United States Court of Appeals FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT Argued May 9, 2008 Decided August 29, 2008 No. 07-5173 CREEKSTONE FARMS PREMIUM BEEF, L.L.C., APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT v. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE AND EDWARD T. SCHAFER, SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE, APPELLANTS/CROSS-APPELLEES Consolidated with NO. 07-5199 Appeals from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia (No. 06cv00544) Eric Fleisig-Greene, Attorney, United States Department of Justice, argued the cause for the appellants/cross-appellees. Jeffrey S. Bucholtz, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Jeffrey A. Taylor, United States Attorney, and Mark B. Stern and Michael S. Raab, Attorneys, United States Department of Justice, were on brief. James J. Gilligan, Attorney, United States Department of Justice, and R. Craig Lawrence, Assistant United States Attorney, entered appearances.
http://pacer.cadc.uscourts.gov/docs/common/opinions/200808/07-5173-1135720.pdf
IN SHORT, NO WAY, NO HOW, LET MAD COW SPREAD SAYS BUSH. ...TSS
Court: US can block mad cow testingBy MATT APUZZO ; Associated Press Writer Published: August 29th, 2008 10:46 AM Updated: August 29th, 2008 11:03 AMWASHINGTON -- The Bush administration can prohibit meat packers from testing their animals for mad cow disease, a federal appeals court said Friday. The dispute pits the Agriculture Department, which tests about 1 percent of cows for the potentially deadly disease, against a Kansas meat packer that wants to test all its animals.
Larger meat packers opposed such testing. If Creekstone Farms Premium Beef began advertising that its cows have all been tested, other companies fear they too will have to conduct the expensive tests.
The Bush administration says the low level of testing reflects the rareness of the disease. Mad cow disease has been linked to more than 150 human deaths worldwide, mostly in Great Britain. Only three cases have been reported in the U.S., all involving cows, not humans.
A federal judge ruled last year that Creekstone must be allowed to conduct the test because the Agriculture Department can only regulate disease "treatment." Since there is no cure for mad cow disease and the test is performed on dead animals, the judge ruled, the test is not a treatment.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit overturned that ruling, saying diagnosis can be considered part of treatment.
"And we owe USDA a considerable degree of deference in its interpretation of the term," Judge Karen LeCraft Henderson wrote.
The case was sent back to the district court, where Creekstone can make other arguments.
http://www.thenewstribune.com/tacoma/24hour/politics/story/465116.html
Henderson, Karen LeCraft Born 1944 in Oberlin, OH
Federal Judicial Service: Judge, U. S. District Court, District of South Carolina Nominated by Ronald Reagan on June 3, 1986, to a seat vacated by William W. Wilkins, Jr.; Confirmed by the Senate on June 13, 1986, and received commission on June 16, 1986. Service terminated on July 11, 1990, due to appointment to another judicial position.
Judge, U. S. Court of Appeals for District of Columbia Circuit Nominated by George H.W. Bush on May 8, 1990, to a seat vacated by Kenneth W. Starr; Confirmed by the Senate on June 28, 1990, and received commission on July 5, 1990.
Education: Duke University, B.A., 1966
University of North Carolina School of Law, J.D., 1969
Professional Career: Private practice, Chapel Hill, North Carolina, 1969-1970 Assistant state attorney general, South Carolina, 1973-1978 Senior assistant state attorney general, Director Special Litigation Section, South Carolina, 1978-1982 Deputy state attorney general, Director Criminal Division, South Carolina, 1982-1983 Private practice, Charleston and Columbia, South Carolina, 1983-1986
Race or Ethnicity: White
Gender: Female
http://www.fjc.gov/servlet/tGetInfo?jid=1023
BSE BASE MAD COW TESTING TEXAS, USA, AND CANADA
http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/
Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; MRR
http://docket-aphis-2006-0041.blogspot.com/2008/06/bovine-spongiform-encephalopathy.html
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CREEKSTONE FARMS PREMIUM BEEF, L.L.C., Plaintiff, v. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, et al., Defendants. ::::::::::: Civil Action No. 06-0544 (JR)
snip...
JAMES ROBERTSON United States District Judge
The government's additional argument, that private testing 14 somehow would interfere with USDA's surveillance program, is unexplained and therefore rejected. Of greater concern is the possibility that private testing 15 could produce a false positive result, which might trigger unnecessary public alarm. USDA has asserted this possibility as a reason to avoid private testing. Indeed, the Bio-Rad kits that Creekstone proposes using are used throughout the world, including as part of the USDA's own surveillance testing. - 18 -
https://ecf.dcd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/show_public_doc?2006cv0544-22
August 20, 2008
Atypical BSE (BASE) Transmitted from Asymptomatic Aging Cattle to a Primate
Emmanuel E. Comoy1*, Cristina Casalone2, Nathalie Lescoutra-Etchegaray1, Gianluigi Zanusso3, Sophie Freire1, Dominique Marcé1, Frédéric Auvré1, Marie-Magdeleine Ruchoux1, Sergio Ferrari3, Salvatore Monaco3, Nicole Salès4, Maria Caramelli2, Philippe Leboulch1,5, Paul Brown1, Corinne I. Lasmézas4, Jean-Philippe Deslys1
1 Institute of Emerging Diseases and Innovative Therapies, CEA, Fontenay-aux-Roses, France, 2 Istituto Zooprofilattico Sperimentale del Piemonte, Turin, Italy, 3 Policlinico G.B. Rossi, Verona, Italy, 4 Scripps Florida, Jupiter, Florida, United States of America, 5 Genetics Division, Brigham & Women's Hospital, Harvard Medical School, Boston, Massachusetts, United States of America
Abstract Background Human variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (vCJD) results from foodborne transmission of prions from slaughtered cattle with classical Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (cBSE). Atypical forms of BSE, which remain mostly asymptomatic in aging cattle, were recently identified at slaughterhouses throughout Europe and North America, raising a question about human susceptibility to these new prion strains.
Methodology/Principal Findings Brain homogenates from cattle with classical BSE and atypical (BASE) infections were inoculated intracerebrally into cynomolgus monkeys (Macacca fascicularis), a non-human primate model previously demonstrated to be susceptible to the original strain of cBSE. The resulting diseases were compared in terms of clinical signs, histology and biochemistry of the abnormal prion protein (PrPres). The single monkey infected with BASE had a shorter survival, and a different clinical evolution, histopathology, and prion protein (PrPres) pattern than was observed for either classical BSE or vCJD-inoculated animals. Also, the biochemical signature of PrPres in the BASE-inoculated animal was found to have a higher proteinase K sensitivity of the octa-repeat region. We found the same biochemical signature in three of four human patients with sporadic CJD and an MM type 2 PrP genotype who lived in the same country as the infected bovine.
Conclusion/Significance Our results point to a possibly higher degree of pathogenicity of BASE than classical BSE in primates and also raise a question about a possible link to one uncommon subset of cases of apparently sporadic CJD. Thus, despite the waning epidemic of classical BSE, the occurrence of atypical strains should temper the urge to relax measures currently in place to protect public health from accidental contamination by BSE-contaminated products.
Citation: Comoy EE, Casalone C, Lescoutra-Etchegaray N, Zanusso G, Freire S, et al. (2008) Atypical BSE (BASE) Transmitted from Asymptomatic Aging Cattle to a Primate. PLoS ONE 3(8): e3017. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0003017
Editor: Neil Mabbott, University of Edinburgh, United Kingdom
Received: April 24, 2008; Accepted: August 1, 2008; Published: August 20, 2008
Copyright: © 2008 Comoy et al. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited.
snip... FULL TEXT ;
http://www.plosone.org/article/info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pone.0003017
>>>"the biochemical signature of PrPres in the BASE-inoculated animal was found to have a higher proteinase K sensitivity of the octa-repeat region. We found the same biochemical signature in three of four human patients with sporadic CJD and an MM type 2 PrP genotype who lived in the same country as the infected bovine." <<<
NOT to forget ;
Thursday, June 05, 2008 Review on the epidemiology and dynamics of BSE epidemics Vet. Res. (2008) 39:15 www.vetres.org DOI: 10.1051/vetres:2007053 c INRA, EDP Sciences, 2008 Review article
snip...
And last but not least, similarities of PrPres between Htype BSE and human prion diseases like CJD or GSS have been put forward [10], as well as between L-type BSE and CJD [17]. These findings raise questions about the origin and inter species transmission of these prion diseases that were discovered through the BSE active surveillance.
snip...
Cases of atypical BSE have only been found in countries having implemented large active surveillance programs. As of 1st September 2007, 36 cases (16 H, 20 L) have been described all over the world in cattle: Belgium (1 L) [23], Canada (1 H)15, Denmark (1 L)16, France (8 H, 6 L)17, Germany (1 H, 1 L) [13], Italy (3 L)18, Japan (1 L) [71], Netherlands (1 H, 2 L)19, Poland (1 H, 6 L)20, Sweden (1 H)21, United Kingdom (1 H)22, and USA (2 H)23. Another H-type case has been found in a 19 year old miniature zebu in a zoological park in Switzerland [56].
It is noteworthy that atypical cases have been found in countries that did not experience classical BSE so far, like Sweden, or in which only few cases of classical BSE have been found, like Canada or the USA. And last but not least, similarities of PrPres between Htype BSE and human prion diseases like CJD or GSS have been put forward [10], as well as between L-type BSE and CJD [17]. These findings raise questions about the origin and inter species transmission of these prion diseases that were discovered through the BSE active surveillance. full text 18 pages ;
http://www.vetres.org/index.php?option=article&access=standard&Itemid=129&url=/articles/vetres/pdf/2008/04/v07232.pdf
please see full text ;
http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2008/06/review-on-epidemiology-and-dynamics-of.html
***Atypical forms of BSE have emerged which, although rare, appear to be more virulent than the classical BSE that causes vCJD.***
Progress Report from the National Prion Disease Pathology Surveillance Center An Update from Stephen M. Sergay, MB, BCh & Pierluigi Gambetti, MD April 3, 2008
http://www.aan.com/news/?event=read&article_id=4397&page=72.45.45
Sunday, March 16, 2008
MAD COW DISEASE terminology UK c-BSE (typical), atypical BSE H or L, and or Italian L-BASE
http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2008/03/mad-cow-disease-terminology-uk-c-bse.html
HUMAN and ANIMAL TSE Classifications i.e. mad cow disease and the UKBSEnvCJD only theory JUNE 2008
snip...
Tissue infectivity and strain typing of the many variants Manuscript of the human and animal TSEs are paramount in all variants of all TSE. There must be a proper classification that will differentiate between all these human TSE in order to do this. With the CDI and other more sensitive testing coming about, I only hope that my proposal will some day be taken seriously. ... snip...
http://cjdmadcowbaseoct2007.blogspot.com/2008/06/human-and-animal-tse-classifications-ie.html
Atypical BSE (BASE) Transmitted from Asymptomatic Aging Cattle to a Primate
http://organicconsumers.org/forum/index.php?showtopic=1951
http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2008/08/atypical-bse-base-transmitted-from.html
to be continued. ... TSS
Wednesday, August 20, 2008
Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Mad Cow Disease typical and atypical strains, was there a cover-up ? August 20, 2008
http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2008/08/bovine-spongiform-encephalopathy-mad.html
Wednesday, June 11, 2008 OIE Recognition of the BSE Status of Members RESOLUTION No. XXI (Adopted by the International Committee of the OIE on 27 May 2008)
snip...
http://usdavskorea.blogspot.com/2008/06/oie-recognition-of-bse-status-of.html
BSE YOUNGEST AGE STATISTICS UNDER 30 MONTHS
http://bseyoungestage.blogspot.com/
In this context, a word is in order about the US testing program. After the discovery of the first (imported) cow in 2003, the magnitude of testing was much increased, reaching a level of >400,000 tests in 2005 (Figure 4). Neither of the 2 more recently indigenously infected older animals with nonspecific clinical features would have been detected without such testing, and neither would have been identified as atypical without confirmatory Western blots. Despite these facts, surveillance has now been decimated to 40,000 annual tests (USDA news release no. 0255.06, July 20, 2006) and invites the accusation that the United States will never know the true status of its involvement with BSE.
In short, a great deal of further work will need to be done before the phenotypic features and prevalence of atypical BSE are understood. More than a single strain may have been present from the beginning of the epidemic, but this possibility has been overlooked by virtue of the absence of widespread Western blot confirmatory testing of positive screening test results; or these new phenotypes may be found, at least in part, to result from infections at an older age by a typical BSE agent, rather than neonatal infections with new "strains" of BSE. Neither alternative has yet been investigated.
http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/EID/vol12no12/06-0965.htm
NEW SOLUTIONS: A Journal of Environmental and Occupational Health Policy
Issue: Volume 18, Number 2 / 2008 Pages: 145 - 156 URL: Linking Options
Mad Cows and Computer Models: The U.S. Response to BSE
Frank Ackerman and Wendy A. Johnecheck
Abstract:
The proportion of slaughtered cattle tested for BSE is much smaller in the U.S. than in Europe and Japan, leaving the U.S. heavily dependent on statistical models to estimate both the current prevalence and the spread of BSE. We examine the models relied on by USDA, finding that the prevalence model provides only a rough estimate, due to limited data availability. Reassuring forecasts from the model of the spread of BSE depend on the arbitrary constraint that worst-case values are assumed by only one of 17 key parameters at a time. In three of the six published scenarios with multiple worst-case parameter values, there is at least a 25% probability that BSE will spread rapidly. In public policy terms, reliance on potentially flawed models can be seen as a gamble that no serious BSE outbreak will occur. Statistical modeling at this level of abstraction, with its myriad, compound uncertainties, is no substitute for precautionary policies to protect public health against the threat of epidemics such as BSE.
http://baywood.metapress.com/app/home/contribution.asp?referrer=parent&backto=issue,5,18;journal,1,41;linkingpublicationresults,1:300327,1
Owner and Corporation Plead Guilty to Defrauding Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Surveillance Program
PLEASE SEE FULL TEXT ;
Monday, June 16, 2008 Mad Cows and Computer Models: The U.S. Response to BSE
http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/
Owner and Corporation Plead Guilty to Defrauding Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Surveillance Program
An Arizona meat processing company and its owner pled guilty in February 2007 to charges of theft of Government funds, mail fraud, and wire fraud. The owner and his company defrauded the BSE Surveillance Program when they falsified BSE Surveillance Data Collection Forms and then submitted payment requests to USDA for the services. In addition to the targeted sample population (those cattle that were more than 30 months old or had other risk factors for BSE), the owner submitted to USDA, or caused to be submitted, BSE obex (brain stem) samples from healthy USDA-inspected cattle. As a result, the owner fraudulently received approximately $390,000. Sentencing is scheduled for May 2007.
snip...
Topics that will be covered in ongoing or planned reviews under Goal 1 include:
soundness of BSE maintenance sampling (APHIS),
implementation of Performance-Based Inspection System enhancements for specified risk material (SRM) violations and improved inspection controls over SRMs (FSIS and APHIS),
snip...
The findings and recommendations from these efforts will be covered in future semiannual reports as the relevant audits and investigations are completed.
4 USDA OIG SEMIANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS FY 2007 1st Half
http://www.usda.gov/oig/webdocs/sarc070619.pdf
snip... please see full text ;
http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2008/06/mad-cows-and-computer-models-us.html
PLEASE NOTE THE PARTIAL AND VOLUNTARY MAD COW FEED BAN OF AUGUST 4, 1997 nothing more than ink on paper ... TSS
Wednesday, April 23, 2008
FDA Strengthens Safeguards for Consumers of Beef Issues Regulation on Animal Feeds with Added Safeguards Against BSE
http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/
Sent: Monday, April 28, 2008 9:48 PM
Subject: Interference at the EPA Science and Politics at the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
Reports and Research
Interference at the EPA
Science and Politics at the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has the simple yet profound charge "to protect human health and the environment." EPA scientists apply their expertise to protect the public from air and water pollution, clean up hazardous waste, and study emerging threats such as global warming. Because each year brings new and potentially toxic chemicals into our homes and workplaces, because air pollution still threatens our public health, and because environmental challenges are becoming more complex and global, a strong and capable EPA is more important than ever.
Yet challenges from industry lobbyists and some political leaders to the agency's decisions have too often led to the suppression and distortion of the scientific findings underlying those decisions—to the detriment of both science and the health of our nation. While every regulatory agency must balance scientific findings with other considerations, policy makers need access to the highest-quality scientific information to make fully informed decisions.
Concern over this problem led the Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS) to investigate political interference in science at the EPA. The investigation combines dozens of interviews with current and former EPA staff, analysis of government documents, more than 1,600 responses to a survey sent to current EPA scientists, and written comments from EPA scientists.
The results of these investigations show an agency under siege from political pressures. On numerous issues—ranging from mercury pollution to groundwater contamination to climate change—political appointees have edited scientific documents, manipulated scientific assessments, and generally sought to undermine the science behind dozens of EPA regulations. ...
snip...please see full text ;
http://sciencebushwhacked.blogspot.com/
STANLEY PRUSINER NOBEL PEACE PRIZE WINNER ON THE PRION
US AG SEC AND LAYCRAFT
“nothing matters, except beef from Canada under 30 months bone in beef product, that’s ALL THAT MATTERS!”
US SENATOR AND STAN THE MAN SLAM USDA ”DAMNING TESTIMONY”
Senator Michael Machado from California
”USDA does not know what’s going on”. ”USDA is protecting the industry”. ” SHOULD the state of California step in”
Stanley Prusiner
”nobody has ever ask us to comment”
”they don’t want us to comment”
”they never ask”
i tried to see Venemon, after Canadian cow was discovered with BSE. went to see lyle. after talking with him…
absolute ignorance…
then thought i should see Venemon…
it was clear his entire policy was to get cattle boneless beef prods across the border…
nothing else mattered…
his aids confirmed this…
5 times i tried to see Venemon, never worked…
eventually met with carl rove the political…
he is the one that arranged meeting with Venemon…
just trying to give you a sense of the distance…
threat to health public safety…
was never contacted…
yes i believe that prions are bad to eat and you can die from them…END
Dr. Stan bashing Ann Veneman - 3 minutes - Damning testimony
http://maddeer.org/video/embedded/08snip.ram
File Name: USDA DON'T ASK DON'T TELL POLICY 02snip.rpm
DAMNING testimony of consumer consumption of Washington mad cow in California
http://www.maddeer.org/video/embedded/02snip.rm
Communicated by: Terry S. Singeltary Sr.
[In submitting these data, Terry S. Singeltary Sr. draws attention to the steady increase in the "type unknown" category, which, according to their definition, comprises cases in which vCJD could be excluded. The total of 26 cases for the current year (2007) is disturbing, possibly symptomatic of the circulation of novel agents. Characterization of these agents should be given a high priority. - Mod.CP]
http://pro-med.blogspot.com/2007/11/proahedr-prion-disease-update-2007-07.html
http://www.promedmail.org/pls/askus/f?p=2400:1001:6833194127530602005::NO::F2400_P1001_BACK_PAGE,F2400_P1001_PUB_MAIL_ID:1010,39963
There is a growing number of human CJD cases, and they were presented last week in San Francisco by Luigi Gambatti(?) from his CJD surveillance collection.
He estimates that it may be up to 14 or 15 persons which display selectively SPRPSC and practically no detected RPRPSC proteins.
http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/06/transcripts/1006-4240t1.htm
http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/06/transcripts/2006-4240t1.pdf
JOURNAL OF NEUROLOGY
MARCH 26, 2003
RE-Monitoring the occurrence of emerging forms of Creutzfeldt-Jakob
disease in the United States
Email Terry S. Singeltary:
flounder@wt.net
I lost my mother to hvCJD (Heidenhain Variant CJD). I would like to comment on the CDC's attempts to monitor the occurrence of emerging forms of CJD. Asante, Collinge et al [1] have reported that BSE transmission to the 129-methionine genotype can lead to an alternate phenotype that is indistinguishable from type 2 PrPSc, the commonest sporadic CJD. However, CJD and all human TSEs are not reportable nationally. CJD and all human TSEs must be made reportable in every state and internationally. I hope that the CDC does not continue to expect us to still believe that the 85%+ of all CJD cases which are sporadic are all spontaneous, without route/source. We have many TSEs in the USA in both animal and man. CWD in deer/elk is spreading rapidly and CWD does transmit to mink, ferret, cattle, and squirrel monkey by intracerebral inoculation. With the known incubation periods in other TSEs, oral transmission studies of CWD may take much longer. Every victim/family of CJD/TSEs should be asked about route and source of this agent. To prolong this will only spread the agent and needlessly expose others. In light of the findings of Asante and Collinge et al, there should be drastic measures to safeguard the medical and surgical arena from sporadic CJDs and all human TSEs. I only ponder how many sporadic CJDs in the USA are type 2 PrPSc?
http://www.neurology.org/cgi/eletters/60/2/176#535
THE PATHOLOGICAL PROTEIN
Hardcover, 304 pages plus photos and illustrations. ISBN 0-387-95508-9
June 2003
BY Philip Yam
CHAPTER 14 LAYING ODDS
Answering critics like Terry Singeltary, who feels that the U.S. under- counts CJD, Schonberger conceded that the current surveillance system has errors but stated that most of the errors will be confined to the older population.
http://www.thepathologicalprotein.com/
Diagnosis and Reporting of Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease Singeltary, Sr et al. JAMA.2001; 285: 733-734. Vol. 285 No. 6, February 14, 2001 JAMA
Diagnosis and Reporting of Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease
To the Editor: In their Research Letter, Dr Gibbons and colleagues1 reported that the annual US death rate due to Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (CJD) has been stable since 1985. These estimates, however, are based only on reported cases, and do not include misdiagnosed or preclinical cases. It seems to me that misdiagnosis alone would drastically change these figures. An unknown number of persons with a diagnosis of Alzheimer disease in fact may have CJD, although only a small number of these patients receive the postmortem examination necessary to make this diagnosis. Furthermore, only a few states have made CJD reportable. Human and animal transmissible spongiform encephalopathies should be reportable nationwide and internationally.
Terry S. Singeltary, Sr Bacliff, Tex
1. Gibbons RV, Holman RC, Belay ED, Schonberger LB. Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease in the United States: 1979-1998. JAMA. 2000;284:2322-2323. FREE FULL TEXT
http://jama.ama-assn.org/cgi/content/extract/285/6/733?maxtoshow=&HITS=10&hits=10&RESULTFORMAT=&fulltext=singeltary&searchid=1&FIRSTINDEX=0&resourcetype=HWCIT
http://jama.ama-assn.org/cgi/content/full/285/6/733?maxtoshow=&HITS=10&hits=10&RESULTFORMAT=&fulltext=singeltary&searchid=1&FIRSTINDEX=0&resourcetype=HWCIT
2 January 2000 British Medical Journal
U.S. Scientist should be concerned with a CJD epidemic in the U.S., as well
http://www.bmj.com/cgi/eletters/320/7226/8/b#6117
15 November 1999 British Medical Journal vCJD in the USA * BSE in U.S.
http://www.bmj.com/cgi/eletters/319/7220/1312/b#5406
Over the next 8-10 weeks, approximately 40% of all the adult mink on the farm died from TME. Since previous incidences of TME were associated with common or shared feeding practices, we obtained a careful history of feed ingredients used over the past 12-18 months. The rancher was a "dead stock" feeder using mostly (>95%) downer or dead dairy cattle and a few horses. Sheep had never been fed.
http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/mb/m09/tab05.pdf
APHIS-2006-0041-0006 TSE advisory committee for the meeting December 15, 2006
http://www.regulations.gov/fdmspublic/ContentViewer?objectId=09000064801f3413&disposition=attachment&contentType=msw8
Subject: [Docket No. FSIS-2006-0011] FSIS Harvard Risk Assessment of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE)
http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/Comments/2006-0011/2006-0011-1.pdf
[Docket No. 03-025IFA] FSIS Prohibition of the Use of Specified Risk Materials for Human Food and Requirement for the Disposition of Non-Ambulatory Disabled Cattle
9/13/2005
http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/Comments/03-025IFA/03-025IFA-2.pdf
DEEP THROAT TO TSS 2000-2001 (take these old snips of emails with how ever many grains of salt you wish. ...tss)
The most frightening thing I have read all day is the report of Gambetti's finding of a new strain of sporadic cjd in young people...Dear God, what in the name of all that is holy is that!!! If the US has different strains of scrapie.....why????than the UK...then would the same mechanisms that make different strains of scrapie here make different strains of BSE...if the patterns are different in sheep and mice for scrapie.....could not the BSE be different in the cattle, in the mink, in the humans.......I really think the slides or tissues and everything from these young people with the new strain of sporadic cjd should be put up to be analyzed by many, many experts in cjd........bse.....scrapie Scrape the damn slide and put it into mice.....wait.....chop up the mouse brain and and spinal cord........put into some more mice.....dammit amplify the thing and start the damned research.....This is NOT rocket science...we need to use what we know and get off our butts and move....the whining about how long everything takes.....well it takes a whole lot longer if you whine for a year and then start the research!!! Not sure where I read this but it was a recent press release or something like that: I thought I would fall out of my chair when I read about how there was no worry about infectivity from a histopath slide or tissues because they are preserved in formic acid, or formalin or formaldehyde.....for God's sake........ Ask any pathologist in the UK what the brain tissues in the formalin looks like after a year.......it is a big fat sponge...the agent continues to eat the brain ......you can't make slides anymore because the agent has never stopped........and the old slides that are stained with Hemolysin and Eosin......they get holier and holier and degenerate and continue...what you looked at 6 months ago is not there........Gambetti better be photographing every damned thing he is looking at.....
Okay, you need to know. You don't need to pass it on as nothing will come of it and there is not a damned thing anyone can do about it. Don't even hint at it as it will be denied and laughed at.......... USDA is gonna do as little as possible until there is actually a human case in the USA of the nvcjd........if you want to move this thing along and shake the earth....then we gotta get the victims families to make sure whoever is doing the autopsy is credible, trustworthy, and a saint with the courage of Joan of Arc........I am not kidding!!!! so, unless we get a human death from EXACTLY the same form with EXACTLY the same histopath lesions as seen in the UK nvcjd........forget any action........it is ALL gonna be sporadic!!!
And, if there is a case.......there is gonna be every effort to link it to international travel, international food, etc. etc. etc. etc. etc. They will go so far as to find out if a sex partner had ever traveled to the UK/europe, etc. etc. .... It is gonna be a long, lonely, dangerous twisted journey to the truth. They have all the cards, all the money, and are willing to threaten and carry out those threats....and this may be their biggest downfall...
Thanks as always for your help. (Recently had a very startling revelation from a rather senior person in government here..........knocked me out of my chair........you must keep pushing. If I was a power person....I would be demanding that there be a least a million bovine tested as soon as possible and agressively seeking this disease. The big players are coming out of the woodwork as there is money to be made!!! In short: "FIRE AT WILL"!!! for the very dumb....who's "will"! "Will be the burden to bare if there is any coverup!"
again it was said years ago and it should be taken seriously....BSE will NEVER be found in the US! As for the BSE conference call...I think you did a great service to freedom of information and making some people feign integrity...I find it scary to see that most of the "experts" are employed by the federal government or are supported on the "teat" of federal funds. A scary picture! I hope there is a confidential panel organized by the new government to really investigate this thing.
You need to watch your back........but keep picking at them.......like a buzzard to the bone...you just may get to the truth!!! (You probably have more support than you know. Too many people are afraid to show you or let anyone else know. I have heard a few things myself... you ask the questions that everyone else is too afraid to ask.)
The statistical incidence of CJD cases in the United States has been revised to reflect that there is one case per 9000 in adults age 55 and older. Eighty-five percent of the cases are sporadic, meaning there is no known cause at present.
http://www.cjdfoundation.org/fact.html
Saturday, March 22, 2008
10 Million Baby Boomers to have Alzheimer's in the coming decades 2008 Alzheimer's disease facts and figures
http://betaamyloidcjd.blogspot.com/2008/03/association-between-deposition-of-beta.html
re-Association between Deposition of Beta-Amyloid and Pathological Prion Protein in Sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease
http://betaamyloidcjd.blogspot.com/2008/04/re-association-between-deposition-of.html
Terry S. Singeltary Sr. P.O. Box 42 Bacliff, Texas USA 77518
Friday, August 29, 2008
Friday, August 22, 2008
MEXICO blocks Alberta cattle following the discovery of Canada's 14th case of mad cow disease
MEXICO blocks Alberta cattle
21.aug.08 Calgary Herald Gina Teel
http://www.canada.com/calgaryherald/news/calgarybusiness/story.html?id=8776e072-8f40-46b9-bd8a-b6581f5389bd
Mexico has banned imports of live cattle from Alberta, following the discovery of Canada's 14th case of mad cow disease in the province last week. Mexico is banning imports of beef and dairy breeding cattle -- but not stopping the flow of beef into the country -- in a move Federal Agriculture Minister Gerry Ritz said has no legitimacy from a scientific perspective. Canada and Mexico are both considered as controlled-risk status for BSE, or bovine spongiform encephalopathy, as recognized by the World Organization for Animal Health, or OIE. "They're (Mexico is) very concerned that if they're bringing in an older breeding animal, that they may be importing BSE; that's the genesis of this," Ritz said in a telephone interview Wednesday. Rob McNabb, general manager of operations at the Canadian Cattlemen's Association, said Mexico has given written notice of the ban to the Canadian Food Inspection Agency. Mexican authorities are describing the move as a temporary prohibition of live cattle from Alberta, he said, while they undertake their own risk assessment "and assure themselves that what Canada's doing to ensure safety is sound." No further details about a timeline were available.
Mexico blocks live cattle from Alberta // 21 aug 2008
http://www.allaboutfeed.net/news/id102-61630/mexico_blocks_live_cattle_from_alberta.html
Scientific Report of the European Food Safety Authority on the Assessment of the Geographical BSE Risk (GBR) of the United States of America (USA) Numero domanda: EFSA-Q-2003-083 Data di adozione: 01/07/2004 Sintesi (0.1Mb)
Documento (0.2Mb)
Summary
The European Food Safety Authority and its Scientific Expert Working Group on the Assessment of the Geographical Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Risk (GBR) were asked by the European Commission (EC) to provide an up-to-date scientific report on the GBR in the United States of America, i.e. the likelihood of the presence of one or more cattle being infected with BSE, pre-clinically as well as clinically, in USA. This scientific report addresses the GBR of USA as assessed in 2004 based on data covering the period 1980-2003.
The BSE agent was probably imported into USA and could have reached domestic cattle in the middle of the eighties. These cattle imported in the mid eighties could have been rendered in the late eighties and therefore led to an internal challenge in the early nineties. It is possible that imported meat and bone meal (MBM) into the USA reached domestic cattle and leads to an internal challenge in the early nineties.
A processing risk developed in the late 80s/early 90s when cattle imports from BSE risk countries were slaughtered or died and were processed (partly) into feed, together with some imports of MBM. This risk continued to exist, and grew significantly in the mid 90's when domestic cattle, infected by imported MBM, reached processing. Given the low stability of the system, the risk increased over the years with continued imports of cattle and MBM from BSE risk countries.
EFSA concludes that the current GBR level of USA is III, i.e. it is likely but not confirmed that domestic cattle are (clinically or pre-clinically) infected with the BSE-agent. As long as there are no significant changes in rendering or feeding, the stability remains extremely/very unstable. Thus, the probability of cattle to be (pre-clinically or clinically) infected with the BSE-agent persistently increases.
Scarica il file (0.3Mb)
http://www.efsa.eu.int/EFSA/efsa_locale-1178620753820_1178620779461.htm
Scientific Report of the European Food Safety Authority on the Assessment of the Geographical BSE-Risk (GBR) of CANADA Question N° EFSA-Q-2003-083 Adopted July 2004 Summary The European Food Safety Authority and its Scientific Expert Working Group on the Assessment of the Geographical Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Risk (GBR) were asked by the European Commission (EC), to provide an up-to-date scientific report on the GBR in Canada, i.e. the likelihood of the presence of one or more cattle being infected with BSE, pre-clinically as well as clinically, in Canada. This scientific report addresses the GBR of Canada as assessed in 2004 based on data covering the period 1980-2003. The BSE agent was probably imported into the country middle of the eighties and could have reached domestic cattle in the early nineties. These cattle imported in the mid eighties could have been rendered in the late eighties and therefore led to an internal challenge in the early 90s. It is possible that imported meat and bone meal (MBM) into Canada reached domestic cattle and led to an internal challenge in the early 90s. A certain risk that BSE-infected cattle entered processing in Canada, and were at least partly rendered for feed, occurred in the early 1990s when cattle imported from UK in the mid 80s could have been slaughtered. This risk continued to exist, and grew significantly in the mid 90's when domestic cattle, infected by imported MBM, reached processing. Given the low stability of the system, the risk increased over the years with continued imports of cattle and MBM from BSE risk countries. EFSA concludes that the current GBR level of Canada is III, i.e. it is confirmed at a lower level that domestic cattle are (clinically or pre-clinically) infected with the BSE-agent. As long as the system remains unstable, it is expected that the GBR continues to grow, even if no additional external challenges occur.
http://www.mvo.nl/wetgeving-dierlijk-vet/onderzoek/download/EFSA%20on%20BSE%20risk%20Canada%20jul%202004.pdf
Scientific Report of the European Food Safety Authority on the Assessment of the Geographical BSE-Risk (GBR) of MEXICO Question N° EFSA-Q-2003-083 Adopted July 2004 Summary The European Food Safety Authority and its Scientific Expert Working Group on the Assessment of the Geographical Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Risk (GBR) were asked by the European Commission (EC) to provide an up-to-date scientific report on the GBR in Mexico, i.e. the likelihood of the presence of one or more cattle being infected with BSE, pre-clinically as well as clinically, in Mexico. This scientific report addresses the GBR of Mexico as assessed in 2004 based on data covering the period 1980-2003. The BSE agent was probably imported into Mexico and could have reached domestic cattle. These cattle imported could have been rendered and therefore led to an internal challenge in the mid to late 1990's. It is possible that imported meat and bone meal (MBM) into Mexico reached domestic cattle and leads to an internal challenge around 1993. It is likely that BSE infectivity entered processing at the time of imported 'at - risk' MBM (1993) and at the time of slaughter of imported live 'at - risk' cattle (mid to late 1990s). The high level of external challenge is maintained throughout the reference period, and the system has not been made stable. Thus it is likely that BSE infectivity was recycled and propagated from approximately 1993. The risk has since grown consistently due to a maintained internal and external challenge and lack of a stable system. EFSA concludes that the current geographical BSE risk (GBR) level is III, i.e. it is likely but not confirmed that domestic cattle are (clinically or pre-clinically) infected with the BSEagent. The GBR is likely to increase due to continued internal and external challenge, coupled with a very unstable system.
http://www.mvo.nl/wetgeving-dierlijk-vet/onderzoek/download/EFSA%20on%20BSE%20risk%20Mexico%20jul%202004.pdf
Wednesday, June 11, 2008
OIE Recognition of the BSE Status of Members RESOLUTION No. XXI (Adopted by the International Committee of the OIE on 27 May 2008)
http://usdavskorea.blogspot.com/2008/06/oie-recognition-of-bse-status-of.html
http://organicconsumers.org/forum/index.php?showtopic=1566
Docket APHIS-2006-0041 Docket Title Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Minimal-Risk Regions; Importation of Live Bovines and Products Derived from Bovines Commodities Docket Type Rulemaking Document APHIS-2006-0041-0001 Document Title Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Minimal-Risk Regions; Importation of Live Bovines and Products Derived From Bovines Public Submission APHIS-2006-0041-0006 Public Submission Title Comment from Terry S Singletary Sr Views Add Comments How To Comment
snip...
MY personal belief, since you ask, is that not only the Canadian border, but the USA border, and the Mexican border should be sealed up tighter than a drum for exporting there TSE tainted products, until a validated, 100% sensitive test is available, and all animals for human and animal consumption are tested. all we are doing is the exact same thing the UK did with there mad cow poisoning when they exported it all over the globe, all the while knowing what they were doing. this BSE MRR policy is nothing more than a legal tool to do just exactly what the UK did, thanks to the OIE and GW, it's legal now. and they executed Saddam for poisoning ???
go figure....
Terry S. Singeltary Sr. P.O. Box 42 Bacliff, Texas USA 77518
http://www.regulations.gov/fdmspublic/component/main?main=DocumentDetail&d=APHIS-2006-0041-0006
Docket APHIS-2006-0041 Docket Title Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Minimal-Risk Regions; Importation of Live Bovines and Products Derived from Bovines Commodities Docket Type Rulemaking Document APHIS-2006-0041-0001 Document Title Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Minimal-Risk Regions; Importation of Live Bovines and Products Derived From Bovines Public Submission APHIS-2006-0041-0028 Public Submission Title Comment from Terry S Singletary
Comment 2006-2007 USA AND OIE POISONING GLOBE WITH BSE MRR POLICY
THE USA is in a most unique situation, one of unknown circumstances with human and animal TSE. THE USA has the most documented TSE in different species to date, with substrains growing in those species (BSE/BASE in cattle and CWD in deer and elk, there is evidence here with different strains), and we know that sheep scrapie has over 20 strains of the typical scrapie with atypical scrapie documented and also BSE is very likely to have passed to sheep. all of which have been rendered and fed back to animals for human and animal consumption, a frightening scenario. WE do not know the outcome, and to play with human life around the globe with the very likely TSE tainted products from the USA, in my opinion is like playing Russian roulette, of long duration, with potential long and enduring consequences, of which once done, cannot be undone. These are the facts as I have come to know through daily and extensive research of TSE over 9 years, since 12/14/97. I do not pretend to have all the answers, but i do know to continue to believe in the ukbsenvcjd only theory of transmission to humans of only this one strain from only this one TSE from only this one part of the globe, will only lead to further failures, and needless exposure to humans from all strains of TSE, and possibly many more needless deaths from TSE via a multitude of proven routes and sources via many studies with primates and rodents and other species.
MY personal belief, since you ask, is that not only the Canadian border, but the USA border, and the Mexican border should be sealed up tighter than a drum for exporting there TSE tainted products, until a validated, 100% sensitive test is available, and all animals for human and animal consumption are tested. all we are doing is the exact same thing the UK did with there mad cow poisoning when they exported it all over the globe, all the while knowing what they were doing. this BSE MRR policy is nothing more than a legal tool to do just exactly what the UK did, thanks to the OIE and GW, it's legal now. and they executed Saddam for poisoning ???
go figure. ...
http://www.regulations.gov/fdmspublic/component/main?main=DocumentDetail&o=09000064801f8151
Docket APHIS-2006-0041 Docket Title Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Minimal-Risk Regions; Importation of Live Bovines and Products Derived from Bovines Commodities Docket Type Rulemaking Document APHIS-2006-0041-0001 Document Title Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Minimal-Risk Regions; Importation of Live Bovines and Products Derived From Bovines Public Submission APHIS-2006-0041-0028.1 Public Submission Title Attachment to Singletary comment
January 28, 2007
Greetings APHIS,
I would kindly like to submit the following to ;
BSE; MRR; IMPORTATION OF LIVE BOVINES AND PRODUCTS DERIVED FROM BOVINES [Docket No. APHIS-2006-0041] RIN 0579-AC01
http://www.regulations.gov/fdmspublic/ContentViewer?objectId=09000064801f8152&disposition=attachment&contentType=msw8
Food and Veterinary Office - Inspection reports MX Mexico - Control of residues and contaminants in live animals and animal products, including controls on veterinary medicinal products
snip...
5.4.3.2. In feed mills (medicated pre-mixes and medicated feedingstuffs)
Feed mills and on-farm mixers manufacturing medicated feed must be authorised by SAGARPA Central level. The authorisation is unlimited in time, but must be updated when changes occur. The CA informed the mission team that there are currently 365 such establishments authorised. All establishments are required to have a SAGARPA approved veterinarian employed and the approval of the veterinarian is renewed every 2 years. The supervision of feed mills for medicated feedingstuffs, and farms with on-farm mixing of medicated feed is delegated to the SAGARPA State Offices. The SAGARPA Verification Programme will include random checks on feed mills. The mission team noted that:
in the feed mill visited, growth promoting additives, medicated premixes and coccidiostats were used routinely. Feed was produced for cattle, pigs, poultry, shrimps and pets in two lines. No checks for homogeneity, stability, recovery/content or cross contamination of feedingstuffs were carried out. There is no system in place to prevent finishing feed to be manufactured directly after a batch containing additives or medicated premixes;
in the feed mill visited, several medicated feedingstuffs were marketed in sacks with the concentration and types of added antibiotics listed on a separate label stitched to the sack. However, several of the antibiotic combinations marketed were not listed in the SAGARPA registration document and none of the labels comprised SAGARPA registration numbers;
the pig farm visited regularly produced feed with growth promoters and therapeutic doses of VMPs (carbadox, ractopamine, tyiosin, florfenicol) for the finishing period. Flushing was used between batches but no checks were made for cross contamination or recovery;
s> the feed mill visited by the mission team had been inspected by the State Office once during the last five years while the pig farm with on-farm mixing facility for medicated feed visited had never been inspected;
NOM-012-ZOO-1993 requires quality control, including quantitative analysis of active substances in feedingstuffs. Such analyses were performed by the feed mill delivering medicated feedingstuffs to the pig farm visited. However, the feed mill visited only analysed the nutritional components in produced feedingstuffs. In the inspection protocol from 2003 this fact had been noted as an observation. The CCA informed the mission team on the spot that additional analyses were not compulsory for feed mills.
5.4.3.3. On veterinary practitioners and farms
The SAGARPA State Offices are responsible for the controls of veterinary practitioners and farms and no federal legislation or guidelines have been issued. Veterinary practices for food producing animals are usually combined with a pharmacy and thus inspected as pharmacies. The SAGARPA Verification Programme will include random checks on veterinary practitioners. All poultry and pig farms are required to have a SAGARPA approved veterinarian employed. This approved veterinarian signs the animal movement certificates when animals are sent to slaughter. Movement certificates for other species, e.g. horses, are signed by a veterinarian of the State Committee (comprising farmers, food producers, federal state and state government). Animal health inspections for export are conducted by SAGARPA staff, while health inspections for control programs are conducted by
15
the approved veterinarians on the farms (pigs and poultry) or the Committee veterinarians (other species). These inspections are coordinated by SENASICA and include a description of disease problems and medicines used on farm. The mission team noted that:
there is no legal requirement for inspections of VMP usage in veterinary practices or farms;
there is no legal requirement for farmers to keep treatment records, thus inspection of VMP usage on farm is based on verbal information from the fanner or on voluntary farm records 7;
health certificates for slaughter in TIF slaughterhouses are not required to contain information or guarantees by the farmer or the approved veterinarian regarding banned substances or the respect of withdrawal times for VMP;
in two States visited apiaries were regularly inspected and comprehensive check lists, including VMP usage, were used.
6. CONCLUSIONS
6.1. LEGISLATION
(1) Hormonal substances and beta-agonists for growth promotion (except diethylstilbestrol and clenbuterol) are not legally prohibited for use as growth promoters in food producing animals. In the absence of a split production system the CCA does not meet Community requirements for the export of fresh meat (currently only horse meat) to the EU.
(2) Whilst there is a legal basis for the control of residues and contaminants in tissues of cattle, equidae, pigs and sheep, the absence of national legislation for residues control of other commodities (e.g. milk, shrimps, eggs and honey) and the absence of corresponding MRLs militates against effective implementation of the NRCP, in particular the assessment of analysis results and execution of follow-up actions.
(3) Several national MRLs and MLs for meat and animal tissues exceed those fixed in EU legislation; this could result in situations where export consignments would not meet Community requirements.
6.2. NATIONAL RESIDUE CONTROL PLAN
(1) The general layout of the NRCP and the range of commodities tested are in line with Community requirements. However, many relevant substances including EU-banned VMPs are not tested for and a limited number of substances are tested within certain therapeutic categories. Given the number of VMPs authorised, the current structure of the plan reduces the possibility of detecting the potential misuse of numerous VMPs and to guarantee that export consignments meet Community requirements.
(2) The random selection and number of samples taken in accordance with the guidelines of the Codex Alimentarius can allow the estimated prevalence rate
7 In their response to the draft report the Mexican CA stilted that in the specific case of aquaculture, farms must keep a register of the use and application of antibiotics, which will be checked during the inspections by CONAPESCA.
16
snip...
(2) A prescription system laid down in national legislation in 2004 is still not implemented. Together with the lack of a requirement for medicinal records on farms, these factors undermine effective controls on VMPs at retail and farm level.
(3) The authorisation and use of VMPs containing pharmacologically active substances which are either banned or are not authorised for use in food producing animals in the EL) is of concern, considering the absence of some national MRLs, restricted analytical capabilities and lack of an effective VMP control system. Cumulatively these factors may result in the presence of undesirable residues in exported commodities and weaken CA guarantees on the residue status of exported consignments. It is doubtful that the relevant requirements of Community food law9 can be met.
6.5. OVERALL CONCLUSION
This first ever residues mission to Mexico revealed serious shortcomings in the application of residues and veterinary medicines controls, in respect of commodities currently exported to the EU or which are planned to be exported. In particular, the authorisation and use of hormones and beta-agonists for growth promotion in the absence of any 'split system' for EU exports means that Mexico does not comply with Community requirements concerning the export of meat from potentially treated animals. In addition, the fact that many veterinary medicines which are banned for use in food producing animals in the EU are authorised and are freely available in Mexico, raises concerns on the residue status of several commodities exported to the EU. This is exacerbated by weak controls on the use of veterinary medicines, failure to implement the nationally legally required prescription system, the absence of any obligation to maintain medicinal treatment records on farm and the fact that there is no laboratory capability at present to test for residues of most of these substances. Given this situation and shortcomings in the current structure and implementation of the national residue control plan, the residue control system in Mexico can not be judged to offer equivalent guarantees to those required under Community legislation.
7. CLOSING MEETING
A closing meeting was held on 15 September 2005 with representatives of the CA. At this meeting, the inspection team presented the main findings and preliminary conclusions of the mission. The CCA did not express major disagreement.
8. RECOMMENDATIONS
The competent authorities were invited to provide details of the actions taken and planned, including deadlines for their completion ('action plan'), aimed at addressing the recommendations set out below, within 25 working days of receipt of a draft of this mission report.
(1) Ensure that consignments of meat and meat products exported to the EU are not derived from animals which have been treated with hormonal growth promoters or beta-agonists for growth promotion.
9 Article 11 of Regulation (EC) No 178/2002.
18
snip...
http://europa.eu.int/comm/food/fvo/act_getPDF.cfm?PDF_ID=5018
Mexico Livestock and Products Mexico BSE Update (Third Edition) 2004
http://www.agobservatory.org/library.cfm?refID=30418
TSS
21.aug.08 Calgary Herald Gina Teel
http://www.canada.com/calgaryherald/news/calgarybusiness/story.html?id=8776e072-8f40-46b9-bd8a-b6581f5389bd
Mexico has banned imports of live cattle from Alberta, following the discovery of Canada's 14th case of mad cow disease in the province last week. Mexico is banning imports of beef and dairy breeding cattle -- but not stopping the flow of beef into the country -- in a move Federal Agriculture Minister Gerry Ritz said has no legitimacy from a scientific perspective. Canada and Mexico are both considered as controlled-risk status for BSE, or bovine spongiform encephalopathy, as recognized by the World Organization for Animal Health, or OIE. "They're (Mexico is) very concerned that if they're bringing in an older breeding animal, that they may be importing BSE; that's the genesis of this," Ritz said in a telephone interview Wednesday. Rob McNabb, general manager of operations at the Canadian Cattlemen's Association, said Mexico has given written notice of the ban to the Canadian Food Inspection Agency. Mexican authorities are describing the move as a temporary prohibition of live cattle from Alberta, he said, while they undertake their own risk assessment "and assure themselves that what Canada's doing to ensure safety is sound." No further details about a timeline were available.
Mexico blocks live cattle from Alberta // 21 aug 2008
http://www.allaboutfeed.net/news/id102-61630/mexico_blocks_live_cattle_from_alberta.html
Scientific Report of the European Food Safety Authority on the Assessment of the Geographical BSE Risk (GBR) of the United States of America (USA) Numero domanda: EFSA-Q-2003-083 Data di adozione: 01/07/2004 Sintesi (0.1Mb)
Documento (0.2Mb)
Summary
The European Food Safety Authority and its Scientific Expert Working Group on the Assessment of the Geographical Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Risk (GBR) were asked by the European Commission (EC) to provide an up-to-date scientific report on the GBR in the United States of America, i.e. the likelihood of the presence of one or more cattle being infected with BSE, pre-clinically as well as clinically, in USA. This scientific report addresses the GBR of USA as assessed in 2004 based on data covering the period 1980-2003.
The BSE agent was probably imported into USA and could have reached domestic cattle in the middle of the eighties. These cattle imported in the mid eighties could have been rendered in the late eighties and therefore led to an internal challenge in the early nineties. It is possible that imported meat and bone meal (MBM) into the USA reached domestic cattle and leads to an internal challenge in the early nineties.
A processing risk developed in the late 80s/early 90s when cattle imports from BSE risk countries were slaughtered or died and were processed (partly) into feed, together with some imports of MBM. This risk continued to exist, and grew significantly in the mid 90's when domestic cattle, infected by imported MBM, reached processing. Given the low stability of the system, the risk increased over the years with continued imports of cattle and MBM from BSE risk countries.
EFSA concludes that the current GBR level of USA is III, i.e. it is likely but not confirmed that domestic cattle are (clinically or pre-clinically) infected with the BSE-agent. As long as there are no significant changes in rendering or feeding, the stability remains extremely/very unstable. Thus, the probability of cattle to be (pre-clinically or clinically) infected with the BSE-agent persistently increases.
Scarica il file (0.3Mb)
http://www.efsa.eu.int/EFSA/efsa_locale-1178620753820_1178620779461.htm
Scientific Report of the European Food Safety Authority on the Assessment of the Geographical BSE-Risk (GBR) of CANADA Question N° EFSA-Q-2003-083 Adopted July 2004 Summary The European Food Safety Authority and its Scientific Expert Working Group on the Assessment of the Geographical Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Risk (GBR) were asked by the European Commission (EC), to provide an up-to-date scientific report on the GBR in Canada, i.e. the likelihood of the presence of one or more cattle being infected with BSE, pre-clinically as well as clinically, in Canada. This scientific report addresses the GBR of Canada as assessed in 2004 based on data covering the period 1980-2003. The BSE agent was probably imported into the country middle of the eighties and could have reached domestic cattle in the early nineties. These cattle imported in the mid eighties could have been rendered in the late eighties and therefore led to an internal challenge in the early 90s. It is possible that imported meat and bone meal (MBM) into Canada reached domestic cattle and led to an internal challenge in the early 90s. A certain risk that BSE-infected cattle entered processing in Canada, and were at least partly rendered for feed, occurred in the early 1990s when cattle imported from UK in the mid 80s could have been slaughtered. This risk continued to exist, and grew significantly in the mid 90's when domestic cattle, infected by imported MBM, reached processing. Given the low stability of the system, the risk increased over the years with continued imports of cattle and MBM from BSE risk countries. EFSA concludes that the current GBR level of Canada is III, i.e. it is confirmed at a lower level that domestic cattle are (clinically or pre-clinically) infected with the BSE-agent. As long as the system remains unstable, it is expected that the GBR continues to grow, even if no additional external challenges occur.
http://www.mvo.nl/wetgeving-dierlijk-vet/onderzoek/download/EFSA%20on%20BSE%20risk%20Canada%20jul%202004.pdf
Scientific Report of the European Food Safety Authority on the Assessment of the Geographical BSE-Risk (GBR) of MEXICO Question N° EFSA-Q-2003-083 Adopted July 2004 Summary The European Food Safety Authority and its Scientific Expert Working Group on the Assessment of the Geographical Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Risk (GBR) were asked by the European Commission (EC) to provide an up-to-date scientific report on the GBR in Mexico, i.e. the likelihood of the presence of one or more cattle being infected with BSE, pre-clinically as well as clinically, in Mexico. This scientific report addresses the GBR of Mexico as assessed in 2004 based on data covering the period 1980-2003. The BSE agent was probably imported into Mexico and could have reached domestic cattle. These cattle imported could have been rendered and therefore led to an internal challenge in the mid to late 1990's. It is possible that imported meat and bone meal (MBM) into Mexico reached domestic cattle and leads to an internal challenge around 1993. It is likely that BSE infectivity entered processing at the time of imported 'at - risk' MBM (1993) and at the time of slaughter of imported live 'at - risk' cattle (mid to late 1990s). The high level of external challenge is maintained throughout the reference period, and the system has not been made stable. Thus it is likely that BSE infectivity was recycled and propagated from approximately 1993. The risk has since grown consistently due to a maintained internal and external challenge and lack of a stable system. EFSA concludes that the current geographical BSE risk (GBR) level is III, i.e. it is likely but not confirmed that domestic cattle are (clinically or pre-clinically) infected with the BSEagent. The GBR is likely to increase due to continued internal and external challenge, coupled with a very unstable system.
http://www.mvo.nl/wetgeving-dierlijk-vet/onderzoek/download/EFSA%20on%20BSE%20risk%20Mexico%20jul%202004.pdf
Wednesday, June 11, 2008
OIE Recognition of the BSE Status of Members RESOLUTION No. XXI (Adopted by the International Committee of the OIE on 27 May 2008)
http://usdavskorea.blogspot.com/2008/06/oie-recognition-of-bse-status-of.html
http://organicconsumers.org/forum/index.php?showtopic=1566
Docket APHIS-2006-0041 Docket Title Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Minimal-Risk Regions; Importation of Live Bovines and Products Derived from Bovines Commodities Docket Type Rulemaking Document APHIS-2006-0041-0001 Document Title Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Minimal-Risk Regions; Importation of Live Bovines and Products Derived From Bovines Public Submission APHIS-2006-0041-0006 Public Submission Title Comment from Terry S Singletary Sr Views Add Comments How To Comment
snip...
MY personal belief, since you ask, is that not only the Canadian border, but the USA border, and the Mexican border should be sealed up tighter than a drum for exporting there TSE tainted products, until a validated, 100% sensitive test is available, and all animals for human and animal consumption are tested. all we are doing is the exact same thing the UK did with there mad cow poisoning when they exported it all over the globe, all the while knowing what they were doing. this BSE MRR policy is nothing more than a legal tool to do just exactly what the UK did, thanks to the OIE and GW, it's legal now. and they executed Saddam for poisoning ???
go figure....
Terry S. Singeltary Sr. P.O. Box 42 Bacliff, Texas USA 77518
http://www.regulations.gov/fdmspublic/component/main?main=DocumentDetail&d=APHIS-2006-0041-0006
Docket APHIS-2006-0041 Docket Title Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Minimal-Risk Regions; Importation of Live Bovines and Products Derived from Bovines Commodities Docket Type Rulemaking Document APHIS-2006-0041-0001 Document Title Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Minimal-Risk Regions; Importation of Live Bovines and Products Derived From Bovines Public Submission APHIS-2006-0041-0028 Public Submission Title Comment from Terry S Singletary
Comment 2006-2007 USA AND OIE POISONING GLOBE WITH BSE MRR POLICY
THE USA is in a most unique situation, one of unknown circumstances with human and animal TSE. THE USA has the most documented TSE in different species to date, with substrains growing in those species (BSE/BASE in cattle and CWD in deer and elk, there is evidence here with different strains), and we know that sheep scrapie has over 20 strains of the typical scrapie with atypical scrapie documented and also BSE is very likely to have passed to sheep. all of which have been rendered and fed back to animals for human and animal consumption, a frightening scenario. WE do not know the outcome, and to play with human life around the globe with the very likely TSE tainted products from the USA, in my opinion is like playing Russian roulette, of long duration, with potential long and enduring consequences, of which once done, cannot be undone. These are the facts as I have come to know through daily and extensive research of TSE over 9 years, since 12/14/97. I do not pretend to have all the answers, but i do know to continue to believe in the ukbsenvcjd only theory of transmission to humans of only this one strain from only this one TSE from only this one part of the globe, will only lead to further failures, and needless exposure to humans from all strains of TSE, and possibly many more needless deaths from TSE via a multitude of proven routes and sources via many studies with primates and rodents and other species.
MY personal belief, since you ask, is that not only the Canadian border, but the USA border, and the Mexican border should be sealed up tighter than a drum for exporting there TSE tainted products, until a validated, 100% sensitive test is available, and all animals for human and animal consumption are tested. all we are doing is the exact same thing the UK did with there mad cow poisoning when they exported it all over the globe, all the while knowing what they were doing. this BSE MRR policy is nothing more than a legal tool to do just exactly what the UK did, thanks to the OIE and GW, it's legal now. and they executed Saddam for poisoning ???
go figure. ...
http://www.regulations.gov/fdmspublic/component/main?main=DocumentDetail&o=09000064801f8151
Docket APHIS-2006-0041 Docket Title Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Minimal-Risk Regions; Importation of Live Bovines and Products Derived from Bovines Commodities Docket Type Rulemaking Document APHIS-2006-0041-0001 Document Title Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Minimal-Risk Regions; Importation of Live Bovines and Products Derived From Bovines Public Submission APHIS-2006-0041-0028.1 Public Submission Title Attachment to Singletary comment
January 28, 2007
Greetings APHIS,
I would kindly like to submit the following to ;
BSE; MRR; IMPORTATION OF LIVE BOVINES AND PRODUCTS DERIVED FROM BOVINES [Docket No. APHIS-2006-0041] RIN 0579-AC01
http://www.regulations.gov/fdmspublic/ContentViewer?objectId=09000064801f8152&disposition=attachment&contentType=msw8
Food and Veterinary Office - Inspection reports MX Mexico - Control of residues and contaminants in live animals and animal products, including controls on veterinary medicinal products
snip...
5.4.3.2. In feed mills (medicated pre-mixes and medicated feedingstuffs)
Feed mills and on-farm mixers manufacturing medicated feed must be authorised by SAGARPA Central level. The authorisation is unlimited in time, but must be updated when changes occur. The CA informed the mission team that there are currently 365 such establishments authorised. All establishments are required to have a SAGARPA approved veterinarian employed and the approval of the veterinarian is renewed every 2 years. The supervision of feed mills for medicated feedingstuffs, and farms with on-farm mixing of medicated feed is delegated to the SAGARPA State Offices. The SAGARPA Verification Programme will include random checks on feed mills. The mission team noted that:
in the feed mill visited, growth promoting additives, medicated premixes and coccidiostats were used routinely. Feed was produced for cattle, pigs, poultry, shrimps and pets in two lines. No checks for homogeneity, stability, recovery/content or cross contamination of feedingstuffs were carried out. There is no system in place to prevent finishing feed to be manufactured directly after a batch containing additives or medicated premixes;
in the feed mill visited, several medicated feedingstuffs were marketed in sacks with the concentration and types of added antibiotics listed on a separate label stitched to the sack. However, several of the antibiotic combinations marketed were not listed in the SAGARPA registration document and none of the labels comprised SAGARPA registration numbers;
the pig farm visited regularly produced feed with growth promoters and therapeutic doses of VMPs (carbadox, ractopamine, tyiosin, florfenicol) for the finishing period. Flushing was used between batches but no checks were made for cross contamination or recovery;
s> the feed mill visited by the mission team had been inspected by the State Office once during the last five years while the pig farm with on-farm mixing facility for medicated feed visited had never been inspected;
NOM-012-ZOO-1993 requires quality control, including quantitative analysis of active substances in feedingstuffs. Such analyses were performed by the feed mill delivering medicated feedingstuffs to the pig farm visited. However, the feed mill visited only analysed the nutritional components in produced feedingstuffs. In the inspection protocol from 2003 this fact had been noted as an observation. The CCA informed the mission team on the spot that additional analyses were not compulsory for feed mills.
5.4.3.3. On veterinary practitioners and farms
The SAGARPA State Offices are responsible for the controls of veterinary practitioners and farms and no federal legislation or guidelines have been issued. Veterinary practices for food producing animals are usually combined with a pharmacy and thus inspected as pharmacies. The SAGARPA Verification Programme will include random checks on veterinary practitioners. All poultry and pig farms are required to have a SAGARPA approved veterinarian employed. This approved veterinarian signs the animal movement certificates when animals are sent to slaughter. Movement certificates for other species, e.g. horses, are signed by a veterinarian of the State Committee (comprising farmers, food producers, federal state and state government). Animal health inspections for export are conducted by SAGARPA staff, while health inspections for control programs are conducted by
15
the approved veterinarians on the farms (pigs and poultry) or the Committee veterinarians (other species). These inspections are coordinated by SENASICA and include a description of disease problems and medicines used on farm. The mission team noted that:
there is no legal requirement for inspections of VMP usage in veterinary practices or farms;
there is no legal requirement for farmers to keep treatment records, thus inspection of VMP usage on farm is based on verbal information from the fanner or on voluntary farm records 7;
health certificates for slaughter in TIF slaughterhouses are not required to contain information or guarantees by the farmer or the approved veterinarian regarding banned substances or the respect of withdrawal times for VMP;
in two States visited apiaries were regularly inspected and comprehensive check lists, including VMP usage, were used.
6. CONCLUSIONS
6.1. LEGISLATION
(1) Hormonal substances and beta-agonists for growth promotion (except diethylstilbestrol and clenbuterol) are not legally prohibited for use as growth promoters in food producing animals. In the absence of a split production system the CCA does not meet Community requirements for the export of fresh meat (currently only horse meat) to the EU.
(2) Whilst there is a legal basis for the control of residues and contaminants in tissues of cattle, equidae, pigs and sheep, the absence of national legislation for residues control of other commodities (e.g. milk, shrimps, eggs and honey) and the absence of corresponding MRLs militates against effective implementation of the NRCP, in particular the assessment of analysis results and execution of follow-up actions.
(3) Several national MRLs and MLs for meat and animal tissues exceed those fixed in EU legislation; this could result in situations where export consignments would not meet Community requirements.
6.2. NATIONAL RESIDUE CONTROL PLAN
(1) The general layout of the NRCP and the range of commodities tested are in line with Community requirements. However, many relevant substances including EU-banned VMPs are not tested for and a limited number of substances are tested within certain therapeutic categories. Given the number of VMPs authorised, the current structure of the plan reduces the possibility of detecting the potential misuse of numerous VMPs and to guarantee that export consignments meet Community requirements.
(2) The random selection and number of samples taken in accordance with the guidelines of the Codex Alimentarius can allow the estimated prevalence rate
7 In their response to the draft report the Mexican CA stilted that in the specific case of aquaculture, farms must keep a register of the use and application of antibiotics, which will be checked during the inspections by CONAPESCA.
16
snip...
(2) A prescription system laid down in national legislation in 2004 is still not implemented. Together with the lack of a requirement for medicinal records on farms, these factors undermine effective controls on VMPs at retail and farm level.
(3) The authorisation and use of VMPs containing pharmacologically active substances which are either banned or are not authorised for use in food producing animals in the EL) is of concern, considering the absence of some national MRLs, restricted analytical capabilities and lack of an effective VMP control system. Cumulatively these factors may result in the presence of undesirable residues in exported commodities and weaken CA guarantees on the residue status of exported consignments. It is doubtful that the relevant requirements of Community food law9 can be met.
6.5. OVERALL CONCLUSION
This first ever residues mission to Mexico revealed serious shortcomings in the application of residues and veterinary medicines controls, in respect of commodities currently exported to the EU or which are planned to be exported. In particular, the authorisation and use of hormones and beta-agonists for growth promotion in the absence of any 'split system' for EU exports means that Mexico does not comply with Community requirements concerning the export of meat from potentially treated animals. In addition, the fact that many veterinary medicines which are banned for use in food producing animals in the EU are authorised and are freely available in Mexico, raises concerns on the residue status of several commodities exported to the EU. This is exacerbated by weak controls on the use of veterinary medicines, failure to implement the nationally legally required prescription system, the absence of any obligation to maintain medicinal treatment records on farm and the fact that there is no laboratory capability at present to test for residues of most of these substances. Given this situation and shortcomings in the current structure and implementation of the national residue control plan, the residue control system in Mexico can not be judged to offer equivalent guarantees to those required under Community legislation.
7. CLOSING MEETING
A closing meeting was held on 15 September 2005 with representatives of the CA. At this meeting, the inspection team presented the main findings and preliminary conclusions of the mission. The CCA did not express major disagreement.
8. RECOMMENDATIONS
The competent authorities were invited to provide details of the actions taken and planned, including deadlines for their completion ('action plan'), aimed at addressing the recommendations set out below, within 25 working days of receipt of a draft of this mission report.
(1) Ensure that consignments of meat and meat products exported to the EU are not derived from animals which have been treated with hormonal growth promoters or beta-agonists for growth promotion.
9 Article 11 of Regulation (EC) No 178/2002.
18
snip...
http://europa.eu.int/comm/food/fvo/act_getPDF.cfm?PDF_ID=5018
Mexico Livestock and Products Mexico BSE Update (Third Edition) 2004
http://www.agobservatory.org/library.cfm?refID=30418
TSS
Friday, August 15, 2008
BSE CASE CONFIRMED IN ALBERTA OTTAWA, August 15, 2008
BSE CASE CONFIRMED IN ALBERTA OTTAWA, August 15, 2008 -
The Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA) has confirmed bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) in a six-year-old beef cow from Alberta. No part of the animal’s carcass entered the human food or animal feed systems.
The animal’s birth farm has been identified, and an investigation is underway. The CFIA is tracing the animal's herdmates at the time of birth and examining possible sources of infection. The age and location of the infected animal are consistent with previous cases detected in Canada.
This case was detected through the national BSE surveillance program, which has been highly successful in demonstrating the low level of BSE in Canada. The program continues to play an important role in Canada’s strategy to manage BSE.
Canada remains a Controlled Risk country for BSE, as recognized by the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE). Accordingly, this case should not affect exports of Canadian cattle or beef.
- 30 -
For information:
Canadian Food Inspection Agency Media relations: 613-228-6682
http://www.inspection.gc.ca/english/anima/heasan/disemala/bseesb/ab2008/14notavie.shtml
Amazing what you will find when you look. The Canadians are doing a far better job than the US in confirming BSE/TSE cases. ...TSS
Wednesday, June 11, 2008
OIE Recognition of the BSE Status of Members RESOLUTION No. XXI (Adopted by the International Committee of the OIE on 27 May 2008)
snip...SEE FULL TEXT with facts and sources @ ;
http://usdavskorea.blogspot.com/2008/06/oie-recognition-of-bse-status-of.html
http://organicconsumers.org/forum/index.php?showtopic=1566
Friday, April 25, 2008
Substances Prohibited From Use in Animal Food or Feed [Docket No. 2002N-0273] (Formerly Docket No. 02N-0273) RIN 0910-AF46
http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2008/04/substances-prohibited-from-use-in.html
Review on the epidemiology and dynamics of BSE epidemics
Cases of atypical BSE have only been found in countries having implemented large active surveillance programs. As of 1st September 2007, 36 cases (16 H, 20 L) have been described all over the world in cattle: Belgium (1 L) [23], Canada (1 H)15, Denmark (1 L)16, France (8 H, 6 L)17, Germany (1 H, 1 L) [13], Italy (3 L)18, Japan (1 L) [71], Netherlands (1 H, 2 L)19, Poland (1 H, 6 L)20, Sweden (1 H)21, United Kingdom (1 H)22, and USA (2 H)23. Another H-type case has been found in a 19 year old miniature zebu in a zoological park in Switzerland [56]. It is noteworthy that atypical cases have been found in countries that did not experience classical BSE so far, like Sweden, or in which only few cases of classical BSE have been found, like Canada or the USA.
And last but not least, similarities of PrPres between Htype BSE and human prion diseases like CJD or GSS have been put forward [10], as well as between L-type BSE and CJD [17]. These findings raise questions about the origin and inter species transmission of these prion diseases that were discovered through the BSE active surveillance.
full text 18 pages ;
http://www.vetres.org/index.php?option=article&access=standard&Itemid=129&url=/articles/vetres/pdf/2008/04/v07232.pdf
USA BSE ACTIVE SURVEILLANCE ???
http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2008/06/review-on-epidemiology-and-dynamics-of.html
Please remember, the last two mad cows documented in the USA i.e. Alabama and Texas, both were of the 'atypical' BSE strain, and immediately after that, the USDA shut down the testing from 470,000 to 40,000 in the U.S. in 2007 out of about 35 million cattle slaughtered. also, science is showing that some of these atypical cases are more virulent to humans than the typical UK BSE strain ;
***Atypical forms of BSE have emerged which, although rare, appear to be more virulent than the classical BSE that causes vCJD.***
Progress Report from the National Prion Disease Pathology Surveillance Center
An Update from Stephen M. Sergay, MB, BCh & Pierluigi Gambetti, MD
April 3, 2008
http://www.aan.com/news/?event=read&article_id=4397&page=72.45.45
In this context, a word is in order about the US testing program. After the discovery of the first (imported) cow in 2003, the magnitude of testing was much increased, reaching a level of >400,000 tests in 2005 (Figure 4). Neither of the 2 more recently indigenously infected older animals with nonspecific clinical features would have been detected without such testing, and neither would have been identified as atypical without confirmatory Western blots. Despite these facts, surveillance has now been decimated to 40,000 annual tests (USDA news release no. 0255.06, July 20, 2006) and invites the accusation that the United States will never know the true status of its involvement with BSE.
In short, a great deal of further work will need to be done before the phenotypic features and prevalence of atypical BSE are understood. More than a single strain may have been present from the beginning of the epidemic, but this possibility has been overlooked by virtue of the absence of widespread Western blot confirmatory testing of positive screening test results; or these new phenotypes may be found, at least in part, to result from infections at an older age by a typical BSE agent, rather than neonatal infections with new "strains" of BSE. Neither alternative has yet been investigated.
http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/EID/vol12no12/06-0965.htm
Wednesday, August 13, 2008 Identification of a Heritable Polymorphism in Bovine PRNP Associated with Genetic Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy: Evidence of Heritable BSE
http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2008/08/identification-of-heritable.html
http://organicconsumers.org/forum/index.php?showtopic=1918
Tuesday, August 12, 2008
Biosafety in Microbiological and Biomedical Laboratories Fifth Edition 2007 (occupational exposure to prion diseases)
http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2008/08/biosafety-in-microbiological-and.html
Sunday, August 10, 2008
A New Prionopathy OR more of the same old BSe and sporadic CJD
http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2008/08/new-prionopathy-or-more-of-same-old-bse.html
Tuesday, June 3, 2008
SCRAPIE USA UPDATE JUNE 2008 NOR-98 REPORTED PA
http://nor-98.blogspot.com/2008/06/scrapie-usa-update-june-2008-nor-98.html
Terry S. Singeltary Sr. P.O. Box 42 Bacliff, Texas USA 77518
The Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA) has confirmed bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) in a six-year-old beef cow from Alberta. No part of the animal’s carcass entered the human food or animal feed systems.
The animal’s birth farm has been identified, and an investigation is underway. The CFIA is tracing the animal's herdmates at the time of birth and examining possible sources of infection. The age and location of the infected animal are consistent with previous cases detected in Canada.
This case was detected through the national BSE surveillance program, which has been highly successful in demonstrating the low level of BSE in Canada. The program continues to play an important role in Canada’s strategy to manage BSE.
Canada remains a Controlled Risk country for BSE, as recognized by the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE). Accordingly, this case should not affect exports of Canadian cattle or beef.
- 30 -
For information:
Canadian Food Inspection Agency Media relations: 613-228-6682
http://www.inspection.gc.ca/english/anima/heasan/disemala/bseesb/ab2008/14notavie.shtml
Amazing what you will find when you look. The Canadians are doing a far better job than the US in confirming BSE/TSE cases. ...TSS
Wednesday, June 11, 2008
OIE Recognition of the BSE Status of Members RESOLUTION No. XXI (Adopted by the International Committee of the OIE on 27 May 2008)
snip...SEE FULL TEXT with facts and sources @ ;
http://usdavskorea.blogspot.com/2008/06/oie-recognition-of-bse-status-of.html
http://organicconsumers.org/forum/index.php?showtopic=1566
Friday, April 25, 2008
Substances Prohibited From Use in Animal Food or Feed [Docket No. 2002N-0273] (Formerly Docket No. 02N-0273) RIN 0910-AF46
http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2008/04/substances-prohibited-from-use-in.html
Review on the epidemiology and dynamics of BSE epidemics
Cases of atypical BSE have only been found in countries having implemented large active surveillance programs. As of 1st September 2007, 36 cases (16 H, 20 L) have been described all over the world in cattle: Belgium (1 L) [23], Canada (1 H)15, Denmark (1 L)16, France (8 H, 6 L)17, Germany (1 H, 1 L) [13], Italy (3 L)18, Japan (1 L) [71], Netherlands (1 H, 2 L)19, Poland (1 H, 6 L)20, Sweden (1 H)21, United Kingdom (1 H)22, and USA (2 H)23. Another H-type case has been found in a 19 year old miniature zebu in a zoological park in Switzerland [56]. It is noteworthy that atypical cases have been found in countries that did not experience classical BSE so far, like Sweden, or in which only few cases of classical BSE have been found, like Canada or the USA.
And last but not least, similarities of PrPres between Htype BSE and human prion diseases like CJD or GSS have been put forward [10], as well as between L-type BSE and CJD [17]. These findings raise questions about the origin and inter species transmission of these prion diseases that were discovered through the BSE active surveillance.
full text 18 pages ;
http://www.vetres.org/index.php?option=article&access=standard&Itemid=129&url=/articles/vetres/pdf/2008/04/v07232.pdf
USA BSE ACTIVE SURVEILLANCE ???
http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2008/06/review-on-epidemiology-and-dynamics-of.html
Please remember, the last two mad cows documented in the USA i.e. Alabama and Texas, both were of the 'atypical' BSE strain, and immediately after that, the USDA shut down the testing from 470,000 to 40,000 in the U.S. in 2007 out of about 35 million cattle slaughtered. also, science is showing that some of these atypical cases are more virulent to humans than the typical UK BSE strain ;
***Atypical forms of BSE have emerged which, although rare, appear to be more virulent than the classical BSE that causes vCJD.***
Progress Report from the National Prion Disease Pathology Surveillance Center
An Update from Stephen M. Sergay, MB, BCh & Pierluigi Gambetti, MD
April 3, 2008
http://www.aan.com/news/?event=read&article_id=4397&page=72.45.45
In this context, a word is in order about the US testing program. After the discovery of the first (imported) cow in 2003, the magnitude of testing was much increased, reaching a level of >400,000 tests in 2005 (Figure 4). Neither of the 2 more recently indigenously infected older animals with nonspecific clinical features would have been detected without such testing, and neither would have been identified as atypical without confirmatory Western blots. Despite these facts, surveillance has now been decimated to 40,000 annual tests (USDA news release no. 0255.06, July 20, 2006) and invites the accusation that the United States will never know the true status of its involvement with BSE.
In short, a great deal of further work will need to be done before the phenotypic features and prevalence of atypical BSE are understood. More than a single strain may have been present from the beginning of the epidemic, but this possibility has been overlooked by virtue of the absence of widespread Western blot confirmatory testing of positive screening test results; or these new phenotypes may be found, at least in part, to result from infections at an older age by a typical BSE agent, rather than neonatal infections with new "strains" of BSE. Neither alternative has yet been investigated.
http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/EID/vol12no12/06-0965.htm
Wednesday, August 13, 2008 Identification of a Heritable Polymorphism in Bovine PRNP Associated with Genetic Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy: Evidence of Heritable BSE
http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2008/08/identification-of-heritable.html
http://organicconsumers.org/forum/index.php?showtopic=1918
Tuesday, August 12, 2008
Biosafety in Microbiological and Biomedical Laboratories Fifth Edition 2007 (occupational exposure to prion diseases)
http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2008/08/biosafety-in-microbiological-and.html
Sunday, August 10, 2008
A New Prionopathy OR more of the same old BSe and sporadic CJD
http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2008/08/new-prionopathy-or-more-of-same-old-bse.html
Tuesday, June 3, 2008
SCRAPIE USA UPDATE JUNE 2008 NOR-98 REPORTED PA
http://nor-98.blogspot.com/2008/06/scrapie-usa-update-june-2008-nor-98.html
Terry S. Singeltary Sr. P.O. Box 42 Bacliff, Texas USA 77518
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