with substrains growing in those species (BSE/BASE in cattle and CWD in deer and elk, there is evidence here with different strains), and we know that sheep scrapie has over 20 strains of the typical scrapie with atypical scrapie documented and also BSE is very likely to have passed to sheep. all of which have been rendered and fed back to animals for human and animal consumption, a frightening scenario. WE do not know the outcome, and to play with human life around the globe with the very likely TSE tainted products from the USA, in my opinion is like playing Russian roulette, of long duration, with potential long and enduring consequences, of which once done, cannot be undone. These are the facts as I have come to know through daily and extensive research of TSE over 9 years, since 12/14/97. I do not pretend to have all the answers, but i do know to continue to believe in the ukbsenvcjd only theory of transmission to humans of only this one strain from only this one TSE from only this one part of the globe, will only lead to further failures, and needless exposure to humans from all strains of TSE, and possibly many more needless deaths from TSE via a multitude of proven routes and sources via many studies with primates and rodents and other species.

MY personal belief, since you ask, is that not only the Canadian border, but the USA border, and the Mexican border should be sealed up tighter than a drum for exporting there TSE tainted products, until a validated, 100% sensitive test is available, and all animals for human and animal consumption are tested. all we are doing is the exact same thing the UK did with there mad cow poisoning when they exported it all over the globe, all the while knowing what they were doing. this BSE MRR policy is nothing more than a legal tool to do just exactly what the UK did, thanks to the OIE and GW, it's legal now. and they executed Saddam for poisoning ???

go figure. ...


http://www.regulations.gov/fdmspublic/component/main?main=DocumentDetail&o=09000064801f8151


Docket APHIS-2006-0041 Docket Title Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Minimal-Risk Regions; Importation of Live Bovines and Products Derived from Bovines Commodities Docket Type Rulemaking Document APHIS-2006-0041-0001 Document Title Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Minimal-Risk Regions; Importation of Live Bovines and Products Derived From Bovines Public Submission APHIS-2006-0041-0028.1 Public Submission Title Attachment to Singletary comment

January 28, 2007

Greetings APHIS,

I would kindly like to submit the following to ;

BSE; MRR; IMPORTATION OF LIVE BOVINES AND PRODUCTS DERIVED FROM BOVINES [Docket No. APHIS-2006-0041] RIN 0579-AC01


http://www.regulations.gov/fdmspublic/ContentViewer?objectId=09000064801f8152&disposition=attachment&contentType=msw8


IN A NUT SHELL ; $$$

(Adopted by the International Committee of the OIE on 23 May 2006)

11. Information published by the OIE is derived from appropriate declarations made by the official Veterinary Services of Member Countries.The OIE is not responsible for inaccurate publication of country disease status based on inaccurate information or changes in epidemiological status or other significant events that were not promptly reported to then Central Bureau............


http://www.oie.int/eng/Session2007/RF2006.pdf


Owner and Corporation Plead Guilty to Defrauding Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Surveillance Program

An Arizona meat processing company and its owner pled guilty in February 2007 to charges of theft of Government funds, mail fraud, and wire fraud. The owner and his company defrauded the BSE Surveillance Program when they falsified BSE Surveillance Data Collection Forms and then submitted payment requests to USDA for the services. In addition to the targeted sample population (those cattle that were more than 30 months old or had other risk factors for BSE), the owner submitted to USDA, or caused to be submitted, BSE obex (brain stem) samples from healthy USDA-inspected cattle. As a result, the owner fraudulently received approximately $390,000. Sentencing is scheduled for May 2007.

snip...

4 USDA OIG SEMIANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS FY 2007 1st Half


http://www.usda.gov/oig/webdocs/sarc070619.pdf


USDA: In 9,200 cases only one type of test could be used

WASHINGTON (AP)--The U.S. Department of Agriculture acknowledged Aug. 17 that its testing options for bovine spongiform encephalopathy were limited in 9,200 cases despite its effort to expand surveillance throughout the U.S. herd.

In those cases, only one type of test was used--one that failed to detect the disease in an infected Texas cow.

The department posted the information on its website because of an inquiry from The Associated Press.

Conducted over the past 14 months, the tests have not been included in the department's running tally of BSE tests since last summer. That total reached 439,126 on Aug. 17.

"There's no secret program," the department's chief veterinarian, John Clifford, said in an interview. "There has been no hiding, I can assure you of that."

Officials intended to report the tests later in an annual report, Clifford said.

These 9,200 cases were different because brain tissue samples were preserved with formalin, which makes them suitable for only one type of test--immunohistochemistry, or IHC.

In the Texas case, officials had declared the cow free of disease in November after an IHC test came back negative. The department's inspector general ordered an additional kind of test, which confirmed the animal was infected.

Veterinarians in remote locations have used the preservative on tissue to keep it from degrading on its way to the department's laboratory in Ames, Iowa. Officials this year asked veterinarians to stop using preservative and send fresh or chilled samples within 48 hours.

The department recently investigated a possible case of BSE that turned up in a preserved sample. Further testing ruled out the disease two weeks ago.

Scientists used two additional tests--rapid screening and Western blot--to help detect BSE in the country's second confirmed case, in a Texas cow in June. They used IHC and Western blot to confirm the first case, in a Washington state cow in December 2003.

"The IHC test is still an excellent test," Clifford said. "These are not simple tests, either."

Clifford pointed out that scientists reran the IHC several times and got conflicting results. That happened, too, with the Western blot test. Both tests are accepted by international animal health officials.

Date: 8/25/05


http://www.hpj.com/archives/2005/aug05/aug29/BSEtestoptionswerelimited.cfm


""These 9,200 cases were different because brain tissue samples were preserved with formalin, which makes them suitable for only one type of test--immunohistochemistry, or IHC."

THIS WAS DONE FOR A REASON!

THE IHC test has been proven to be the LEAST LIKELY to detect BSE/TSE in the bovine, and these were probably from the most high risk cattle pool, the ones the USDA et al, SHOULD have been testing. ...TSS

USDA 2003

We have to be careful that we don't get so set in the way we do things that we forget to look for different emerging variations of disease. We've gotten away from collecting the whole brain in our systems. We're using the brain stem and we're looking in only one area. In Norway, they were doing a project and looking at cases of Scrapie, and they found this where they did not find lesions or PRP in the area of the obex. They found it in the cerebellum and the cerebrum. It's a good lesson for us. Ames had to go back and change the procedure for looking at Scrapie samples. In the USDA, we had routinely looked at all the sections of the brain, and then we got away from it. They've recently gone back. Dr. Keller: Tissues are routinely tested, based on which tissue provides an 'official' test result as recognized by APHIS.

Dr. Detwiler: That's on the slaughter. But on the clinical cases, aren't they still asking for the brain? But even on the slaughter, they're looking only at the brainstem. We may be missing certain things if we confine ourselves to one area.

snip.............

Dr. Detwiler: It seems a good idea, but I'm not aware of it. Another important thing to get across to the public is that the negatives do not guarantee absence of infectivity. The animal could be early in the disease and the incubation period. Even sample collection is so important. If you're not collecting the right area of the brain in sheep, or if collecting lymphoreticular tissue, and you don't get a good biopsy, you could miss the area with the PRP in it and come up with a negative test. There's a new, unusual form of Scrapie that's been detected in Norway. We have to be careful that we don't get so set in the way we do things that we forget to look for different emerging variations of disease. We've gotten away from collecting the whole brain in our systems. We're using the brain stem and we're looking in only one area. In Norway, they were doing a project and looking at cases of Scrapie, and they found this where they did not find lesions or PRP in the area of the obex. They found it in the cerebellum and the cerebrum. It's a good lesson for us. Ames had to go back and change the procedure for looking at Scrapie samples. In the USDA, we had routinely looked at all the sections of the brain, and then we got away from it. They've recently gone back.

Dr. Keller: Tissues are routinely tested, based on which tissue provides an 'official' test result as recognized by APHIS .

Dr. Detwiler: That's on the slaughter. But on the clinical cases, aren't they still asking for the brain? But even on the slaughter, they're looking only at the brainstem. We may be missing certain things if we confine ourselves to one area.

snip...

FULL TEXT;

Completely Edited Version PRION ROUNDTABLE

Accomplished this day, Wednesday, December 11, 2003, Denver, Colorado

2005

=============================

CDC DR. PAUL BROWN TSE EXPERT COMMENTS 2006

The U.S. Department of Agriculture was quick to assure the public earlier this week that the third case of mad cow disease did not pose a risk to them, but what federal officials have not acknowledged is that this latest case indicates the deadly disease has been circulating in U.S. herds for at least a decade.

The second case, which was detected last year in a Texas cow and which USDA officials were reluctant to verify, was approximately 12 years old.

These two cases (the latest was detected in an Alabama cow) present a picture of the disease having been here for 10 years or so, since it is thought that cows usually contract the disease from contaminated feed they consume as calves. The concern is that humans can contract a fatal, incurable, brain-wasting illness from consuming beef products contaminated with the mad cow pathogen.

"The fact the Texas cow showed up fairly clearly implied the existence of other undetected cases," Dr. Paul Brown, former medical director of the National Institutes of Health's Laboratory for Central Nervous System Studies and an expert on mad cow-like diseases, told United Press International. "The question was, 'How many?' and we still can't answer that."

Brown, who is preparing a scientific paper based on the latest two mad cow cases to estimate the maximum number of infected cows that occurred in the United States, said he has "absolutely no confidence in USDA tests before one year ago" because of the agency's reluctance to retest the Texas cow that initially tested positive.

USDA officials finally retested the cow and confirmed it was infected seven months later, but only at the insistence of the agency's inspector general.

"Everything they did on the Texas cow makes everything USDA did before 2005 suspect," Brown said. ...snip...end


http://www.upi.com/ConsumerHealthDaily/view.php?StoryID=20060315-055557-1284r


CDC - Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy and Variant Creutzfeldt ... Dr. Paul Brown is Senior Research Scientist in the Laboratory of Central Nervous System ... Address for correspondence: Paul Brown, Building 36, Room 4A-05, ...


http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/eid/vol7no1/brown.htm


In this context, a word is in order about the US testing program. After the discovery of the first (imported) cow in 2003, the magnitude of testing was much increased, reaching a level of >400,000 tests in 2005 (Figure 4). Neither of the 2 more recently indigenously infected older animals with nonspecific clinical features would have been detected without such testing, and neither would have been identified as atypical without confirmatory Western blots. Despite these facts, surveillance has now been decimated to 40,000 annual tests (USDA news release no. 0255.06, July 20, 2006) and invites the accusation that the United States will never know the true status of its involvement with BSE.

In short, a great deal of further work will need to be done before the phenotypic features and prevalence of atypical BSE are understood. More than a single strain may have been present from the beginning of the epidemic, but this possibility has been overlooked by virtue of the absence of widespread Western blot confirmatory testing of positive screening test results; or these new phenotypes may be found, at least in part, to result from infections at an older age by a typical BSE agent, rather than neonatal infections with new "strains" of BSE. Neither alternative has yet been investigated.


http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/EID/vol12no12/06-0965.htm


Executive Summary

In June 2005, an inconclusive bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) sample from November 2004, that had originally been classified as negative on the immunohistochemistry test, was confirmed positive on SAF immunoblot (Western blot). The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) identified the herd of origin for the index cow in Texas; that identification was confirmed by DNA analysis. USDA, in close cooperation with the Texas Animal Health Commission (TAHC), established an incident command post (ICP) and began response activities according to USDA’s BSE Response Plan of September 2004. Response personnel removed at-risk cattle and cattle of interest (COI) from the index herd, euthanized them, and tested them for BSE; all were negative. USDA and the State extensively traced all at-risk cattle and COI that left the index herd. The majority of these animals entered rendering and/or slaughter channels well before the investigation began. USDA’s response to the Texas finding was thorough and effective.


http://www.aphis.usda.gov/lpa/issues/bse/epi-updates/bse_final_epidemiology_report.pdf


http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/search?updated-max=2008-11-27T20%3A13%3A00-08%3A00&max-results=7


http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/


Report on Food & Drug Administration Dallas District Investigation of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Event in Texas 2005 Executive Summary: On June 24, 2005, USDA informed FDA that a cow in Texas tested positive for Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE). Information provided by APHIS was that the BSE positive cow was born and raised in a herd in Texas and was approximately 12 years old. The animal was sampled for BSE at a pet food plant in Texas on November 15, 2004, as part of USDA’s enhanced surveillance program.


http://www.fda.gov/cvm/texasfeedrpt.htm


Texas even had a 'secret' test that showed that mad cow positive; experimental IHC test results, because the test was not a validated procedure, and because the two approved IHC tests came back negative, the results were not considered to be of regulatory significance and therefore were not reported beyond the laboratory. • A Western blot test conducted the week of June 5, 2005, returned positive for BSE.


http://www.usda.gov/documents/vs_bse_ihctestvar.pdf


48 hr BSE confirmation turnaround took 7+ months to confirm this case, so the BSE MRR policy could be put into place. ...


TSS

-------- Original Message --------

Subject: re-USDA's surveillance plan for BSE aka mad cow diseaseDate: Mon, 02 May 2005 16:59:07 -0500

From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."

To: mhtml:%7B33B38F65-8D2E-434D-8F9B-8BDCD77D3066%7Dmid://00000061/!x-usc:mailto:paffairs@oig.hhs.gov, mhtml:%7B33B38F65-8D2E-434D-8F9B-8BDCD77D3066%7Dmid://00000061/!x-usc:mailto:HHSTips@oig.hhs.gov, mhtml:%7B33B38F65-8D2E-434D-8F9B-8BDCD77D3066%7Dmid://00000061/!x-usc:mailto:contactOIG@hhsc.state.tx.us Greetings Honorable Paul Feeney, Keith Arnold, and William Busbyet al at OIG, ...............

snip...

There will be several more emails of my research to follow. I respectfully request a full inquiry into the cover-up of TSEs in the United States of America over the past 30 years. I would be happy to testify...

Thank you, I am sincerely, Terry S. Singeltary Sr. P.O. Box 42 Bacliff, Texas USA 77518 xxx xxx xxxx


http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/search?updated-max=2008-07-31T13%3A31%3A00-07%3A00&max-results=7


Safeguarding American Agriculture Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service • United States Department of Agriculture •


http://www.usda.gov/documents/vs_bse_ihctestvar.pdf


THIS confirms that the June 2004 Enhanced BSE cover-up, was just that. Like i said before, due to this terribly flawed system, those 388,000 testing to date for BSE in the USA were meaningless and should be retested. ...

Subject: USDA JOHANN'S MAD ABOUT FONG, PLANS HIS OWN LAB AND HIS OWN MAD COW ANTIBODIES ;-) Date: July 29, 2005 at 2:35 pm PST

Friday, July 29, 2005


http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/search?updated-max=2007-12-18T12%3A13%3A00-08%3A00&max-results=7


USDA did not test possible mad cows

By Steve Mitchell United Press International Published 6/8/2004 9:30 PM

WASHINGTON, June 8 (UPI) -- The U.S. Department of Agriculture claims ittested 500 cows with signs of a brain disorder for mad cow disease last year, but agency documents obtained by United Press International show the agency tested only half that number.

USDA officials said the difference is made up in animals tested at state veterinary diagnostic laboratories, but these animals were not tested using the "gold standard" test employed by the agency for confirming acase of the deadly disease. Instead, the state labs used a less sensitive test that experts say could miss mad cow cases.

In addition, the state lab figures were not included in a March 2004 USDA document estimating the number of animals most likely to be infected among U.S. herds, and apparently were not given to a congressional committee that had requested agency data on the number of cows with brain disorder signs that had been tested for the disease.

"This is just adding to the demise of USDA's credibility," said Felicia Nestor, senior policy adviser to the Government Accountability Project, a group in Washington, D.C., that works with federal whistleblowers.

"If the USDA is going to exclude from testing the animals most likely to have the disease, that would seem to have a very negative impact on there liability of their conclusion," Nestor told UPI.

Nestor, who has monitored the USDA's mad cow surveillance program closely for several years, asked, "Are they deliberately avoiding testing animals that look like they have the disease?"

Concerns about the number of cows in U.S. herds with brain disorder symptoms have been heightened due to the recent case in Texas, in which USDA officials failed to test an animal with such symptoms, also known as central nervous system or CNS signs. This was a violation of USDA policy, which stipulates all CNS cows should be tested because they are considered the most likely to be mad cow infected. To date, the Washington cow that tested positive last December is the only confirmed case of mad cow disease -- also known as bovine spongiform encephalopathy -- among U.S. herds.

The Texas incident has alarmed the public and members of Congress because humans can contract a fatal brain disorder called variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease from consuming meat infected with the mad cow pathogen. If the USDA's surveillance program is allowing the riskiest cows to go untested, it raises concerns about the ability of the monitoring system to detect the disease reliably in U.S. herds, Rep.Henry Waxman, D-Calif., charged in a May 13 letter to Agriculture Secretary Ann Veneman.

Dr. Peter Lurie, of the consumer group Public Citizen, said CNS cows should be the one category that absolutely has to be tested to have a sound surveillance system.

"CNS animals are far and away the most important animals to test," said Lurie, who has done several analyses of the USDA's mad cow surveillance program.

"If there's any category that needs 100 percent testing, that's it, because they would be the most likely place to find mad cow in America," he told UPI. "Any CNS cow that slips into the food supply represents a major case of malpractice by USDA, and similarly, the failure to test the brain of that animal to see if it was indeed infected is really a failure to protect the public."

USDA officials said the agency has no estimate on how many CNS cows occur in U.S. herds. But spokesman Ed Loyd has told UPI, and at least one other media outlet, that 500 CNS cows were tested in fiscal year 2003. Yet agency testing records for the first 10 months of FY 2003, obtained by UPI under the Freedom of Information Act, show only 254 animals that fall under the CNS category -- or about half the number Loyd cited.

After failing to respond to repeated requests from UPI for clarification of the apparent discrepancy, Loyd finally offered the explanation that an additional 45 CNS cows were tested by the USDA during the final two months of FY 2003. The remainder, he said, was made up by CNS cases tested at various state veterinary diagnostic laboratories.

"We also include data reported to us from state veterinary diagnostic laboratories, and all of these are CNS cases that have been tested for BSE using a histological examination," Loyd said.

"We were not using any other labs during this period, other than (the USDA lab), to run the IHC tests for BSE, which is the gold standard," he said. "This (state laboratory) information contributes important data to our surveillance effort."

However, the state labs did not use the immunohistochemistry test, which the USDA has called the "gold standard" for diagnosing mad cow disease. Instead, the labs used a different test called histopathology, which theUSDA itself does not use to confirm a case, opting instead for the more sensitive IHC test.

The histopathology test, unlike the IHC test, does not detect prions --misfolded proteins that serve as a marker for infection and can be spotted early on in the course of the illness. Rather, it screens forthe microscopic holes in the brain that are characteristic of advanced mad cow disease.

According to the USDA's Web site, histopathology proves reliable only if the brain sample is removed soon after the death of the animal. If there is too much of a delay, the Web site states, it can be "very difficult to confirm a diagnosis by histopathology" because the brain structures may have begun to disintegrate.

That is one reason the agency began using the IHC test -- it can confirm a diagnosis if the brain has begun disintegrating or been frozen for shipping.

The state labs used histopathology to screen 266 CNS cases in FY 2003, as well as 257 cases in FY 2002, according to Loyd. He did not explain why this information was not included in the testing records the agency provided to UPI and has not responded to requests for the identity of the state labs.

Linda Detwiler, a former USDA veterinarian who oversaw the agency's madcow testing program, told UPI the histopathology test probably is adequate for screening CNS cows. If they have mad cow disease, she said, it would likely be an advanced stage that should be obvious.

Other mad cow disease experts, however, said having a back-up test suchas IHC would be advisable, because histopathology tests sometimes can miss evidence of infection.

The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations offers similar recommendations in its protocol for conducing a histopathology test. The protocol states that even if histopathology is negative,"further sampling should be undertaken" in cases "where clinical signs have strongly suggested BSE" -- a criteria that includes all of the cows tested at the state labs.

The USDA seems to agree on the need for a back-up test. Its expanded surveillance program, which began June 1, calls for using IHC -- or another test called Western blot -- to confirm any positives found on rapid tests. The March 15 document that describes the new program does not mention using histopathology to confirm cases of mad cow disease.

"Subtle changes can be missed on histopathology that would probably not be as easy to miss using IHC," said Elizabeth Mumford, a veterinarian and BSE expert at Safe Food Solutions in Bern, Switzerland, a company that provides advice on reducing mad cow risk to industry and governments.

"Therefore I believe it is valuable to run (histopathology)," Mumford told UPI.

She noted that in Europe, two tests -- neither one the histopathology test -- are used to ensure no cases are missed. A rapid test is used initially for screening, followed by IHC as a confirmatory test.

Markus Moser, a molecular biologist and chief executive officer of the Swiss firm Prionics, which manufactures tests for detecting mad cow disease, agrees about the possibility of a case being missed by histopathology.

"There were cases which were (histopathology) negative but still clearly positive with the other (testing) methods," Moser said. "BSE testing based on histology on sub-optimal tissue was probably one of the reasons why Germany was allegedly BSE-free until our test discovered that they were not" in 2000, Moser told UPI.

He agreed with Detwiler that histopathology should be suitable for most cases of CNS cows, but added it still can fail to detect the disease in some CNS cases -- particularly if the sample is not optimum.

"It is difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish the subtle changes in a diseased brain from artifacts like ruptures in the tissue due to tissue damage during the sampling, transport or preparation," he said.

Loyd asserted the additional CNS cases from the state labs actually yielded a total of 565 such cows the USDA had tested -- 65 more than his original figure of 500. Whether the USDA considers its total to be 500 or 565, however, either figure would exceed the agency's own estimates for the total number of such cows that it identifies annually.

According to data the USDA provided to the House Committee on Government Reform, and numbers the agency included in the March document about its expanded surveillance plan, only 201 to 249 CNS cows are identified at slaughterhouses. Approximately 129 additional cases occur on farms annually. At most, that yields a combined total of 378 CNS cows, or nearly 200 less than the 565 Loyd claims the agency tested.

The USDA surveillance plan document makes no mention of the number of CNS animals tested at state veterinary diagnostic labs. The figure also does not appear to be included in the agency's estimates of the number of high-risk animals that occur in the United States each year. The latter number was used to help the USDA calculate the number of animals it will screen for mad cow disease in its expanded surveillance plan.

USDA officials also did not include the state lab figures in response to a question from the House Committee on Government Reform, a source close to the issue told UPI. The committee, on which Waxman is the ranking Democrat, had requested in a March 8 letter to Veneman that she provide "the number of BSE tests that were conducted on cattle exhibiting central nervous system symptoms" for each of the last five years.

Loyd did not respond to a request from UPI asking why agency officials did not provide that information to the committee or include it in USDA's explanation of its expanded surveillance plan.

The committee has taken note of the CNS issue and plans to delve into it further in a hearing slated for sometime in the next few months.

"The committee will explore this and other issues surrounding USDA and BSE testing at a hearing later this summer," Drew Crockett, spokesman for the committee, told UPI.

--

Steve Mitchell is UPI's Medical Correspondent. E-mail mhtml:%7B33B38F65-8D2E-434D-8F9B-8BDCD77D3066%7Dmid://00000061/!x-usc:mailto:sciencemail@upi.com

Copyright © 2001-2004 United Press International


http://www.upi.com/view.cfm?StoryID=20040608-014607-3865r


''USDA gets a D or D minus," said Caroline Smith Dewaal of the Center for Science in the Public Interest, an advocacy group based in Washington. ''The best thing that came out of this is the work of the inspector general."

It was the department's in-house watchdog, Inspector General Phyllis Fong, who skirted the USDA hierarchy by ordering retesting with a different method more than six months after a routine second-round test, known as the immunohistochemistry, or IHC, test proved negative for the disease.

Agriculture Secretary Mike Johanns, who assumed office in January, has said he neither knew about nor authorized the retesting by the National Veterinary Services Laboratories in Ames, Iowa.

BESIDES the Texas mad cow that sat on the shelf for 7+ months before the Honorable Phyllis Fong of the OIG finally did the end around Johanns et al and finally had Weybridge bring that negative cow back from the dead to finally being a confirmed mad cow (hint, hint, getting MRR implemented first), was this simply another bumbling of BSE protocol, or just same old same old;

Jim Rogers (202) 690-4755

USDA Press Office (202) 720-4623

Statement by Chief Veterinary Medical Officer John Clifford Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service Regarding Non-Definitive BSE Test ResultsJuly 27, 2005

snip...

Our laboratory ran the IHC test on the sample and received non-definitive results that suggest the need for further testing. As we have previously experienced, it is possible for an IHC test to yield differing results depending on the “slice” of tissue that is tested. Therefore, scientists at our laboratory and at Weybridge will run the IHC test on additional “slices” of tissue from this animal to determine whether or not it was infected with BSE. We will announce results as soon as they are compiled, which we expect to occur by next week.

I would note that the sample was taken in April, at which time the protocols allowed for a preservative to be used (protocols changed in June 2005). The sample was not submitted to us until last week, because the veterinarian set aside the sample after preserving it and simply forgot to send it in. On that point, I would like to emphasize that while that time lag is not optimal, it has no implications in terms of the risk to human health. The carcass of this animal was destroyed, therefore there is absolutely no risk to human or animal health from this animal.

snip...


http://www.aphis.usda.gov/lpa/news/2005/07/bsestatement_vs.html


Subject: Statement by Dr. John Clifford Regarding Non-Definitive BSE Test Results

Date: July 27, 2005 at 12:37 pm PST

Jim Rogers (202) 690-4755Jerry Redding (202) 720-6959

Statement by Dr. John Clifford Regarding Non-Definitive BSE Test Results

Late yesterday, we received non-definitive test results on an animal sampled as part of a voluntary extension of our enhanced BSE surveillance program. USDA is conducting further testing at the National Veterinary Services Laboratories in Ames, Iowa, in consultation with experts from the international reference laboratory in Weybridge, England. We are also sending samples from this animal to the Weybridge laboratory for further testing. It is important to note that this animal poses no threat to our food supply because it did not enter the human food or animal feed chains.

The sample was submitted to us by a private veterinarian. As an extension of our enhanced surveillance program, accredited private veterinarians, who often visit farms in remote areas, collect samples when warranted. The sample in question today was taken from a cow that was at least 12 years of age and experienced complications during calving. The veterinarian treated the sample with a preservative, which readies it for testing using the immunohistochemistry (IHC) test - an internationally recognized confirmatory test for BSE. Neither the rapid screening test nor the Western blot confirmatory test can be conducted on a sample that has been preserved.

Our laboratory ran the IHC test on the sample and received non-definitive results that suggest the need for further testing. As we have previously experienced, it is possible for an IHC test to yield differing results depending on the â?osliceâ? of tissue that is tested. Therefore, scientists at our laboratory and at Weybridge will run the IHC test on additional â?oslicesâ? of tissue from this animal to determine whether or not it was infected with BSE. We will announce results as soon as they are compiled, which we expect to occur by next week.I would note that the sample was taken in April, at which time the protocols allowed for a preservative to be used (protocols changed in June 2005).

The sample was not submitted to us until last week, because the veterinarian set aside the sample after preserving it and simply forgot to send it in. On that point, I would like to emphasize that while that time lag is not optimal, it has no implications in terms of the risk to human health. The carcass of this animal was destroyed, therefore there is absolutely no risk to human or animal health from this animal.

Regardless of the outcome of the further testing, I want to emphasize that human and animal health in the United States are protected by a system of interlocking safeguards. The most important of these is the ban on specified risk materials from the food supply and the Food and Drug Administrations feed ban. And by any measure, the incidence of BSE in this country is extremely low. Our enhanced surveillance program is designed to provide information about the level of prevalence of BSE in the United States. We are extremely gratified that to date, all sectors of the cattle industry have cooperated in this program by submitting samples from more than 419,000 animals from the highest risk populations. To date, only one animal has tested positive for the disease as part of the surveillance program. These interlocking safeguards continue to protect our food supply.

#

Note to Reporters: USDA news releases, program announcements and media advisories are available on the Internet. Go to the APHIS home page at http://www.aphis.usda.gov/ and click on the â?oNewsâ? button. Also, anyone with an e-mail address can sign up to receive APHIS press releases automatically. Send an e-mail message to mhtml:%7B33B38F65-8D2E-434D-8F9B-8BDCD77D3066%7Dmid://00000061/!x-usc:mailto:lyris@mdrdlyriss10.aphis.usda.govand leave the subject blank. In the message, typesubscribe press_releases.USDA mhtml:%7B33B38F65-8D2E-434D-8F9B-8BDCD77D3066%7Dmid://00000061/!x-usc:mailto:Newsoc.news@usda.gov202 720-4623----------------------------------------------------

"The sample was submitted to us by a private veterinarian. As an extension of our enhanced surveillance program, accredited private veterinarians who often visit farms in remote areas collect samples when warranted. The sample in question today was taken from a cow that was at least 12 years of age and experienced complications during calving.

"The veterinarian treated the sample with a preservative which readies it for testing using the immunohistochemistry test, an internationally recognized confirmatory test for BSE.

"Neither the rapid screening test nor the Western blot confirmatory test can be conducted on a sample that has been preserved. Our laboratory ran the IHC test on the sample and received non-definitive results that suggest the need for further testing.

"As we have previously experienced, it is possible for an IHC test to yield differing results, depending on the slice of tissue that is tested. Therefore scientists at our laboratory and at Weybridge will run the IHC test on additional slices of tissue from this animal to determine whether or not it was infected with BSE.

"We will announce results as soon as they are compiled, which we expect to occur by next week.

snip...


http://www.usda.gov/wps/portal/usdahome?contentidonly=true&contentid=2005/07/0280.xml


In Reply to: Re: Statement by Dr. John Clifford Regarding Non-Definitive BSE Test Results posted by TSS on July 27, 2005 at 12:53 pm:

o.k., let me get this right. i am pondering here;-)

all the time this TEXAS positive, positive, (secret) positive, inconclusive, negative, then Weybridge confirmed 2nd BSE documented case (thanks to the Honorable Phyllis Fong),all this time this BSe going on in TEXAS, was plastered all over the news, this guy forgot about that sample, and it just sat up on some shelf wasting away for months, as to be in such bad shape, they now cannot even test it properly. r i g h t ... like ooops, sorry. ...end

============================================

The animal died in April, but the veterinarian forgot to send the sample to USDA until this month, Mr. Clifford said. "While that time lag is not optimal, it has no implications in terms of the risk to human health," he said.

IHC tests returned conflicting results on the Texas cow. Use of the preservative means that the other tests commonly done when mad cow is suspected, initial rapid screening and Western blot, can't be performed on this sample, the official said. Mr. Clifford said it's possible to get different results, "depending on the slice of tissue that is tested."

The fatal brain-wasting disease is known medically as bovine spongiform encephalopathy, or BSE. In people, eating tainted meat products has been linked to about 150 deaths from a fatal disorder called variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease. Most of the deaths were in the United Kingdom, where there was an outbreak in the 1980s and 1990s.

The U.S. banned Canadian cattle in May 2003 following Canada's first case of mad-cow disease. The U.S. was about to lift the ban in March when U.S. District Judge Richard Cebull in Billings, Mont., granted an injunction to a ranchers' group called R-CALF United Stockgrowers of America. The ranchers had sued to keep the border closed to Canadian cattle, saying the disease presented a risk to the U.S. beef industry as well as to American consumers.

The 9th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the injunction earlier this month, allowing cattle shipments from Canada to resume. The lifting of the ban reopens the U.S. to cattle younger than 30 months and expands the list of beef products Canada is allowed to ship to the U.S. Older animals are still banned, because infection levels are believed to increase with age.

Copyright © 2005 Associated Press

http://online.wsj.com/


Greetings,

this is what you call the 'FONG' syndrome. make sure she can't make them do a WB on this sample.

I BEG THE OIG and the Honorable Phyllis Fong to investigate this blunder too. there is no way that sample sat on a shelf while the world waited on that Texas mad cow blunder dust to settle, and someone just forgets about it. i just don't believe this either...

============================================


http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/search?updated-max=2007-12-18T12%3A13%3A00-08%3A00&max-results=7


MAD COW DISEASE USA DECEMBER 28, 2008 an 8 year review of a failed and flawed policy


http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2008/12/mad-cow-disease-usa-december-28-2008-8.html


Wednesday, February 04, 2009

Creutzfeldt-Jacob disease presenting as severe depression: a case report


http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2009/02/creutzfeldt-jacob-disease-presenting-as.html


CJD QUESTIONNAIRE USA CWRU AND CJD FOUNDATION


http://cjdquestionnaire.blogspot.com/



Terry S. Singeltary Sr. P.O. Box 42 Bacliff, Texas USA 77518

REPORT ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE FIFTEENTH CASE OF BOVINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY (BSE) IN CANADA

REPORT ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE FIFTEENTH CASE OF BOVINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY (BSE) IN CANADA

BACKGROUND

On November 3, 2008, the Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA) sampled a Holstein cow under Canada's National BSE Surveillance Program. Brain samples were received by the British Columbia Ministry of Agriculture and Lands (BCMAL) Laboratory, where they were screened for BSE using a Prionics rapid test. The result of this preliminary test did not rule out BSE. In accordance with the prescribed testing protocol, the test was repeated and produced a reaction a second time. Brain samples were then sent to the National BSE Reference Laboratory in Lethbridge, Alberta. Additional testing for BSE (Prionics-Check PrioStrip, BioRad TeSeE ELISA, Prionics-Check Western and Hybrid Western Blot) was conducted at the National BSE Reference Laboratory to validate the result of the screening test and was positive on Nov 6, 2008. The Scrapie Associated Fibril Immunoblot procedure was positive on Nov 7, 2008 and the immunohistochemistry procedure was positive on Nov 14, 2008. The carcass was secured at the sampling site and will subsequently be transferred to CFIA’s Lethbridge laboratory for incineration. No part of the carcass entered the human food supply or animal feed chain.

The CFIA immediately initiated an epidemiological investigation based on the recommended BSE guidelines (Terrestrial Animal Health Code 2008) of the World Organisation for Animal Health, referred to as the OIE. Specifically, the CFIA followed the recommended BSE guidelines for a country with controlled risk status and investigated:

the feed cohort, comprising all cattle which, during their first year of life, were reared with the BSE case during its first year of life, and which investigation showed consumed the same potentially contaminated feed during that period, or the birth cohort, comprising all cattle born in the same herd as, and within 12 months of the birth of the BSE case, if the above cannot be identified and feed to which the animal may have been exposed early in its life. ANIMAL INVESTIGATION The positive animal was a registered Holstein dairy cow born on January 1, 2001, and it was 94 months of age at the time of death. The animal was born, raised and had spent its entire life on the same farm. The producer reported the duration of illness as less than 2 days with the animal exhibiting an abnormal gait (locomotion, change in movement), which was worse on the hind end. The animal had a short stunted gait and exhibited signs of ataxia (uncoordinated movements). The producer elected to have the animal humanely destroyed. Since the inclusion criteria of Canada’s National BSE Surveillance Program were met, arrangements were made to forward appropriate samples for laboratory evaluation.

The birth farm was a dairy operation located in the Fraser Valley area of British Columbia. The feed cohort was determined to comprise 187 animals, which along with the case animal, were raised on the farm. This cohort consisted of female Holsteins. Males sold at less than two weeks of age for fattening and subsequent slaughter without having access to any commercially prepared feeds were excluded from the investigation because they were not exposed to the same potentially contaminated feed as the case animal. No males were retained or raised on the farm. The trace-out investigation of the feed cohort located 22 live animals on the case farm. These animals are quarantined and will be humanely destroyed; their carcasses disposed of by incineration in accordance with the OIE recommendations. The following is the disposition of the remaining animals in the feed cohort:

122 animals were traced and confirmed to have died or been slaughtered; 24 animals were traced and presumed to have died or been slaughtered; 5 animals were traced and confirmed to have been exported for slaughter and the importing country has been notified; and 14 animals were determined to be untraceable because of records limitations. FEED INVESTIGATION The feed investigation focused on feeds to which the case animal may have had access during its first year of life and on the manufacturing practices used to produce these feeds.

All feed products to which the BSE case animal had access were intended for feeding to ruminants. These consisted of farm-grown and purchased forages and silages and mixed feed products provided to the farm from one commercial supplier. On-farm mixing equipment consisted of a mixer wagon used to combine forages with commercial products for calves, heifers and lactating cows. Several cats on the farm were fed in the barn and one dog was fed in the house away from the dairy operation. It is reasonable to presume that the cat and dog food did contain prohibited material; however, review of farm feeding practices confirmed that ruminants did not have access to these feeds.

For the first three weeks of life, the case animal was housed individually in a calf pen and fed milk and a commercially prepared calf ration. From 3 to 9 weeks the animal was housed in a series of group pens with animals of similar age and continued to be fed calf ration and milk as well as hay and had access to two kinds of mineral blocks. From 9 weeks to 12 months the animal continued to cycle through several group pens with animals of similar age and continued to be fed calf ration, hay and farm grown corn and grass silages as well as having access to two kinds of mineral blocks. Additionally, a dry cow mineral was added to the animal’s diet at the 3 month stage.

The only other commercial feed products used on the farm included a complete ration for the lactating cows and a dry cow ration. On-farm investigation confirmed that the lactation ration was not fed to the case animal prior to twelve months of age, however, the same on-farm mixer wagon was used to mix rations for both the case animal and the lactating cows. It was also determined that the case animal could not have access to the dry cow ration which was received, stored and fed directly from bags and away from animals less than one year of age.

Investigation at the commercial feed manufacturer, which was the sole supplier of calf ration and lactation ration, identified that this facility handled prohibited material. Components of this facility were dedicated to the manufacture of feeds not containing prohibited material in the formula. However, bulk ingredient receiving and finished feed conveyances were cross-utilized. Written procedures and production records were insufficient to rule out possible contamination with prohibited material at these points affecting both ration types delivered to the case farm.

Investigation at the commercial feed supplier identified that the two kinds of mineral blocks were manufactured by a separate facility, independent of the main commercial feed manufacturer. Investigation at the manufacturer of these blocks determined that this facility did handle prohibited material during the period of interest; however, no written procedures or production records were available. As the period of interest occurs after the introduction of the 1997 Mammalian Feed Ban, it is unlikely that ruminant meat and bone meal was intentionally used in the formulation of either of these mineral blocks. However, as production records are not available for review, it is not possible to rule out the possibility that contamination during production could have taken place.

The dry cow mineral used on farm was obtained from a specialized facility not handling prohibited material and was packaged in bags. This product was ruled out as a possible source of contamination.

Considering the farm’s feeding regime and specific production records reviewed, a likely source of exposure to BSE infectivity appears to be potentially contaminated heifer ration. However, the risk associated with possible ingestion of small amounts of the lactation ration and either of the mineral blocks exists, and potential contamination of these products cannot be ruled out.

INVESTIGATION OVERVIEW The detection of this case does not change any of Canada’s BSE risk parameters. The location and age of the animal are consistent with previous cases. Surveillance results to date, including this case, reflect an extremely low level of BSE in Canada.

Since the confirmation of BSE in a native-born animal in May 2003, Canada has significantly increased its targeted testing of cattle in high-risk categories advocated by the OIE (including non-ambulatory animals). This effort is directed at determining the level of BSE in Canada, while monitoring the effectiveness of the risk-mitigating measures in place. Canada’s National BSE Surveillance Program continues to demonstrate an extremely low level of BSE in Canada, with 15 positive animals detected.

With respect to BSE, the safety of beef produced in Canada is assured by public health measures enacted in 2003. The removal of specific risk material (SRM) - the tissues that have been demonstrated to have the potential to harbour BSE infectivity - from all animals slaughtered for human consumption is the most effective single measure to protect consumers in Canada and importing countries from exposure to BSE infectivity in meat products.

As demonstrated by the surveillance system, the feed ban implemented in 1997 is effectively preventing the amplification of BSE in Canada's feed system. Additional regulations to enhance Canada's feed ban were enacted in 2007. The most important change is the removal of SRM from all animal feeds, pet food and fertilizer. The enhancement will accelerate progress toward eradicating BSE from the national cattle herd by preventing more than 99 per cent of potential BSE infectivity from entering the Canadian feed system. These measures are effectively minimizing the risk of BSE transmission.

Canada is officially categorized under the OIE's science-based system as a controlled BSE risk country. This status clearly recognizes the effectiveness of Canada's surveillance, mitigation and eradication measures, and acknowledges the work done by all levels of government, the cattle industry, veterinarians and ranchers to effectively manage and eventually eradicate BSE in Canada.



http://www.inspection.gc.ca/english/anima/heasan/disemala/bseesb/bccb2008/15investe.shtml


REPORT ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE FOURTEENTH CASE OF BOVINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY (BSE) IN CANADA BACKGROUND


On July 25, 2008 a commercial beef cow in Northern Alberta was sampled by a private practitioner under Canada's National BSE Surveillance Program. Brain samples from this animal were sent to the Alberta Agriculture and Rural Development (ARD) laboratory where they were screened for BSE using a Bio-Rad rapid test on August 6, 2008. The result of this preliminary test did not rule out BSE. In accordance with the prescribed testing protocol, the test was repeated and produced a reaction a second time. Brain samples were then sent to the National BSE Reference Laboratory in Lethbridge, Alberta. Additional rapid tests for BSE (Prionics-Check PrioStrip and BioRad TeSeE ELISA) were conducted at the National BSE Reference Laboratory to validate the result of the screening test and were positive on August 12, 2008. The Prionics-Check Western and the Hybrid Western Blot was positive on August 14, 2008. Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy was confirmed on August 14, 2008 using the Scrapie Associated Fibril Immunoblot procedure. The carcass was secured at the sampling site. No part of the carcass entered the human food supply or animal feed chain.

The CFIA immediately initiated an epidemiological investigation based on the recommended BSE guidelines (Terrestrial Animal Health Code 2008) of the World Organisation for Animal Health, referred to as the OIE. Specifically, the CFIA followed the recommended BSE guidelines for a country with controlled risk status and investigated:

the feed cohort, comprising all cattle which, during their first year of life, were reared with the BSE case during its first year of life, and which investigation showed consumed the same potentially contaminated feed during that period, or the birth cohort, comprising all cattle born in the same herd as, and within 12 months of the birth of the BSE case, if the above cannot be identified and feed to which the animal may have been exposed early in its life. ANIMAL INVESTIGATION The positive animal was a commercial beef cow, Gelbvieh cross, born on March 20, 2002 and it was 76 months of age at the time of death. The animal was born, raised and had spent its entire life on the same farm. The producer reported the duration of illness as approximately 6 months with the animal exhibiting gradual deterioration culminating in the animal becoming non-ambulatory (downer). During this period, the animal showed a change in behaviour resulting in the animal becoming apprehensive/nervous. When examined by a private practitioner on July 25, 2008, the animal was recumbent. Physical examination by the practitioner revealed opisthotonus (muscle spasms). The practitioner and producer determined that the animal should be euthanized . A post-mortem examination was conducted, and the kidneys were observed to be smaller than normal with a thickened adherent capsule. A presumptive diagnosis of chronic renal disease was made by the submitting practitioner. Since the inclusion criteria of Canada’s National BSE Surveillance Program were met, arrangements were made to forward appropriate samples for laboratory evaluation.

The birth farm was a commercial beef cow-calf operation. The birth cohort was determined to comprise 72 animals, which along with the case animal, were raised on the farm. Due to the practice of animals being sold in lots from the case premises, 106 animals (including the 72 birth cohorts) were traced. The trace-out investigation of the birth cohort located 6 live animals on the case farm and 3 live animals on a subsequent premises. All of these animals have since been humanely destroyed; their carcasses disposed of by incineration in accordance with the OIE recommendations. The following is the disposition of the remaining animals in the 97 animals:

80 animals were traced and confirmed to have died or been slaughtered, 14 animals were traced and presumed to have died or been slaughtered, 3 animals were determined to be untraceable because of records limitations. FEED INVESTIGATION The feed investigation yielded limited records specific to the animal’s first year of life. All feed products to which the BSE case animal had access were intended for feeding to ruminants.

Routine feeding practices were to provide animals with pasture during the summer months and to provide additional hay and grain during the winter. It was not farm practice to supplement the diets with commercially prepared rations, however due to drought conditions during the animal’s first year of life, three commercially prepared rations were provided in addition to the commonly fed forages, grains, salt and minerals.

For the first seven months of life, the case animal was housed in a cow-calf pen and had pasture access. During this period, the animal received cow’s milk and calf starter and had access to loose mineral, salt blocks and pasture. Beyond seven months to the end of the first year of life, the animal was housed in a calf pen where it received a creep feed, feedlot starter and possibly grain and straw and had access to salt blocks.

The three commercial rations made available to the BSE case animal consisted of a calf starter, a creep feed and a feedlot starter which were manufactured by two different commercial feed manufacturers.

Two forms of salt were used on farm: salt blocks and loose mineral salt. The salt blocks were manufactured by a company which does not handle any prohibited material. The loose mineral salt was manufactured by one of the same facilities which manufactured two of the commercially prepared rations received by the farm.

Neither of the two commercial feed manufacturers has production records dating back to the period of interest. As a result, trace back inspections at the manufacturers of commercial feeds distributed to the birth farm did not yield mixing formulas for the period of interest. As this was subsequent to the implementation of the 1997 Mammalian Feed Ban, it is very unlikely that ruminant meat and bone meal was intentionally used in the formulation of any of the three commercially prepared rations or loose mineral salt distributed to the birth farm.

However, as production records are not available for review, it is not possible to rule out that contamination during production could have taken place. One of the two commercial feed manufacturers did handle ruminant meat and bone meal (prohibited material/PM), however they did have procedures in place to prevent the contamination of ruminant feed with PM. The other commercial feed manufacturer did not handle PM directly, though they did receive a premix used in the manufacture of one of the feeds received by the case farm, from another facility which did handle PM.

INVESTIGATION OVERVIEW The detection of this case does not change any of Canada’s BSE risk parameters. The location and age of the animal are consistent with previous cases. Surveillance results to date, including this case, reflect an extremely low level of BSE in Canada.

Since the confirmation of BSE in a native-born animal in May 2003, Canada has significantly increased its targeted testing of cattle in high-risk categories advocated by the OIE (including non-ambulatory animals). This effort is directed at determining the level of BSE in Canada, while monitoring the effectiveness of the risk-mitigating measures in place. Canada’s National BSE Surveillance Program continues to demonstrate an extremely low level of BSE in Canada, with 14 positive animals detected.

With respect to BSE, the safety of beef produced in Canada is assured by public health measures enacted in 2003. The removal of specific risk material (SRM) - the tissues that have been demonstrated to have the potential to harbour BSE infectivity - from all animals slaughtered for human consumption is the most effective single measure to protect consumers in Canada and importing countries from exposure to BSE infectivity in meat products.

As demonstrated by the surveillance system, the feed ban implemented in 1997 is effectively preventing the amplification of BSE in Canada's feed system. Additional regulations to enhance Canada's feed ban were enacted in 2007. The most important change is the removal of SRM from all animal feeds, pet food and fertilizer. The enhancement will accelerate progress toward eradicating BSE from the national cattle herd by preventing more than 99 per cent of potential BSE infectivity from entering the Canadian feed system. These measures are effectively minimizing the risk of BSE transmission.

Canada is officially categorized under the OIE's science-based system as a controlled BSE risk country. This status clearly recognizes the effectiveness of Canada's surveillance, mitigation and eradication measures, and acknowledges the work done by all levels of government, the cattle industry, veterinarians and ranchers to effectively manage and eventually eradicate BSE in Canada.





http://www.inspection.gc.ca/english/anima/heasan/disemala/bseesb/ab2008/14investe.shtml




P26

TRANSMISSION OF ATYPICAL BOVINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY (BSE) IN HUMANIZED MOUSE MODELS

Liuting Qing1, Fusong Chen1, Michael Payne1, Wenquan Zou1, Cristina Casalone2, Martin Groschup3, Miroslaw Polak4, Maria Caramelli2, Pierluigi Gambetti1, Juergen Richt5*, and Qingzhong Kong1 1Department of Pathology, Case Western Reserve University, Cleveland, OH 44106, USA; 2CEA, Istituto Zooprofilattico Sperimentale, Italy; 3Friedrich-Loeffler-Institut, Germany; 4National Veterinary Research Institute, Poland; 5Kansas State University, Diagnostic Medicine/Pathobiology Department, Manhattan, KS 66506, USA. *Previous address: USDA National Animal Disease Center, Ames, IA 50010, USA

Classical BSE is a world-wide prion disease in cattle, and the classical BSE strain (BSE-C) has led to over 200 cases of clinical human infection (variant CJD). Two atypical BSE strains, BSE-L (also named BASE) and BSE-H, have been discovered in three continents since 2004. The first case of naturally occurring BSE with mutated bovine PrP gene (termed BSE-M) was also found in 2006 in the USA. The transmissibility and phenotypes of these atypical BSE strains/isolates in humans were unknown. We have inoculated humanized transgenic mice with classical and atypical BSE strains (BSE-C, BSE-L, BSE-H) and the BSE-M isolate. We have found that the atypical BSE-L strain is much more virulent than the classical BSE-C. The atypical BSE-H strain is also transmissible in the humanized transgenic mice with distinct phenotype, but no transmission has been observed for the BSE-M isolate so far.

III International Symposium on THE NEW PRION BIOLOGY: BASIC SCIENCE, DIAGNOSIS AND THERAPY 2 - 4 APRIL 2009, VENEZIA (ITALY)



http://www.istitutoveneto.it/prion_09/Abstracts_09.pdf



Research Project: GENETIC AND BIOLOGICAL DETERMINANTS OF RESPIRATORY DISEASE SUSCEPTIBILITY Location: Animal Health Systems Research

Title: Association of a bovine prion gene haplotype with atypical BSE

Author

Clawson, Michael

Submitted to: Meeting Abstract Publication Type: Abstract Publication Acceptance Date: December 2, 2008 Publication Date: January 1, 2009 Citation: Clawson, M.L. 2009. Association of a bovine prion gene haplotype with atypical BSE [abstract]. Plant and Animal Genomes XVII Conference. Abstract No. W091. Available: http://www.intl-pag.org/17/abstracts/

Technical Abstract: Transmissible spongiform encephalopathies (TSEs), also known as prion diseases, are a class of fatal neurodegenerative disorders that occur in humans, ruminants, cats, and mink. Three distinct TSEs afflict cattle: classical bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE), atypical H-type BSE, and atypical L-type BSE. Classical BSE was identified in the 1980s and is acquired by cattle through the consumption of feed contaminated with the infectious prion agent. Atypical BSEs have only recently been recognized as distinct cattle prion diseases and are extremely rare. The full extent of genetic susceptibilities to atypical BSEs is unknown; however, one atypical H-type case identified in the United States (2006) was most likely caused by a genetic mutation in the prion gene, E211K. We have identified an association of a bovine prion DNA haplotype with atypical BSE that is independent of E211K. The haplotype spans a portion of the prion gene that includes part of intron 2, the entire coding region of exon 3, and part of the three prime untranslated region of exon 3 (13 kb). Despite the low frequency of this haplotype among general cattle populations, it was present in a majority of H- and L-type atypical BSE cases from Canada, France, and the United States. This result indicates that there is a genetic component to atypical BSE susceptibility in addition to E211K.



http://www.ars.usda.gov/research/publications/publications.htm?SEQ_NO_115=234699



I ask Professor Kong ;

Thursday, December 04, 2008 3:37 PM Subject: RE: re--Chronic Wating Disease (CWD) and Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathies (BSE): Public Health Risk Assessment

''IS the h-BSE more virulent than typical BSE as well, or the same as cBSE, or less virulent than cBSE? just curious.....''

Professor Kong reply ;

.....snip

''As to the H-BSE, we do not have sufficient data to say one way or another, but we have found that H-BSE can infect humans. I hope we could publish these data once the study is complete. Thanks for your interest.''

Best regards, Qingzhong Kong, PhD Associate Professor Department of Pathology Case Western Reserve University Cleveland, OH 44106 USA

END...TSS

I look forward to further transmission studies, and a true ENHANCED BSE/atypical BSE surveillance program put forth testing all cattle for human and animal consumption for 5 years. a surveillance program that uses the most sensitive TSE testing, and has the personnel that knows how to use them, and can be trusted. I look forward to a stringent mad cow feed ban being put forth, and then strictly enforced. we need a forced, not voluntary feed ban, an enhanced feed ban at that, especially excluding blood. we need some sort of animal traceability. no more excuses about privacy. if somebody is putting out a product that is killing folks and or has the potential to kill you, then everybody needs to know who they are, and where that product came from. same with hospitals, i think medical incidents in all states should be recorded, and made public, when it comes to something like a potential accidental transmission exposure event. so if someone is out there looking at a place to go have surgery done, if you have several hospitals having these type 'accidental exposure events', than you can go some place else. it only makes sense. somewhere along the road, the consumer lost control, and just had to take whatever they were given, and then charged these astronomical prices. some where along the line the consumer just lost interest, especially on a long incubating disease such as mad cow disease i.e. Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy. like i said before, there is much more to the mad cow story than bovines and eating a hamburger, we must start focusing on all TSE in all species. ...TSS

Month Number of Tests

Feb 2009 -- 1,891

Jan 2009 -- 4,620



http://www.aphis.usda.gov/newsroom/hot_issues/bse/surveillance/ongoing_surv_results.shtml



P02.35

Molecular Features of the Protease-resistant Prion Protein (PrPres) in H-type BSE

Biacabe, A-G1; Jacobs, JG2; Gavier-Widén, D3; Vulin, J1; Langeveld, JPM2; Baron, TGM1 1AFSSA, France; 2CIDC-Lelystad, Netherlands; 3SVA, Sweden

Western blot analyses of PrPres accumulating in the brain of BSE-infected cattle have demonstrated 3 different molecular phenotypes regarding to the apparent molecular masses and glycoform ratios of PrPres bands. We initially described isolates (H-type BSE) essentially characterized by higher PrPres molecular mass and decreased levels of the diglycosylated PrPres band, in contrast to the classical type of BSE. This type is also distinct from another BSE phenotype named L-type BSE, or also BASE (for Bovine Amyloid Spongiform Encephalopathy), mainly characterized by a low representation of the diglycosylated PrPres band as well as a lower PrPres molecular mass. Retrospective molecular studies in France of all available BSE cases older than 8 years old and of part of the other cases identified since the beginning of the exhaustive surveillance of the disease in 20001 allowed to identify 7 H-type BSE cases, among 594 BSE cases that could be classified as classical, L- or H-type BSE. By Western blot analysis of H-type PrPres, we described a remarkable specific feature with antibodies raised against the C-terminal region of PrP that demonstrated the existence of a more C-terminal cleaved form of PrPres (named PrPres#2 ), in addition to the usual PrPres form (PrPres #1). In the unglycosylated form, PrPres #2 migrates at about 14 kDa, compared to 20 kDa for PrPres #1. The proportion of the PrPres#2 in cattle seems to by higher compared to the PrPres#1. Furthermore another PK-resistant fragment at about 7 kDa was detected by some more N-terminal antibodies and presumed to be the result of cleavages of both N- and C-terminal parts of PrP. These singular features were maintained after transmission of the disease to C57Bl/6 mice. The identification of these two additional PrPres fragments (PrPres #2 and 7kDa band) reminds features reported respectively in sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease and in Gerstmann-Sträussler-Scheinker (GSS) syndrome in humans.



http://www.neuroprion.com/pdf_docs/conferences/prion2007/abstract_book.pdf



Research Project: Study of Atypical Bse Location: Virus and Prion Diseases of Livestock

Project Number: 3625-32000-086-05 Project Type: Specific Cooperative Agreement

Start Date: Sep 15, 2004 End Date: Sep 14, 2009

Objective: The objective of this cooperative research project with Dr. Maria Caramelli from the Italian BSE Reference Laboratory in Turin, Italy, is to conduct comparative studies with the U.S. bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) isolate and the atypical BSE isolates identified in Italy. The studies will cover the following areas: 1. Evaluation of present diagnostics tools used in the U.S. for the detection of atypical BSE cases. 2. Molecular comparison of the U.S. BSE isolate and other typical BSE isolates with atypical BSE cases. 3. Studies on transmissibility and tissue distribution of atypical BSE isolates in cattle and other species.

Approach: This project will be done as a Specific Cooperative Agreement with the Italian BSE Reference Laboratory, Istituto Zooprofilattico Sperimentale del Piemonte, in Turin, Italy. It is essential for the U.S. BSE surveillance program to analyze the effectiveness of the U.S diagnostic tools for detection of atypical cases of BSE. Molecular comparisons of the U.S. BSE isolate with atypical BSE isolates will provide further characterization of the U.S. BSE isolate. Transmission studies are already underway using brain homogenates from atypical BSE cases into mice, cattle and sheep. It will be critical to see whether the atypical BSE isolates behave similarly to typical BSE isolates in terms of transmissibility and disease pathogenesis. If transmission occurs, tissue distribution comparisons will be made between cattle infected with the atypical BSE isolate and the U.S. BSE isolate. Differences in tissue distribution could require new regulations regarding specific risk material (SRM) removal.



http://www.ars.usda.gov/research/projects/projects.htm?ACCN_NO=408490



Wednesday, February 11, 2009

Atypical BSE North America Update February 2009

Both of the BSE cases ascertained in the US native-born cattle were atypical cases (H-type), which contributed to the initial ambiguity of the diagnosis. 174, 185 In Canada, there have been 2 atypical BSE cases in addition to the 14 cases of the classic UK strain of BSE2: one was the H-type, and the other was of the L-type.198

snip...end

source :

Enhanced Abstract Journal of the American Veterinary Medical Association January 1, 2009, Vol. 234, No. 1, Pages 59-72

Bovine spongiform encephalopathy

Jane L. Harman, DVM, PhD; Christopher J. Silva, PhD



http://avmajournals.avma.org/doi/ref/10.2460/javma.234.1.59



Atypical BSE North America Update February 2009



http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2009/02/atypical-bse-north-america-update.html



Thursday, April 9, 2009

Docket No. FDA2002N0031 (formerly Docket No. 2002N0273) RIN 0910AF46 Substances Prohibited From Use in Animal Food or Feed; Final Rule: Proposed



http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2009/04/docket-no-fda2002n0031-formerly-docket.html



please see ;



http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2009/04/docket-no-fda2002n0031-formerly-docket.html#comments



TSS COMMENT SUBMISSION # 5

Docket ID FDA-2002-N-0031 Docket Title Animal Proteins Prohibited in Ruminant Feed Document ID FDA-2002-N-0031-0132 Document Title Substances Prohibited From Use in Animal Food or Feed; Final Rule: Proposed Delay of Effective Date

Completely Edited Version

PRION ROUNDTABLE

2003

page 29

Dr. Linda Detwiler

The UK imports into the US.

There were 496 total, and 173 of the UK imports could have entered the US feed system. People don't like to hear this, but it's possible that one of the UK imports in the US entered the animal feed system and was exported to Canada. That's a possibility, because they import 50% of their feed from the US.

From 1994, we imported 11 million head of cattle from Canada. Most of these were feedlot animals for slaughter, but there were about 500,000 breeding animals. A number of Canada's cull cows were slaughtered here and could have introduced infectivity into our system. Even today we have Canadian imports in the country, breeding animals that were brought in prior to the ban and reside here.

We have feed ban exemptions: plate waste, poultry litter. We still allow that if it comes off a human plate, or if it's trimmings, it can be palletized and fed to ruminants. That might be a small amount, but it could allow spinal cord in certain cuts to be fed back to ruminants. Poultry litter or feather meal could be significant. Poultry is getting quite a bit of ruminant material in the US because it cannot go back to ruminants. Poultry and pigs are getting a substantial amount. Poultry litter is not only what passes through the chicken, but think about how chickens eat. They spill a lot on the floor. That stuff is still allowed to be fed back to cattle. That's a direct break in the ban, except that it's legal. Ruminants are getting ruminant material.

Unfiltered tallow: tallow is a lipid material. However, if it's not filtered, there are protein residues. That's meat and bone meal. That's allowed to be fed, so that's another legal exception where you can feed ruminant meat and bone meal through unfiltered tallow. We don't have an SRM ban and the 40 animals are the ones that if you have the agent, they introduce the most infectivity back into the animal food chain when they're rendered.

What's our on-farm compliance? We really don't know. ...snip...end...Dr. Linda Detwiler

UK EXPORTS OF MBM TO WORLD



http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/mb/m11g/tab05.pdf



OTHERS



BEEF AND VEAL



http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/mb/m11f/tab08.pdf



http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/mb/m11f/tab09.pdf



http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/mb/m11f/tab10.pdf



LIVE CATTLE



http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/mb/m11f/tab11.pdf



FATS



http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/mb/m11g/tab01.pdf



EMBRYOS



http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/mb/m11g/tab03.pdf



GELATIN ETC



http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/mb/m11g/tab02.pdf



SEMEN



http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/mb/m11g/tab04.pdf



MEAT



http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/mb/m11g/tab05.pdf




USA BSE GBR



http://www.efsa.europa.eu/EFSA/efsa_locale-1178620753812_1178620779461.htm



http://www.efsa.europa.eu/EFSA/Scientific_Document/sr03_biohaz02_usa_report_annex_en1.pdf?ssbinary=true



http://www.efsa.europa.eu/EFSA/Scientific_Document/sr03_biohaz02_usa_report_v2_en1.pdf?ssbinary=true



http://www.efsa.europa.eu/EFSA/Scientific_Document/sr03_biohaz02_usa_report_summary_en1.pdf?ssbinary=true



CANADA BSE GBR



http://www.mvo.nl/wetgeving-dierlijk-vet/onderzoek/download/EFSA%20on%20BSE%20risk%20Canada%20jul%202004.pdf



MEXICO BSE GBR



http://www.mvo.nl/wetgeving-dierlijk-vet/onderzoek/download/EFSA%20on%20BSE%20risk%20Mexico%20jul%202004.pdf








Wednesday, April 16, 2008 MBM, greaves, meat offal, live cattle, imports from UK to USA vs Canada "Three of four possible manufacturers supplying a protein supplement likely fed to the animal could have included meat and bone meal (MBM) as an ingredient in its formulation. One of these manufacturers was able to confirm usage of meat and bone meal in supplements and confirm a source of MBM to be one common to previous BSE investigations."

USA AND CANADA IMPORTS OF UK CATTLE BETWEEN 1981 - 1989

USA = 496

CANADA = 198

*add 14 to 198 as last UK import to Canada, 14 in 1990



http://www.inspection.gc.ca/english/sci/ahra/bseris/bserise.pdf



HERE is another look at all the imports for both the USA and Canada of UK live cattle and greaves exports ;

UK Exports of Live Cattle by Value 1986-96

USA 697 LIVE CATTLE

CANADA 299 LIVE CATTLE



http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/mb/m11f/tab11.pdf



UK TABLE of Exports of meal of meat and meat offal; greaves 1979 - 1995

USA 24 TONS

CANADA 83 TONS



http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/mb/m12/tab12.pdf



HOWEVER, my files show 44 tons of greaves for USA. ...TSS



Subject: Re: exports from the U.K. of it's MBM to U.S.??? From: mhtml:%7B33B38F65-8D2E-434D-8F9B-8BDCD77D3066%7Dmid://00000199/!x-usc:mailto:S.J.Pearsall@esg.maff.gsi.gov.uk Date: Tue, 8 Feb 2000 14:03:16 +0000 To: mhtml:%7B33B38F65-8D2E-434D-8F9B-8BDCD77D3066%7Dmid://00000199/!x-usc:mailto:flounder@wt.net (Receipt Notification Requested) (Non Receipt Notification Requested)



Terry



Meat and bonemeal is not specifically classified for overseas trade purposes. The nearest equivalent is listed as flours and meals of meat or offals (including tankage), unfit for human consumption; greaves. UK exports of this to the US are listed below:

Country Tonnes

1980 1981 12 1982 1983 1984 10 1985 2 1986 1987 1988 1989 20 1990

Data for exports between 1975 and 1979 are not readily available. These can be obtained (at a charge) from data retailers appointed by HM Customs and Excise: BTSL (Tel: 01372 463121) or Abacus (01245 252222). Best wishes Simon Pearsall Overseas trade statistics Stats (C&F)C

============ END...TSS...2008============

P04.27

Experimental BSE Infection of Non-human Primates: Efficacy of the Oral Route

snip...full text ;



http://prionunitusaupdate2008.blogspot.com/2009/04/r-calf-and-usa-mad-cow-problem-dont.html#comments



Sunday, April 12, 2009 r-calf and the USA mad cow problem, don't look, don't find, and then blame Canada



http://prionunitusaupdate2008.blogspot.com/2009/04/r-calf-and-usa-mad-cow-problem-dont.html



http://prionunitusaupdate2008.blogspot.com/2009/04/cjd-foundation-sides-with-r-calfers-no.html#comments



FDA2002N0031

r-calf



http://www.regulations.gov/fdmspublic/ContentViewer?objectId=0900006480952081&disposition=attachment&contentType=pdf



CJD FOUNDATION



http://www.regulations.gov/fdmspublic/component/main?main=DocumentDetail&o=090000648094d9f9



greetings,

i don't think i interpreted anything about USA mad cow problem, and or USA mad cow feed problem, of which is what this docket was for. in 2007, in one fda warning letter week, two warning letters, where 10,000,000 pounds of suspect banned mad cow feed went into commerce to be fed out. and 2006 was a banner year as well for USA MAD COW FEED that was banned, that went into commerce to be fed out. why does r-calf not mention this $$$ or the failed, flawed, and corrupt 2004 ENHANCED BSE SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM, that was nothing more of another mad cow cover-up. we all know it. OIG said it, in it's own way, and Paul Brown of CDC said it in plain terms. hmmm, no mention there either by r-calf$ that's what the r-calf is all about. they are playing some like a deck of cards.

nothing more of the same, big, big, denial, and that' s what anyone that signed that letter with r-calf ET AL supported, a big denial. ...TSS

Month Number of Tests

Feb 2009 -- 1,891

Jan 2009 -- 4,620



http://www.aphis.usda.gov/newsroom/hot_issues/bse/surveillance/ongoing_surv_results.shtml



unday, April 12, 2009

BSE MAD COW TESTING USA 2009 FIGURES



http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2009/04/bse-mad-cow-testing-usa-2009-figures.html



Saturday, January 24, 2009

Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy h-BSE ATYPICAL USA 2008 Annual Report Research Project: Study of Atypical Bse

Location: Virus and Prion Diseases of Livestock

2008 Annual Report



http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2009/01/bovine-spongiform-encephalopathy-h-bse.html



Thursday, December 04, 2008 2:37 PM

"we have found that H-BSE can infect humans."

personal communication with Professor Kong. ...TSS

see full text ;



http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2009/02/atypical-bse-north-america-update.html



MAD COW DISEASE USA DECEMBER 28, 2008 an 8 year review of a failed and flawed policy



http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2008/12/mad-cow-disease-usa-december-28-2008-8.html



Wednesday, February 04, 2009

Creutzfeldt-Jacob disease presenting as severe depression: a case report



http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2009/02/creutzfeldt-jacob-disease-presenting-as.html



CJD QUESTIONNAIRE USA CWRU AND CJD FOUNDATION



http://cjdquestionnaire.blogspot.com/

BSE MAD COW TESTING USA 2009 FIGURES

Month Number of Tests

Feb 2009 -- 1,891

Jan 2009 -- 4,620




http://www.aphis.usda.gov/newsroom/hot_issues/bse/surveillance/ongoing_surv_results.shtml




2009

ACTIVE TSE SURVEILLANCE IN GREAT BRITAIN

Current Surveys

NB, these figures do not reflect those samples unsuitable for testing.

YEAR BSE SURVEYS NUMBER OF ANIMALS TESTED NUMBER OF ANIMALS TESTED WITH OUTCOME PENDING NUMBER OF ANIMALS TESTED IN WHICH BSE NOT CONFIRMED NUMBER OF ANIMALS TESTED IN WHICH BSE CONFIRMED

2009 Fallen Stock 39433 0 39431 2

2009 Emergency Slaughter > 48 months 2 0 2 0

2009 Ante-Mortem Inspection > 48 months 2 0 2 0

2009 Emergency Slaughter Casualties at Fresh Meat Plants 358 0 358 0

2009 Ante-Mortem Inspection Casualties at Fresh Meat Plants 139 0 139 0

2009 Healthy slaughtered animals aged over 48 months, born before August 1996 474 0 474 0

2009 Healthy slaughtered fresh meat animals aged over 48 months, born after July 1996 100452 0 100452 0

2009 BSE culling 5 0 5 0

Total for animals born in 96/97 Cohort (including fallen stock, casualties etc) 7757 0 7757 0

Total for other test categories as at 3 April 2009 133108 0 133106 2

Total for all Cattle tested between 1 January 2009 - 3 April 2009 140865 0 140863 2

2001-09 All cattle tested 3993513 0 3991667 1846




http://www.defra.gov.uk/vla/science/docs/sci_tse_stats_active.pdf





USDA: In 9,200 cases only one type of test could be used

WASHINGTON (AP)--The U.S. Department of Agriculture acknowledged Aug. 17 that its testing options for bovine spongiform encephalopathy were limited in 9,200 cases despite its effort to expand surveillance throughout the U.S. herd.

In those cases, only one type of test was used--one that failed to detect the disease in an infected Texas cow.

The department posted the information on its website because of an inquiry from The Associated Press.

Conducted over the past 14 months, the tests have not been included in the department's running tally of BSE tests since last summer. That total reached 439,126 on Aug. 17.

"There's no secret program," the department's chief veterinarian, John Clifford, said in an interview. "There has been no hiding, I can assure you of that."

Officials intended to report the tests later in an annual report, Clifford said.

These 9,200 cases were different because brain tissue samples were preserved with formalin, which makes them suitable for only one type of test--immunohistochemistry, or IHC.

In the Texas case, officials had declared the cow free of disease in November after an IHC test came back negative. The department's inspector general ordered an additional kind of test, which confirmed the animal was infected.

Veterinarians in remote locations have used the preservative on tissue to keep it from degrading on its way to the department's laboratory in Ames, Iowa. Officials this year asked veterinarians to stop using preservative and send fresh or chilled samples within 48 hours.

The department recently investigated a possible case of BSE that turned up in a preserved sample. Further testing ruled out the disease two weeks ago.

Scientists used two additional tests--rapid screening and Western blot--to help detect BSE in the country's second confirmed case, in a Texas cow in June. They used IHC and Western blot to confirm the first case, in a Washington state cow in December 2003.

"The IHC test is still an excellent test," Clifford said. "These are not simple tests, either."

Clifford pointed out that scientists reran the IHC several times and got conflicting results. That happened, too, with the Western blot test. Both tests are accepted by international animal health officials.

Date: 8/25/05




http://www.hpj.com/archives/2005/aug05/aug29/BSEtestoptionswerelimited.cfm




""These 9,200 cases were different because brain tissue samples were preserved with formalin, which makes them suitable for only one type of test--immunohistochemistry, or IHC."

THIS WAS DONE FOR A REASON!



THE IHC test has been proven to be the LEAST LIKELY to detect BSE/TSE in the bovine, and these were probably from the most high risk cattle pool, the ones the USDA et al, SHOULD have been testing. ...TSS



USDA 2003

We have to be careful that we don't get so set in the way we do things that we forget to look for different emerging variations of disease. We've gotten away from collecting the whole brain in our systems. We're using the brain stem and we're looking in only one area. In Norway, they were doing a project and looking at cases of Scrapie, and they found this where they did not find lesions or PRP in the area of the obex. They found it in the cerebellum and the cerebrum. It's a good lesson for us. Ames had to go back and change the procedure for looking at Scrapie samples. In the USDA, we had routinely looked at all the sections of the brain, and then we got away from it. They've recently gone back. Dr. Keller: Tissues are routinely tested, based on which tissue provides an 'official' test result as recognized by APHIS.

Dr. Detwiler: That's on the slaughter. But on the clinical cases, aren't they still asking for the brain? But even on the slaughter, they're looking only at the brainstem. We may be missing certain things if we confine ourselves to one area.

snip.............

Dr. Detwiler: It seems a good idea, but I'm not aware of it. Another important thing to get across to the public is that the negatives do not guarantee absence of infectivity. The animal could be early in the disease and the incubation period. Even sample collection is so important. If you're not collecting the right area of the brain in sheep, or if collecting lymphoreticular tissue, and you don't get a good biopsy, you could miss the area with the PRP in it and come up with a negative test. There's a new, unusual form of Scrapie that's been detected in Norway. We have to be careful that we don't get so set in the way we do things that we forget to look for different emerging variations of disease. We've gotten away from collecting the whole brain in our systems. We're using the brain stem and we're looking in only one area. In Norway, they were doing a project and looking at cases of Scrapie, and they found this where they did not find lesions or PRP in the area of the obex. They found it in the cerebellum and the cerebrum. It's a good lesson for us. Ames had to go back and change the procedure for looking at Scrapie samples. In the USDA, we had routinely looked at all the sections of the brain, and then we got away from it. They've recently gone back.

Dr. Keller: Tissues are routinely tested, based on which tissue provides an 'official' test result as recognized by APHIS .

Dr. Detwiler: That's on the slaughter. But on the clinical cases, aren't they still asking for the brain? But even on the slaughter, they're looking only at the brainstem. We may be missing certain things if we confine ourselves to one area.

snip...

FULL TEXT;

Completely Edited Version PRION ROUNDTABLE

Accomplished this day, Wednesday, December 11, 2003, Denver, Colorado

2005

=============================

CDC DR. PAUL BROWN TSE EXPERT COMMENTS 2006

The U.S. Department of Agriculture was quick to assure the public earlier this week that the third case of mad cow disease did not pose a risk to them, but what federal officials have not acknowledged is that this latest case indicates the deadly disease has been circulating in U.S. herds for at least a decade.

The second case, which was detected last year in a Texas cow and which USDA officials were reluctant to verify, was approximately 12 years old.

These two cases (the latest was detected in an Alabama cow) present a picture of the disease having been here for 10 years or so, since it is thought that cows usually contract the disease from contaminated feed they consume as calves. The concern is that humans can contract a fatal, incurable, brain-wasting illness from consuming beef products contaminated with the mad cow pathogen.

"The fact the Texas cow showed up fairly clearly implied the existence of other undetected cases," Dr. Paul Brown, former medical director of the National Institutes of Health's Laboratory for Central Nervous System Studies and an expert on mad cow-like diseases, told United Press International. "The question was, 'How many?' and we still can't answer that."

Brown, who is preparing a scientific paper based on the latest two mad cow cases to estimate the maximum number of infected cows that occurred in the United States, said he has "absolutely no confidence in USDA tests before one year ago" because of the agency's reluctance to retest the Texas cow that initially tested positive.

USDA officials finally retested the cow and confirmed it was infected seven months later, but only at the insistence of the agency's inspector general.

"Everything they did on the Texas cow makes everything USDA did before 2005 suspect," Brown said. ...snip...end

http://www.upi.com/ConsumerHealthDaily/view.php?StoryID=20060315-055557-1284r

CDC - Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy and Variant Creutzfeldt ... Dr. Paul Brown is Senior Research Scientist in the Laboratory of Central Nervous System ... Address for correspondence: Paul Brown, Building 36, Room 4A-05, ...

http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/eid/vol7no1/brown.htm

In this context, a word is in order about the US testing program. After the discovery of the first (imported) cow in 2003, the magnitude of testing was much increased, reaching a level of >400,000 tests in 2005 (Figure 4). Neither of the 2 more recently indigenously infected older animals with nonspecific clinical features would have been detected without such testing, and neither would have been identified as atypical without confirmatory Western blots. Despite these facts, surveillance has now been decimated to 40,000 annual tests (USDA news release no. 0255.06, July 20, 2006) and invites the accusation that the United States will never know the true status of its involvement with BSE.

In short, a great deal of further work will need to be done before the phenotypic features and prevalence of atypical BSE are understood. More than a single strain may have been present from the beginning of the epidemic, but this possibility has been overlooked by virtue of the absence of widespread Western blot confirmatory testing of positive screening test results; or these new phenotypes may be found, at least in part, to result from infections at an older age by a typical BSE agent, rather than neonatal infections with new "strains" of BSE. Neither alternative has yet been investigated.




http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/EID/vol12no12/06-0965.htm




http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2009/02/report-on-testing-ruminants-for-tses-in.html




FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE Statement May 4, 2004 Media Inquiries: 301-827-6242 Consumer Inquiries: 888-INFO-FDA

Statement on Texas Cow With Central Nervous System Symptoms On Friday, April 30 th , the Food and Drug Administration learned that a cow with central nervous system symptoms had been killed and shipped to a processor for rendering into animal protein for use in animal feed.

FDA, which is responsible for the safety of animal feed, immediately began an investigation. On Friday and throughout the weekend, FDA investigators inspected the slaughterhouse, the rendering facility, the farm where the animal came from, and the processor that initially received the cow from the slaughterhouse.

FDA's investigation showed that the animal in question had already been rendered into "meat and bone meal" (a type of protein animal feed). Over the weekend FDA was able to track down all the implicated material. That material is being held by the firm, which is cooperating fully with FDA.

Cattle with central nervous system symptoms are of particular interest because cattle with bovine spongiform encephalopathy or BSE, also known as "mad cow disease," can exhibit such symptoms. In this case, there is no way now to test for BSE. But even if the cow had BSE, FDA's animal feed rule would prohibit the feeding of its rendered protein to other ruminant animals (e.g., cows, goats, sheep, bison).

FDA is sending a letter to the firm summarizing its findings and informing the firm that FDA will not object to use of this material in swine feed only. If it is not used in swine feed, this material will be destroyed. Pigs have been shown not to be susceptible to BSE. If the firm agrees to use the material for swine feed only, FDA will track the material all the way through the supply chain from the processor to the farm to ensure that the feed is properly monitored and used only as feed for pigs.

To protect the U.S. against BSE, FDA works to keep certain mammalian protein out of animal feed for cattle and other ruminant animals. FDA established its animal feed rule in 1997 after the BSE epidemic in the U.K. showed that the disease spreads by feeding infected ruminant protein to cattle.

Under the current regulation, the material from this Texas cow is not allowed in feed for cattle or other ruminant animals. FDA's action specifying that the material go only into swine feed means also that it will not be fed to poultry.

FDA is committed to protecting the U.S. from BSE and collaborates closely with the U.S. Department of Agriculture on all BSE issues. The animal feed rule provides crucial protection against the spread of BSE, but it is only one of several such firewalls. FDA will soon be improving the animal feed rule, to make this strong system even stronger.

####




http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/news/2004/new01061.html




USDA: In 9,200 cases only one type of test could be used

WASHINGTON (AP)--The U.S. Department of Agriculture acknowledged Aug. 17 that its testing options for bovine spongiform encephalopathy were limited in 9,200 cases despite its effort to expand surveillance throughout the U.S. herd.

In those cases, only one type of test was used--one that failed to detect the disease in an infected Texas cow.

The department posted the information on its website because of an inquiry from The Associated Press.

Conducted over the past 14 months, the tests have not been included in the department's running tally of BSE tests since last summer. That total reached 439,126 on Aug. 17.

"There's no secret program," the department's chief veterinarian, John Clifford, said in an interview. "There has been no hiding, I can assure you of that."

Officials intended to report the tests later in an annual report, Clifford said.

These 9,200 cases were different because brain tissue samples were preserved with formalin, which makes them suitable for only one type of test--immunohistochemistry, or IHC.

In the Texas case, officials had declared the cow free of disease in November after an IHC test came back negative. The department's inspector general ordered an additional kind of test, which confirmed the animal was infected.

Veterinarians in remote locations have used the preservative on tissue to keep it from degrading on its way to the department's laboratory in Ames, Iowa. Officials this year asked veterinarians to stop using preservative and send fresh or chilled samples within 48 hours.

The department recently investigated a possible case of BSE that turned up in a preserved sample. Further testing ruled out the disease two weeks ago.

Scientists used two additional tests--rapid screening and Western blot--to help detect BSE in the country's second confirmed case, in a Texas cow in June. They used IHC and Western blot to confirm the first case, in a Washington state cow in December 2003.

"The IHC test is still an excellent test," Clifford said. "These are not simple tests, either."

Clifford pointed out that scientists reran the IHC several times and got conflicting results. That happened, too, with the Western blot test. Both tests are accepted by international animal health officials.

Date: 8/25/05




http://www.hpj.com/archives/2005/aug05/aug29/BSEtestoptionswerelimited.cfm




""These 9,200 cases were different because brain tissue samples were preserved with formalin, which makes them suitable for only one type of test--immunohistochemistry, or IHC."

THIS WAS DONE FOR A REASON!

As for lowering standards, R-CALF has referenced the OIE (World Organization for Animal Health) as the authority on animal health issues. That's fine, as far as it goes. Trouble is, the OIE does not set standards, as R-CALF has claimed. Further, the OIE does not recommend countries ban meat imported - with SRMs removed - from countries with low or high BSE risk, contrary to R-CALF's implication.

In addition, there are no standards recognized for importing meat from minimal- or low-risk BSE countries. The U.S. is trying to set standards as precedent for trade, based on nearly 20 years of science. R-CALF wants trade only with countries who have never had a BSE case. They have not explained how many years they want the rest of the world to sit around and wait until it's okay to trust science and begin trading. Or how they would justify keeping imports out if ever a BSE case was discovered in the U.S. or export again ever.




http://www.mad-cow-facts.com/News-Commentary/r-calf-bullard-4-4-05.htm




JUST ABOUT EVERY COUNTRY THAT WENT BY THOSE FAILED OIE BSE GUIDELINES WENT DOWN WITH BSE. ...TSS

OH, NOT TO FOGET ;

Owner and Corporation Plead Guilty to Defrauding Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Surveillance Program

An Arizona meat processing company and its owner pled guilty in February 2007 to charges of theft of Government funds, mail fraud, and wire fraud. The owner and his company defrauded the BSE Surveillance Program when they falsified BSE Surveillance Data Collection Forms and then submitted payment requests to USDA for the services. In addition to the targeted sample population (those cattle that were more than 30 months old or had other risk factors for BSE), the owner submitted to USDA, or caused to be submitted, BSE obex (brain stem) samples from healthy USDA-inspected cattle. As a result, the owner fraudulently received approximately $390,000. Sentencing is scheduled for May 2007.

snip...

4 USDA OIG SEMIANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS FY 2007 1st Half



http://www.usda.gov/oig/webdocs/sarc070619.pdf





In 2007, in one weekly enforcement report, the fda recalled 10,000,000+ pounds of BANNED MAD COW FEED, 'in commerce', and i can tell you that most of it was fed out ;


10,000,000+ LBS. of PROHIBITED BANNED MAD COW FEED I.E. MBM IN COMMERCE USA 2007

Date: March 21, 2007 at 2:27 pm PST REASON Blood meal used to make cattle feed was recalled because it was cross-contaminated with prohibited bovine meat and bone meal that had been manufactured on common equipment and labeling did not bear cautionary BSE statement.

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 42,090 lbs. DISTRIBUTION WI

REASON Products manufactured from bulk feed containing blood meal that was cross contaminated with prohibited meat and bone meal and the labeling did not bear cautionary BSE statement.

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 9,997,976 lbs. DISTRIBUTION ID and NV

END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR MARCH 21, 2007




http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/enforce/2007/ENF00996.html




Subject: MAD COW FEED RECALL USA SEPT 6, 2006 1961.72 TONS IN COMMERCE AL, TN, AND WV Date: September 6, 2006 at 7:58 am PST

snip...

see listings and references of enormous amounts of banned mad cow protein 'in commerce' in 2006 and 2005 ;

see full text ;

Friday, April 25, 2008 Substances Prohibited From Use in Animal Food or Feed [Docket No. 2002N-0273] (Formerly Docket No. 02N-0273) RIN 0910-AF46




http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2008/04/substances-prohibited-from-use-in.html





SPECIFIED RISK MATERIALS




http://madcowspontaneousnot.blogspot.com/2008/02/specified-risk-materials-srm.html




SRM MAD COW RECALL 406 THOUSAND POUNDS CATTLE HEADS WITH TONSILS KANSAS




http://cjdmadcowbaseoct2007.blogspot.com/2008/04/srm-mad-cow-recall-406-thousand-pounds.html




Thursday, April 9, 2009

Docket No. FDA2002N0031 (formerly Docket No. 2002N0273) RIN 0910AF46 Substances Prohibited From Use in Animal Food or Feed; Final Rule: Proposed




http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2009/04/docket-no-fda2002n0031-formerly-docket.html




Thursday, December 04, 2008 2:37 PM


"we have found that H-BSE can infect humans."


personal communication with Professor Kong. ...TSS

see full text ;




http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2009/02/atypical-bse-north-america-update.html




Saturday, January 24, 2009

Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy h-BSE ATYPICAL USA 2008 Annual Report Research Project: Study of Atypical Bse

Location: Virus and Prion Diseases of Livestock

2008 Annual Report




http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2009/01/bovine-spongiform-encephalopathy-h-bse.html




SCHOOL LUNCH PROGRAM FROM DOWNER CATTLE UPDATE

IS THERE A SCRAPIE-LIKE DISEASE IN CATTLE ?

In April of 1985, a mink rancher in Wisconsin reported a debilitating neurologic disease in his herd which we diagnosed as TME by histopathologic findings confirmed by experimental transmission to mink and squirrel monkeys. The rancher was a ''dead stock'' feeder using mostly (>95%) downer or dead dairy cattle and a few horses. She had never been fed.

We believe that these findings may indicate the presence of a previously unrecognized scrapie-like disease in cattle and wish to alert dairy practitioners to this possibility.

snip...

PROCEEDINGS OF THE SEVENTH ANNUAL WESTERN CONFERENCE FOR FOOD ANIMAL VETERINARY MEDICINE, University of Arizona, March 17-19, 1986




http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/mb/m09a/tab01.pdf




http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/mb/m09/tab05.pdf




IS THERE A SCRAPIE-LIKE DISEASE IN CATTLE ?

YOU BET THERE IS, AND HAS BEEN, AND WE BEEN FEEDING THE MOST HIGH RISK I.E. DEAD STOCK DOWNER COWS TO OUR CHILDREN FOR DECADES, who will follow these children for human TSE from mad cow disease here in the USA in the years, decades to come, and how many will they expose from the 'pass it forward' friendly fire modes ???



http://downercattle.blogspot.com/2008/12/evaluation-of-fsis-management-controls.html




http://downercattle.blogspot.com/




Saturday, March 14, 2009 Agriculture Secretary Tom Vilsack Announces Final Rule for Handling of Non-Ambulatory Cattle

Release No. 0060.09 Contact: Amanda Eamich (202) 720-9113




http://downercattle.blogspot.com/2009/03/agriculture-secretary-tom-vilsack.html




http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2009/04/docket-no-fda2002n0031-formerly-docket.html




TSS

JAPAN-Local governments to carry on BSE testing despite subsidy cuts

11/03/2009 00:54:58

Japan-BSE Testing.

JAPAN-Local governments to carry on BSE testing despite subsidy cuts



Every local government across the country with meat inspection facilities will continue to test all beef cows for mad cow disease during the next fiscal year, a Mainichi survey has found.

The finding comes despite the central government’s abolition of about 200 million yen in annual subsidies to local governments for bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) tests. Japan is the only country where all beef cows are tested for the disease.

In August 2005, the Health, Labor and Welfare Ministry deemed that there is no need for BSE tests on cows 20 months old or younger, on the grounds that no cow born before January 2002 has been found infected with BSE and that there is little chance of finding BSE in such young cows even if they have been infected.

Nevertheless, the ministry had extended subsidies to local governments conducting BSE tests on all beef cows until July last year.

Officials in charge at all 77 prefectural and municipal governments that have beef inspection facilities said they will continue BSE tests on all beef cows in fiscal 2009.

Among the reasons given was the need to "maintain the brand image of their locally produced beef" and "prevent confusion in the marketing process."

However, 30 government bodies said that there was no discussion on whether to continue testing. The survey also suggested that governments tend to abide by the policy of their peers and requests from local residents.

"It would take a lot of nerve to stop it while other prefectures are continuing it," said an official at the Akita Prefectural Government.

"We’d like to stop it but we can’t gain support from local residents," a Miyagi Prefectural Government representative said. An official at the Yokohama Municipal Government said that the national government needs to take the initiative in convincing the public of the safety of beef.

The Toyohashi Municipal Government in Aichi Prefecture called on the national government to organize a nationwide BSE testing system. "Since beef is marketed in widespread areas, there is no point in conducting inspections on them unless they are coordinated.."

The government has also applied with the World Organization for Animal Health to raise its evaluation of Japan’s BSE countermeasures from the lowest level of "a country whose BSE risk is unknown" to the middle level of "a country having a controlled BSE risk.."

Japan filed the application after it was decided to abolish a practice called "pithing" at all meat treatment centers across the country by the end of this fiscal year. In pithing, a wire is inserted into the cow’s head to destroy the brains and spinal marrow and to prevent them from thrashing around. The practice is feared to raise the risk of BSE infections.

The government expects its application to be approved at a general meeting of the organization to be held in May this year.



http://www.farminguk.com/news/Japan-BSE-Testing.12958.asp





I applaud Japans effort to continue to try and eradicate BSE (TSE) i.e. mad cow from their herds. A far cry as to what the USDA has done here in the USA. they did just the opposite. the truth hurts sometimes when reality sets in $$$


WITHOUT a doubt, IF the USA, Canada, and Mexico can have a terribly flawed favorable rating, even though they are BSE GBR risk factor III, and even at that it was on flawed data, with all this, why not Japan being as controlled as the USA and North America ??? it's all about money is it not $$$ that's what Prusiner et al told the hearing committee in California ;


DAMNING TESTIMONY FROM STANLEY PRUSINER THE NOBEL PEACE PRIZE WINNER ON PRIONS SPEAKING ABOUT ANN VENEMAN ''they don't wanna know, the dont' care''





----- Original Message ----- From: TERRY SINGELTARY To: mhtml:%7B33B38F65-8D2E-434D-8F9B-8BDCD77D3066%7Dmid://00000049/!x-usc:mailto:BSE-L@LISTS.AEGEE.ORG Cc:
Sent: Friday, March 06, 2009 4:27 PM Subject: Risk of Introduction of BSE into Japan by the Historical Importation of Live Cattle from the United Kingdom

Journal of Veterinary Medical Science

Vol. 71 (2009) , No. 2 February pp.133-138

Risk of Introduction of BSE into Japan by the Historical Importation of Live Cattle from the United Kingdom

Katsuaki SUGIURA1), Toyoko KUSAMA1), Tomotaro YOSHIDA1), Naoki SHINODA1) and Takashi ONODERA2)

1) Food and Agricultural Materials Inspection Center 2) Department of Molecular Immunology, University of Tokyo

(Received 10-Mar-2008) (Accepted 3-Sep-2008)

ABSTRACT. All cattle imported from the United Kingdom to Japan since 1980 and slaughtered before 2002 were traced (n=33), and the number of cattle that were possibly infected with BSE and entered the animal feed chain was calculated. Because there was no effective system to avoid recycling of the BSE agent via animal feed until the early 1990s, of the 33 cattle imported from the UK into Japan, most probably 7 or 8 were infected and entered the animal feed chain, 2 of which entered the animal feed chain in each of 1992 and 1993. In terms of infectivity, 400-550 cattle oral ID50 of the BSE agent entered the feed chain in each of these years. The amount of infectivity that entered the feed chain in 1989, 1991 and 1995 was smaller but still substantial, suggesting that the BSE agent might have entered the Japanese feed chain in any of these years.

KEY WORDS: bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE), import risk analysis, Japan, live cattle, simulation

snip...

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

The results of this study indicate that, if BSE had been introduced into Japan by live cattle imported from the UK, it would have most probably entered Japan through cattle imported in 1987 and 1988 and that infectivity would then have been most likely introduced into the feed system through MBM produced from carcasses or waste materials from one or more of these cattle when they were slaughtered or died during 1992–1993. This is consistent with the results of Sugiura’s previous study reported in 2004 [11].

The results of this study also indicate that a substantial amount of BSE infectivity is likely to have been released into the feed chain by imported cattle from the UK in 1992 and 1993, and a small but still substantial amount of BSE infectivity is likely to have been released in 1989, 1991 and 1995. Considering the amount of infectivity that entered the feed chain and the absence of a cattle/BSE system that would avoid processing of infected cattle and recycling the BSE agent via the feed chain (SRM removal, pressurized heat treatment of MBM, and an effective feed ban were not practiced or in place), one can assume that some Japanese cattle born in the early 1990s became infected by consuming contaminated MBM produced from these imported cattle.

Of the 35 BSE cases detected in Japan by the end of April 2008, 13 were born in 1995–1996, 19 were born in 1999– 2001, two were born in 1992 and one was born in 2002. Considering the substantial amount of infectivity that entered the feed chain in 1989, 1992, 1993 and 1995 and that cattle get infected within one year of birth [17], the cases born in 1995–1996 might have been infected by consuming feed containing infected MBM produced in 1995 or by recycling of cattle infected in 1989–1993. Of the two BSE cases born in 1992, one was atypical, and the other was typical, which might have been infected by consuming feed containing infected MBM produced in 1991–1993.

The results of the present study are consistent with the conclusion made by Yoshikawa et al. in their report [18], that the imported cattle from the UK that were slaughtered in an abattoir in the Kanto region in 1995 and whose rendered byproducts were used in that region, possibly became the source of infection for the three BSE cases detected in this region.

In Sugiura’s previous study [11], only the cattle that developed BSE (i.e., had reached the last stage of the incubation period) were assumed to be infectious. As a result, the probabilities that BSE entered the animal feed chain might have been underestimated. The present study has overcome this problem by using prevalence of infection (probability of being infected) instead of using incidence rate (probability of developing clinical signs) for each birth cohort.

In the present study, we assumed that the cattle imported from the UK all died or were slaughtered for non-BSE reasons because according to the official records, none of them showed clinical signs compatible with BSE at death/slaughter. However, most of the 33 animals had some clinical signs at death/slaughter, such as reproductive disorder, arthritis, mastitis, post-parturition downer, ketosis, rumen displacement [18], and some of them might have died or been culled after having completed the incubation period. As a result, the amount of infectivity that entered the animal feed chain might have been underestimated.

According to the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries’ database [18], the amount of MBM used between 1989 and 1995 as raw material for the production of cattle compound feed was 83 to 247 metric tons annually, representing less than 0.05% of the total amount of MBM used for feed (most of the MBM used for feed was used for production chicken and pig feed). In addition, co-farming of ruminants and non-ruminants is not a common practice in Japan. These facts suggest that, of the 1,080–1,460 cattle oral ID50 that were estimated to have entered the animal feed chain between 1989 and 1995, the amount of BSE agent consumed by cattle would be much smaller, and thus the amount of BSE agent estimated should be considered the maximum amount consumed by cattle. Considering that the BSE agent is likely to be heterogeneously distributed in feedstuffs [16] and that no information was available about how heterogeneously the BSE agent was distributed in feed in Japan, the authors suggest that, without calculating the possible number of infected animals, the calculated amount of ID50 represents the maximum amount that would have been consumed by cattle.

Fig. 2. Probability distributions of the number of infected animals that entered the animal feed chain from (a) the total of 33 cattle imported from the UK, (b) the 5 cattle imported from the UK in 1982, (c) the 9 cattle imported from the UK in 1987 and (d) the 19 cattle imported from the UK in 1988.

Fig. 4. Amount of BSE infectivity that entered the animal feed chain in Japan by year. Solid, dashed and dotted lines assume doubling time of 4 months, 2 months and 1 month, respectively

snip...end



http://www.jstage.jst.go.jp/article/jvms/71/2/133/_pdf



REFERENCES



http://www.jstage.jst.go.jp/article/jvms/71/2/71_133/_cit



Greetings BSE-L members !

Because there was no effective system to avoid recycling of the BSE agent via animal feed until the early 1990s, of the 33 cattle imported from the UK into Japan, most probably 7 or 8 were infected and entered the animal feed chain, 2 of which entered the animal feed chain in each of 1992 and 1993. In terms of infectivity, 400-550 cattle oral ID50 of the BSE agent entered the feed chain in each of these years. The amount of infectivity that entered the feed chain in 1989, 1991 and 1995 was smaller but still substantial, suggesting that the BSE agent might have entered the Japanese feed chain in any of these years.<<< O.K., lets look at other imports of live catte from the U.K. to the U.S.A. and Canada, just to compare to Japan. UK Exports of Live Cattle by Value 1986-96 USA 697 LIVE CATTLE CANADA 299 LIVE CATTLE SO, where does that leave us here in North America ??? HERE IN THE U.S.A. IT'S WHAT I CALL, MAD COW DENIAL $$$ TSS USA AND CANADA IMPORTS OF UK CATTLE BETWEEN 1981 - 1989 USA = 496 CANADA = 198 *add 14 to 198 as last UK import to Canada, 14 in 1990


http://www.inspection.gc.ca/english/sci/ahra/bseris/bserise.pdf



HERE is another look at all the imports for both the USA and Canada of UK live cattle and greaves exports ;

UK Exports of Live Cattle by Value 1986-96

USA 697 LIVE CATTLE

CANADA 299 LIVE CATTLE



http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/mb/m11f/tab11.pdf



UK EXPORTS OF MBM TO WORLD



http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/mb/m11g/tab05.pdf



OTHERS

SNIP...

*** SEE FULL TEXT ;

Risk of Introduction of BSE into Japan by the Historical Importation of Live Cattle from the United Kingdom



http://bseusa.blogspot.com/2009/03/risk-of-introduction-of-bse-into-japan.html



UK EXPORTS OF MBM TO WORLD



http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/mb/m11g/tab05.pdf




OTHERS


BEEF AND VEAL



http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/mb/m11f/tab08.pdf



http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/mb/m11f/tab09.pdf



http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/mb/m11f/tab10.pdf



LIVE CATTLE



http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/mb/m11f/tab11.pdf



FATS



http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/mb/m11g/tab01.pdf



EMBRYOS



http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/mb/m11g/tab03.pdf



GELATIN ETC



http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/mb/m11g/tab02.pdf



SEMEN



http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/mb/m11g/tab04.pdf



MEAT



http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/mb/m11g/tab05.pdf



Wednesday, April 16, 2008

MBM, greaves, meat offal, live cattle, imports from UK to USA vs Canada "Three of four possible manufacturers supplying a protein supplement likely fed to the animal could have included meat and bone meal (MBM) as an ingredient in its formulation. One of these manufacturers was able to confirm usage of meat and bone meal in supplements and confirm a source of MBM to be one common to previous BSE investigations."

USA AND CANADA IMPORTS OF UK CATTLE BETWEEN 1981 - 1989

USA = 496

CANADA = 198

*add 14 to 198 as last UK import to Canada, 14 in 1990



http://www.inspection.gc.ca/english/sci/ahra/bseris/bserise.pdf



HERE is another look at all the imports for both the USA and Canada of UK live cattle and greaves exports ;

UK Exports of Live Cattle by Value 1986-96

USA 697 LIVE CATTLE

CANADA 299 LIVE CATTLE



http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/mb/m11f/tab11.pdf



UK TABLE of Exports of meal of meat and meat offal; greaves 1979 - 1995

USA 24 TONS

CANADA 83 TONS



http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/mb/m12/tab12.pdf



HOWEVER, my files show 44 tons of greaves for USA. ...TSS

Subject: Re: exports from the U.K. of it's MBM to U.S.??? From: mhtml:%7B33B38F65-8D2E-434D-8F9B-8BDCD77D3066%7Dmid://00000049/!x-usc:mailto:S.J.Pearsall@esg.maff.gsi.gov.uk Date: Tue, 8 Feb 2000 14:03:16 +0000 To: mhtml:%7B33B38F65-8D2E-434D-8F9B-8BDCD77D3066%7Dmid://00000049/!x-usc:mailto:flounder@wt.net (Receipt Notification Requested) (Non Receipt Notification Requested)

Terry

Meat and bonemeal is not specifically classified for overseas trade purposes. The nearest equivalent is listed as flours and meals of meat or offals (including tankage), unfit for human consumption; greaves. UK exports of this to the US are listed below:

Country Tonnes

1980

1981 12

1982

1983

1984 10

1985 2

1986

1987

1988

1989 20

1990

Data for exports between 1975 and 1979 are not readily available. These can be obtained (at a charge) from data retailers appointed by HM Customs and Excise: BTSL (Tel: 01372 463121) or Abacus (01245 252222). Best wishes Simon Pearsall Overseas trade statistics Stats (C&F)C

============ END...TSS...2008============



http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2009/02/atypical-bse-north-america-update.html



Wednesday, July 23, 2008 Audit says USDA lost track of imported cattle Report No. 50601-0012-Ch March 2008

Audit says USDA lost track of imported cattle Canada has reported 13 cases of mad cow



http://usdameatexport.blogspot.com/2008/07/audit-says-usda-lost-track-of-imported.html



Wednesday, February 11, 2009 Atypical BSE North America Update February 2009

Wednesday, February 11, 2009 Atypical BSE North America Update February 2009

Greetings,

Considering that Mad Cow disease of all documented phenotypes, either the c-BSE, or the atypical h-BSE and or the l-BSE, ALL of which have been documented in North America, how many more, who knows, but they seem to be throwing all there marbles in the pot now by calling the h-type BSE 'familial'. what happens if we come up with another strain ? kinda like the sporadic FFI, that's not familial, what's that all about ? considering the many different strains of the typical scrapie 20+, and then the atypical Nor-98 Scrapie, which the USA has documented 6 cases the last i heard, and the thought of more than one strain of CWD in deer and elk, where will the next year, 4 years, 8 years, and beyond take us in the world of human and animal Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy and 'sound science' in the USA ? WILL the New Administration see the enfamous enhanced bse surveillance program of 2004 for what it was, a fraud, and have a 'redo' ? WE can hope i suppose. ...TSS

Both of the BSE cases ascertained in the US native-born cattle were atypical cases (H-type), which contributed to the initial ambiguity of the diagnosis. 174, 185 In Canada, there have been 2 atypical BSE cases in addition to the 14 cases of the classic UK strain of BSE2: one was the H-type, and the other was of the L-type.198

snip...end

source :

Enhanced Abstract Journal of the American Veterinary Medical Association January 1, 2009, Vol. 234, No. 1, Pages 59-72

Bovine spongiform encephalopathy

Jane L. Harman, DVM, PhD; Christopher J. Silva, PhD



http://avmajournals.avma.org/doi/ref/10.2460/javma.234.1.59



Thursday, December 04, 2008 2:37 PM

"we have found that H-BSE can infect humans."

personal communication with Professor Kong. ...TSS

see full text ;



http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2009/02/atypical-bse-north-america-update.html



Sunday, December 28, 2008

MAD COW DISEASE USA DECEMBER 28, 2008 an 8 year review of a failed and flawed policy



http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2008/12/mad-cow-disease-usa-december-28-2008-8.html



Wednesday, August 20, 2008

Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Mad Cow Disease typical and atypical strains, was there a cover-up ?



http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2008/08/bovine-spongiform-encephalopathy-mad.html



Friday, August 29, 2008

CREEKSTONE VS USDA COURT OF APPEALS, BUSH SAYS, NO WAY, NO HOW



http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2008/08/creekstone-vs-usda-court-of-appeals.html



Sunday, March 16, 2008

MAD COW DISEASE terminology UK c-BSE (typical), atypical BSE H or L, and or Italian L-BASE



http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2008/03/mad-cow-disease-terminology-uk-c-bse.html



HUMAN and ANIMAL TSE Classifications i.e. mad cow disease and the UKBSEnvCJD only theory JUNE 2008

snip...

Tissue infectivity and strain typing of the many variants Manuscript of the human and animal TSEs are paramount in all variants of all TSE. There must be a proper classification that will differentiate between all these human TSE in order to do this. With the CDI and other more sensitive testing coming about, I only hope that my proposal will some day be taken seriously. ...

snip...



http://cjdmadcowbaseoct2007.blogspot.com/2008/06/human-and-animal-tse-classifications-ie.html



Manuscript Draft Manuscript Number: Title: HUMAN and ANIMAL TSE Classifications i.e. mad cow disease and the UKBSEnvCJD only theory Article Type: Personal View Corresponding Author: Mr. Terry S. Singeltary, Corresponding Author's Institution: na First Author: Terry S Singeltary, none Order of Authors: Terry S Singeltary, none; Terry S. Singeltary Abstract: TSEs have been rampant in the USA for decades in many species, and they all have been rendered and fed back to animals for human/animal consumption. I propose that the current diagnostic criteria for human TSEs only enhances and helps the spreading of human TSE from the continued belief of the UKBSEnvCJD only theory in 2007.



http://www.regulations.gov/fdmspublic/ContentViewer?objectId=090000648027c28e&disposition=attachment&contentType=pdf



OIE amending the Annex to Decision 2007/453/EC establishing the BSE status of Member States or third countries or regions thereof according to their BSE risk



http://docket-aphis-2006-0041.blogspot.com/2009/01/oie-amending-annex-to-decision.html



IN A NUT SHELL ; $$$

(Adopted by the International Committee of the OIE on 23 May 2006)

11. Information published by the OIE is derived from appropriate declarations made by the official Veterinary Services of Member Countries.The OIE is not responsible for inaccurate publication of country disease status based on inaccurate information or changes in epidemiological status or other significant events that were not promptly reported to then Central Bureau............



http://www.oie.int/eng/Session2007/RF2006.pdf



full text ;



http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2007/10/bse-base-mad-cow-testing-texas-usa-and.html



http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/



NOW, ask yourself why not one single mad cow has been documented in the USA since the Honorable Phyllis Fong of the OIG did the end around Johanns, Dehaven et al ??? found two atypical BSE or BASE cases and they flat shut it down i tell you. IF the OIE gives a favorable rating, IF the OIE gives any other rating but the lowest, poorest possible BSE/TSE rating, the OIE will have sealed there fate once and for all, because most of the world knows the truth about the USA and there mad cows. THE OIE will then be able to stand side by side with the USA, and proudly claim to have sold there soul to the devil, all for a buck, commodities and futures, to hell with human health. A 'CONTROLLED' RATING IS EXACTLY what the OIE will get if that is what they classify the USA as a 'CONTROLLED RATING'. IT will be controlled by Johanns, Dehaven, and GW. IT WILL BE RIGGED in other words. but that is nothing new, it's been rigged for years. ...

snip...

SEE FULL TEXT with facts and sources @ ;Wednesday, June 11, 2008

OIE Recognition of the BSE Status of Members RESOLUTION No. XXI (Adopted by the International Committee of the OIE on 27 May 2008)

Attachment to Singeltary comment January 28, 2007 Greetings APHIS, I would kindly like to submit the following to ; BSE; MRR; IMPORTATION OF LIVE BOVINES AND PRODUCTS DERIVED FROM BOVINES [Docket No. APHIS-2006-0041] RIN 0579-AC01 [Federal Register: January 9, 2007 (Volume 72, Number 5)] [Proposed Rules] [Page 1101-1129] From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov] [DOCID:fr09ja07-21]

BSE; MRR; IMPORTATION OF LIVE BOVINES AND PRODUCTS DERIVED FROM BOVINES [Docket No. APHIS-2006-0041] RIN 0579-AC01 Date: January 9, 2007 at 9:08 am PST

snip...

MY personal belief, since you ask, is that not only the Canadian border, but the USA border, and the Mexican border should be sealed up tighter than a drum for exporting there TSE tainted products, until a validated, 100% sensitive test is available, and all animals for human and animal consumption are tested. all we are doing is the exact same thing the UK did with there mad cow poisoning when they exported it all over the globe, all the while knowing what they were doing. this BSE MRR policy is nothing more than a legal tool to do just exactly what the UK did, thanks to the OIE and GW, it's legal now. and they executed Saddam for poisoning ???

go figure....

Terry S. Singeltary Sr. P.O. Box 42 Bacliff, Texas USA 77518



http://www.regulations.gov/fdmspublic/component/main?main=DocumentDetail&o=09000064801f3412



http://www.regulations.gov/fdmspublic/ContentViewer?objectId=09000064801f3413&disposition=attachment&contentType=msw8



January 28, 2007

Greetings APHIS,

I would kindly like to submit the following to ;

BSE; MRR; IMPORTATION OF LIVE BOVINES AND PRODUCTS DERIVED FROM BOVINES [Docket No. APHIS-2006-0041] RIN 0579-AC01

[Federal Register: January 9, 2007 (Volume 72, Number 5)] [Proposed Rules] [Page 1101-1129] From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov] [DOCID:fr09ja07-21]

[[Page 1101]]



http://docket-aphis-2006-0041.blogspot.com/2008/06/bovine-spongiform-encephalopathy.html



Docket APHIS-2007-0033 Docket Title Agricultural Bioterrorism Protection Act of 2002; Biennial Review and Republication of the Select Agent and Toxin List Docket Type Rulemaking Document APHIS-2007-0033-0001 Document Title Agricultural Bioterrorism Protection Act of 2002; Biennial Review and Republication of the Select Agent and Toxin List Public Submission APHIS-2007-0033-0002.1 Public Submission Title Attachment to Singeltary comment



http://www.regulations.gov/fdmspublic/component/main?main=DocumentDetail&o=090000648027c28e



CHAPTER 3 Animal Disease Eradication Programs and Control and Certification Programs

snip...

In FY 2007, two field cases, one validation study case, and two RSSS cases were consistent with a variant of the disease known as Nor98 scrapie.1 These five cases originated from flocks in California, Minnesota, Colorado, Wyoming, and Indiana, respectively.

snip...



http://www.aphis.usda.gov/publications/animal_health/content/printable_version/AHR_Web_PDF_07/D_Chapter_3.pdf



NOR-98 Scrapie FY 2008 to date 1



http://www.aphis.usda.gov/animal_health/animal_diseases/scrapie/downloads/monthly_scrapie_rpt.pps



ATYPICAL TSEs in USA CATTLE AND SHEEP ?



http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/sc/seac17/tab03.pdf



with kindness regards,

I am sincerely,

Terry S. Singeltary Sr. P.O. Box 42 Bacliff, Texas USA 77518

REPORT ON TESTING RUMINANTS FOR TSE's in the EU 2007 (2009)

Report on the monitoring and testing of ruminants for the presence of transmissible spongiform encephalopathies (TSEs) in the EU in 2007 (2009)

Directorate E — Safety of the food chain E2 — Food Hygiene, Alert System and Training

2009

snip...

1. Summary In 2007, a total of 9 711 123 bovine, 828 644 ovine and 277 196 caprine animals were tested in the EU 27 in the framework of the TSE monitoring programmes. 174 bovine, 2 253 ovine and 1272 caprine animals turned out positive. 1 445 280 risk bovine animals and 8 262 517 healthy animals slaughtered for human consumption were tested by rapid tests. 1 860 bovine animals were tested in the framework of passive surveillance (animals reported as official BSE suspects). In addition, 1 466 animals were tested in the framework of culling of animals with an epidemiological connection to a BSE case. 91 % of positive cases were detected by the active monitoring (testing of risk animals, healthy slaughtered and culled cattle) and 9 % were detected by passive surveillance. In 2007, no BSE case was found in Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, Estonia, Greece, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Romania, Finland and Sweden. The number of BSE cases and the overall prevalence in tested animals decreased by respectively 46 % and 41 % in 2007 compared to 2006. 826 730 ovine animals were tested by active monitoring, while 1 914 were animals reported as official TSE suspects and therefore subjected to laboratory examination. In caprine animals, the numbers of tests in the respective groups were 276 040 (active monitoring) and 1 156 (TSE suspects). Some 987 and 112 TSE cases in respectively sheep and goats confirmed in 2007 were subjected to discriminatory testing. None of them have been confirmed to be BSE. In addition, in the framework of a survey for chronic wasting disease (CWD) in cervids, as required by Commission Decision 2007/182/EC, 10 843 animals were tested between 2006 and 2007 hunting seasons. None of them turned out positive. All Member States submitted information on the TSE testing of bovine, ovine and caprine animals. In addition to the Member States, Norway also submitted information on their TSE testing programmes.

see full text ;



http://ec.europa.eu/food/food/biosafety/bse/preliminary_annual_report_tse2007_en.pdf



NOW, compare to USA MAD COW TESTING, or the lack of $$$ ;

USDA to cut back BSE testing program Jul 20, 2006 (CIDRAP News) – The US government's expanded testing program for bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) will be cut back soon, having shown that the nation has "no significant BSE problem," Agriculture Secretary Mike Johanns said today.

About 759,000 cattle, or more than 1,000 cattle per day, have been tested since the US Department of Agriculture (USDA) expanded BSE surveillance in June 2004, Johanns said at a news conference. Two cases were found during that time, in addition to the first US case discovered in 2003.

Starting as early as late August, testing will be reduced to about 40,000 cattle a year, or about 110 a week, Johanns announced. The reduced testing program—similar to what was done before the expansion—will cost about $8 million a year, versus about $52 million a year currently, he said.

To the suggestion that the current level of testing should continue indefinitely, Johanns said, "There simply is no scientific justification for doing so. . . . The reality is this: there is no significant BSE problem in the United States. And after all this surveillance I am able to say there never was. We've proved that with our enhanced surveillance."

Johanns said that testing 40,000 cattle a year is 10 times as many as recommended in the science-based guidelines of the World Organization for Animal Health (OIE). The USDA will continue to test cattle from high-risk populations and from a variety of places around the country, he said.

"To put it simply, we've accomplished our enhanced surveillance goals, and it's time to move forward with a level of surveillance that corresponds to the very low level of BSE in this country," he added. In a news release, he stated that the reduced testing program "will maintain our ability to detect BSE, [and] provide assurance that our interlocking safeguards are successfully preventing BSE."

The testing program was expanded in response to the first BSE case in 2003, with the aim of determining the disease's prevalence. The government originally proposed to test about 275,000 cattle over 12 to 18 months, but the program now has lasted more than 25 months.

The plan to reduce testing comes as Japan prepares to resume importing US beef, long banned because of BSE worries, and as the USDA tries to reopen South Korea and China to American beef. Japan has been inspecting US beef processing plants this month and, if the results are satisfactory, is expected to resume imports of beef from cattle younger than 20 months.

In response to questions, Johanns said the USDA told the nation's trading partners about the testing cutback in advance. He also said it would have been "enormously disingenuous, if not downright dishonest" if the USDA had waited until the foreign markets reopened and then reduced the testing program.

Johanns stressed that the testing program is not a food safety program but rather a way to assess the prevalence of BSE. The key to protecting food safety is removing the specified risk materials (SRM)—cattle parts such as the brain and spinal cord, which are likely to carry the BSE agent if an animal is infected, he said. Removal of SRM from carcasses of cattle older than 30 months has been required since early 2004.

Citing an analysis of the US surveillance program released in April, Johanns said, "Experts believe that in an adult cattle population of 42 million we might find four to seven animals with BSE." With BSE that rare and with the SRM ban in place, the risk of BSE-contaminated beef getting into the food supply is "virtually nonexistent."

Also at the news conference, Dr. Ron DeHaven, head of the USDA Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, said the USDA is considering relaxing restrictions on imports of live Canadian cattle. Canada recently identified its sixth BSE case.

Because of BSE concerns, the only live Canadian cattle allowed into the United States are those destined for slaughter before reaching the age of 30 months. In response to a question, DeHaven said the USDA is considering allowing older cattle to be imported, because the Canadian system for preventing BSE "mirrors what we have in the US."

But he also said the USDA will consider any findings about Canada's latest BSE case before making any changes in the import rules. The latest case was in a 4-year-old cow, born years after a ban on putting recycled cattle protein into cattle feed took effect in 1997.

DeHaven also commented on recent reports that the two latest US BSE cases involved a different "strain" of prion protein from that seen in the first case and in European cases.

"Both the Alabama and the Texas cows had a slightly different prion" with a higher molecular weight than in previous cases, he said. He added that researchers are working to find out what that means.

"From the regulatory standpoint we're considering those to be two cases of BSE. But we feel very comfortable that our existing program provides the appropriate level of protection," regardless of the type of prion involved, DeHaven said.



http://www.cidrap.umn.edu/cidrap/content/other/bse/news/jul2006bse.html



Owner and Corporation Plead Guilty to Defrauding Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Surveillance Program

An Arizona meat processing company and its owner pled guilty in February 2007 to charges of theft of Government funds, mail fraud, and wire fraud. The owner and his company defrauded the BSE Surveillance Program when they falsified BSE Surveillance Data Collection Forms and then submitted payment requests to USDA for the services. In addition to the targeted sample population (those cattle that were more than 30 months old or had other risk factors for BSE), the owner submitted to USDA, or caused to be submitted, BSE obex (brain stem) samples from healthy USDA-inspected cattle. As a result, the owner fraudulently received approximately $390,000. Sentencing is scheduled for May 2007.

snip...

4 USDA OIG SEMIANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS FY 2007 1st Half



http://www.usda.gov/oig/webdocs/sarc070619.pdf



full text ;



http://foiamadsheepmadrivervalley.blogspot.com/2008/09/re-foia-of-declaration-of-extraordinary.html



USDA: In 9,200 cases only one type of test could be used

WASHINGTON (AP)--The U.S. Department of Agriculture acknowledged Aug. 17 that its testing options for bovine spongiform encephalopathy were limited in 9,200 cases despite its effort to expand surveillance throughout the U.S. herd.

In those cases, only one type of test was used--one that failed to detect the disease in an infected Texas cow.

The department posted the information on its website because of an inquiry from The Associated Press.

Conducted over the past 14 months, the tests have not been included in the department's running tally of BSE tests since last summer. That total reached 439,126 on Aug. 17.

"There's no secret program," the department's chief veterinarian, John Clifford, said in an interview. "There has been no hiding, I can assure you of that."

Officials intended to report the tests later in an annual report, Clifford said.

These 9,200 cases were different because brain tissue samples were preserved with formalin, which makes them suitable for only one type of test--immunohistochemistry, or IHC.

In the Texas case, officials had declared the cow free of disease in November after an IHC test came back negative. The department's inspector general ordered an additional kind of test, which confirmed the animal was infected.

Veterinarians in remote locations have used the preservative on tissue to keep it from degrading on its way to the department's laboratory in Ames, Iowa. Officials this year asked veterinarians to stop using preservative and send fresh or chilled samples within 48 hours.

The department recently investigated a possible case of BSE that turned up in a preserved sample. Further testing ruled out the disease two weeks ago.

Scientists used two additional tests--rapid screening and Western blot--to help detect BSE in the country's second confirmed case, in a Texas cow in June. They used IHC and Western blot to confirm the first case, in a Washington state cow in December 2003.

"The IHC test is still an excellent test," Clifford said. "These are not simple tests, either."

Clifford pointed out that scientists reran the IHC several times and got conflicting results. That happened, too, with the Western blot test. Both tests are accepted by international animal health officials.

Date: 8/25/05



http://www.hpj.com/archives/2005/aug05/aug29/BSEtestoptionswerelimited.cfm



""These 9,200 cases were different because brain tissue samples were preserved with formalin, which makes them suitable for only one type of test--immunohistochemistry, or IHC."

THIS WAS DONE FOR A REASON!

THE IHC test has been proven to be the LEAST LIKELY to detect BSE/TSE in the bovine, and these were probably from the most high risk cattle pool, the ones the USDA et al, SHOULD have been testing. ...TSS

USDA 2003

We have to be careful that we don't get so set in the way we do things that we forget to look for different emerging variations of disease. We've gotten away from collecting the whole brain in our systems. We're using the brain stem and we're looking in only one area. In Norway, they were doing a project and looking at cases of Scrapie, and they found this where they did not find lesions or PRP in the area of the obex. They found it in the cerebellum and the cerebrum. It's a good lesson for us. Ames had to go back and change the procedure for looking at Scrapie samples. In the USDA, we had routinely looked at all the sections of the brain, and then we got away from it. They've recently gone back. Dr. Keller: Tissues are routinely tested, based on which tissue provides an 'official' test result as recognized by APHIS.

Dr. Detwiler: That's on the slaughter. But on the clinical cases, aren't they still asking for the brain? But even on the slaughter, they're looking only at the brainstem. We may be missing certain things if we confine ourselves to one area.

snip.............

Dr. Detwiler: It seems a good idea, but I'm not aware of it. Another important thing to get across to the public is that the negatives do not guarantee absence of infectivity. The animal could be early in the disease and the incubation period. Even sample collection is so important. If you're not collecting the right area of the brain in sheep, or if collecting lymphoreticular tissue, and you don't get a good biopsy, you could miss the area with the PRP in it and come up with a negative test. There's a new, unusual form of Scrapie that's been detected in Norway. We have to be careful that we don't get so set in the way we do things that we forget to look for different emerging variations of disease. We've gotten away from collecting the whole brain in our systems. We're using the brain stem and we're looking in only one area. In Norway, they were doing a project and looking at cases of Scrapie, and they found this where they did not find lesions or PRP in the area of the obex. They found it in the cerebellum and the cerebrum. It's a good lesson for us. Ames had to go back and change the procedure for looking at Scrapie samples. In the USDA, we had routinely looked at all the sections of the brain, and then we got away from it. They've recently gone back.

Dr. Keller: Tissues are routinely tested, based on which tissue provides an 'official' test result as recognized by APHIS .

Dr. Detwiler: That's on the slaughter. But on the clinical cases, aren't they still asking for the brain? But even on the slaughter, they're looking only at the brainstem. We may be missing certain things if we confine ourselves to one area.

snip...

FULL TEXT;

Completely Edited Version PRION ROUNDTABLE

Accomplished this day, Wednesday, December 11, 2003, Denver, Colorado

2005

=============================

CDC DR. PAUL BROWN TSE EXPERT COMMENTS 2006

The U.S. Department of Agriculture was quick to assure the public earlier this week that the third case of mad cow disease did not pose a risk to them, but what federal officials have not acknowledged is that this latest case indicates the deadly disease has been circulating in U.S. herds for at least a decade.

The second case, which was detected last year in a Texas cow and which USDA officials were reluctant to verify, was approximately 12 years old.

These two cases (the latest was detected in an Alabama cow) present a picture of the disease having been here for 10 years or so, since it is thought that cows usually contract the disease from contaminated feed they consume as calves. The concern is that humans can contract a fatal, incurable, brain-wasting illness from consuming beef products contaminated with the mad cow pathogen.

"The fact the Texas cow showed up fairly clearly implied the existence of other undetected cases," Dr. Paul Brown, former medical director of the National Institutes of Health's Laboratory for Central Nervous System Studies and an expert on mad cow-like diseases, told United Press International. "The question was, 'How many?' and we still can't answer that."

Brown, who is preparing a scientific paper based on the latest two mad cow cases to estimate the maximum number of infected cows that occurred in the United States, said he has "absolutely no confidence in USDA tests before one year ago" because of the agency's reluctance to retest the Texas cow that initially tested positive.

USDA officials finally retested the cow and confirmed it was infected seven months later, but only at the insistence of the agency's inspector general.

"Everything they did on the Texas cow makes everything USDA did before 2005 suspect," Brown said. ...snip...end



http://www.upi.com/ConsumerHealthDaily/view.php?StoryID=20060315-055557-1284r



CDC - Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy and Variant Creutzfeldt ... Dr. Paul Brown is Senior Research Scientist in the Laboratory of Central Nervous System ... Address for correspondence: Paul Brown, Building 36, Room 4A-05, ...



http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/eid/vol7no1/brown.htm



In this context, a word is in order about the US testing program. After the discovery of the first (imported) cow in 2003, the magnitude of testing was much increased, reaching a level of >400,000 tests in 2005 (Figure 4). Neither of the 2 more recently indigenously infected older animals with nonspecific clinical features would have been detected without such testing, and neither would have been identified as atypical without confirmatory Western blots. Despite these facts, surveillance has now been decimated to 40,000 annual tests (USDA news release no. 0255.06, July 20, 2006) and invites the accusation that the United States will never know the true status of its involvement with BSE.

In short, a great deal of further work will need to be done before the phenotypic features and prevalence of atypical BSE are understood. More than a single strain may have been present from the beginning of the epidemic, but this possibility has been overlooked by virtue of the absence of widespread Western blot confirmatory testing of positive screening test results; or these new phenotypes may be found, at least in part, to result from infections at an older age by a typical BSE agent, rather than neonatal infections with new "strains" of BSE. Neither alternative has yet been investigated.



http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/EID/vol12no12/06-0965.htm



Executive Summary

In June 2005, an inconclusive bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) sample from November 2004, that had originally been classified as negative on the immunohistochemistry test, was confirmed positive on SAF immunoblot (Western blot). The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) identified the herd of origin for the index cow in Texas; that identification was confirmed by DNA analysis. USDA, in close cooperation with the Texas Animal Health Commission (TAHC), established an incident command post (ICP) and began response activities according to USDA’s BSE Response Plan of September 2004. Response personnel removed at-risk cattle and cattle of interest (COI) from the index herd, euthanized them, and tested them for BSE; all were negative. USDA and the State extensively traced all at-risk cattle and COI that left the index herd. The majority of these animals entered rendering and/or slaughter channels well before the investigation began. USDA’s response to the Texas finding was thorough and effective.



http://www.aphis.usda.gov/lpa/issues/bse/epi-updates/bse_final_epidemiology_report.pdf



Friday, August 29, 2008

CREEKSTONE VS USDA COURT OF APPEALS, BUSH SAYS, NO WAY, NO HOW



http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2008/08/creekstone-vs-usda-court-of-appeals.html



see full text of this ongoing cover-up of mad cow disease in the USA. ...



http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/



Usda Certified Deadstock Downer Cow School Lunch Program Update

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Wednesday, December 10, 2008

Evaluation of FSIS Management Controls Over Pre-Slaughter Activities (Audit Report 24601-7-KC)



http://downercattle.blogspot.com/2008/12/evaluation-of-fsis-management-controls.html



Over the next 8-10 weeks, approximately 40% of all the adult mink on the farm died from TME. Since previous incidences of TME were associated with common or shared feeding practices, we obtained a careful history of feed ingredients used over the past 12-18 months. ***The rancher was a "dead stock" feeder using mostly (>95%) downer or dead dairy cattle and a few horses. Sheep had never been fed.***

snip...end



http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/mb/m09/tab05.pdf



Epidemiology Epidemiologic studies suggest that animals contract the disease by external exposure to the infectious agent, such as by eating contaminated feed. No evidence suggests that the TME agent spreads by contact between unrelated mink or from mother to nursing young. The disease has been identified in both genders and all color phases in animals greater than 1 year old. The first documented TME outbreak in the United States occurred in 1947 on one ranch in Wisconsin and then on a ranch in Minnesota that had received mink from the Wisconsin ranch. In 1961, TME outbreaks occurred on five ranches in Wisconsin. In Factsheet Veterinary Services February 2002 APHIS 1963, outbreaks occurred in Idaho, Minnesota, and Wisconsin. Epidemiologic data from the Minnesota and Wisconsin outbreaks trace the cases in those States to one common purchased food source.

snip...

The 1985 Stetsonville Outbreak The most recent TME outbreak occurred on one mink ranch in Stetsonville, WI, in 1985. In the herd of 7,300 adult mink, 60 percent of the animals died. Clinical signs included tail arching, incoordination, and hyperexcitability. At the most advanced stages of the disease, the animals were in trancelike states and eventually died. The outbreak lasted 5 months. Microscopic examination of sections of the brain confirmed the spongelike changes characteristic of TME. Diagnostic tests identified the prion protein. The following year, mink born during the outbreak showed no signs of TME. The late Richard Marsh, a veterinary virologist at the University of Wisconsin who studied the transmission of TME and other TSE's, investigated this outbreak. Marsh learned that the mink were fed a diet composed of fresh meat products from "downer cattle" and commercial sources of fish, poultry, and cereal. Downer cattle are nonambulatory and cannot rise because they are affected with a condition such as a metabolic disease, broken limbs, or a central nervous system disorder. Marsh theorized that the meat from these downer cattle introduced a TSE agent to the mink in which TME resulted. Although Marsh's hypothesis is based on speculation and anecdotal evidence, in 1993 APHIS adjusted its national BSE surveillance program to include testing downer cattle for evidence of a TSE. The brains of more than 20,141 cattle have been examined at APHIS' National Veterinary Services Laboratories and other State diagnostic laboratories. Not a single tissue sample has revealed evidence of BSE or another TSE in cattle.



http://www.aphis.usda.gov/publications/animal_health/content/printable_version/fs_ahtme.pdf



AND as everyone knows, the rest is history, those dead-stock downers, the most high risk cattle, were NOT tested, and in FACT, was a major source of YOUR CHILDRENS SCHOOL LUNCH PROGRAM, all across the Nation. sorry, these are the most high risk cattle for TSE aka mad cow disease, and i am a bit touchy about this topic. ...sorry. ...terry

DOWNER COW SCHOOL LUNCH PROGRAM



http://downercattle.blogspot.com/



IN CONFIDENCE PERCEPTION OF UNCONVENTENTIONAL SLOW VIRUS DISEASES OF ANIMALS IN THE USA 1985

The Stetsonville outbreak (farmer's name: Brecke). In addition to the downer cows and horses Brecke's mink recieved a cereal supplement. Hartsough's view was that this would contain bone meal and would be from a commercial source. If this were so and it was contaminated with a TME agent why were no other ranches affected? Many mink ranches now feed a commerical pelleted diet.

Brecke was equipped to process LARGE CARCASSES USING A CRUSHER/MIXER WHICH COULD ACCOMMODATE A WHOLE COW!

snip...

Wilbur Clarke (reference the Mission, Texas scrapie transmission transmission to cattle study) is now the State Veterinarian for Montana based at Helena. I was given confidential access to sections from the Clarke scrapie-cattle transmission experiment. Details of the experimental design were as supplied previously by Dr. Wrathall (copy of relevant information appended). Only 3 animals (2 inoculated with 2nd pass Suffolk scrapie and 1 inoculated with Angora goat passaged scrapie) showed clinical signs. Clinical signs were characterised by weakness, ''a stilted hindlimb gait'', disorientation, ataxia and, terminally, lateral recumbency. The two cattle from which I examined material were inocluated at 8 months of age and developed signs 36 months pi (goat scrapie inoculum) and 49 months pi (one of the Suffolk scrapie inoculated) respectively. This latter animal was killed at 58 months of age and so the clinical duration was only 1 month. The neuropathology was somewhat different from BSE or the Stetsonville TME in cattle. Vacuolar changes were minimal, to the extent that detection REQUIRED CAREFUL SEARCHING. Conversely astrocyte hypertrophy was a widespread and prominent feature. The material requires DETAILED NEUROPATHOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT BUT WHETHER OR NOT THIS WILL BE DONE REMAINS A QUESTION.

snip...

were there extensive neurologic lesions, which are primary for BSE, such as severe vacuolation of neurons and neuropil or neuronal necrosis and gliosis. Although some vacuolation of neuropil, chromotolysis in neurons, and gliosis were seen in the brains of some affected calves, these were industinguishable from those of controls. Vacuolated neurons in the red nucleus of both challenged and normal calves were considered normal for the bovines as previously described (50). PrP-res was found in ALL CHALLENGED CALVES REGARDLESS OF CLINCIAL SIGNS, and the amount of PrP-res positively related to the length of the incubation. ...

snip...

WE also conclude from these studies that scrapie in cattle MIGHT NOT BE RECOGNIZED BY ROUTINE HISTOPATHOLOGICAL EXAMINATION OF THE BRAIN AND SUGGEST THAT DETECTION OF PrP-res by immunohistochemistry or immunoblotting is necessary to make a definitive diagnosis. THUS, undiagnosed scrapie infection could contribute to the ''DOWNER-COW'' syndrome and could be responsible for some outbreaks of transmissible mink encephalopathy proposed by Burger and Hartsough (8) and Marsh and harsough (52). ...

snip...

Multiple sources of sheep affected with scrapie and two breeds of cattle from several sources were used inthe current study in an effort to avoid a single strain of either agent or host. Preliminary results from mouse inoculations indicate multiple strains of the agent were present in the pooled inoculum (unpublished data). ...

Transmission of the sheep scrapie to cattle was attempted in 1979 by using intracerebral, intramuscular, subcutaneous, and oral routes of inoculation of 5, 8- to 11-month old cattlw with a homologous mixture of brain from 1 affected sheep (61, 62). ONE of the 5 cattle develped neurologic signs 48 months after inoculation. Signs were disorientation, incoordination, a stiff-legged stilted gait, progressive difficulty in rising, and finally in terminal recumbency. The clinical course was 2.5 months. TWO of the 5 cattle similarly inoculated with brain tissue from a goat with scrapie exhibited similar signs 27 and 36 months after incoluation. Clinical courses were 43 an 44 days. Brain lesions of mild gliosis and vacuolation and mouse inoculation data were insufficient to confirm a diagnosis of scrapie. This work remained controversial until recent examination of the brains detected PrP-res in all 3 cattle with neurologic disease but in none of the unaffected cattle (62). Results of these studies are similar to ours and underscore the necessity of methods other than histopathology to diagnose scrapie infection in cattle. We believe that immunologic techniques for detecting PrP-res currently provide the most sensitive and reliable way to make a definitive diagnosis...



http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/sc/seac17/tab03.pdf



Visit to USA ... info on BSE and Scrapie



http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/yb/1988/10/00001001.pdf



Saturday, February 21, 2009

Renderers say industry not prepared for FDA feed ban rule ??? WHAT, IT'S 2009 FOR PETE'S SAKE $$$

Two recent articles caught my eye ;

Renderers say industry not prepared for FDA feed ban rule

Food Chemical News

February 2, 2009

and

BSE, rendering relate to human safety

Emma Struve 02/17/2009



http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2009/02/renderers-say-industry-not-prepared-for.html



OIE amending the Annex to Decision 2007/453/EC establishing the BSE status of Member States or third countries or regions thereof according to their BSE risk



http://docket-aphis-2006-0041.blogspot.com/2009/01/oie-amending-annex-to-decision.html



Saturday, January 24, 2009

Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy h-BSE ATYPICAL USA 2008 Annual Report Research Project: Study of Atypical Bse

Location: Virus and Prion Diseases of Livestock

2008 Annual Report



http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2009/01/bovine-spongiform-encephalopathy-h-bse.html



Sunday, December 28,

2008 MAD COW DISEASE USA DECEMBER 28, 2008 an 8 year review of a failed and flawed policy



http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2008/12/mad-cow-disease-usa-december-28-2008-8.html



A New Prionopathy OR more of the same old BSe and sporadic CJD



http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2008/08/new-prionopathy-or-more-of-same-old-bse.html



Communicated by: Terry S. Singeltary Sr.

[In submitting these data, Terry S. Singeltary Sr. draws attention to the steady increase in the "type unknown" category, which, according to their definition, comprises cases in which vCJD could be excluded. The total of 26 cases for the current year (2007) is disturbing, possibly symptomatic of the circulation of novel agents. Characterization of these agents should be given a high priority. - Mod.CP]



http://pro-med.blogspot.com/2007/11/proahedr-prion-disease-update-2007-07.html



http://www.promedmail.org/pls/askus/f?p=2400:1001:6833194127530602005::NO::F2400_P1001_BACK_PAGE,F2400_P1001_PUB_MAIL_ID:1010,39963



There is a growing number of human CJD cases, and they were presented last week in San Francisco by Luigi Gambatti(?) from his CJD surveillance collection.

He estimates that it may be up to 14 or 15 persons which display selectively SPRPSC and practically no detected RPRPSC proteins.



http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/06/transcripts/1006-4240t1.htm



http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/06/transcripts/2006-4240t1.pdf



sporadic Fatal Familial Insomnia



http://sporadicffi.blogspot.com/



JOURNAL OF NEUROLOGY

MARCH 26, 2003

RE-Monitoring the occurrence of emerging forms of Creutzfeldt-Jakob

disease in the United States

Email Terry S. Singeltary:

mhtml:%7B33B38F65-8D2E-434D-8F9B-8BDCD77D3066%7Dmid://00000036/!x-usc:mailto:flounder@wt.net

I lost my mother to hvCJD (Heidenhain Variant CJD). I would like to comment on the CDC's attempts to monitor the occurrence of emerging forms of CJD. Asante, Collinge et al [1] have reported that BSE transmission to the 129-methionine genotype can lead to an alternate phenotype that is indistinguishable from type 2 PrPSc, the commonest sporadic CJD. However, CJD and all human TSEs are not reportable nationally. CJD and all human TSEs must be made reportable in every state and internationally. I hope that the CDC does not continue to expect us to still believe that the 85%+ of all CJD cases which are sporadic are all spontaneous, without route/source. We have many TSEs in the USA in both animal and man. CWD in deer/elk is spreading rapidly and CWD does transmit to mink, ferret, cattle, and squirrel monkey by intracerebral inoculation. With the known incubation periods in other TSEs, oral transmission studies of CWD may take much longer. Every victim/family of CJD/TSEs should be asked about route and source of this agent. To prolong this will only spread the agent and needlessly expose others. In light of the findings of Asante and Collinge et al, there should be drastic measures to safeguard the medical and surgical arena from sporadic CJDs and all human TSEs. I only ponder how many sporadic CJDs in the USA are type 2 PrPSc?



http://www.neurology.org/cgi/eletters/60/2/176#535



THE PATHOLOGICAL PROTEIN

Hardcover, 304 pages plus photos and illustrations. ISBN 0-387-95508-9

June 2003

BY Philip Yam

CHAPTER 14 LAYING ODDS

Answering critics like Terry Singeltary, who feels that the U.S. under- counts CJD, Schonberger conceded that the current surveillance system has errors but stated that most of the errors will be confined to the older population.



http://www.thepathologicalprotein.com/



Diagnosis and Reporting of Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease Singeltary, Sr et al. JAMA.2001; 285: 733-734. Vol. 285 No. 6, February 14, 2001 JAMA

Diagnosis and Reporting of Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease

To the Editor: In their Research Letter, Dr Gibbons and colleagues1 reported that the annual US death rate due to Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (CJD) has been stable since 1985. These estimates, however, are based only on reported cases, and do not include misdiagnosed or preclinical cases. It seems to me that misdiagnosis alone would drastically change these figures. An unknown number of persons with a diagnosis of Alzheimer disease in fact may have CJD, although only a small number of these patients receive the postmortem examination necessary to make this diagnosis. Furthermore, only a few states have made CJD reportable. Human and animal transmissible spongiform encephalopathies should be reportable nationwide and internationally.

Terry S. Singeltary, Sr Bacliff, Tex

1. Gibbons RV, Holman RC, Belay ED, Schonberger LB. Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease in the United States: 1979-1998. JAMA. 2000;284:2322-2323. FREE FULL TEXT



http://jama.ama-assn.org/cgi/content/extract/285/6/733?maxtoshow=&HITS=10&hits=10&RESULTFORMAT=&fulltext=singeltary&searchid=1&FIRSTINDEX=0&resourcetype=HWCIT



http://jama.ama-assn.org/cgi/content/full/285/6/733?maxtoshow=&HITS=10&hits=10&RESULTFORMAT=&fulltext=singeltary&searchid=1&FIRSTINDEX=0&resourcetype=HWCIT



2 January 2000 British Medical Journal U.S. Scientist should be concerned with a CJD epidemic in the U.S., as well



http://www.bmj.com/cgi/eletters/320/7226/8/b#6117



15 November 1999 British Medical Journal vCJD in the USA * BSE in U.S.



http://www.bmj.com/cgi/eletters/319/7220/1312/b#5406



Creutzfeldt Jakob Disease



http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/



USA PRION UNIT BLOG



http://prionunitusaupdate2008.blogspot.com/



Sunday, April 20, 2008 Progress Report from the National Prion Disease Pathology Surveillance Center April 3, 2008

Atypical forms of BSE have emerged which, although rare, appear to be more virulent than the classical BSE that causes vCJD.

see full text ;



http://prionunitusaupdate2008.blogspot.com/2008/04/progress-report-from-national-prion.html



CJD TEXAS (cjd clusters)



http://cjdtexas.blogspot.com/



USA WRITTEN CJD QUESTIONNAIRE ???



http://cjdquestionnaire.blogspot.com/



The statistical incidence of CJD cases in the United States has been revised to reflect that there is one case per 9000 in adults age 55 and older. Eighty-five percent of the cases are sporadic, meaning there is no known cause at present.



http://www.cjdfoundation.org/fact.html



Attending Dr.: Date / Time Admitted : 12/14/97 1228

UTMB University of Texas Medical Branch Galveston, Texas 77555-0543 (409) 772-1238 Fax (409) 772-5683 Pathology Report

FINAL AUTOPSY DIAGNOSIS Autopsy' Office (409)772-2858

FINAL AUTOPSY DIAGNOSIS

I. Brain: Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease, Heidenhain variant.



http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2008/07/heidenhain-variant-creutzfeldt-jakob.html



Thursday, December 04, 2008 2:37 PM

"we have found that H-BSE can infect humans."

personal communication with Professor Kong. ...TSS

Terry S. Singeltary Sr. P.O. Box 42 Bacliff, Texas USA 77518

TAFS1 Position Paper on Testing of Cattle for BSE (Revision January 2009)

TAFS INTERNATIONAL FORUM FOR TRANSMISSIBLE ANIMAL

Foundation

(Revision January 2009)

TAFS1 Position Paper on Testing of Cattle for BSE – Purpose and Effectiveness © TAFS, Berne, 2009 Large scale testing of cattle for BSE has now been established in many countries, starting in Switzerland in 1999, and followed by the European Union in 2001. Similar programmes have subsequently been introduced in other countries. This position paper explains some of the background to such testing, especially in relation to its purpose and effectiveness, and possible future developments. It also emphasises the fact that the key measure to protect consumers is the removal of Specified Risk Materials, rather than testing. Further details of SRM controls and their background can be found in a separate TAFS position paper. For the purposes of this document, testing means the collection of a sample of brain tissue after death or slaughter, and its examination with a commercial “rapid test”.

Why are countries required to test cattle for BSE?

* The main purpose of testing is to identify whether BSE exists in a country, and if so, the likely numbers of infected cattle. This is to supplement compulsory reporting of clinically affected suspects, and is particularly important where farmers and veterinarians may have difficulty in recognising BSE. Diagnosis of BSE in the live animal requires experience, and early signs of abnormalities may either be missed, or their significance not recognised. Farmers may therefore slaughter or sell such animals without ever suspecting that they are affected with BSE. Testing has been effective in identifying the first case of BSE in several countries thought to be free of the disease. World-wide statistics arising from surveillance are available through the OIE or World Animal Health Organisation(16).

* By determining how much BSE exists, especially when monitored over a sufficiently long period of time, the testing can give an indication of the effectiveness of measures introduced to control BSE. In other words, a declining prevalence indicates that controls are working. If cases continue to occur for long periods after controls have been introduced, it may mean that controls are not totally effective.

1 TAFS is an international platform created by a group of scientists, food industry experts, animal health regulators, epidemiologists, diagnosticians, food producers, and consumers. Its purpose is to establish and maintain lines of communication for the dissemination of reliable information to the public that can maintain confidence in the safety of food with regard to Transmissible Animal Diseases (TAD).

TAFS 2

* The scale of testing has also enabled the detection of apparently new forms of BSE, in small numbers, colloquially referred to as “atypical BSE”. A separate TAFS position paper is available on “atypical BSE”

* In some countries testing of cattle at slaughter is also introduced to increase consumer confidence in the consumption of beef and other products produced from cattle. The removal of positive cattle from the human food chain is claimed to provide a degree of protection to consumers. Clinically suspect cattle are already excluded from the food chain.

Are all cattle tested?

* No. In Europe, the primary target for testing of cattle slaughtered for human consumption is cattle aged over 30 months at the time of slaughter. This age was chosen from experience in the British epidemic that the brain and spinal cord of infected cattle over 30 months are more likely to be infectious, and test positive, than in younger animals.

* Some countries (eg Germany, France, Italy, Spain) have at times included animals aged over 24 months in the testing programme, while Japan, tested all ages in the early days of its surveillance programme. From 2005 the Japanese government no longer required the testing of cattle under 21 months of age, but allowed local authorities to continue should they prefer to do so. That continues to be the position at the beginning of 2009.

* Two other categories of cattle are also targeted for testing. The first, called fallen stock, which are cattle that are sick and die or are culled on farm, do not enter the human food chain. They are normally destroyed by incineration or rendering, or occasionally buried on farm. Such animals over 30 months of age have been shown to have a higher probability of testing BSE positive than animals slaughtered for human consumption. Animals over 24 months in this group weretargeted for testing, but as discussed below, this can change.

* Secondly, a category of cattle called “casualties” are also considered to be a good target population for the detection of BSE. These animals may be suffering from some abnormality, but have been certified by a veterinary surgeon as being fit for human consumption. Cattle with broken legs are an example of such animals. Broken legs or other injuries can arise as a result of excessive kicking on the part of the cow due to infection with BSE. In the EU, casualties (defined as cattle subject to emergency slaughter or found sick at ante-mortem inspection) over 24 months of age were tested for BSE. Some countries ban the consumption of casualties, in which case they will then be destroyed and tested along with fallen stock.

* Testing of fallen stock and casualties is the most cost-effective approach of finding BSE infected animals in that fewer animals have to be tested for each positive detected. Together they are commonly referred to as “risk animals.” ? None of the categories and age-groups referred to above are absolute. It is essential that they are reviewed from time to time to consider whether they remain appropriate. (See below)

Is it necessary to test all ages of cattle?

* No. Some countries have at times introduced such a policy (eg Japan), but it is extremely expensive while doing little to increase the likelihood of finding positive cattle.

TAFS 3

* Experience in the United Kingdom suggests that most infected cattle die of BSE at between four and six years of age, with an average of 60 months(19) although some may be much older. Research on sheep naturally infected with a similar disease called scrapie, or mice experimentally infected with scrapie, suggested that the brain would be infected by approximately mid-way in the incubation(4, 7, 10, 14). Translated into cattle this would be approximately 30 months of age if it is assumed that calves become infected in the first few months of life. Small numbers would of course be positive before this age. Surveillance in Germany has shown this to be possible, and the age at testing in that country was reduced to 24 months as a result. Japan has had a similar experience. Indeed the youngest BSE case ever detected was clinically affected at 20 months of age in the United Kingdom, and may represent the extreme end of the age range of affected cattle.

* Brains of cattle experimentally infected with 100g of BSE-infected brain in two separate challenge studies in the United Kingdom have tested positive only at 32 and 30/33 months after infection(1,8,18,), although one of these studies also demonstrates that the brain is infectious shortly before it tests positive by rapid tests(8). A German study has confirmed however that there is considerable variation between animals challenged at the same age, and occasional animals may be positive before 30 months(11). In that study, the lower limit detected after an oral dose of 100g was 24 months post- infection. Perhaps more realistically, following a dose of 1g only, and more likely to represent natural exposure levels, brain was found to be positive at 44 months post-infection(1).

* Further research data from the United Kingdom on BSE-infected cattle suggests that the brain is actually not infectious until a much later stage of incubation than seen in sheep and mice with scrapie. It seems as if this may only be in the six to 12 months before the onset of clinical disease. This suggests that for the majority of infected cattle the selection of 30 months as the age above which cattle are tested is appropriate, and cautious. In other words, it should detect the vast majority of infected cattle that are approaching the onset of clinical disease (1, 3, 9, 18).

* Selection of just a proportion of cattle to test, such as fallen stock, casualties and healthy animals over 30 (or 24) months of age when killed, makes best use of limited resources in establishing a large testing programme, particularly in countries with low BSE risk. In other words, in order of probability of detecting positive cattle, testing could be focused on cattle exhibiting clinical signs compatible with BSE, fallen stock/casualties, or apparently healthy cattle over the age of 30 months when slaughtered. The ideal mix of cattle to be sampled will vary from country to country, but the testing of healthy cattle is not an appropriate substitute for the testing of the other categories.

What tissue is tested?

* Brain (particularly the part referred to as brain stem), or sometimes spinal cord, are the preferred tissues to test. This is because these tissues, along with the eye, are the only tissues found to be consistently positive in naturally infected cattle. The tests used have also been optimised to work on brain.

* In experimentally infected cattle, in addition to central nervous tissue, the lower small intestine is also infected, but it is inconsistently positive and it is not yet possible to perform tests with any confidence on this tissue. It has not proved possible to demonstrate this infectivity in the intestine of naturally infected cattle. Traces of infectivity have been detected in tonsil and bone marrow of experimentally infected

TAFS 4

cattle, but these results do not indicate that either tissue is an appropriate alternative for testing. ? More recently, tests carried out on peripheral nerves of cattle clinically affected with BSE(2,12,13,15) have confirmed that at late stages of incubation some nerves are positive, but much less so than brain. So again they do not represent optimal targets for testing.

Is this effective in detecting all infected cattle?

* No. Only a proportion of infected cattle will be detected by the testing of brain. As explained above in selecting the age of cattle to test, infectivity appears to reach the brain and spinal cord only relatively late in the incubation period. Consequently, an animal in the early stages of incubation will test negative despite being infected.

* This problem could be overcome if the intestine could be tested as described above, but that is not yet possible with current tests.

If all infected cattle cannot be detected by this means, why bother to test at all?

* Because the primary purpose of testing is to improve our understanding of how much BSE exists in the cattle population, the inefficiency of the testing approach is outweighed by the additional information gathered, over and above reliance on the detection of clinically affected cattle. Taken together they give a better indication of the scale of the problem, and whether or not measures introduced to control BSE are effective. Ideally surveillance results should indicate that cattle born after the introduction of control measures are either not infected or far less likely to be infected than cattle born before the measures.

If only a proportion of infected cattle can be detected, does testing provide significant consumer protection?

* The extent to which testing increases consumer protection is still open to question, especially if other protective measures are in place (see below).

* It is conceivable that tissues not previously recognised as infected may still be found as research continues. Infectivity levels are expected to be extremely low, and undetectable with the tools used so far. If these tissues were otherwise consumed then the destruction of the carcase would afford the consumer a greater degree of protection. If the tissues are not sufficiently infectious to pose a health risk, and/or are not consumed, then the additional protection provided may be nil.

* Recent results from Japan and Germany confirm this point(2,12,13,15), with positivity or infectivity being detected in some peripheral nerves that would not normally be removed as SRM. The amount of infectivity present is low, and considered be up to 1000-fold lower than the brain. Unpublished evidence suggests that these become positive only after the brain and spinal cord. This therefore confirms that testing and removal of positive animals does provide some additional, as yet unquantifiable, protection to consumers over and above that provided by removal of SRM. Given that detection of positivity or infectivity in some peripheral nerves coincides with the onset of clinical signs, it is probable that such animals would be detected before slaughter, and therefore excluded from the food chain.

What alternatives are there to testing of cattle slaughtered for human consumption?

TAFS 5

* In most countries, testing of cattle at slaughter is only one of several lines of defence to protect the consumer.

* The first critical step is the exclusion of all clinically affected cattle from the human food chain. These should be reported to the authorities, killed and destroyed. Inspection of animals as they enter the abattoir for slaughter will identify some affected cattle that may not have been detected on farm. Indeed, transportation to the abattoir often triggers more obvious clinical signs in affected animals. These will be destroyed.

* Finally, in most countries where BSE has been recognised, the key protective measure is the removal from the human food chain of tissues that are expected to contain the greatest amounts of infectivity. Such tissues are currently called Specified Risk Materials. These are described more fully in the TAFS position paper on SRM.

* When SRM are removed they are destroyed, and thereby also excluded from animal feed as well. This measure therefore protects both humans and animals.

What tests are used?

* Since 1999, when the European Commission first evaluated new rapid screening tests, there have been further rounds of evaluation and approval. In addition, the OIE has also started to offer evaluation of tests for more global use.

* All allow the completion of testing of cattle within a matter of hours from death, thus enabling abattoirs to await the results before carcases are released for human consumption. All parts of positive animals are then kept separate and destroyed.

* Although test manufacturers make claims about the relative merits of their tests, all are considered to be appropriate for the purpose. None have been shown to guarantee the detection of animals earlier in the incubation period than the others. Criteria for selection of tests for use in a particular country therefore take into account the skills and resources in that country for conducting testing, the volume of testing to be done, and test cost price.

* Because of the constantly evolving nature of this area, with approvals having taken place in the EU, Japan, USA and Canada, it is not possible to list all approvals in this document. Most of the tests used in N America and Japan are related to those approved in Europe, and are essentially identical. The OIE Reference Laboratory at the Veterinary Laboratories Agency(17), UK therefore maintains lists of approved tests, or links to approval sites in other countries where accessible, that will enable readers to further investigate what is available on the market.

* Any animals found positive by the use of such tests are subjected to further testing at National Reference Laboratories using internationally recognised confirmatory tests. Carcases will already have been removed from the food chain before this as a precautionary measure.

Will testing continue indefinitely?

* This is most unlikely as it is extremely expensive and complex to implement. In its discussion document entitled the “TSE Roadmap”(5), the European Commission estimated that between 2001 and 2004 it cost 1.56 million euros to detect each case by testing in the healthy slaughter population, but this rose to 64 million euros/case for animals aged under 48 months. As this is an average figure, for countries with very low incidence of BSE the cost was even higher.

* As control measures take effect, these costs will rise even in older testing groups, while in parallel the risk to consumers is falling towards zero.

TAFS 6

* The TSE Roadmap therefore began a public debate in Europe about planning a future strategy that will maintain protective measures for both consumers and animals, but at a cost that is proportionate to the risk.

* As anticipated by the TSE Roadmap, the review process was taken forward in 2008 when the European Commission consulted the European Food Safety Authority on options for alternative testing strategies. In recognition of the falling prevalence of BSE in EU countries where controls were tightened at the end of 2000, the Commission asked EFSA to consider the implications of raising the target age for testing in both healthy and risk categories of cattle. The EFSA Opinion offered estimates for the consequences of increasing the minimum age at testing by 12 month intervals to an upper limit of 60 months.

* In summary, the EFSA Opinion(6) considered options of raising the age at testing to 36, 48 or 60 months in healthy cattle, and 30, 36, 48 and 60 months for risk animals. As recognized earlier in this paper, falling prevalence of BSE in EU152 countries confirmed the effectiveness of measures introduced at the end of 2000 (newer Member States where control measures have not been in place for as long as in EU15 countries were excluded as further time was needed to provide evidence of effectiveness).

* For healthy cattle, the Opinion estimated that fewer than two cases would be missed in all EU15 countries if the age at testing was increased to 36 or 48 months, and fewer than three missed if the age was raised to 60 months.

* For risk animals, less than one positive animal would be missed by raising the age at testing to 30, 36 or 48 months, or fewer than three cases if raised to 60 months.

* As a result, the Commission recommended that EU15 countries could apply to increase the age at testing in both surveillance streams to 48 months in 2009. Following consultation with the European Parliament, and by national authorities, the age at testing in EU15 countries has been raised to 48 months in 2009. Some may decide not to apply this flexibility across all surveillance streams.

* In future, similar changes can be anticipated in the remaining EU countries, and the age limit may be raised further in the EU15 countries, but all changes will continue to be subject to ongoing review of surveillance and enforcement data throughout the EU.

2 EU15 countries – Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom.

TAFS 7

References:

1. Arnold, M.A., Ryan, J.B.M., Konold, T., Simmons, M.M., Spencer, Y.I., Wear, A., Chaplin, M., Stack, M., Czub, S., Mueller, R., Webb, P.R., Davis, A., Spiropoulos, J., Holdaway, J., Hawkins, S.A.C., Austin, A.R., and Wells, G.A.H. (2007) Estimating the temporal relationship between PrPSc detection and incubation period in experimental bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) of cattle. J. Gen Virol. 88: 3198-3208. 2. Buschmann A., Groschup MH. Highly BSE-sensitive transgenic mice confirm the essential restriction of infectivity to the nervous system in clinically diseased cattle. J Infect Dis. 2005 Sep 1;192(5):934-42. 3. Deslys, J.P, Comoy, E, Hawkins, S, Simon, S, Schimmel, H, Wells, G, Grassi, J and Moynagh, J. (2001). Screening of slaughtered cattle for BSE. Nature. 409, 476-478. 4. Dickinson, A.G. and Outram, G. (1979). The scrapie replication-site hypothesis and its implications for pathogenesis. In: Slow Transmissible Diseases of the Nervous System. vol.2. S.B.Prusiner and W.J.Hadlow, eds. Academic Press, New York, pp 13-31. 5. EC. 2005. The TSE Roadmap – available at


http://ec.europa.eu/food/food/biosafety/bse/roadmap_en.pdf


6. EFSA (2008). Scientific Opinion of the Panel on Biological Hazards on a request from the European Commission on the Risk for Human and Animal Health related to the revision of the BSE monitoring regime in some Member States. The EFSA Journal. 762:1-47.


http://www.efsa.europa.eu/cs/BlobServer/Scientific_Opinion/biohaz_op_ej762_bse_monitoring_en,2.pdf?ssbinary=true


7. Eklund, C.M, Kennedy, R.C. and Hadlow, W.J. (1967). Pathogenesis of scrapie virus infection in the mouse. J. Infect Dis. 117. 15-22. 8. Espinosa, J-C., Morales, ,M., Castilla, J., Rogers, M. and Torres, J.M. (2007) Progression of prion infectivity in asymptomatic cattle after oral bovine spongiform encephalopathy challenge. J. Gen. Virol. 88. 1379-1383 9. Grassi, J, Comoy, E, Simon, S, Creminon, C, Frobert, Y, Trapmann, S, Schimmel, H, Hawkins, S.A.C, Moynagh, J, Deslys, J.P and Wells, G.A.H. (2001). Rapid test for the preclinical postmortem diagnosis of BSE in central nervous system tissue. Vet Rec. 149, 577-582. 10. Hadlow, W.J, Kennedy, R.C. and Race, R.E. (1982). Natural infection of Suffolk sheep with scrapie virus. J Infect Dis. 146, 657-664. 11. Hoffmann, C., Ziegler, U., Buschmann, A., Weber, A., Kupfer, L., Oelschlegel, A., Hammerschmidt, B. and Groschup, M.J. (2007) Prions spread via the autonomic nervous system in cattle incubating bovine spongiform encephalopathy. J. Gen. Virol. 88. 1048-1055. TAFS 8 12. Iwamaru Y, Okubo Y, Ikeda T, Hayashi H, Imamura M, Yokoyama T, Shinagawa M. (2005) PrPSc distribution of a natural case of bovine spongiform encephalopathy. In: Kitamoto T, ed. Prions. Food and Drug Safety. Springer Verlag, New York. 13. Iwata, N., Sato, Y. Higuchi, Y. Nohtomi, K. Nagata, N. Hasegawa, H. Tobiume, M. Nakamura, Y., Hagiwara, K., Furuoka, H, Horiuchi, M. Yamakawa, Y & Sata.T (2006). Distribution of PrP(Sc) in Cattle with Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Slaughtered at Abattoirs in Japan. Jpn J Infect Dis. 59:100-7. 14. Kimberlin, R.H. and Walker, C.A. (1988). Pathogenesis of experimental scrapie. In: Novel Infectious Agents and the Central Nervous System. Ciba Foundation Symposium. 135. G.Boack and J. Marsh, Eds. Wiley, Chichester.pp 37-62. 15. Masujin, K., Matthews, D., Wells, G.A.H., Mohri, S and Yokoyama, T. (2007). Prions in the peripheral nerves of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) affected cattle. J. Gen. Virol. 88: 1850-1858. 16. OIE, World Animal Health Organisation, BSE statistics: available at :-


http://www.oie.int/eng/info/en_esb.htm


17. Veterinary Laboratories Agency (VLA) – TSE science home page for references on approved rapid tests, available at:-


http://www.defra.gov.uk/corporate/vla/science/science-tse-rl-intro.htm


18. Wells, G.A.H, Hawkins, S.A.C, Green, R.B, Austin, A.R, Dexter, I, Spencer, Y.I, Chaplin, M.J, Stack, M.J, and Dawson, M. (1998). Preliminary observations on the pathogenesis of experimental bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE):an update. Vet Rec. 142, 103-106. 19. Wilesmith, J.W. (1998). Manual on Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy. FAO. Rome.




http://www.tafsforum.org/position_papers/TAFS_POSITION_PAPER_ON_TESTING_OF_CATTLE_FOR_BSE_2009.pdf




Wednesday, January 28, 2009 TAFS1 Position Paper on Specified Risk Materials (January, 2009)

TAFS INTERNATIONAL FORUM FOR TRANSMISSIBLE ANIMAL DISEASES AND FOOD SAFETY a non-profit Swiss Foundation

(January 2009)

TAFS1 Position Paper on Specified Risk Materials




http://madcowspontaneousnot.blogspot.com/2009/01/tafs1-position-paper-on-specified-risk.html






Saturday, January 24, 2009

Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy h-BSE ATYPICAL USA 2008 Annual Report

Research Project: Study of Atypical Bse

Location: Virus and Prion Diseases of Livestock

2008 Annual Report




http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2009/01/bovine-spongiform-encephalopathy-h-bse.html




Research Project: Detection of Prp**d in Tissue Samples and Bodily Fluids of Cattle from the German Bse Pathogenesis Study Location: Virus and Prion Diseases of Livestock

2008 Annual Report

1a.Objectives (from AD-416) The overall objective of this cooperative project is to evaluate PrP**D tissue distribution and migration in cattle orally infected with BSE of British origin. To achieve this objective, the following specific approaches will be conducted: (1) the protein misfolding cyclic amplification (PMCA) assay will be used on blinded replicate aliquots of tissue from animals in the BSE study to independently confirm whether PrP**D can be detected in the tissue samples. The Cooperator will function as lead investigator and ARS will confirm test results for the presence or absence of PrP**D in any given sample. (2) The Cooperator will analyze the proteome in tissue samples by two dimensional SDS PAGE. (3) NADC will evaluate microscopic pathology and visual function of the retina of available animals and tissues to assess PrP**D accumulation and visual function effects.

1b.Approach (from AD-416) The German BSE oral pathogenesis study involves 56 beef cattle orally dosed with BSE containing brain tissue obtained from British cattle. The animal study is managed by the cooperator and various tissues are collected at prescribed times and at necropsy. These tissues will enable the cooperating parties to perform independent confirmation on the presence or absence of PrP**D for verification of PrP**D distribution in tissues. In addition, retinal samples will be analyzed to assess the extent of retinal pathology in infected cattle and visual system function in available remaining live cattle will be tested using electroretinography.

3.Progress Report The overall objective of this cooperative project is to evaluate PrP**d tissue distribution and migration in cattle orally infected with Bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) of British origin. The live-animal phase of this work was completed this year. Samples from this experiment will be brought to the USDA, ARS, National Animal Disease Center for further characterization in the upcoming year. Methods used for monitoring included phone contact, e-mail, and site visits. This project addresses NP 103, component 8.




http://www.ars.usda.gov/research/projects/projects.htm?ACCN_NO=411017&fy=2008




Research Project: Study of Atypical Bse Location: Virus and Prion Diseases of Livestock

Project Number: 3625-32000-086-05 Project Type: Specific Cooperative Agreement

Start Date: Sep 15, 2004 End Date: Sep 14, 2009

Objective: The objective of this cooperative research project with Dr. Maria Caramelli from the Italian BSE Reference Laboratory in Turin, Italy, is to conduct comparative studies with the U.S. bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) isolate and the atypical BSE isolates identified in Italy. The studies will cover the following areas: 1. Evaluation of present diagnostics tools used in the U.S. for the detection of atypical BSE cases. 2. Molecular comparison of the U.S. BSE isolate and other typical BSE isolates with atypical BSE cases. 3. Studies on transmissibility and tissue distribution of atypical BSE isolates in cattle and other species.

Approach: This project will be done as a Specific Cooperative Agreement with the Italian BSE Reference Laboratory, Istituto Zooprofilattico Sperimentale del Piemonte, in Turin, Italy. It is essential for the U.S. BSE surveillance program to analyze the effectiveness of the U.S diagnostic tools for detection of atypical cases of BSE. Molecular comparisons of the U.S. BSE isolate with atypical BSE isolates will provide further characterization of the U.S. BSE isolate. Transmission studies are already underway using brain homogenates from atypical BSE cases into mice, cattle and sheep. It will be critical to see whether the atypical BSE isolates behave similarly to typical BSE isolates in terms of transmissibility and disease pathogenesis. If transmission occurs, tissue distribution comparisons will be made between cattle infected with the atypical BSE isolate and the U.S. BSE isolate. Differences in tissue distribution could require new regulations regarding specific risk material (SRM) removal.



http://www.ars.usda.gov/research/projects/projects.htm?ACCN_NO=408490




CHAPTER 3 Animal Disease Eradication Programs and Control and Certification Programs

snip...

In FY 2007, two field cases, one validation study case, and two RSSS cases were consistent with a variant of the disease known as Nor98 scrapie.1 These five cases originated from flocks in California, Minnesota, Colorado, Wyoming, and Indiana, respectively.

snip...



http://www.aphis.usda.gov/publications/animal_health/content/printable_version/AHR_Web_PDF_07/D_Chapter_3.pdf




NOR-98 Scrapie FY 2008 to date 1




http://www.aphis.usda.gov/animal_health/animal_diseases/scrapie/downloads/monthly_scrapie_rpt.pps




ATYPICAL TSEs in USA CATTLE AND SHEEP ?




http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/sc/seac17/tab03.pdf





Monday, December 1, 2008

When Atypical Scrapie cross species barriers



http://nor-98.blogspot.com/2008/12/when-atypical-scrapie-cross-species.html




Tuesday, January 06, 2009

CWD Update 93 December 29, 2008



http://chronic-wasting-disease.blogspot.com/2009/01/cwd-update-93-december-29-2008.html




Sunday, December 28, 2008

MAD COW DISEASE USA DECEMBER 28, 2008 an 8 year review of a failed and flawed policy



http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2008/12/mad-cow-disease-usa-december-28-2008-8.html




[Docket No. FDA-2008-D-0597] Draft Guidance for Industry: Small Entities Compliance Guide for Renderers-Substances Prohibited From Use in Animal Food or Feed; Availability AGENCY: Food and Drug Administration, HHS. ACTION:

snip...



http://edocket.access.gpo.gov/2008/pdf/E8-28189.pdf




Greetings,

I kindly wish to submit the following to [Docket No. FDA-2008-D-0597] ;

I would kindly like to once again comment on the failed attempts of the FDA et al to stop the spread of animal TSEs, including BSE, through the legal, and illegal feeding practices, of feeding animal protein to livestock for human and animal consumption. Since the terribly flawed, partial, and voluntary August 4, 1997 ruminant to ruminant feed ban was put into place, literally 100s of thousands of tons of banned animal protein has been fed out into commerce, even as late as 2007, when some 10,000,000+ LBS. of PROHIBITED BANNED MAD COW FEED I.E. Blood meal used to make cattle feed was recalled because it was cross-contaminated with prohibited bovine meat and bone meal that had been manufactured on common equipment and labeling did not bear cautionary BSE statement. NOW, how much of that product that went out into commerce was fed out to cattle, and how much was ever recovered ? AND to think that feeding blood to livestock producing animals is still legal, when scientific study after study shows that TSEs are easily transmitted via blood. IT is absolutely unacceptable that still in 2008, the USA is still feeding highly suspect mad cow feed to USA cattle, and other livestock producing animals. Especially when the last two cases of BSE that were allowed to be tested and reported were of the atypical BSE category, of which we now know the atypical BSE is more virulent than that of the typical BSE, and when ARS research on the atypical BSE said long ago the SRM rules may need to be changed, IF the atypical BSE were to be proven to be more virulent. Why do we continue to flounder? I have submitted to these BSE feed dockets until I am blue in the face, and still to date, they still debate an issue that should have been settled long ago. IT's a fine example of how big ag, big industry, have a stranglehold on sound science and policy making thereof. How many millions of animals and humans have been needlessly exposed to this TSE agent, due to nothing more than ignorance and greed, simply because of a disease that is 100% fatal, but one that has such a long incubation period. For the government and industry as a whole, to continue to flagrantly violate said rules and regulations, in my opinion, should be regarded as criminal, and treated as such. People are dying. ...

Please see references ;

snip...



http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2008/12/docket-no-fda2008d0597-draft-guidance.html




November 25, 2008

Update On Feed Enforcement Activities To Limit The Spread Of BSE



http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2008/11/november-2008-update-on-feed.html



http://madcowspontaneousnot.blogspot.com/2008/02/specified-risk-materials-srm.html



http://madcowspontaneousnot.blogspot.com/





USDA CERTIFIED SRM BRAINS FOR EXPORT (not tested for TSE). ...TSS


0206290030: BRAINS OF BOVINE ANIMALS, EDIBLE, FROZEN

U.S. Domestic Exports: December 2004 and 2004 Year-to-Date, not Seasonally Adjusted

(FAS Value, in Thousands of Dollars) (Units of Quantity: Kilogram) December 2004 2004, through December Quantity Value Quantity Value .

World 37,727 33 363,222 344

Mexico 37,727 33 338,475 326

Romania 0 0 24,747 19


0206290010: HEARTS OF BOVINE ANIMALS, EDIBLE, FROZEN

U.S. Domestic Exports: December 2004 and 2004 Year-to-Date, not Seasonally Adjusted

(FAS Value, in Thousands of Dollars) (Units of Quantity: Kilogram) December 2004 2004, through December Quantity Value Quantity Value .

World 581,872 418 7,564,955 5,685

Angola 0 0 211,527 46

Cambodia (Kampuchea) 0 0 22,682 60

China 0 0 49,887 36

Colombia 0 0 22,657 28

Gabon 0 0 24,947 11

Hong Kong 0 0 24,494 45

Indonesia 400,639 261 4,420,683 2,747

Italy 0 0 24,494 20

Korea 0 0 124,089 71

Mexico 181,233 157 2,494,078 2,517

Poland 0 0 47,359 20

Russia 0 0 98,058 85


0206290020: KIDNEYS OF BOVINE ANIMALS, EDIBLE, FROZEN

U.S. Domestic Exports: December 2004 and 2004 Year-to-Date, not Seasonally Adjusted

(FAS Value, in Thousands of Dollars) (Units of Quantity: Kilogram)

December 2004 2004, through December Quantity Value Quantity Value .

World 303,293 175 3,009,780 1,684 Angola 0 0 60,075 15 Bahamas 0 0 11,431 8 Cayman Islands 0 0 4,450 10 China 0 0 48,988 26 Gabon 48,200 15 489,329 206 Hong Kong 0 0 48,988 26 Indonesia 0 0 47,174 17 Ivory Coast 188,414 96 1,694,772 959 Jamaica 10,546 5 78,933 37 Mexico 56,133 59 203,788 204 Moldova 0 0 295,091 166 Romania 0 0 26,761 10

0206290040: SWEATBREADS OF BOVINE ANIMALS, EDIBLE, FROZEN

U.S. Domestic Exports: December 2004 and 2004 Year-to-Date, not Seasonally Adjusted

(FAS Value, in Thousands of Dollars) (Units of Quantity: Kilogram) December 2004 2004, through December Quantity Value Quantity Value .

World 0 0 95,209 83

Bulgaria 0 0 25,243 22

Ghana 0 0 0 0

Mexico 0 0 69,859 58

Netherlands 0 0 107 4


0206290050: LIPS OF BOVINE ANIMALS, EDIBLE, FROZEN

U.S. Domestic Exports: December 2004 and 2004 Year-to-Date, not Seasonally Adjusted

(FAS Value, in Thousands of Dollars) (Units of Quantity: Kilogram) December 2004 2004, through December Quantity Value Quantity Value .World 1,389,825 2,709 7,355,294 13,917 Bahamas 0 0 40,000 5 Mexico 1,386,800 2,706 7,293,673 13,895 Montserrat 0 0 18,596 15 Namibia 3,025 3 3,025 3

0206290090: OFFAL OF BOVINE ANIMALS, EDIBLE, NESOI, FROZEN

U.S. Domestic Exports: December 2004 and 2004 Year-to-Date, not Seasonally Adjusted

(FAS Value, in Thousands of Dollars) (Units of Quantity: Kilogram) December 2004 2004, through December Quantity Value Quantity Value .World 2,386,597 2,913 22,701,393 25,320 Antigua Barbuda 2,141 6 3,162 11 Argentina 590 4 1,044 7 Aruba 1,000 4 1,476 10 Bahamas 0 0 117,929 184 Bulgaria 0 0 315,543 301 Canada 337,392 255 3,544,821 3,347 Cayman Islands 0 0 5,350 21 China 0 0 22,185 37 Colombia 0 0 24,127 36 Cyprus 0 0 25,052 20 Denmark 0 0 46,416 25 Dominican Republic 0 0 24,086 16 Egypt 0 0 145 3 Gabon 96,208 92 316,411 271 Germany 0 0 2,545,197 554 Greece 0 0 190,564 146 Guatemala 0 0 117,362 197 Haiti 0 0 13,125 25

Haiti 0 0 13,125 25 Honduras 23,940 34 23,940 34 Hong Kong 0 0 48,343 130 Indonesia 7,470 9 640,472 249 Italy 0 0 47,849 38 Ivory Coast 192,410 184 1,133,273 1,012 Jamaica 80,703 54 124,514 86 Japan 25,094 53 432,608 2,659 Korea 0 0 23,596 25 Malaysia 97,997 48 457,516 203 Mexico 1,376,419 1,977 9,425,957 13,261 Netherlands 20,229 20 245,555 129 New Zealand 0 0 0 0 Panama 23,399 44 161,425 117 Philippines 0 0 22,184 39 Poland 0 0 805,355 477 Romania 48,988 33 1,294,879 1,191 Senegal 0 0 52,909 103 Singapore 0 0 728 3 Spain 0 0 202 4 St Christopher-Nevis 0 0 1,020 3 St Lucia 0 0 5,313 8 Switzerland 0 0 6,506 35 Taiwan 46,920 86 97,268 127 Trinidad and Tobago 0 0 38,102 84 Turks and Caicos Islands 5,697 9 6,082 13 United Kingdom 0 0 291,303 76 Uruguay 0 0 499 4



http://ita.doc.gov/td/industry/otea/Trade-Detail/Latest-Month/Exports/02/020629.html





10,000,000+ LBS. of PROHIBITED BANNED MAD COW FEED I.E. MBM IN COMMERCE USA 2007

Date: March 21, 2007 at 2:27 pm PST RECALLS AND FIELD CORRECTIONS: VETERINARY MEDICINES -- CLASS II ___________________________________

PRODUCT

Bulk cattle feed made with recalled Darling’s 85% Blood Meal, Flash Dried, Recall # V-024-2007

CODE

Cattle feed delivered between 01/12/2007 and 01/26/2007

RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER

Pfeiffer, Arno, Inc, Greenbush, WI. by conversation on February 5, 2007.

Firm initiated recall is ongoing.

REASON

Blood meal used to make cattle feed was recalled because it was cross-contaminated with prohibited bovine meat and bone meal that had been manufactured on common equipment and labeling did not bear cautionary BSE statement.

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE

42,090 lbs.

DISTRIBUTION

WI

___________________________________

PRODUCT

Custom dairy premix products: MNM ALL PURPOSE Pellet, HILLSIDE/CDL Prot-Buffer Meal, LEE, M.-CLOSE UP PX Pellet, HIGH DESERT/ GHC LACT Meal, TATARKA, M CUST PROT Meal, SUNRIDGE/CDL PROTEIN Blend, LOURENZO, K PVM DAIRY Meal, DOUBLE B DAIRY/GHC LAC Mineral, WEST PIONT/GHC CLOSEUP Mineral, WEST POINT/GHC LACT Meal, JENKS, J/COMPASS PROTEIN Meal, COPPINI – 8# SPECIAL DAIRY Mix, GULICK, L-LACT Meal (Bulk), TRIPLE J – PROTEIN/LACTATION, ROCK CREEK/GHC MILK Mineral, BETTENCOURT/GHC S.SIDE MK-MN, BETTENCOURT #1/GHC MILK MINR, V&C DAIRY/GHC LACT Meal, VEENSTRA, F/GHC LACT Meal, SMUTNY, A-BYPASS ML W/SMARTA, Recall # V-025-2007

CODE

The firm does not utilize a code - only shipping documentation with commodity and weights identified.

RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER

Rangen, Inc, Buhl, ID, by letters on February 13 and 14, 2007. Firm initiated recall is complete.

REASON

Products manufactured from bulk feed containing blood meal that was cross contaminated with prohibited meat and bone meal and the labeling did not bear cautionary BSE statement.

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE

9,997,976 lbs.

DISTRIBUTION

ID and NV

END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR MARCH 21, 2007



http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/enforce/2007/ENF00996.html



2006

Subject: MAD COW FEED RECALL USA SEPT 6, 2006 1961.72 TONS IN COMMERCE AL, TN, AND WV

Date: September 6, 2006 at 7:58 am PST

PRODUCT

a) EVSRC Custom dairy feed, Recall # V-130-6; b) Performance Chick Starter, Recall # V-131-6; c) Performance Quail Grower, Recall # V-132-6; d) Performance Pheasant Finisher, Recall # V-133-6.

CODE None

RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER

Donaldson & Hasenbein/dba J&R Feed Service, Inc., Cullman, AL, by telephone on June 23, 2006 and by letter dated July 19, 2006. Firm initiated recall is complete.

REASON

Dairy and poultry feeds were possibly contaminated with ruminant based protein.

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE

477.72 tons

DISTRIBUTION

AL ______________________________

PRODUCT

a) Dairy feed, custom, Recall # V-134-6; b) Custom Dairy Feed with Monensin, Recall # V-135-6. CODE None. Bulk product

RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER

Recalling Firm: Burkmann Feed, Greeneville, TN, by Telephone beginning on June 28, 2006.

Manufacturer: H. J. Baker & Bro., Inc., Albertville, AL. Firm initiated recall is complete.

REASON

Possible contamination of dairy feeds with ruminant derived meat and bone meal.

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE

1,484 tons

DISTRIBUTION

TN and WV



http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/enforce/2006/ENF00968.html



Subject: MAD COW FEED RECALLS ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR AUGUST 9, 2006 KY, LA, MS, AL, GA, AND TN 11,000+ TONS

Date: August 16, 2006 at 9:19 am PST

RECALLS AND FIELD CORRECTIONS: VETERINARY MEDICINE - CLASS II ______________________________

PRODUCT

Bulk custom made dairy feed, Recall # V-115-6

CODE None

RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER

Hiseville Feed & Seed Co., Hiseville, KY, by telephone and letter on or about July 14, 2006. FDA initiated recall is ongoing.

REASON

Custom made feeds contain ingredient called Pro-Lak which may contain ruminant derived meat and bone meal.

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE

Approximately 2,223 tons

DISTRIBUTION

KY

______________________________

PRODUCT

Bulk custom made dairy feed, Recall # V-116-6

CODE None

RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER

Rips Farm Center, Tollesboro, KY, by telephone and letter on July 14, 2006. FDA initiated recall is ongoing.

REASON

Custom made feeds contain ingredient called Pro-Lak which may contain ruminant derived meat and bone meal.

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE

1,220 tons

DISTRIBUTION

KY

______________________________

PRODUCT

Bulk custom made dairy feed, Recall # V-117-6

CODE None

RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER

Kentwood Co-op, Kentwood, LA, by telephone on June 27, 2006. FDA initiated recall is completed.

REASON

Possible contamination of animal feed ingredients, including ingredients that are used in feed for dairy animals, with ruminant derived meat and bone meal.

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE

40 tons

DISTRIBUTION

LA and MS

______________________________

PRODUCT

Bulk Dairy Feed, Recall V-118-6

CODE None

RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER

Cal Maine Foods, Inc., Edwards, MS, by telephone on June 26, 2006. FDA initiated recall is complete.

REASON

Possible contamination of animal feed ingredients, including ingredients that are used in feed for dairy animals, with ruminant derived meat and bone meal.

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE

7,150 tons

DISTRIBUTION

MS

______________________________

PRODUCT

Bulk custom dairy pre-mixes, Recall # V-119-6

CODE None

RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER

Walthall County Co-op, Tylertown, MS, by telephone on June 26, 2006. Firm initiated recall is complete.

REASON

Possible contamination of dairy animal feeds with ruminant derived meat and bone meal.

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE

87 tons

DISTRIBUTION

MS

______________________________

PRODUCT

Bulk custom dairy pre-mixes, Recall # V-120-6

CODE None

RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER

Ware Milling Inc., Houston, MS, by telephone on June 23, 2006. Firm initiated recall is complete.

REASON

Possible contamination of dairy animal feeds with ruminant derived meat and bone meal.

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE

350 tons

DISTRIBUTION

AL and MS

______________________________

PRODUCT

a) Tucker Milling, LLC Tm 32% Sinking Fish Grower, #2680-Pellet, 50 lb. bags, Recall # V-121-6; b) Tucker Milling, LLC #31120, Game Bird Breeder Pellet, 50 lb. bags, Recall # V-122-6; c) Tucker Milling, LLC #31232 Game Bird Grower, 50 lb. bags, Recall # V-123-6; d) Tucker Milling, LLC 31227-Crumble, Game Bird Starter, BMD Medicated, 50 lb bags, Recall # V-124-6; e) Tucker Milling, LLC #31120, Game Bird Breeder, 50 lb bags, Recall # V-125-6; f) Tucker Milling, LLC #30230, 30 % Turkey Starter, 50 lb bags, Recall # V-126-6; g) Tucker Milling, LLC #30116, TM Broiler Finisher, 50 lb bags, Recall # V-127-6

CODE

All products manufactured from 02/01/2005 until 06/20/2006

RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER

Recalling Firm: Tucker Milling LLC, Guntersville, AL, by telephone and visit on June 20, 2006, and by letter on June 23, 2006. Manufacturer: H. J. Baker and Brothers Inc., Stamford, CT. Firm initiated recall is ongoing.

REASON

Poultry and fish feeds which were possibly contaminated with ruminant based protein were not labeled as "Do not feed to ruminants".

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE

7,541-50 lb bags

DISTRIBUTION

AL, GA, MS, and TN

END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR AUGUST 9, 2006

###




http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/ENFORCE/2006/ENF00964.html




Subject: MAD COW FEED RECALL MI MAMMALIAN PROTEIN VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 27,694,240 lbs

Date: August 6, 2006 at 6:14 pm PST

PRODUCT

Bulk custom dairy feds manufactured from concentrates, Recall # V-113-6

CODE

All dairy feeds produced between 2/1/05 and 6/16/06 and containing H. J. Baker recalled feed products.

RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER

Vita Plus Corp., Gagetown, MI, by visit beginning on June 21, 2006. Firm initiated recall is complete.

REASON

The feed was manufactured from materials that may have been contaminated with mammalian protein.

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE

27,694,240 lbs

DISTRIBUTION

MI

END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR AUGUST 2, 2006

###




http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/enforce/2006/ENF00963.html




Subject: MAD COW FEED RECALL AL AND FL VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 125 TONS Products manufactured from 02/01/2005 until 06/06/2006

Date: August 6, 2006 at 6:16 pm PST

PRODUCT

a) CO-OP 32% Sinking Catfish, Recall # V-100-6; b) Performance Sheep Pell W/Decox/A/N, medicated, net wt. 50 lbs, Recall # V-101-6; c) Pro 40% Swine Conc Meal -- 50 lb, Recall # V-102-6; d) CO-OP 32% Sinking Catfish Food Medicated, Recall # V-103-6; e) "Big Jim's" BBB Deer Ration, Big Buck Blend, Recall # V-104-6; f) CO-OP 40% Hog Supplement Medicated Pelleted, Tylosin 100 grams/ton, 50 lb. bag, Recall # V-105-6; g) Pig Starter Pell II, 18% W/MCDX Medicated 282020, Carbadox -- 0.0055%, Recall # V-106-6; h) CO-OP STARTER-GROWER CRUMBLES, Complete Feed for Chickens from Hatch to 20 Weeks, Medicated, Bacitracin Methylene Disalicylate, 25 and 50 Lbs, Recall # V-107-6; i) CO-OP LAYING PELLETS, Complete Feed for Laying Chickens, Recall # 108-6; j) CO-OP LAYING CRUMBLES, Recall # V-109-6; k) CO-OP QUAIL FLIGHT CONDITIONER MEDICATED, net wt 50 Lbs, Recall # V-110-6; l) CO-OP QUAIL STARTER MEDICATED, Net Wt. 50 Lbs, Recall # V-111-6; m) CO-OP QUAIL GROWER MEDICATED, 50 Lbs, Recall # V-112-6

CODE

Product manufactured from 02/01/2005 until 06/06/2006

RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER

Alabama Farmers Cooperative, Inc., Decatur, AL, by telephone, fax, email and visit on June 9, 2006. FDA initiated recall is complete.

REASON

Animal and fish feeds which were possibly contaminated with ruminant based protein not labeled as "Do not feed to ruminants".

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE

125 tons

DISTRIBUTION

AL and FL

END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR AUGUST 2, 2006

###



http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/enforce/2006/ENF00963.html




Subject: MAD COW FEED RECALL KY VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE ????? Date: August 6, 2006 at 6:19 pm PST

PRODUCT

Bulk custom made dairy feed, Recall # V-114-6

CODE None

RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER

Burkmann Feeds LLC, Glasgow, KY, by letter on July 14, 2006. Firm initiated recall is ongoing.

REASON

Custom made feeds contain ingredient called Pro-Lak, which may contain ruminant derived meat and bone meal.

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE

?????

DISTRIBUTION

KY

END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR AUGUST 2, 2006

###



http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/enforce/2006/ENF00963.html



CJD WATCH MESSAGE BOARD TSS

MAD COW FEED RECALL USA EQUALS 10,878.06 TONS NATIONWIDE

Sun Jul 16, 2006 09:22

71.248.128.67

RECALLS AND FIELD CORRECTIONS: VETERINARY MEDICINE -- CLASS II

______________________________

PRODUCT

a) PRO-LAK, bulk weight, Protein Concentrate for Lactating Dairy Animals, Recall # V-079-6; b) ProAmino II, FOR PREFRESH AND LACTATING COWS, net weight 50lb (22.6 kg), Recall # V-080-6; c) PRO-PAK, MARINE & ANIMAL PROTEIN CONCENTRATE FOR USE IN ANIMAL FEED, Recall # V-081-6; d) Feather Meal, Recall # V-082-6 CODE a) Bulk b) None c) Bulk d) Bulk

RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER

H. J. Baker & Bro., Inc., Albertville, AL, by telephone on June 15, 2006 and by press release on June 16, 2006. Firm initiated recall is ongoing.

REASON

Possible contamination of animal feeds with ruminent derived meat and bone meal.

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE

10,878.06 tons

DISTRIBUTION

Nationwide

END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR July 12, 2006

###



http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/enforce/2006/ENF00960.html



Subject: MAD COW FEED BAN WARNING LETTER ISSUED MAY 17, 2006

Date: June 27, 2006 at 7:42 am PST

Public Health Service

Food and Drug Administration

New Orleans District 297 Plus Park Blvd. Nashville, TN 37217

Telephone: 615-781-5380 Fax: 615-781-5391

May 17, 2006

WARNING LETTER NO. 2006-NOL-06

FEDERAL EXPRESS OVERNIGHT DELIVERY

Mr. William Shirley, Jr., Owner Louisiana.DBA Riegel By-Products 2621 State Street Dallas, Texas 75204

Dear Mr. Shirley:

On February 12, 17, 21, and 22, 2006, a U.S. Food & Drug Administration (FDA) investigator inspected your rendering plant, located at 509 Fortson Street, Shreveport, Louisiana. The inspection revealed significant deviations from the requirements set forth in Title 21, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 589.2000 [21 CFR 589.2000], Animal Proteins Prohibited in Ruminant Feed. This regulation is intended to prevent the establishment and amplification of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE). You failed to follow the requirements of this regulation; products being manufactured and distributed by your facility are misbranded within the meaning of Section 403(a)(1) [21 USC 343(a)(1)] of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (the Act).

Our investigation found you failed to provide measures, including sufficient written procedures, to prevent commingling or cross-contamination and to maintain sufficient written procedures [21 CFR 589.2000(e)] because:

You failed to use clean-out procedures or other means adequate to prevent carryover of protein derived from mammalian tissues into animal protein or feeds which may be used for ruminants. For example, your facility uses the same equipment to process mammalian and poultry tissues. However, you use only hot water to clean the cookers between processing tissues from each species. You do not clean the auger, hammer mill, grinder, and spouts after processing mammalian tissues.

You failed to maintain written procedures specifying the clean-out procedures or other means to prevent carryover of protein derived from mammalian tissues into feeds which may be used for ruminants.

As a result . the poultry meal you manufacture may contain protein derived from mammalian tissues prohibited in ruminant feed. Pursuant to 21 CFR 589.2000(e)(1)(i), any products containing or may contain protein derived from mammalian tissues must be labeled, "Do not feed to cattle or other ruminants." Since you failed to label a product which may contain protein derived from mammalian tissues with the required cautionary statement. the poultry meal is misbranded under Section 403(a)(1) [21 USC 343(a)(1)] of the Act.

This letter is not intended as an all-inclusive list of violations at your facility. As a manufacturer of materials intended for animal feed use, you are responsible for ensuring your overall operation and the products you manufacture and distribute are in compliance with the law. You should take prompt action to correct these violations, and you should establish a system whereby violations do not recur. Failure to promptly correct these violations may result in regulatory action, such as seizure and/or injunction, without further notice.

You should notify this office in writing within 15 working days of receiving this letter, outlining the specific steps you have taken to bring your firm into compliance with the law. Your response should include an explanation of each step taken to correct the violations and prevent their recurrence. If corrective action cannot be completed within 15 working days, state the reason for the delay and the date by which the corrections will be completed. Include copies of any available documentation demonstrating corrections have been made.

Your reply should be directed to Mark W. Rivero, Compliance Officer, U.S. Food and Drug Administration, 2424 Edenborn Avenue, Suite 410, Metairie, Louisiana 70001. If you have questions regarding any issue in this letter, please contact Mr. Rivero at (504) 219-8818, extension 103.

Sincerely,

/S

Carol S. Sanchez Acting District Director New Orleans District



http://www.fda.gov/foi/warning_letters/g5883d.htm



see full text ;



http://madcowspontaneousnot.blogspot.com/2008/02/specified-risk-materials-srm.html





OIE amending the Annex to Decision 2007/453/EC establishing the BSE status of Member States or third countries or regions thereof according to their BSE risk


snip...


IN A NUT SHELL ; $$$

(Adopted by the International Committee of the OIE on 23 May 2006)

11. Information published by the OIE is derived from appropriate declarations made by the official Veterinary Services of Member Countries.The OIE is not responsible for inaccurate publication of country disease status based on inaccurate information or changes in epidemiological status or other significant events that were not promptly reported to then Central Bureau............



http://www.oie.int/eng/Session2007/RF2006.pdf



full text ;



http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2007/10/bse-base-mad-cow-testing-texas-usa-and.html




TSS