Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) CANADA Import Policy for Bovine Animals and Their Products (TAHD-DSAT-IE-2005-9-2) Import Policy updates August 2010
Terrestrial Animal Health Import Requirements for Rendered and Inedible Products, July 7, 2010 (TAHD-DSAT-IE-2002-10-5)
http://www.inspection.gc.ca/english/anima/heasan/pol/ie-2002-10e.shtml
Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Import Policy for Bovine Animals and Their Products and By-Products TAHD-DSAT-IE-2005-9-2
Main Page - BSE
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Amendments: The policy has been extensively revised and replaces any previous versions.
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This policy, under the legislative authority of the Health of Animals Act and Health of Animals Regulations, specifies BSE-related import or transit conditions intended to manage the zoonotic and animal health risks associated with the presence of the BSE agent in bovine animals of an exporting country.
Overview Situating the BSE import policy within the broader import framework
While this policy deals specifically with bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE), it is important to recognize that other factors and diseases may play a role in developing the import conditions necessary to provide an acceptable level of protection for public and animal health. This section addresses those factors.
Under the Health of Animals Regulations, importation of bovine animals, animal products, animal by-products, animal pathogens and other things is allowed under certain conditions. The specific sections of the Regulations are: Part II, (sections 7 to 16); Part III; Part IV; and, Part XIII, (section 160).
CFIA uses the above regulatory authority as the basis for recognition of a specific country, or part of a country, as being free of, or as posing a negligible risk for, a particular disease, depending on a variety of factors which include, but are not limited to the following parameters:
the country having been assessed by CFIA as having an equivalent veterinary infrastructure to Canada's, having an effective and implemented system for detecting and diagnosing diseases, as well as reporting outbreaks, and surveillance data to the international community.
Additional import conditions related to other diseases such as FMD, TB, Brucellosis, are often necessary and can be found either in commodity-specific import directives listed in the Import Policies and Directives Web link or in the Automated Import Reference System (AIRS). The importer of bovine animals or products is obligated to ensure compliance with the specific requirements of other CFIA policies and directives that fall under the legislative authority of the Meat Inspection Act and Meat Inspection Regulations, Feeds Act and Feeds Regulations and the Fertilizers Act and Fertilizers Regulations.
The requirements indicated with respect to the slaughter of bovine animals, namely, ante-mortem and post-mortem inspection, stunning, age determination, and specified risk material (SRM) removal and disposition must comply with the standards set out in the CFIA Manual of Procedures, Annex D, Chapter 17, under the authority of the Meat Inspection Regulations.
The Canada Border Services Agency assists the CFIA with border clearance responsibilities and importers are obligated to meet any requirements of the Canada Border Services Agency Act or other applicable legislation under which Border Services Officers are designated.
Bovine products and by-products used in the preparation of food, cosmetics, drugs (including pharmaceuticals for use in animals, pharmaceuticals and biologics for human use, and natural health products for use in animals or humans) and medical devices are also regulated by Health Canada through product-specific regulatory programs, which are administered under the authority of the Food and Drugs Act and Food and Drugs Regulations. Veterinary biologics and their components are regulated similarly by the CFIA under the Health of Animals Act and Health of Animals Regulations.
It is the responsibility of the prospective importer or licensee to be in compliance with any additional import requirements or restrictions associated with the importation or licensing of a commodity for human use, or administration to animals.
BSE-specific overview
The BSE import policy for bovine animals and animal products, animal by-products, germplasm, animal food, meat, meat by-products and veterinary biologics, of bovine origin, adheres closely to the recommendations of the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) and abides by the intent of the North American harmonization of a BSE strategy1.
For the purpose of this policy, bovine animals consist of cattle and bison and their exotic relatives. Taxonomically they are classified as members of the Subfamily Bovinae from the genus Bos, which includes cattle (Bos taurus and Bos indicus) and bison (Bos bison).
Depending on the commodity being considered for importation, whether live animals, animal products or by-products of bovine origin, BSE-related conditions may be required if import is allowed.
Canada accepts the OIE classification for country BSE risk categorization. Therefore, CFIA does not routinely carry out independent assessment regarding a country's BSE categorization.
List of Countries by BSE Designation The OIE classifies countries for BSE risk into three categories: 1) negligible risk, 2) controlled risk, or 3) undetermined risk.
The following countries are recognized as having a negligible BSE risk in accordance with Chapter 11.5 of the OIE Terrestrial Animal Health Code 2010:
1.Argentina 2.Australia 3.Chile 4.Finland 5.Iceland 6.India 7.New Zealand 8.Norway 9.Paraguay 10.Peru 11.Singapore 12.Sweden 13.Uruguay The following countries are recognized as having a controlled BSE risk in accordance with Chapter 11.5 of the OIE Terrestrial Animal Health Code 2010:
1.Austria 2.Belgium 3.Brazil 4.Canada 5.Chinese Taipei 6.Colombia 7.Cyprus 8.Czech Republic 9.Denmark 10.Estonia 11.France 12.Germany 13.Greece 14.Hungary 15.Ireland 16.Italy 17.Japan 18.Korea (Republic of) 19.Latvia 20.Liechtenstein 21.Lithuania 22.Luxembourg 23.Malta 24.Mexico 25.Netherlands 26.Panama 27.Poland 28.Portugal 29.Slovak Republic 30.Slovenia 31.Spain 32.Switzerland 33.United Kingdom 34.United States of America Exemptions to the conditions for the importation of animals, products and by-products or any other commodities not listed, may be considered on a case-by-case basis, taking into account such factors as the intended use, the nature of the product, the bovine tissues from which it was derived and the manufacturing and processing methods to which it was subjected. Applicable import conditions would be developed on the basis of the outcome of a prior risk assessment.
Definitions Note: all definitions within this import policy, unless referenced otherwise, are based on the Health of Animals Act and the Health of Animals Regulations, interpretation, section 2.
Animal: means any member of one of the species regulated by CFIA, and, includes an embryo and a fertilized egg or ovum.
Animal food: means any food containing an animal product or animal by-product for chickens, turkeys, ducks, geese, ratites, game birds, ruminants, swine or horses but does not include such things as fish meal or vitamin or mineral supplements that do not contain animal products or by-products.
Animal by-product: means an animal by-product that originated from a bird or from any mammal except a member of the orders Rodentia, Cetacea, Pinnipedia and Sirenia (Health of Animals Regulations).
Animal product: means an animal product that originated from a bird or from any mammal except a member of the orders Rodentia, Cetacea, Pinnipedia and Sirenia.
Biologics (human): drugs listed on Schedule D of the Food and Drugs Act include names of individual products, product classes and reference to particular sources and methodology. Biologics are manufactured from animals, or micro-organisms, or through the use of animals or micro-organisms. Examples include blood and blood components, insulin, monoclonal antibodies, cytokines, protein hormones and gene therapy products2.
Bovine: means cattle or bison and includes their exotic relatives. Taxonomically they are classified as members of the Subfamily Bovinae from the genus Bos, which includes cattle (Bos taurus and Bos indicus) and bison (Bos bison).
BSE slaughter process: means any process of slaughtering an animal other than a process in which the animal is subjected, before being slaughtered, to a) a stunning process in which a device is used to inject compressed air or gas into the animal's cranial cavity; or b) a pithing process involving laceration, after stunning of the animal, of the animal's central nervous tissue by means of an elongated rod-shaped instrument that is introduced into the animal's cranial cavity.
Cosmetic: includes any substance or mixture of substances manufactured, sold or represented for use in cleansing, improving or altering the complexion, skin, hair or teeth, and includes deodorants and perfumes3.
Drug: includes any substance or mixture of substances manufactured, sold or represented for use in a) the diagnosis, treatment, mitigation or prevention of a disease, disorder or abnormal physical state, or its symptoms, in human beings or animals; b) restoring, correcting or modifying organic functions in human beings or animals; or c) disinfection in premises in which food is manufactured, prepared or kept4.
Device: means any article, instrument, apparatus or contrivance, including any component, part or accessory thereof, manufactured, sold or represented for use in a) the diagnosis, treatment, mitigation or prevention of a disease, disorder or abnormal physical state, or its symptoms, in human beings or animals; b) restoring, correcting or modifying a body function or the body structure of human beings or animals; c) the diagnosis of pregnancy in human beings or animals; or d) the care of human beings or animals during pregnancy and at and after birth of the offspring, including care of the offspring, and includes a contraceptive device but does not include a drug5.
Food: includes any article manufactured, sold or represented for use as food or drink for human beings, chewing gum, and any ingredient that may be mixed with food for any purpose whatever6.
Germplasm: means semen, male or female germ cells or genetic material taken from a male or female germ cell for the purpose of producing a zygote and includes embryos but does not include a hatching egg7.
Meat: means the edible part of a carcass that is the muscle associated with the skeleton, tongue, diaphragm, heart, gizzard or mammalian oesophagus, with or without accompanying and overlying fat, together with those parts of the bones, skin, sinews, nerves, blood vessels and other tissues that normally accompany the muscle and are not ordinarily removed in dressing a carcass, but does not include the muscle associated with the lips, snout, scalp or ears, mechanically recovered meat or meat to which an ingredient other than meat has been added8.
Meat by-product: means edible blood, an edible organ or edible tissue that was derived from the carcass of a food animal, but does not include meat or mechanically recovered meat9.
Mechanically recovered meat (MRM): means meat obtained using high pressure to recover the residual raw meat adhering to the bones after other boning processes have been completed10.
Ruminant: means an animal of the suborder Ruminatiae and includes an animal of the family Camelidae.
Specified risk material (SRM): means a) the skull, brain, trigeminal ganglia, eyes, tonsils, spinal cord and dorsal root ganglia of cattle aged 30 months or older; and b) the distal ileum of cattle of all ages (SRM in Food and Drug Regulations and SRM in Health of Animals Regulations).
Tallow: is an odourless, tasteless, waxy white fat consisting of suet (the hard fat about the kidneys and loins of cattle, sheep, and horses) or fats from other animals11.
Veterinary biologic: means a) a helminth, protozoa or micro-organism, b) a substance or mixture of substances derived from animals, helminths, protozoa or micro-organisms, or c) a substance of synthetic origin, that is manufactured, sold or represented for use in restoring, correcting or modifying organic functions in animals or for use in the diagnosis, treatment, mitigation or prevention of a disease, disorder or abnormal physical state, or the symptoms thereof, in animals;12 and includes any veterinary biologic derived through biotechnology (Health of Animals Regulations); veterinary biologics do not include veterinary drugs (which are assigned a DIN number) and are primarily regulated by Health Canada (Veterinary Drugs Directorate) under the authority of the Food and Drugs Act and Regulations.13
BSE-Specific Import conditions for commodities of bovine origin An important tool for importers is AIRS which details specific import conditions and required documentation by product type or animal and includes non-BSE-related conditions, such as Foot and Mouth Disease requirements. More guidance on import requirements can also be obtained by contacting the CFIA local animal health office (by province).
The BSE-related import conditions by commodity are indicated below. Any certification requirements in section a) through h) are to address potential cross-contamination with the bovine tissues listed below14 (these tissues are what are legally defined within Canadian legislation as SRM), and as such meet the OIE requirement and Canadian domestic legislative requirements that the commodity contain "no other tissues of cattle". The OIE Code Commission emphasizes that the removal and avoidance of contamination with SRM, as defined by Canada are paramount to manage the human and animal health risks associated with BSE. Measures must be taken to exclude cross-contamination with the below-named tissues during slaughter, harvest and/or handling processes and certification by the veterinary administration of same. Products for human use may have additional conditions applied, in order to satisfy the requirements of Health Canada.
In reference to the OIE Terrestrial Animal Health Code 2010 (Chapter 11.5 - Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy) A. Milk, Milk Products and Colostrum
•No BSE-related conditions. B. Semen and In Vivo Derived Bovine Embryos Collected and Handled in Accordance With the Recommendations of the International Embryo Transfer Society
•No BSE-related conditions. C. Hides and Skins for Any End Use
Countries of negligible BSE risk
•No BSE-related conditions. Countries of controlled and undetermined BSE risk - In order to be consistent with Canadian domestic policy
•Certification by the veterinary administration that the hides and skins from the head (face plates only) of bovine animals aged 30 months or older, which were stunned with a penetrating device, were: a.removed; or b.trimmed of hide a minimum of 2.5 cm around the stun hole and a minimum of 2.5 cm around all parts of the face plate that were visibly contaminated with brain tissue; or c.washed, scraped, vacuumed, or otherwise processed to remove visible brain materials.
D. Gelatin and Collagen Prepared Exclusively from Hides and Skins
•See the Highly Processed Products directive for both the BSE and non-BSE requirements. E. Tallow with a Maximum Level of Insoluble Impurities of 0.15 Percent in Weight and Derivatives Made From This Tallow
•See the Rendered and Inedible Products directive for both the BSE and non- BSE requirements. F. Dicalcium Phosphate (with no trace of protein or fat)
•See the Highly Processed Products directive for both the BSE and non-BSE requirements. G. Meat and Meat By-Products
1. deboned skeletal muscle meat, excluding mechanically recovered meat
All Countries
Certification by the veterinary administration that:
•the deboned skeletal muscle meat (excluding mechanically separated meat) was derived from cattle which were not subjected to a stunning process prior to slaughter, with a device injecting compressed air or gas into the cranial cavity or to a pithing process, and which passed ante-mortem and post-mortem inspections and which has been prepared in a manner to avoid contamination with tissues listed in Article 11.5.14 of the OIE Terrestrial Animal Health Code 2010. 2. all other meat and meat by-products, including bone-in meat
Countries of negligible BSE risk
Certification by the veterinary administration was derived from cattle which were not subjected to a stunning process prior to slaughter, with a device injecting compressed air or gas into the cranial cavity or to a pithing process, and that the country complies with conditions in Article 11.5.3 of the OIE Terrestrial Animal Health Code 2010 and:
a.the bovine animals from which the meat and meat products were derived were subjected to and passed ante-mortem and post-mortem inspections, the meat and meat products were deemed fit for human consumption in the country of origin, and the facility in which the animals were slaughtered and processed was approved by the CFIA; AND b.where indigenous cases of BSE have occurred, the meat and meat products were derived from bovine animals that were born after the date from which the ban on the feeding of ruminant animals with meat and bone meal (or greaves) derived from ruminants was effectively enforced. Countries of controlled BSE risk
Certification by the veterinary administration that the country complies with conditions in Article 11.5.4 of the OIE Terrestrial Animal Health Code 2010 and:
a.the bovine animals from which the meat and meat products were derived were subjected to and passed ante-mortem and post-mortem inspections, the meat and meat products were deemed fit for human consumption in the country of origin, and the facility in which the animals were slaughtered and processed was approved by the CFIA; AND b.the bovine animals from which the meat and meat products were derived were subjected to a BSE slaughter process, which is any process for slaughtering an animal other than a process in which the animal is subjected, before slaughtering, to: a) a stunning process in which a device is used to inject compressed air or gas into the animal's cranial cavity; or b) a pithing process involving laceration, after stunning of the animal, of the animal's central nervous tissue by means of an elongated rod-shaped instrument that is introduced into the animal's cranial cavity; AND c.the meat and meat products do not contain mechanically recovered meat from the skull and vertebral column of bovine animals aged 30 months or older; AND d.the meat and meat products do not contain, were not prepared from or were not contaminated with: a) distal ileum of all ages of bovine animals, and b) palatine tonsils, the skull including the brain, trigeminal ganglia and eyes, the spinal cord and the vertebral column (excluding the vertebrae of the tail, the transverse processes of the thoracic and lumbar vertebrae, and the wings of the sacrum), from bovine animals aged 30 months or older. Countries of undetermined BSE risk
Certification by the veterinary administration that:
a.the bovine animals from which the meat and meat products were derived were subjected to and passed ante-mortem and post-mortem inspections, the meat and meat products were deemed fit for human consumption in the country of origin, and the facility in which the animals were slaughtered and processed was approved by the CFIA; AND b.the bovine animals, from which the meat and meat products were derived, were subjected to a BSE slaughter process, which is any process for slaughtering an animal other than a process in which the animal is subjected, before slaughtering, to a) a stunning process in which a device is used to inject compressed air or gas into the animal's cranial cavity; or b) a pithing process involving laceration, after stunning of the animal, of the animal's central nervous tissue by means of an elongated rod-shaped instrument that is introduced into the animal's cranial cavity; AND c.any visible nervous and lymphatic tissues exposed during deboning were removed; AND d.the meat and meat products do not contain mechanically recovered meat from the skull and vertebral column of bovine animals aged 12 months or older; AND e.the meat and meat products do not contain, were not prepared from or were not contaminated with a) distal ileum of all ages of bovine animals, and b) palatine tonsils, the skull including the brain, trigeminal ganglia and eyes, the spinal cord and the vertebral column, (excluding the vertebrae of the tail, the transverse processes of the thoracic and lumbar vertebrae, and the wings of the sacrum), from bovine animals aged 12 months or older. H. Blood and Blood By-Products for Inedible Uses
•See the Rendered Products and Inedible Products import directive for both BSE and non-BSE requirements. Blood and blood by-products for Edible Uses (i.e. for food, cosmetics, drugs [including pharmaceuticals, biologicals for human use and natural health products], veterinary biologics or medical devices).
Countries of negligible BSE risk
Certification by the veterinary administration that the country complies with conditions in Article 11.5.3 of the OIE Terrestrial Animal Health Code 2010 and:
a.was derived from cattle which were not subjected to a stunning process prior to slaughter, with a device injecting compressed air or gas into the cranial cavity or to a pithing process, and which passed ante-mortem and post-mortem inspections and the bovine animals from which the blood and blood by-products were derived were subjected to and passed ante-mortem and post-mortem inspections, the blood was deemed fit for human consumption in the country of origin, and the facility in which the animals were slaughtered and processed was approved by the CFIA; AND b.the blood was collected from cattle by a closed blood collection method such as using a hollow knife or cannula. Countries of controlled BSE risk and Countries of undetermined BSE risk
Certification by the veterinary administration that the country complies with conditions in Article 11.5.4 of the OIE Terrestrial Animal Health Code 2010 and:
a.the bovine animals from which the blood and blood by-products were derived were subjected to and passed ante-mortem and post-mortem inspections, the blood was deemed fit for human consumption in the country of origin, and the facility in which the animals were slaughtered and processed was approved by the CFIA; AND b.the bovine animals, from which the blood and blood by-products were derived, were subjected to a BSE slaughter process, which is any process for slaughtering an animal other than a process in which the animal is subjected, before slaughtering, to a) a stunning process in which a device is used to inject compressed air or gas into the animal's cranial cavity; or b) a pithing process involving laceration, after stunning of the animal, of the animal's central nervous tissue by means of an elongated rod-shaped instrument that is introduced into the animal's cranial cavity; AND c.the blood was collected from bovine animals by a closed blood collection method such as using a hollow knife or cannula. I. Live Animals
Countries of negligible BSE risk and Countries of controlled BSE risk
Certification by the veterinary administration that the country complies with conditions in either Article 11.5.3 of the OIE Terrestrial Animal Health Code 2010 or Article 11.5.4 of the OIE Terrestrial Animal Health Code 2010, as applicable, and where there has been an indigenous case:
a.the animals are identified by a permanent identification system enabling them to be traced back to demonstrate that the animals were not classified as exposed cattle nor under any restriction for movement, slaughter or destruction control, as described in the 2010 OIE Terrestrial Animal Health Code Chapter 11.5 on BSE; AND b.the bovine animals were born after the date, as determined by CFIA, from which the ban on the feeding of ruminant animals with meat and bone meal (or greaves) derived from ruminants was effectively enforced. Countries of undetermined BSE risk
Importation of live animals from countries of undetermined BSE risk is restricted. Case by case evaluations are possible in order to grant derogations to this restriction under CFIA's Import permitting system.
J. Ruminant-Derived Meat and Bone Meal (or greaves) or any Commodities Containing Such Products
Countries of negligible BSE risk
Certification by the veterinary administration that the country complies with conditions in either Article 11.5.3 of the OIE Terrestrial Animal Health Code 2010; and
In the case of countries of negligible BSE risk where indigenous cases of BSE have occurred, certification by the veterinary administration that these commodities were derived from bovine animals that were born after the date from which the ban on the feeding of ruminant animals with meat and bone meal (or greaves) derived from ruminants was effectively enforced.
Countries of controlled BSE or of undetermined BSE risk
Importation of these commodities from countries of controlled and undetermined BSE risk is restricted. Case by case evaluations are possible in order to grant derogations to this restriction under CFIA's Import permitting system.
K. Gelatin and Collagen Prepared from Bones
•See the Highly Processed Products directive for both the BSE and non-BSE requirements. L. Tallow with Greater than 0.15 Percent Insoluble Impurities in Weight and Tallow Derivatives Made from Such Tallow
•See the Rendered Products and Inedible Products import directive for both BSE and non-BSE requirements. M. Dicalcium Phosphate Containing Protein or Fat
•See the Highly Processed Products directive for both the BSE and non-BSE requirements. The dicalcium phosphate (containing protein or fat) is a by-product of gelatin production, produced according to the conditions for the importation of the commodity gelatin and collagen prepared from bones.
N. Products Produced by Subjecting Bones to Rigorous Processes of Extraction and Purification such as Ossein, Bone Ash, Bone Charcoal and Bone Oil
•See the Highly Processed Products directive for both the BSE and non-BSE requirements. O. Products and By-Products Produced by Rigorous Processes of Extraction and Purification Such as Animal Glue, Oleosterin, Triglycerides, Glycerol, and Sorbitan Esters
•See the Highly Processed Products directive for both the BSE and non-BSE requirements. P. Animal By-Products (bone meal, meat meal, blood meal, organ meats, rendered animal fats, gluestock, meat, inedible meat) as Ingredients Within Commercially Prepared, Finished Pet Food, Pet Treats, and Stuffed Pet Chews
•Refer to the Animal Health Import Requirements for Pet Food, Treats and Chews Containing Animal Products and By-Products. For specific details regarding importation of ingredients for the manufacture of the pet food, please refer to the Rendered Products and Inedible Products import directive for both BSE and non-BSE requirements or to AIRS.
Q. Dried Processed Rawhide, Cattle Ears, Bull Pizzles, Cow Hooves or Tendons as Pet Chews
•Refer to the Animal Health Import Requirements for Pet Food, Treats and Chews Containing Animal Products and By-Products. R. Veterinary Biologics (vaccines, antibody products, and diagnostic test kits) Derived From or Containing Bovine Tissues
Countries of negligible and controlled BSE risk
Certification by the veterinary administration that the country complies with conditions in either Article 11.5.3 of the OIE Terrestrial Animal Health Code 2010 or Article 11.5.4 of the OIE Terrestrial Animal Health Code 2010, as applicable,
As well as the following requirements as they are indicated on the import permit once issued.
Importation of veterinary biologics, or their components, from countries of negligible risk or controlled risk is authorized by issuance of import permits, dependent upon examination and approval of the manufacturer's certification that the products were not prepared from or were not contaminated, at any point during the manufacturing process with: a) distal ileum of all ages of bovine animals, and b) palatine tonsils, the skull including the brain, trigeminal ganglia and eyes, the spinal cord and the vertebral column (excluding the vertebrae of the tail, the transverse processes of the thoracic and lumbar vertebrae, and the wings of the sacrum), from all bovine animals aged 30 months or older.
This is done through facility inspections and examination of manufacturer's documentation and certification for freedom from the above-listed materials. Factors assessed include the following: composition of the product (especially bovine-origin materials); BSE risk status of the country where each of the starting materials and product components were sourced; BSE risk status of the country where the veterinary biologic was manufactured; manufacturing methods; target species and/or potential end uses of the product; and safe handling and disposal of potentially hazardous wastes associated with the imported materials.
Countries of undetermined BSE risk
Importation of veterinary biologics, or their components, from countries of undetermined BSE risk is restricted. Case by case evaluations are possible in order to grant derogations to this restriction under CFIA's Import permitting system.
S. Cell Lines, Culture Media, and Laboratory Reagents Derived From or Containing Bovine Tissues
Countries of negligible, controlled and undetermined BSE risk
Importation of cell lines, culture media and laboratory reagents from countries of negligible, controlled and undetermined BSE risk is authorized by issuance of import permits, dependent upon multiple factors including the intended use and the examination and approval of the manufacturer's certification that the products were not prepared from or were not contaminated at any point during the manufacturing process with: a) distal ileum of all ages of bovine animals; and, b) palatine tonsils, the skull including the brain, trigeminal ganglia and eyes, the spinal cord and the vertebral column (excluding the vertebrae of the tail, the transverse processes of the thoracic and lumbar vertebrae, and the wings of the sacrum), from all bovine animals aged 30 months or older from countries of controlled and undetermined BSE risk.
Importers are advised to reference AIRS for commodity-specific instructions or to contact the CFIA local office (by province) for further information. This policy does not remove any obligation to the Canadian importer to comply with the import requirements of other CFIA programs and/or other government departments.
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1. Report of the North American Chief Veterinary Officers on Harmonization of a BSE Strategy, Meeting of the Senior Health Officials of Mexico, Canada and United States, Mexico, March 17 2005, page 4.
2. Summarized from Health Canada, Fact Sheet: Subsequent Entry Biologics in Canada.
3. Food and Drugs Act, Interpretation, Section 2, "Cosmetic"
4. Food and Drugs Act, Interpretation, Section 2, "Drug"
5. Food and Drugs Act, Interpretation, Section 2, "Device"
6. Food and Drugs Act, Interpretation, Section 2, "Food"
7. Health of Animals Regulations, Part II, Importation of Germplasm and Animals, Definitions, Section 10, "Germplasm"
8. Meat Inspection Regulations, Interpretation, Section 2, "Meat"
9. Meat Inspection Regulations, Interpretation, Section 2, "Meat by-product"
10. Canadian Institute of Health Research, Meeting the Challenge of Prion Diseases: Conference Proceedings and Invitational Research Planning Workshop Report, Appendix VIII Glossary of Terms and Acronyms, Mechanically Recovered Meat.
11. Tallow. (2009). In Encyclopaedia Britannica. Retrieved May 25, 2009.
12. Health of Animals Act, Interpretation, Section 2, "Veterinary biologic"
13. Veterinary Biologics Guideline 3.25E Guideline for Importation of Veterinary Biologics.
14. the distal ileum of bovine animals of all ages; and, the palatine tonsils, the skull including the brain, the trigeminal ganglia and eyes, the spinal cord and the vertebral column (excluding the vertebrae of the tail, the transverse processes of the thoracic and lumbar vertebrae, and the wings of the sacrum) of all bovine animals aged 30 months or older from controlled and undetermined BSE risk countries.
http://www.inspection.gc.ca/english/anima/heasan/pol/ie-2005-9e.shtml
World Organization for Animal Health (OIE) BSE Risk Categorization The international framework for the evaluation of the BSE risk of countries has continuously evolved over the past several years in response to advancements in the understanding of the disease and the demonstrated effectiveness of measures over time.
Initially, in the absence of an agreed international standard and assessment criteria, BSE risk assessments varied by country and were conducted through bilateral and multilateral arrangements. These ranged from the European Union's Geographic Based Risk (commonly referred to as the GBR), to the harmonized questionnaire and shared assessment undertaken by Canada, the United States and Mexico (NAFTA Protocol), to the Australian-New Zealand Food Safety Assessment.
In 1999, the World Organization for Animal Health (referred to by its historical acronym, the OIE), recognized by the World Trade Organization as the international standard setting body for animal health and diseases, developed a five level system that would categorize BSE risk in countries as free, provisionally free, minimum, moderate and high risk.
In 2003, due to advancements in the International Terrestrial Animal Health Code and improved surveillance standards the OIE began developing a revised, simplified categorization system which was more reflective of the science of the day.
Under the previous five level system of categorization, one of the determining factors for categorization of a country had been the number of cases detected within a twelve month period. However it was demonstrated not to be a scientifically sound indicator of a country's true BSE status. For example, the detection of ten cases in a twelve month period where the animals found were all nine years of age or older is not indicative of the BSE status of the country at present but rather is reflective of events some nine to ten years previous due to the long incubation period of the disease.
Furthermore the system, as it was, did not objectively take into account the evolving science with respect to the impact on incubation of the age of animal at exposure or the level of exposure to BSE, nor did the system adequately recognize and reward investments countries had made to effectively mitigate the further spread of the disease.
In May 2005, during the 73rd General Session of the International Committee of the OIE, the member countries formally adopted a simplified 3 tiered categorization system for evaluating the BSE risk.
The revised categorization system was designed to reflect the current knowledge and understanding of BSE and to demonstrate the effectiveness of investments countries have made to mitigate the spread and eventually eradicate the disease. The categories are: Negligible, Controlled and Undetermined risk.
In applications for BSE risk assessment, countries must demonstrate compliance with the following recommended safeguards: BSE surveillance has been conducted in accordance with the OIE's BSE guidelines; an appropriate feed ban is in place; awareness, education and reporting programs exist; diagnostic competency is demonstrated and a risk assessment has been undertaken to guide the design of policies to protect animal and human health.
Under the OIE criteria, a country can be categorized as negligible risk if it can demonstrate compliance with the recommended safeguards and it has either never had a case of BSE in a domestic animal or any infected domestic animals were born more than 11 years ago. Canada was categorized as a controlled risk country because, while it has demonstrated compliance with the recommended safeguards, it has had BSE cases in domestic animals born in the previous 11 years. Countries which are not able to demonstrate they meet, or have not been assessed against, the requirements for negligible risk or controlled risk are placed in the undetermined category.
To determine a country's BSE risk, country submissions and supporting evidence are reviewed by a team of international subject matter experts. Based on their evaluation, a recommendation is made to the Scientific Commission for Animal Diseases. The Commission reviews the recommendation and, if accepted and endorsed, a proposal is made for the country as either a Negligible or Controlled BSE risk. The proposal is then circulated to the Delegates of all OIE member countries. Member countries then have sixty days in which to register an objection in writing with supporting scientific or technical grounds. Official recognition is achieved through adoption of a resolution by the International Committee during the General Session comment.
Countries which have been assessed as negligible or controlled risk must also notify the OIE in writing during the month of November of each year that the epidemiological situation in respect of BSE has remained unchanged and document their the continued observance of OIE standards. Failure to comply provides grounds for the OIE to revoke the given status.
http://www.inspection.gc.ca/english/anima/heasan/disemala/bseesb/oiee.shtml
TERRESTRIAL ANIMAL HEALTH STANDARDS COMMISSION FEBRUARY 2010 REPORT CHAPTER 1.6. STATUS FOR OIE LISTED DISEASES: PROCEDURES FOR SELF DECLARATION AND FOR OFFICIAL RECOGNITION BY THE OIE
Article 1.6.1.
General principles Members may wish to make a self declaration as to the freedom of a country, zone or compartment from an OIE listed disease. The Member may inform the OIE of its claimed status and the OIE may publish the claim. Publication does not imply endorsement of the claim. The OIE does not recognise publish self declaration for bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE), foot and mouth disease (FMD), rinderpest and contagious bovine pleuropneumonia (CBPP). Members may request official recognition by the OIE as to: 1. the risk status of a country or zone with regard to BSE;
http://www.aphis.usda.gov/import_export/animals/oie/downloads/tahc_feb10/tahc_status_oie_list_dis_78_feb10_cmt.pdf
IT was set up to fail.
Please under stand what this says ;
The Member may inform the OIE of its claimed status and the OIE may publish the claim.
and then remember this ;
IN A NUT SHELL ; $$$
(Adopted by the International Committee of the OIE on 23 May 2006)
11. Information published by the OIE is derived from appropriate declarations made by the official Veterinary Services of Member Countries.The OIE is not responsible for inaccurate publication of country disease status based on inaccurate information or changes in epidemiological status or other significant events that were not promptly reported to then Central Bureau............
http://www.oie.int/eng/Session2007/RF2006.pdf
full text ;
http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2007/10/bse-base-mad-cow-testing-texas-usa-and.html
http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/
REPEAL THE B.S.E. MINIMAL RISK REGION (MRR) policy !
THEN, put back in place the B.S.E. G.B.R. Risk Assessments, and enhance them to include all T.S.E. i.e. the atypical strains.
REPEAL THE B.S.E. MINIMAL RISK REGION (MRR) policy !
The BSE MRR policy was shoved down the throat of every country by the O.I.E. and the U.S.D.A..
MOST every one of those Country's came down with BSE.
THE O.I.E. formula to detect B.S.E. is, and has been flawed. It was and is a policy set up for trade, NOT for human and animal health.
The BSE MRR policy made legal what the U.K. did, when the poisoned the globe with BSE. Except BSE has mutated and different strains have evolved, some that are more virulent than the c-BSE, all can transmit to humans (Kong et al 2009), all are in North America.
The BSE MRR policy was ratified while two cases of BSE were sitting on the shelf waiting to be confirmed (one was 7+ months later after an Act of Congress, and the other suspect sample that sat on a shelf for 4 months, which was not preserved correctly, which only IHC could be used, the least likely to detect BSE, was found inconclusive or negative), then the Alabama mad cow was confirmed. AFTER this, the USDA shut the testing program down to levels that would not detect BSE.
Docket APHIS-2006-0026 Docket Title Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Animal Identification and Importation of Commodities Docket Type Rulemaking Document APHIS-2006-0026-0001 Document Title Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Minimal-Risk Regions, Identification of Ruminants and Processing and Importation of Commodities Public Submission APHIS-2006-0026-0012 Public Submission Title Comment from Terry S Singletary
http://www.regulations.gov/fdmspublic/component/main?main=DocumentDetail&o=09000064801e47e1
SEE FULL TEXT ;
http://www.regulations.gov/search/Regs/contentStreamer?objectId=09000064801e47e1&disposition=attachment&contentType=xml
Docket APHIS-2006-0041 Docket Title Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Minimal-Risk Regions; Importation of Live Bovines and Products Derived from Bovines
Commodities Docket Type Rulemaking Document APHIS-2006-0041-0001 Document Title Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Minimal-Risk Regions; Importation of Live Bovines and Products Derived From Bovines Public Submission APHIS-2006-0041-0028 Public Submission Title Comment from Terry S Singletary
Comment 2006-2007 USA AND OIE POISONING GLOBE WITH BSE MRR POLICY
THE USA is in a most unique situation, one of unknown circumstances with human and animal TSE. THE USA has the most documented TSE in different species to date, with substrains growing in those species (BSE/BASE in cattle and CWD in deer and elk, there is evidence here with different strains), and we know that sheep scrapie has over 20 strains of the typical scrapie with atypical scrapie documented and also BSE is very likely to have passed to sheep. all of which have been rendered and fed back to animals for human and animal consumption, a frightening scenario. WE do not know the outcome, and to play with human life around the globe with the very likely TSE tainted products from the USA, in my opinion is like playing Russian roulette, of long duration, with potential long and enduring consequences, of which once done, cannot be undone. These are the facts as I have come to know through daily and extensive research of TSE over 9 years, since 12/14/97. I do not pretend to have all the answers, but i do know to continue to believe in the ukbsenvcjd only theory of transmission to humans of only this one strain from only this one TSE from only this one part of the globe, will only lead to further failures, and needless exposure to humans from all strains of TSE, and possibly many more needless deaths from TSE via a multitude of proven routes and sources via many studies with primates and rodents and other species.
MY personal belief, since you ask, is that not only the Canadian border, but the USA border, and the Mexican border should be sealed up tighter than a drum for exporting there TSE tainted products, until a validated, 100% sensitive test is available, and all animals for human and animal consumption are tested. all we are doing is the exact same thing the UK did with there mad cow poisoning when they exported it all over the globe, all the while knowing what they were doing. this BSE MRR policy is nothing more than a legal tool to do just exactly what the UK did, thanks to the OIE and GW, it's legal now. and they executed Saddam for poisoning ???
go figure. ...
http://www.regulations.gov/fdmspublic/component/main?main=DocumentDetail&o=09000064801f8151
SEE FULL TEXT ;
http://www.regulations.gov/search/Regs/contentStreamer?objectId=09000064801f8152&disposition=attachment&contentType=msw8
WHAT THE USA AND THE OIE DID, was make legal what the U.K. did when they poisoned the globe with mad cow disease. they knew what they were doing, but did it anyway. The BSE GBR risk assessments were put into place so that would never ever happen again. UNTIL they USA finally documented a case. UP until then, the USA would not accept products that may contain BSE from any country. ONCE the USA lost the 'gold card', the shoe was the on the other foot, and they literally left 2 suspect mad cow brain samples sit on a shelf for 7+ months and 4 months respectfully, all the while the BSE MRR policy was being legalized. ONCE made legal, and after an act of Congress, the one suspect Texas mad cow case that had sat up on a shelf for 7+ months was finally confirmed by Weybridge et al in the U.K., and the other, which the sample was not preserved correctly, was found after being a suspect, to be inconclusive and finally they termed it negative. Then the Alabama mad cow was confirmed and they had to shut the program down before they found anymore. ...TSS
SEE FULL TEXT ;
http://usdameatexport.blogspot.com/2010/06/us-denied-upgraded-bse-status-from-oie.html
P.9.21
Molecular characterization of BSE in Canada
Jianmin Yang1, Sandor Dudas2, Catherine Graham2, Markus Czub3, Tim McAllister1, Stefanie Czub1 1Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada Research Centre, Canada; 2National and OIE BSE Reference Laboratory, Canada; 3University of Calgary, Canada
Background: Three BSE types (classical and two atypical) have been identified on the basis of molecular characteristics of the misfolded protein associated with the disease. To date, each of these three types have been detected in Canadian cattle.
Objectives: This study was conducted to further characterize the 16 Canadian BSE cases based on the biochemical properties of there associated PrPres. Methods: Immuno-reactivity, molecular weight, glycoform profiles and relative proteinase K sensitivity of the PrPres from each of the 16 confirmed Canadian BSE cases was determined using modified Western blot analysis.
Results: Fourteen of the 16 Canadian BSE cases were C type, 1 was H type and 1 was L type. The Canadian H and L-type BSE cases exhibited size shifts and changes in glycosylation similar to other atypical BSE cases. PK digestion under mild and stringent conditions revealed a reduced protease resistance of the atypical cases compared to the C-type cases. N terminal- specific antibodies bound to PrPres from H type but not from C or L type. The C-terminal-specific antibodies resulted in a shift in the glycoform profile and detected a fourth band in the Canadian H-type BSE.
Discussion: The C, L and H type BSE cases in Canada exhibit molecular characteristics similar to those described for classical and atypical BSE cases from Europe and Japan. This supports the theory that the importation of BSE contaminated feedstuff is the source of C-type BSE in Canada. It also suggests a similar cause or source for atypical BSE in these countries.
http://www.prion2009.com/sites/default/files/Prion2009_Book_of_Abstracts.pdf
Wednesday, August 11, 2010
REPORT ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE SIXTEENTH CASE OF BOVINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY (BSE) IN CANADA
http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2010/08/report-on-investigation-of-sixteenth.html
Thursday, August 19, 2010
REPORT ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE SEVENTEENTH CASE OF BOVINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY (BSE) IN CANADA
http://bseusa.blogspot.com/2010/08/report-on-investigation-of-seventeenth.html
Thursday, August 19, 2010
SCRAPIE CANADA UPDATE Current as of 2010-07-31 The following table lists sheep flocks and/or goat herds confirmed to be infected with scrapie in Canada in 2010.
Current as of: 2010-07-31
http://nor-98.blogspot.com/2010/08/scrapie-canada-update-current-as-of.html
14th ICID International Scientific Exchange Brochure -
Final Abstract Number: ISE.114
Session: International Scientific Exchange
Transmissible Spongiform encephalopathy (TSE) animal and human TSE in North America
update October 2009
T. Singeltary
Bacliff, TX, USA
Background:
An update on atypical BSE and other TSE in North America. Please remember, the typical U.K. c-BSE, the atypical l-BSE (BASE), and h-BSE have all been documented in North America, along with the typical scrapie's, and atypical Nor-98 Scrapie, and to date, 2 different strains of CWD, and also TME. All these TSE in different species have been rendered and fed to food producing animals for humans and animals in North America (TSE in cats and dogs ?), and that the trading of these TSEs via animals and products via the USA and Canada has been immense over the years, decades.
Methods:
12 years independent research of available data
Results:
I propose that the current diagnostic criteria for human TSEs only enhances and helps the spreading of human TSE from the continued belief of the UKBSEnvCJD only theory in 2009. With all the science to date refuting it, to continue to validate this old myth, will only spread this TSE agent through a multitude of potential routes and sources i.e. consumption, medical i.e., surgical, blood, dental, endoscopy, optical, nutritional supplements, cosmetics etc.
Conclusion:
I would like to submit a review of past CJD surveillance in the USA, and the urgent need to make all human TSE in the USA a reportable disease, in every state, of every age group, and to make this mandatory immediately without further delay. The ramifications of not doing so will only allow this agent to spread further in the medical, dental, surgical arena's. Restricting the reporting of CJD and or any human TSE is NOT scientific. Iatrogenic CJD knows NO age group, TSE knows no boundaries. I propose as with Aguzzi, Asante, Collinge, Caughey, Deslys, Dormont, Gibbs, Gajdusek, Ironside, Manuelidis, Marsh, et al and many more, that the world of TSE Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy is far from an exact science, but there is enough proven science to date that this myth should be put to rest once and for all, and that we move forward with a new classification for human and animal TSE that would properly identify the infected species, the source species, and then the route.
http://ww2.isid.org/Downloads/14th_ICID_ISE_Abstracts.pdf
Wednesday, March 31, 2010
Atypical BSE in Cattle
http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2010/03/atypical-bse-in-cattle-position-post.html
This new prionopathy in humans? the genetic makeup is IDENTICAL to the g-h-BSEalabama mad cow, the only _documented_ mad cow in the world to date like this, ......wait, it get's better. this new prionpathy is killing young and old humans, with LONG DURATION from onset of symptoms to death, and the symptoms are very similar to nvCJD victims, OH, and the plaques are very similar in some cases too, bbbut, it's not related to the g-h-BSEalabama cow, WAIT NOW, it gets even better, the new human prionpathy that they claim is a genetic TSE, has no relation to any gene mutation in that family. daaa, ya think it could be related to that mad cow with the same genetic make-up ??? there were literally tons and tons of banned mad cow protein in Alabama in commerce, and none of it transmitted to cows, and the cows to humans there from ??? r i g h t $$$
g-h-BSE-alabama E211K mad cows USA how many would that be annually ???
if our ciphering is correct (?), that would be about 35 g-h-BSE-alabama E211K mad cows going into the food chain a year.
an incidence of less than 1 in 2000.
let's see, that's 500 such per million.
or 50,000 cows per 100 million (US herd size).
even at less than 1 in a million, with 35 million slaughtered, that's 35 infected cows going into the food chain each year.
hmmm, friendly fire there from ???
ALABAMA MAD COW g-h-BSEalabama
In this study, we identified a novel mutation in the bovine prion protein gene (Prnp), called E211K, of a confirmed BSE positive cow from Alabama, United States of America. This mutation is identical to the E200K pathogenic mutation found in humans with a genetic form of CJD. This finding represents the first report of a confirmed case of BSE with a potential pathogenic mutation within the bovine Prnp gene. We hypothesize that the bovine Prnp E211K mutation most likely has caused BSE in "the approximately 10-year-old cow" carrying the E221K mutation.
http://www.plospathogens.org/article/info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.ppat.1000156
http://www.plospathogens.org/article/fetchObjectAttachment.action?uri=info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.ppat.1000156&representation=PDF
Saturday, August 14, 2010
BSE Case Associated with Prion Protein Gene Mutation (g-h-BSEalabama) and VPSPr PRIONPATHY (see mad cow feed in COMMERCE IN ALABAMA...TSS)
http://prionpathy.blogspot.com/2010/08/bse-case-associated-with-prion-protein.html
Monday, August 9, 2010
Variably protease-sensitive prionopathy: A new sporadic disease of the prion protein or just more PRIONBALONEY ?
http://prionunitusaupdate2008.blogspot.com/2010/08/variably-protease-sensitive-prionopathy.html
International Society for Infectious Diseases Web: http://www.isid.org
I ask Professor Kong ;
Thursday, December 04, 2008 3:37 PM Subject: RE: re--Chronic Wating Disease (CWD) and Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathies (BSE): Public Health Risk Assessment
''IS the h-BSE more virulent than typical BSE as well, or the same as cBSE, or less virulent than cBSE? just curious.....''
Professor Kong reply ;
.....snip
''As to the H-BSE, we do not have sufficient data to say one way or another, but we have found that H-BSE can infect humans. I hope we could publish these data once the study is complete.
Thanks for your interest.''
Best regards,
Qingzhong Kong, PhD Associate Professor Department of Pathology Case Western Reserve University Cleveland, OH 44106 USA
END...TSS
P.4.23
Transmission of atypical BSE in humanized mouse models
Liuting Qing1, Wenquan Zou1, Cristina Casalone2, Martin Groschup3, Miroslaw Polak4, Maria Caramelli2, Pierluigi Gambetti1, Juergen Richt5, Qingzhong Kong1 1Case Western Reserve University, USA; 2Instituto Zooprofilattico Sperimentale, Italy; 3Friedrich-Loeffler-Institut, Germany; 4National Veterinary Research Institute, Poland; 5Kansas State University (Previously at USDA National Animal Disease Center), USA
Background: Classical BSE is a world-wide prion disease in cattle, and the classical BSE strain (BSE-C) has led to over 200 cases of clinical human infection (variant CJD). Atypical BSE cases have been discovered in three continents since 2004; they include the L-type (also named BASE), the H-type, and the first reported case of naturally occurring BSE with mutated bovine PRNP (termed BSE-M). The public health risks posed by atypical BSE were largely undefined.
Objectives: To investigate these atypical BSE types in terms of their transmissibility and phenotypes in humanized mice. Methods: Transgenic mice expressing human PrP were inoculated with several classical (C-type) and atypical (L-, H-, or Mtype) BSE isolates, and the transmission rate, incubation time, characteristics and distribution of PrPSc, symptoms, and histopathology were or will be examined and compared.
Results: Sixty percent of BASE-inoculated humanized mice became infected with minimal spongiosis and an average incubation time of 20-22 months, whereas only one of the C-type BSE-inoculated mice developed prion disease after more than 2 years. Protease-resistant PrPSc in BASE-infected humanized Tg mouse brains was biochemically different from bovine BASE or sCJD. PrPSc was also detected in the spleen of 22% of BASE-infected humanized mice, but not in those infected with sCJD. Secondary transmission of BASE in the humanized mice led to a small reduction in incubation time.
The atypical BSE-H strain is also transmissible with distinct phenotypes in the humanized mice, but no BSE-M transmission has been observed so far.
Discussion: Our results demonstrate that BASE is more virulent than classical BSE, has a lymphotropic phenotype, and displays a modest transmission barrier in our humanized mice.
BSE-H is also transmissible in our humanized Tg mice.
The possibility of more than two atypical BSE strains will be discussed.
Supported by NINDS NS052319, NIA AG14359, and NIH AI 77774.
http://www.prion2009.com/sites/default/files/Prion2009_Book_of_Abstracts.pdf
P02.35
Molecular Features of the Protease-resistant Prion Protein (PrPres) in H-type BSE
Biacabe, A-G1; Jacobs, JG2; Gavier-Widén, D3; Vulin, J1; Langeveld, JPM2; Baron, TGM1 1AFSSA, France; 2CIDC-Lelystad, Netherlands; 3SVA, Sweden
Western blot analyses of PrPres accumulating in the brain of BSE-infected cattle have demonstrated 3 different molecular phenotypes regarding to the apparent molecular masses and glycoform ratios of PrPres bands. We initially described isolates (H-type BSE) essentially characterized by higher PrPres molecular mass and decreased levels of the diglycosylated PrPres band, in contrast to the classical type of BSE. This type is also distinct from another BSE phenotype named L-type BSE, or also BASE (for Bovine Amyloid Spongiform Encephalopathy), mainly characterized by a low representation of the diglycosylated PrPres band as well as a lower PrPres molecular mass. Retrospective molecular studies in France of all available BSE cases older than 8 years old and of part of the other cases identified since the beginning of the exhaustive surveillance of the disease in 20001 allowed to identify 7 H-type BSE cases, among 594 BSE cases that could be classified as classical, L- or H-type BSE. By Western blot analysis of H-type PrPres, we described a remarkable specific feature with antibodies raised against the C-terminal region of PrP that demonstrated the existence of a more C-terminal cleaved form of PrPres (named PrPres#2 ), in addition to the usual PrPres form (PrPres #1). In the unglycosylated form, PrPres #2 migrates at about 14 kDa, compared to 20 kDa for PrPres #1. The proportion of the PrPres#2 in cattle seems to by higher compared to the PrPres#1. Furthermore another PK-resistant fragment at about 7 kDa was detected by some more N-terminal antibodies and presumed to be the result of cleavages of both N- and C-terminal parts of PrP. These singular features were maintained after transmission of the disease to C57Bl/6 mice. The identification of these two additional PrPres fragments (PrPres #2 and 7kDa band) reminds features reported respectively in sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease and in Gerstmann-Sträussler-Scheinker (GSS) syndrome in humans.
http://www.neuroprion.com/pdf_docs/conferences/prion2007/abstract_book.pdf
Monday, August 30, 2010
Examination of the Offspring of a Japanese Cow Affected with L-Type Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy
http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2010/08/examination-of-offspring-of-japanese.html
Friday, August 27, 2010
NEW ATYPICAL NOR-98 SCRAPIE CASE DETECTED IDAHO NOW 5 CASES DOCUMENTED 2010
http://nor-98.blogspot.com/2010/08/new-atypical-nor-98-scrapie-case.html
Tuesday, July 13, 2010
(SEE BEEF PRODUCTS EXPORTED TO AUSTRALIA FROM USA...TSS)
AUSTRALIAN QUESTIONNAIRE TO ASSESS BSE RISK (OIE) Terrestrial Animal Health Code, 2009 and USA export risk factor for BSE to Australia
http://usdameatexport.blogspot.com/2010/07/australian-questionnaire-to-assess-bse.html
Saturday, August 14, 2010
USA NON-SPECIES CODING SYSTEM (BEEF IMPORT EXPORT BSE RISK THERE FROM)
US denies it's illegally sending beef to Australia ?
Friday, 13/08/2010
http://usdameatexport.blogspot.com/2010/08/usa-non-species-coding-system-beef.html
Saturday, June 19, 2010
U.S. DENIED UPGRADED BSE STATUS FROM OIE
http://usdameatexport.blogspot.com/2010/06/us-denied-upgraded-bse-status-from-oie.html
Sunday, August 15, 2010
ATYPICAL BSE NOW LINKED TO CAUSING SPORADIC CJD OVERSEAS Commonwealth of Australia
http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2010/08/atypical-bse-now-linked-to-causing.html
FRIENDLY FIRE FROM ALL OF THE ABOVE ;
Wednesday, August 18, 2010
Incidence of CJD Deaths Reported by CJD-SS in Canada as of July 31, 2010
http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2010/08/incidence-of-cjd-deaths-reported-by-cjd.html
Monday, August 9, 2010
National Prion Disease Pathology Surveillance Center Cases Examined (July 31, 2010)
(please watch and listen to the video and the scientist speaking about atypical BSE and sporadic CJD and listen to Professor Aguzzi)
http://prionunitusaupdate2008.blogspot.com/2010/08/national-prion-disease-pathology.html
Thursday, August 12, 2010
USA Blood products, collected from a donor who was at risk for vCJD, were distributed July-August 2010
http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2010/08/usa-blood-products-collected-from-donor.html
Saturday, June 12, 2010
PUBLICATION REQUEST AND FOIA REQUEST Project Number: 3625-32000-086-05 Study of Atypical Bse
http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2010/06/publication-request-and-foia-request.html
Archive Number 20100405.1091 Published Date 05-APR-2010
Subject PRO/AH/EDR> Prion disease update 1010 (04)
snip...
[Terry S. Singeltary Sr. has added the following comment:
"According to the World Health Organisation, the future public health threat of vCJD in the UK and Europe and potentially the rest of the world is of concern and currently unquantifiable. However, the possibility of a significant and geographically diverse vCJD epidemic occurring over the next few decades cannot be dismissed.
The key word here is diverse. What does diverse mean? If USA scrapie transmitted to USA bovine does not produce pathology as the UK c-BSE, then why would CJD from there look like UK vCJD?"
http://www.promedmail.org/pls/apex/f?p=2400:1001:568933508083034::NO::F2400_P1001_BACK_PAGE,F2400_P1001_PUB_MAIL_ID:1000,82101
Up until about 6 years ago, the pt worked at Tyson foods where she
worked on the assembly line, slaughtering cattle and preparing them for
packaging. She was exposed to brain and spinal cord matter when she
would euthanize the cattle.
http://www.recordandoalinda.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=19:cjd-english-info&catid=9:cjd-ingles&Itemid=8
CJD TEXAS 38 YEAR OLD FEMALE WORKED SLAUGHTERING CATTLE EXPOSED TO BRAIN AND SPINAL CORD MATTER
http://cjdtexas.blogspot.com/2010/03/cjd-texas-38-year-old-female-worked.html
Monday, April 5, 2010
UPDATE - CJD TEXAS 38 YEAR OLD FEMALE WORKED SLAUGHTERING CATTLE EXPOSED TO BRAIN AND SPINAL CORD MATTER
http://prionunitusaupdate2008.blogspot.com/2010/04/update-cjd-texas-38-year-old-female.html
Tuesday, June 1, 2010
USA cases of dpCJD rising with 24 cases so far in 2010
http://cjdtexas.blogspot.com/2010/06/usa-cases-of-dpcjd-rising-with-24-cases.html
Sunday, July 11, 2010
CJD or prion disease 2 CASES McLennan County Texas population 230,213 both cases in their 40s
http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2010/07/cjd-2-cases-mclennan-county-texas.html
Friday, February 05, 2010
New Variant Creutzfelt Jakob Disease case reports United States 2010 A Review
http://vcjd.blogspot.com/2010/02/new-variant-creutzfelt-jakob-disease.html
Manuscript Draft Manuscript Number: Title: HUMAN and ANIMAL TSE Classifications i.e. mad cow disease and the UKBSEnvCJD only theory Article Type: Personal View Corresponding Author: Mr. Terry S. Singeltary, Corresponding Author's Institution: na First Author: Terry S Singeltary, none Order of Authors: Terry S Singeltary, none; Terry S. Singeltary
Abstract: TSEs have been rampant in the USA for decades in many species, and they all have been rendered and fed back to animals for human/animal consumption. I propose that the current diagnostic criteria for human TSEs only enhances and helps the spreading of human TSE from the continued belief of the UKBSEnvCJD only theory in 2007.
http://www.regulations.gov/fdmspublic/ContentViewer?objectId=090000648027c28e&disposition=attachment&contentType=pdf
Saturday, June 13, 2009
Monitoring the occurrence of emerging forms of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease in the United States 2003 revisited 2009
http://cjdusa.blogspot.com/2009/06/monitoring-occurrence-of-emerging-forms.html
Saturday, January 2, 2010
Human Prion Diseases in the United States January 1, 2010 ***FINAL***
http://prionunitusaupdate2008.blogspot.com/2010/01/human-prion-diseases-in-united-states.html
my comments to PLosone here ;
http://www.plosone.org/annotation/listThread.action?inReplyTo=info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fannotation%2F04ce2b24-613d-46e6-9802-4131e2bfa6fd&root=info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fannotation%2F04ce2b24-613d-46e6-9802-4131e2bfa6fd
HOW many of you recieved a written CJD Questionnaire asking real questions pertaining to route and source (and there are many here in North America) ?
IS every case getting a cjd questionnaire asking real questions ???
Friday, November 30, 2007
CJD QUESTIONNAIRE USA CWRU AND CJD FOUNDATION USA PRION UNIT
http://cjdquestionnaire.blogspot.com/
Tuesday, July 27, 2010
Spontaneous generation of mammalian prions
http://madcowspontaneousnot.blogspot.com/2010/07/spontaneous-generation-of-mammalian.html
Sunday, August 29, 2010
Prion Disease Round Table Conducted Wednesday December 11, 2003 at Denver, Colorado R-CALF-USA Sponsored (REVISITED AUGUST 2010)
From: Terry S. Singeltary Sr.
Sent: Sunday, August 29, 2010 11:49 AM
Subject: Prion Disease Round Table Conducted Wednesday December 11, 2003 at Denver, Colorado R-CALF-USA Sponsored (REVISITED AUGUST 2010)
Greetings,
Below is the full text (unedited version) of the Prion Round Table Conducted Wednesday December 11, 2003 at Denver, Colorado R-CALF-USA Sponsored (REVISITED AUGUST 2010 by me). Periodically, I will comment on science that has changed since this Prion Round Table, and will reference the update scientific data. So the full text of the 2003 PRION ROUND TABLE IS HERE, but is broke up intermittently with my comments and updated scientific facts. It is interested for sure, to see the thought process in 2003 by the Government and the Industry, and compare to today. The ever emerging TSE science is changing, mutating and becoming more virulent, but sadly, the SSS policy is still going strong in the USA. OF course, Canada is finding cases, they are the only ones searching for cases in North America. Ramifications from all this, human TSE i.e. CJD and the new prionopathy there from is on the rise. ...TSS
Prion Disease Round Table Conducted Wednesday December 11, 2003 at Denver, Colorado R-CALF-USA Sponsored (REVISITED AUGUST 2010)
R-CALF-USA Sponsored Prion Disease Round Table Conducted Wednesday December 11, 2003 at Denver, Colorado
On Thursday, December 11, 2003, R-CALF-USA and a number of its affiliate cattle organizations sponsored a Prion Disease Roundtable in Denver, Colorado. Dr. R. M. Thornsberry, President of the Missouri Stockgrower’s Association was commissioned by R-CALF President Leo McDonnel to organize the roundtable and invite prion specialists to present information at the roundtable that would benefit the education of livestock producers throughout the United States.
Dr. Stanley Prusiner, the scientist who discovered prions, for which he won the Nobel Prize in medicine, was invited to the roundtable. Notes from Dr. Prusiner’s presentation on prions and prion diseases were presented to the roundtable by Dr. Thornsberry, who had attended one of Dr. Prusiner’s lectures on prion diseases. Although unable to attend the roundtable, Dr. Prusiner provided the roundtable with five papers published in prestigious peer reviewed medical and science journals. These papers were provided to all the attendees and key points from these papers were discussed at the beginning of the roundtable discussion. Dr. Prusiner emphasized normal cooking temperatures do not inactivate prions. This point is especially important when humans are exposed to Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) prions in the normal process of consuming beef muscle cuts that may contain significant nerve tissue. Dr. Prusiner’s laboratory is currently developing a live animal test to determine whether or not an animal is carrying BSE prions prior to entering the food chain for human consumption.
Dr. Jason Bartz, an applied science researcher from Creighton University, Omaha, Nebraska, was the second presenter at the roundtable. Dr. Bartz presented current research data on prion diseases and particularly outlined the pathogenesis of prion diseases. Dr. Bartz presented data that defined the ability of prions to replicate in secondary lymphoreticular system tissues, and the ability of prions to travel throughout the nervous system, finally locating within the brain or brain stem tissues where pathological changes occur. Dr. Bartz also presented data to illustrate the severity of prion disease appears to increase as the disease is passed from animal to animal. Dr. Bartz presented data to illustrate the infectivity and persistency of prions. Prions in brain tissue were heated to 600 degrees Celsius--that is over 1200 degrees Fahrenheit--and injected into brain tissue. These heat treated prions were still capable of causing prion disease changes. In other words, there is no commonly utilized method with which to inactivate prions on surgical instruments, surfaces, pens, corrals, chutes, ground, etc. Dr. Bartz also presented data that indicates tongue lesions or sores provide the mechanism for prions to enter brain tissue through the nerve that supplies the muscle tissue of an animal’s tongue. ...snip...end...(TSS/2010)
Completely Edited Version
PRION ROUNDTABLE
snip...see full text ;
http://bseusa.blogspot.com/2010/08/prion-disease-round-table-conducted.html
TSS
Monday, August 30, 2010
Saturday, July 17, 2010
Methods for the detection of central nervous tissue (CNT) are urgently needed in food control due to TSE prion disease
GC/MS detection of central nervous tissue as specified BSE risk material in meat products and meat and bone meals: thermal stability of markers in comparison with immunochemistry and RT-PCR
Journal Analytical and Bioanalytical Chemistry
Publisher Springer Berlin / Heidelberg
ISSN 1618-2642 (Print) 1618-2650 (Online)
Category Original Paper
DOI 10.1007/s00216-010-3956-5
Subject Collection Chemistry and Materials Science
SpringerLink Date Tuesday, July 13, 2010
Ernst Lücker1 , Wolfgang Biedermann1, Thomas Alter2 and Andreas Hensel3
(1) Institut für Lebensmittelhygiene, Universität Leipzig, An den Tierkliniken 1, 04103 Leipzig, Germany (2) Institut für Lebensmittelhygiene, Freie Universität Berlin, Königsweg 69, 14163 Berlin, Germany (3) Bundesinstitut für Risikobewertung, P. O. Box 330013, 14191 Berlin, Germany
Received: 10 May 2010 Revised: 18 June 2010 Accepted: 20 June 2010 Published online: 13 July 2010
Abstract
Methods for the detection of central nervous tissue (CNT) are urgently needed in food control as a means for controlling strict adherence to both food labeling and banning of specified BSE risk material. Here, we report data on heat stability of the CNT markers neuron-specific enolase (NSE) in western blotting, glial fibrillary acidic protein (GFAP) in an enzyme linked immunoassay, mRNAGFAP in a real-time PCR assay, and several fatty acids (C22:6, C24:0-OH, C24:1?9/?7, C24:1?9-OH/?7-OH, and C24:0) in gas chromatography mass spectrometry (GC/MS). The sample matrix, a standard material of emulsion-type sausage with varied contents of CNT (brain), was heat-treated in three studies: (1) routine meat technological heat treatment with low (85 °C, 30 min), medium (115 °C, 30 min), and high (133 °C, 30 min, 3 bar) heating of 72 anonymous samples from a blind trial; (2) heat treatment under experimental conditions (100, 110, …, 200 °C, 45 min); and (3) fractionized heating of central nervous system (up to three times) under moderate routine technological conditions (85, 100, and 115 °C, 30 min). The markers of the immunochemical methods showed a low GFAP or very low NSE temperature stability at medium and high temperature conditions. The real-time PCR assay gave inconsistent, non-quantitative results, which indicated an uncontrollable matrix effect. The relevant GC/MS markers (C24:0-OH, C24:1?9/?7, and C24:1?9-OH/?7-OH) proved to be extremely stable. Neither meat and bone meal conditions (133 °C) nor experimental heating (up to and above 140 °C) showed any reduction of GC/MS CNT quantification. On the contrary, a slight but significant increase was noted over a certain temperature range (120–140 °C) for most fatty acids, possibly due to an improved extractability of the fatty acids. We conclude that a quantitative approach is highly unreliable when using immunochemical methods; moreover, these methods might be basically prone to false-negative results depending on heat treatment and matrix composition. Therefore, antibodies with higher affinity to heat-treated CNT marker epitopes are needed. Relevant amounts of CNT (=0.5%) in low- and medium-heated products would still be reliably detectable by the GFAP ELISA, which justifies its use as a screening method in official food control. The results obtained by the real-time PCR assay were contradictory to recently published data, indicating a need for further protocol optimization and collaborative trials. Up to date, the analytical approach using GC/MS is the only valid procedure as pertaining to heat stability and quantitative analysis; consequently, it should be recommended as the reference procedure in official food control for CNT detection in heat-treated meat products.
Figure The introduction of central nervous tissue from bovines into the food chain probably caused a new variant of Creutzfeldt-Jacob disease in humans. Analytical control of meat products by immunochemical CNT detection can be hindered by so far unknown severe heat induced losses. In contrast the CNT-specific fatty acids detected by GC/MS turned out to be remarkably stable up to temperatures of 160 °C
Keywords Bovine spongiform encephalopathy - Central nervous tissue - Specified risk material - GC/MS - ELISA - Western blot - RT-PCR - Fatty acids - NSE - GFAP
http://www.springerlink.com/content/m815t21870123200/
Monday, July 05, 2010
Immunohistochemical Detection of Disease-Associated Prion Protein in the Intestine of Cattle Naturally Affected with Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy
http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2010/07/immunohistochemical-detection-of.html
Thursday, June 24, 2010
Accumulation of L-type Bovine Prions in Peripheral Nerve Tissues
Volume 16, Number 7–July 2010
http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2010/06/accumulation-of-l-type-bovine-prions-in.html
Thursday, July 15, 2010
Effect of autolysis on the specificity of bovine spongiform encephalopathy rapid tests
http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2010/07/effect-of-autolysis-on-specificity-of.html
Saturday, June 19, 2010
U.S. DENIED UPGRADED BSE STATUS FROM OIE
see full text and reasons why here ;
http://usdameatexport.blogspot.com/2010/06/us-denied-upgraded-bse-status-from-oie.html
Saturday, July 17, 2010
TSE Road map 2 A Strategy paper on TSE, a road to no where
Brussels, 16.7.2010 COM(2010)384 final COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL
http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2010/07/tse-road-map-2-strategy-paper-on-tse.html
Saturday, July 17, 2010
Variant Creutzfeldt–Jakob disease Ironside JW., Haemophilia. 2010 Jul;16 Suppl 5:175-80
REVIEW ARTICLE
http://vcjdtransfusion.blogspot.com/2010/07/variant-creutzfeldtjakob-disease.html
TSS
Journal Analytical and Bioanalytical Chemistry
Publisher Springer Berlin / Heidelberg
ISSN 1618-2642 (Print) 1618-2650 (Online)
Category Original Paper
DOI 10.1007/s00216-010-3956-5
Subject Collection Chemistry and Materials Science
SpringerLink Date Tuesday, July 13, 2010
Ernst Lücker1 , Wolfgang Biedermann1, Thomas Alter2 and Andreas Hensel3
(1) Institut für Lebensmittelhygiene, Universität Leipzig, An den Tierkliniken 1, 04103 Leipzig, Germany (2) Institut für Lebensmittelhygiene, Freie Universität Berlin, Königsweg 69, 14163 Berlin, Germany (3) Bundesinstitut für Risikobewertung, P. O. Box 330013, 14191 Berlin, Germany
Received: 10 May 2010 Revised: 18 June 2010 Accepted: 20 June 2010 Published online: 13 July 2010
Abstract
Methods for the detection of central nervous tissue (CNT) are urgently needed in food control as a means for controlling strict adherence to both food labeling and banning of specified BSE risk material. Here, we report data on heat stability of the CNT markers neuron-specific enolase (NSE) in western blotting, glial fibrillary acidic protein (GFAP) in an enzyme linked immunoassay, mRNAGFAP in a real-time PCR assay, and several fatty acids (C22:6, C24:0-OH, C24:1?9/?7, C24:1?9-OH/?7-OH, and C24:0) in gas chromatography mass spectrometry (GC/MS). The sample matrix, a standard material of emulsion-type sausage with varied contents of CNT (brain), was heat-treated in three studies: (1) routine meat technological heat treatment with low (85 °C, 30 min), medium (115 °C, 30 min), and high (133 °C, 30 min, 3 bar) heating of 72 anonymous samples from a blind trial; (2) heat treatment under experimental conditions (100, 110, …, 200 °C, 45 min); and (3) fractionized heating of central nervous system (up to three times) under moderate routine technological conditions (85, 100, and 115 °C, 30 min). The markers of the immunochemical methods showed a low GFAP or very low NSE temperature stability at medium and high temperature conditions. The real-time PCR assay gave inconsistent, non-quantitative results, which indicated an uncontrollable matrix effect. The relevant GC/MS markers (C24:0-OH, C24:1?9/?7, and C24:1?9-OH/?7-OH) proved to be extremely stable. Neither meat and bone meal conditions (133 °C) nor experimental heating (up to and above 140 °C) showed any reduction of GC/MS CNT quantification. On the contrary, a slight but significant increase was noted over a certain temperature range (120–140 °C) for most fatty acids, possibly due to an improved extractability of the fatty acids. We conclude that a quantitative approach is highly unreliable when using immunochemical methods; moreover, these methods might be basically prone to false-negative results depending on heat treatment and matrix composition. Therefore, antibodies with higher affinity to heat-treated CNT marker epitopes are needed. Relevant amounts of CNT (=0.5%) in low- and medium-heated products would still be reliably detectable by the GFAP ELISA, which justifies its use as a screening method in official food control. The results obtained by the real-time PCR assay were contradictory to recently published data, indicating a need for further protocol optimization and collaborative trials. Up to date, the analytical approach using GC/MS is the only valid procedure as pertaining to heat stability and quantitative analysis; consequently, it should be recommended as the reference procedure in official food control for CNT detection in heat-treated meat products.
Figure The introduction of central nervous tissue from bovines into the food chain probably caused a new variant of Creutzfeldt-Jacob disease in humans. Analytical control of meat products by immunochemical CNT detection can be hindered by so far unknown severe heat induced losses. In contrast the CNT-specific fatty acids detected by GC/MS turned out to be remarkably stable up to temperatures of 160 °C
Keywords Bovine spongiform encephalopathy - Central nervous tissue - Specified risk material - GC/MS - ELISA - Western blot - RT-PCR - Fatty acids - NSE - GFAP
http://www.springerlink.com/content/m815t21870123200/
Monday, July 05, 2010
Immunohistochemical Detection of Disease-Associated Prion Protein in the Intestine of Cattle Naturally Affected with Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy
http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2010/07/immunohistochemical-detection-of.html
Thursday, June 24, 2010
Accumulation of L-type Bovine Prions in Peripheral Nerve Tissues
Volume 16, Number 7–July 2010
http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2010/06/accumulation-of-l-type-bovine-prions-in.html
Thursday, July 15, 2010
Effect of autolysis on the specificity of bovine spongiform encephalopathy rapid tests
http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2010/07/effect-of-autolysis-on-specificity-of.html
Saturday, June 19, 2010
U.S. DENIED UPGRADED BSE STATUS FROM OIE
see full text and reasons why here ;
http://usdameatexport.blogspot.com/2010/06/us-denied-upgraded-bse-status-from-oie.html
Saturday, July 17, 2010
TSE Road map 2 A Strategy paper on TSE, a road to no where
Brussels, 16.7.2010 COM(2010)384 final COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL
http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2010/07/tse-road-map-2-strategy-paper-on-tse.html
Saturday, July 17, 2010
Variant Creutzfeldt–Jakob disease Ironside JW., Haemophilia. 2010 Jul;16 Suppl 5:175-80
REVIEW ARTICLE
http://vcjdtransfusion.blogspot.com/2010/07/variant-creutzfeldtjakob-disease.html
TSS
Thursday, July 15, 2010
Effect of autolysis on the specificity of bovine spongiform encephalopathy rapid tests
Effect of autolysis on the specificity of bovine spongiform encephalopathy rapid tests
Daniela Meloni*, Katia Varello, Marzia Pezzolato, Elsa Manzardo, Maria C. Cavarretta, Francesco Ingravalle, Maria Caramelli, Elena Bozzetta National Reference Laboratory for Animal Encephalopathies, Istituto Zooprofilattico Sperimentale del Piemonte Liguria e Valle d’Aosta, Turin, Italy. *Corresponding author Email addresses: DM: daniela.meloni@izsto.it KV: katia.varello@izsto.it MP: marzia.pezzolato@izsto.it EM: elsa.manzardo@izsto.it MCC: test.rapidi@izsto.it FI: francesco.ingravalle@izsto.it MC: maria.caramelli@izsto.it EB: elena.bozzetta@izsto.it
Abstract
Background: Routine rapid testing for Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) has highlighted some problems with BSE rapid test performance, the most significant being the number of initially reactive samples and the false positive results on autolyzed tissue. This point is important for BSE active surveillance in risk populations, because tissue autolysis is often unavoidable in routine cases. A robust test suitable for use on field material is therefore needed. To date, very limited information regarding the effect of autolysis on the robustness of rapid tests has been documented; therefore, the National Reference Centre for Animal Encephalopathies (CEA) rapid test laboratory selected 450 autolyzed and negative brain stem samples from fallen stock bovines older than 24 months to assess the specificity of four tests approved for BSE active surveillance: Biorad TeSeE, Enfer TSE version 2.0, Prionics® Check LIA, and IDEXX Herd Check BSE Antigen Kit EIA. The samples were graded according to the degree of autolysis and then dissected into five portions, four of which randomly assigned to processing by rapid tests and one to be available for confirmatory Western blot analysis. Findings: the specificity of the four systems was 100% for all three grades of autolysis, while the percentage of initially reactive results was 0.00 (95%CI 0.00-0.82), 0.22 (95%CI 0.006-1.23), 0.44 (95%CI 0.05-1.60), and 0.89 (95%CI 0.24-2.26) for the Biorad TeSeE, the Prionics® Check LIA, the IDEXX Herd Check BSE and the Enfer TSE tests, respectively. No association with degree of autolysis could be drawn. Conclusions: the present study demonstrates that the four rapid tests can be considered wellrunning diagnostic tools regardless of tissue quality; nevertheless, the number of initial reactive samples reported for some systems must not be underestimated in routine testing. Furthermore the compliance with the reported performance can be guaranteed only when an ongoing high careful batch quality control system is in place.
http://www.biomedcentral.com/content/pdf/1756-0500-3-193.pdf
Here in the USA, the USDA et al likes to take samples of suspect BSE mad cows that are either perfectly healthy cows, OR, they let the suspect samples sit, and deteriorate, until valid testing on that tissue sample is impossible. Seems that is the only way they can keep their 'gold card'. ...TSS
"I would note that the sample was taken in April, at which time the protocols allowed for a preservative to be used. The sample was not submitted to us until last week because the veterinarian set aside the sample after preserving it and simply forgot to send it in.
http://www.usda.gov/wps/portal/usdahome?contentidonly=true&contentid=2005/07/0280.xml
Executive Summary
In June 2005, an inconclusive bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) sample from November 2004, that had originally been classified as negative on the immunohistochemistry test, was confirmed positive on SAF immunoblot (Western blot). The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) identified the herd of origin for the index cow in Texas; that identification was confirmed by DNA analysis. USDA, in close cooperation with the Texas Animal Health Commission (TAHC), established an incident command post (ICP) and began response activities according to USDA’s BSE Response Plan of September 2004. Response personnel removed at-risk cattle and cattle of interest (COI) from the index herd, euthanized them, and tested them for BSE; all were negative. USDA and the State extensively traced all at-risk cattle and COI that left the index herd. The majority of these animals entered rendering and/or slaughter channels well before the investigation began. USDA’s response to the Texas finding was thorough and effective.
http://www.aphis.usda.gov/lpa/issues/bse/epi-updates/bse_final_epidemiology_report.pdf
Report on Food & Drug Administration Dallas District Investigation of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Event in Texas 2005
Executive Summary:
On June 24, 2005, USDA informed FDA that a cow in Texas tested positive for Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE). Information provided by APHIS was that the BSE positive cow was born and raised in a herd in Texas and was approximately 12 years old. The animal was sampled for BSE at a pet food plant in Texas on November 15, 2004, as part of USDA’s enhanced surveillance program.
http://www.fda.gov/cvm/texasfeedrpt.htm
Texas even had a 'secret' test that showed that mad cow positive;
experimental IHC test results, because the test was
not a validated procedure, and because the two
approved IHC tests came back negative, the results
were not considered to be of regulatory significance
and therefore were not reported beyond the
laboratory.
• A Western blot test conducted the week of
June 5, 2005, returned positive for BSE.
http://www.usda.gov/documents/vs_bse_ihctestvar.pdf
48 hr BSE confirmation turnaround took 7+ months to confirm this case, so the BSE MRR policy could be put into place. ...TSS
THIS highly suspect stumbling and staggering Texas Mad Cow got not test at all, went straight to render ;
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE Statement May 4, 2004 Media Inquiries: 301-827-6242 Consumer Inquiries: 888-INFO-FDA
Statement on Texas Cow With Central Nervous System Symptoms On Friday, April 30 th , the Food and Drug Administration learned that a cow with central nervous system symptoms had been killed and shipped to a processor for rendering into animal protein for use in animal feed.
FDA, which is responsible for the safety of animal feed, immediately began an investigation. On Friday and throughout the weekend, FDA investigators inspected the slaughterhouse, the rendering facility, the farm where the animal came from, and the processor that initially received the cow from the slaughterhouse.
FDA's investigation showed that the animal in question had already been rendered into "meat and bone meal" (a type of protein animal feed). Over the weekend FDA was able to track down all the implicated material. That material is being held by the firm, which is cooperating fully with FDA.
Cattle with central nervous system symptoms are of particular interest because cattle with bovine spongiform encephalopathy or BSE, also known as "mad cow disease," can exhibit such symptoms. In this case, there is no way now to test for BSE. But even if the cow had BSE, FDA's animal feed rule would prohibit the feeding of its rendered protein to other ruminant animals (e.g., cows, goats, sheep, bison).
FDA is sending a letter to the firm summarizing its findings and informing the firm that FDA will not object to use of this material in swine feed only. If it is not used in swine feed, this material will be destroyed. Pigs have been shown not to be susceptible to BSE. If the firm agrees to use the material for swine feed only, FDA will track the material all the way through the supply chain from the processor to the farm to ensure that the feed is properly monitored and used only as feed for pigs.
To protect the U.S. against BSE, FDA works to keep certain mammalian protein out of animal feed for cattle and other ruminant animals. FDA established its animal feed rule in 1997 after the BSE epidemic in the U.K. showed that the disease spreads by feeding infected ruminant protein to cattle.
Under the current regulation, the material from this Texas cow is not allowed in feed for cattle or other ruminant animals. FDA's action specifying that the material go only into swine feed means also that it will not be fed to poultry.
FDA is committed to protecting the U.S. from BSE and collaborates closely with the U.S. Department of Agriculture on all BSE issues. The animal feed rule provides crucial protection against the spread of BSE, but it is only one of several such firewalls. FDA will soon be improving the animal feed rule, to make this strong system even stronger.
####
http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/news/2004/NEW01061.html
OR, there were some 9,200 samples where testing used the least likely test to find BSE, the IHC ;
National Veterinary Services Laboratory (NVSL) Immunohistochemistry (IHC) Testing Summary
The BSE enhanced surveillance program involves the use of a rapid screening test, followed by confirmatory testing for any samples that come back "inconclusive." The weekly summary below captures all rapid tests conducted as part of the enhanced surveillance effort. It should be noted that since the enhanced surveillance program began, USDA has also conducted approximately 9,200 routine IHC tests on samples that did not first undergo rapid testing. This was done to ensure that samples inappropriate for the rapid screen test were still tested, and also to monitor and improve upon IHC testing protocols. Of those 9,200 routine tests, one test returned a non-definitive result on July 27, 2005. That sample underwent additional testing at NVSL, as well as at the Veterinary Laboratories Agency in Weybridge, England, and results were negative. To view the IHC testing numbers from 1990 through 2004, click on the following link:
http://www.aphis.usda.gov/lpa/issues/bse/surveillance/figure2f.html
http://www.aphis.usda.gov/lpa/issues/bse_testing/test_results.html
BSE test options were limited
USDA: In 9,200 cases only one type of test could be used
WASHINGTON (AP)--The U.S. Department of Agriculture acknowledged Aug. 17 that its testing options for bovine spongiform encephalopathy were limited in 9,200 cases despite its effort to expand surveillance throughout the U.S. herd.
In those cases, only one type of test was used--one that failed to detect the disease in an infected Texas cow.
The department posted the information on its website because of an inquiry from The Associated Press.
Conducted over the past 14 months, the tests have not been included in the department's running tally of BSE tests since last summer. That total reached 439,126 on Aug. 17.
"There's no secret program," the department's chief veterinarian, John Clifford, said in an interview. "There has been no hiding, I can assure you of that."
Officials intended to report the tests later in an annual report, Clifford said.
These 9,200 cases were different because brain tissue samples were preserved with formalin, which makes them suitable for only one type of test--immunohistochemistry, or IHC.
In the Texas case, officials had declared the cow free of disease in November after an IHC test came back negative. The department's inspector general ordered an additional kind of test, which confirmed the animal was infected.
Veterinarians in remote locations have used the preservative on tissue to keep it from degrading on its way to the department's laboratory in Ames, Iowa. Officials this year asked veterinarians to stop using preservative and send fresh or chilled samples within 48 hours.
The department recently investigated a possible case of BSE that turned up in a preserved sample. Further testing ruled out the disease two weeks ago.
Scientists used two additional tests--rapid screening and Western blot--to help detect BSE in the country's second confirmed case, in a Texas cow in June. They used IHC and Western blot to confirm the first case, in a Washington state cow in December 2003.
"The IHC test is still an excellent test," Clifford said. "These are not simple tests, either."
Clifford pointed out that scientists reran the IHC several times and got conflicting results. That happened, too, with the Western blot test. Both tests are accepted by international animal health officials.
Date: 8/25/05
http://www.hpj.com/archives/2005/aug05/aug29/BSEtestoptionswerelimited.cfm
Office of the United States Attorney District of Arizona
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE For Information Contact Public Affairs
February 16, 2007 WYN HORNBUCKLE Telephone: (602) 514-7625 Cell: (602) 525-2681
CORPORATION AND ITS PRESIDENT PLEAD GUILTY TO DEFRAUDING GOVERNMENT’S MAD COW DISEASE SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM
PHOENIX -- Farm Fresh Meats, Inc. and Roland Emerson Farabee, 55, of Maricopa, Arizona, pleaded guilty to stealing $390,000 in government funds, mail fraud and wire fraud, in federal district court in Phoenix.U.S. Attorney Daniel Knauss stated, “The integrity of the system that tests for mad cow disease relies upon the honest cooperation of enterprises like Farm Fresh Meats. Without that honest cooperation, consumers both in the U.S. and internationally are at risk. We want to thank the USDA’s Office of Inspector General for their continuing efforts to safeguard the public health and enforce the law.” Farm Fresh Meats and Farabee were charged by Information with theft of government funds, mail fraud and wire fraud. According to the Information, on June 7, 2004, Farabee, on behalf of Farm Fresh Meats, signed a contract with the U.S. Department of Agriculture (the “USDA Agreement”) to collect obex samples from cattle at high risk of mad cow disease (the “Targeted Cattle Population”). The Targeted Cattle Population consisted of the following cattle: cattle over thirty months of age; nonambulatory cattle; cattle exhibiting signs of central nervous system disorders; cattle exhibiting signs of mad cow disease; and dead cattle. Pursuant to the USDA Agreement, the USDA agreed to pay Farm Fresh Meats $150 per obex sample for collecting obex samples from cattle within the Targeted Cattle Population, and submitting the obex samples to a USDA laboratory for mad cow disease testing. Farm Fresh Meats further agreed to maintain in cold storage the sampled cattle carcasses and heads until the test results were received by Farm Fresh Meats.
Evidence uncovered during the government’s investigation established that Farm Fresh Meats and Farabee submitted samples from cattle outside the Targeted Cattle Population. Specifically, Farm Fresh Meats and Farabee submitted, or caused to be submitted, obex samples from healthy, USDA inspected cattle, in order to steal government moneys.
Evidence collected also demonstrated that Farm Fresh Meats and Farabee failed to maintain cattle carcasses and heads pending test results and falsified corporate books and records to conceal their malfeasance. Such actions, to the extent an obex sample tested positive (fortunately, none did), could have jeopardized the USDA’s ability to identify the diseased animal and pinpoint its place of origin. On Wednesday, February 14, 2007, Farm Fresh Meats and Farabee pleaded guilty to stealing government funds and using the mails and wires to effect the scheme. According to their guilty pleas:
(a) Farm Fresh Meats collected, and Farabee directed others to collect, obex samples from cattle outside the Targeted Cattle Population, which were not subject to payment by the USDA;
(b) Farm Fresh Meats2 and Farabee caused to be submitted payment requests to the USDA knowing that the requests were based on obex samples that were not subject to payment under the USDA Agreement; (c) Farm Fresh Meats completed and submitted, and Farabee directed others to complete and submit, BSE Surveillance Data Collection Forms to the USDA’s testing laboratory that were false and misleading;
(d) Farm Fresh Meats completed and submitted, and Farabee directed others to complete and submit, BSE Surveillance Submission Forms filed with the USDA that were false and misleading;
(e) Farm Fresh Meats falsified, and Farabee directed others to falsify, internal Farm Fresh Meats documents to conceal the fact that Farm Fresh Meats was seeking and obtaining payment from the USDA for obex samples obtained from cattle outside the Targeted Cattle Population; and
(f) Farm Fresh Meats failed to comply with, and Farabee directed others to fail to comply with, the USDA Agreement by discarding cattle carcasses and heads prior to receiving BSE test results.
A conviction for theft of government funds carries a maximum penalty of 10 years imprisonment. Mail fraud and wire fraud convictions carry a maximum penalty of 20 years imprisonment. Convictions for the above referenced violations also carry a maximum fine of $250,000 for individuals and $500,000 for organizations. In determining an actual sentence, Judge Earl H. Carroll will consult the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, which provide appropriate sentencing ranges. The judge, however, is not bound by those guidelines in determining a sentence. Sentencing is set before Judge Earl H. Carroll on May 14, 2007. The investigation in this case was conducted by Assistant Special Agent in Charge Alejandro Quintero, United States Department of Agriculture, Office of Inspector General. The prosecution is being handled by Robert Long, Assistant U.S. Attorney, District of Arizona, Phoenix.
CASE NUMBER: CR-07-00160-PHX-EHC RELEASE NUMBER: 2007-051(Farabee) # # #
http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/az/press_releases/2007/2007-051(Farabee).pdf
USA MAD COW POLICY, don't look, don't find, or screw the testing up so bad, everything comes out negative. UNLESS of course you get the end around by the Honorable Phyllis Fong of the OIG. Course, that was a one time deal. But what a coup it was. ...TSS
-------- Original Message --------
Subject: USA BIO-RADs INCONCLUSIVEs
Date: Fri, 17 Dec 2004 15:37:28 -0600
From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."
To: susan_berg@bio-rad.com
Hello Susan and Bio-Rad,
Happy Holidays!
I wish to ask a question about Bio-Rad and USDA BSE/TSE testing and there inconclusive. IS the Bio-Rad test for BSE/TSE that complicated, or is there most likely some human error we are seeing here?
HOW can Japan have 2 positive cows with No clinical signs WB+, IHC-, HP- , BUT in the USA, these cows are considered 'negative'?
IS there more politics working here than science in the USA?
What am I missing?
-------- Original Message --------
Subject: Re: USDA: More mad cow testing will demonstrate beef's safety
Date: Fri, 17 Dec 2004 09:26:19 -0600
From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr." snip...end
Experts doubt USDA's mad cow results
snip...END
WELL, someone did call me from Bio-Rad about this, however it was not Susan Berg. but i had to just about take a blood oath not to reveal there name. IN fact they did not want me to even mention this, but i feel it is much much to important. I have omitted any I.D. of this person, but thought I must document this ;
Bio-Rad, TSS phone conversation 12/28/04
SNIP...
full text ;
http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2008/01/bse-oie-usda.html
Saturday, August 16, 2008
Qualitative Analysis of BSE Risk Factors in the United States February 13, 2000 at 3:37 pm PST (BSE red book)
http://bseusa.blogspot.com/2008/08/qualitative-analysis-of-bse-risk.html
48 hour traceback for BSE mad cow disease in the USA ???
NOT in your lifetime !
8 YEARS IN REVIEW OF THE MAD COW DEBACLE IN THE USA ;
http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2008/12/mad-cow-disease-usa-december-28-2008-8.html
Thursday, June 24, 2010
Accumulation of L-type Bovine Prions in Peripheral Nerve Tissues
Volume 16, Number 7–July 2010
http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2010/06/accumulation-of-l-type-bovine-prions-in.html
Saturday, June 19, 2010
U.S. DENIED UPGRADED BSE STATUS FROM OIE
see full text and reasons why here ;
http://usdameatexport.blogspot.com/2010/06/us-denied-upgraded-bse-status-from-oie.html
Wednesday, March 31, 2010
Atypical BSE in Cattle
http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2010/03/atypical-bse-in-cattle-position-post.html
Saturday, June 12, 2010
PUBLICATION REQUEST AND FOIA REQUEST Project Number: 3625-32000-086-05 Study of Atypical Bse
http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2010/06/publication-request-and-foia-request.html
Wednesday, February 24, 2010
Transmissible Spongiform encephalopathy (TSE) animal and human TSE in North America 14th
ICID International Scientific Exchange Brochure -
http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2010/02/transmissible-spongiform-encephalopathy.html
PEOPLE wonder why there is no mad cows in the USA. I don't. It's as obvious as the day is long $$$
RAMIFICATIONS OF USA POLICY ON MAD COW DISEASE as follows ;
Thursday, July 08, 2010
GLOBAL CLUSTERS OF CREUTZFELDT JAKOB DISEASE - A REVIEW 2010
http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2010/07/global-clusters-of-creutzfeldt-jakob.html
Thursday, July 08, 2010
Nosocomial transmission of sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease: results from a risk-based assessment of surgical interventions Public release date: 8-Jul-2010
http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2010/07/nosocomial-transmission-of-sporadic.html
Tuesday, June 1, 2010
USA cases of dpCJD rising with 24 cases so far in 2010
http://cjdtexas.blogspot.com/2010/06/usa-cases-of-dpcjd-rising-with-24-cases.html
Wednesday, June 16, 2010
Defining sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease strains and their transmission properties
http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2010/06/defining-sporadic-creutzfeldt-jakob.html
Archive Number 20100405.1091 Published Date 05-APR-2010
Subject PRO/AH/EDR> Prion disease update 1010 (04)
snip...
[Terry S. Singeltary Sr. has added the following comment:
"According to the World Health Organisation, the future public health threat of vCJD in the UK and Europe and potentially the rest of the world is of concern and currently unquantifiable. However, the possibility of a significant and geographically diverse vCJD epidemic occurring over the next few decades cannot be dismissed.
The key word here is diverse. What does diverse mean? If USA scrapie transmitted to USA bovine does not produce pathology as the UK c-BSE, then why would CJD from there look like UK vCJD?"
http://www.promedmail.org/pls/apex/f?p=2400:1001:568933508083034::NO::F2400_P1001_BACK_PAGE,F2400_P1001_PUB_MAIL_ID:1000,82101
> Up until about 6 years ago, the pt worked at Tyson foods where she
> worked on the assembly line, slaughtering cattle and preparing them for
> packaging. She was exposed to brain and spinal cord matter when she
> would euthanize the cattle.
http://www.recordandoalinda.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=19:cjd-english-info&catid=9:cjd-ingles&Itemid=8
CJD TEXAS 38 YEAR OLD FEMALE WORKED SLAUGHTERING CATTLE EXPOSED TO BRAIN AND SPINAL CORD MATTER
http://cjdtexas.blogspot.com/2010/03/cjd-texas-38-year-old-female-worked.html
Monday, April 5, 2010
UPDATE - CJD TEXAS 38 YEAR OLD FEMALE WORKED SLAUGHTERING CATTLE EXPOSED TO BRAIN AND SPINAL CORD MATTER
http://prionunitusaupdate2008.blogspot.com/2010/04/update-cjd-texas-38-year-old-female.html
Friday, November 30, 2007
CJD QUESTIONNAIRE USA CWRU AND CJD FOUNDATION
http://cjdquestionnaire.blogspot.com/
TSS
Daniela Meloni*, Katia Varello, Marzia Pezzolato, Elsa Manzardo, Maria C. Cavarretta, Francesco Ingravalle, Maria Caramelli, Elena Bozzetta National Reference Laboratory for Animal Encephalopathies, Istituto Zooprofilattico Sperimentale del Piemonte Liguria e Valle d’Aosta, Turin, Italy. *Corresponding author Email addresses: DM: daniela.meloni@izsto.it KV: katia.varello@izsto.it MP: marzia.pezzolato@izsto.it EM: elsa.manzardo@izsto.it MCC: test.rapidi@izsto.it FI: francesco.ingravalle@izsto.it MC: maria.caramelli@izsto.it EB: elena.bozzetta@izsto.it
Abstract
Background: Routine rapid testing for Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) has highlighted some problems with BSE rapid test performance, the most significant being the number of initially reactive samples and the false positive results on autolyzed tissue. This point is important for BSE active surveillance in risk populations, because tissue autolysis is often unavoidable in routine cases. A robust test suitable for use on field material is therefore needed. To date, very limited information regarding the effect of autolysis on the robustness of rapid tests has been documented; therefore, the National Reference Centre for Animal Encephalopathies (CEA) rapid test laboratory selected 450 autolyzed and negative brain stem samples from fallen stock bovines older than 24 months to assess the specificity of four tests approved for BSE active surveillance: Biorad TeSeE, Enfer TSE version 2.0, Prionics® Check LIA, and IDEXX Herd Check BSE Antigen Kit EIA. The samples were graded according to the degree of autolysis and then dissected into five portions, four of which randomly assigned to processing by rapid tests and one to be available for confirmatory Western blot analysis. Findings: the specificity of the four systems was 100% for all three grades of autolysis, while the percentage of initially reactive results was 0.00 (95%CI 0.00-0.82), 0.22 (95%CI 0.006-1.23), 0.44 (95%CI 0.05-1.60), and 0.89 (95%CI 0.24-2.26) for the Biorad TeSeE, the Prionics® Check LIA, the IDEXX Herd Check BSE and the Enfer TSE tests, respectively. No association with degree of autolysis could be drawn. Conclusions: the present study demonstrates that the four rapid tests can be considered wellrunning diagnostic tools regardless of tissue quality; nevertheless, the number of initial reactive samples reported for some systems must not be underestimated in routine testing. Furthermore the compliance with the reported performance can be guaranteed only when an ongoing high careful batch quality control system is in place.
http://www.biomedcentral.com/content/pdf/1756-0500-3-193.pdf
Here in the USA, the USDA et al likes to take samples of suspect BSE mad cows that are either perfectly healthy cows, OR, they let the suspect samples sit, and deteriorate, until valid testing on that tissue sample is impossible. Seems that is the only way they can keep their 'gold card'. ...TSS
"I would note that the sample was taken in April, at which time the protocols allowed for a preservative to be used. The sample was not submitted to us until last week because the veterinarian set aside the sample after preserving it and simply forgot to send it in.
http://www.usda.gov/wps/portal/usdahome?contentidonly=true&contentid=2005/07/0280.xml
Executive Summary
In June 2005, an inconclusive bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) sample from November 2004, that had originally been classified as negative on the immunohistochemistry test, was confirmed positive on SAF immunoblot (Western blot). The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) identified the herd of origin for the index cow in Texas; that identification was confirmed by DNA analysis. USDA, in close cooperation with the Texas Animal Health Commission (TAHC), established an incident command post (ICP) and began response activities according to USDA’s BSE Response Plan of September 2004. Response personnel removed at-risk cattle and cattle of interest (COI) from the index herd, euthanized them, and tested them for BSE; all were negative. USDA and the State extensively traced all at-risk cattle and COI that left the index herd. The majority of these animals entered rendering and/or slaughter channels well before the investigation began. USDA’s response to the Texas finding was thorough and effective.
http://www.aphis.usda.gov/lpa/issues/bse/epi-updates/bse_final_epidemiology_report.pdf
Report on Food & Drug Administration Dallas District Investigation of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Event in Texas 2005
Executive Summary:
On June 24, 2005, USDA informed FDA that a cow in Texas tested positive for Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE). Information provided by APHIS was that the BSE positive cow was born and raised in a herd in Texas and was approximately 12 years old. The animal was sampled for BSE at a pet food plant in Texas on November 15, 2004, as part of USDA’s enhanced surveillance program.
http://www.fda.gov/cvm/texasfeedrpt.htm
Texas even had a 'secret' test that showed that mad cow positive;
experimental IHC test results, because the test was
not a validated procedure, and because the two
approved IHC tests came back negative, the results
were not considered to be of regulatory significance
and therefore were not reported beyond the
laboratory.
• A Western blot test conducted the week of
June 5, 2005, returned positive for BSE.
http://www.usda.gov/documents/vs_bse_ihctestvar.pdf
48 hr BSE confirmation turnaround took 7+ months to confirm this case, so the BSE MRR policy could be put into place. ...TSS
THIS highly suspect stumbling and staggering Texas Mad Cow got not test at all, went straight to render ;
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE Statement May 4, 2004 Media Inquiries: 301-827-6242 Consumer Inquiries: 888-INFO-FDA
Statement on Texas Cow With Central Nervous System Symptoms On Friday, April 30 th , the Food and Drug Administration learned that a cow with central nervous system symptoms had been killed and shipped to a processor for rendering into animal protein for use in animal feed.
FDA, which is responsible for the safety of animal feed, immediately began an investigation. On Friday and throughout the weekend, FDA investigators inspected the slaughterhouse, the rendering facility, the farm where the animal came from, and the processor that initially received the cow from the slaughterhouse.
FDA's investigation showed that the animal in question had already been rendered into "meat and bone meal" (a type of protein animal feed). Over the weekend FDA was able to track down all the implicated material. That material is being held by the firm, which is cooperating fully with FDA.
Cattle with central nervous system symptoms are of particular interest because cattle with bovine spongiform encephalopathy or BSE, also known as "mad cow disease," can exhibit such symptoms. In this case, there is no way now to test for BSE. But even if the cow had BSE, FDA's animal feed rule would prohibit the feeding of its rendered protein to other ruminant animals (e.g., cows, goats, sheep, bison).
FDA is sending a letter to the firm summarizing its findings and informing the firm that FDA will not object to use of this material in swine feed only. If it is not used in swine feed, this material will be destroyed. Pigs have been shown not to be susceptible to BSE. If the firm agrees to use the material for swine feed only, FDA will track the material all the way through the supply chain from the processor to the farm to ensure that the feed is properly monitored and used only as feed for pigs.
To protect the U.S. against BSE, FDA works to keep certain mammalian protein out of animal feed for cattle and other ruminant animals. FDA established its animal feed rule in 1997 after the BSE epidemic in the U.K. showed that the disease spreads by feeding infected ruminant protein to cattle.
Under the current regulation, the material from this Texas cow is not allowed in feed for cattle or other ruminant animals. FDA's action specifying that the material go only into swine feed means also that it will not be fed to poultry.
FDA is committed to protecting the U.S. from BSE and collaborates closely with the U.S. Department of Agriculture on all BSE issues. The animal feed rule provides crucial protection against the spread of BSE, but it is only one of several such firewalls. FDA will soon be improving the animal feed rule, to make this strong system even stronger.
####
http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/news/2004/NEW01061.html
OR, there were some 9,200 samples where testing used the least likely test to find BSE, the IHC ;
National Veterinary Services Laboratory (NVSL) Immunohistochemistry (IHC) Testing Summary
The BSE enhanced surveillance program involves the use of a rapid screening test, followed by confirmatory testing for any samples that come back "inconclusive." The weekly summary below captures all rapid tests conducted as part of the enhanced surveillance effort. It should be noted that since the enhanced surveillance program began, USDA has also conducted approximately 9,200 routine IHC tests on samples that did not first undergo rapid testing. This was done to ensure that samples inappropriate for the rapid screen test were still tested, and also to monitor and improve upon IHC testing protocols. Of those 9,200 routine tests, one test returned a non-definitive result on July 27, 2005. That sample underwent additional testing at NVSL, as well as at the Veterinary Laboratories Agency in Weybridge, England, and results were negative. To view the IHC testing numbers from 1990 through 2004, click on the following link:
http://www.aphis.usda.gov/lpa/issues/bse/surveillance/figure2f.html
http://www.aphis.usda.gov/lpa/issues/bse_testing/test_results.html
BSE test options were limited
USDA: In 9,200 cases only one type of test could be used
WASHINGTON (AP)--The U.S. Department of Agriculture acknowledged Aug. 17 that its testing options for bovine spongiform encephalopathy were limited in 9,200 cases despite its effort to expand surveillance throughout the U.S. herd.
In those cases, only one type of test was used--one that failed to detect the disease in an infected Texas cow.
The department posted the information on its website because of an inquiry from The Associated Press.
Conducted over the past 14 months, the tests have not been included in the department's running tally of BSE tests since last summer. That total reached 439,126 on Aug. 17.
"There's no secret program," the department's chief veterinarian, John Clifford, said in an interview. "There has been no hiding, I can assure you of that."
Officials intended to report the tests later in an annual report, Clifford said.
These 9,200 cases were different because brain tissue samples were preserved with formalin, which makes them suitable for only one type of test--immunohistochemistry, or IHC.
In the Texas case, officials had declared the cow free of disease in November after an IHC test came back negative. The department's inspector general ordered an additional kind of test, which confirmed the animal was infected.
Veterinarians in remote locations have used the preservative on tissue to keep it from degrading on its way to the department's laboratory in Ames, Iowa. Officials this year asked veterinarians to stop using preservative and send fresh or chilled samples within 48 hours.
The department recently investigated a possible case of BSE that turned up in a preserved sample. Further testing ruled out the disease two weeks ago.
Scientists used two additional tests--rapid screening and Western blot--to help detect BSE in the country's second confirmed case, in a Texas cow in June. They used IHC and Western blot to confirm the first case, in a Washington state cow in December 2003.
"The IHC test is still an excellent test," Clifford said. "These are not simple tests, either."
Clifford pointed out that scientists reran the IHC several times and got conflicting results. That happened, too, with the Western blot test. Both tests are accepted by international animal health officials.
Date: 8/25/05
http://www.hpj.com/archives/2005/aug05/aug29/BSEtestoptionswerelimited.cfm
Office of the United States Attorney District of Arizona
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE For Information Contact Public Affairs
February 16, 2007 WYN HORNBUCKLE Telephone: (602) 514-7625 Cell: (602) 525-2681
CORPORATION AND ITS PRESIDENT PLEAD GUILTY TO DEFRAUDING GOVERNMENT’S MAD COW DISEASE SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM
PHOENIX -- Farm Fresh Meats, Inc. and Roland Emerson Farabee, 55, of Maricopa, Arizona, pleaded guilty to stealing $390,000 in government funds, mail fraud and wire fraud, in federal district court in Phoenix.U.S. Attorney Daniel Knauss stated, “The integrity of the system that tests for mad cow disease relies upon the honest cooperation of enterprises like Farm Fresh Meats. Without that honest cooperation, consumers both in the U.S. and internationally are at risk. We want to thank the USDA’s Office of Inspector General for their continuing efforts to safeguard the public health and enforce the law.” Farm Fresh Meats and Farabee were charged by Information with theft of government funds, mail fraud and wire fraud. According to the Information, on June 7, 2004, Farabee, on behalf of Farm Fresh Meats, signed a contract with the U.S. Department of Agriculture (the “USDA Agreement”) to collect obex samples from cattle at high risk of mad cow disease (the “Targeted Cattle Population”). The Targeted Cattle Population consisted of the following cattle: cattle over thirty months of age; nonambulatory cattle; cattle exhibiting signs of central nervous system disorders; cattle exhibiting signs of mad cow disease; and dead cattle. Pursuant to the USDA Agreement, the USDA agreed to pay Farm Fresh Meats $150 per obex sample for collecting obex samples from cattle within the Targeted Cattle Population, and submitting the obex samples to a USDA laboratory for mad cow disease testing. Farm Fresh Meats further agreed to maintain in cold storage the sampled cattle carcasses and heads until the test results were received by Farm Fresh Meats.
Evidence uncovered during the government’s investigation established that Farm Fresh Meats and Farabee submitted samples from cattle outside the Targeted Cattle Population. Specifically, Farm Fresh Meats and Farabee submitted, or caused to be submitted, obex samples from healthy, USDA inspected cattle, in order to steal government moneys.
Evidence collected also demonstrated that Farm Fresh Meats and Farabee failed to maintain cattle carcasses and heads pending test results and falsified corporate books and records to conceal their malfeasance. Such actions, to the extent an obex sample tested positive (fortunately, none did), could have jeopardized the USDA’s ability to identify the diseased animal and pinpoint its place of origin. On Wednesday, February 14, 2007, Farm Fresh Meats and Farabee pleaded guilty to stealing government funds and using the mails and wires to effect the scheme. According to their guilty pleas:
(a) Farm Fresh Meats collected, and Farabee directed others to collect, obex samples from cattle outside the Targeted Cattle Population, which were not subject to payment by the USDA;
(b) Farm Fresh Meats2 and Farabee caused to be submitted payment requests to the USDA knowing that the requests were based on obex samples that were not subject to payment under the USDA Agreement; (c) Farm Fresh Meats completed and submitted, and Farabee directed others to complete and submit, BSE Surveillance Data Collection Forms to the USDA’s testing laboratory that were false and misleading;
(d) Farm Fresh Meats completed and submitted, and Farabee directed others to complete and submit, BSE Surveillance Submission Forms filed with the USDA that were false and misleading;
(e) Farm Fresh Meats falsified, and Farabee directed others to falsify, internal Farm Fresh Meats documents to conceal the fact that Farm Fresh Meats was seeking and obtaining payment from the USDA for obex samples obtained from cattle outside the Targeted Cattle Population; and
(f) Farm Fresh Meats failed to comply with, and Farabee directed others to fail to comply with, the USDA Agreement by discarding cattle carcasses and heads prior to receiving BSE test results.
A conviction for theft of government funds carries a maximum penalty of 10 years imprisonment. Mail fraud and wire fraud convictions carry a maximum penalty of 20 years imprisonment. Convictions for the above referenced violations also carry a maximum fine of $250,000 for individuals and $500,000 for organizations. In determining an actual sentence, Judge Earl H. Carroll will consult the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, which provide appropriate sentencing ranges. The judge, however, is not bound by those guidelines in determining a sentence. Sentencing is set before Judge Earl H. Carroll on May 14, 2007. The investigation in this case was conducted by Assistant Special Agent in Charge Alejandro Quintero, United States Department of Agriculture, Office of Inspector General. The prosecution is being handled by Robert Long, Assistant U.S. Attorney, District of Arizona, Phoenix.
CASE NUMBER: CR-07-00160-PHX-EHC RELEASE NUMBER: 2007-051(Farabee) # # #
http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/az/press_releases/2007/2007-051(Farabee).pdf
USA MAD COW POLICY, don't look, don't find, or screw the testing up so bad, everything comes out negative. UNLESS of course you get the end around by the Honorable Phyllis Fong of the OIG. Course, that was a one time deal. But what a coup it was. ...TSS
-------- Original Message --------
Subject: USA BIO-RADs INCONCLUSIVEs
Date: Fri, 17 Dec 2004 15:37:28 -0600
From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."
To: susan_berg@bio-rad.com
Hello Susan and Bio-Rad,
Happy Holidays!
I wish to ask a question about Bio-Rad and USDA BSE/TSE testing and there inconclusive. IS the Bio-Rad test for BSE/TSE that complicated, or is there most likely some human error we are seeing here?
HOW can Japan have 2 positive cows with No clinical signs WB+, IHC-, HP- , BUT in the USA, these cows are considered 'negative'?
IS there more politics working here than science in the USA?
What am I missing?
-------- Original Message --------
Subject: Re: USDA: More mad cow testing will demonstrate beef's safety
Date: Fri, 17 Dec 2004 09:26:19 -0600
From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr." snip...end
Experts doubt USDA's mad cow results
snip...END
WELL, someone did call me from Bio-Rad about this, however it was not Susan Berg. but i had to just about take a blood oath not to reveal there name. IN fact they did not want me to even mention this, but i feel it is much much to important. I have omitted any I.D. of this person, but thought I must document this ;
Bio-Rad, TSS phone conversation 12/28/04
SNIP...
full text ;
http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2008/01/bse-oie-usda.html
Saturday, August 16, 2008
Qualitative Analysis of BSE Risk Factors in the United States February 13, 2000 at 3:37 pm PST (BSE red book)
http://bseusa.blogspot.com/2008/08/qualitative-analysis-of-bse-risk.html
48 hour traceback for BSE mad cow disease in the USA ???
NOT in your lifetime !
8 YEARS IN REVIEW OF THE MAD COW DEBACLE IN THE USA ;
http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2008/12/mad-cow-disease-usa-december-28-2008-8.html
Thursday, June 24, 2010
Accumulation of L-type Bovine Prions in Peripheral Nerve Tissues
Volume 16, Number 7–July 2010
http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2010/06/accumulation-of-l-type-bovine-prions-in.html
Saturday, June 19, 2010
U.S. DENIED UPGRADED BSE STATUS FROM OIE
see full text and reasons why here ;
http://usdameatexport.blogspot.com/2010/06/us-denied-upgraded-bse-status-from-oie.html
Wednesday, March 31, 2010
Atypical BSE in Cattle
http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2010/03/atypical-bse-in-cattle-position-post.html
Saturday, June 12, 2010
PUBLICATION REQUEST AND FOIA REQUEST Project Number: 3625-32000-086-05 Study of Atypical Bse
http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2010/06/publication-request-and-foia-request.html
Wednesday, February 24, 2010
Transmissible Spongiform encephalopathy (TSE) animal and human TSE in North America 14th
ICID International Scientific Exchange Brochure -
http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2010/02/transmissible-spongiform-encephalopathy.html
PEOPLE wonder why there is no mad cows in the USA. I don't. It's as obvious as the day is long $$$
RAMIFICATIONS OF USA POLICY ON MAD COW DISEASE as follows ;
Thursday, July 08, 2010
GLOBAL CLUSTERS OF CREUTZFELDT JAKOB DISEASE - A REVIEW 2010
http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2010/07/global-clusters-of-creutzfeldt-jakob.html
Thursday, July 08, 2010
Nosocomial transmission of sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease: results from a risk-based assessment of surgical interventions Public release date: 8-Jul-2010
http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2010/07/nosocomial-transmission-of-sporadic.html
Tuesday, June 1, 2010
USA cases of dpCJD rising with 24 cases so far in 2010
http://cjdtexas.blogspot.com/2010/06/usa-cases-of-dpcjd-rising-with-24-cases.html
Wednesday, June 16, 2010
Defining sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease strains and their transmission properties
http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2010/06/defining-sporadic-creutzfeldt-jakob.html
Archive Number 20100405.1091 Published Date 05-APR-2010
Subject PRO/AH/EDR> Prion disease update 1010 (04)
snip...
[Terry S. Singeltary Sr. has added the following comment:
"According to the World Health Organisation, the future public health threat of vCJD in the UK and Europe and potentially the rest of the world is of concern and currently unquantifiable. However, the possibility of a significant and geographically diverse vCJD epidemic occurring over the next few decades cannot be dismissed.
The key word here is diverse. What does diverse mean? If USA scrapie transmitted to USA bovine does not produce pathology as the UK c-BSE, then why would CJD from there look like UK vCJD?"
http://www.promedmail.org/pls/apex/f?p=2400:1001:568933508083034::NO::F2400_P1001_BACK_PAGE,F2400_P1001_PUB_MAIL_ID:1000,82101
> Up until about 6 years ago, the pt worked at Tyson foods where she
> worked on the assembly line, slaughtering cattle and preparing them for
> packaging. She was exposed to brain and spinal cord matter when she
> would euthanize the cattle.
http://www.recordandoalinda.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=19:cjd-english-info&catid=9:cjd-ingles&Itemid=8
CJD TEXAS 38 YEAR OLD FEMALE WORKED SLAUGHTERING CATTLE EXPOSED TO BRAIN AND SPINAL CORD MATTER
http://cjdtexas.blogspot.com/2010/03/cjd-texas-38-year-old-female-worked.html
Monday, April 5, 2010
UPDATE - CJD TEXAS 38 YEAR OLD FEMALE WORKED SLAUGHTERING CATTLE EXPOSED TO BRAIN AND SPINAL CORD MATTER
http://prionunitusaupdate2008.blogspot.com/2010/04/update-cjd-texas-38-year-old-female.html
Friday, November 30, 2007
CJD QUESTIONNAIRE USA CWRU AND CJD FOUNDATION
http://cjdquestionnaire.blogspot.com/
TSS
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