BSE BASE MAD COW TESTING TEXAS, USA, AND CANADA

Potential mad cows that entered food supply without being tested for BSE 2011: UK END OF YEAR REVIEW

2011-12-21T08:56:00.000-08:00

Potential mad cows that entered food supply without being tested for BSE 2011: UK END OF YEAR REVIEW

Bullock aged over 72 months enters food supply without being tested for BSE

Wednesday 21 December 2011

The Agency has been notified that meat has entered the food supply from a bullock aged over 72 months that had not been tested for BSE. A negative BSE test result is mandatory for cattle slaughtered for human consumption at over 72 months of age.

It is very unlikely that the bullock was infected with BSE and, as specified risk material (SRM) was removed, any risk to human health is extremely low. SRM is the parts of cattle most likely to carry BSE infectivity.

The bullock, aged 75 months and 28 days, was slaughtered at N Bramall & Son Ltd’s abattoir in Oxspring, Nr Sheffield, on 6 October 2011. The error was discovered on 1 December in the course of routine cross-checks of slaughter and BSE test data.

According to BSE regulations, the untested bullock, plus the one slaughtered before and the two after, should not have entered the food supply. However, by the time the failure was discovered, the associated carcasses had left the premises.

One of the carcasses was sent to the Netherlands where the authorities have been informed. The hearts and cheek meat from all the associated carcasses were traced and have since been destroyed. Other checks indicate that the rest of the meat from the carcasses is either no longer in the food supply or traceable and is likely to have been eaten.

http://www.food.gov.uk/news/newsarchive/2011/dec/bullockfoodchain

Bullock aged over 72 months enters food supply without being tested for BSE

Monday 14 November 2011

The Agency has been notified that meat has entered the food supply from a bullock aged over 72 months that had not been tested for BSE. A negative BSE test result is mandatory for cattle slaughtered for human consumption at more than 72 months of age. It is very unlikely that the bullock was infected with BSE and as specified risk material (SRM) was removed, any risk to human health is extremely low. SRM is the parts of cattle most likely to carry BSE infectivity.

The bullock, aged 75 months and 7 days, was slaughtered at C&S Meats Ltd’s abattoir in Dorset, on 2 September 2011. The error was discovered on 27 October in the course of routine cross-checks of slaughter and BSE test data. According to BSE regulations, the untested bullock, plus the one slaughtered before should not have entered the food supply. However, by the time the failure was discovered, the associated carcasses had left the premises. Subsequent checks traced a 20kg piece of meat from the untested bullock that has since been destroyed and indicate that the rest of the meat from the carcasses is no longer in the food supply.

http://www.food.gov.uk/news/newsarchive/2011/nov/csmeats

Cow aged over 72 months enters food supply without being tested for BSE

Wednesday 26 October 2011

The Agency has been notified that meat has entered the food supply from a cow aged over 72 months that had not been tested for BSE. A negative BSE test result is mandatory for cattle slaughtered for human consumption at over 72 months of age. It is very unlikely that the cow was infected with BSE and as specified risk material (SRM) was removed, any risk to human health is extremely low. SRM is the parts of cattle most likely to carry BSE infectivity.

The cow, aged 74 months and 11 days, was slaughtered at Anglo Dutch Meats (Charing) Ltd’s abattoir in Kent, on 11 August 2011. The error was discovered on 6 October in the course of routine cross-checks of slaughter and BSE test data. According to BSE regulations, the untested cow, plus the one slaughtered before and the two after should not have entered the food supply. However, by the time the failure was discovered, the associated carcases had left the premises. Subsequent checks indicate that the meat from the carcases was mixed with a large volume of other meat which is no longer in the food supply and is likely to have been eaten.

http://www.food.gov.uk/news/newsarchive/2011/oct/anglodutch

Tuesday, April 19, 2011

Bull aged over 48 months enters food supply without being tested for BSE Monday 18 April 2011

Bull aged over 48 months enters food supply without being tested for BSE Monday 18 April 2011

The Agency has been notified that meat has entered the food supply from a bull aged over 48 months that had not been tested for BSE. A negative BSE test result is mandatory for cattle slaughtered for human consumption at over 48 months of age.

It is very unlikely that the bull was infected with BSE and as specified risk material (SRM) was removed, any risk to human health is extremely low. SRM is that part of the animal most likely to contain BSE infectivity.

The bull, aged 88 months, was slaughtered at S J Norman & Sons’ abattoir in Bridport, Dorset on 3 February 2011. The error was discovered on 5 April in the course of routine cross-checks of slaughter and BSE test data.

According to BSE regulations, the untested bull should not have entered the food supply. However, by the time the failure was discovered, the carcass had left the premises.

Subsequent checks indicate that all the meat from the carcass is no longer traceable and is likely to have been eaten.

http://www.food.gov.uk/news/newsarchive/2011/apr/otmbull

Imported cow aged over 30 months not tested for BSE

Wednesday 16 February 2011

The Agency has been notified that meat has entered the food supply from an Over Thirty Month (OTM) cow imported from Switzerland that had not been tested for BSE.It is very unlikely that the cow was infected with BSE and, as specified risk material (SRM) was removed, any risk to human health is extremely low.

SRM is those parts of an animal likely to be infected if the animal has BSE.Nevertheless, according to BSE regulations the untested cow, the one slaughtered before and the two slaughtered after must not enter the food supply. Negative BSE test results were received for the 'one before' and 'two after'.

The cow had been imported into the UK in December 2009 and was slaughtered at William Taylor & Son Ltd's abattoir in Bamber Bridge, near Preston, on 15 October 2010 at just over 41 months of age.

BSE testing is mandatory for cattle born in Switzerland if slaughtered for human consumption at over 30 months of age. The missing BSE test result was discovered on 17 November during routine cross checks of slaughter and BSE test data. By the time the failure was discovered, all of the associated carcasses had left the premises.

The Agency has established that the carcase of the Swiss-born bovine was sold as fresh meat and is likely to have been eaten. We also traced the batch of carcases that included the 'one before' and 'two after'. This showed that:

the majority of the meat was no longer in the food supply and is likely to have been eaten a small portion of the batch was found in cold storage and has since been destroyed a small portion of the batch was mixed with a large quantity of meat from other batches and used in Iceland's own brand 1.4kg steak pies with 'best before' dates of 23.11.11 and 26.11.11.

Although any food safety risk from consuming these pies would be extremely low, Iceland has taken the decision to withdraw the affected pies from sale some had been exported to Ireland and the authorities there have been informed.

http://www.food.gov.uk/news/newsarchive/2011/feb/otm160211

Food Standards Agency - 31 Jan 2011 11:53

Two cows aged over 48 months enter food supply without being tested for BSE

The Agency has been notified that meat has entered the food supply from two cows aged over 48 months that had not been tested for BSE. A negative BSE test result is mandatory for cattle slaughtered for human consumption at over 48 months of age.

It is very unlikely that the cows were infected with BSE and as specified risk material was removed, any risk to human health is extremely low.

One of the cows was just under 52 months of age and the other just over 52 months of age when slaughtered on 2 November 2010 at J V Richards (Reitfontein) Ltd’s abattoir in Truro. The error was discovered on 10 January in the course of routine cross-checks of slaughter and BSE test data.

According to BSE regulations, both the untested cows and the one slaughtered before them should not have entered the food supply. However, by the time the failure was discovered, all three associated carcasses had left the premises.

Subsequent checks indicate that all the meat from the carcasses is no longer in the food supply chain and is likely to have been eaten.

http://www.wired-gov.net/wg/wg-news-1.nsf/lfi/DNWA-8DMFY9

BSE controls explained: Main controls on production

http://www.food.gov.uk/safereating/animaldiseases/bse/what/beef/controls

Wednesday, July 28, 2010

Atypical prion proteins and IBNC in cattle DEFRA project code SE1796 FOIA Final report

http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2010/07/atypical-prion-proteins-and-ibnc-in.html

Tuesday, November 02, 2010

BSE - ATYPICAL LESION DISTRIBUTION (RBSE 92-21367) statutory (obex only) diagnostic criteria CVL 1992

http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2010/11/bse-atypical-lesion-distribution-rbse.html

EFSA Journal 2011 The European Response to BSE: A Success Story

This is an interesting editorial about the Mad Cow Disease debacle, and it's ramifications that will continue to play out for decades to come ;

Monday, October 10, 2011

EFSA Journal 2011 The European Response to BSE: A Success Story

snip...

EFSA and the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) recently delivered a scientific opinion on any possible epidemiological or molecular association between TSEs in animals and humans (EFSA Panel on Biological Hazards (BIOHAZ) and ECDC, 2011). This opinion confirmed Classical BSE prions as the only TSE agents demonstrated to be zoonotic so far but the possibility that a small proportion of human cases so far classified as "sporadic" CJD are of zoonotic origin could not be excluded. Moreover, transmission experiments to non-human primates suggest that some TSE agents in addition to Classical BSE prions in cattle (namely L-type Atypical BSE, Classical BSE in sheep, transmissible mink encephalopathy (TME) and chronic wasting disease (CWD) agents) might have zoonotic potential.

snip... http://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/efsajournal/pub/e991.htm?emt=1

http://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/efsajournal/doc/e991.pdf

see follow-up here about North America BSE Mad Cow TSE prion risk factors, and the ever emerging strains of Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy in many species here in the USA, including humans ;

http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/10/efsa-journal-2011-european-response-to.html

Saturday, November 19, 2011

Novel Prion Protein in BSE-affected Cattle, Switzerland

http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/11/novel-prion-protein-in-bse-affected.html

Saturday, December 3, 2011

Isolation of Prion with BSE Properties from Farmed Goat

Volume 17, Number 12—December 2011

http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/12/isolation-of-prion-with-bse-properties.html

Saturday, June 25, 2011

Transmissibility of BSE-L and Cattle-Adapted TME Prion Strain to Cynomolgus Macaque

"BSE-L in North America may have existed for decades"

http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/06/transmissibility-of-bse-l-and-cattle.html

Over the next 8-10 weeks, approximately 40% of all the adult mink on the farm died from TME.

snip...

The rancher was a ''dead stock'' feeder using mostly (>95%) downer or dead dairy cattle...

http://web.archive.org/web/20030516051623/http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/mb/m09/tab05.pdf

2010-2011

When L-type BSE was inoculated into ovine transgenic mice and Syrian hamster the resulting molecular fingerprint had changed, either in the first or a subsequent passage, from L-type into C-type BSE. In addition, non-human primates are specifically susceptible for atypical BSE as demonstrated by an approximately 50% shortened incubation time for L-type BSE as compared to C-type. Considering the current scientific information available, it cannot be assumed that these different BSE types pose the same human health risks as C-type BSE or that these risks are mitigated by the same protective measures.

This study will contribute to a correct definition of specified risk material (SRM) in atypical BSE. The incumbent of this position will develop new and transfer existing, ultra-sensitive methods for the detection of atypical BSE in tissue of experimentally infected cattle.

http://www.prionetcanada.ca/detail.aspx?menu=5&dt=293380&app=93&cat1=387&tp=20&lk=no&cat2

2011 Monday, September 26, 2011

L-BSE BASE prion and atypical sporadic CJD

http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2011/09/l-bse-base-prion-and-atypical-sporadic.html

SEE RISE OF SPORADIC CJD YEAR TO YEAR ;

http://www.cjd.ed.ac.uk/figures.htm

Sunday, December 18, 2011

A blood test for variant Creutzfeldt‐Jakob disease: briefing note for patients, carers and health professionals

http://vcjdtransfusion.blogspot.com/2011/12/blood-test-for-variant-creutzfeldtjakob.html

TSS

Bullock aged over 72 months enters food supply without being tested for BSE

2011-11-14T08:50:00.000-08:00

Bullock aged over 72 months enters food supply without being tested for BSE

Monday 14 November 2011

The Agency has been notified that meat has entered the food supply from a bullock aged over 72 months that had not been tested for BSE. A negative BSE test result is mandatory for cattle slaughtered for human consumption at more than 72 months of age.

It is very unlikely that the bullock was infected with BSE and as specified risk material (SRM) was removed, any risk to human health is extremely low. SRM is the parts of cattle most likely to carry BSE infectivity.

The bullock, aged 75 months and 7 days, was slaughtered at C&S Meats Ltd’s abattoir in Dorset, on 2 September 2011. The error was discovered on 27 October in the course of routine cross-checks of slaughter and BSE test data.

According to BSE regulations, the untested bullock, plus the one slaughtered before should not have entered the food supply. However, by the time the failure was discovered, the associated carcasses had left the premises.

Subsequent checks traced a 20kg piece of meat from the untested bullock that has since been destroyed and indicate that the rest of the meat from the carcasses is no longer in the food supply.

http://www.food.gov.uk/news/newsarchive/2011/nov/csmeats

a review of other recent bovines entering commerce without being tested for BSE. ...tss

Cow aged over 72 months enters food supply without being tested for BSE

Wednesday 26 October 2011

The Agency has been notified that meat has entered the food supply from a cow aged over 72 months that had not been tested for BSE. A negative BSE test result is mandatory for cattle slaughtered for human consumption at over 72 months of age.

It is very unlikely that the cow was infected with BSE and as specified risk material (SRM) was removed, any risk to human health is extremely low. SRM is the parts of cattle most likely to carry BSE infectivity.

The cow, aged 74 months and 11 days, was slaughtered at Anglo Dutch Meats (Charing) Ltd’s abattoir in Kent, on 11 August 2011. The error was discovered on 6 October in the course of routine cross-checks of slaughter and BSE test data.

According to BSE regulations, the untested cow, plus the one slaughtered before and the two after should not have entered the food supply. However, by the time the failure was discovered, the associated carcases had left the premises.

Subsequent checks indicate that the meat from the carcases was mixed with a large volume of other meat which is no longer in the food supply and is likely to have been eaten.

http://www.food.gov.uk/news/newsarchive/2011/oct/anglodutch

Cow aged over 48 months enters food supply without being tested for BSE

Tuesday 23 February 2010

The Agency has been notified that meat from a cow aged over 48 months has entered the food supply without being tested for BSE.

It is very unlikely that the cow was infected with BSE and, as specified risk material (SRM) was removed, any risk to human health is extremely low. However, testing is mandatory for cattle slaughtered for human consumption at over 48 months of age.

The cow was slaughtered at Pickstock Ashby Ltd's abattoir in Hartshorne, Derbyshire, on 4 November 2009 aged almost 57 months. The failure was discovered on 28 January during routine cross checks of slaughter and BSE test data. By the time the failure was discovered all of the affected carcasses and offal had left the premises.

The affected carcasses, some edible co-products and offal had been exported. Some meat returned to Britain after processing and some went to other countries. Other edible co-products remained in Britain. Subsequent checks indicate that all of the meat and edible co-product that remained in Britain or that returned to Britain is no longer in the food supply chain. The authorities in the countries that received the exported material have been informed.

Background to BSE testing The BSE testing age was raised to 48 months at the beginning of last year. Cattle aged over 48 months are allowed to enter the food supply provided they have tested negative for BSE. If there is no BSE test, all parts of the carcase must be condemned.

Specified risk material (SRM) is those parts of the animal that contain almost all BSE infectivity, if the animal is infected with BSE.

http://www.food.gov.uk/news/newsarchive/2010/feb/over48monthcow

Cow aged over 48 months enters food supply without being tested for BSE

Tuesday 14 September 2010

The Agency has been notified that meat has entered the food supply from a cow aged over 48 months that had not been tested for BSE.

It is very unlikely that the cow was infected with BSE and, as specified risk material was removed, any risk to human health is extremely low. Nevertheless, a negative BSE test result is mandatory for cattle over 48 months of age slaughtered for human consumption.

The cow was aged one day over 48 months when slaughtered on 9 July at G & GB Hewitt Ltd abattoir in Chester. The error was discovered on 24 August in the course of routine cross-checks of slaughter and BSE test data.

According to BSE regulations, the untested cow, the animal slaughtered before and the two slaughtered after must not enter the food supply. However, by the time the failure was discovered, all of the associated carcasses had left the premises.

Subsequent checks traced one small batch of meat that has since been destroyed and indicate that the rest of the meat from the carcasses is no longer in the food supply chain.

http://www.food.gov.uk/news/newsarchive/2010/sep/otmuntested

Cow aged over 48 months enters food supply without being tested for BSE

Monday 2 November 2009

The Agency has been notified that a 58 months old cow has entered the food supply without being tested for BSE. BSE testing is mandatory for cattle slaughtered for human consumption at over 48 months of age.

However, as all the specified risk material (SRM) was removed, and it is unlikely that the cow was infected with BSE, any risk to human health is very low. SRM is those parts of the animal that contain almost all BSE infectivity.

The cow was slaughtered on 28 July 2009 at Dunbia abattoir in Dungannon. The error was discovered by Northern Ireland's Department of Agriculture and Rural Development (DARD) when a routine annual herd TB test revealed that the cow had been misidentified.

DARD has now established the correct identity and age of the cow slaughtered on 28 July. Checks indicate that all the meat and other products from the untested cow are likely to have been eaten.

http://www.food.gov.uk/news/newsarchive/2009/nov/over48

Monday, May 12, 2008

BSE YOUNGEST AGE STATISTICS UNDER 30 MONTHS

http://bseyoungestage.blogspot.com/

Tuesday, November 01, 2011

Could we face the return of CJD? Experts fear it may lie dormant in thousands

http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2011/11/could-we-face-return-of-cjd-experts.html

EFSA Journal 2011 The European Response to BSE: A Success Story

This is an interesting editorial about the Mad Cow Disease debacle, and it's ramifications that will continue to play out for decades to come ;

Monday, October 10, 2011

EFSA Journal 2011 The European Response to BSE: A Success Story

snip...

EFSA and the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) recently delivered a scientific opinion on any possible epidemiological or molecular association between TSEs in animals and humans (EFSA Panel on Biological Hazards (BIOHAZ) and ECDC, 2011). This opinion confirmed Classical BSE prions as the only TSE agents demonstrated to be zoonotic so far but the possibility that a small proportion of human cases so far classified as "sporadic" CJD are of zoonotic origin could not be excluded. Moreover, transmission experiments to non-human primates suggest that some TSE agents in addition to Classical BSE prions in cattle (namely L-type Atypical BSE, Classical BSE in sheep, transmissible mink encephalopathy (TME) and chronic wasting disease (CWD) agents) might have zoonotic potential.

snip...

http://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/efsajournal/pub/e991.htm?emt=1

http://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/efsajournal/doc/e991.pdf

see follow-up here about North America BSE Mad Cow TSE prion risk factors, and the ever emerging strains of Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy in many species here in the USA, including humans ;

http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/10/efsa-journal-2011-european-response-to.html

Monday, September 26, 2011

L-BSE BASE prion and atypical sporadic CJD

http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2011/09/l-bse-base-prion-and-atypical-sporadic.html

tss

Board advises on increase in BSE testing age FSA

2011-06-10T08:31:00.000-07:00

The Agency has advised Ministers that it would be acceptable to increase the age at which BSE tests are carried out on healthy cattle slaughtered for human consumption.

http://www.wired-gov.net/wg/wg-news-1.nsf/lfi/DNWA-8HPHBS

Food Standards Agency - 10 Jun 2011 15:15

Board advises on increase in BSE testing age

The Agency has advised Ministers that it would be acceptable to increase the age at which BSE tests are carried out on healthy cattle slaughtered for human consumption.

The advice was given following a discussion on proposed changes to BSE testing held at the Board’s open meeting in Belfast on 25 May. The proposal is that the age threshold for healthy cattle slaughtered for human consumption born in the UK and 24 other member states should be increased from 48 to 72 months.

BSE testing requirements for 'risk' cattle (those most likely to test positive for BSE, but not BSE suspects) would remain largely the same and those for BSE suspects (cattle with clinical symptoms of the disease) would not change.

Commenting on the proposed change, FSA director of food safety Alison Gleadle said: 'Numbers of BSE cases have dropped dramatically since the height of the UK's BSE epidemic. In 1992 there were more than 37,000 clinical cases reported. Last year there were just 11 detected via the testing programme – none of which were in cattle slaughtered for human consumption.

'Subject to effective surveillance for BSE continuing to be in place, the Agency believes that increasing the threshold for BSE testing of healthy slaughtered cattle to 72 months would be acceptable on grounds of food safety. The main protection for consumers is through the removal of specified risk material.'

If Ministers agree to proceed with the change, which could take place from 1 July this year, it will be the third major relaxation in BSE controls in the last six years.

In November 2005, the ban on cattle aged over thirty months (OTM) from entering the food chain was replaced with BSE testing of all OTM cattle entering the food chain.

In January 2009, the age threshold at which cattle had to be tested for BSE was increased from 30 months to 48 months.

The latest change would mean that almost all healthy cattle slaughtered for human consumption will not have to be tested until the age of 72 months.

http://www.wired-gov.net/wg/wg-news-1.nsf/lfi/DNWA-8HPHBS

SEAC

POSITION STATEMENT ON THE REQUIREMENTS FOR BSE TESTING OF HEALTHY CATTLE

SEAC was asked by the Food Standards Agency to consider the change in risk to consumers from exposure to BSE that would result if (a) from 2011, the age threshold for BSE testing healthy slaughter cattle was raised from 48 to 72 months and (b) BSE testing of healthy slaughter cattle was to stop altogether.

FSA presented to SEAC an analysis carried out by the Veterinary Laboratories Agency (VLA) assessing the impact of reducing the level of BSE testing of healthy cattle slaughtered for human consumption, using a mathematical model developed at VLA. The model predicts the number of additional infected cattle that would be consumed if monitoring is reduced and estimates the consequent impact on the amount of infectivity entering the food supply.

SEAC advises that in the short-term there is an insignificant additional risk to human health that would result from raising the age for healthy slaughter cattle from 48 to 72 months. The VLA modelling results concur with the low numbers of cattle now being identified with BSE. However, SEAC notes that this conclusion is only valid if the prevalence of BSE in the UK cattle population remains at or decreases from its current value. The current and future validity of this analysis therefore depends critically on the nature and quality of BSE surveillance within the cattle population, and in particular its capacity to ensure the early detection of any re-emerging epidemic. This assessment would equally apply to any proposal to cease altogether the testing of healthy slaughter cattle. SEAC considers that any change in the incidence of BSE is most likely to be detected in fallen stock and casualty animals because of the currently higher likelihood of detecting BSE in these sub-populations. Provided that surveillance of fallen stock and casualty animals is sufficient to provide the necessary information about disease incidence and prevalence, the additional risk to consumers of reducing testing of healthy cattle will remain small.

In addition, SEAC offers the following observations that the FSA and other interested Government Departments might wish to consider:

(a) Surveillance is the only effective means of monitoring changes in the incidence or prevalence of BSE. It is therefore important that current surveillance protocols are kept under review, to ensure that they are capable of detecting an increase in BSE prevalence both in an appropriate time frame and at a suitable sensitivity to detect an

increase in prevalence that would warrant reintroduction of testing healthy slaughtered cattle.

(b) It is not clear that testing a sample of healthy slaughter cattle older than 72 months would provide much useful information: this age group might be sub-optimal. The arguments for random testing of healthy slaughter cattle at this age, compared to other ages, should be considered carefully, taking account of the purpose of this sampling, the sample size and test sensitivity (by incubation period) amongst other considerations.

(c) UK data should continue to be used to demonstrate a decline in the prevalence of BSE in the UK herd, rather than relying on EU-wide figures.

(d) It is instructive to use the VLA model to examine a range of hypothetical rates of increase in BSE infection and the ability of current surveillance measures to detect the change, and this should be repeated as necessary when significant changes to current practices are envisaged.

(e) Changing one BSE control measure can have knock-on effects on other control measures and it is important that the possibility of such interactions is fully taken into account when a proposal such as this is considered.

30 MARCH 2011

http://www.food.gov.uk/multimedia/pdfs/seacstatment.pdf

Related links

BSE

http://www.food.gov.uk/safereating/animaldiseases/bse/

Chair's letters to ministers

http://www.food.gov.uk/multimedia/pdfs/letterstominst.pdf

(pdf 696KB)

Letter from the Chief Medical Officer

http://www.food.gov.uk/multimedia/pdfs/lettermedpfficer.pdf

(pdf 110KB)

Paper considered by SEAC

http://www.food.gov.uk/multimedia/pdfs/paperseac.pdf

(pdf 250KB)

SEAC position statement

http://www.food.gov.uk/multimedia/pdfs/seacstatment.pdf

(pdf 23KB)

END...TSS

Monday, May 12, 2008

BSE YOUNGEST AGE STATISTICS UNDER 30 MONTHS

http://bseyoungestage.blogspot.com/

Wednesday, March 31, 2010

Atypical BSE in Cattle

To date the OIE/WAHO assumes that the human and animal health standards set out in the BSE chapter for classical BSE (C-Type) applies to all forms of BSE which include the H-type and L-type atypical forms. This assumption is scientifically not completely justified and accumulating evidence suggests that this may in fact not be the case. Molecular characterization and the spatial distribution pattern of histopathologic lesions and immunohistochemistry (IHC) signals are used to identify and characterize atypical BSE. Both the L-type and H-type atypical cases display significant differences in the conformation and spatial accumulation of the disease associated prion protein (PrPSc) in brains of afflicted cattle. Transmission studies in bovine transgenic and wild type mouse models support that the atypical BSE types might be unique strains because they have different incubation times and lesion profiles when compared to C-type BSE. When L-type BSE was inoculated into ovine transgenic mice and Syrian hamster the resulting molecular fingerprint had changed, either in the first or a subsequent passage, from L-type into C-type BSE. In addition, non-human primates are specifically susceptible for atypical BSE as demonstrated by an approximately 50% shortened incubation time for L-type BSE as compared to C-type. Considering the current scientific information available, it cannot be assumed that these different BSE types pose the same human health risks as C-type BSE or that these risks are mitigated by the same protective measures.

This study will contribute to a correct definition of specified risk material (SRM) in atypical BSE. The incumbent of this position will develop new and transfer existing, ultra-sensitive methods for the detection of atypical BSE in tissue of experimentally infected cattle.

http://www.prionetcanada.ca/detail.aspx?menu=5&dt=293380&app=93&cat1=387&tp=20&lk=no&cat2

Thursday, August 12, 2010

Seven main threats for the future linked to prions

First threat

The TSE road map defining the evolution of European policy for protection against prion diseases is based on a certain numbers of hypotheses some of which may turn out to be erroneous. In particular, a form of BSE (called atypical Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy), recently identified by systematic testing in aged cattle without clinical signs, may be the origin of classical BSE and thus potentially constitute a reservoir, which may be impossible to eradicate if a sporadic origin is confirmed.

***Also, a link is suspected between atypical BSE and some apparently sporadic cases of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease in humans. These atypical BSE cases constitute an unforeseen first threat that could sharply modify the European approach to prion diseases.

Second threat

snip...

http://www.neuroprion.org/en/np-neuroprion.html http://prionpathy.blogspot.com/2010/08/seven-main-threats-for-future-linked-to.html

Friday, May 13,

2011 EFSA Joint Scientific Opinion on any possible epidemiological or molecular association between TSEs in animals and humans

http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/05/efsa-joint-scientific-opinion-on-any.html

Monday, May 23, 2011

Atypical Prion Diseases in Humans and Animals 2011

Top Curr Chem (2011)

DOI: 10.1007/128_2011_161

# Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2011

Michael A. Tranulis, Sylvie L. Benestad, Thierry Baron, and Hans Kretzschmar

Abstract

Although prion diseases, such as Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (CJD) in humans and scrapie in sheep, have long been recognized, our understanding of their epidemiology and pathogenesis is still in its early stages. Progress is hampered by the lengthy incubation periods and the lack of effective ways of monitoring and characterizing these agents. Protease-resistant conformers of the prion protein (PrP), known as the "scrapie form" (PrPSc), are used as disease markers, and for taxonomic purposes, in correlation with clinical, pathological, and genetic data. In humans, prion diseases can arise sporadically (sCJD) or genetically (gCJD and others), caused by mutations in the PrP-gene (PRNP), or as a foodborne infection, with the agent of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) causing variant CJD (vCJD). Person-to-person spread of human prion disease has only been known to occur following cannibalism (kuru disease in Papua New Guinea) or through medical or surgical treatment (iatrogenic CJD, iCJD). In contrast, scrapie in small ruminants and chronic wasting disease (CWD) in cervids behave as infectious diseases within these species. Recently, however, so-called atypical forms of prion diseases have been discovered in sheep (atypical/Nor98 scrapie) and in cattle, BSE-H and BSE-L. These maladies resemble sporadic or genetic human prion diseases and might be their animal equivalents. This hypothesis also raises the significant public health question of possible epidemiological links between these diseases and their counterparts in humans.

M.A. Tranulis (*)

Norwegian School of Veterinary Science, Oslo, Norway

e-mail: Michael.Tranulis@nvh.no

S.L. Benestad

Norwegian Veterinary Institute, Oslo, Norway

T. Baron

Agence Nationale de Se´curite´ Sanitaire, ANSES, Lyon, France

H. Kretzschmar

Ludwig-Maximilians University of Munich, Munich, Germany

Keywords Animal Atypical Atypical/Nor98 scrapie BSE-H BSE-L Human Prion disease Prion strain Prion type

http://resources.metapress.com/pdf-preview.axd?code=f433r34h34ugg617&size=largest

snip...SEE MORE HERE ;

http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2011/05/atypical-prion-diseases-in-humans-and.html

Thursday, June 2, 2011

USDA scrapie report for April 2011 NEW ATYPICAL NOR-98 SCRAPIE CASES Pennsylvania AND California

http://nor-98.blogspot.com/2011/06/usda-scrapie-report-for-april-2011-new.html

Scientific Report of the European Food Safety Authority on the Assessment of the Geographical BSE Risk (GBR) of the USA Question number: EFSA-Q-2003-083

Adopted: 1 July 2004

Summary

The European Food Safety Authority and its Scientific Expert Working Group on the Assessment of the Geographical Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Risk (GBR) were asked by the European Commission (EC) to provide an up-to-date scientific report on the GBR in the United States of America, i.e. the likelihood of the presence of one or more cattle being infected with BSE, pre-clinically as well as clinically, in USA. This scientific report addresses the GBR of USA as assessed in 2004 based on data covering the period 1980-2003.

The BSE agent was probably imported into USA and could have reached domestic cattle in the middle of the eighties. These cattle imported in the mid eighties could have been rendered in the late eighties and therefore led to an internal challenge in the early nineties. It is possible that imported meat and bone meal (MBM) into the USA reached domestic cattle and leads to an internal challenge in the early nineties.

A processing risk developed in the late 80s/early 90s when cattle imports from BSE risk countries were slaughtered or died and were processed (partly) into feed, together with some imports of MBM. This risk continued to exist, and grew significantly in the mid 90’s when domestic cattle, infected by imported MBM, reached processing. Given the low stability of the system, the risk increased over the years with continued imports of cattle and MBM from BSE risk countries.

EFSA concludes that the current GBR level of USA is III, i.e. it is likely but not confirmed that domestic cattle are (clinically or pre-clinically) infected with the BSE-agent. As long as there are no significant changes in rendering or feeding, the stability remains extremely/very unstable. Thus, the probability of cattle to be (pre-clinically or clinically) infected with the BSE-agent persistently increases.

http://www.efsa.europa.eu/EFSA/efsa_locale-1178620753812_1211902594180.htm

Annex to the EFSA Scientific Report (2004) 3, 1-17 on the Assessment of the Geographical BSE Risk of USA - 1 - European Food Safety Authority Scientific Expert Working Group on GBR Working Group Report on the Assessment of the Geographical BSE-Risk (GBR) of UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 2004

http://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/scdocs/doc/3rax1.pdf

Sunday, May 01, 2011

STUDY OF ATYPICAL BSE 2010 Annual Report May 2011

http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2011/05/study-of-atypical-bse-2010-annual.html

What is the potential cost of pre- and post-slaughter testing? The estimated cost of post-mortem testing is $40 per head. This amount is comprised almost entirely of the cost of the test kit and sample analysis. It is expected that ante-mortem tests (live animal), if a test is developed, will reduce BSE testing costs to approximately $15 per head.

http://www.prionetcanada.ca/detail.aspx?menu=12&dt=293720&app=70&cat1=211&tp=12&lk=no

Monday, May 23, 2011

CDC Assesses Potential Human Exposure to Prion Diseases Travel Warning

http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/05/cdc-assesses-potential-human-exposure.html

Wednesday, July 28, 2010

Atypical prion proteins and IBNC in cattle DEFRA project code SE1796 FOIA Final report

http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2010/07/atypical-prion-proteins-and-ibnc-in.html

IBNC

"All of the 15 cattle tested showed that the brains had abnormally accumulated prion protein."

Saturday, February 28, 2009

NEW RESULTS ON IDIOPATHIC BRAINSTEM NEURONAL CHROMATOLYSIS "All of the 15 cattle tested showed that the brains had abnormally accumulated PrP" 2009

SEAC 102/2

http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2009/02/new-results-on-idiopathic-brainstem.html

2009 UPDATE ON ALABAMA AND TEXAS MAD COWS 2005 and 2006

http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2006/08/bse-atypical-texas-and-alabama-update.html

Tuesday, April 26, 2011

sporadic CJD RISING Text and figures of the latest annual report of the NCJDRSU covering the period 1990-2009 (published 11th March 2011)

http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2011/04/sporadic-cjd-rising-text-and-figures-of.html

Saturday, March 5, 2011

MAD COW ATYPICAL CJD PRION TSE CASES WITH CLASSIFICATIONS PENDING ON THE RISE IN NORTH AMERICA

http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/03/mad-cow-atypical-cjd-prion-tse-cases.html

Tuesday, April 26, 2011

sporadic CJD RISING Text and figures of the latest annual report of the NCJDRSU covering the period 1990-2009 (published 11th March 2011)

http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2011/04/sporadic-cjd-rising-text-and-figures-of.html

something that disturbs me very much, iatrogenic prion TSE exposure and accumulation there from all of the above ???

Tuesday, March 29, 2011

TRANSMISSIBLE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY EXPOSURE SPREADING VIA HOSPITALS AND SURGICAL PROCEDURES AROUND THE GLOBE

http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/03/transmissible-spongiform-encephalopathy.html

TSS

Bovine spongiform encephalopathy, Switzerland O.I.E. report

2011-05-03T10:17:00.000-07:00

Bovine spongiform encephalopathy, Switzerland

Information received on 03/05/2011 from Mr Hans Wyss, Chief Veterinary Officer, Schwarzenburgstrasse 161, Swiss Federal Veterinary Office, LIEBEFELD BERNE, Switzerland

Summary

Report type Immediate notification (Final report) Start date 08/04/2011 Date of first confirmation of the event 18/04/2011 Report date 03/05/2011 Date submitted to OIE 03/05/2011 Date event resolved 03/05/2011 Reason for notification Reoccurrence of a listed disease Date of previous occurrence 10/2006 Manifestation of disease Sub-clinical infection Causal agent Prion Nature of diagnosis Laboratory (advanced) This event pertains to the whole country

New outbreaks Summary of outbreaks Total outbreaks: 1 Location(s) SANKT GALLEN (Sankt Gallen)

Total animals affected Species Susceptible Cases Deaths Destroyed Slaughtered Cattle 32 1 0 1 0

Outbreak statistics Species Apparent morbidity rate Apparent mortality rate Apparent case fatality rate Proportion susceptible animals lost* Cattle 3.13% 0.00% 0.00% 3.13%

* Removed from the susceptible population through death, destruction and/or slaughter

Epidemiology Source of the outbreak(s) or origin of infection Unknown or inconclusive

Control measures Measures applied No vaccination No treatment of affected animals

Measures to be applied No other measures

Diagnostic test results Laboratory name and type National Reference Laboratory (National laboratory) Tests and results Species Test Test date Result Cattle western blotting 18/04/2011 Positive

Future Reporting The event is resolved. No more reports will be submitted.

http://web.oie.int/wahis/public.php?page=single_report&pop=1&reportid=10546

Switzerland sporadic CJD ; Swiss rise in CJD raises concerns over possible BSE link [LONDON]

THE LANCET

Plaque attack: Swiss patients have spongiform patterns in the brain typical of sporadic CJD. The number of people dying from Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (CJD) has risen sharply in Switzerland -- sparking fears of a possible link with bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE). BSE is thought to be the cause of a distinctive form of the brain-wasting disease known as variant CJD. The Swiss cases, in contrast, are standard 'sporadic' CJD. Each year between 1997 and 2000, no more than 11 Swiss people developed CJD. But 19 cases were reported in 2001, and seven were recorded in the first quarter of this year. This is some four times higher than the incidence elsewhere, reports a team led by Adriano Aguzzi of the University Hospital Zurich (M. Glatzel et al. Lancet 360, 139-141; 2002). The increase could be a mere statistical blip, or it may be due to increased awareness of the disease leading to more diagnoses. More disturbing is the possibility that the cases are linked to the consumption of BSE-infected meat products -- which would mean that the BSE agent can cause two distinct forms of CJD. Possible links between the Swiss CJD cases and BSE will now be explored by strain-typing experiments in which the disease is transmitted to mice. These tests will take at least a year to complete. "It's the best way to establish or exclude any suspected link," says Moira Bruce of the UK Institute for Animal Health's Neuropathogenesis Unit in Edinburgh.

======================================

Experiences in England and Switzerland -- two countries that discovered mad cow disease in their cattle -- have heightened concerns about the possibility some cases of sporadic CJD are due to consuming mad-cow-tainted beef. Both countries have reported increases in sporadic CJD since mad cow was first detected in British herds in 1986. Switzerland discovered last year its CJD rate was twice that of any other country in the world. Switzerland had been seeing about eight to 11 cases per year from 1997 to 2000. Then the incidence more than doubled, to 19 cases in 2001 and 18 cases in 2002.

http://www.upi.com/view.cfm?StoryID=20030721-102924-4786r

Mouse model sheds new light on human prion disease

snip...

Professor John Collinge said We are not saying that all or even most cases of sporadic CJD are as a result of BSE exposure, but some more recent cases may be the incidence of sporadic CJD has shown an upward trend in the UK over the last decade. While most of this apparent increase may be because doctors are now more aware of CJD and better at diagnosing it, serious consideration should be given to a proportion of this rise being BSE-related. Switzerland, which has had a substantial BSE epidemic, has noted a sharp recent increase in sporadic CJD.

snip...

http://www.mrc.ac.uk/txt/index/public-interest/public-news-4/public-news_archive/public-news-archive_nov_dec_02/public-bse_and_sporadic_cjd.htm

Monday, May 19, 2008

SPORADIC CJD IN FARMERS, FARMERS WIVES, FROM FARMS WITH BSE HERD AND ABATTOIRS

http://bseinquiry.blogspot.com/

Thursday, August 12, 2010

Seven main threats for the future linked to prions First threat The TSE road map defining the evolution of European policy for protection against prion diseases is based on a certain numbers of hypotheses some of which may turn out to be erroneous. In particular, a form of BSE (called atypical Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy), recently identified by systematic testing in aged cattle without clinical signs, may be the origin of classical BSE and thus potentially constitute a reservoir, which may be impossible to eradicate if a sporadic origin is confirmed.

***Also, a link is suspected between atypical BSE and some apparently sporadic cases of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease in humans. These atypical BSE cases constitute an unforeseen first threat that could sharply modify the European approach to prion diseases.

Second threat

snip...

http://www.neuroprion.org/en/np-neuroprion.html

http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2011/04/sporadic-cjd-rising-text-and-figures-of.html

Saturday, March 5, 2011

MAD COW ATYPICAL CJD PRION TSE CASES WITH CLASSIFICATIONS PENDING ON THE RISE IN NORTH AMERICA

http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/03/mad-cow-atypical-cjd-prion-tse-cases.html

Sunday, May 01, 2011

STUDY OF ATYPICAL BSE 2010 Annual Report May 2011

http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2011/05/study-of-atypical-bse-2010-annual.html

Monday, April 25, 2011

Experimental Oral Transmission of Atypical Scrapie to Sheep

Volume 17, Number 5–May 2011

http://nor-98.blogspot.com/2011/04/experimental-oral-transmission-of.html

"THE OIE has now shown they are nothing more than a National Trading Brokerage for all strains of animal TSE. AS i said before, OIE should hang up there jock strap now, since it appears they will buckle every time a country makes some political hay about trade protocol, commodities and futures. IF they are not going to be science based, they should do everyone a favor and dissolve there organization."

NOW, some history on the failed OIE BSE/TSE policy, and why the OIE allowed BSE and other TSE to spread around the globe $$$

while i applaud Switerland for reporting this case of BSE, i must say again that the OIE is a failed organization. to have a reporting system set up for TSE that only reports a case of TSE when a country sees fit to report a case, and only relies on the GOOD WORD of a country, is a failed system. apparently, the USA and Canada and Mexico i.e. North America, is exempt from the OIE reporting base of TSE on the OIE news feed. ...tss

Scrapie

The two Commissions discussed the issue of ‘atypical’ scrapie in terms of notification requirements and the issue of the host genetic resistance. In response to questions of Members, the Code Commission clarified that ‘classical’ scrapie is reportable to the OIE but that ‘atypical’ scrapie is not reportable (in accordance with the recommendations made by the ad hoc Group on Atypical Scrapie and Atypical BSE, which met in November 2007). However, the sharing of scientific information on ‘atypical’ scrapie is encouraged. At this time, the Code Commission considered that more scientific information would be needed to fully address the issues associated with host genotype.

EU comment

4

OIE Terrestrial Animal Health Standards Commission / September 2010

The EU takes note of the fact that atypical scrapie is not an OIE listed disease. Nevertheless, it will remain notifiable in the EU. Moreover it must be stressed that any emergence of this disease should be notified to the OIE by Members and that scientific data should continue to be gathered.

snip...

Zoonotic Potential

Has transmission to humans been proven? (with the exception of artificial circumstances) AND Is human infection associated with severe consequences? (death or prolonged illness)

http://ec.europa.eu/food/international/organisations/docs/EU_comments_OIE_terrestrial_animal_health_code_en.pdf

What is Nor98-Like (Nonclassical) Scrapie?

Nor98-like scrapie is a prion disease. The prion diseases include classical scrapie in sheep and goats, Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) primarily of cattle, chronic wasting disease (CWD) of deer and elk, and in humans Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (CJD) and variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (vCJD). What each of these diseases has in common is that they cause a progressive and ultimately fatal degeneration of the nervous system. While the underlying cause(s) are still debated, the theory most widely accepted in the scientific community is that the agent is a prion – an abnormal form of a normally occurring cellular protein.

Unlike BSE, classical scrapie and Nor98-like scrapie have not been shown to be a threat to human health. Classical scrapie has been known to exist for over 250 years, and cases have occurred in the United States since 1947. It is likely that Nor98-like scrapie has also existed for a long time; however, it was first identified in Norway in 1998, hence the name Nor98. This type of scrapie is referred to as “atypical scrapie”, “Nor98 scrapie”, “Nor98-like scrapie”, or “nonclassical scrapie” in the literature.

Since 1998, almost every country in Europe, as well as the Falkland Islands, New Zealand, Canada, and the United States have found similar cases. The first cases in the United States were identified in 2007.

Nor98-like (nonclassical) scrapie and classical scrapie are separate diseases with distinct features.

Transmission

Classical scrapie is an infectious disease that is transmitted to other sheep and goats under natural conditions.

Nor98-like scrapie is either not transmitted or is poorly transmitted, under natural conditions. Many scientists believe that Nor98-like scrapie is not an infectious disease under natural conditions and that it is instead caused by a random conversion of the normal prion protein into the abnormal form (often referred to as “sporadic”).

Distribution

Nor98-like scrapie has been found in all countries where extensive surveillance has been conducted using sensitive test methods; whereas, classical scrapie has not been reported in some of these countries.

Nor98-like scrapie cases are widely distributed and proportionate with sheep/goat populations; whereas, classical scrapie cases often occur in clusters.

Number of affected sheep or goats in a flock or herd

Classical scrapie usually infects more than one animal in an infected flock. In the US, approximately 18 percent of the mature, genetically susceptible sheep in an infected flock are infected.

Nor98-like scrapie is rarely found in more than one animal in a flock or herd. When an additional case is found, it is usually in flocks with more than 500 sheep.

Average age of onset of clinical signs in animals

With classical scrapie, clinical signs typically first appear and result in death in animals that are between 3-5 years of age.

In Nor98-like scrapie, clinical signs are rarely documented and the animals are typically diagnosed when they are sampled at slaughter, usually at greater than 5 years of age.

Variations in protection against disease conferred by genotype

Sheep with genotypes that are resistant to classical scrapie are susceptible to Nor98-like scrapie.

Clinical signs associated with disease

Unlike classical scrapie, clinical signs are rarely reported in Nor98-like scrapie cases.

In the few Nor98-like scrapie cases where clinical signs were reported, the signs observed were indistinguishable from those described for classical scrapie. These include incoordination, gait abnormalities, collapse while running, tremors, loss of condition, leg biting, nibble response and/or behavioral changes.

One potential clinical difference is that intense rubbing is a frequently occurring clinical sign in classical scrapie cases; whereas, it has not been reported in Nor98-like scrapie cases.

Laboratory findings readily distinguish Nor98-like scrapie from classical scrapie.

In 2009, the World Animal Health Organization (OIE) recognized Nor98-like scrapie as a separate disease from classical scrapie because of differences in laboratory findings, transmissibility, and distribution. This determination means that Nor98-like scrapie is not a reportable disease to OIE, and should be of no trade concern.

How has APHIS’ policy changed regarding Nor98-like scrapie?

APHIS will no longer require the depopulation or movement restriction of Nor98-like scrapie exposed sheep and goats. APHIS will propose changes to the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) in 2010 to allow the APHIS Administrator to eliminate or reduce post exposure requirements for certain scrapie types (or certain/specific types of scrapie)-- such as Nor98-like scrapie -- that are determined to pose minimal risk of lateral transmission under natural conditions.

In the meantime, APHIS is conducting a national scrapie control pilot project for Nor98-like scrapie. The project is for flocks and herds in which animals positive to Nor98-like scrapie were born, lambed, or kidded.

What will the pilot project do for producers?

The pilot project will allow producers that have sheep and goats exposed to Nor98-like (nonclassical) scrapie to retain, sell, exhibit or move them for any purpose.

What will happen if Nor98-like scrapie case is found on or traced back to an owner’s flock or herd?

The owner will be contacted by a Federal or State veterinarian who will schedule a visit to the farm with the owner. The activities listed below will be performed.

Confirm the identification of the positive animal.

Provide the owner with information about scrapie and its control.

Determine if the positive animal was born in or gave birth in the flock/herd. If so, the veterinarian will:

Work with state animal health authority to ensure animals are not moved from the premises until they have been officially identified;

Develop a Nor98-like scrapie flock plan and a 5 year monitoring plan with the producer;

If not already officially identified, apply official eartags to sheep and goats exposed to Nor98-like scrapie; and

Inventory all sheep and goats, and any sheep or goat embryos.

The officially identified sheep and goats will then be classified and handled as low-risk exposed animals, allowing the owner to move the animals from the premises for any purpose including sale.

http://www.aphis.usda.gov/animal_health/animal_diseases/scrapie/downloads/nor98-like_information.pdf

SCRAPIE The United States is unable to support the proposed new draft Code Chapter on Scrapie. The draft chapter, as written, departs significantly from the existing chapter, is confusing and is difficult to understand. This version of the scrapie chapter uses much of the same wording as the BSE chapter and is written as if the predominance of evidence revealed that scrapie was a food-borne disease similar to BSE in cattle which is inappropriate. Moreover, several of the new changes are not supported by current scientific evidence. As a result, detailed comments on individual articles would not meaningful at this time. The United States is not supportive of the proposed draft chapter for the following reasons: 1. Inclusion of “atypical” scrapie: The scientific evidence indicates that “atypical” scrapie, also referred to as Nor-98, Nor-98-like, or non-classical scrapie, is not the same disease as classical scrapie. Further, “atypical” scrapie does not meet the criteria for listing diseases of trade concern by the OIE, as described in Chapter 2.1.1 of the Code. The United States recommends that the scope of this chapter be limited to classical scrapie in sheep and goats. Further, the United States recommends that OIE clearly adopt the position that “atypical” scrapie represents a distinct disease entity from classical scrapie and that it not be a listed disease. • There is no evidence that “atypical” scrapie is a contagious disease. If it is contagious, available evidence suggests that it has a much lower transmission efficiency. (Hopp, et al, 2006; Green, et al, 2007; Benestad, et al 2008; McIntyre, et al, 2008) • The disease appears to be ubiquitous in that it has been found wherever sufficient surveillance has been conducted. (Buschmann et al, 2004; De Bosschere et al, 2004; Orge, et al, 2004; Everest et al, 2006; Arsac, 2007; Benestad, et al 2008; Fediaevsky, et al, 2008) • The disease does not appear to be economically significant in that the prevalence of clinical disease is low and it typically occurs in older animals. (Luhken, et al., 2007; Benestad, et al 2008). • The disease is as likely as not to be the result of a spontaneous conversion of normal prion protein. (Benestad, et al 2008, De Bosschere et al 2007) • Removal of exposed sheep is unlikely to reduce the prevalence of “atypical” scrapie infection and removing only those exposed sheep that are phenylalanine (F) at codon 141 is scientifically unsound since the disease is known to affect sheep of most other genotypes. Further, sheep with AHQ alleles have a similar risk of infection with “atypical” strains as sheep with F at codon 141. (Luhken, et al., 2007). • If “atypical” scrapie is included as a listed disease, the surveillance and diagnostic requirements which are needed to identify these cases should be described in detail in both this Chapter and the Manual of Diagnostic Tests and Vaccines for Terrestrial 2 Animals. Data from Europe illustrates that using the proper test(s) is essential for the identification of atypical scrapie (Fediaevsky et al., 2008).

SNIP...

6. Overemphasis on importation and use of bovine meat and bone meal as a route of scrapie transmission: Given that the draft Chapter is not intended to address risk mitigation for BSE in small ruminants, we believe there is an over-emphasis on this potential route of transmission in the current draft. The United States recommends that the requirements in this chapter be limited to the inclusion of products from sheep and goats (instead of from all ruminants) in feed or feed ingredients intended for consumption by animals • The use of products from sheep and goats as feed or feed ingredients for ruminant or non-ruminant animals represent one possible route of transmission (Philippe, et al, 2005) and a source of environmental contamination with the classical scrapie agent. However, this is not the primary route of transmission for the scrapie agent. • The need for the exclusion of cattle-derived protein or other animal protein to mitigate BSE risk should be based on a country’s BSE risk status and should be addressed in Chapter 2.3.13 of the Code.

SNIP...

14. Failure to provide scientific justification for the list of permitted commodities in Item 1 of Article 2.4.8.1. . We recommend that the list be re-evaluated and those items that have not been substantiated as presenting no risk be excluded or those with some risk but where the intended use mitigates the risk the use be specified. • There is no known human health risk associated with scrapie. As such, if meat and meat products for human consumption are included in this list, sheep and/or goat milk intended for human consumption should also be added to the list of permitted commodities in Item 1 of Article 2.4.8.1. • In the vast majority of sheep infected with classical scrapie, actual infectivity or PrPres has been identified in most tissues including the lymphoreticular system (tonsils, spleen, lymph nodes), the gastrointestinal tract, brain, and spinal cord (Hadlow et. al. 1979; Hadlow et al., 1980; van Kuelen et al., 1996; van Kuelen et al., 1999, Andreoletti et al., 2000; Heggebø et al., 2002; Caplazi et al., 2004). Infectivity and/or PrPres has also been identified in the placenta (see Hourrigan et al., 1979; Onodera et al., 1993; Pattison et al., 1972; Pattison et al., 1974; Race et al., 1998), blood (Hunter et al., 2002; Houston et al. 2008); peripheral nerves (Groschup et al., 1996), muscle (Pattison and Millson, 1962; Andreoletti et al., 2004; Casalone et al., 2005), salivary gland (Hadlow et al., 1980; Vascellari et al., 2007), kidney (Siso et al., 2006), and skin ( Thomzig et al., 2007). In addition, recent work has shown milk and/or colostrum from scrapie infected ewes transmitted the disease to 17 of 18 lambs (Konold et al., 2008). • The data on the risk of low protein tallow made from scrapie infected tissues particularly for use in milk replacer is limited and some epidemiologic studies suggest an association of milk replacer use with scrapie risk. Taylor et al., 1997 examined the inactivation capacity of different rendering system in regards to scrapie. The presence of infectivity was determined by bioassay into mice. From the onset of this study, it was assumed that tallow was not the vehicle for the transmission of TSE. Hence only 2 tallow samples were examined.

http://www.aphis.usda.gov/import_export/animals/oie/downloads/tahc_mar-sep08/tahc-scrapie-77-mar08_cmt.pdf

Increased Atypical Scrapie Detections

Press reports indicate that increased surveillance is catching what otherwise would have been unreported findings of atypical scrapie in sheep. In 2009, five new cases have been reported in Quebec, Ontario, Alberta, and Saskatchewan. With the exception of Quebec, all cases have been diagnosed as being the atypical form found in older animals. Canada encourages producers to join its voluntary surveillance program in order to gain scrapie-free status. The World Animal Health will not classify Canada as scrapie-free until no new cases are reported for seven years. The Canadian Sheep Federation is calling on the government to fund a wider surveillance program in order to establish the level of prevalence prior to setting an eradication date. Besides long-term testing, industry is calling for a compensation program for farmers who report unusual deaths in their flocks.

http://gain.fas.usda.gov/Recent%20GAIN%20Publications/This%20Week%20in%20Canadian%20Agriculture%20%20%20%20%20Issue%2028_Ottawa_Canada_11-6-2009.pdf

Saturday, December 18, 2010

OIE Global Conference on Wildlife Animal Health and Biodiversity - Preparing for the Future (TSE AND PRIONS) Paris (France), 23-25 February 2011

http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2010/12/oie-global-conference-on-wildlife.html

Monday, April 25, 2011

Experimental Oral Transmission of Atypical Scrapie to Sheep

Volume 17, Number 5–May 2011

http://nor-98.blogspot.com/2011/04/experimental-oral-transmission-of.html

Friday, March 4, 2011

Alberta dairy cow found with mad cow disease

http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/03/alberta-dairy-cow-found-with-mad-cow.html

Wednesday, August 11, 2010

REPORT ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE SIXTEENTH CASE OF BOVINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY (BSE) IN CANADA

http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2010/08/report-on-investigation-of-sixteenth.html

Thursday, August 19, 2010

REPORT ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE SEVENTEENTH CASE OF BOVINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY (BSE) IN CANADA

http://bseusa.blogspot.com/2010/08/report-on-investigation-of-seventeenth.html

Thursday, February 10, 2011

TRANSMISSIBLE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY REPORT UPDATE CANADA FEBRUARY 2011 a nd how to hide mad cow disease in Canada Current as of: 2011-01-31

http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2011/02/transmissible-spongiform-encephalopathy.html

i wonder if CFIA Canada uses the same OBEX ONLY diagnostic criteria as the USDA ?

Tuesday, November 02, 2010

BSE - ATYPICAL LESION DISTRIBUTION (RBSE 92-21367) statutory (obex only) diagnostic criteria CVL 1992

http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2010/11/bse-atypical-lesion-distribution-rbse.html

Sunday, March 27, 2011

SCRAPIE USA UPDATE FEBRUARY 2011

http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/03/scrapie-usa-update-february-2011.html

Monday, April 25, 2011

Experimental Oral Transmission of Atypical Scrapie to Sheep

Volume 17, Number 5-May 2011

http://nor-98.blogspot.com/2011/04/experimental-oral-transmission-of.html

Wednesday, March 9, 2011

27 U.S. Senators want to force feed Japan Highly Potential North America Mad Cow Beef TSE PRION CJD

March 8, 2011

President Barack Obama The White House

1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, W Washington, DC 20500

Dear President Obama:

http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/03/27-us-senators-want-to-force-feed-japan.html

TSS

Bull aged over 48 months enters food supply without being tested for BSE Monday 18 April 2011

2011-04-19T08:50:00.000-07:00

Bull aged over 48 months enters food supply without being tested for BSE Monday 18 April 2011

The Agency has been notified that meat has entered the food supply from a bull aged over 48 months that had not been tested for BSE. A negative BSE test result is mandatory for cattle slaughtered for human consumption at over 48 months of age.

It is very unlikely that the bull was infected with BSE and as specified risk material (SRM) was removed, any risk to human health is extremely low. SRM is that part of the animal most likely to contain BSE infectivity.

The bull, aged 88 months, was slaughtered at S J Norman & Sons’ abattoir in Bridport, Dorset on 3 February 2011. The error was discovered on 5 April in the course of routine cross-checks of slaughter and BSE test data.

According to BSE regulations, the untested bull should not have entered the food supply. However, by the time the failure was discovered, the carcass had left the premises.

Subsequent checks indicate that all the meat from the carcass is no longer traceable and is likely to have been eaten.

http://www.food.gov.uk/news/newsarchive/2011/apr/otmbull

Wednesday, April 13, 2011

Joint consultation by the FSA, Defra and Welsh Assembly Government on proposed changes to BSE testing of cattle slaughtered for human consumption

http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2011/04/joint-consultation-by-fsa-defra-and.html

The drawbacks of allowing testing relate to the potential to negatively impact consumer attitudes toward untested beef, lack of support from regulators, and the prospect that testing, especially under a future ante mortem test, might identify positive cases and adversely impact Canada‘s BSE risk status.

SEE FULL TEXT ;

http://prioninstitute.ca/forms/BSE%20Testing%20Final-revised%20%20Plus%20App%20C%20AM%20Mar%2029.pdf

Saturday, January 29, 2011

Atypical L-Type Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (L-BSE) Transmission to Cynomolgus Macaques, a Non-Human Primate

Jpn. J. Infect. Dis., 64 (1), 81-84, 2011

http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/01/atypical-l-type-bovine-spongiform.html

Monday, May 11, 2009

Rare BSE mutation raises concerns over risks to public health

http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2009/05/rare-bse-mutation-raises-concerns-over.html

The most recent assessments (and reassessments) were published in June 2005 (Table I; 18), and included the categorisation of Canada, the USA, and Mexico as GBR III. Although only Canada and the USA have reported cases, the historically open system of trade in North America suggests that it is likely that BSE is present also in Mexico.

http://www.oie.int/boutique/extrait/06heim937950.pdf

Wednesday, August 11, 2010

REPORT ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE SIXTEENTH CASE OF BOVINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY (BSE) IN CANADA

http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2010/08/report-on-investigation-of-sixteenth.html

Thursday, August 19, 2010

REPORT ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE SEVENTEENTH CASE OF BOVINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY (BSE) IN CANADA

http://bseusa.blogspot.com/2010/08/report-on-investigation-of-seventeenth.html

Thursday, February 10, 2011

TRANSMISSIBLE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY REPORT UPDATE CANADA FEBRUARY 2011 and how to hide mad cow disease in Canada Current as of: 2011-01-31

http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2011/02/transmissible-spongiform-encephalopathy.html

Friday, March 4, 2011

Alberta dairy cow found with mad cow disease

http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/03/alberta-dairy-cow-found-with-mad-cow.html

i wonder if CFIA Canada uses the same OBEX ONLY diagnostic criteria as the USDA ? they could not have found a mad cow if they were standing beside the stumbling and staggering bovine $$$, using the diagnostic criteria they were using, AND TOLD SO, but they kept on doing it anyway. ...

Tuesday, November 02, 2010

BSE - ATYPICAL LESION DISTRIBUTION (RBSE 92-21367) statutory (obex only) diagnostic criteria CVL 1992

http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2010/11/bse-atypical-lesion-distribution-rbse.html

Wednesday, November 17, 2010

MAD COW TESTING FAKED IN USA BY Nebraska INSPECTOR Senator Mike Johanns STATE

http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2010/11/mad-cow-testing-faked-in-usa-by.html

Friday, February 18, 2011

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA VS GALEN J. NIEHUES FAKED MAD COW FEED TEST ON 92 BSE INSPECTION REPORTS FOR APPROXIMATELY 100 CATTLE OPERATIONS ''PLEADS GUILTY"

http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2011/02/united-states-of-america-vs-galen-j.html

Subject: USDA OIG SEMIANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS FY 2007 1st Half (bogus BSE sampling FROM HEALTHY USDA CATTLE) Date: June 21, 2007 at 2:49 pm PST

Owner and Corporation Plead Guilty to Defrauding Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Surveillance Program

An Arizona meat processing company and its owner pled guilty in February 2007 to charges of theft of Government funds, mail fraud, and wire fraud. The owner and his company defrauded the BSE Surveillance Program when they falsified BSE Surveillance Data Collection Forms and then submitted payment requests to USDA for the services. In addition to the targeted sample population (those cattle that were more than 30 months old or had other risk factors for BSE), the owner submitted to USDA, or caused to be submitted, BSE obex (brain stem) samples from healthy USDA-inspected cattle. As a result, the owner fraudulently received approximately $390,000. Sentencing is scheduled for May 2007.

snip...

Topics that will be covered in ongoing or planned reviews under Goal 1 include:

soundness of BSE maintenance sampling (APHIS),

implementation of Performance-Based Inspection System enhancements for specified risk material (SRM) violations and improved inspection controls over SRMs (FSIS and APHIS),

snip...

The findings and recommendations from these efforts will be covered in future semiannual reports as the relevant audits and investigations are completed.

4 USDA OIG SEMIANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS FY 2007 1st Half

http://www.usda.gov/oig/webdocs/sarc070619.pdf

THE USDA JUNE 2004 ENHANCED BSE SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM WAS TERRIBLY FLAWED ;

CDC DR. PAUL BROWN TSE EXPERT COMMENTS 2006

In an article today for United Press International, science reporter Steve Mitchell writes:

Analysis: What that mad cow means

By STEVE MITCHELL UPI Senior Medical Correspondent

WASHINGTON, March 15 (UPI) -- The U.S. Department of Agriculture was quick to assure the public earlier this week that the third case of mad cow disease did not pose a risk to them, but what federal officials have not acknowledged is that this latest case indicates the deadly disease has been circulating in U.S. herds for at least a decade.

The second case, which was detected last year in a Texas cow and which USDA officials were reluctant to verify, was approximately 12 years old.

These two cases (the latest was detected in an Alabama cow) present a picture of the disease having been here for 10 years or so, since it is thought that cows usually contract the disease from contaminated feed they consume as calves. The concern is that humans can contract a fatal, incurable, brain-wasting illness from consuming beef products contaminated with the mad cow pathogen.

"The fact the Texas cow showed up fairly clearly implied the existence of other undetected cases," Dr. Paul Brown, former medical director of the National Institutes of Health's Laboratory for Central Nervous System Studies and an expert on mad cow-like diseases, told United Press International. "The question was, 'How many?' and we still can't answer that."

Brown, who is preparing a scientific paper based on the latest two mad cow cases to estimate the maximum number of infected cows that occurred in the United States, said he has "absolutely no confidence in USDA tests before one year ago" because of the agency's reluctance to retest the Texas cow that initially tested positive.

USDA officials finally retested the cow and confirmed it was infected seven months later, but only at the insistence of the agency's inspector general.

"Everything they did on the Texas cow makes everything they did before 2005 suspect," Brown said.

Despite this, Brown said the U.S. prevalence of mad cow, formally known as bovine spongiform encephalopathy, or BSE, did not significantly threaten human or cattle health.

"Overall, my view is BSE is highly unlikely to pose any important risk either in cattle feed or human feed," he said.

However, Jean Halloran of Consumers Union in Yonkers, N.Y., said consumers should be troubled by the USDA's secrecy and its apparent plan to dramatically cut back the number of mad cow tests it conducts.

"Consumers should be very concerned about how little we know about the USDA's surveillance program and the failure of the USDA to reveal really important details," Halloran told UPI. "Consumers have to be really concerned if they're going to cut back the program," she added.

Last year the USDA tested more than 300,000 animals for the disease, but it has proposed, even in light of a third case, scaling back the program to 40,000 tests annually.

"They seem to be, in terms of actions and policies, taking a lot more seriously the concerns of the cattle industry than the concerns of consumers," Halloran said. "It's really hard to know what it takes to get this administration to take action to protect the public."

The USDA has insisted that the safeguards of a ban on incorporating cow tissue into cattle feed (which is thought to spread the disease) and removal of the most infectious parts of cows, such as the brain and spinal cord, protect consumers. But the agency glosses over the fact that both of these systems have been revealed to be inadequately implemented.

The feed ban, which is enforced by the Food and Drug Administration, has been criticized by the Government Accountability Office in two reports, the most recent coming just last year. The GAO said the FDA's enforcement of the ban continues to have weaknesses that "undermine the nation's firewall against BSE."

USDA documents released last year showed more than 1,000 violations of the regulations requiring the removal of brains and spinal cords in at least 35 states, Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands, with some plants being cited repeatedly for infractions. In addition, a violation of similar regulations that apply to beef exported to Japan is the reason why Japan closed its borders to U.S. beef in January six weeks after reopening them.

Other experts also question the adequacy of the USDA's surveillance system. The USDA insists the prevalence of mad cow disease is low, but the agency has provided few details of its surveillance program, making it difficult for outside experts to know if the agency's monitoring plan is sufficient.

"It's impossible to judge the adequacy of the surveillance system without having a breakdown of the tested population by age and risk status," Elizabeth Mumford, a veterinarian and BSE expert at Safe Food Solutions in Bern, Switzerland, a company that provides advice on reducing mad cow risk to industry and governments, told UPI.

"Everybody would be happier and more confident and in a sense it might be able to go away a little bit for (the USDA) if they would just publish a breakdown on the tests," Mumford added.

UPI requested detailed records about animals tested under the USDA's surveillance plan via the Freedom of Information Act in May 2004 but nearly two years later has not received any corresponding documents from the agency, despite a federal law requiring agencies to comply within 30 days. This leaves open the question of whether the USDA is withholding the information, does not have the information or is so haphazardly organized that it cannot locate it.

Mumford said the prevalence of the disease in U.S. herds is probably quite low, but there have probably been other cases that have so far gone undetected. "They're only finding a very small fraction of that low prevalence," she said.

Mumford expressed surprise at the lack of concern about the deadly disease from American consumers. "I would expect the U.S. public to be more concerned," she said.

Markus Moser, a molecular biologist and chief executive officer of Prionics, a Swiss firm that manufactures BSE test kits, told UPI one concern is that if people are infected, the mad cow pathogen could become "humanized" or more easily transmitted from person to person.

"Transmission would be much easier, through all kinds of medical procedures" and even through the blood supply, Moser said.

© Copyright 2006 United Press International, Inc. All Rights Reserved

http://www.upi.com/ConsumerHealthDaily/view.php?StoryID=20060315-055557-1284r

http://www.upi.com/Science_News/2003/12/30/Mad-Cow-Linked-to-thousands-of-CJD-cases/UPI-47861072816318/

CDC - Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy and Variant Creutzfeldt ... Dr. Paul Brown is Senior Research Scientist in the Laboratory of Central Nervous System ... Address for correspondence: Paul Brown, Building 36, Room 4A-05, ...

http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/eid/vol7no1/brown.htm

PAUL BROWN COMMENT TO ME ON THIS ISSUE

Tuesday, September 12, 2006 11:10 AM

"Actually, Terry, I have been critical of the USDA handling of the mad cow issue for some years, and with Linda Detwiler and others sent lengthy detailed critiques and recommendations to both the USDA and the Canadian Food Agency." ........TSS

http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2009/07/mad-cow-cover-up-usa-masked-as-sporadic.html

OR, what the Honorable Phyllis Fong of the OIG found ;

Audit Report Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Surveillance Program Â Phase II and Food Safety and Inspection Service

Controls Over BSE Sampling, Specified Risk Materials, and Advanced Meat Recovery Products - Phase III

Report No. 50601-10-KC January 2006

Finding 2 Inherent Challenges in Identifying and Testing High-Risk Cattle Still Remain

http://www.usda.gov/oig/webdocs/50601-10-KC.pdf

Tuesday, January 1, 2008

BSE OIE USDA

STATEMENT BY DR. RON DEHAVEN REGARDING OIE RISK RECOMMENDATION

March 9, 2007

http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2008/01/bse-oie-usda.html

2009 UPDATE ON ALABAMA AND TEXAS MAD COWS 2005 and 2006

http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2006/08/bse-atypical-texas-and-alabama-update.html

10,000,000+ LBS. of PROHIBITED BANNED MAD COW FEED I.E. BLOOD LACED MBM IN COMMERCE USA 2007

Date: March 21, 2007 at 2:27 pm PST

RECALLS AND FIELD CORRECTIONS: VETERINARY MEDICINES -- CLASS II

___________________________________

PRODUCT

Bulk cattle feed made with recalled Darling's 85% Blood Meal, Flash Dried, Recall # V-024-2007

CODE

Cattle feed delivered between 01/12/2007 and 01/26/2007

RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER

Pfeiffer, Arno, Inc, Greenbush, WI. by conversation on February 5, 2007.

Firm initiated recall is ongoing.

REASON

Blood meal used to make cattle feed was recalled because it was cross- contaminated with prohibited bovine meat and bone meal that had been manufactured on common equipment and labeling did not bear cautionary BSE statement.

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE

42,090 lbs.

DISTRIBUTION

WI

___________________________________

PRODUCT

Custom dairy premix products: MNM ALL PURPOSE Pellet, HILLSIDE/CDL Prot- Buffer Meal, LEE, M.-CLOSE UP PX Pellet, HIGH DESERT/ GHC LACT Meal, TATARKA, M CUST PROT Meal, SUNRIDGE/CDL PROTEIN Blend, LOURENZO, K PVM DAIRY Meal, DOUBLE B DAIRY/GHC LAC Mineral, WEST PIONT/GHC CLOSEUP Mineral, WEST POINT/GHC LACT Meal, JENKS, J/COMPASS PROTEIN Meal, COPPINI - 8# SPECIAL DAIRY Mix, GULICK, L-LACT Meal (Bulk), TRIPLE J - PROTEIN/LACTATION, ROCK CREEK/GHC MILK Mineral, BETTENCOURT/GHC S.SIDE MK-MN, BETTENCOURT #1/GHC MILK MINR, V&C DAIRY/GHC LACT Meal, VEENSTRA, F/GHC LACT Meal, SMUTNY, A- BYPASS ML W/SMARTA, Recall # V-025-2007

CODE

The firm does not utilize a code - only shipping documentation with commodity and weights identified.

RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER

Rangen, Inc, Buhl, ID, by letters on February 13 and 14, 2007. Firm initiated recall is complete.

REASON

Products manufactured from bulk feed containing blood meal that was cross contaminated with prohibited meat and bone meal and the labeling did not bear cautionary BSE statement.

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE

9,997,976 lbs.

DISTRIBUTION

ID and NV

END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR MARCH 21, 2007

http://www.fda.gov/Safety/Recalls/EnforcementReports/2007/ucm120446.htm

BANNED MAD COW FEED IN COMMERCE IN ALABAMA (where h-g-BSEalabama mad cow was documented)

Date: September 6, 2006 at 7:58 am PST PRODUCT

a) EVSRC Custom dairy feed, Recall # V-130-6;

b) Performance Chick Starter, Recall # V-131-6;

c) Performance Quail Grower, Recall # V-132-6;

d) Performance Pheasant Finisher, Recall # V-133-6.

CODE None RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER Donaldson & Hasenbein/dba J&R Feed Service, Inc., Cullman, AL, by telephone on June 23, 2006 and by letter dated July 19, 2006. Firm initiated recall is complete.

REASON

Dairy and poultry feeds were possibly contaminated with ruminant based protein.

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 477.72 tons

DISTRIBUTION AL

______________________________

http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/enforce/2006/ENF00968.html

PRODUCT Bulk custom dairy pre-mixes,

Recall # V-120-6 CODE None RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER Ware Milling Inc., Houston, MS, by telephone on June 23, 2006. Firm initiated recall is complete. REASON Possible contamination of dairy animal feeds with ruminant derived meat and bone meal.

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 350 tons

DISTRIBUTION AL and MS

______________________________

PRODUCT

a) Tucker Milling, LLC Tm 32% Sinking Fish Grower, #2680-Pellet, 50 lb. bags, Recall # V-121-6;

b) Tucker Milling, LLC #31120, Game Bird Breeder Pellet, 50 lb. bags, Recall # V-122-6;

c) Tucker Milling, LLC #31232 Game Bird Grower, 50 lb. bags, Recall # V-123-6;

d) Tucker Milling, LLC 31227-Crumble, Game Bird Starter, BMD Medicated, 50 lb bags, Recall # V-124-6;

e) Tucker Milling, LLC #31120, Game Bird Breeder, 50 lb bags, Recall # V-125-6;

f) Tucker Milling, LLC #30230, 30 % Turkey Starter, 50 lb bags, Recall # V-126-6;

g) Tucker Milling, LLC #30116, TM Broiler Finisher, 50 lb bags, Recall # V-127-6

CODE All products manufactured from 02/01/2005 until 06/20/2006 RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER Recalling Firm: Tucker Milling LLC, Guntersville, AL, by telephone and visit on June 20, 2006, and by letter on June 23, 2006. Manufacturer: H. J. Baker and Brothers Inc., Stamford, CT. Firm initiated recall is ongoing.

REASON Poultry and fish feeds which were possibly contaminated with ruminant based protein were not labeled as "Do not feed to ruminants".

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 7,541-50 lb bags

DISTRIBUTION AL, GA, MS, and TN

END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR AUGUST 9, 2006

###

http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/ENFORCE/2006/ENF00964.html

Subject: MAD COW FEED RECALL AL AND FL VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 125 TONS Products manufactured from 02/01/2005 until 06/06/2006

Date: August 6, 2006 at 6:16 pm PST PRODUCT

a) CO-OP 32% Sinking Catfish, Recall # V-100-6;

b) Performance Sheep Pell W/Decox/A/N, medicated, net wt. 50 lbs, Recall # V-101-6;

c) Pro 40% Swine Conc Meal -- 50 lb, Recall # V-102-6;

d) CO-OP 32% Sinking Catfish Food Medicated, Recall # V-103-6;

e) "Big Jim's" BBB Deer Ration, Big Buck Blend, Recall # V-104-6;

f) CO-OP 40% Hog Supplement Medicated Pelleted, Tylosin 100 grams/ton, 50 lb. bag, Recall # V-105-6;

g) Pig Starter Pell II, 18% W/MCDX Medicated 282020, Carbadox -- 0.0055%, Recall # V-106-6;

h) CO-OP STARTER-GROWER CRUMBLES, Complete Feed for Chickens from Hatch to 20 Weeks, Medicated, Bacitracin Methylene Disalicylate, 25 and 50 Lbs, Recall # V-107-6;

i) CO-OP LAYING PELLETS, Complete Feed for Laying Chickens, Recall # 108-6;

j) CO-OP LAYING CRUMBLES, Recall # V-109-6;

k) CO-OP QUAIL FLIGHT CONDITIONER MEDICATED, net wt 50 Lbs, Recall # V-110-6;

l) CO-OP QUAIL STARTER MEDICATED, Net Wt. 50 Lbs, Recall # V-111-6;

m) CO-OP QUAIL GROWER MEDICATED, 50 Lbs, Recall # V-112-6 CODE

Product manufactured from 02/01/2005 until 06/06/2006

RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER Alabama Farmers Cooperative, Inc., Decatur, AL, by telephone, fax, email and visit on June 9, 2006. FDA initiated recall is complete.

REASON Animal and fish feeds which were possibly contaminated with ruminant based protein not labeled as "Do not feed to ruminants".

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 125 tons

DISTRIBUTION AL and FL

END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR AUGUST 2, 2006

###

http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/enforce/2006/ENF00963.html

MAD COW FEED RECALL USA EQUALS 10,878.06 TONS NATIONWIDE Sun Jul 16, 2006 09:22 71.248.128.67

RECALLS AND FIELD CORRECTIONS: VETERINARY MEDICINE -- CLASS II

______________________________

PRODUCT

a) PRO-LAK, bulk weight, Protein Concentrate for Lactating Dairy Animals, Recall # V-079-6;

b) ProAmino II, FOR PREFRESH AND LACTATING COWS, net weight 50lb (22.6 kg), Recall # V-080-6;

c) PRO-PAK, MARINE & ANIMAL PROTEIN CONCENTRATE FOR USE IN ANIMAL FEED, Recall # V-081-6;

d) Feather Meal, Recall # V-082-6 CODE

a) Bulk

b) None

c) Bulk

d) Bulk

RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER H. J. Baker & Bro., Inc., Albertville, AL, by telephone on June 15, 2006 and by press release on June 16, 2006. Firm initiated recall is ongoing.

REASON

Possible contamination of animal feeds with ruminent derived meat and bone meal.

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 10,878.06 tons

DISTRIBUTION Nationwide

END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR July 12, 2006

###

http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/enforce/2006/ENF00960.html

Monday, January 17, 2011

MAD COW Update on Feed Enforcement Activities to Limit the Spread of BSE January 13, 2011

January 2011

http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/01/mad-cow-update-on-feed-enforcement.html

Friday, January 7, 2011

MEAT AND BONE MEAL AND MINERAL FEED ADDITIVES MAY INCREASE THE RISK OF ORAL PRION DISEASE TRANSMISSION

Journal of Toxicology and Environmental Health, Part A, 74:161–166, 2011 Copyright © Taylor & Francis Group, LLC ISSN: 1528-7394 print / 1087-2620 online DOI: 10.1080/15287394.2011.529066

http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/01/meat-and-bone-meal-and-mineral-feed.html

Saturday, November 6, 2010

TAFS1 Position Paper on Position Paper on Relaxation of the Feed Ban in the EU Berne, 2010 TAFS

INTERNATIONAL FORUM FOR TRANSMISSIBLE ANIMAL DISEASES AND FOOD SAFETY a non-profit Swiss Foundation

http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2010/11/tafs1-position-paper-on-position-paper.html

Archive Number 20101206.4364 Published Date 06-DEC-2010 Subject Prion disease update 2010 (11)

PRION DISEASE UPDATE 2010 (11)

http://www.promedmail.org/pls/apex/f?p=2400:1001:5492868805159684::NO::F2400_P1001_BACK_PAGE,F2400_P1001_PUB_MAIL_ID:1000,86129

CJD9/10022

October 1994

Mr R.N. Elmhirst Chairman British Deer Farmers Association Holly Lodge Spencers Lane BerksWell Coventry CV7 7BZ

Dear Mr Elmhirst,

CREUTZFELDT-JAKOB DISEASE (CJD) SURVEILLANCE UNIT REPORT

Thank you for your recent letter concerning the publication of the third annual report from the CJD Surveillance Unit. I am sorry that you are dissatisfied with the way in which this report was published.

The Surveillance Unit is a completely independant outside body and the Department of Health is committed to publishing their reports as soon as they become available. In the circumstances it is not the practice to circulate the report for comment since the findings of the report would not be amended. In future we can ensure that the British Deer Farmers Association receives a copy of the report in advance of publication.

The Chief Medical Officer has undertaken to keep the public fully informed of the results of any research in respect of CJD. This report was entirely the work of the unit and was produced completely independantly of the the Department.

The statistical results reqarding the consumption of venison was put into perspective in the body of the report and was not mentioned at all in the press release. Media attention regarding this report was low key but gave a realistic presentation of the statistical findings of the Unit. This approach to publication was successful in that consumption of venison was highlighted only once by the media ie. in the News at one television proqramme.

I believe that a further statement about the report, or indeed statistical links between CJD and consumption of venison, would increase, and quite possibly give damaging credence, to the whole issue. From the low key media reports of which I am aware it seems unlikely that venison consumption will suffer adversely, if at all.

http://web.archive.org/web/20030511010117/http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/yb/1994/10/00003001.pdf

Wednesday, February 16, 2011

IN CONFIDENCE

SCRAPIE TRANSMISSION TO CHIMPANZEES

IN CONFIDENCE

http://scrapie-usa.blogspot.com/2011/02/in-confidence-scrapie-transmission-to.html

Wednesday, March 9, 2011

27 U.S. Senators want to force feed Japan Highly Potential North America Mad Cow Beef TSE PRION CJD

March 8, 2011

President Barack Obama The White House

1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, W Washington, DC 20500

Dear President Obama:

http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/03/27-us-senators-want-to-force-feed-japan.html

Sunday, April 17, 2011

Transmission of Prion Strains in a Transgenic Mouse Model Overexpressing Human A53T Mutated [alpha]-Synuclein

Journal of Neuropathology & Experimental Neurology:

POST AUTHOR CORRECTIONS, 8 April 2011 doi: 10.1097/NEN.0b013e318217d95f

http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2011/04/transmission-of-prion-strains-in.html

Saturday, March 5, 2011

MAD COW ATYPICAL CJD PRION TSE CASES WITH CLASSIFICATIONS PENDING ON THE RISE IN NORTH AMERICA

http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/03/mad-cow-atypical-cjd-prion-tse-cases.html

another by-product of ignorance and the industries $$$

Tuesday, March 29, 2011

TRANSMISSIBLE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY EXPOSURE SPREADING VIA HOSPITALS AND SURGICAL PROCEDURES AROUND THE GLOBE

http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/03/transmissible-spongiform-encephalopathy.html

Friday, April 15, 2011

PRION TRANSMISSIBLE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY PROJECTS, RESEARCH FUNDING, BSE VOLUNTARY TESTING UPDATE IN NORTH AMERICA 2011

http://prionunitusaupdate2008.blogspot.com/2011/04/prion-transmissible-spongiform.html

The most recent assessments (and reassessments) were published in June 2005 (Table I; 18), and included the categorisation of Canada, the USA, and Mexico as GBR III. Although only Canada and the USA have reported cases, the historically open system of trade in North America suggests that it is likely that BSE is present also in Mexico.

http://www.oie.int/boutique/extrait/06heim937950.pdf

TSS

Joint consultation by the FSA, Defra and Welsh Assembly Government on proposed changes to BSE testing of cattle slaughtered for human consumption

2011-04-13T11:09:00.000-07:00

Joint consultation by the FSA, Defra and Welsh Assembly Government on proposed changes to BSE testing of cattle slaughtered for human consumption

Monday 11 April 2011

The FSA, Defra and the Welsh Assembly Government are consulting on (i) increasing the age above which all healthy cattle slaughtered for human consumption must be tested for bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE), from 48 to 72 months, from 1 July 2011; and (ii) from 1 January 2013, testing a sample number of healthy cattle slaughtered for human consumption aged over 72 months.

All comments and views should be sent to:

Katie Barnes

Defra, Food and Farming Group Room 5A, 9 Millbank C/O 17 Smith Square London SW1P 3JR

Tel: 020 7238 6535 Fax: 020 7238 3114 E-mail: BSETesting.ProposedChanges@defra.gsi.gov.uk

Responses are requested by: 6 May 2011

Audience

Who will be affected by the proposals in this consultation?

The cattle and meat industries, principally abattoirs that slaughter cattle aged more than 48 months for human consumption. Consumers will also have an interest.

What is the purpose of this consultation?

The European Union (EU) has agreed an amendment to Commission Decision 719/2009/EC to provide the United Kingdom (UK) and 21 other member states with the options of (i) increasing the age above which all healthy cattle slaughtered for human consumption must be tested for bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE), from 48 to 72 months, from 1 July 2011; and (ii) from 1 January 2013, testing a sample number of healthy cattle slaughtered for human consumption aged over 72 months.

Have there been any previous consultations on this topic?

Defra, the Welsh Assembly Government and the FSA consulted on changes to BSE testing in September 2008 and on the TSE Roadmap 2, in July 2010.

Consultation details

This consultation is being co-ordinated by Defra.

The consultation package includes a partial Business and Regulatory Impact Assessment. This provides further detail on the above measures in terms of their impact on stakeholders.

Separate consultations on proposals to make similar changes in Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales are being carried out in those countries.

Responses:

Your views and responses to specific questions are sought on the proposals described in the consultation document and Impact Assessment available on Defra’s website from the link below.

Responses are required by close Friday 6 May 2011. Please state, in your response, whether you are responding as a private individual or on behalf of an organisation/company (including details of any stakeholders your organisation represents).

Further information

This consultation has been prepared in accordance with the HM Government Code of Practice on Consultation, which states that a consultation must follow better regulation best practice, including carrying out an Impact Assessment (Regulatory Impact Assessment in Scotland). The assessment is included in the consultation documents.

We are interested in what you thought of this consultation and would therefore welcome your general feedback on both the consultation package and overall consultation process. If you would like to assist us to improve the quality of future consultations, please feel free to share your thoughts with us by using the consultation feedback questionnaire.

Consultation feedback questionnaire (Word)

Consultation feedback questionnaire (pdf)

Publication of personal data and confidentiality of responses

In accordance with the FSA principle of openness our Information Centre at Aviation House will hold a copy of the completed consultation. The FSA will publish a summary of responses, which may include personal data, such as your full name. Disclosure of any other personal data would be made only upon request for the full consultation responses. If you do not want this information to be released, please complete and return the Publication of Personal Data Form. Return of this form does not mean that we will treat your response to the consultation as confidential, just your personal data.

Data protection form (Word)

Data protection form (pdf)

Publication of response summary

Within three months of a consultation ending we aim to publish a summary of responses received and provide a link to it from this page.

If, after three months, the summary is still not showing, please contact the person who was responsible for the original consultation. Alternatively, you can contact the FSA Consultation Co-ordinator by email: consultationcoordinator@foodstandards.gsi.gov.uk

External links The Food Standards Agency has no responsibility for the content of external websites

Non-formal consultation on proposed changes to BSE testing of cattle slaughtered for human consumption

Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra) website

http://www.food.gov.uk/consultations/consulteng/2011/bsetestingeng

stupid is, as stupid does, and some times you just can not fix stupid $$$

Thursday, August 12, 2010

Seven main threats for the future linked to prions

First threat

The TSE road map defining the evolution of European policy for protection against prion diseases is based on a certain numbers of hypotheses some of which may turn out to be erroneous. In particular, a form of BSE (called atypical Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy), recently identified by systematic testing in aged cattle without clinical signs, may be the origin of classical BSE and thus potentially constitute a reservoir, which may be impossible to eradicate if a sporadic origin is confirmed. ***Also, a link is suspected between atypical BSE and some apparently sporadic cases of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease in humans. These atypical BSE cases constitute an unforeseen first threat that could sharply modify the European approach to prion diseases.

Second threat

snip...

http://www.neuroprion.org/en/np-neuroprion.html

http://prionpathy.blogspot.com/2010/08/seven-main-threats-for-future-linked-to.html

http://prionpathy.blogspot.com/

http://prionopathy.blogspot.com/

Wednesday, March 31, 2010

Atypical BSE in Cattle

To date the OIE/WAHO assumes that the human and animal health standards set out in the BSE chapter for classical BSE (C-Type) applies to all forms of BSE which include the H-type and L-type atypical forms. This assumption is scientifically not completely justified and accumulating evidence suggests that this may in fact not be the case. Molecular characterization and the spatial distribution pattern of histopathologic lesions and immunohistochemistry (IHC) signals are used to identify and characterize atypical BSE. Both the L-type and H-type atypical cases display significant differences in the conformation and spatial accumulation of the disease associated prion protein (PrPSc) in brains of afflicted cattle. Transmission studies in bovine transgenic and wild type mouse models support that the atypical BSE types might be unique strains because they have different incubation times and lesion profiles when compared to C-type BSE. When L-type BSE was inoculated into ovine transgenic mice and Syrian hamster the resulting molecular fingerprint had changed, either in the first or a subsequent passage, from L-type into C-type BSE. In addition, non-human primates are specifically susceptible for atypical BSE as demonstrated by an approximately 50% shortened incubation time for L-type BSE as compared to C-type. Considering the current scientific information available, it cannot be assumed that these different BSE types pose the same human health risks as C-type BSE or that these risks are mitigated by the same protective measures.

This study will contribute to a correct definition of specified risk material (SRM) in atypical BSE. The incumbent of this position will develop new and transfer existing, ultra-sensitive methods for the detection of atypical BSE in tissue of experimentally infected cattle.

http://www.prionetcanada.ca/detail.aspx?menu=5&dt=293380&app=93&cat1=387&tp=20&lk=no&cat2

Saturday, January 29, 2011

Atypical L-Type Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (L-BSE) Transmission to Cynomolgus Macaques, a Non-Human Primate

Jpn. J. Infect. Dis., 64 (1), 81-84, 2011

http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/01/atypical-l-type-bovine-spongiform.html

Wednesday, February 16, 2011

IN CONFIDENCE

SCRAPIE TRANSMISSION TO CHIMPANZEES

IN CONFIDENCE

http://scrapie-usa.blogspot.com/2011/02/in-confidence-scrapie-transmission-to.html

Tuesday, November 17, 2009

SEAC NEW RESULTS ON IDIOPATHIC BRAINSTEM NEURONAL CHROMATOLYSIS (IBNC) FROM THE VETERINARY LABORATORIES AGENCY (VLA) SEAC 103/1

http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2009/11/seac-new-results-on-idiopathic.html

31 March 2009 - A summary of the 102nd SEAC meeting (35 KB) held on 4th March 2009

snip...

SEAC noted that IBNC appeared to be a rare disease that occurred in older cattle, predominantly as single cases, although it is possible that surveillance may not detect all cases. Biochemical studies suggested that the prion protein may play a role in the disease. However, it is unclear whether the normal form of the protein or an abnormal form is involved. Studies are required to determine whether IBNC is transmissible or not. SEAC concluded, noting that specified risk material controls are in place to prevent cattle brain from entering the food supply, that current data on IBNC do not suggest it presents a risk to human health.

http://www.seac.gov.uk/summaries/seac102_summary.pdf

"All of the 15 cattle tested showed that the brains had abnormally accumulated prion protein."

Saturday, February 28, 2009

NEW RESULTS ON IDIOPATHIC BRAINSTEM NEURONAL CHROMATOLYSIS "All of the 15 cattle tested showed that the brains had abnormally accumulated PrP" 2009

SEAC 102/2

http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2009/02/new-results-on-idiopathic-brainstem.html

Wednesday, October 08, 2008

Idiopathic Brainstem Neuronal Chromatolysis (IBNC): a novel prion protein related disorder of cattle?

http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2008/10/idiopathic-brainstem-neuronal.html

''THE LINE TO TAKE'' ON IBNC $$$ 1995 $$$

1995

page 9 of 14 ;

30. The Committee noted that the results were unusual. the questioned whether there could be coincidental BSE infection or contamination with scrapie. Dr. Tyrell noted that the feeling of the committee was that this did not represent a new agent but it was important to be prepared to say something publicly about these findings. A suggested line to take was that these were scientifically unpublishable results but in line with the policy of openness they would be made publicly available and further work done to test their validity. Since the BSE precautions were applied to IBNC cases, human health was protected. Further investigations should be carried out on isolations from brains of IBNC cases with removal of the brain and subsequent handling under strict conditions to avoid the risk of any contamination.

31. Mr. Bradley informed the Committee that the CVO had informed the CMO about the IBNC results and the transmission from retina and he, like the Committee was satisfied that the controls already in place or proposed were adequate. ...

snip... see full text

http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/yb/1995/06/21005001.pdf

http://collections.europarchive.org/tna/20080102204938/http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/yb/1995/06/21005001.pdf

SEAC MINUTES OF THE 19TH MEETING HELD ON 21 JUNE 1995 AT THE CENTRAL VETERINARY LABORATORY

31. Mr Bradley informed the Committee that the CVO had informed the CMO about the IBNC results and the transmission from retina and he, like the Committee was satisfied that the controls already in place or proposed were adequate. ...

http://web.archive.org/web/20030327015011/http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/yb/1995/06/21005001.pdf

Tuesday, November 02, 2010

IN CONFIDENCE

The information contained herein should not be disseminated further except on the basis of "NEED TO KNOW".

BSE - ATYPICAL LESION DISTRIBUTION (RBSE 92-21367) statutory (obex only) diagnostic criteria CVL 1992

http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2010/11/bse-atypical-lesion-distribution-rbse.html

Monday, May 12, 2008

BSE YOUNGEST AGE STATISTICS UNDER 30 MONTHS

http://bseyoungestage.blogspot.com/

Sunday, August 10, 2008

A New Prionopathy OR more of the same old BSe and sporadic CJD

http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2008/08/new-prionopathy-or-more-of-same-old-bse.html

NEW STRAIN OF CJD IN NORTH AMERICA cpsCJD or classification pending sporadic creutzfeldt jakob disease $$$

Saturday, March 5, 2011

MAD COW ATYPICAL CJD PRION TSE CASES WITH CLASSIFICATIONS PENDING ON THE RISE IN NORTH AMERICA

http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/03/mad-cow-atypical-cjd-prion-tse-cases.html

CANADA GREENS CALL FOR 100% BSE MAD COW TESTING

Greens call for ban on federal GMO research Apr 10, 2011 11:45 PM

snip...

The party said it would also aim to tighten Canada's testing net for bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) in slaughter cattle by implementing "100 per cent" testing of all slaughtered animals, but only "as soon as the process of detecting BSE in blood samples is perfected." The party also calls for ensuring no "animal byproducts" are used in ruminant animal feed....

snip...

http://www.albertafarmexpress.ca/issues/story.aspx?aid=1000407400

Green Party MPs will develop a National Agricultural and Food Policy which:

Improves Food Safety by:

• Amending the Canadian Food Inspection Agency mandate to remove any obligation to promote Canadian agri-business, ensuring the focus is on food safety and food safety only, with enhanced resources for inspection and monitoring.

• Ensuring the quality and wholesomeness of food by strengthening the monitoring of pesticides, herbicides, fungicides, growth hormones, non-therapeutic antibiotics and insecticides in food production, processing and storage, with the goal of an orderly reduction in detectable residues of these substances until they reach undetectable limits.

• Establishing federally funded, community-guided school lunch programs across Canada to ensure that our children have daily access to healthy local food and can learn about sustainable food production and healthy eating.

• Strengthening Plant Protection and Health of Animals Programs with measures to ensure the integrity of farm food products.

• Improving and strengthening the Canadian Organic Standard.

• Providing transitional assistance for those switching to certified organic farming practices.

• Ensuring that no animal by-products are used in ruminant animal feed.

• Strengthen testing for BSE by implementing 100% testing (testing of every slaughtered animal) as soon as the process of detecting BSE in blood samples is perfected.

Vision Green April 2011

http://greenparty.ca/files/attachments/april_2011_vision_green.pdf

THANK YOU !!!

IN THE USA, we use the SSS policy, or the 'don't look, don't find' policy, or what i also call the ''obex only'' diagnostic criteria for how not to find a mad cow. The USA pollutes its oceans, bays, gulf, and rivers, and allows others to pollute them too. Allows industry to pollute the air we breath. Texas has now become the USA nuclear dumping grounds, thanks to our good gov perry. the USA federal gov. dumps all funding for the mad cow TSE prion diseases, while at the same time, human and animal TSE in North America are mutating, spreading, and cpsCJD (classification pending sporadic creutzfeldt jakob disease) is rising in young and old. i don't understand the insanity of it all. ...

All Other Emerging and Zoonotic Infectious Diseases CDC's FY 2012 request of $52,658,000 for all other emerging and zoonotic infectious disease activities is a decrease of $13,607,000 below the FY 2010 level, which includes the elimination of Prion activities ($5,473,000), a reduction for other cross-cutting infectious disease activities, and administrative savings. These funds support a range of critical emerging and zoonotic infectious disease programs such Lyme Disease, Chronic Fatigue Syndrome, and Special Pathogens, as well as other activities described below.

http://www.cdc.gov/fmo/topic/Budget%20Information/appropriations_budget_form_pdf/FY2012_CDC_CJ_Final.pdf

" the FY 2010 level, which includes the elimination of Prion activities ($5,473,000), "

PROBLEMS SOLVED $$$

Friday, March 4, 2011

Alberta dairy cow found with mad cow disease

http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/03/alberta-dairy-cow-found-with-mad-cow.html

Wednesday, August 11, 2010

REPORT ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE SIXTEENTH CASE OF BOVINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY (BSE) IN CANADA

http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2010/08/report-on-investigation-of-sixteenth.html

Thursday, August 19, 2010

REPORT ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE SEVENTEENTH CASE OF BOVINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY (BSE) IN CANADA

http://bseusa.blogspot.com/2010/08/report-on-investigation-of-seventeenth.html

Thursday, February 10, 2011

TRANSMISSIBLE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY REPORT UPDATE CANADA FEBRUARY 2011 and how to hide mad cow disease in Canada Current as of: 2011-01-31

http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2011/02/transmissible-spongiform-encephalopathy.html

Wednesday, December 22, 2010

Manitoba veterinarian has been fined $10,000 for falsifying certification documents for U.S. bound cattle and what about mad cow disease ?

http://usdameatexport.blogspot.com/2010/12/manitoba-veterinarian-has-been-fined.html

Saturday, March 12, 2011

Variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease in a Canadian resident Infectious Diseases News Brief - March 11, 2011

http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/03/variant-creutzfeldt-jakob-disease-in.html

Rare BSE mutation raises concerns over risks to public health

SIR - Atypical forms (known as H- and L-type) of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) have recently appeared in several European countries as well as in Japan, Canada and the United States. This raises the unwelcome possibility that variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (vCJD) could increase in the human population. Of the atypical BSE cases tested so far, a mutation in the prion protein gene (PRNP) has been detected in just one, a cow in Alabama with BSE; her healthy calf also carried the mutation (J. A. Richt and S. M. Hall PLoS Pathog. 4, e1000156; 2008). This raises the possibility that the disease could occasionally be genetic in origin. Indeed, the report of the UK BSE Inquiry in 2000 suggested that the UK epidemic had most likely originated from such a mutation and argued against the scrapierelated assumption. Such rare potential pathogenic PRNP mutations could occur in countries at present considered to be free of BSE, such as Australia and New Zealand. So it is important to maintain strict surveillance for BSE in cattle, with rigorous enforcement of the ruminant feed ban (many countries still feed ruminant proteins to pigs). Removal of specified risk material, such as brain and spinal cord, from cattle at slaughter prevents infected material from entering the human food chain. Routine genetic screening of cattle for PRNP mutations, which is now available, could provide additional data on the risk to the public. Because the point mutation identified in the Alabama animals is identical to that responsible for the commonest type of familial (genetic) CJD in humans, it is possible that the resulting infective prion protein might cross the bovine-human species barrier more easily. Patients with vCJD continue to be identified. The fact that this is happening less often should not lead to relaxation of the controls necessary to prevent future outbreaks. Malcolm A. Ferguson-Smith Cambridge University Department of Veterinary Medicine, Madingley Road, Cambridge CB3 0ES, UK e-mail: maf12@cam.ac.uk Jürgen A. Richt College of Veterinary Medicine, Kansas State University, K224B Mosier Hall, Manhattan, Kansas 66506-5601, USA

NATURE|Vol 457|26 February 2009

http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v457/n7233/full/4571079b.html

August 4, 1997 partial and voluntary mad cow feed ban was nothing more than ink on paper ;

10,000,000+ LBS. of PROHIBITED BANNED MAD COW FEED I.E. BLOOD LACED MBM IN COMMERCE USA 2007

Date: March 21, 2007 at 2:27 pm PST

RECALLS AND FIELD CORRECTIONS: VETERINARY MEDICINES -- CLASS II

___________________________________

PRODUCT

Bulk cattle feed made with recalled Darling's 85% Blood Meal, Flash Dried, Recall # V-024-2007

CODE

Cattle feed delivered between 01/12/2007 and 01/26/2007

RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER

Pfeiffer, Arno, Inc, Greenbush, WI. by conversation on February 5, 2007.

Firm initiated recall is ongoing.

REASON

Blood meal used to make cattle feed was recalled because it was cross- contaminated with prohibited bovine meat and bone meal that had been manufactured on common equipment and labeling did not bear cautionary BSE statement.

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE

42,090 lbs.

DISTRIBUTION

WI

___________________________________

PRODUCT

Custom dairy premix products: MNM ALL PURPOSE Pellet, HILLSIDE/CDL Prot- Buffer Meal, LEE, M.-CLOSE UP PX Pellet, HIGH DESERT/ GHC LACT Meal, TATARKA, M CUST PROT Meal, SUNRIDGE/CDL PROTEIN Blend, LOURENZO, K PVM DAIRY Meal, DOUBLE B DAIRY/GHC LAC Mineral, WEST PIONT/GHC CLOSEUP Mineral, WEST POINT/GHC LACT Meal, JENKS, J/COMPASS PROTEIN Meal, COPPINI - 8# SPECIAL DAIRY Mix, GULICK, L-LACT Meal (Bulk), TRIPLE J - PROTEIN/LACTATION, ROCK CREEK/GHC MILK Mineral, BETTENCOURT/GHC S.SIDE MK-MN, BETTENCOURT #1/GHC MILK MINR, V&C DAIRY/GHC LACT Meal, VEENSTRA, F/GHC LACT Meal, SMUTNY, A- BYPASS ML W/SMARTA, Recall # V-025-2007

CODE

The firm does not utilize a code - only shipping documentation with commodity and weights identified.

RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER

Rangen, Inc, Buhl, ID, by letters on February 13 and 14, 2007. Firm initiated recall is complete.

REASON

Products manufactured from bulk feed containing blood meal that was cross contaminated with prohibited meat and bone meal and the labeling did not bear cautionary BSE statement.

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE

9,997,976 lbs.

DISTRIBUTION

ID and NV

END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR MARCH 21, 2007

http://www.fda.gov/Safety/Recalls/EnforcementReports/2007/ucm120446.htm

Thursday, November 18, 2010

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA VS GALEN J. NIEHUES FAKED MAD COW FEED TEST ON 92 BSE INSPECTION REPORTS FOR APPROXIMATELY 100 CATTLE OPERATIONS

http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2010/11/united-states-of-america-vs-galen-j.html

Wednesday, November 17, 2010

MAD COW TESTING FAKED IN USA BY Nebraska INSPECTOR Senator Mike Johanns STATE

http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2010/11/mad-cow-testing-faked-in-usa-by.html

Wednesday, November 17, 2010

MAD COW TESTING FAKED IN USA BY Nebraska INSPECTOR Senator Mike Johanns STATE

http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2010/11/mad-cow-testing-faked-in-usa-by.html

WHO IS RESPONSIBLE FOR SPREADING TSE prions AROUND THE GLOBE ???

you can thank the USDA/APHIS/FDA/CDC, MAFF/DEFRA, OIE, and WTO, in my opinion, they are responsible for this killing agent, and all strains that come with it, around the globe, and the death that come with it. this includes both the nvCJD, and the infamous sporadic CJD's, both directly, and indirectly via friendly fire. ...

England worried briefly about infecting other countries 27 Aug 00 confidential correspondence obtained by Terry S. Singeltary Sr.

BSE11/2 020;

SC1337p

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND SOCIAL SECURITY Richmond House, 79 Whitehall, London SWIA 2NS Telephone 01-210 3000 From the Chief Medical Officer Sir Donald Achson KBE DM DSc FRCP FFCM FFOM

Mr K C Meldrum Chief Veterinary Officer Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food Government Buildings Hook Rise South Tolworth Surbiton Surrey KT6 7NG 3 January 1990

Dear Mr Meldrum

BOVINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY

You will recall that we have previously discussed the potential risks of BSE occurring in other countries as a result of the continuing export from the UK of meat and bone that may be contaminated by scrapie or possibly BSE.

I remain concerned that we are not being consistent in our attempts to contain the risks of BSE. Having banned the feeding of meat and bone meal to ruminamts in 1988, we should take steps to prevent these UK products being fed to ruminants in other countries. This could be achieved either through a ban on the export of meat and bone meal, or at least by the proper labelling of these products to make it absolutely clear they should not be fed to ruminants [or zoo animals, including rare and endangered primates -- webmaster]. Unless some such action is taken the difficult problems we have faced with BSE may well occur in other countries who import UK meat and bone meal. Surely it is short sighted for us to risk being seen in future as having been responsible for the introduction of BSE to the food chain in other countries.

I would be very interested to hear how you feel this gap in the present precautionary measures to eliminate BSE should be closed. We should be aiming at the global elimination of this new bovine disense. The export of our meat and bone meal is a continuing risk to other countries.

Yours Sincerely Donald Acheson

Copy: Dr Metters Dr Pickles

90/1.03/1.1 ============ BSE13/3 0083

Dr Pickles From: Dr J S Metters DCM0 International, Prevention and Community Services 7 June 1990 Copies to: Dr McInnes Miss Pease Mr Otley

BSE

1. I spoke to Mr Capstick yesterday. Among other things, he told me that MAFF are now considering the labelling of animal foodstuffs, and in particular what detail would be required if such labelling was made compulsory. Apparently our freedom of action is constrained by EC Directives [total garbage, MAFF wants to keep exporting -- webmaster], and there is also concern about the level of detail that should be included in any foodstuff labels.

2. Mr Capstick suggested that this was not an area that DH had a particular interest. I countered by saying that we supported the principle of labelling of animal foodstuffs, particularly when these were going for export.

3. I also thanked him for keeping us informed, in a way that I hope encourage further communication of MAFF's internal deliberations.

J S METTERS Room 509 Richmond House Ext. 5591 92/YdeS 90/6.7/5.1

http://www.mad-cow.org/00/aug00_last_news.html#fff

Subject: MBM/U.K. imports of MBM to the U.S./BSE Inquiry http://www.bse.org.uk/dfa/dfa25.htm

Date:Mon, 10 Apr 2000 15:14:21 -0700

From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr." To: flounder@wt.net

69. On 14 February 1990, Mr Meldrum wrote a letter to the Chief Veterinary Officers of a number of countries. [76] On 15 February 1990, Mrs Attridge and other officials were sent a copy of the letter of 14 February 1990 and a list of the countries to which it had been sent. They were stated to be the countries which had imported ruminant based meat and bone meal from the United Kingdom. The countries listed were Norway; Sweden, Switzerland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Nigeria, Thailand, South Africa, Malaysia, Taiwan, Hong Kong, South Korea, Japan, Canada, USA, Turkey, Kenya, Malta, Libera, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Sri Lanka, Puerto Rico, Curacao, Finland.[77] The letter from Mr Meldrum included the following:

Although we have kept the Office Internationale des Epizooties (OIE) fully informed about this new disease, and they will shortly be disseminating information and recommendations to member countries, I am writing to you on a personal basis to ensure that you are aware of all the developments in relation to BSE, including its likely cause. The majority of our findings have now been published in the Veterinary Record.?[78] 70.

On 20 February 1990, Dr Pickles wrote to Ms Verity (APS/CMO). Dr Pickles? minute included the following:

1. Mr Meldrum is arguing that MAFF have already taken all the necessary and responsible steps to warn importing countries of the BSE dangers in UK meat and bone meal. Yet the action taken so far overseas suggest the message has not got through, or where it has this has been late. The first nation that woke up to the danger did so a year after our own feed ban. It seems even now several EC countries neither ban our imports or the general feeding of ruminant protein. It also seems the OIE and CVO have yet to inform the rest of the world.

2. I do not see how this can be claimed to be responsible?. We do not need an expert group of the Scientific Veterinary Committee to tell us British meat and bone meal is unsafe for ruminants. I fail to understand why this cannot be tackled from the British end which seems to be the only sure way of doing it, preferably by banning exports. As CMO says in his letter of 3 January surely it is short sighted for us to risk being seen in future as having been responsible for the introduction of BSE to the food chain in other countries.??[79]

http://www.mad-cow.org/00/jul00_dont_eat_sheep.html#hhh

NOW, 2011, and the USA is doing the same thing the UK did back in 1985, the USA and North America are poisoning the globe with Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy aka mad cow disease, typical and atypical, from many species, including the bovine, but it's legal now thanks to the BSE MRR policy, which did away with all logic on TSE surveillance and eradication, just for trading purpose, thanks to the USDA, OIE, WTO, et al. The BSE MRR policy set us back to ground zero, 1984-1985. ...

Docket APHIS-2006-0041 Docket Title Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Minimal-Risk Regions; Importation of Live Bovines and Products Derived from Bovines Commodities Docket Type Rulemaking Document APHIS-2006-0041-0001 Document Title Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Minimal-Risk Regions; Importation of Live Bovines and Products Derived From Bovines Public Submission APHIS-2006-0041-0006 Public Submission Title Comment from Terry S Singletary Sr Views Add Comments How To Comment

snip...

MY personal belief, since you ask, is that not only the Canadian border, but the USA border, and the Mexican border should be sealed up tighter than a drum for exporting there TSE tainted products, until a validated, 100% sensitive test is available, and all animals for human and animal consumption are tested. all we are doing is the exact same thing the UK did with there mad cow poisoning when they exported it all over the globe, all the while knowing what they were doing. this BSE MRR policy is nothing more than a legal tool to do just exactly what the UK did, thanks to the OIE and GW, it's legal now. and they executed Saddam for poisoning ???

go figure....

Terry S. Singeltary Sr. P.O. Box 42 Bacliff, Texas USA 77518

http://www.regulations.gov/fdmspublic/component/main?main=DocumentDetail&d=APHIS-2006-0041-0006

APHIS-2006-0041-0006 TSE advisory committee for the meeting December 15,
2006 Singeltary Attachment

http://www.regulations.gov/fdmspublic/ContentViewer?objectId=09000064801f3413&disposition=attachment&contentType=msw8

From: Terry S. Singeltary Sr. [flounder9@verizon.net]
Sent: Monday, July 24, 2006 1:09 PM
To: FSIS RegulationsComments
Subject: [Docket No. FSIS-2006-0011] FSIS Harvard Risk Assessment of Bovine
Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE)

Page 1 of 98

8/3/2006

Greetings FSIS,

I would kindly like to comment on the following ;

FULL TEXT ;

http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/Comments/2006-0011/2006-0011-1.pdf

Comments on technical aspects of the risk assessment were then submitted to FSIS. Comments were received from Food and Water Watch, Food Animal Concerns Trust (FACT), Farm Sanctuary, R-CALF USA, Linda A Detwiler, and Terry S. Singeltary. This document provides itemized replies to the public comments received on the 2005 updated Harvard BSE risk assessment. Please bear the following points in mind:

snip...see full text 33 pages ;

http://www.fsis.usda.gov/PDF/BSE_Risk_Assess_Response_Public_Comments.pdf

Wednesday, March 9, 2011

27 U.S. Senators want to force feed Japan Highly Potential North America Mad Cow Beef TSE PRION CJD March 8, 2011

President Barack Obama The White House

1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, W Washington, DC 20500

Dear President Obama:

http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/03/27-us-senators-want-to-force-feed-japan.html

Saturday, December 18, 2010

OIE Global Conference on Wildlife Animal Health and Biodiversity - Preparing for the Future (TSE AND PRIONS) Paris (France), 23-25 February 2011

http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2010/12/oie-global-conference-on-wildlife.html

http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/

http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/

Wednesday, April 13, 2011

CANADA GREENS CALL FOR 100% BSE MAD COW TESTING

http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2011/04/canada-greens-call-for-100-bse-mad-cow.html

very sadly disgusted in Bacliff, Texas

TSS

CANADA GREENS CALL FOR 100% BSE MAD COW TESTING

2011-04-13T10:19:00.000-07:00

CANADA GREENS CALL FOR 100% BSE MAD COW TESTING

Greens call for ban on federal GMO research Apr 10, 2011 11:45 PM

snip...

The party said it would also aim to tighten Canada's testing net for bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) in slaughter cattle by implementing "100 per cent" testing of all slaughtered animals, but only "as soon as the process of detecting BSE in blood samples is perfected." The party also calls for ensuring no "animal byproducts" are used in ruminant animal feed....

snip...

http://www.albertafarmexpress.ca/issues/story.aspx?aid=1000407400

Green Party MPs will develop a National Agricultural and Food Policy which:

Improves Food Safety by:

• Amending the Canadian Food Inspection Agency mandate to remove any obligation to promote Canadian agri-business, ensuring the focus is on food safety and food safety only, with enhanced resources for inspection and monitoring.

• Ensuring the quality and wholesomeness of food by strengthening the monitoring of pesticides, herbicides, fungicides, growth hormones, non-therapeutic antibiotics and insecticides in food production, processing and storage, with the goal of an orderly reduction in detectable residues of these substances until they reach undetectable limits.

• Establishing federally funded, community-guided school lunch programs across Canada to ensure that our children have daily access to healthy local food and can learn about sustainable food production and healthy eating.

• Strengthening Plant Protection and Health of Animals Programs with measures to ensure the integrity of farm food products.

• Improving and strengthening the Canadian Organic Standard.

• Providing transitional assistance for those switching to certified organic farming practices.

• Ensuring that no animal by-products are used in ruminant animal feed.

• Strengthen testing for BSE by implementing 100% testing (testing of every slaughtered animal) as soon as the process of detecting BSE in blood samples is perfected.

Vision Green April 2011

http://greenparty.ca/files/attachments/april_2011_vision_green.pdf

THANK YOU !!!

IN THE USA, we use the SSS policy, or the 'don't look, don't find' policy, or what i also call the ''obex only'' diagnostic criteria for how not to find a mad cow. The USA pollutes its oceans, bays, gulf, and rivers, and allows others to pollute them too. Allows industry to pollute the air we breath. Texas has now become the USA nuclear dumping grounds, thanks to our good gov perry. the USA federal gov. dumps all funding for the mad cow TSE prion diseases, while at the same time, human and animal TSE in North America are mutating, spreading, and cpsCJD (classification pending sporadic creutzfeldt jakob disease) is rising in young and old. i don't understand the insanity of it all. ...

All Other Emerging and Zoonotic Infectious Diseases CDC's FY 2012 request of $52,658,000 for all other emerging and zoonotic infectious disease activities is a decrease of $13,607,000 below the FY 2010 level, which includes the elimination of Prion activities ($5,473,000), a reduction for other cross-cutting infectious disease activities, and administrative savings. These funds support a range of critical emerging and zoonotic infectious disease programs such Lyme Disease, Chronic Fatigue Syndrome, and Special Pathogens, as well as other activities described below.

http://www.cdc.gov/fmo/topic/Budget%20Information/appropriations_budget_form_pdf/FY2012_CDC_CJ_Final.pdf

" the FY 2010 level, which includes the elimination of Prion activities ($5,473,000), "

PROBLEMS SOLVED $$$

Friday, March 4, 2011

Alberta dairy cow found with mad cow disease

http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/03/alberta-dairy-cow-found-with-mad-cow.html

Wednesday, August 11, 2010

REPORT ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE SIXTEENTH CASE OF BOVINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY (BSE) IN CANADA

http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2010/08/report-on-investigation-of-sixteenth.html

Thursday, August 19, 2010

REPORT ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE SEVENTEENTH CASE OF BOVINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY (BSE) IN CANADA

http://bseusa.blogspot.com/2010/08/report-on-investigation-of-seventeenth.html

Thursday, February 10, 2011

TRANSMISSIBLE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY REPORT UPDATE CANADA FEBRUARY 2011 and how to hide mad cow disease in Canada Current as of: 2011-01-31

http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2011/02/transmissible-spongiform-encephalopathy.html

Saturday, March 12, 2011

Variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease in a Canadian resident Infectious Diseases News Brief - March 11, 2011

http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/03/variant-creutzfeldt-jakob-disease-in.html

Rare BSE mutation raises concerns over risks to public health

SIR - Atypical forms (known as H- and L-type) of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) have recently appeared in several European countries as well as in Japan, Canada and the United States. This raises the unwelcome possibility that variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (vCJD) could increase in the human population. Of the atypical BSE cases tested so far, a mutation in the prion protein gene (PRNP) has been detected in just one, a cow in Alabama with BSE; her healthy calf also carried the mutation (J. A. Richt and S. M. Hall PLoS Pathog. 4, e1000156; 2008). This raises the possibility that the disease could occasionally be genetic in origin. Indeed, the report of the UK BSE Inquiry in 2000 suggested that the UK epidemic had most likely originated from such a mutation and argued against the scrapierelated assumption. Such rare potential pathogenic PRNP mutations could occur in countries at present considered to be free of BSE, such as Australia and New Zealand. So it is important to maintain strict surveillance for BSE in cattle, with rigorous enforcement of the ruminant feed ban (many countries still feed ruminant proteins to pigs). Removal of specified risk material, such as brain and spinal cord, from cattle at slaughter prevents infected material from entering the human food chain. Routine genetic screening of cattle for PRNP mutations, which is now available, could provide additional data on the risk to the public. Because the point mutation identified in the Alabama animals is identical to that responsible for the commonest type of familial (genetic) CJD in humans, it is possible that the resulting infective prion protein might cross the bovine-human species barrier more easily. Patients with vCJD continue to be identified. The fact that this is happening less often should not lead to relaxation of the controls necessary to prevent future outbreaks. Malcolm A. Ferguson-Smith Cambridge University Department of Veterinary Medicine, Madingley Road, Cambridge CB3 0ES, UK e-mail: maf12@cam.ac.uk Jürgen A. Richt College of Veterinary Medicine, Kansas State University, K224B Mosier Hall, Manhattan, Kansas 66506-5601, USA

NATURE|Vol 457|26 February 2009

http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v457/n7233/full/4571079b.html

Thursday, August 12, 2010

Seven main threats for the future linked to prions

The NeuroPrion network has identified seven main threats for the future linked to prions.

First threat

The TSE road map defining the evolution of European policy for protection against prion diseases is based on a certain numbers of hypotheses some of which may turn out to be erroneous. In particular, a form of BSE (called atypical Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy), recently identified by systematic testing in aged cattle without clinical signs, may be the origin of classical BSE and thus potentially constitute a reservoir, which may be impossible to eradicate if a sporadic origin is confirmed. *** Also, a link is suspected between atypical BSE and some apparently sporadic cases of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease in humans. These atypical BSE cases constitute an unforeseen first threat that could sharply modify the European approach to prion diseases.

Second threat...

see full text ;

http://www.neuroprion.org/en/np-neuroprion.html

Thursday, August 12, 2010

Seven main threats for the future linked to prions

http://prionpathy.blogspot.com/2010/08/seven-main-threats-for-future-linked-to.html

14th ICID International Scientific Exchange Brochure -

Final Abstract Number: ISE.114

Session: International Scientific Exchange

Transmissible Spongiform encephalopathy (TSE) animal and human TSE in North America update October 2009

T. Singeltary

Bacliff, TX, USA

Background:

An update on atypical BSE and other TSE in North America. Please remember, the typical U.K. c-BSE, the atypical l-BSE (BASE), and h-BSE have all been documented in North America, along with the typical scrapie's, and atypical Nor-98 Scrapie, and to date, 2 different strains of CWD, and also TME. All these TSE in different species have been rendered and fed to food producing animals for humans and animals in North America (TSE in cats and dogs ?), and that the trading of these TSEs via animals and products via the USA and Canada has been immense over the years, decades.

Methods:

12 years independent research of available data

Results:

I propose that the current diagnostic criteria for human TSEs only enhances and helps the spreading of human TSE from the continued belief of the UKBSEnvCJD only theory in 2009. With all the science to date refuting it, to continue to validate this old myth, will only spread this TSE agent through a multitude of potential routes and sources i.e. consumption, medical i.e., surgical, blood, dental, endoscopy, optical, nutritional supplements, cosmetics etc.

Conclusion:

I would like to submit a review of past CJD surveillance in the USA, and the urgent need to make all human TSE in the USA a reportable disease, in every state, of every age group, and to make this mandatory immediately without further delay. The ramifications of not doing so will only allow this agent to spread further in the medical, dental, surgical arena's. Restricting the reporting of CJD and or any human TSE is NOT scientific. Iatrogenic CJD knows NO age group, TSE knows no boundaries. I propose as with Aguzzi, Asante, Collinge, Caughey, Deslys, Dormont, Gibbs, Gajdusek, Ironside, Manuelidis, Marsh, et al and many more, that the world of TSE Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy is far from an exact science, but there is enough proven science to date that this myth should be put to rest once and for all, and that we move forward with a new classification for human and animal TSE that would properly identify the infected species, the source species, and then the route.

http://ww2.isid.org/Downloads/14th_ICID_ISE_Abstracts.pdf

Thursday, October 07, 2010

Experimental Transmission of H-type Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy to Bovinized Transgenic Mice

http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2010/10/experimental-transmission-of-h-type.html

Tuesday, November 02, 2010

IN CONFIDENCE

The information contained herein should not be disseminated further except on the basis of "NEED TO KNOW".

BSE - ATYPICAL LESION DISTRIBUTION (RBSE 92-21367) statutory (obex only) diagnostic criteria CVL 1992

http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2010/11/bse-atypical-lesion-distribution-rbse.html

August 4, 1997 partial and voluntary mad cow feed ban was nothing more than ink on paper ;

10,000,000+ LBS. of PROHIBITED BANNED MAD COW FEED I.E. BLOOD LACED MBM IN COMMERCE USA 2007

Date: March 21, 2007 at 2:27 pm PST

RECALLS AND FIELD CORRECTIONS: VETERINARY MEDICINES -- CLASS II

___________________________________

PRODUCT

Bulk cattle feed made with recalled Darling's 85% Blood Meal, Flash Dried, Recall # V-024-2007

CODE

Cattle feed delivered between 01/12/2007 and 01/26/2007

RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER

Pfeiffer, Arno, Inc, Greenbush, WI. by conversation on February 5, 2007.

Firm initiated recall is ongoing.

REASON

Blood meal used to make cattle feed was recalled because it was cross- contaminated with prohibited bovine meat and bone meal that had been manufactured on common equipment and labeling did not bear cautionary BSE statement.

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE

42,090 lbs.

DISTRIBUTION

WI

___________________________________

PRODUCT

Custom dairy premix products: MNM ALL PURPOSE Pellet, HILLSIDE/CDL Prot- Buffer Meal, LEE, M.-CLOSE UP PX Pellet, HIGH DESERT/ GHC LACT Meal, TATARKA, M CUST PROT Meal, SUNRIDGE/CDL PROTEIN Blend, LOURENZO, K PVM DAIRY Meal, DOUBLE B DAIRY/GHC LAC Mineral, WEST PIONT/GHC CLOSEUP Mineral, WEST POINT/GHC LACT Meal, JENKS, J/COMPASS PROTEIN Meal, COPPINI - 8# SPECIAL DAIRY Mix, GULICK, L-LACT Meal (Bulk), TRIPLE J - PROTEIN/LACTATION, ROCK CREEK/GHC MILK Mineral, BETTENCOURT/GHC S.SIDE MK-MN, BETTENCOURT #1/GHC MILK MINR, V&C DAIRY/GHC LACT Meal, VEENSTRA, F/GHC LACT Meal, SMUTNY, A- BYPASS ML W/SMARTA, Recall # V-025-2007

CODE

The firm does not utilize a code - only shipping documentation with commodity and weights identified.

RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER

Rangen, Inc, Buhl, ID, by letters on February 13 and 14, 2007. Firm initiated recall is complete.

REASON

Products manufactured from bulk feed containing blood meal that was cross contaminated with prohibited meat and bone meal and the labeling did not bear cautionary BSE statement.

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE

9,997,976 lbs.

DISTRIBUTION

ID and NV

END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR MARCH 21, 2007

http://www.fda.gov/Safety/Recalls/EnforcementReports/2007/ucm120446.htm

Thursday, November 18, 2010

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA VS GALEN J. NIEHUES FAKED MAD COW FEED TEST ON 92 BSE INSPECTION REPORTS FOR APPROXIMATELY 100 CATTLE OPERATIONS

http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2010/11/united-states-of-america-vs-galen-j.html

Wednesday, November 17, 2010

MAD COW TESTING FAKED IN USA BY Nebraska INSPECTOR Senator Mike Johanns STATE

http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2010/11/mad-cow-testing-faked-in-usa-by.html

Wednesday, November 17, 2010

MAD COW TESTING FAKED IN USA BY Nebraska INSPECTOR Senator Mike Johanns STATE

http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2010/11/mad-cow-testing-faked-in-usa-by.html

Wednesday, December 22, 2010

Manitoba veterinarian has been fined $10,000 for falsifying certification documents for U.S. bound cattle and what about mad cow disease ?

http://usdameatexport.blogspot.com/2010/12/manitoba-veterinarian-has-been-fined.html

Tuesday, November 02, 2010

IN CONFIDENCE

The information contained herein should not be disseminated further except on the basis of "NEED TO KNOW".

BSE - ATYPICAL LESION DISTRIBUTION (RBSE 92-21367) statutory (obex only) diagnostic criteria CVL 1992

http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2010/11/bse-atypical-lesion-distribution-rbse.html

Sunday, April 12, 2009

r-calf and the USA mad cow problem, don't look, don't find, and then blame Canada

http://prionunitusaupdate2008.blogspot.com/2009/04/r-calf-and-usa-mad-cow-problem-dont.html

Saturday, April 11, 2009

CJD FOUNDATION SIDES WITH R-CALFERS NO BSE OR HUMAN TSE THERE OF IN USA 'don't be fooled'

http://prionunitusaupdate2008.blogspot.com/2009/04/cjd-foundation-sides-with-r-calfers-no.html

P.9.21

Molecular characterization of BSE in Canada

Jianmin Yang1, Sandor Dudas2, Catherine Graham2, Markus Czub3, Tim McAllister1, Stefanie Czub1 1Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada Research Centre, Canada; 2National and OIE BSE Reference Laboratory, Canada; 3University of Calgary, Canada

Background: Three BSE types (classical and two atypical) have been identified on the basis of molecular characteristics of the misfolded protein associated with the disease. To date, each of these three types have been detected in Canadian cattle.

Objectives: This study was conducted to further characterize the 16 Canadian BSE cases based on the biochemical properties of there associated PrPres. Methods: Immuno-reactivity, molecular weight, glycoform profiles and relative proteinase K sensitivity of the PrPres from each of the 16 confirmed Canadian BSE cases was determined using modified Western blot analysis.

Results: Fourteen of the 16 Canadian BSE cases were C type, 1 was H type and 1 was L type. The Canadian H and L-type BSE cases exhibited size shifts and changes in glycosylation similar to other atypical BSE cases. PK digestion under mild and stringent conditions revealed a reduced protease resistance of the atypical cases compared to the C-type cases. N terminal- specific antibodies bound to PrPres from H type but not from C or L type. The C-terminal-specific antibodies resulted in a shift in the glycoform profile and detected a fourth band in the Canadian H-type BSE.

Discussion: The C, L and H type BSE cases in Canada exhibit molecular characteristics similar to those described for classical and atypical BSE cases from Europe and Japan. This supports the theory that the importation of BSE contaminated feedstuff is the source of C-type BSE in Canada. *It also suggests a similar cause or source for atypical BSE in these countries.

http://www.prion2009.com/sites/default/files/Prion2009_Book_of_Abstracts.pdf

Saturday, November 6, 2010

TAFS1 Position Paper on Position Paper on Relaxation of the Feed Ban in the EU Berne, 2010 TAFS

INTERNATIONAL FORUM FOR TRANSMISSIBLE ANIMAL DISEASES AND FOOD SAFETY a non-profit Swiss Foundation

http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2010/11/tafs1-position-paper-on-position-paper.html

Saturday, June 12, 2010

PUBLICATION REQUEST AND FOIA REQUEST Project Number: 3625-32000-086-05 Study of Atypical Bse

http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2010/06/publication-request-and-foia-request.html

Wednesday, July 28, 2010

re-Freedom of Information Act Project Number 3625-32000-086-05, Study of Atypical BSE UPDATE July 28, 2010

http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2010/07/re-freedom-of-information-act-project.html

LET'S take a closer look at this new prionpathy or prionopathy, and then let's look at the g-h-BSEalabama mad cow.

This new prionopathy in humans? the genetic makeup is IDENTICAL to the g-h-BSEalabama mad cow, the only _documented_ mad cow in the world to date like this, ......wait, it get's better. this new prionpathy is killing young and old humans, with LONG DURATION from onset of symptoms to death, and the symptoms are very similar to nvCJD victims, OH, and the plaques are very similar in some cases too, bbbut, it's not related to the g-h-BSEalabama cow, WAIT NOW, it gets even better, the new human prionpathy that they claim is a genetic TSE, has no relation to any gene mutation in that family. daaa, ya think it could be related to that mad cow with the same genetic make-up ??? there were literally tons and tons of banned mad cow protein in Alabama in commerce, and none of it transmitted to cows, and the cows to humans there from ??? r i g h t $$$

ALABAMA MAD COW g-h-BSEalabama

In this study, we identified a novel mutation in the bovine prion protein gene (Prnp), called E211K, of a confirmed BSE positive cow from Alabama, United States of America. This mutation is identical to the E200K pathogenic mutation found in humans with a genetic form of CJD. This finding represents the first report of a confirmed case of BSE with a potential pathogenic mutation within the bovine Prnp gene. We hypothesize that the bovine Prnp E211K mutation most likely has caused BSE in "the approximately 10-year-old cow" carrying the E221K mutation.

http://www.plospathogens.org/article/info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.ppat.1000156

http://www.plospathogens.org/article/fetchObjectAttachment.action?uri=info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.ppat.1000156&representation=PDF

Saturday, August 14, 2010

BSE Case Associated with Prion Protein Gene Mutation (g-h-BSEalabama) and VPSPr PRIONPATHY

(see mad cow feed in COMMERCE IN ALABAMA...TSS)

http://prionpathy.blogspot.com/2010/08/bse-case-associated-with-prion-protein.html

2009 UPDATE ON ALABAMA AND TEXAS MAD COWS 2005 and 2006

http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2006/08/bse-atypical-texas-and-alabama-update.html

her healthy calf also carried the mutation (J. A. Richt and S. M. Hall PLoS Pathog. 4, e1000156; 2008).

This raises the possibility that the disease could occasionally be genetic in origin. Indeed, the report of the UK BSE Inquiry in 2000 suggested that the UK epidemic had most likely originated from such a mutation and argued against the scrapierelated assumption. Such rare potential pathogenic PRNP mutations could occur in countries at present considered to be free of BSE, such as Australia and New Zealand. So it is important to maintain strict surveillance for BSE in cattle, with rigorous enforcement of the ruminant feed ban (many countries still feed ruminant proteins to pigs). Removal of specified risk material, such as brain and spinal cord, from cattle at slaughter prevents infected material from entering the human food chain. Routine genetic screening of cattle for PRNP mutations, which is now available, could provide additional data on the risk to the public. Because the point mutation identified in the Alabama animals is identical to that responsible for the commonest type of familial (genetic) CJD in humans, it is possible that the resulting infective prion protein might cross the bovine–human species barrier more easily. Patients with vCJD continue to be identified. The fact that this is happening less often should not lead to relaxation of the controls necessary to prevent future outbreaks.

Malcolm A. Ferguson-Smith Cambridge University Department of Veterinary Medicine, Madingley Road, Cambridge CB3 0ES, UK e-mail: maf12@cam.ac.uk Jürgen A. Richt College of Veterinary Medicine, Kansas State University, K224B Mosier Hall, Manhattan, Kansas 66506-5601, USA

NATURE|Vol 457|26 February 2009

http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v457/n7233/full/4571079b.html

Monday, May 11, 2009

Rare BSE mutation raises concerns over risks to public health

http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2009/05/rare-bse-mutation-raises-concerns-over.html

Saturday, January 29, 2011

Atypical L-Type Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (L-BSE) Transmission to Cynomolgus Macaques, a Non-Human Primate

Jpn. J. Infect. Dis., 64 (1), 81-84, 2011

http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/01/atypical-l-type-bovine-spongiform.html

Saturday, March 5, 2011

ATYPICAL CJD PRION TSE CASES WITH CLASSIFICATIONS PENDING ON THE RISE IN NORTH AMERICA

Greetings,

WITH more and more atypical Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy cases showing up in more and more species here in North America, and the enormous monumental amount of banned mad cow protein in commerce since the infamous partial and voluntary mad cow feed ban inked on paper, with tons and tons crossing back and forth between the USA, Canada, and Mexico, it just does not surprise me of all these "PENDING CLASSIFICATIONS" of human TSE in Canada, and the USA. UK c-BSE transmitted to humans became nvCJD. WE now have atypical strains of BSE in cattle. Mission Texas experiments long ago showed that transmitted USA sheep scrapie to USA bovine, produced a TSE much different than the UK typical c-BSE. SO why would human TSE in the USA look like UK human TSE ? The corruption is mind boggling. The UK saw a suspicious TSE in humans, and science linked it to cattle. North America is awash with human and animal TSE, CJD is rising in young and old, with the same pathology and same symptoms, and none of it is related to the other. isn't that nice. who, what, bestowed such miracles upon North America $

Archive Number 20100405.1091 Published Date 05-APR-2010

Subject PRO/AH/EDR> Prion disease update 1010 (04)

snip...

[Terry S. Singeltary Sr. has added the following comment:

"According to the World Health Organisation, the future public health threat of vCJD in the UK and Europe and potentially the rest of the world is of concern and currently unquantifiable. However, the possibility of a significant and geographically diverse vCJD epidemic occurring over the next few decades cannot be dismissed.

http://whqlibdoc.who.int/publications/2003/9241545887.pdf

The key word here is diverse. What does diverse mean? If USA scrapie transmitted to USA bovine does not produce pathology as the UK c-BSE, then why would CJD from there look like UK vCJD?"

http://www.promedmail.org/pls/apex/f?p=2400:1001:568933508083034::NO::F2400_P1001_BACK_PAGE,F2400_P1001_PUB_MAIL_ID:1000,82101

CANADA CJD UPDATE 2011

CJD Deaths Reported by CJDSS1, 1994-20112 As of January 31, 2011

3. Final classification of 49 cases from 2009, 2010, 2011 is pending.

snip...

http://www.phac-aspc.gc.ca/hcai-iamss/cjd-mcj/cjdss-ssmcj/pdf/stats_0111-eng.pdf

USA 2011

USA

National Prion Disease Pathology Surveillance Center

Cases Examined1

(November 1, 2010)

Year Total Referrals2 Prion Disease Sporadic Familial Iatrogenic vCJD

1996 & earlier 51 33 28 5 0 0

1997 114 68 59 9 0 0

1998 87 51 43 7 1 0

1999 121 73 65 8 0 0

2000 146 103 89 14 0 0

2001 209 119 109 10 0 0

2002 248 149 125 22 2 0

2003 274 176 137 39 0 0

2004 325 186 164 21 0 13

2005 344 194 157 36 1 0

2006 383 197 166 29 0 24

2007 377 214 187 27 0 0

2008 394 231 205 25 0 0

2009 425 258 215 43 0 0

2010 333 213 158 33 0 0

TOTAL 38315 22656 1907 328 4 3

1 Listed based on the year of death or, if not available, on year of referral;

2 Cases with suspected prion disease for which brain tissue and/or blood (in familial cases) were submitted;

3 Disease acquired in the United Kingdom;

4 Disease was acquired in the United Kingdom in one case and in Saudi Arabia in the other case;

5 Includes 18 cases in which the diagnosis is pending, and 18 inconclusive cases;

6 Includes 23 (22 from 2010) cases with type determination pending in which the diagnosis of vCJD has been excluded.

http://www.cjdsurveillance.com/pdf/case-table.pdf

Please notice where sporadic CJD cases in 1996 went from 28 cases, to 215 cases in 2009, the highest recorded year to date. sporadic CJD is on a steady rise, and has been since 1996.

I also urge you to again notice these disturbing factors in lines 5 and 6 ;

5 Includes 18 cases in which the diagnosis is pending, and 18 inconclusive cases;

6 Includes 23 (22 from 2010) cases with type determination pending in which the diagnosis of vCJD has been excluded.

========end=====tss=====2011

Monday, August 9, 2010

National Prion Disease Pathology Surveillance Center Cases Examined (July 31, 2010)

(please watch and listen to the video and the scientist speaking about atypical BSE and sporadic CJD and listen to Professor Aguzzi)

http://prionunitusaupdate2008.blogspot.com/2010/08/national-prion-disease-pathology.html

THE steady rise of sporadic CJD cases in Canada AND USA, with many unusual cases of ''PENDING CLASSIFICATIONS" which have been pending now FOR 3 YEARS. HOW long can this cover-up continue $$$

Saturday, March 5, 2011

MAD COW ATYPICAL CJD PRION TSE CASES WITH CLASSIFICATIONS PENDING ON THE RISE IN NORTH AMERICA

http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/03/mad-cow-atypical-cjd-prion-tse-cases.html

Tuesday, March 29, 2011

TRANSMISSIBLE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY EXPOSURE SPREADING VIA HOSPITALS AND SURGICAL PROCEDURES AROUND THE GLOBE

http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/03/transmissible-spongiform-encephalopathy.html

The most recent assessments (and reassessments) were published in June 2005 (Table I; 18), and included the categorisation of Canada, the USA, and Mexico as GBR III. Although only Canada and the USA have reported cases, the historically open system of trade in North America suggests that it is likely that BSE is present also in Mexico.

http://www.oie.int/boutique/extrait/06heim937950.pdf

snip...see full text ;

http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/03/mad-cow-atypical-cjd-prion-tse-cases.html

Tuesday, April 5, 2011

Action Plan National Program 103 Animal Health 2012-2017 PRIONS AND TRANSMISSIBLE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY

Action Plan National Program 103 Animal Health 2012-2017

http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/04/action-plan-national-program-103-animal.html

Sunday, April 3, 2011

PRION 2011 NEWWORLD MONTREAL CANADA MAY 16 - 19

http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/04/prion-2011-newworld-montreal-canada-may.html

Wednesday, March 9, 2011

27 U.S. Senators want to force feed Japan Highly Potential North America Mad Cow Beef TSE PRION CJD

March 8, 2011

President Barack Obama The White House

1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, W Washington, DC 20500

Dear President Obama:

http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/03/27-us-senators-want-to-force-feed-japan.html

Wednesday, January 5, 2011

ENLARGING SPECTRUM OF PRION-LIKE DISEASES Prusiner Colby et al 2011

Prions

David W. Colby1,* and Stanley B. Prusiner1,2

----- Original Message -----

From: David Colby

To: flounder9@verizon.net

Cc: stanley@XXXXXXXX

Sent: Tuesday, March 01, 2011 8:25 AM

Subject: Re: FW: re-Prions David W. Colby1,* and Stanley B. Prusiner1,2 + Author Affiliations

Dear Terry Singeltary,

Thank you for your correspondence regarding the review article Stanley Prusiner and I recently wrote for Cold Spring Harbor Perspectives. Dr. Prusiner asked that I reply to your message due to his busy schedule. We agree that the transmission of CWD prions to beef livestock would be a troubling development and assessing that risk is important. In our article, we cite a peer-reviewed publication reporting confirmed cases of laboratory transmission based on stringent criteria. The less stringent criteria for transmission described in the abstract you refer to lead to the discrepancy between your numbers and ours and thus the interpretation of the transmission rate. We stand by our assessment of the literature--namely that the transmission rate of CWD to bovines appears relatively low, but we recognize that even a low transmission rate could have important implications for public health and we thank you for bringing attention to this matter.

Warm Regards, David Colby

--

David Colby, PhDAssistant ProfessorDepartment of Chemical EngineeringUniversity of Delaware

====================END...TSS==============

re-ENLARGING SPECTRUM OF PRION-LIKE DISEASES Prusiner Colby et al 2011 Prions

CWD to cattle figures CORRECTION

Greetings,

I believe the statement and quote below is incorrect ;

"CWD has been transmitted to cattle after intracerebral inoculation, although the infection rate was low (4 of 13 animals [Hamir et al. 2001]). This finding raised concerns that CWD prions might be transmitted to cattle grazing in contaminated pastures."

Please see ;

Within 26 months post inoculation, 12 inoculated animals had lost weight, revealed abnormal clinical signs, and were euthanatized. Laboratory tests revealed the presence of a unique pattern of the disease agent in tissues of these animals. These findings demonstrate that when CWD is directly inoculated into the brain of cattle, 86% of inoculated cattle develop clinical signs of the disease.

http://www.ars.usda.gov/research/publications/publications.htm?seq_no_115=194089

"although the infection rate was low (4 of 13 animals [Hamir et al. 2001])."

shouldn't this be corrected, 86% is NOT a low rate. ...

kindest regards,

Terry S. Singeltary Sr. P.O. Box 42 Bacliff, Texas USA 77518

Thank you!

Thanks so much for your updates/comments. We intend to publish as rapidly as possible all updates/comments that contribute substantially to the topic under discussion.

http://cshperspectives.cshlp.org/letters/submit

re-Prions David W. Colby1,* and Stanley B. Prusiner1,2 + Author Affiliations

1Institute for Neurodegenerative Diseases, University of California, San Francisco, San Francisco, California 94143 2Department of Neurology, University of California, San Francisco, San Francisco, California 94143 Correspondence: stanley@ind.ucsf.edu

http://cshperspectives.cshlp.org/content/3/1/a006833.full.pdf+html

snip...full text ;

Wednesday, January 5, 2011

ENLARGING SPECTRUM OF PRION-LIKE DISEASES Prusiner Colby et al 2011 Prions

David W. Colby1,* and Stanley B. Prusiner1,2

http://cshperspectives.cshlp.org/content/3/1/a006833.full.pdf+html

http://betaamyloidcjd.blogspot.com/2011/01/enlarging-spectrum-of-prion-like.html

http://betaamyloidcjd.blogspot.com/

Friday, December 24, 2010

TEXAS NUCLEAR DUMP VOTE SET AMID HOLIDAY RUSH THANKS TO GOVERNOR RICK PERRY NUCLEAR DUMP VOTE SET AMID HOLIDAY RUSH

CRITICS PROTEST TIMING OF MEETING ON 38-STATE WASTE FACILITY IN TEXAS

Greetings fellow Texicans,

THIS is typical timing of such an event. This is how our Government gets bills and reports passed by the public. They usual do it late at night, on a Friday night at that, so it will be only late weekend news. they got it down pat too.

Twas the night before Christmas, when all through the house, Not a creature was stirring, not even a mouse, but the rats they were a stirring, right in the House, Their pockets were lined, with money and greed, in hopes that St Nicholas would not have seen.

The children were nestled all snug in their beds, While visions of sugar-plums danced in there heads. And mamma in her 'kerchief, and I in my cap, Had just settled our brains for a long winter's nap, and again, our good Governor from Texas Rick Perry, stabbed us in the back.

When out on the lawn there arose such a clatter, I sprang from the bed to see what was the matter. Away to the window I flew like a flash, Tore open the shutters and threw up the sash, there was a bright glow from a far, in the west, it was a big bright flash.

The moon on the breast of the new-fallen snow, gave the lustre of mid-day to objects below. When, what to my wondering eyes should appear, but train load after train load of Nuclear Prolifer.

With a little old driver, his hair in perfect affair, all groomed and combed over, like a multi-millionaire, was atop the train of nuclear prolifer. The glow was so bright, it lit up the whole night. More rapid than eagles his coursers they came, and he whistled, and shouted, bring more, bring more, we will light up the whole game.

"Now Dasher! now, Dancer! now, Prancer and Vixen! On, Comet! On, Cupid! on, on Donner and Blitzen! To the top of the porch! to the top of the wall, thanks to Governor Rick Perry, we may all glow like a great big fire ball.

AS dry leaves that before the wild hurricane fly, When they meet with this fire ball in the sky, the money the received will be their final cry. So UP the house and the senate i say, and to you rick perry, i better not say.

end

I wrote about our good Environmental Friendly Governor Rick Perry and his willingness to bring nuclear waste from Ohio to Texas back in 2008. Seems the money is so good, he wants to now include 38 states to the list of states able to pollute the great state of Texas with Nuclear Proliferation waste. at a boy governor, you single handedly made Texas a toxic dump for nuclear waste. Course, which is worse, the air quality or the nuclear waste, which will kill you first ? This Governor has shown time and time again where his heart is, and it's NOT in Texas. ...

Wednesday, August 6, 2008

Company advances on plan for West Texas nuclear dump

(railcars loaded with MOUND COLD WAR NUCLEAR AFTER-BIRTH headed to Texas see photo)

http://sciencebushwhacked.blogspot.com/2008/08/company-advances-on-plan-for-west-texas.html

full text ;

http://sciencebushwhacked.blogspot.com/2010/12/texas-nuclear-dump-vote-set-amid.html

http://sciencebushwhacked.blogspot.com/2008/07/texas-wins-to-be-next-big-dumping.html

HERE in Texas, when the EPA has a regulation on the books for the protection of the people, the industry and lawmakers just add another bogus bill to the books to override it $$$

House Republicans seek to bar EPA from regulating greenhouse gases

By DAVID ESPO © 2011 The Associated Press Feb. 1, 2011, 8:42PM

WASHINGTON — In a sharp challenge to the Obama administration, House Republicans intend to unveil legislation Wednesday to ban the Environmental Protection Agency from regulating greenhouse gases under the Clean Air Act and expect to advance the bill quickly, officials disclosed Tuesday night.

The officials said the bill would nullify all of the steps the EPA has taken to date on the issue, including a threshold finding that greenhouse gases constitute a danger to the public health and welfare.

In addition, it seeks to strip the agency of its authority to use the law in any future attempts to crack down on the emissions from factories, utilities and other stationary sources.

snip...end

http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/nation/7408456.html

----- Original Message -----
From: Rep. Paul
To: flounder9@verizon.net
Sent: Monday, April 04, 2011 9:56 AM
Subject: Reply from Rep. Paul

Dear Mr. Singeltary:

Thank you for taking the time to contact my office with your concerns regarding the global warming controversy. I appreciate the opportunity to address this issue.

As I serve in the 112th Congress, one of my primary goals is to embrace an agenda of limited government, as well as do all I can to remind my colleagues of the Constitution's limits on governmental power. The Constitution is very specific regarding powers delegated to the federal government, granting no authority over environmental programs. This certainly applies to global warming.

Thank you for sharing your thoughts and concerns about this important issue with me.

Sincerely,

Ron Paul

I cannot guarantee the integrity of the text of this letter if it was not sent to you directly from my Congressional Email Account: rep.paul@mail.house.gov. If you have any questions about the validity of this message, please email me at: rep.paul@mail.house.gov or call my Washington, DC office at: (202) 225-2831.

got to hand it to old governor perry, if left up to him, Texas will be nothing more than a nuclear waste dump, with air not fit to breath, and a nuclear reactor in every county. ...tss

The Texas attorney general has charged BP with illegally emitting hundreds of thousands of pounds of toxic chemicals at one of its refineries in Texas City, a massive release of dangerous pollutants that lasted more than a month.

A joint investigation by ProPublica and Frontline found that, just two weeks before the Deepwater Horizon explosion in the Gulf, a key piece of equipment at BP’s Texas City refinery failed, allowing the release of toxic chemicals such as carbon monoxide and benzene, a carcinogen. Rather than halt operations to conduct repairs, BP continued production at the refinery, resulting in the release of 538,000 pounds of toxic chemicals over the span of almost 40 days.

http://www.pbs.org/wnet/need-to-know/environment/texas-sues-bp-over-huge-toxic-release-at-texas-city-refinery/2785/

Wednesday, August 6, 2008

Company advances on plan for West Texas nuclear dump

http://sciencebushwhacked.blogspot.com/2008/08/company-advances-on-plan-for-west-texas.html

Wednesday, July 30, 2008

TEXAS WINS TO BE NEXT BIG DUMPING GROUND FOR NUCLEAR WEAPONS RADIOACTIVE WASTE

http://sciencebushwhacked.blogspot.com/2008/07/texas-wins-to-be-next-big-dumping.html

Wednesday, July 9, 2008

Ex-official: Cheney wanted climate change report altered

http://sciencebushwhacked.blogspot.com/2008/07/ex-official-cheney-wanted-climate.html

Friday, December 24, 2010

TEXAS NUCLEAR DUMP VOTE SET AMID HOLIDAY RUSH THANKS TO GOVERNOR RICK PERRY

http://sciencebushwhacked.blogspot.com/2010/12/texas-nuclear-dump-vote-set-amid.html

IT seems a more correct headlines would have read ''Company bribes Governor Perry to bury nuclear waste and contaminate Texas''. Waste Control Specialists. The company is owned by Harold Simmons, a ''TOP DONOR TO GOV. RICK PERRY, WHO APPOINTS MEMBERS TO THE TCEQ.'' The good governor has sold out to the citizens of Texas for train car, after train car of nuclear waste from 'the mound' Monsanto plant in Miamisburg Ohio. It just so happens, my father-in-law, who is down visiting now with us, has pictures of those railroad cars just sitting and waiting to come down to Texas. Odd how I was watching the news today, about this small plane that had crashed, it had showed pictures of where it had crashed right up near a bunch of tractor-trailer cargo container boxes in a parking lot. What would keep this from happening with those radioactive toxic containers in Ohio, at 'the mound', and or in route to Texas? You see, it's been killing my father-in-law, he has been on oxygen for years, but his breathing is getting more and more labored now, even with the oxygen. He worked at 'the mound' for years and years, and he is now dying a slow death from asbestosis, among other ailments caused by working at 'the mound'. NOW here is what I just cannot understand. This material is so toxic, in trying to gain further medical assistance from the DOE, the evidence that was needed to show that indeed my father-in-law worked their i.e. work records, paperwork records, payment records etc., they told my father-in-law, that they could not dig those records up, that they were buried due to high nuclear contamination, it was just too toxic, and that he had to prove that he had worked there. In which he did finally prove, and did gain further assistance. Also, ''Soward said a contested hearing could either rebut or support allegations that the agency ignored it's own scientific evidence that the site is geologically unsuitable to store material that will remain radioactive for tens of thousands of years.'' This is typical of the Bush Administration, and it happens all the time. The only science that the Bush administration knows, is junk science, bought and paid for by industry scientist. This has been proven time and time again ;

Wednesday, July 30, 2008

TEXAS WINS TO BE NEXT BIG DUMPING GROUND FOR NUCLEAR WEAPONS RADIOACTIVE WASTE

(railcars loaded with MOUND COLD WAR NUCLEAR AFTER-BIRTH headed to Texas see photos)

http://sciencebushwhacked.blogspot.com/2008/07/texas-wins-to-be-next-big-dumping.html

http://sciencebushwhacked.blogspot.com/2008/08/company-advances-on-plan-for-west-texas.html

In Memory Of Dana (Red) Ashcraft November 10, 1927 - January 9, 2011

Another victim of the MONSANTO MOUND in Miamisburg, Ohio 45342

Beloved Husband of Myrtle M. Ashcraft for 66 years, loving father of Bonnie Singeltary and Joyce Ashcraft, grandfather of Brad, Todd, and Terry Singeltary Jr. and great grandfather of eight.

R.I.P. old fishing buddy , i'm gonna miss ya. ...

Terry S. Singeltary Sr.

Terry S. Singeltary Sr.
P.O. Box 42
Bacliff, Texas USA 77518

TRANSMISSIBLE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY REPORT UPDATE CANADA FEBRUARY 2011 and how to hide mad cow disease in Canada

2011-02-10T13:18:00.000-08:00

Current as of: 2011-01-31

Date confirmed Location Animal type infected

January 19 Saskatchewan Deer

January 4 Saskatchewan Deer

http://www.inspection.gc.ca/english/anima/disemala/rep/2011cwdmdce.shtml

Current as of: 2011-01-31

Date confirmed Location Animal type infected January 19 Ontario Sheep

*Atypical scrapie

http://www.inspection.gc.ca/english/anima/disemala/rep/2011scrtree.shtml

Wednesday, August 11, 2010

REPORT ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE SIXTEENTH CASE OF BOVINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY (BSE) IN CANADA

http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2010/08/report-on-investigation-of-sixteenth.html

Thursday, August 19, 2010

REPORT ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE SEVENTEENTH CASE OF BOVINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY (BSE) IN CANADA

http://bseusa.blogspot.com/2010/08/report-on-investigation-of-seventeenth.html

Thursday, August 19, 2010 REPORT ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE SEVENTEENTH CASE OF BOVINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY (BSE) IN CANADA Greetings BSE-L et al,

I have sent off for a full report on the 17th case of BSE in Canada, and anymore cases since then. It now seems that the only way Canada is going to report their cases to the media, consumer, or the public, is if you ask, and be sure to be very explicit when you ask for whatever case you are referring too. I can't (well, I can) believe it's come to this. WE know the USA has systematically covered up mad cow disease in the USA (they just screwed up and got caught a couple of times), but this just seems to be acceptable now around the globe. But for Canada now to turn to these same type practices as the USDA, after such a long time of being up front with the consumer and the world on their Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy problems, I find it sad that this is what it has come to now. I had previously ask the CFIA for the ''16th case, and up'', and they only sent me the 16th case of mad cow disease. So I will await now to see if we get the full details on the 17th case of mad cow disease in Canada, and or the 18th case, and any more cases they might have found to date. I cannot believe either that this is what the OIE has let it come to be.

It says on the CFIA website ;

Completed Investigations The CFIA has completed investigations of 16 cases of BSE in Canadian cattle.

To request a copy of a BSE investigation report that is not listed below, please send an e-mail to CFIAMaster@inspection.gc.ca or call 1-800-442-2342.

http://www.inspection.gc.ca/english/anima/disemala/bseesb/comenqe.shtml

Wednesday, December 22, 2010

Manitoba veterinarian has been fined $10,000 for falsifying certification documents for U.S. bound cattle and what about mad cow disease ?

http://usdameatexport.blogspot.com/2010/12/manitoba-veterinarian-has-been-fined.html

i wonder if CFIA Canada uses the same OBEX ONLY diagnostic criteria as the USDA ?

Tuesday, November 02, 2010

BSE - ATYPICAL LESION DISTRIBUTION (RBSE 92-21367) statutory (obex only) diagnostic criteria CVL 1992

http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2010/11/bse-atypical-lesion-distribution-rbse.html

PLEASE NOTE, I still have not received my request for the full report of the 17th case of BSE in Canada, and or if anymore cases have been reported since Canada started using the USDA's cloak and dagger secret BSE surveillance program of SSS. The SSS policy seems to now be the gold card for the OIE. I had great respect for Canada's BSE surveillance program and defended them greatly in the past. BUT, they have taken the low road of secrecy now, as with the USA. These actions speak louder than words, and proves in my opinion that they have more to hide than meats the eye i.e. mad cow disease $$$ for them to turn to secrecy as the USA, mad cow disease must really be bad. They still don't even list BSE mad cow # 16 and or BSE mad cow # 17 case on the CFIA site. i guess if these cases are not posted, the world thinks they are not happening. WRONG !

BSE, MRR, TSS and R-CALF ON CANADA VS USA

Bill Rancher

Joined: 10 Feb 2005 Posts: 1418 Location: GWN Posted: Fri Jan 05, 2007 9:49 am Post subject:

Texan wrote:

Hey Terry, I'd like to get a little further clarification on something if/when you have time. I'm not sure if I'm reading you correctly....

flounder wrote:

This is what sank my battleship in regards to testifying for r-calf. they actually appoached me about it, but i told them i would be glad to testify, but i was not stopping at the Canadian border, my testimony was to come south as well if given the opportunity. and that ended that, but i did supply them with a load of data, for whatever that was worth.

I highlighted the parts that confuse me. This almost makes it seem as if R-CALF was asking you to testify for them, but changed their mind when they found out that you were going to tell the WHOLE truth, instead of just the truth as regards Canadian imports.

I thought that R-CALF was only interested in the WHOLE truth - not just the selected parts of the truth that fit their protectionist agenda? After reading your post, it makes a person wonder. Maybe I read it wrong...

Am I reading this correctly, Terry? That can't be right, can it? Thanks.

I was wondering exactly the same thing Texan.

_________________

Canadian Beef....A cut above the rest!

my answer to big muddy from canada ;

hello there Texan,

yep, you read it right. don't know what ya'll gonna do without me. you know i plan on retiring from this mess soon. the pay is simply too excessive ;-( i fed them all i had at the time, and they shot the teacher. then hired old stanley i heard, go figure, must have been all those PhDs i had ;-)

as with the fuji-tv, when they came here and interviewed me for a BSE show, that i don't know what happened too, or the madcowboy documentary i was asked to proofread, and did, assured i would get some credit for, to never hear from again, to the speech in south Korea i was to make Nov. 23, but was

shipwrecked somehow there too, and that might have been a good thing considering all the riots, and they did get the information anyway, to the TSS documentary, that too fell apart for good reasons i suppose, to helping creekstone, and finally to the NIH attempted destruction of an historical bank of donated tissue from CJD victims, and that one i think i did manage to stop, and that thanks to a Republican John Cornyn, i simply think it's time to let you fellars and gals clear this mess up. i have wasted enough time. it will be a decade next Christmas. i just would hate to keep kicking the same old mad cow. i know what happened for the most part, and the ones that don't get it now, never will.

now there Texan, as far as your question, and confusion ;-) i bet you thought i was not going to answer it, or, maybe hoping i would ;

flounder wrote:

This is what sank my battleship in regards to testifying for r-calf. they actually appoached me about it, but i told them i would be glad to testify, but i was not stopping at the Canadian border, my testimony was to come south as well if given the opportunity. and that ended that, but i did supply them with a load of data, for whatever that was worth.

I highlighted the parts that confuse me. This almost makes it seem as if R-CALF was asking you to testify for them, but changed their mind when they found out that you were going to tell the WHOLE truth, instead of just the truth as regards Canadian imports.

I thought that R-CALF was only interested in the WHOLE truth - not just the selected parts of the truth that fit their protectionist agenda? After reading your post, it makes a person wonder. Maybe I read it wrong...

Am I reading this correctly, Terry? That can't be right, can it? Thanks.

=========================================================

hello again there Texan,

i don't guess it matters anymore, i don't think ill be testifying for anyone, unless it is my own execution.

i was willing to participate in good faith, and sound science, that is why i

think i was never sent to testify,

because in my opinion, R-Calf only wanted to cherry-pick the science, to use

to there advantage, to try and

claim that Canada had a worse BSE problem than the USA, and i could not conceed to that. the science did

not confirm this. all one has to do is read the BSE GBR risk assessments, and that is why GW/OIE et al revised

there own risk assessments ;-) the BSE MRR policy.

i don't know, maybe i misinterpreted it all, maybe not, you can be the judge

oh what tangled webs we weave, when all we do is practice to deceive. ...TSS

SNIP...END... SEE FULL TEXT, you need to read the following ;

start thread here r-calf vs TSS

*** http://ranchers.net/forum/viewtopic.php?t=15704&postdays=0&postorder=asc&start=12

follow thread here ;

http://ranchers.net/forum/viewtopic.php?t=15704&postdays=0&postorder=asc&start=24

http://ranchers.net/forum/viewtopic.php?t=15704&postdays=0&postorder=asc&start=36

http://ranchers.net/forum/viewtopic.php?t=15704&postdays=0&postorder=asc&start=48

Saturday, April 11, 2009

CJD FOUNDATION SIDES WITH R-CALFERS NO BSE OR HUMAN TSE THERE OF IN USA 'don't be fooled'

http://prionunitusaupdate2008.blogspot.com/2009/04/cjd-foundation-sides-with-r-calfers-no.html

Sunday, April 12, 2009

r-calf and the USA mad cow problem, don't look, don't find, and then blame Canada

http://prionunitusaupdate2008.blogspot.com/2009/04/r-calf-and-usa-mad-cow-problem-dont.html

http://prionunitusaupdate2008.blogspot.com/2009/04/cjd-foundation-sides-with-r-calfers-no.html#comments

Wednesday, November 18, 2009

R-CALF: 40 Groups Disagree With USDA's Latest BSE Court Submission

http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2009/11/r-calf-40-groups-disagree-with-usdas.html

BSE MRR = don't look, don't find, thus keep the gold card, and BSE aka mad cow disease will continue to spread. $$$ and that's just what the OIE is all about. ...TSS

Saturday, January 29, 2011

Atypical L-Type Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (L-BSE) Transmission to Cynomolgus Macaques, a Non-Human Primate

Jpn. J. Infect. Dis., 64 (1), 81-84, 2011

http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/01/atypical-l-type-bovine-spongiform.html

CJD9/10022

October 1994

Mr R.N. Elmhirst Chairman British Deer Farmers Association Holly Lodge Spencers Lane BerksWell Coventry CV7 7BZ

Dear Mr Elmhirst,

CREUTZFELDT-JAKOB DISEASE (CJD) SURVEILLANCE UNIT REPORT

Thank you for your recent letter concerning the publication of the third annual report from the CJD Surveillance Unit. I am sorry that you are dissatisfied with the way in which this report was published.

The Surveillance Unit is a completely independant outside body and the Department of Health is committed to publishing their reports as soon as they become available. In the circumstances it is not the practice to circulate the report for comment since the findings of the report would not be amended. In future we can ensure that the British Deer Farmers Association receives a copy of the report in advance of publication.

The Chief Medical Officer has undertaken to keep the public fully informed of the results of any research in respect of CJD. This report was entirely the work of the unit and was produced completely independantly of the the Department.

The statistical results reqarding the consumption of venison was put into perspective in the body of the report and was not mentioned at all in the press release. Media attention regarding this report was low key but gave a realistic presentation of the statistical findings of the Unit. This approach to publication was successful in that consumption of venison was highlighted only once by the media ie. in the News at one television proqramme.

I believe that a further statement about the report, or indeed statistical links between CJD and consumption of venison, would increase, and quite possibly give damaging credence, to the whole issue. From the low key media reports of which I am aware it seems unlikely that venison consumption will suffer adversely, if at all.

http://web.archive.org/web/20030511010117/http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/yb/1994/10/00003001.pdf

UPDATED DATA ON 2ND CWD STRAIN

Wednesday, September 08, 2010

CWD PRION CONGRESS SEPTEMBER 8-11 2010

http://chronic-wasting-disease.blogspot.com/2010/09/cwd-prion-2010.html

Our findings demonstrate that cervid PrPSc, upon strain adaptation by serial passages in vitro or in cervid transgenic mice, is capable of converting human PrPC to produce PrPSc with unique biochemical properties, likely representing a new human prion strain. The newly generated CWD-huPrPSc material has been inoculated into transgenic mice expressing human PrP to study infectivity and disease phenotype and this data will be published elsewhere.

http://www.jbc.org/content/early/2011/01/04/jbc.M110.198465.long

Sent: Thursday, February 03, 2011 12:15 PM

Subject: NMLB and USDA allow scrapie prion infected mutton to enter food chain on the Navajo Reservation in New Mexico

Greetings Honorable People of the Great Navajo Nation, and the Honorable President Ben Shelly,

I send this to you with great concern. ...

http://scrapie-usa.blogspot.com/2011/02/nmlb-and-usda-allow-scrapie-prion.html

Monday, February 7, 2011

FDA's Currently-Recommended Policies to Reduce the Possible Risk of Transmission of CJD and vCJD by Blood and Blood Products 2011 ???

http://tseac.blogspot.com/2011/02/fdas-currently-recommended-policies-to.html

Terry S. Singeltary Sr. P.O. Box 42 Bacliff, Texas USA 77518 flounder9@verizon.net

MAD COW TESTING FAKED IN USA BY Nebraska INSPECTOR Senator Mike Johanns STATE

2010-11-17T16:38:00.000-08:00

Neb. inspector accused of faking mad cow tests

Published November 17, 2010

Associated Press

OMAHA, Neb. – A former Nebraska cattle inspector has been indicted on charges that he faked reports about mad cow disease, the U.S. Attorney's Office announced Wednesday.

Galen Niehues, 41, of Cozad, was charged Tuesday in U.S. District Court in Lincoln with making false statements and mail fraud.

Niehues was employed by the state Department of Agriculture from July 2009 through March under a U.S. Food and Drug Administration grant. The indictment says he submitted inspection reports on 92 Nebraska cattle operations, along with travel expenses, but never actually performed the inspections.

Niehues collected about $35,500 in pay and benefits while working for the state, the indictment says.

No number was listed for Niehues, and court records don't list his attorney.

His first court appearance is scheduled for Dec. 2. Niehues faces up to 25 years in prison and $500,000 in fines if convicted.

Agriculture Department spokeswoman Bobbie Kriz-Wickham referred comment to the FDA. A message left Wednesday for an FDA investigator wasn't immediately returned.

___

Online:

U.S. District Court, Nebraska: http://www.ned.uscourts.gov/

Nebraska Department of Agriculture: http://www.agr.state.ne.us/

U.S. Food and Drug Administration: http://www.fda.gov/

http://www.foxnews.com/us/2010/11/17/neb-inspector-accused-faking-mad-cow-tests/

From The Associated Press, November 17, 2010 - 4:59 PM

Former Neb. inspector accused of faking tests for mad cow disease; no longer works for state

OMAHA, Neb. (AP) - A former state cattle inspector has been indicted for faking tests for mad cow disease.

The two-count indictment announced Wednesday by the U.S Attorney's Office says 41-year-old Galen Niehues, of Cozad, submitted inspection reports on 92 cattle operations in Nebraska but never actually performed the inspections. He faces federal charges of making false statements and mail fraud.

No number was listed for Niehues, and court records don't list his attorney.

His first court appearance is scheduled for Dec. 2. Niehues faces up to 25 years in prison if convicted.

A message left with the Agriculture Department wasn't immediately returned. The indictment says Niehues worked for the department from July 2009 through March.

http://www.canadianbusiness.com/markets/market_news/article.jsp?content=D9JI50D00

Thursday, November 18, 2010

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA VS GALEN J. NIEHUES FAKED MAD COW FEED TEST ON 92 BSE INSPECTION REPORTS FOR APPROXIMATELY 100 CATTLE OPERATIONS

4:10-cr-03119-RGK -CRZ Doc # 1 Filed: 11/16/10 Page 1 of 4 - Page ID #1

FILED

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEBRASKA

10 NOV 16 PM 4:16

OFFICE OF THE CLERK

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEBRASKA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

vs.

GALEN J. NIEHUES,

Defendant.

INDICTMENT

18 U.S.C. § 1001

18 U.S.C. § 1341

The Grand Jury charges that:

INTRODUCTION

see full text here ;

http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2010/11/united-states-of-america-vs-galen-j.html

Subject: USDA OIG SEMIANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS FY 2007 1st Half
(bogus BSE sampling FROM HEALTHY USDA CATTLE)
Date: June 21, 2007 at 2:49 pm PST

Owner and Corporation Plead Guilty to Defrauding Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Surveillance Program

An Arizona meat processing company and its owner pled guilty in February 2007 to charges of theft of Government funds, mail fraud, and wire fraud. The owner and his company defrauded the BSE Surveillance Program when they falsified BSE Surveillance Data Collection Forms and then submitted payment requests to USDA for the services. In addition to the targeted sample population (those cattle that were more than 30 months old or had other risk factors for BSE), the owner submitted to USDA, or caused to be submitted, BSE obex (brain stem) samples from healthy USDA-inspected cattle. As a result, the owner fraudulently received approximately $390,000. Sentencing is scheduled for May 2007.

snip...

Topics that will be covered in ongoing or planned reviews under Goal 1 include:

soundness of BSE maintenance sampling (APHIS),

implementation of Performance-Based Inspection System enhancements for specified risk material (SRM) violations and improved inspection controls over SRMs (FSIS and APHIS),

snip...

The findings and recommendations from these efforts will be covered in future semiannual reports as the relevant audits and investigations are completed.

4 USDA OIG SEMIANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS FY 2007 1st Half

http://www.usda.gov/oig/webdocs/sarc070619.pdf

Office of the United States Attorney District of Arizona

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE For Information Contact Public Affairs

February 16, 2007 WYN HORNBUCKLE Telephone: (602) 514-7625 Cell: (602) 525-2681

CORPORATION AND ITS PRESIDENT PLEAD GUILTY TO DEFRAUDING GOVERNMENT’S MAD COW DISEASE SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM

PHOENIX -- Farm Fresh Meats, Inc. and Roland Emerson Farabee, 55, of Maricopa, Arizona, pleaded guilty to stealing $390,000 in government funds, mail fraud and wire fraud, in federal district court in Phoenix.U.S. Attorney Daniel Knauss stated, “The integrity of the system that tests for mad cow disease relies upon the honest cooperation of enterprises like Farm Fresh Meats. Without that honest cooperation, consumers both in the U.S. and internationally are at risk. We want to thank the USDA’s Office of Inspector General for their continuing efforts to safeguard the public health and enforce the law.” Farm Fresh Meats and Farabee were charged by Information with theft of government funds, mail fraud and wire fraud. According to the Information, on June 7, 2004, Farabee, on behalf of Farm Fresh Meats, signed a contract with the U.S. Department of Agriculture (the “USDA Agreement”) to collect obex samples from cattle at high risk of mad cow disease (the “Targeted Cattle Population”). The Targeted Cattle Population consisted of the following cattle: cattle over thirty months of age; nonambulatory cattle; cattle exhibiting signs of central nervous system disorders; cattle exhibiting signs of mad cow disease; and dead cattle. Pursuant to the USDA Agreement, the USDA agreed to pay Farm Fresh Meats $150 per obex sample for collecting obex samples from cattle within the Targeted Cattle Population, and submitting the obex samples to a USDA laboratory for mad cow disease testing. Farm Fresh Meats further agreed to maintain in cold storage the sampled cattle carcasses and heads until the test results were received by Farm Fresh Meats.

Evidence uncovered during the government’s investigation established that Farm Fresh Meats and Farabee submitted samples from cattle outside the Targeted Cattle Population. Specifically, Farm Fresh Meats and Farabee submitted, or caused to be submitted, obex samples from healthy, USDA inspected cattle, in order to steal government moneys.

Evidence collected also demonstrated that Farm Fresh Meats and Farabee failed to maintain cattle carcasses and heads pending test results and falsified corporate books and records to conceal their malfeasance. Such actions, to the extent an obex sample tested positive (fortunately, none did), could have jeopardized the USDA’s ability to identify the diseased animal and pinpoint its place of origin. On Wednesday, February 14, 2007, Farm Fresh Meats and Farabee pleaded guilty to stealing government funds and using the mails and wires to effect the scheme. According to their guilty pleas:

(a) Farm Fresh Meats collected, and Farabee directed others to collect, obex samples from cattle outside the Targeted Cattle Population, which were not subject to payment by the USDA;

(b) Farm Fresh Meats2 and Farabee caused to be submitted payment requests to the USDA knowing that the requests were based on obex samples that were not subject to payment under the USDA Agreement; (c) Farm Fresh Meats completed and submitted, and Farabee directed others to complete and submit, BSE Surveillance Data Collection Forms to the USDA’s testing laboratory that were false and misleading;

(d) Farm Fresh Meats completed and submitted, and Farabee directed others to complete and submit, BSE Surveillance Submission Forms filed with the USDA that were false and misleading;

(e) Farm Fresh Meats falsified, and Farabee directed others to falsify, internal Farm Fresh Meats documents to conceal the fact that Farm Fresh Meats was seeking and obtaining payment from the USDA for obex samples obtained from cattle outside the Targeted Cattle Population; and

(f) Farm Fresh Meats failed to comply with, and Farabee directed others to fail to comply with, the USDA Agreement by discarding cattle carcasses and heads prior to receiving BSE test results.

A conviction for theft of government funds carries a maximum penalty of 10 years imprisonment. Mail fraud and wire fraud convictions carry a maximum penalty of 20 years imprisonment. Convictions for the above referenced violations also carry a maximum fine of $250,000 for individuals and $500,000 for organizations. In determining an actual sentence, Judge Earl H. Carroll will consult the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, which provide appropriate sentencing ranges. The judge, however, is not bound by those guidelines in determining a sentence. Sentencing is set before Judge Earl H. Carroll on May 14, 2007. The investigation in this case was conducted by Assistant Special Agent in Charge Alejandro Quintero, United States Department of Agriculture, Office of Inspector General. The prosecution is being handled by Robert Long, Assistant U.S. Attorney, District of Arizona, Phoenix.

CASE NUMBER: CR-07-00160-PHX-EHC RELEASE NUMBER: 2007-051(Farabee) # # #

http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/az/press_releases/2007/2007-051(Farabee).pdf

Nebraska Senator Mike Johanns

Wednesday, February 11, 2009

Atypical BSE North America Update February 2009

http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2009/02/atypical-bse-north-america-update.html

Tuesday, November 02, 2010

BSE - ATYPICAL LESION DISTRIBUTION (RBSE 92-21367) statutory (obex only) diagnostic criteria CVL 1992

IN CONFIDENCE

The information contained herein should not be disseminated further except on the basis of "NEED TO KNOW".

http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2010/11/bse-atypical-lesion-distribution-rbse.html

Rare BSE mutation raises concerns over risks to public health

SIR — Atypical forms (known as H- and L-type) of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) have recently appeared in several European countries as well as in Japan, Canada and the United States. This raises the unwelcome possibility that variant Creutzfeldt–Jakob disease (vCJD) could increase in the human population. Of the atypical BSE cases tested so far, a mutation in the prion protein gene (PRNP) has been detected in just one, a cow in Alabama with BSE;

http://www.plospathogens.org/article/fetchObjectAttachment.action?uri=info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.ppat.1000156&representation=PDF

http://prionpathy.blogspot.com/2010/08/bse-case-associated-with-prion-protein.html

her healthy calf also carried the mutation (J. A. Richt and S. M. Hall PLoS Pathog. 4, e1000156; 2008).

This raises the possibility that the disease could occasionally be genetic in origin. Indeed, the report of the UK BSE Inquiry in 2000 suggested that the UK epidemic had most likely originated from such a mutation and argued against the scrapierelated assumption. Such rare potential pathogenic PRNP mutations could occur in countries at present considered to be free of BSE, such as Australia and New Zealand. So it is important to maintain strict surveillance for BSE in cattle, with rigorous enforcement of the ruminant feed ban (many countries still feed ruminant proteins to pigs). Removal of specified risk material, such as brain and spinal cord, from cattle at slaughter prevents infected material from entering the human food chain. Routine genetic screening of cattle for PRNP mutations, which is now available, could provide additional data on the risk to the public. Because the point mutation identified in the Alabama animals is identical to that responsible for the commonest type of familial (genetic) CJD in humans, it is possible that the resulting infective prion protein might cross the bovine–human species barrier more easily. Patients with vCJD continue to be identified. The fact that this is happening less often should not lead to relaxation of the controls necessary to prevent future outbreaks.

Malcolm A. Ferguson-Smith Cambridge University Department of Veterinary Medicine, Madingley Road, Cambridge CB3 0ES, UK e-mail: maf12@cam.ac.uk Jürgen A. Richt College of Veterinary Medicine, Kansas State University, K224B Mosier Hall, Manhattan, Kansas 66506-5601, USA

NATUREVol 45726 February 2009

http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v457/n7233/full/4571079b.html

LET'S take a closer look at this new prionpathy or prionopathy, and then let's look at the g-h-BSEalabama mad cow.

This new prionopathy in humans? the genetic makeup is IDENTICAL to the g-h-BSEalabama mad cow, the only _documented_ mad cow in the world to date like this, ......wait, it get's better. this new prionpathy is killing young and old humans, with LONG DURATION from onset of symptoms to death, and the symptoms are very similar to nvCJD victims, OH, and the plaques are very similar in some cases too, bbbut, it's not related to the g-h-BSEalabama cow, WAIT NOW, it gets even better, the new human prionpathy that they claim is a genetic TSE, has no relation to any gene mutation in that family. daaa, ya think it could be related to that mad cow with the same genetic make-up ??? there were literally tons and tons of banned mad cow protein in Alabama in commerce, and none of it transmitted to cows, and the cows to humans there from ??? r i g h t $$$

ALABAMA MAD COW g-h-BSEalabama

In this study, we identified a novel mutation in the bovine prion protein gene (Prnp), called E211K, of a confirmed BSE positive cow from Alabama, United States of America. This mutation is identical to the E200K pathogenic mutation found in humans with a genetic form of CJD. This finding represents the first report of a confirmed case of BSE with a potential pathogenic mutation within the bovine Prnp gene. We hypothesize that the bovine Prnp E211K mutation most likely has caused BSE in "the approximately 10-year-old cow" carrying the E221K mutation.

http://www.plospathogens.org/article/info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.ppat.1000156

http://www.plospathogens.org/article/fetchObjectAttachment.action?uri=info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.ppat.1000156&representation=PDF

Saturday, August 14, 2010

BSE Case Associated with Prion Protein Gene Mutation (g-h-BSEalabama) and VPSPr PRIONPATHY

(see mad cow feed in COMMERCE IN ALABAMA...TSS)

http://prionpathy.blogspot.com/2010/08/bse-case-associated-with-prion-protein.html

2009 UPDATE ON ALABAMA AND TEXAS MAD COWS 2005 and 2006

http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2006/08/bse-atypical-texas-and-alabama-update.html

I ask Professor Kong ;

Thursday, December 04, 2008 3:37 PM Subject: RE: re--Chronic Wating Disease (CWD) and Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathies (BSE): Public Health Risk Assessment

''IS the h-BSE more virulent than typical BSE as well, or the same as cBSE, or less virulent than cBSE? just curious.....''

Professor Kong reply ;

.....snip

''As to the H-BSE, we do not have sufficient data to say one way or another, but we have found that H-BSE can infect humans. I hope we could publish these data once the study is complete.

Thanks for your interest.''

Best regards,

Qingzhong Kong, PhD Associate Professor Department of Pathology Case Western Reserve University Cleveland, OH 44106 USA

END...TSS

P26

TRANSMISSION OF ATYPICAL BOVINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY (BSE) IN HUMANIZED MOUSE MODELS

Liuting Qing1, Fusong Chen1, Michael Payne1, Wenquan Zou1, Cristina Casalone2, Martin Groschup3, Miroslaw Polak4, Maria Caramelli2, Pierluigi Gambetti1, Juergen Richt5*, and Qingzhong Kong1

1Department of Pathology, Case Western Reserve University, Cleveland, OH 44106, USA; 2CEA, Istituto Zooprofilattico Sperimentale, Italy; 3Friedrich-Loeffler-Institut, Germany; 4National Veterinary Research Institute, Poland; 5Kansas State University, Diagnostic Medicine/Pathobiology Department, Manhattan, KS 66506, USA. *Previous address: USDA National Animal Disease Center, Ames, IA 50010, USA

Classical BSE is a world-wide prion disease in cattle, and the classical BSE strain (BSE-C) has led to over 200 cases of clinical human infection (variant CJD). Two atypical BSE strains, BSE-L (also named BASE) and BSE-H, have been discovered in three continents since 2004. The first case of naturally occurring BSE with mutated bovine PrP gene (termed BSE-M) was also found in 2006 in the USA. The transmissibility and phenotypes of these atypical BSE strains/isolates in humans were unknown.

We have inoculated humanized transgenic mice with classical and atypical BSE strains (BSE-C, BSE-L, BSE-H) and the BSE-M isolate. We have found that the atypical BSE-L strain is much more virulent than the classical BSE-C. The atypical BSE-H strain is also transmissible in the humanized transgenic mice with distinct phenotype, but no transmission has been observed for the BSE-M isolate so far.

http://www.istitutoveneto.it/prion_09/Abstracts_09.pdf

Thursday, October 07, 2010

Experimental Transmission of H-type Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy to Bovinized Transgenic Mice

http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2010/10/experimental-transmission-of-h-type.html

Wednesday, July 28, 2010

re-Freedom of Information Act Project Number 3625-32000-086-05, Study of Atypical BSE UPDATE July 28, 2010

http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2010/07/re-freedom-of-information-act-project.html

Wednesday, November 10, 2010 McDonald's and USA BSE aka mad cow disease McDonald's AND Seriologicals USA NOT PROTECTED FROM MAD COW

http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2010/11/mcdonalds-and-usa-bse-aka-mad-cow.html

WAKE UP AMERICA !

with kindest regards, terry

layperson

FDA STATEMENT FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE May 4, 2004 Media Inquiries: 301-827-6242 Consumer Inquiries: 888-INFO-FDA

Statement on Texas Cow With Central Nervous System Symptoms On Friday, April 30th, the Food and Drug Administration learned that a cow with central nervous system symptoms had been killed and shipped to a processor for rendering into animal protein for use in animal feed.

FDA, which is responsible for the safety of animal feed, immediately began an investigation. On Friday and throughout the weekend, FDA investigators inspected the slaughterhouse, the rendering facility, the farm where the animal came from, and the processor that initially received the cow from the slaughterhouse.

FDA's investigation showed that the animal in question had already been rendered into "meat and bone meal" (a type of protein animal feed). Over the weekend FDA was able to track down all the implicated material. That material is being held by the firm, which is cooperating fully with FDA.

Cattle with central nervous system symptoms are of particular interest because cattle with bovine spongiform encephalopathy or BSE, also known as "mad cow disease," can exhibit such symptoms. In this case, there is no way now to test for BSE. But even if the cow had BSE, FDA's animal feed rule would prohibit the feeding of its rendered protein to other ruminant animals (e.g., cows, goats, sheep, bison).

FDA is sending a letter to the firm summarizing its findings and informing the firm that FDA will not object to use of this material in swine feed only. If it is not used in swine feed, this material will be destroyed. Pigs have been shown not to be susceptible to BSE. If the firm agrees to use the material for swine feed only, FDA will track the material all the way through the supply chain from the processor to the farm to ensure that the feed is properly monitored and used only as feed for pigs.

To protect the U.S. against BSE, FDA works to keep certain mammalian protein out of animal feed for cattle and other ruminant animals. FDA established its animal feed rule in 1997 after the BSE epidemic in the U.K. showed that the disease spreads by feeding infected ruminant protein to cattle.

Under the current regulation, the material from this Texas cow is not allowed in feed for cattle or other ruminant animals. FDA's action specifying that the material go only into swine feed means also that it will not be fed to poultry.

FDA is committed to protecting the U.S. from BSE and collaborates closely with the U.S. Department of Agriculture on all BSE issues. The animal feed rule provides crucial protection against the spread of BSE, but it is only one of several such firewalls. FDA will soon be improving the animal feed rule, to make this strong system even stronger.

#

http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/2004/ucm108292.htm

Saturday, November 6, 2010

TAFS1 Position Paper on Position Paper on Relaxation of the Feed Ban in the EU Berne, 2010 TAFS

INTERNATIONAL FORUM FOR TRANSMISSIBLE ANIMAL DISEASES AND FOOD SAFETY a non-profit Swiss Foundation

http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2010/11/tafs1-position-paper-on-position-paper.html

Seven main threats for the future linked to prions

The NeuroPrion network has identified seven main threats for the future linked to prions.

First threat

The TSE road map defining the evolution of European policy for protection against prion diseases is based on a certain numbers of hypotheses some of which may turn out to be erroneous. In particular, a form of BSE (called atypical Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy), recently identified by systematic testing in aged cattle without clinical signs, may be the origin of classical BSE and thus potentially constitute a reservoir, which may be impossible to eradicate if a sporadic origin is confirmed. *** Also, a link is suspected between atypical BSE and some apparently sporadic cases of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease in humans. These atypical BSE cases constitute an unforeseen first threat that could sharply modify the European approach to prion diseases.

Second threat

In small ruminants, a new atypical form of scrapie currently represents up to 50% of detected cases and even involves sheep selected for resistance to classical scrapie. The consequences for animal and human health are still unknown and there may be a potential connection with atypical BSE. These atypical scrapie cases constitute a second threat not envisioned previously which could deeply modify the European approach to prion diseases.

Third threat

The species barrier between human and cattle might be weaker than previously expected and the risk of transmission of prion diseases between different species has been notoriously unpredictable. The emergence of new atypical strains in cattle and sheep together with the spread of chronic wasting disease in cervids renders the understanding of the species barrier critical. This constitutes a third threat not properly envisioned previously that could deeply modify the European approach to prion diseases.

Fourth threat

Prion infectivity has now been detected in blood, urine and milk and this has potential consequences on risk assessments for the environment and food as well as for contamination of surfaces including medical instruments. Furthermore the procedures recommended for decontamination of MBM (Meat and Bone Meal), which are based on older methodologies not designed for this purpose, have turned out to be of very limited efficacy and compromise current policies concerning the reuse of these high value protein supplements (cross-contamination of feed circuits are difficult to control). It should be noted that the destruction or very limited use of MBM is estimated to still cost 1 billion euros per year to the European economy,

whereas other countries, including the US,

Brazil, and Argentine do not have these constraints.

However, many uncertainties remain concerning the guarantees that can be reasonably provided for food and feed safety and scientific knowledge about the causative agents (prions) will continue to evolve. This decontamination and environmental issue is a fourth threat that could modify deeply the European approach to prion diseases.

Fifth threat The precise nature of prions remains elusive. Very recent data indicate that abnormal prion protein (PrPTSE) can be generated from the brains of normal animals, and under some conditions (including contaminated waste water) PrPTSE can be destroyed whereas the BSE infectious titre remains almost unchanged, a finding that underlines the possibility of having BSE without any detectable diagnostic marker. These are just two areas of our incomplete knowledge of the fundamental biology of prions which constitute a fifth threat to the European approach to prion diseases.

Sixth threat The absence of common methods and standardisation in the evaluation of multiple in vivo models with different prion strains and different transgenic mice expressing PrP from different species (different genotypes of cattle, sheep, cervids, etc) renders a complete and comprehensive analysis of all the data generated by the different scientific groups almost impossible. This deeply impairs risk assessment. Moreover, the possibility of generating PrPTSE de novo with new powerful techniques has raised serious questions about their appropriateness for use as blood screening tests. The confusion about an incorrect interpretation of positive results obtained by these methods constitutes a sixth threat to European approach to prion diseases.

Seventh Threat The detection of new or re-emerging prion diseases in animals or humans which could lead to a new crisis in consumer confidence over the relaxation of precautionary measures and surveillance programmes constitutes a seventh threat that could modify the European approach to prion diseases.

http://www.neuroprion.org/en/np-neuroprion.html

Thursday, August 12, 2010

Seven main threats for the future linked to prions

http://prionpathy.blogspot.com/2010/08/seven-main-threats-for-future-linked-to.html

http://prionpathy.blogspot.com/

Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport References Committee The possible impacts and consequences for public health, trade and agriculture of the Government's decision to relax import restrictions on beef Final report June 2010

2.65 At its hearing on 14 May 2010, the committee heard evidence from Dr Alan Fahey who has recently submitted a thesis on the clinical neuropsychiatric, epidemiological and diagnostic features of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease.48 Dr Fahey told the committee of his concerns regarding the lengthy incubation period for transmissible spongiform encephalopathies, the inadequacy of current tests and the limited nature of our current understanding of this group of diseases.49

2.66 Dr Fahey also told the committee that in the last two years a link has been established between forms of atypical CJD and atypical BSE. Dr Fahey said that: They now believe that those atypical BSEs overseas are in fact causing sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease. They were not sure if it was due to mad sheep disease or a different form. If you look in the textbooks it looks like this is just arising by itself. But in my research I have a summary of a document which states that there has never been any proof that sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease has arisen de novo-has arisen of itself. There is no proof of that. The recent research is that in fact it is due to atypical forms of mad cow disease which have been found across Europe, have been found in America and have been found in Asia. These atypical forms of mad cow disease typically have even longer incubation periods than the classical mad cow disease.50

http://www.aph.gov.au/senate/committee/rrat_ctte/mad_cows/report/report.pdf

5 Includes 28 cases in which the diagnosis is pending, and 17 inconclusive cases;

6 Includes 28 (24 from 2010) cases with type determination pending in which the diagnosis of vCJD has been excluded

http://www.cjdsurveillance.com/pdf/case-table.pdf

CJD TEXAS 38 YEAR OLD FEMALE WORKED SLAUGHTERING CATTLE EXPOSED TO BRAIN AND SPINAL CORD MATTER

" Up until about 6 years ago, the pt worked at Tyson foods where she worked on the assembly line, slaughtering cattle and preparing them for packaging. She was exposed to brain and spinal cord matter when she would euthanize the cattle. "

http://www.recordandoalinda.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=19:cjd-english-info&catid=9:cjd-ingles&Itemid=8

According to the World Health Organisation, the future public health threat of vCJD in the UK and Europe and potentially the rest of the world is of concern and currently unquantifiable. However, the possibility of a significant and geographically diverse vCJD epidemic occurring over the next few decades cannot be dismissed.

The key word here is diverse. What does diverse mean?

If USA scrapie transmitted to USA bovine does not produce pathology as the UK c-BSE, then why would CJD from there look like UK vCJD?"

SEE FULL TEXT ;

http://www.promedmail.org/pls/apex/f?p=2400:1001:568933508083034::NO::F2400_P1001_BACK_PAGE,F2400_P1001_PUB_MAIL_ID:1000,82101

5 Includes 28 cases in which the diagnosis is pending, and 17 inconclusive cases;

6 Includes 28 (24 from 2010) cases with type determination pending in which the diagnosis of vCJD has been excluded

http://www.cjdsurveillance.com/pdf/case-table.pdf

USA MAD COW POLICY, don't look, don't find, or screw the testing up so bad, everything comes out negative. UNLESS of course you get the end around by the Honorable Phyllis Fong of the OIG. Course, that was a one time deal. But what a coup it was. ...TSS

-------- Original Message --------

Subject: USA BIO-RADs INCONCLUSIVEs

Date: Fri, 17 Dec 2004 15:37:28 -0600

From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."

To: susan_berg@bio-rad.com

Hello Susan and Bio-Rad,

Happy Holidays!

I wish to ask a question about Bio-Rad and USDA BSE/TSE testing and there inconclusive. IS the Bio-Rad test for BSE/TSE that complicated, or is there most likely some human error we are seeing here?

HOW can Japan have 2 positive cows with No clinical signs WB+, IHC-, HP- , BUT in the USA, these cows are considered 'negative'?

IS there more politics working here than science in the USA?

What am I missing?

-------- Original Message --------

Subject: Re: USDA: More mad cow testing will demonstrate beef's safety

Date: Fri, 17 Dec 2004 09:26:19 -0600

From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr." snip...end

Experts doubt USDA's mad cow results

snip...END

WELL, someone did call me from Bio-Rad about this, however it was not Susan Berg. but i had to just about take a blood oath not to reveal there name. IN fact they did not want me to even mention this, but i feel it is much much to important. I have omitted any I.D. of this person, but thought I must document this ;

Bio-Rad, TSS phone conversation 12/28/04

SNIP...

full text ;

http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2008/01/bse-oie-usda.html

Saturday, August 16, 2008

Qualitative Analysis of BSE Risk Factors in the United States February 13, 2000 at 3:37 pm PST (BSE red book)

http://bseusa.blogspot.com/2008/08/qualitative-analysis-of-bse-risk.html

48 hour traceback for BSE mad cow disease in the USA ???

NOT in your lifetime !

8 YEARS IN REVIEW OF THE MAD COW DEBACLE IN THE USA ;

http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2008/12/mad-cow-disease-usa-december-28-2008-8.html

Thursday, June 24, 2010

Accumulation of L-type Bovine Prions in Peripheral Nerve Tissues

Volume 16, Number 7–July 2010

http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2010/06/accumulation-of-l-type-bovine-prions-in.html

Saturday, June 19, 2010

U.S. DENIED UPGRADED BSE STATUS FROM OIE

see full text and reasons why here ;

http://usdameatexport.blogspot.com/2010/06/us-denied-upgraded-bse-status-from-oie.html

-------- Original Message --------

Subject: TESTIMONY OF THE HONORABLE MIKE JOHANNS USDA BEFORE THE U.S. SENATE COMMITTEE ON AGRICULTURE, NUTRITION & FORESTRY FEBRUARY 3, 2005 Date: Tue, 22 Feb 2005 16:29:55 -0600
From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."
Reply-To: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy
To: BSE-L@LISTSERV.KALIV.UNI-KARLSRUHE.DE

##################### Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy #####################

TESTIMONY OF THE HONORABLE MIKE JOHANNS UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE BEFORE THE U.S. SENATE COMMITTEE ON AGRICULTURE, NUTRITION & FORESTRY FEBRUARY 3, 2005

Chairman Chambliss, Mr. Harkin, Members of the Committee, thank you for holding this important hearing today and for the opportunity to testify before you. Accompanying me today are Dr. Keith Collins, USDA s Chief Economist and Dr. Ron DeHaven, Administrator of USDA s Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS). They will be available to assist in answering any questions you might have.

Before I begin, I want to thank you all for the professionalism and courtesy extended to Stephanie and me during my recent confirmation process. I appreciate the close, positive working relationships that we have begun forging, and thanks to the diligence of this Committee, it was an honor and privilege for me to be the first Cabinet member confirmed during President Bush s second term. It is, therefore, a pleasure to return for my first hearing as Secretary.

I have said frequently that addressing Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) issues, particularly as they relate to trade disruptions, would be my top priority as Secretary. I have also heard from this Committee quite clearly on this topic, and I believe very strongly that we are all on the side of American agriculture. The Committee and your constituents have also posed some useful and valid questions that deserve thorough examination, which this hearing will help provide.

The actions that the U.S. Department of Agriculture and the federal government are taking in regard to BSE are potentially precedent-setting and could affect international trade patterns for years to come, with important economic implications for our cattle producers and the entire beef industry. Therefore, our actions must be undertaken with the utmost deliberation, using science as the basis. In the absence of that science, sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) restrictions will be used arbitrarily by many nations, without any basis of protecting human or animal health.

Accordingly, this hearing could not be timelier. I want to be very clear that while protecting human and animal health must remain our top priorities, I am confident that we can seek to return to normal patterns of international commerce by continuing to use science as the basis for decision making by U.S. regulatory authorities and our trading partners.

Almost exactly one year ago, Secretary Veneman appeared before this Committee to discuss BSE. In the time since then, much has transpired:

On March 8, 2004, USDA published a notice reopening the comment period on a rule to establish minimal-risk regions for BSE (the minimal-risk rule ).

On March 15, 2004, consistent with the recommendations of an International Review Team (IRT) of scientific advisers, USDA announced that beginning June 1 it would implement an enhanced BSE surveillance program to test as many high risk animals as possible over a 12-18 month period. We wanted once and for all to clearly ascertain whether we had BSE in our cattle herd and, if so, how prevalent it might be. USDA began the work of setting up the infrastructure required, including laboratory equipment and certification, staff training, outreach efforts, and licensing and approval of rapid tests. The plan was reviewed by the IRT, which characterized it as comprehensive, scientifically based and address[ing] the most important points regarding BSE surveillance in animals.

On June 1, 2004, the enhanced surveillance program began. Our goal is to test as many high- risk cattle as possible in 12-18 months. If we test 268, 500 we will be able to detect the presence of as few as five targeted, high-risk cattle with BSE at a 99 percent confidence level. At the time, USDA officials consistently stated that the surveillance plan might uncover additional BSE-positive animals. To date, some eight months later, more than 200,000 animals have been tested, all of which have been negative.

In order to help raise awareness about potential BSE cases among animal-health professionals and livestock producers, education and outreach have also been critical components of these efforts. These activities have included advertisements in industry publications, media articles, presentations at trade shows, and other materials. The role of producers, renderers and others in helping obtain samples of high-risk animals has been indispensable to the success of our surveillance program, and the cooperation we have received has been outstanding.

On December 29, 2004, USDA announced the final minimal-risk rule, which designated Canada as the first minimal-risk region for BSE, and which will become effective on March 7, 2005.

On January 2, 2005, Canada confirmed its second domestic case of BSE in a cow that was born in October of 1996 (the first since May 20, 2003). It was followed nine days later by a third case, an 81-month-old cow.

On January 24, 2005, USDA dispatched a technical team to Canada. We sent the team to investigate the efficacy of Canada s ruminant to ruminant feed ban because the animal was born shortly after the implementation of that ban and to determine if there are any potential links among the positive animals. We have appreciated Canada s willingness to cooperate and assist us in these efforts.

The technical team is focusing both on the efficacy of Canada s feed ban and its epidemiological investigation of the new BSE cases. The team is composed of experts from APHIS in the areas of epidemiology, transmissible spongiform encephalopathies (the family of diseases to which BSE belongs), and official documentation.

An auditor from USDA s Agricultural Marketing Service (AMS) is also part of the team, which will also be joined by representatives of USDA s Foreign Agricultural Service (FAS) stationed in Canada. Technical experts from the Department of Health and Human Services Food and Drug Administration are accompanying the team in an advisory capacity.

We have been receiving regular updates from the team. We expect a final report on feed ban issues in mid-February and the epidemiological report by the end of March. These reports will be critical as we consider whether any adjustments to current policies are warranted.

The Minimal-Risk Rule

As you are aware, USDA s minimal-risk rule has come under legal challenge. I will address the process of promulgating the rule, which was transparent, deliberative and science-based.

Two rounds of public comment were conducted on the rule, with more than 3,300 comments received.

The final rule establishes criteria for geographic regions to be recognized as presenting minimal risk of introducing BSE into the United States. It places Canada in the minimal-risk category, and defines the requirements that must be met for the import of certain ruminants and ruminant products from Canada. A minimal-risk region can include a region in which BSE-infected animals have been diagnosed, but where sufficient risk-mitigation measures have been put in place to make the introduction of BSE into the United States unlikely.

Because the rule permits the import of live cattle under 30 months of age and ruminant products from older animals, it is useful to note the risk mitigation measures. These include: proper animal identification; accompanying animal health certification that includes information on individual animal identification, age, origin, destination, and responsible parties; the movement of the cattle to feedlots or slaughter facilities in sealed containers; the prohibition on cattle moving to more than one feedlot in the United States; and the removal of specified risk materials (SRMs) from cattle slaughtered in the United States.

For live sheep and goats under 12 months of age, all of the same mitigation measures apply, except for the requirement that SRMs be removed from the animal at slaughter.

We remain very confident that the combination of all of these requirements, in addition to the animal and public health measures that Canada has in place to prevent the spread of BSE, along with the extensive U.S. regulatory food-safety and animal-health systems, provide the utmost protection to U.S. consumers and livestock.

USDA continues to undertake several steps to ensure Canada s compliance with its BSE regulations. In addition to the investigation that I already discussed, USDA s Food Safety and Inspection Service in December 2004 conducted an intensive audit of Canada s compliance with the BSE requirements of the United States, with particular attention to SRM removal. FSIS visited several facilities that slaughter only cattle under 30 months of age and determined that they are effectively implementing the BSE regulations.

This month, FSIS will conduct a similar BSE audit of Canadian plants that slaughter cattle 30 months and older. Canada currently has only seven such plants that are certified to export meat to the United States.

I am aware of concerns with the portion of USDA s minimal-risk rule that would allow meat from animals over 30 months of age to be imported from Canada, but continue the prohibition on the importation of live animals of the same age for processing in the United States. Some have suggested that going forward with this rule will change the historical beef-trading patterns in North America to the detriment of U.S. packers.

As Secretary of Agriculture, I believe that the marketplace should determine cross-border trading patterns. We must make every effort to avoid policies that favor one group of packers over another. Decisions, however, related to sanitary and phytosanitary measures must be based on science.

I can assure you that I will be reviewing this issue very carefully in the days ahead as we move closer to the March 7 implementation date.

The Role of Science

I simply cannot emphasize strongly enough the central role of science in this entire process, particularly with regard to the rigorous evaluation of risk.

Since the discovery of the first case of BSE in Great Britain in 1986, we have learned a tremendous amount about this disease. That knowledge has greatly informed our regulatory systems and response efforts.

We have learned that the single most important thing we can do to protect human health regarding BSE is the removal of SRMs from the food supply. Likewise, the most significant step we can take to prevent the spread of BSE and bring about its complete eradication is the ruminant to ruminant feed ban. It is because of the strong systems the United States has put in place, especially these two essential firewalls, that we can be confident of the safety of our beef supply and that the spread of BSE has been prevented in this nation.

After Canada reported its first case of BSE in May 2003, USDA conducted a comprehensive risk analysis to review the potential threat it posed. The initial analysis followed the recommended structure of the World Organization for Animal Health, or OIE, and drew on findings from the Harvard-Tuskegee BSE risk assessment, findings from the epidemiological investigation of BSE in Canada, and information on Canadian BSE surveillance and feed ban, and history of imports of cattle and meat and bone meal from countries known to have BSE.

The results of that analysis, available on the USDA Website, confirmed that Canada has the necessary safeguards in place to protect U.S. consumers and livestock against BSE. These mitigation measures include the removal of SRMs from the food chain supply, a ruminant-to-ruminant feed ban, a national surveillance program and import restrictions. The extensive risk assessment conducted as part of USDA s rulemaking process also took into careful consideration the possibility that Canada could experience additional cases of BSE.

In the risk analysis update for the final rule, USDA also considered the additional risk protection from new slaughter procedures, such as the prohibition on the use of downer animals for food.

The public commented on the risk assessment that accompanied the proposed rule and the Explanatory Note released following the finding of BSE in a cow in Washington State. Over a period of months, USDA carefully considered these comments, and responses were published with the final rule. The comments were beneficial to the final risk analysis. The risk analysis was reviewed internally at USDA and by Dr. William Hueston, an international expert on BSE and a member of the International Review Team.

The OIE recommends the use of risk assessment to manage human and animal health risks of BSE. OIE guidelines, based on current scientific understanding, recognize that there are different levels of risk in countries or regions, and suggest how trade may safely occur according to the levels of risk. USDA used OIE as a basis in developing our regulations defining Canada as a minimal risk country.

Cattle and Beef Trade Impacts

While SPS regulations protecting human and animal health are the foremost concern, USDA also has examined the potential economic impacts of the minimal-risk rule and related BSE trade issues, as required by Executive Order 12866.

For more than three months following the May 20, 2003, BSE discovery in Canada, all imports of Canadian ruminants and ruminant products were barred. Then, certain Canadian ruminant products for which there is inherently lower risk were allowed to enter under permit beginning September 2003.

For all of 2003, the United States imported 336,000 metric tons of beef from Canada. Imports increased to an estimated 476,000 metric tons in 2004, up nearly 42 percent and back to about the level that prevailed in years prior to 2003. The cost-benefit analysis conducted as part of the final rule indicates that U.S. beef imports from Canada are projected to actually decrease slightly in 2005 (about 4 percent), as Canada shifts its slaughter capacity to lower-yielding older cattle not eligible for export to the United States.

At the same time since the border has been closed to live cattle since May 2003, imports of fed and feeder cattle under 30 months are expected to increase in 2005, which is expected to drive up U.S. beef production, reduce beef prices slightly and, consequently, reduce cattle prices. Our most recent forecast for all of 2005 is that fed cattle prices are expected to average $82 per cwt, assuming the Canadian border opens on March 7, 2005, and that Asian markets do not open to our beef during 2005. The precise economic effects will depend on the timing and volume of cattle and beef imports from Canada. If USDA s price forecast turns out to be correct, that would be the third-highest annual fed cattle price on record. Cattle futures prices may be less affected than indicated by our forecast, as market prices have likely already reflected some probability of the border opening. In addition, to the extent that we can continue to open markets that are currently closed to our beef, U.S. cattle price prospects will strengthen.

U.S. market-maintenance activities have been critical in helping restore our beef export markets. In 2003, the total export value of U.S. beef and ruminant products was $7.5 billion. After December 23, 2003, 64 percent of that market was immediately closed. Today, we have recovered well over a third of that, so that 41 percent of that market ($3.1 billion) remains closed. Two countries Japan ($1.5 billion) and Korea ($800 million) account for nearly three-quarters of the existing closures.

Opening the Japanese Market

As a leader in the critical Asian markets, Japan is a vital market to reopen to U.S. beef exports. We are aware that the decision to resume trade in this market will set an important precedent for trade resumption in many other markets. Therefore we have endeavored to use science in our ongoing efforts. Efforts to re-open this market have drawn on resources across the federal government and at the highest political levels. As I have previously said, this issue has occupied much of my first few days as Secretary. Just last week, I met with Ambassador Kato and also wrote to my counterpart, Minister Shimamura, on the importance of this issue. At the same time, Ambassador Baker continues to press this issue with Government of Japan officials in Tokyo, and other U.S. Government officials continue to contact their counterparts.

These efforts are just the latest in many policy discussions and technical exchanges over the past 13 months. Indeed, the issue has been a major focus of direct discussions between President Bush and Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi.

On October 23, 2004, Japan and the United States developed a framework to allow the resumption of bilateral beef trade following the conclusion of regulatory processes in both countries. As a step toward the resumption of normal trade, the agreement establishes an interim special marketing program, known as the Beef Export Verification (BEV) Program, to allow the United States to sell beef and beef products to Japanese importers from animals 20 months of age and under. Animal age will be determined through a combination of production records and physiological (grading) means. We are now working with Japanese officials to gain approval of the BEV under their regulatory process.

While we are focusing on Japan because of our important trading relationship and its leadership role in the region, we are also pursuing efforts to reopen all of the markets that have been closed to us. We are actively engaged with Korea, Hong Kong, Taiwan, China, Egypt, and Russia and have specific actions underway in each market to get trade resumed. I would be pleased to provide Members upon request additional detail on these and other secondary markets. While the progress that has been made has taken far longer than we had hoped, progress is indeed being made. And, I have stated that USDA, and indeed the entire U.S. Government, will exert every effort to resolve the matter at the earliest possible time.

Conclusion

As traditional trade barriers such as tariffs are lowered, our focus to eliminate unjustified non-tariff barriers such as non-science based SPS regulatory measures become all the more important to maintain the flow of mutually beneficial trade. For USDA, a common touchstone across these issues is the need to maintain consistency and predictability, to base our domestic regulations on science and to encourage the use of science-based solutions within the international community. The United States has long been a leader in this regard, including negotiating the World Trade Organization Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures during the Uruguay Round.

Even before the discovery of a single case of BSE in the United States, USDA had begun talking with other countries about the need for international trade standards to keep pace with the science, and we will redouble our efforts in this regard.

It is also critical that domestic trade rules reflect the current state of knowledge regarding BSE, and here the United States is leading, as well. We are confident that trade can be resumed with countries where BSE has been discovered, contingent upon strong protections within those countries, as well as the robust and effective regulatory system those imports are subject to when they enter the United States. These facts are reflected in the minimal-risk rule.

At the same time, we will continue to work with our trading partners to ensure the ongoing strength of their own BSE protection systems, especially the removal of SRMs and implementation of the feed ban. While trade opportunities are multiplying in an increasingly global marketplace, we must always remain mindful of our paramount responsibility to protect the public health and animal health.

In summary, I am confident that we are continuing to keep the protection of public and animal health foremost in our concerns. It is critical that we continue to use science as a basis for our decisions and regulations, and that the United States maintain its leadership role in advancing our scientific understanding of these kinds of SPS-related issues and appropriate science-based responses.

Mr. Chairman, thank you once again for holding this important hearing. I would now be pleased to take any questions you or other members may have.

###

http://www.usda.gov/agency/ocr/download/Johanns.BSE.020305.doc

July 14 Ann Veneman , Secretary of Agriculture Joint Hearing: House Committee on Agriculture and House Committee on Government Reform Ongoing activities related to Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE)

http://www.usda.gov/agency/ocr/download/Veneman.BSE.071404.doc

February 24 The Honorable Elsa Murano , Under Secretary for Food Safety; Dr. Ron DeHaven , Deputy Administrator for Veterinary Services Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service; Dr. Keith Collins, Chief Economist Senate Appropriations Committee BSE

http://www.usda.gov/agency/ocr/download/Murano.22404.doc

http://www.usda.gov/agency/ocr/download/Dehaven.22404.doc

http://www.usda.gov/agency/ocr/download/KeithCollins.22404.doc

January 2004 January 27 The Honorable Ann M. Veneman,

Secretary, USDA

Senate Agriculture

Committee

BSE-positive cow found in Washington State and USDA's response January 21 The Honorable Ann M. Veneman,

Secretary, USDA

House Agriculture

Committee

BSE-positive cow found in Washington State and USDA's response

http://www.usda.gov/agency/ocr/download/BSE.Veneman.012704.doc

http://www.usda.gov/agency/ocr/download/BSE.Veneman.012104.doc

June 19 Bobby Accord, Administrator, APHIS House Resources Subcommittee on Fisheries, Conservation, Wildlife & Oceans Chronic Wasting Disease; palentological resources

NO LINK

May 16 Dr. Jim Butler , Duputy Under Secretary for Marketing & Regulatory Programs House Committee of Resources - Subcommittees on Forest and Forest Health , and Fishery Conservation, Wildlife and Oceans Chronic Wasting Disease

http://www.usda.gov/agency/ocr/download/MRP-Butler-5.16.02.pdf

http://resourcescommittee.house.gov/107cong/forests/2002may16/agenda.htm

ARCHIVES FROM 2001

NOT

http://www.usda.gov/agency/ocr/testimony2001.htm

???

MORE on that OTHER LITTLE OLD MAD COW FROM TEXAS (real player)

Assigned vet wanted it tested.

Gov. insp. over rided and decided not to test.

SYSTEM broken around the Country.

PROBLEMS NATION WIDE!

APHIS inspectors do not follow through.

http://www.npr.org/dmg/dmg.php?prgCode=ME&showDate=07-May2004&segNum=8&mediaPref=RM

May 13, 2004

Failure To Test Staggering Cow May Reflect Wider Problems Rep. Waxman raises concerns that the recent failure of USDA to test an impaired cow for BSE may not be an isolated incident, citing the failure of USDA to monitor whether cows condemned for central nervous system symptoms are actually tested for mad cow disease.

- Letter to USDA

http://www.house.gov/reform/min/pdfs_108_2/pdfs_inves/pdf_food_usda_mad_cow_may_13_let.pdf

http://www.house.gov/reform/min/pdfs_108_2/pdfs_inves/pdf_food_usda_mad_cow_may_13_let.pdf

===============================================

THAT ONE TEXAS MAD COW IS ONLY TIP OF ICE BURG;

No mad cow results for nearly 500 cows

By Steve Mitchell United Press International Published 8/11/2004 11:23 AM

WASHINGTON, Aug. 11 (UPI) -- The U.S. Department of Agriculture failed to test for mad cow disease or collect the correct portion of the brain on nearly 500 suspect cows over the past two years -- including some in categories considered most likely to be infected -- according to agency records obtained by United Press International.

The testing problems mean it may never be known with certainty whether these animals were infected with the deadly disease. Department officials said these animals were not included in the agency's final tally of mad cow tests, but the records, obtained by UPI under the Freedom of Information Act, indicate at least some of them were counted...

snip...

--

Steve Mitchell is UPI's Medical Correspondent. E-mail sciencemail@upi.com Copyright Â© 2001-2004 United Press International

http://www.upi.com/view.cfm?StoryID=20040810-042935-2066r

------------------------------------------------------------------------

Note: On Dec. 23, 2003, the U.S. Department of Agriculture reported that a cow in Washington state had tested positive for bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE, or mad cow disease). As a result, information on this Web page stating that no BSE cases had been found in the United States is now incorrect. However, because other information on this page continues to have value, the page will remain available for viewing.

FDA ANNOUNCES TEST RESULTS FROM TEXAS FEED LOT

Today the Food and Drug Administration announced the results of tests taken on feed used at a Texas feedlot that was suspected of containing meat and bone meal from other domestic cattle -- a violation of FDA's 1997 prohibition on using ruminant material in feed for other ruminants. Results indicate that a very low level of prohibited material was found in the feed fed to cattle.

FDA has determined that each animal could have consumed, at most and in total, five-and-one-half grams - approximately a quarter ounce -- of prohibited material. These animals weigh approximately 600 pounds.

It is important to note that the prohibited material was domestic in origin (therefore not likely to contain infected material because there is no evidence of BSE in U.S. cattle), fed at a very low level, and fed only once. The potential risk of BSE to such cattle is therefore exceedingly low, even if the feed were contaminated.

According to Dr. Bernard Schwetz, FDA's Acting Principal Deputy Commissioner, "The challenge to regulators and industry is to keep this disease out of the United States. One important defense is to prohibit the use of any ruminant animal materials in feed for other ruminant animals. Combined with other steps, like U.S. Department of Agriculture's (USDA) ban on the importation of live ruminant animals from affected countries, these steps represent a series of protections, to keep American cattle free of BSE."

Despite this negligible risk, Purina Mills, Inc., is nonetheless announcing that it is voluntarily purchasing all 1,222 of the animals held in Texas and mistakenly fed the animal feed containing the prohibited material. Therefore, meat from those animals will not enter the human food supply. FDA believes any cattle that did not consume feed containing the prohibited material are unaffected by this incident, and should be handled in the beef supply clearance process as usual.

FDA believes that Purina Mills has behaved responsibly by first reporting the human error that resulted in the misformulation of the animal feed supplement and then by working closely with State and Federal authorities.

This episode indicates that the multi-layered safeguard system put into place is essential for protecting the food supply and that continued vigilance needs to be taken, by all concerned, to ensure these rules are followed routinely.

FDA will continue working with USDA as well as State and local officials to ensure that companies and individuals comply with all laws and regulations designed to protect the U.S. food supply.

------------------------------------------------------------------------ http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/NEWS/2001/NEW00752.html

Chapter 5

Center for Veterinary Medicine

Last Update: August 07, 2003

Animal Feeds

Warning Letters Issued for CGMP Violations

* On March 8, 2001, the FDA s New Orleans District Office issued a Warning Letter to Prestage Farms, Inc., West Point, Mississippi. The firm manufactures medicated and non-medicated feeds for its own integrated swine enterprise. An FDA inspection of the facility on February 21 - 22, 2001, disclosed significant deviations from the Current Good Manufacturing Practice (CGMP) requirements for Medicated Feeds. These deviations included: failure to perform assays for the active drug ingredient in one product since 1999; failure to perform appropriate investigations and/or corrective actions for out of limit assays; and failure to have master production records. * The FDA s Dallas District Office issued a Warning Letter to Purina Mills, St. Louis, Missouri, on March 23, 2001. The Warning Letter followed the an FDA inspection of Purina Mills, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, on February 2-6, and 13-14, 2001. The firm failed to follow Purina's SOP for Drug Sequencing Requirements. The SOP provides for sequencing production (without flushing the mixer) of animal feeds for a species for which a drug component of a prior medicated feed is not approved. Additionally, the firm had distributed bagged medicated feeds since June 2000, with faulty tagging equipment and no control to ensure that all bagged feeds were completely labeled.

Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE)

To help prevent the establishment and amplification of BSE in the Unites States, FDA implemented a final rule that prohibits the use of most mammaliam protein in feeds for ruminant animals. This rule, Title 21 Part 589.2000 of the Code of Federal Regulations, became effective on August 4, 1997.

On August 23, 2001, Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) Secretary Tommy Thompson unveiled a department-wide action plan outlining new steps to improve scientific understanding of BSE, commonly known as "mad cow disease," and related diseases known as TSEs. The plan incorporates a comprehensive approach to further strengthen surveillance, increase research resources, and expand existing inspection efforts to prevent BSE and TSEs from entering or taking hold in the U.S.

Warning Letters for BSE Violations

FDA Inspection Finds Numerous Violations of BSE Regulations

* On August 8, 2001, the FDA s Seattle District Office issued a Warning Letter to the owner of an animal feed manufacturing facility located in Tualatin, Oregon. FDA investigators conducted an inspection on July 12, 2001, which disclosed violations of the bovine feed ingredient regulations. The inspection revealed that the firm failed to separate the receipt, processing, and storage of products containing prohibited material from non-prohibited material; failed to establish a written system, including clean-out and flushing procedures, to avoid commingling and cross-contamination of equipment; and failed to maintain records sufficient to track the materials. In addition, the firm failed to label products with the required cautionary statement, Do Not Feed to Cattle or Other Ruminants.

Gamecock Feedmill Found Violating BSE Regulations

* On July 12, 2001, the FDA s Cincinnati District Office issued a Warning Letter to the Carrollton Farmers Exchange, Carrollton, Ohio, a feed mill. FDA investigators conducted an inspection on June 25, 2001, which found the firm was manufacturing gamecock feed containing prohibited proteins. The firm was not labeling the gamecock feed with the cautionary statement, Do not Feed to Cattle or Other Ruminants; was not flushing or sequencing after manufacturing the feed, and was not maintaining distribution information.

Warning Issued for Lack of Required BSE Cautionary Statement

* The FDA s New Orleans District Office issued a Warning Letter to Shields Feed and Supply, Coffeeville, Alabama, on March 7, 2001. An inspection conducted on February 1, 2001, of Shields animal feed operation showed the finished product label lacked the required ruminant cautionary statement. In addition, mixing and distribution records were not maintained; no written procedures were established for mixer cleaning; and the corn used for the mixer cleaning was not labeled and quarantined.

Firm Warned for No Measures to Avoid Commingling of Feed

* On May 3, 2001, the FDA s Minneapolis District Office issued a Warning Letter to Adrian Elevator, Inc., a Butterfield, Minnesota, a manufacturer of animal feeds. On March 16, 2001, an inspection conducted by the State of Minnesota (on behalf of FDA) found significant deviations from the BSE regulations. The firm failed to provide adequate measures to avoid commingling or cross-contamination and failed to maintain adequate records to assure that prohibited animal proteins were not incorporated into feeds that may be used for ruminants. For example, there was no documentation to verify that the amount of "flush" being used was sufficient, and there were no procedures or documentation to verify that production was properly sequenced and that flushes were performed.

Warned Issued for Failure to Take Adequate Steps to Prevent BSE

* The FDA s Seattle District Office issued a Warning Letter on May 14, 2001, to Wallowa County Grain Growers, Inc., Enterprise, Oregon, for violations FDA regulations regarding Animal Proteins Prohibited in Ruminant Feed. An inspection of the firm on April 11 - 12, 2001, disclosed that the firm was not taking adequate steps to prevent the establishment and amplification of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) in that they failed to separate the receipt, processing, and storage of the product containing prohibited materials from non-prohibited material; failed to establish a written system, including clean-out, and flushing procedures to avoid commingling and cross-contamination of common equipment; and failed to maintain records sufficient to track the materials throughout the receipt, processing, and distribution of product.

Contract Feed Manufacturer Found Violating BSE Regulations

On May 1, 2001, the FDA s Chicago District Office issued a Warning Letter to Material Resources, a contract feed manufacturer in Washington Park, Illinois. An inspection of the firm in March 2001, disclosed several deviations from the BSE regulation. These included failure to maintain written procedures and provide adequate means to prevent commingling between feeds containing prohibited protein and all other protein products. The firm also lacked adequate records to track products that contained prohibited protein throughout their receipt and processing.

Firm Warned for Lack of Written Procedures for Clean-Out to Prevent Commingling

* On June 6, 2001, the FDA s Seattle District issued a Warning Letter to Superior Feeds, Chester, Montana. The firm is an animal feed manufacturing operation. An inspection of this firm on April 25, 2001, revealed that the firm failed to label their product with the required statement, Do Not Feed to Cattle or other Ruminants. In addition, the facility failed to maintain written procedures specifying the clean-out or sequencing procedures used to prevent commingling or cross-contamination of ruminant and non-ruminant containing feeds.

FDA Inspection Discloses Hog Feed Lacks BSE Statement

* The FDA s Minneapolis District Office issued a Warning Letter on May 30, 2001, to Round Lake Farmers Coop, Round Lake, Minnesota. The firm manufacturers animal feeds. An inspection by the State of Minnesota (on behalf of FDA) on March 30, 2001, found significant deviations from the requirements for Animal Proteins Prohibited in Animal Feed. The firm failed to label a hog feed with the required BSE caution statement. In addition, they failed to establish and implement procedures for handling prohibited animal proteins and failed to maintain records sufficient to track the receipt of products containing prohibited animal proteins.

Import Detentions

Possible Contamination of Fish Food Leads to Detention

The week of March 7, 2001, the FDA s New York District Upstate Import Operations Branch detained three entries of fish food under Import Alert 99-25 (Detention Without Physical Examination of Animal Feed, Animal Feed Ingredients And Other Products For Animal Use Consisting Or Containing Ingredients of Animal Origin) due to possible contamination with the infectious agent for BSE. The country of origin for the fish food was the Federal Republic of Germany. The local USDA/Philadelphia/PPQ Office was notified.

Vitamin Supplement for Pets Detained

* The week of February 14, 2001, the FDA s Atlanta District reported the detention of 8,777 cartons of vitamin supplements for cats, kittens, puppies, and older dogs. The detention included both dog and cat treats. The detention was based on Import Alert 99-25 (BSE). The products were manufactured by Beaphar, Raalte, Netherlands, and were valued at approximately $63,000.

Calf Ration Detained

The FDA s New York District Office reported that during the week of March 21, 2001, FDA investigators detained an entry of Calf Starter Ration and Calf Finisher Ration under Import Alert 99-25, since some of the ingredients originated from France and The Netherlands (both of which are listed on IA 99-25 as BSE susceptible countries). The manufacturer of the feed was Grober Inc., Cambridge, Ontario, Canada, and the consignee was Majestic View Farms in Milan, Pennsylvania. The USDA/APHIS/PPQ Buffalo, New York office was contacted.

Recall of Various Animal Feed Products

* The FDA s Cincinnati District Office reported that The Hyland Company, Coalton, Kentucky, conducted a recall of various animal feed products, including Ultra Bloom and Endurance Plus horse feeds, due to cross-contamination with prohibited bovine material. The firm's corrective action involved the application of a sticker-label that contained the required BSE warning statement on the labels of their affected products. The firm initiated the recall by telephone on July 25, 201, and letters on July 31, 2001. * During an FDA inspection by the Cincinnati District Office investigators determined that Central Farm Supply of Kentucky, Inc., Louisville, Kentucky, had received poultry feed manufactured by Burkmann Mills, Bowling Green, Kentucky, that contained prohibited protein, but lacked the required caution statement. On May 3, 2001, the district and the University of Kentucky Regulatory Services Division met with the responsible parties of the mill's parent firm, Burkmann Mills London, London, Kentucky. During the meeting the firm volunteered to recall all feed products manufactured at the Bowling Green mill due to the lack of the required caution statement.

FDA Announces Animal Feed Recall

On January 30, 2001, FDA issued a Press Release announcing the results of tests taken on feed used at a Texas feedlot that was suspected of containing meat and bone meal from other domestic cattle -- a violation of FDA's 1997 prohibition on using ruminant material in feed for other ruminants. The results indicated that a very low level of prohibited material was found in the feed fed to cattle.

FDA determined that each animal could have consumed, at most and in total, five-and-one-half grams - approximately a quarter ounce -- of prohibited material. These animals weigh approximately 600 pounds. It is important to note that the prohibited material was domestic in origin (therefore not likely to contain infected material because there is no evidence of BSE in U.S. cattle), fed at a very low level, and fed only once. The potential risk of BSE to such cattle was therefore exceedingly low, even if the feed were contaminated.

According to Dr. Bernard Schwetz, FDA's Acting Principal Deputy Commissioner, "The challenge to regulators and industry is to keep this disease out of the United States. One important defense is to prohibit the use of any ruminant animal materials in feed for other ruminant animals. Combined with other steps, like U.S. Department of Agriculture's (USDA) ban on the importation of live ruminant animals from affected countries, these steps represent a series of protections, to keep American cattle free of BSE."

Despite this negligible risk, Purina Mills, Inc., nonetheless announced that it was voluntarily purchasing all 1,222 of the animals held in Texas and mistakenly fed the animal feed containing the prohibited material. Therefore, meat from those animals would not enter the human food supply. FDA believes any cattle that did not consume feed containing the prohibited material was unaffected by this incident, and should be handled in the beef supply clearance process as usual.

FDA believes that Purina Mills acted responsibly by first reporting the human error that resulted in the misformulation of the animal feed supplement and then by working closely with State and Federal authorities. This episode indicates that the multi-layered safeguard system put into place is essential for protecting the food supply and that continued vigilance needs to be taken, by all concerned, to ensure these rules are followed routinely. FDA continues to work with USDA as well as State and local officials to ensure that companies and individuals comply with all laws and regulations designed to protect the U.S. food supply.

Drug Residues

Warning Letters Issued for Illegal Drug Residues

Gentamicin

* The FDA s New England District Office issued a Warning Letter on February 1, 2001, to D & K Farm, Middlefield, Connecticut, for selling a dairy cow for slaughter as human food which had the presence of Gentamicin. Gentamicin is not approved for use in cattle. An FDA inspection of this dairy operation located in Wallingford, Connecticut, disclosed that in November 2000, the owner sold a dairy cow for slaughter as human to a livestock dealer. USDA analysis of tissue samples collected from that animal identified the presence of Gentamicin in the animal s kidney at a level of 4.74 ppm. The Warning Letter also noted that the owner holds animals under conditions which are so inadequate that diseased animals and/or medicated animals bearing potentially harmful drug residues are likely to enter the food supply.

Penicillin

* On January 31, 2001, the FDA s New York District Office issued a Warning Letter to Jay N. Martin, a producer and the owner of Jay N. Martin, a.k.a. Horizon Dairy, in Clyde, New York. An FDA inspection of the firm on November 20-22, and 27, 2000, confirmed that the firm offered two dairy cows for slaughter with drug residues. A USDA sample analyses indicated the presence of penicillin at illegal levels in the kidneys of both slaughtered cows, and streptomycin, for which there is no published tolerance. * The FDA s Minneapolis District Office issued a Warning Letter on August 28, 2001, to Paskewitz Cattle Company of Vesta,Minnesota. The Warning Letter cited adulteration of two animals (a dairy cow and a steer) with residues of penicillin that were above tolerance. The investigation conducted by the Minnesota Department of Agriculture found that Paskewitz Cattle did not keep adequate records of their own drug treatment, and they did not have an adequate system for handling purchased animals that may have been treated with drugs. * The FDA s Denver District Office issued a Warning Letter to DeJong Dairy, Greeley, Colorado, on February 23, 2001, citing adulteration charges due to the presence of penicillin residue in a cow offered for slaughter. An FDA inspection of this dairy farm on February 7 and 9, 2001, confirmed that the owner offered an animal for slaughter in violation of the FD&C Act. Specifically, on October 27, 2000, Mr. DeJong offered a cow for slaughter as human food. USDA analysis of tissue samples collected from this cow identified the presence of penicillin residues at 0.89 ppm in the kidney. A tolerance of 0.05 ppm has been established for residues of penicillin in the edible tissue of cows. The analysis also identified the presence of gentamicin residue at 13.31 ppm in the kidney. The Warning Letter also addressed poor animal husbandry practices which lead to the residue. USDA condemned this cow which was also diagnosed with septicemia, pneumonia, pleuritis, peritonitis, hepatitis, nephritis, and lymphedenitis. * The FDA s San Francisco District Office issued a Warning Letter to Parreiro-Pinheiro & Sons Dairy, Tipton, CA. The dairy consigned for sale for human food a cow that had penicillin residue in the liver and kidney that were in excess of the allowable tolerance. The FDA s San Francisco District Office s inspection found that the dairy was not keeping complete medication records and lacked an adequate drug inventory system. In addition, The FDA s San Francisco District Office s investigation found that the dairy was adulterated the drug, in that it was not being used in conformance with its labeled instructions.

Sulfadimethoxine

* On June 15, 2001, the FDA s Denver District Office issued a Warning Letter to North Point Dairy, Clovis, New Mexico, citing adulteration charges due to the presence of sulfadimethoxine residue in a cow offered for slaughter. An FDA inspection of this dairy farm on April 17, 2001, confirmed that a cow was offered for sale for slaughter as food in violation of the FD&C Act. USDA analysis of tissues samples collected from this cow identified the presence of sulfadimethoxine residue of 0.36 ppm in the liver and 0.34 ppm in the muscle. A tolerance of 0.10 ppm has been established for residues of sulfadimethoxine in the edible tissues of beef cows. The Warning Letter also addressed poor animal husbandry practices, which led to the residue.

Neomycin

* The FDA s Florida District Office issued a tissue residue Warning Letter on April 30, 2001, to Larson's Dairy, Inc., Okeechobee, Florida. The FDA conducted an inspection of the diary farm on March 27 and 28, 2001, which confirmed that the firm offered an adulterated animal for sale or slaughter as food. USDA analysis of the dairy calf confirmed the presence of Neomycin in the kidney at the level of 153.12 ppm, more than 21 times the established tolerance of 7.2 ppm. The FDA s Florida District Office's investigation found the calf was fed medicated milk containing Neomycin and Aureomycin. * On June 22, 2001, the FDA s Baltimore District Office issued a Warning Letter to Richard Edwards, owner of Oakland View Farm, Ridgely, Maryland. Mr. Edwards sold veal calves for slaughter as human food that were treated with Neomycin, a drug that is unapproved for this use. In addition, an FDA inspection on May 30 - 31, 2001, revealed that Mr. Edwards did not maintain treatment records showing the dosage rate, the date the drug was administered, or the time period to withhold treated animals from sale.

Streptomycin

* The FDA s New Jersey District Office issued a Warning Letter on March 8, 2001, to Frank Carper, Cranbury, New Jersey. An FDA inspection of this facility on October 24 and 27, 2000, confirmed that a horse purchased and sold by Mr. Carper for use as human food was adulterated due to the presence of streptomycin above tolerance levels. USDA analysis of tissues from the equine revealed that streptomycin in the kidney tissue at 0.38 ppm. The tolerance level for streptomycin in the edible tissue of equines is 0.0 ppm. Any animals shipped to USDA slaughter facilities are considered to be for human consumption.

Consent Decree of Permanent Injunction Filed Against Joe Sozinho Dairies

Firm Enjoined for Continuing to Sell Cattle With Violative Drug Residue

On July 30, 2001, a Consent Decree of Permanent Injunction was filed in the Eastern District of California against Joe Sozinho Sr., Danny Sozinho, Dimas Sozinho, individuals d/b/a Joe Sozinho Dairy #1 and Joe Sozinho Dairy #2. The FDA s San Francisco District Office conducted six inspections in response to violative drug residues reported by USDA/FSIS of Joe Sozinho Dairies resulting in two Warning Letters sent to the firm. Despite repeated warnings during the FDA inspections, as well as nine USDA/FSIS warning letters for illegal drug residues, the Sozinho's failed to take adequate corrective action. Voluntary approaches were not successful in correcting the animal husbandry and drug adulteration problems by the Sozinho's.

The Consent Decree permanently restrains and enjoins the Sozinho's from selling cattle for human food until all of the specifications of the Decree are met which include an animal identification system, medication record keeping system, drug inventory system, drug use system, quarantine system, and animal sales certification system. In addition, the Sozinho's reimbursed FDA's costs in the amount of $12,314.38 for investigational expenses incurred subsequent to the 1994 inspection and Warning Letter.

On February 1, 2002, the Sozinho Dairies and the United States filed a stipulation settling a dispute concerning the Dairies' activities while they were under an order of injunction. Under the Stipulation, the Sozinhos admitted to continued violations of the law. They also admitted delivering "at least 56 animals intended for use as food during a thirty-six day period beginning on July 31, and ending on September 4, 2001." The United States had alleged in its motion for contempt that, under the injunction, such deliveries were prohibited until FDA inspected and cleared the Dairies to resume.

The Dairies were not cleared for such sales until December 2001. The Injunction entered by the Court in July 2001 continues in effect. The defendants have paid the U.S. Treasury fines in the amount of $140,000.

Ridge View Farms Consent Decree of Permanent Injunction

Consent Decree Provides FDA With Future Shutdown Authority

United States v. Ridge View Farms, Inc., Carol A. Castine, and Daniel A. Castine (N.D.N.Y.) On August 7, 2001, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of New York entered a Consent Decree of Permanent Injunction that prohibits the defendants from introducing any food-producing animal into interstate commerce until they have established a system for drug administration and record-keeping to prevent the distribution of any animal containing illegal drug residues in its edible tissues.

The Decree also requires the defendants to provide a copy of the Decree to all persons to whom they have delivered cattle in the past year and to any person to whom they deliver cattle in the future. In addition, the Decree provides the government with the authority to require future shutdown of operations and to impose fines in the event of further violations.

Consent Decree Filed Against H & I Dairy

On November 28, 2000, a Consent Decree of Permanent Injunction was filed in the Eastern District of California against Heduino Brasil (dba H & I Dairy) of Tipton, California. Despite repeated warnings during FDA and the State of California inspections, including six USDA warning letters for illegal drug residue findings in cull cows sold or consigned for slaughter, Mr. Brasil failed to take adequate corrective action. The consent decree permanently restrains and enjoins Mr. Brasil from selling cattle for human food until all the specifications of the decree are met including animal identification, medication record keeping, drug inventory, quarantine, and sales certification systems.

Arie C. Van Leeuwen Sentenced

Violation of Probation Leads to Prison Sentence

United States v. Arie C. Van Leeuwen, (E.D. Cal.) On July 9, 2001, United States District Judge Robert E. Coyle sentenced Arie Van Leeuwen to six months imprisonment and one year of supervised release for probation violations. In 2000, Van Leeuwen pled guilty to two charges of criminal contempt and one felony charge of introducing adulterated food into interstate commerce, resulting from his repeated violations of the statutory and regulatory requirements for administering new animal drugs to food-producing animals.

Van Leeuwen admitted to the following probation violations: failure to obey all laws; failure to submit certain monthly report forms; failure to comply with home confinement conditions; and transporting animals to cattle auctions in violation of the probation terms. In light of Van Leeuwen's history of repeat violations, the Court sentenced him to six months in prison followed by a year of supervised release that includes mandatory attendance in dairy management classes.

http://www.fda.gov/ora/about/enf_story/archive/2001/ch5/default.htm

Veterinary Drugs

Warning Letter to Veterinary Drug Firm

The FDA s New Orleans District Office Nashville Branch issued a Warning Letter on April 10, 2001, to Classic Care Products, Inc., d.b.a. The River City Co., Chattanooga, Tennessee, as the result of an inspection of the firm on March 20 and 22, 2001. The inspection found topical veterinary drug products being manufactured under inadequate conditions. Deviations from the CGMPs included no component testing; no master production records; failure to conduct stability studies on finished products and to assign expiration dates based on these studies; and no label control. The firm also was not registered and the veterinary drug products were not listed.

Unapproved Veterinary Drugs Promoted on the Internet

On June 28, 2001, the FDA s Minneapolis District Office issued a Warning Letter to Vets Plus, Inc., Knapp, Wisconsin. FDA conducted an inspection of the firm s veterinary drug and nutritional supplement manufacturing facility on March 7 and 13, 2001.

The inspection disclosed that the firm was manufacturing veterinary products that, based on the labels and well as product catalogs, contained therapeutic and structure-function claims causing the products to be unapproved new animal drugs. The firm s web sites contained numerous promotional statements and claims for four lines of products marketed by the firm that established that the firm clearly intended the product to be used as animal drugs. In addition, the firm failed to list any of the products with the Center for Veterinary Medicine, and the products were not manufactured in compliance with CGMP regulations.

Distributor of Prescription Veterinary Drugs Receives Warning

On August 27, 2001, the FDA s Philadelphia District Office issued a Warning Letter to the president of Equirace Health and Speed Products, Washington, Pennsylvania. The firm is an exclusive distributor of prescription veterinary and human drugs to horse owners. The FDA conducted an inspection of Equirace on December 5, 2000. The inspection and a review of information from the New Mexico Livestock Board disclosed that the firm was distributing prescription veterinary and human drugs to lay persons without a lawful order from a licensed veterinarian who has a valid veterinarian-client-patient relationship with customers.

The Warning Letter advised the owner that Equirace s distribution business violates several sections of the FD&C Act. For example, the firm s prescription veterinary drugs are misbranded because they are not dispensed by or upon the lawful written or oral order of a licensed veterinarian in the course of the veterinarian s professional practice. Although there was a licensed veterinarian at the firm, he did not have a valid veterinarian-client-patient relationship with any of Equirace s customers. The Warning Letter also noted that certain prescription veterinary and human drugs offered for sale by Equirace were adulterated because they were new animal drugs that were not approved by the FDA for use in horses.

Illegal Veterinary Drugs Exported

On March 5, 2001, the FDA s San Juan District Office found that a shipment of veterinary drugs from Santo Domingo to the U.S. Virgin Islands, consisting of drugs such as antibiotics, hormones and dietary supplements, contained numerous unapproved drugs for veterinary use. The drugs were placed on hold by the U.S. Customs at the Aguadilla airport. The shipment was exported under Custom's supervision.

FDA Assists Customs in Seizure of Illegal Vet Drugs

On July 10, 2001, the FDA s San Juan District Office, in conjunction with U.S. Customs, detained and seized a shipment of veterinary drugs not approved for sale in the U.S. that was imported from Santo Domingo. U.S. Customs agents notified San Juan District Office that the shipment was imported as "Hair Products," but actually contained veterinary drugs. FDA s inspection of the shipment revealed that the veterinary drugs were smuggled among a variety of soaps. The shipment, which was originally thought to consist of a few bottles, contained a total of 793 bottles/pouches of a variety of illegal veterinary drugs. The shipment was detained by FDA and seized by U.S. Customs agents. The value of the shipment was approximately $7,000.

Importer Attempts to Re-Enter Vet Drugs Previously Refused Entry

On May 2, 2001, the FDA s San Juan District Office, in conjunction with U.S. Customs Service seized a shipment of IVOMEC-F, a veterinary drug not approved for sale in the U.S. The shipment was from importer Hacienda Las Carolinas, Santo Domingo. The San Juan District Office was notified by U.S. Customs agents that a shipment that had been refused entry on February 10, 2001, and had been exported under Customs supervision was re- introduced through the same port on March 16, 2001, by the same importer. The value of the shipment was $3,500.00.

Seizure at Veterinary Pharmacy

On December 20, 2000, an FDA investigator accompanied the U.S. Marshals Service in a seizure of unapproved new animal drugs at Veterinary Pharmacy Corporation (d.b.a. Vet Rx Pharmacy), St. Peter, Minnesota. The firm is a compounding pharmacy for veterinary drugs. The firm has a history of serious violations of the FD&C Act, particularly the 1994 Animal Medicinal Drug Use Clarification Act (AMDUCA). The seized drugs, valued at approximately $50,000, were intended for administration to food-producing animals, and were unapproved new drugs in that they were compounded from the bulk active ingredients. Such compounding violates AMDUCA and the implementing regulations, 21 C.F.R. Part 530. The FDA conducted inspections at the firm on June 27 - 29, and July 6 - 7, 2000. These inspections disclosed the above violations.

Consent Decree of Condemnation and Permanent Injunction

U.S. v. Sulfadiozie Sodium and Veterinary Pharmacy Corp. d.b.a. Vet Rx Pharmacy (D. Minn.) On February 28, 2002, a U.S. District Judge signed a Consent Decree of Condemnation and Permanent Injunction against this veterinary pharmacy and two corporate officers, as well as the drugs seized in this action. The Decree orders the defendants to destroy the seized drugs and enjoins them from engaging in compounding activities that fail to conform to the AMDUCA regulations.

http://www.fda.gov/ora/about/enf_story/archive/2001/ch5/cvm2.htm

http://www.fda.gov/ora/about/enf_story/archive/2001/ch5/cvm3.htm

Docket No. 2003N-0312 Animal Feed Safety System [TSS SUBMISSION]

http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dockets/03n0312/03N-0312_emc-000001.txt

Docket Management Docket: 02N-0273 - Substances Prohibited From Use in

Animal Food or Feed; Animal Proteins Prohibited in Ruminant Feed

Comment Number: EC -10

Accepted - Volume 2

http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dailys/03/Jan03/012403/8004be07.html

PART 2

http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dailys/03/Jan03/012403/8004be09.html

APHIS Statement: June 29 Inconclusive BSE Test is Negative

http://www.usda.gov/Newsroom/0275.04.html 07/02/2004

APHIS Statement: First Inconclusive BSE Test is Negative

http://www.usda.gov/Newsroom/0272.04.html 06/30/2004

APHIS Statement Regarding Second Inconclusive BSE Test

http://www.usda.gov/Newsroom/0266.04.html 06/29/2004

APHIS Statement Regarding First Inconclusive BSE Test

http://www.usda.gov/Newsroom/0198.04.html 06/25/2004

January 14, 2005

Dr. John R. Clifford, Deputy Administrator, Chief Veterinary Officer

Animal Plant Health Inspection Service

1400 Independence Ave. SW, Room 317-E

Jamie L. Whitten Federal Building

Washington, DC 20250

Dear Deputy Administrator Clifford,

We have a number of questions about your November 23, 2004 announcement that a cow, which had tested â¬Snot negativeâ¬ in two runs of the Bio-Rad ELISA quick test for mad cow disease, was â¬Sindeed negative for BSE.â¬ We are concerned because New Scientist reported last June that the false positive rate after such repeated testing is â¬Saround one in 100,000 for Bio-Rad.â¬ We would appreciate a chance to meet with you this month to discuss the questions below.

1. You have indicated that the Biorad screening test was run twice and got a positive result both times. Were the two runs conducted by the same or different technicians? Did they use the same or different brain samples?

2. When the immunohistochemistry (IHC) test was conducted, what was the condition of the brain when it arrived at the National Veterinary Services Laboratory in Ames, Iowa? Did scientists note any deterioration?

3. How many slides were made and examined for the IHC test? Were they from only the obex, or other areas of the brain? Atypical strains of BSE have been found in Italy and Japan where the level of PrPres in the obex was low or non-detectable, unlike in traditional BSE. What portion(s) of the brain were examined?

4. Experienced technicians can sometimes disagree on the interpretation of IHC slides. Does one technician review the slides or more than one technician? If the latter, how many? Did they all agree on the conclusion?

5. The World Organization of Animal Health, known as O.I.E., recognizes use of immunoblotting (also know as Western Blot) as a further confirmation of the IHC test, and it is used in Japan and most European countries. USDA used the Western Blot test in December 2003 along with IHC to confirm the first case of mad cow disease in the United States . In Japan and Belgium cows that tested positive on two quick tests (in both cases using a Bio-Rad test), negative on IHC, yet positive on Western Blot and are considered to be confirmed BSE cases. Was Western blot or any other technique besides IHC used to confirm or rule out a positive result on this November 2004 cow? If so, what was the result? If not used, why not?

6. Were all the procedures referred to in your March 15, 2004 announcement of protocols to confirm any suspect positives utilized, particularly the reference to use of â¬Sfull battery of testsâ¬ that includes, but is not limited to IHC? If not, what protocol was used and what is your rationale for the differences?

7. Does USDA still have brain material from the cow in question? If so, could it be sent to the World BSE reference laboratory in Weybridge, United Kingdom for IHC and Western Blot analysis to confirm the USDA finding? If not, why not?

8. Canadian press has reported that â¬SCanadian authorities have been told that the cow, from Texas, didnâ¬"t have the metal ID tags that cows born here are given.â¬ Is this correct? What was the age of the cow and where had it lived?

We would like to request a meeting with you between now and the end of January about these questions, which are very important to consumer confidence in the safety of the food supply.

Sincerely,

Jean Halloran, Director Michael Hansen, Ph.D.

Senior Research Associate

From http://www.ars.usda.gov/is/AR/archive/dec04/tse1204.htm

Yamakawa, Y. et al. 2003. op cit.

De Bosschere, H., Roels, S. and E. Vanopdenbosch. 2004. Atypical case of bovine spongiform encephalopathy in an East-Flemish Cow in Belgium. The International Journal of Applied Research, 2(4). Accessed at http://www.jarvm.com/articles/Vol2Iss1/DEBOSSCHERE.htm

In a technical briefing on the new BSE sureveillance plan, Dr. Ron DeHaven clearly stated that USDA would use multiple tests that included IHC: â¬SThe Department at NVSL will continue to use the immunohistochemistry, or IHC, for quality control testing, and in addition if any of the rapid screen test comes back with a suspect positive then NVSL will use the IHC as well as other tests necessary to confirm the results. . . Let me say up front that we expect that there will be positive results on these screening tests, and that's just the nature of the beast. That's because screening tests by design are intended to be very sensitive and not to miss any positive animals. But with that high degree of sensitivity also comes the possibility for false positive test results. And again that's to be expected. any suspect test results will be sent to NVSL for confirmatory testing with the full battery of tests. That would include the IHC. From: http://www.usda.gov/Newsroom/0106.04.html

From http://edmonton.cbc.ca/regional/servlet/View?filename=ed-mad-cow20041122

Greetings again,

I was told that they were to meet on Feb. 9, 2005 about these inconclusives.

I have heard nothing of the outcome. Maybe we will hear soon.

BUT of course we will never know the results of that first TEXAS mad

cow they covered up, the stumbling and staggering one they refused to

test, and decided to render, head and all...

Experts doubt USDA's mad cow results

By Steve Mitchell Medical Correspondent

Published 11/24/2004 4:34 PM

WASHINGTON, Nov. 24 (UPI) -- U.S. Department of Agriculture officials said a cow that initially tested positive for mad cow disease was found to be negative on follow-up tests, but both domestic and international experts told United Press International the way the agency handled the situation leaves them skeptical about the validity of the results.

"The testing process does indeed make experts scratch their heads," said Markus Moser, a molecular biologist and chief executive officer of the Swiss firm Prionics, which manufactures tests for detecting mad cow disease, also known as bovine spongiform encephalopathy.

"I think some, but not all, BSE people internationally have some degree of cynical de facto doubt about everything the United States does or doesn't do, mostly as a result of seeing so many similar situations where countries at risk deny and deny and deny and then end up having big problems," said Elizabeth Mumford, a veterinarian and BSE expert at Safe Food Solutions in Bern, Switzerland, a company that provides advice on reducing mad cow risk to industry and governments. Several countries, including Germany and Austria, that had been thought to be free of the disease, found out it was circulating in their herds after they initiated large-scale testing. The U.S. cow in question tested positive last week on two so-called rapid tests manufactured by Bio-Rad Laboratories in Hercules, Calif. The USDA said Tuesday the animal had tested negative on more sophisticated confirmatory tests called immunohistochemistry or IHC tests.

John Clifford of the USDA said in a statement that the negative IHC results "makes us confident that the animal in question is indeed negative."

A U.S. veterinarian knowledgeable about mad cow tests told UPI that experts she has spoken with are "very, very skeptical about" the USDA's negative test result.

The veterinarian, who requested anonymity because she feared repercussions for speaking out against the USDA, said the skepticism arose because the agency did not run another kind of mad cow test called a Western blot. The test sometimes can pick up positive cases that IHC misses and the agency has used it in the past to rule out suspect cases. Moser said a Western blot test would make sense for the United States, where the prevalence of mad cow is thought to be low. Other countries -- including Australia, New Zealand, Canada and Mexico -- that are either free of the disease or have low rates, have elected to use the Western blot as part of their surveillance programs, he said.

The veterinarian said concerns also have emerged because the USDA has not made a sample from the cow in question available for examination by outside experts. She added that the USDA did not notify state officials, as officials previously said they would about positive results on rapid tests. Knowledgeable people are saying "wait a minute, this doesn't add up here," the veterinarian said. At stake is the $70 billion U.S. beef industry, including a $3.3 billion export market. More than 60 countries, including Japan, closed their borders to U.S. beef last December after the first -- and so far only -- U.S. case of mad cow was detected.

Asked whether state officials were notified, USDA spokesman Ed Loyd told UPI the agency had not released any information about the cow in question. Loyd also said the false positives on the rapid test were not unexpected. Since June, the USDA has reported three false positives out of more than 121,000 cows tested.

Bio-Rad spokeswoman Sam Kennedy told UPI the company was unfamiliar with the details of this incident and thus could not comment.

Mumford said experts were surprised the USDA did not send samples from the cow in question for independent analysis by one of the three worldwide labs recognized as the foremost authorities on mad cow testing by the World Animal Health Organization. One of these facilities is located in Weybridge, England, where the USDA had sent the first U.S. case of mad cow disease for confirmation in December 2003.

Loyd said USDA officials who would know whether USDA planned to release a sample for verification by an outside party could not be reached Wednesday.

"Full transparency and cooperation would certainly promote the idea internationally that the U.S. is doing everything it can do," Mumford said. "But somehow the U.S. consumer doesn't seem to think that way, or has been appeasable at least up until now, so there seems to be no impetus to do anything more."

The concern is humans can contract a fatal brain illness known as variant Creutzfeldt Jakob disease from eating beef products contaminated with the mad cow pathogen.

Moser said despite USDA's reliance on the IHC test results, repeated negatives on that test does not necessarily rule out the cow being infected.

"The reason for this is that the IHC test ... is done on a different piece of tissue" than that used for the rapid test, he said. Prions, the pathogen thought to cause mad cow disease, tend to concentrate in a region of the brain called the obex, so the different outcomes of the different tests could be due to sampling a brain region that contains little or no prions. This could be made worse if the animal had lay dead for several days before its brain was collected. The brain might be so degraded that it would be difficult to locate the obex region for confirmatory testing and a sample might mistakenly be taken from a region that contains no prions. "So with these samples, the confirmatory testing would be even less reliable, not because of the confirmatory test itself, but because of the sampling," he said. --

E-mail sciencemail@upi.com

Copyright Ã Â© 2001-2004 United Press International

Get Copyright Clearance Want to use this article? Click here for options! Copyright 2004 United Press International

TSS

######### https://listserv.kaliv.uni-karlsruhe.de/warc/bse-l.html ##########

Subject: USDA VS CREEKSTONE BSE/BASE/TSE TESTING Civil Action No. 06-0544

Date: September 4, 2007 at 9:47 am PST USDA

AUGUST 21, 2007

Mr. Terry S. Singeltary Sr. Post Office Box 42 Bacliff, Texas 77518-0042

Dear Mr. Singeltary:

This is in response to your e-mails to Secretary Johanns concerning private testing for bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) and a ruling by the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia involving Creekstone Farms Premium Beef, LLC. We regret the delay in responding.

As you may know, the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) filed an appeal of the U.S. District Court's order on June 15,2007. While we recognize your views, we cannot comment on any matters at issue in the pending litigation. However, we can assure you that USDA remains committed to ensuring effective, scientifically sound testing for significant animal diseases and to protecting U.S. animal and public health from BSE.

We understand that the effects of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (CJD) are devastating, and we are sorry to learn of the loss of your mother. Some of us at USDA have also lost family members to CJD and other degenerative neurological diseases. Although it is rare, the classical form of CJD does occur sporadically in the United States and worldwide. However, no cases of vCJD-the form of BSE that can be transmitted from animals to humans-are known to have originated in the United States. Because the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services' (HHS) Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) is responsible for addressing concerns about CJD and other human health issues, you may wish to contact that agency directly. The address is CDC, HHS, 200 Independence Avenue, SW., Washington, D.C. 20201.

We also wish to clarify that the U.S. Food and Drug Administration's 1997 ban on ruminant-to-ruminant feeding is the primary measure in place to protect animal health with regard to BSE. Protection of public health from BSE is achieved by the removal from the human food supply of the animal tissues-often referred to as specified risk

Mr. Terry S. Singeltary, Sr. Page 2

materials-in which the BSE infective agent would be found if present, and by other controls imposed at the slaughter level. These additional controls include the Food Safety and Inspection Services' ban on nonambulatory cattle from the human food chain; a prohibition on air-injection stunning of slaughter cattle; the requirement of additional process controls in advanced meat recovery systems; and, a prohibition on the use of mechanically separated beef in human food. Additionally, protection from BSE and other diseases is achieved by conducting antemortem inspections of slaughter cattle and excluding any animals that display clinical signs of neurological disease or other abnormalities.

We appreciate the opportunity to address your concerns. To learn more about USDA's BSE surveillance and safeguarding activities, please visit our Web site at www.aphis.usda.gov/newsroom/hot_issues/bse/index.shtml.

Sincerely,

Jere L. Dick Associate Deputy Administrator National Animal Health Policy and Programs Veterinary Services

============================END=========================

Greetings,

LIKE going back in time 25 to 30 years with the science in this reply to me from USDA on BSE. I would kindly like to comment;

Jere L. Dick states ;

Some of us at USDA have also lost family members to CJD

Although it is rare, the classical form of CJD does occur sporadically in the United States and worldwide

THIS is very disturbing to me that even USDA officials family members are dying of sporadic CJD, but yet they refuse to acknowledge the science to date, instead to go by prehistoric science dating back some 3 decades. IN short, there is much more to this sad story than that of the UKBSEnvCJD ONLY hypothesis/myth. Evidently, USDA did not even read the most up to date science i submitted to them, or just chose to ignore it. we now know that the sporadic CJD may not be as sporadic or spontaneous as these officials would have us to believe. THE USA has had two cases of atypical BSE i.e. BASE, which is more similar to some sporadic CJD, than that of the nvCJD, plus, there are some questions pertaining to the potential of some of these sCJD case being tied to either CWD in deer and or elk, and to the scrapie in sheep and goats, and there's other science showing that friendly fire from these sources i.e. iCJD is a very real threat. ...tss

Jere L. Dick states ;

Protection of public health from BSE is achieved by the removal from the human food supply of the animal

tissues-often referred to as specified risk materials-in which the BSE infective agent would be found if present,

and by other controls imposed at the slaughter level.

EXACTLY, and this policy has failed terribly, see recalls of 1,000's of TONS of these banned products that is suppose to protect us from all strains of mad cow disease, that are being fed out in commerce as we speak ;

10,000,000+ LBS. of PROHIBITED BANNED MAD COW FEED I.E. BLOOD LACED MBM IN COMMERCE USA 2007

Date: March 21, 2007 at 2:27 pm PST

RECALLS AND FIELD CORRECTIONS: VETERINARY MEDICINES -- CLASS II

___________________________________

PRODUCT

Bulk cattle feed made with recalled Darling's 85% Blood Meal, Flash Dried, Recall # V-024-2007

CODE

Cattle feed delivered between 01/12/2007 and 01/26/2007

RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER

Pfeiffer, Arno, Inc, Greenbush, WI. by conversation on February 5, 2007.

Firm initiated recall is ongoing.

REASON

Blood meal used to make cattle feed was recalled because it was cross- contaminated with prohibited bovine meat and bone meal that had been manufactured on common equipment and labeling did not bear cautionary BSE statement.

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE

42,090 lbs.

DISTRIBUTION

WI

___________________________________

PRODUCT

Custom dairy premix products: MNM ALL PURPOSE Pellet, HILLSIDE/CDL Prot- Buffer Meal, LEE, M.-CLOSE UP PX Pellet, HIGH DESERT/ GHC LACT Meal, TATARKA, M CUST PROT Meal, SUNRIDGE/CDL PROTEIN Blend, LOURENZO, K PVM DAIRY Meal, DOUBLE B DAIRY/GHC LAC Mineral, WEST PIONT/GHC CLOSEUP Mineral, WEST POINT/GHC LACT Meal, JENKS, J/COMPASS PROTEIN Meal, COPPINI - 8# SPECIAL DAIRY Mix, GULICK, L-LACT Meal (Bulk), TRIPLE J - PROTEIN/LACTATION, ROCK CREEK/GHC MILK Mineral, BETTENCOURT/GHC S.SIDE MK-MN, BETTENCOURT #1/GHC MILK MINR, V&C DAIRY/GHC LACT Meal, VEENSTRA, F/GHC LACT Meal, SMUTNY, A- BYPASS ML W/SMARTA, Recall # V-025-2007

CODE

The firm does not utilize a code - only shipping documentation with commodity and weights identified.

RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER

Rangen, Inc, Buhl, ID, by letters on February 13 and 14, 2007. Firm initiated recall is complete.

REASON

Products manufactured from bulk feed containing blood meal that was cross contaminated with prohibited meat and bone meal and the labeling did not bear cautionary BSE statement.

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE

9,997,976 lbs.

DISTRIBUTION

ID and NV

END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR MARCH 21, 2007

http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/enforce/2007/ENF00996.html

NEW URL

http://www.fda.gov/Safety/Recalls/EnforcementReports/2007/ucm120446.htm

Thursday, March 19, 2009

MILLIONS AND MILLIONS OF POUNDS OF MAD COW FEED IN COMMERCE USA WITH ONGOING 12 YEARS OF DENIAL

http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2009/03/millions-and-millions-of-pounds-of-mad.html

Tuesday, March 2, 2010

Animal Proteins Prohibited in Ruminant Feed/Adulterated/Misbranded Rangen Inc 2/11/10 USA

http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2010/03/animal-proteins-prohibited-in-ruminant.html

Monday, March 1, 2010

ANIMAL PROTEIN I.E. MAD COW FEED IN COMMERCE A REVIEW 2010

http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2010/03/animal-protien-ie-mad-cow-feed-in.html

Tuesday, December 15, 2009

NAIS, COOL, FROM FARM TO FORK, MAD COW DISEASE

http://naiscoolyes.blogspot.com/2009/12/nais-cool-from-farm-to-fork-mad-cow.html

HARVARD BSE TSS COMMENTS AND HARVARD USDA ET AL REBUTAL

http://www.fsis.usda.gov/PDF/BSE_Risk_Assess_Response_Public_Comments.pdf

Monday, October 26, 2009

MAD COW DISEASE, AND U.S. BEEF TRADE

MAD COW DISEASE, CJD, TSE, SOUND SCIENCE, COMMERCE, AND SELLING YOUR SOUL TO THE DEVIL

http://usdameatexport.blogspot.com/2009/10/mad-cow-disease-and-us-beef-trade.html

Friday, March 13, 2009

NAIS comments NCBA and R-Calf Wednesday, March 11, 2009 – 10:30 a.m. Subcommittee on Livestock, Dairy, and Poultry — Public Hearing

http://usdameatexport.blogspot.com/2009/03/nais-comments-ncba-and-r-calf-wednesday.html

Saturday, August 16, 2008

Qualitative Analysis of BSE Risk Factors in the United States February 13, 2000 at 3:37 pm PST (BSE red book)

http://bseusa.blogspot.com/2008/08/qualitative-analysis-of-bse-risk.html

48 hour traceback for BSE mad cow disease in the USA ???

NOT in your lifetime !

8 YEARS IN REVIEW OF THE MAD COW DEBACLE IN THE USA ;

http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2008/12/mad-cow-disease-usa-december-28-2008-8.html

The most recent assessments (and reassessments) were published in June 2005 (Table I; 1, and included the categorisation of Canada, the USA, and Mexico as GBR III. Although only Canada and the USA have reported cases, the historically open system of trade in North America suggests that it is likely that BSE is present also in Mexico.

http://www.oie.int/boutique/extrait/06heim937950.pdf

GOC RELEASES CONSULTATION DOCUMENT ON NEW BSE IMPORT POLICY IN LINE WITH OIE: The Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA) is inviting public comment on a proposed new Canadian Import Policy to prevent bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) in bovine animals and their products. The proposed policy would bring Canada’s approach in line with new World Organization for Animal Health (OIE) standards as well as the proposed North American import standard announced on March 29, 2005. It is based on the recognition that international knowledge of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) and me asures to mitigate its transmission have advanced significantly since Canada’s existing import policy for controlling BSE was established in 1997. The new policy would be less restrictive than the current one. Canada’s current policy permits the importation of live ruminants including, cattle, sheep and goats, and products derived from them, only after the exporting country has been officially recognized as BSE-free. Current science recognizes that the “ BSE-free” requirement is unnecessarily restrictive. The draft policy is based on a proposed new OIE three-tier system for classifying bovine-trading countries based on their BSE risk management regimes. In all cases, exporting countries would also have to continue to meet other non-BSE food safety and animal health

GAIN Report - CA5038 Page 3 of 4

UNCLASSIFIED USDA Foreign Agricultural Service requirements before becoming eligible to ship to Canada under any of the new BSE risk categories. A consultation period ending on July 22, 2005 is being provided to allow interested parties the opportunity to provide comments on the draft policy. Notice of this consultation is being published in the Canada Gazette.

http://www.fas.usda.gov/gainfiles/200505/146129759.pdf

SNIP...

Dr. DeHaven has often represented the United States in delicate and often difficult trade negotiations. As the former U.S. Chief Veterinary Officer and U.S. delegate to the OIE, he routinely used his diplomatic skills as he facilitated agreements that are science-based. He was instrumental in building consensus that led to the current OIE BSE chapter

SNIP...

http://www.usaha.org/meetings/2007/2007_USAHA_Proceedings.pdf

“The U.S. has lower sanitary and phyto-sanitary standards (SPS) for imports than many other countries, especially those concerning bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE). These low standards have made the U.S. a dumping ground for beef from the countries that have experienced BSE problems. Food Safety and SPS issues continue to be problematic for our industry, as some countries comply with OIE standards, while others ignore them either for cultural reasons, or too often use them as trade barriers. The USITC October 7, 2008 release reported, ‘U.S. beef processors and beef cattle ranchers lose billions of dollars in export opportunities each year because of animal health and food safety measures in other countries that are inconsistent with international standards and vary by country.

http://www.cattlenetwork.com/USCA-Testifies--Before-USITC/2010-03-03/Article_Latest_News.aspx?oid=996238&fid=CN-LATEST_NEWS_

LIKE i said before, the OIE not only sold their soul to the devil over the BSE MRR, they sold yours too ;

Wednesday, February 10, 2010

NAIS MAD COW TRACEABILITY DUMPED BY USDA APHIS 2010

http://naiscoolyes.blogspot.com/2010/02/nais-mad-cow-traceability-dumped-by.html

The most recent assessments (and reassessments) were published in June 2005 (Table I; 1, and included the categorisation of Canada, the USA, and Mexico as GBR III. Although only Canada and the USA have reported cases, the historically open system of trade in North America suggests that it is likely that BSE is present also in Mexico.

http://www.oie.int/boutique/extrait/06heim937950.pdf

Scientific Report of the European Food Safety Authority on the Assessment of the Geographical BSE Risk (GBR) of the USA Question number: EFSA-Q-2003-083

Adopted: 1 July 2004 Summary (0.1Mb)

Report (0.2Mb)

Summary

The European Food Safety Authority and its Scientific Expert Working Group on the Assessment of the Geographical Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Risk (GBR) were asked by the European Commission (EC) to provide an up-to-date scientific report on the GBR in the United States of America, i.e. the likelihood of the presence of one or more cattle being infected with BSE, pre-clinically as well as clinically, in USA. This scientific report addresses the GBR of USA as assessed in 2004 based on data covering the period 1980-2003.

The BSE agent was probably imported into USA and could have reached domestic cattle in the middle of the eighties. These cattle imported in the mid eighties could have been rendered in the late eighties and therefore led to an internal challenge in the early nineties. It is possible that imported meat and bone meal (MBM) into the USA reached domestic cattle and leads to an internal challenge in the early nineties.

A processing risk developed in the late 80s/early 90s when cattle imports from BSE risk countries were slaughtered or died and were processed (partly) into feed, together with some imports of MBM. This risk continued to exist, and grew significantly in the mid 90’s when domestic cattle, infected by imported MBM, reached processing. Given the low stability of the system, the risk increased over the years with continued imports of cattle and MBM from BSE risk countries.

EFSA concludes that the current GBR level of USA is III, i.e. it is likely but not confirmed that domestic cattle are (clinically or pre-clinically) infected with the BSE-agent. As long as there are no significant changes in rendering or feeding, the stability remains extremely/very unstable. Thus, the probability of cattle to be (pre-clinically or clinically) infected with the BSE-agent persistently increases.

http://www.efsa.europa.eu/EFSA/efsa_locale-1178620753812_1211902594180.htm

Monday, November 23, 2009

BSE GBR RISK ASSESSMENTS UPDATE NOVEMBER 23, 2009 COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES AND O.I.E.

http://docket-aphis-2006-0041.blogspot.com/2009/11/bse-gbr-risk-assessments-update.html

Docket APHIS-2006-0026 Docket Title Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Animal Identification and Importation of Commodities Docket Type Rulemaking Document APHIS-2006-0026-0001 Document Title Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Minimal-Risk Regions, Identification of Ruminants and Processing and Importation of Commodities Public Submission APHIS-2006-0026-0012 Public Submission Title Comment from Terry S Singletary

http://www.regulations.gov/fdmspublic/component/main?main=DocumentDetail&o=09000064801e47e1

Docket APHIS-2006-0041 Docket Title Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Minimal-Risk Regions; Importation of Live Bovines and Products Derived from Bovines Commodities Docket Type Rulemaking Document APHIS-2006-0041-0001 Document Title Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Minimal-Risk Regions; Importation of Live Bovines and Products Derived From Bovines Public Submission APHIS-2006-0041-0028 Public Submission Title Comment from Terry S Singletary

Comment 2006-2007 USA AND OIE POISONING GLOBE WITH BSE MRR POLICY

THE USA is in a most unique situation, one of unknown circumstances with human and animal TSE. THE USA has the most documented TSE in different species to date, with substrains growing in those species (BSE/BASE in cattle and CWD in deer and elk, there is evidence here with different strains), and we know that sheep scrapie has over 20 strains of the typical scrapie with atypical scrapie documented and also BSE is very likely to have passed to sheep. all of which have been rendered and fed back to animals for human and animal consumption, a frightening scenario. WE do not know the outcome, and to play with human life around the globe with the very likely TSE tainted products from the USA, in my opinion is like playing Russian roulette, of long duration, with potential long and enduring consequences, of which once done, cannot be undone. These are the facts as I have come to know through daily and extensive research of TSE over 9 years, since 12/14/97. I do not pretend to have all the answers, but i do know to continue to believe in the ukbsenvcjd only theory of transmission to humans of only this one strain from only this one TSE from only this one part of the globe, will only lead to further failures, and needless exposure to humans from all strains of TSE, and possibly many more needless deaths from TSE via a multitude of proven routes and sources via many studies with primates and rodents and other species.

MY personal belief, since you ask, is that not only the Canadian border, but the USA border, and the Mexican border should be sealed up tighter than a drum for exporting there TSE tainted products, until a validated, 100% sensitive test is available, and all animals for human and animal consumption are tested. all we are doing is the exact same thing the UK did with there mad cow poisoning when they exported it all over the globe, all the while knowing what they were doing. this BSE MRR policy is nothing more than a legal tool to do just exactly what the UK did, thanks to the OIE and GW, it's legal now. and they executed Saddam for poisoning ???

go figure. ...

http://www.regulations.gov/fdmspublic/component/main?main=DocumentDetail&o=09000064801f8151

Docket APHIS-2006-0041 Docket Title Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Minimal-Risk Regions; Importation of Live Bovines and Products Derived from Bovines Commodities Docket Type Rulemaking Document APHIS-2006-0041-0001 Document Title Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Minimal-Risk Regions; Importation of Live Bovines and Products Derived From Bovines Public Submission APHIS-2006-0041-0028.1 Public Submission Title Attachment to Singletary comment

January 28, 2007

Greetings APHIS,

I would kindly like to submit the following to ;

BSE; MRR; IMPORTATION OF LIVE BOVINES AND PRODUCTS DERIVED FROM BOVINES [Docket No. APHIS-2006-0041] RIN 0579-AC01

http://www.regulations.gov/fdmspublic/ContentViewer?objectId=09000064801f8152&disposition=attachment&contentType=msw8

Owner and Corporation Plead Guilty to Defrauding Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Surveillance Program

An Arizona meat processing company and its owner pled guilty in February 2007 to charges of theft of Government funds, mail fraud, and wire fraud. The owner and his company defrauded the BSE Surveillance Program when they falsified BSE Surveillance Data Collection Forms and then submitted payment requests to USDA for the services. In addition to the targeted sample population (those cattle that were more than 30 months old or had other risk factors for BSE), the owner submitted to USDA, or caused to be submitted, BSE obex (brain stem) samples from healthy USDA-inspected cattle. As a result, the owner fraudulently received approximately $390,000. Sentencing is scheduled for May 2007.

snip...

4 USDA OIG SEMIANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS FY 2007 1st Half

http://www.usda.gov/oig/webdocs/sarc070619.pdf

USDA: In 9,200 cases only one type of test could be used

WASHINGTON (AP)--The U.S. Department of Agriculture acknowledged Aug. 17 that its testing options for bovine spongiform encephalopathy were limited in 9,200 cases despite its effort to expand surveillance throughout the U.S. herd.

In those cases, only one type of test was used--one that failed to detect the disease in an infected Texas cow.

The department posted the information on its website because of an inquiry from The Associated Press.

Conducted over the past 14 months, the tests have not been included in the department's running tally of BSE tests since last summer. That total reached 439,126 on Aug. 17.

"There's no secret program," the department's chief veterinarian, John Clifford, said in an interview. "There has been no hiding, I can assure you of that."

Officials intended to report the tests later in an annual report, Clifford said.

These 9,200 cases were different because brain tissue samples were preserved with formalin, which makes them suitable for only one type of test--immunohistochemistry, or IHC.

In the Texas case, officials had declared the cow free of disease in November after an IHC test came back negative. The department's inspector general ordered an additional kind of test, which confirmed the animal was infected.

Veterinarians in remote locations have used the preservative on tissue to keep it from degrading on its way to the department's laboratory in Ames, Iowa. Officials this year asked veterinarians to stop using preservative and send fresh or chilled samples within 48 hours.

The department recently investigated a possible case of BSE that turned up in a preserved sample. Further testing ruled out the disease two weeks ago.

Scientists used two additional tests--rapid screening and Western blot--to help detect BSE in the country's second confirmed case, in a Texas cow in June. They used IHC and Western blot to confirm the first case, in a Washington state cow in December 2003.

"The IHC test is still an excellent test," Clifford said. "These are not simple tests, either."

Clifford pointed out that scientists reran the IHC several times and got conflicting results. That happened, too, with the Western blot test. Both tests are accepted by international animal health officials.

Date: 8/25/05

http://www.hpj.com/archives/2005/aug05/aug29/BSEtestoptionswerelimited.cfm

""These 9,200 cases were different because brain tissue samples were preserved with formalin, which makes them suitable for only one type of test--immunohistochemistry, or IHC."

THIS WAS DONE FOR A REASON!

THE IHC test has been proven to be the LEAST LIKELY to detect BSE/TSE in the bovine, and these were probably from the most high risk cattle pool, the ones the USDA et al, SHOULD have been testing. ...TSS

USDA 2003

We have to be careful that we don't get so set in the way we do things that we forget to look for different emerging variations of disease. We've gotten away from collecting the whole brain in our systems. We're using the brain stem and we're looking in only one area. In Norway, they were doing a project and looking at cases of Scrapie, and they found this where they did not find lesions or PRP in the area of the obex. They found it in the cerebellum and the cerebrum. It's a good lesson for us. Ames had to go back and change the procedure for looking at Scrapie samples. In the USDA, we had routinely looked at all the sections of the brain, and then we got away from it. They've recently gone back. Dr. Keller: Tissues are routinely tested, based on which tissue provides an 'official' test result as recognized by APHIS.

Dr. Detwiler: That's on the slaughter. But on the clinical cases, aren't they still asking for the brain? But even on the slaughter, they're looking only at the brainstem. We may be missing certain things if we confine ourselves to one area.

snip.............

Dr. Detwiler: It seems a good idea, but I'm not aware of it. Another important thing to get across to the public is that the negatives do not guarantee absence of infectivity. The animal could be early in the disease and the incubation period. Even sample collection is so important. If you're not collecting the right area of the brain in sheep, or if collecting lymphoreticular tissue, and you don't get a good biopsy, you could miss the area with the PRP in it and come up with a negative test. There's a new, unusual form of Scrapie that's been detected in Norway. We have to be careful that we don't get so set in the way we do things that we forget to look for different emerging variations of disease. We've gotten away from collecting the whole brain in our systems. We're using the brain stem and we're looking in only one area. In Norway, they were doing a project and looking at cases of Scrapie, and they found this where they did not find lesions or PRP in the area of the obex. They found it in the cerebellum and the cerebrum. It's a good lesson for us. Ames had to go back and change the procedure for looking at Scrapie samples. In the USDA, we had routinely looked at all the sections of the brain, and then we got away from it. They've recently gone back.

Dr. Keller: Tissues are routinely tested, based on which tissue provides an 'official' test result as recognized by APHIS .

Dr. Detwiler: That's on the slaughter. But on the clinical cases, aren't they still asking for the brain? But even on the slaughter, they're looking only at the brainstem. We may be missing certain things if we confine ourselves to one area.

snip...

FULL TEXT;

Completely Edited Version PRION ROUNDTABLE

Accomplished this day, Wednesday, December 11, 2003, Denver, Colorado

2005

=============================

CDC DR. PAUL BROWN TSE EXPERT COMMENTS 2006

The U.S. Department of Agriculture was quick to assure the public earlier this week that the third case of mad cow disease did not pose a risk to them, but what federal officials have not acknowledged is that this latest case indicates the deadly disease has been circulating in U.S. herds for at least a decade.

The second case, which was detected last year in a Texas cow and which USDA officials were reluctant to verify, was approximately 12 years old.

These two cases (the latest was detected in an Alabama cow) present a picture of the disease having been here for 10 years or so, since it is thought that cows usually contract the disease from contaminated feed they consume as calves. The concern is that humans can contract a fatal, incurable, brain-wasting illness from consuming beef products contaminated with the mad cow pathogen.

"The fact the Texas cow showed up fairly clearly implied the existence of other undetected cases," Dr. Paul Brown, former medical director of the National Institutes of Health's Laboratory for Central Nervous System Studies and an expert on mad cow-like diseases, told United Press International. "The question was, 'How many?' and we still can't answer that."

Brown, who is preparing a scientific paper based on the latest two mad cow cases to estimate the maximum number of infected cows that occurred in the United States, said he has "absolutely no confidence in USDA tests before one year ago" because of the agency's reluctance to retest the Texas cow that initially tested positive.

USDA officials finally retested the cow and confirmed it was infected seven months later, but only at the insistence of the agency's inspector general.

"Everything they did on the Texas cow makes everything USDA did before 2005 suspect," Brown said. ...snip...end

http://www.upi.com/ConsumerHealthDaily/view.php?StoryID=20060315-055557-1284r

CDC - Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy and Variant Creutzfeldt ... Dr. Paul Brown is Senior Research Scientist in the Laboratory of Central Nervous System ... Address for correspondence: Paul Brown, Building 36, Room 4A-05, ...

http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/eid/vol7no1/brown.htm

Report on Food & Drug Administration Dallas District Investigation of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Event in Texas 2005 Executive Summary: On June 24, 2005, USDA informed FDA that a cow in Texas tested positive for Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE). Information provided by APHIS was that the BSE positive cow was born and raised in a herd in Texas and was approximately 12 years old. The animal was sampled for BSE at a pet food plant in Texas on November 15, 2004, as part of USDA's enhanced surveillance program.

http://www.fda.gov/cvm/texasfeedrpt.htm

Texas even had a 'secret' test that showed that mad cow positive; experimental IHC test results, because the test was not a validated procedure, and because the two approved IHC tests came back negative, the results were not considered to be of regulatory significance and therefore were not reported beyond the laboratory. . A Western blot test conducted the week of June 5, 2005, returned positive for BSE.

http://www.usda.gov/documents/vs_bse_ihctestvar.pdf

THIS confirms that the June 2004 Enhanced BSE cover-up, was just that. Like i said before, due to this terribly flawed system, those 388,000 testing to date for BSE in the USA were meaningless and should be retested. ...

Subject: USDA JOHANN'S MAD ABOUT FONG, PLANS HIS OWN LAB AND HIS OWN MAD COW ANTIBODIES ;-) Date: July 29, 2005 at 2:35 pm PST

Friday, July 29, 2005

http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/search?updated-max=2007-12-18T12%3A13%3A00-08%3A00&max-results=7

USDA did not test possible mad cows

By Steve Mitchell United Press International Published 6/8/2004 9:30 PM

WASHINGTON, June 8 (UPI) -- The U.S. Department of Agriculture claims ittested 500 cows with signs of a brain disorder for mad cow disease last year, but agency documents obtained by United Press International show the agency tested only half that number.

USDA officials said the difference is made up in animals tested at state veterinary diagnostic laboratories, but these animals were not tested using the "gold standard" test employed by the agency for confirming acase of the deadly disease. Instead, the state labs used a less sensitive test that experts say could miss mad cow cases.

In addition, the state lab figures were not included in a March 2004 USDA document estimating the number of animals most likely to be infected among U.S. herds, and apparently were not given to a congressional committee that had requested agency data on the number of cows with brain disorder signs that had been tested for the disease.

"This is just adding to the demise of USDA's credibility," said Felicia Nestor, senior policy adviser to the Government Accountability Project, a group in Washington, D.C., that works with federal whistleblowers.

"If the USDA is going to exclude from testing the animals most likely to have the disease, that would seem to have a very negative impact on there liability of their conclusion," Nestor told UPI.

Nestor, who has monitored the USDA's mad cow surveillance program closely for several years, asked, "Are they deliberately avoiding testing animals that look like they have the disease?"

Concerns about the number of cows in U.S. herds with brain disorder symptoms have been heightened due to the recent case in Texas, in which USDA officials failed to test an animal with such symptoms, also known as central nervous system or CNS signs. This was a violation of USDA policy, which stipulates all CNS cows should be tested because they are considered the most likely to be mad cow infected. To date, the Washington cow that tested positive last December is the only confirmed case of mad cow disease -- also known as bovine spongiform encephalopathy -- among U.S. herds.

The Texas incident has alarmed the public and members of Congress because humans can contract a fatal brain disorder called variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease from consuming meat infected with the mad cow pathogen. If the USDA's surveillance program is allowing the riskiest cows to go untested, it raises concerns about the ability of the monitoring system to detect the disease reliably in U.S. herds, Rep.Henry Waxman, D-Calif., charged in a May 13 letter to Agriculture Secretary Ann Veneman.

Dr. Peter Lurie, of the consumer group Public Citizen, said CNS cows should be the one category that absolutely has to be tested to have a sound surveillance system.

"CNS animals are far and away the most important animals to test," said Lurie, who has done several analyses of the USDA's mad cow surveillance program.

"If there's any category that needs 100 percent testing, that's it, because they would be the most likely place to find mad cow in America," he told UPI. "Any CNS cow that slips into the food supply represents a major case of malpractice by USDA, and similarly, the failure to test the brain of that animal to see if it was indeed infected is really a failure to protect the public."

USDA officials said the agency has no estimate on how many CNS cows occur in U.S. herds. But spokesman Ed Loyd has told UPI, and at least one other media outlet, that 500 CNS cows were tested in fiscal year 2003. Yet agency testing records for the first 10 months of FY 2003, obtained by UPI under the Freedom of Information Act, show only 254 animals that fall under the CNS category -- or about half the number Loyd cited.

After failing to respond to repeated requests from UPI for clarification of the apparent discrepancy, Loyd finally offered the explanation that an additional 45 CNS cows were tested by the USDA during the final two months of FY 2003. The remainder, he said, was made up by CNS cases tested at various state veterinary diagnostic laboratories.

"We also include data reported to us from state veterinary diagnostic laboratories, and all of these are CNS cases that have been tested for BSE using a histological examination," Loyd said.

"We were not using any other labs during this period, other than (the USDA lab), to run the IHC tests for BSE, which is the gold standard," he said. "This (state laboratory) information contributes important data to our surveillance effort."

However, the state labs did not use the immunohistochemistry test, which the USDA has called the "gold standard" for diagnosing mad cow disease. Instead, the labs used a different test called histopathology, which theUSDA itself does not use to confirm a case, opting instead for the more sensitive IHC test.

The histopathology test, unlike the IHC test, does not detect prions --misfolded proteins that serve as a marker for infection and can be spotted early on in the course of the illness. Rather, it screens forthe microscopic holes in the brain that are characteristic of advanced mad cow disease.

According to the USDA's Web site, histopathology proves reliable only if the brain sample is removed soon after the death of the animal. If there is too much of a delay, the Web site states, it can be "very difficult to confirm a diagnosis by histopathology" because the brain structures may have begun to disintegrate.

That is one reason the agency began using the IHC test -- it can confirm a diagnosis if the brain has begun disintegrating or been frozen for shipping.

The state labs used histopathology to screen 266 CNS cases in FY 2003, as well as 257 cases in FY 2002, according to Loyd. He did not explain why this information was not included in the testing records the agency provided to UPI and has not responded to requests for the identity of the state labs.

Linda Detwiler, a former USDA veterinarian who oversaw the agency's madcow testing program, told UPI the histopathology test probably is adequate for screening CNS cows. If they have mad cow disease, she said, it would likely be an advanced stage that should be obvious.

Other mad cow disease experts, however, said having a back-up test suchas IHC would be advisable, because histopathology tests sometimes can miss evidence of infection.

The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations offers similar recommendations in its protocol for conducing a histopathology test. The protocol states that even if histopathology is negative,"further sampling should be undertaken" in cases "where clinical signs have strongly suggested BSE" -- a criteria that includes all of the cows tested at the state labs.

The USDA seems to agree on the need for a back-up test. Its expanded surveillance program, which began June 1, calls for using IHC -- or another test called Western blot -- to confirm any positives found on rapid tests. The March 15 document that describes the new program does not mention using histopathology to confirm cases of mad cow disease.

"Subtle changes can be missed on histopathology that would probably not be as easy to miss using IHC," said Elizabeth Mumford, a veterinarian and BSE expert at Safe Food Solutions in Bern, Switzerland, a company that provides advice on reducing mad cow risk to industry and governments.

"Therefore I believe it is valuable to run (histopathology)," Mumford told UPI.

She noted that in Europe, two tests -- neither one the histopathology test -- are used to ensure no cases are missed. A rapid test is used initially for screening, followed by IHC as a confirmatory test.

Markus Moser, a molecular biologist and chief executive officer of the Swiss firm Prionics, which manufactures tests for detecting mad cow disease, agrees about the possibility of a case being missed by histopathology.

"There were cases which were (histopathology) negative but still clearly positive with the other (testing) methods," Moser said. "BSE testing based on histology on sub-optimal tissue was probably one of the reasons why Germany was allegedly BSE-free until our test discovered that they were not" in 2000, Moser told UPI.

He agreed with Detwiler that histopathology should be suitable for most cases of CNS cows, but added it still can fail to detect the disease in some CNS cases -- particularly if the sample is not optimum.

"It is difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish the subtle changes in a diseased brain from artifacts like ruptures in the tissue due to tissue damage during the sampling, transport or preparation," he said.

Loyd asserted the additional CNS cases from the state labs actually yielded a total of 565 such cows the USDA had tested -- 65 more than his original figure of 500. Whether the USDA considers its total to be 500 or 565, however, either figure would exceed the agency's own estimates for the total number of such cows that it identifies annually.

According to data the USDA provided to the House Committee on Government Reform, and numbers the agency included in the March document about its expanded surveillance plan, only 201 to 249 CNS cows are identified at slaughterhouses. Approximately 129 additional cases occur on farms annually. At most, that yields a combined total of 378 CNS cows, or nearly 200 less than the 565 Loyd claims the agency tested.

The USDA surveillance plan document makes no mention of the number of CNS animals tested at state veterinary diagnostic labs. The figure also does not appear to be included in the agency's estimates of the number of high-risk animals that occur in the United States each year. The latter number was used to help the USDA calculate the number of animals it will screen for mad cow disease in its expanded surveillance plan.

USDA officials also did not include the state lab figures in response to a question from the House Committee on Government Reform, a source close to the issue told UPI. The committee, on which Waxman is the ranking Democrat, had requested in a March 8 letter to Veneman that she provide "the number of BSE tests that were conducted on cattle exhibiting central nervous system symptoms" for each of the last five years.

Loyd did not respond to a request from UPI asking why agency officials did not provide that information to the committee or include it in USDA's explanation of its expanded surveillance plan.

The committee has taken note of the CNS issue and plans to delve into it further in a hearing slated for sometime in the next few months.

"The committee will explore this and other issues surrounding USDA and BSE testing at a hearing later this summer," Drew Crockett, spokesman for the committee, told UPI.

--

Steve Mitchell is UPI's Medical Correspondent. E-mail sciencemail@upi.com

Copyright © 2001-2004 United Press International

http://www.upi.com/view.cfm?StoryID=20040608-014607-3865r

''USDA gets a D or D minus," said Caroline Smith Dewaal of the Center for Science in the Public Interest, an advocacy group based in Washington. ''The best thing that came out of this is the work of the inspector general."

It was the department's in-house watchdog, Inspector General Phyllis Fong, who skirted the USDA hierarchy by ordering retesting with a different method more than six months after a routine second-round test, known as the immunohistochemistry, or IHC, test proved negative for the disease.

Agriculture Secretary Mike Johanns, who assumed office in January, has said he neither knew about nor authorized the retesting by the National Veterinary Services Laboratories in Ames, Iowa.

BESIDES the Texas mad cow that sat on the shelf for 7+ months before the Honorable Phyllis Fong of the OIG finally did the end around Johanns et al and finally had Weybridge bring that negative cow back from the dead to finally being a confirmed mad cow (hint, hint, getting MRR implemented first), was this simply another bumbling of BSE protocol, or just same old same old;

Jim Rogers (202) 690-4755

USDA Press Office (202) 720-4623

Statement by Chief Veterinary Medical Officer John Clifford Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service Regarding Non-Definitive BSE Test ResultsJuly 27, 2005

snip...

Our laboratory ran the IHC test on the sample and received non-definitive results that suggest the need for further testing. As we have previously experienced, it is possible for an IHC test to yield differing results depending on the "slice" of tissue that is tested. Therefore, scientists at our laboratory and at Weybridge will run the IHC test on additional "slices" of tissue from this animal to determine whether or not it was infected with BSE. We will announce results as soon as they are compiled, which we expect to occur by next week.

I would note that the sample was taken in April, at which time the protocols allowed for a preservative to be used (protocols changed in June 2005). The sample was not submitted to us until last week, because the veterinarian set aside the sample after preserving it and simply forgot to send it in. On that point, I would like to emphasize that while that time lag is not optimal, it has no implications in terms of the risk to human health. The carcass of this animal was destroyed, therefore there is absolutely no risk to human or animal health from this animal.

snip...

http://www.aphis.usda.gov/lpa/news/2005/07/bsestatement_vs.html

In Reply to: Re: Statement by Dr. John Clifford Regarding Non-Definitive BSE Test Results posted by TSS on July 27, 2005 at 12:53 pm:

o.k., let me get this right. i am pondering here;-)

all the time this TEXAS positive, positive, (secret) positive, inconclusive, negative, then Weybridge confirmed 2nd BSE documented case (thanks to the Honorable Phyllis Fong),all this time this BSe going on in TEXAS, was plastered all over the news, this guy forgot about that sample, and it just sat up on some shelf wasting away for months, as to be in such bad shape, they now cannot even test it properly. r i g h t ... like ooops, sorry. ...end

============================================

The animal died in April, but the veterinarian forgot to send the sample to USDA until this month, Mr. Clifford said. "While that time lag is not optimal, it has no implications in terms of the risk to human health," he said.

IHC tests returned conflicting results on the Texas cow. Use of the preservative means that the other tests commonly done when mad cow is suspected, initial rapid screening and Western blot, can't be performed on this sample, the official said. Mr. Clifford said it's possible to get different results, "depending on the slice of tissue that is tested."

The fatal brain-wasting disease is known medically as bovine spongiform encephalopathy, or BSE. In people, eating tainted meat products has been linked to about 150 deaths from a fatal disorder called variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease. Most of the deaths were in the United Kingdom, where there was an outbreak in the 1980s and 1990s.

The U.S. banned Canadian cattle in May 2003 following Canada's first case of mad-cow disease. The U.S. was about to lift the ban in March when U.S. District Judge Richard Cebull in Billings, Mont., granted an injunction to a ranchers' group called R-CALF United Stockgrowers of America. The ranchers had sued to keep the border closed to Canadian cattle, saying the disease presented a risk to the U.S. beef industry as well as to American consumers.

The 9th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the injunction earlier this month, allowing cattle shipments from Canada to resume. The lifting of the ban reopens the U.S. to cattle younger than 30 months and expands the list of beef products Canada is allowed to ship to the U.S. Older animals are still banned, because infection levels are believed to increase with age.

Copyright © 2005 Associated Press

http://online.wsj.com/

Greetings,

this is what you call the 'FONG' syndrome. make sure she can't make them do a WB on this sample.

I BEG THE OIG and the Honorable Phyllis Fong to investigate this blunder too. there is no way that sample sat on a shelf while the world waited on that Texas mad cow blunder dust to settle, and someone just forgets about it. i just don't believe this either...

============================================

http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/search?updated-max=2007-12-18T12%3A13%3A00-08%3A00&max-results=7

WAKE UP AMERICA !

with kindest regards, terry

layperson

Terry S. Singeltary Sr.
P.O. Box 42
Bacliff, Texas USA 77518
flounder9@verizon.net

BSE surveillance front and centre: CFIA and USA

2010-10-02T17:01:00.000-07:00

BSE surveillance front and centre: CFIA

After seven long years, suffice to say bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) is something the Canadian cattle industry would prefer to put behind it for good. The reality is it will take several more years of continued robust surveillance before Canada can definitively say that BSE is eradicated from the Canadian herd.

As producers consider herd management decisions this fall, the Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA) is counting on their continued support of the national BSE surveillance program. Robust surveillance will play a critical role in demonstrating how effective the enhanced feed ban of July 2007 -- which further protected animal health by banning SRM from all animal feeds, pet foods and fertilizers -has been when the CFIA starts its review of the feed ban in 2012.

“Then we will have good scientific information to determine what adjustments we can and cannot make within the feed ban scenario," said Dr. Brian Evans, the CFIA’s Chief Veterinary Officer/Chief Food Safety Officer.

Another reality of the enhanced feed ban is that the animals born since then are only now in the three to four year age range. Canada has never found a BSE case in an animal that young, so the impact of the enhanced feed ban in terms of getting Canada past BSE and truly eradicating it from the herd won’t be fully assessed until animals from 2006-07 reach the 6, 7 and 8-year-old range.

“That means we’re in this for a few more years,” Evans said.

The CCA supports BSE surveillance as the tool to measure the effectiveness of Canada’s animal health controls that will benefit the long-term economic well-being of the cattle industry.

The CFIA’s reminder call for surveillance participation comes amid shrinking test numbers. Tests declined from 2007 to 2008 by 13,598 tests to 48,808 and softened again from 2008 to 2009 by 14,190 to 34,618 tests. While Canada still met its minimum threshold during this period in terms of making sure the integrity of the surveillance program wasn’t compromised, Evans said a higher level of participation is the goal going forward.

As of July, Canada was approaching 23,000 BSE surveillance tests, a number largely in line with the same time last year and nearing Canada’s minimum annual surveillance target of 30,000 BSE tests. This target was originally based on a national herd size of between 5 million and 6 million adult cattle.

Based on Statistics Canada data, the adult cattle population is still fluctuating in this range, at approximately 5.4 million as of January 1, 2010.

Ideally, Evans would like to see surveillance numbers return to 2008 levels if at all possible. He believes this a realistic goal, based on the current size of the national herd and ongoing commitment present within the cattle industry to responsibly manage BSE.

“We don’t want to be seen as doing the minimum necessary; we want to make sure we’re doing what’s appropriate and that it meets the broad needs of all the people that are watching what we’re doing,” he explained.

And while there are frustrations around the pace of which foreign market access is being restored, Evans said surveillance is a necessary component of opening new markets as Canada continues to move forward to demonstrate its level of commitment to surveillance, while the surveillance results show it’s effective.

“It’s not just about market expansion, it’s also about market maintenance in terms of that trust,” Evans said.

Under Canada’s national BSE surveillance program, when an eligible sample is submitted for testing, the CFIA pays the producer $75 to help cover eventual carcass disposal costs. The national program targets animals most at risk for the disease: OTM cattle that are dead, down, dying or diseased and cattle exhibiting strong clinical signs of BSE. Click here for more information.

In Alberta, the surveillance program is a joint effort of Alberta Agriculture and the CFIA and managed differently. The focus is on cattle between 30 and 107 months of age that are sick and deemed unfit for human consumption and on animals that are down, distressed or dead. Cattle over 107 months of age no longer qualify for sampling for BSE testing unless the animal is displaying clear neurological signs confirmed by a certified veterinarian.

Click here for more information.

http://www.cattle.ca/action-news/09-27-10-email.html#art2

Friday, September 24, 2010 BSE

Surveillance Continues to Benefit Canadian Cattle Producers September 24, 2010 - Notice to Industry

http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2010/09/bse-surveillance-continues-to-benefit.html

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

BSE Ongoing Surveillance Program

Monthly Test Results

APHIS reports ongoing surveillance totals monthly.

The BSE ongoing surveillance program will sample approximately 40,000 animals each year. Under the program, USDA will continue to collect samples from a variety of sites and from the cattle populations where the disease is most likely to be detected, similar to the enhanced surveillance program procedures.

Month Number of Tests

August 2010 1,185

July 2010 2,178

June 2010 2,450

May 2010 2,808

April 2010 3,479

March 2010 6,428

February 2010 5,858

January 2010 6,276

http://www.aphis.usda.gov/newsroom/hot_issues/bse/surveillance/ongoing_surv_results.shtml

Subject: USDA OIG SEMIANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS FY 2007 1st Half (bogus BSE sampling FROM HEALTHY USDA CATTLE)

Date: June 21, 2007 at 2:49 pm PST

Owner and Corporation Plead Guilty to Defrauding Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Surveillance Program

An Arizona meat processing company and its owner pled guilty in February 2007 to charges of theft of Government funds, mail fraud, and wire fraud. The owner and his company defrauded the BSE Surveillance Program when they falsified BSE Surveillance Data Collection Forms and then submitted payment requests to USDA for the services. In addition to the targeted sample population (those cattle that were more than 30 months old or had other risk factors for BSE), the owner submitted to USDA, or caused to be submitted, BSE obex (brain stem) samples from healthy USDA-inspected cattle. As a result, the owner fraudulently received approximately $390,000. Sentencing is scheduled for May 2007.

snip...

Topics that will be covered in ongoing or planned reviews under Goal 1 include:

soundness of BSE maintenance sampling (APHIS),

implementation of Performance-Based Inspection System enhancements for specified risk material (SRM) violations and improved inspection controls over SRMs (FSIS and APHIS),

snip...

The findings and recommendations from these efforts will be covered in future semiannual reports as the relevant audits and investigations are completed.

4 USDA OIG SEMIANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS FY 2007 1st Half

http://www.usda.gov/oig/webdocs/sarc070619.pdf

THE USDA JUNE 2004 ENHANCED BSE SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM WAS TERRIBLY FLAWED ;

CDC DR. PAUL BROWN TSE EXPERT COMMENTS 2006

In an article today for United Press International, science reporter Steve Mitchell writes:

Analysis: What that mad cow means

By STEVE MITCHELL UPI Senior Medical Correspondent

WASHINGTON, March 15 (UPI) -- The U.S. Department of Agriculture was quick to assure the public earlier this week that the third case of mad cow disease did not pose a risk to them, but what federal officials have not acknowledged is that this latest case indicates the deadly disease has been circulating in U.S. herds for at least a decade.

The second case, which was detected last year in a Texas cow and which USDA officials were reluctant to verify, was approximately 12 years old.

These two cases (the latest was detected in an Alabama cow) present a picture of the disease having been here for 10 years or so, since it is thought that cows usually contract the disease from contaminated feed they consume as calves. The concern is that humans can contract a fatal, incurable, brain-wasting illness from consuming beef products contaminated with the mad cow pathogen.

"The fact the Texas cow showed up fairly clearly implied the existence of other undetected cases," Dr. Paul Brown, former medical director of the National Institutes of Health's Laboratory for Central Nervous System Studies and an expert on mad cow-like diseases, told United Press International. "The question was, 'How many?' and we still can't answer that."

Brown, who is preparing a scientific paper based on the latest two mad cow cases to estimate the maximum number of infected cows that occurred in the United States, said he has "absolutely no confidence in USDA tests before one year ago" because of the agency's reluctance to retest the Texas cow that initially tested positive.

USDA officials finally retested the cow and confirmed it was infected seven months later, but only at the insistence of the agency's inspector general.

"Everything they did on the Texas cow makes everything they did before 2005 suspect," Brown said.

Despite this, Brown said the U.S. prevalence of mad cow, formally known as bovine spongiform encephalopathy, or BSE, did not significantly threaten human or cattle health.

"Overall, my view is BSE is highly unlikely to pose any important risk either in cattle feed or human feed," he said.

However, Jean Halloran of Consumers Union in Yonkers, N.Y., said consumers should be troubled by the USDA's secrecy and its apparent plan to dramatically cut back the number of mad cow tests it conducts.

"Consumers should be very concerned about how little we know about the USDA's surveillance program and the failure of the USDA to reveal really important details," Halloran told UPI. "Consumers have to be really concerned if they're going to cut back the program," she added.

Last year the USDA tested more than 300,000 animals for the disease, but it has proposed, even in light of a third case, scaling back the program to 40,000 tests annually.

"They seem to be, in terms of actions and policies, taking a lot more seriously the concerns of the cattle industry than the concerns of consumers," Halloran said. "It's really hard to know what it takes to get this administration to take action to protect the public."

The USDA has insisted that the safeguards of a ban on incorporating cow tissue into cattle feed (which is thought to spread the disease) and removal of the most infectious parts of cows, such as the brain and spinal cord, protect consumers. But the agency glosses over the fact that both of these systems have been revealed to be inadequately implemented.

The feed ban, which is enforced by the Food and Drug Administration, has been criticized by the Government Accountability Office in two reports, the most recent coming just last year. The GAO said the FDA's enforcement of the ban continues to have weaknesses that "undermine the nation's firewall against BSE."

USDA documents released last year showed more than 1,000 violations of the regulations requiring the removal of brains and spinal cords in at least 35 states, Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands, with some plants being cited repeatedly for infractions. In addition, a violation of similar regulations that apply to beef exported to Japan is the reason why Japan closed its borders to U.S. beef in January six weeks after reopening them.

Other experts also question the adequacy of the USDA's surveillance system. The USDA insists the prevalence of mad cow disease is low, but the agency has provided few details of its surveillance program, making it difficult for outside experts to know if the agency's monitoring plan is sufficient.

"It's impossible to judge the adequacy of the surveillance system without having a breakdown of the tested population by age and risk status," Elizabeth Mumford, a veterinarian and BSE expert at Safe Food Solutions in Bern, Switzerland, a company that provides advice on reducing mad cow risk to industry and governments, told UPI.

"Everybody would be happier and more confident and in a sense it might be able to go away a little bit for (the USDA) if they would just publish a breakdown on the tests," Mumford added.

UPI requested detailed records about animals tested under the USDA's surveillance plan via the Freedom of Information Act in May 2004 but nearly two years later has not received any corresponding documents from the agency, despite a federal law requiring agencies to comply within 30 days. This leaves open the question of whether the USDA is withholding the information, does not have the information or is so haphazardly organized that it cannot locate it.

Mumford said the prevalence of the disease in U.S. herds is probably quite low, but there have probably been other cases that have so far gone undetected. "They're only finding a very small fraction of that low prevalence," she said.

Mumford expressed surprise at the lack of concern about the deadly disease from American consumers. "I would expect the U.S. public to be more concerned," she said.

Markus Moser, a molecular biologist and chief executive officer of Prionics, a Swiss firm that manufactures BSE test kits, told UPI one concern is that if people are infected, the mad cow pathogen could become "humanized" or more easily transmitted from person to person.

"Transmission would be much easier, through all kinds of medical procedures" and even through the blood supply, Moser said.

© Copyright 2006 United Press International, Inc. All Rights Reserved

http://www.upi.com/ConsumerHealthDaily/view.php?StoryID=20060315-055557-1284r

http://www.upi.com/Science_News/2003/12/30/Mad-Cow-Linked-to-thousands-of-CJD-cases/UPI-47861072816318/

CDC - Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy and Variant Creutzfeldt ... Dr. Paul Brown is Senior Research Scientist in the Laboratory of Central Nervous System ... Address for correspondence: Paul Brown, Building 36, Room 4A-05, ...

http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/eid/vol7no1/brown.htm

PAUL BROWN COMMENT TO ME ON THIS ISSUE

Tuesday, September 12, 2006 11:10 AM

"Actually, Terry, I have been critical of the USDA handling of the mad cow issue for some years, and with Linda Detwiler and others sent lengthy detailed critiques and recommendations to both the USDA and the Canadian Food Agency." ........TSS

http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2009/07/mad-cow-cover-up-usa-masked-as-sporadic.html

OR, what the Honorable Phyllis Fong of the OIG found ;

Audit Report Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Surveillance Program Â Phase II and Food Safety and Inspection Service

Controls Over BSE Sampling, Specified Risk Materials, and Advanced Meat Recovery Products - Phase III

Report No. 50601-10-KC January 2006

Finding 2 Inherent Challenges in Identifying and Testing High-Risk Cattle Still Remain

http://www.usda.gov/oig/webdocs/50601-10-KC.pdf

THIS is just ONE month report, of TWO recalls of prohibited banned MBM, which is illegal, mixed with 85% blood meal, which is still legal, but yet we know the TSE/BSE agent will transmit blood. we have this l-BSE in North America that is much more virulent and there is much concern with blood issue and l-BSE as there is with nvCJD in humans. some are even starting to be concerned with sporadic CJD and blood, and there are studies showing transmission there as well. ... this is one month recall page, where 10 MILLION POUNDS OF BANNED MAD COW FEED WENT OUT INTO COMMERCE, TO BE FED OUT. very little of the product that reaches commerce is ever returned via recall, very, very little. this was 2007, TEN YEARS AFTER THE AUGUST 4, 1997, PARTIAL AND VOLUNTARY MAD COW FEED BAN IN THE USA, that was nothing but ink on paper. i have listed the tonnage of mad cow feed that was in ALABAMA in one of the links too, this is where the infamous g-h-BSEalabama case was, a genetic relation matching the new sporadic CJD in the USA. seems this saga just keeps getting better and better.......$$$

10,000,000+ LBS. of PROHIBITED BANNED MAD COW FEED I.E. BLOOD LACED MBM IN COMMERCE USA 2007

Date: March 21, 2007 at 2:27 pm PST

RECALLS AND FIELD CORRECTIONS: VETERINARY MEDICINES -- CLASS II

___________________________________

PRODUCT

Bulk cattle feed made with recalled Darling's 85% Blood Meal, Flash Dried, Recall # V-024-2007

CODE

Cattle feed delivered between 01/12/2007 and 01/26/2007

RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER

Pfeiffer, Arno, Inc, Greenbush, WI. by conversation on February 5, 2007.

Firm initiated recall is ongoing.

REASON

Blood meal used to make cattle feed was recalled because it was cross- contaminated with prohibited bovine meat and bone meal that had been manufactured on common equipment and labeling did not bear cautionary BSE statement.

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE

42,090 lbs.

DISTRIBUTION

WI

___________________________________

PRODUCT

Custom dairy premix products: MNM ALL PURPOSE Pellet, HILLSIDE/CDL Prot- Buffer Meal, LEE, M.-CLOSE UP PX Pellet, HIGH DESERT/ GHC LACT Meal, TATARKA, M CUST PROT Meal, SUNRIDGE/CDL PROTEIN Blend, LOURENZO, K PVM DAIRY Meal, DOUBLE B DAIRY/GHC LAC Mineral, WEST PIONT/GHC CLOSEUP Mineral, WEST POINT/GHC LACT Meal, JENKS, J/COMPASS PROTEIN Meal, COPPINI - 8# SPECIAL DAIRY Mix, GULICK, L-LACT Meal (Bulk), TRIPLE J - PROTEIN/LACTATION, ROCK CREEK/GHC MILK Mineral, BETTENCOURT/GHC S.SIDE MK-MN, BETTENCOURT #1/GHC MILK MINR, V&C DAIRY/GHC LACT Meal, VEENSTRA, F/GHC LACT Meal, SMUTNY, A- BYPASS ML W/SMARTA, Recall # V-025-2007

CODE

The firm does not utilize a code - only shipping documentation with commodity and weights identified.

RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER

Rangen, Inc, Buhl, ID, by letters on February 13 and 14, 2007. Firm initiated recall is complete.

REASON

Products manufactured from bulk feed containing blood meal that was cross contaminated with prohibited meat and bone meal and the labeling did not bear cautionary BSE statement.

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE

9,997,976 lbs.

DISTRIBUTION

ID and NV

END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR MARCH 21, 2007

http://www.fda.gov/Safety/Recalls/EnforcementReports/2007/ucm120446.htm

Wednesday, September 22, 2010

Docket APHIS-2010-0056 National Veterinary Services Laboratories; Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Surveillance Program Documents COMMENT SUBMISSION

Docket No. APHIS-2010-0056

http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2010/09/docket-aphis-2010-0056-national.html

Transmissible Spongiform encephalopathy (TSE) animal and human TSE in North America

14th ICID International Scientific Exchange Brochure -

Final Abstract Number: ISE.114

Session: International Scientific Exchange

Transmissible Spongiform encephalopathy (TSE) animal and human TSE in North America

update October 2009

T. Singeltary

Bacliff, TX, USA

Background:

An update on atypical BSE and other TSE in North America. Please remember, the typical U.K. c-BSE, the atypical l-BSE (BASE), and h-BSE have all been documented in North America, along with the typical scrapie's, and atypical Nor-98 Scrapie, and to date, 2 different strains of CWD, and also TME. All these TSE in different species have been rendered and fed to food producing animals for humans and animals in North America (TSE in cats and dogs ?), and that the trading of these TSEs via animals and products via the USA and Canada has been immense over the years, decades.

Methods:

12 years independent research of available data

Results:

I propose that the current diagnostic criteria for human TSEs only enhances and helps the spreading of human TSE from the continued belief of the UKBSEnvCJD only theory in 2009. With all the science to date refuting it, to continue to validate this old myth, will only spread this TSE agent through a multitude of potential routes and sources i.e. consumption, medical i.e., surgical, blood, dental, endoscopy, optical, nutritional supplements, cosmetics etc.

Conclusion:

I would like to submit a review of past CJD surveillance in the USA, and the urgent need to make all human TSE in the USA a reportable disease, in every state, of every age group, and to make this mandatory immediately without further delay. The ramifications of not doing so will only allow this agent to spread further in the medical, dental, surgical arena's. Restricting the reporting of CJD and or any human TSE is NOT scientific. Iatrogenic CJD knows NO age group, TSE knows no boundaries. I propose as with Aguzzi, Asante, Collinge, Caughey, Deslys, Dormont, Gibbs, Gajdusek, Ironside, Manuelidis, Marsh, et al and many more, that the world of TSE Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy is far from an exact science, but there is enough proven science to date that this myth should be put to rest once and for all, and that we move forward with a new classification for human and animal TSE that would properly identify the infected species, the source species, and then the route.

page 114 ;

http://ww2.isid.org/Downloads/14th_ICID_ISE_Abstracts.pdf

International Society for Infectious Diseases Web: http://www.isid.org/

please see full text ;

http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/

To date the OIE/WAHO assumes that the human and animal health standards set out in the BSE chapter for classical BSE (C-Type) applies to all forms of BSE which include the H-type and L-type atypical forms. This assumption is scientifically not completely justified and accumulating evidence suggests that this may in fact not be the case. Molecular characterization and the spatial distribution pattern of histopathologic lesions and immunohistochemistry (IHC) signals are used to identify and characterize atypical BSE. Both the L-type and H-type atypical cases display significant differences in the conformation and spatial accumulation of the disease associated prion protein (PrPSc) in brains of afflicted cattle. Transmission studies in bovine transgenic and wild type mouse models support that the atypical BSE types might be unique strains because they have different incubation times and lesion profiles when compared to C-type BSE. When L-type BSE was inoculated into ovine transgenic mice and Syrian hamster the resulting molecular fingerprint had changed, either in the first or a subsequent passage, from L-type into C-type BSE. In addition, non-human primates are specifically susceptible for atypical BSE as demonstrated by an approximately 50% shortened incubation time for L-type BSE as compared to C-type. Considering the current scientific information available, it cannot be assumed that these different BSE types pose the same human health risks as C-type BSE or that these risks are mitigated by the same protective measures.

http://www.prionetcanada.ca/detail.aspx?menu=5&dt=293380&app=93&cat1=387&tp=20&lk=no&cat2

please see full text ;

Wednesday, March 31, 2010

Atypical BSE in Cattle

http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2010/03/atypical-bse-in-cattle-position-post.html

let's take a closer look at this new prionpathy or prionopathy, and then let's look at the g-h-BSEalabama mad cow.

This new prionopathy in humans? the genetic makeup is IDENTICAL to the g-h-BSEalabama mad cow, the only _documented_ mad cow in the world to date like this, ......wait, it get's better. this new prionpathy is killing young and old humans, with LONG DURATION from onset of symptoms to death, and the symptoms are very similar to nvCJD victims, OH, and the plaques are very similar in some cases too, bbbut, it's not related to the g-h-BSEalabama cow, WAIT NOW, it gets even better, the new human prionpathy that they claim is a genetic TSE, has no relation to any gene mutation in that family. daaa, ya think it could be related to that mad cow with the same genetic make-up ??? there were literally tons and tons of banned mad cow protein in Alabama in commerce, and none of it transmitted to cows, and the cows to humans there from ??? r i g h t $$$

ALABAMA MAD COW g-h-BSEalabama

In this study, we identified a novel mutation in the bovine prion protein gene (Prnp), called E211K, of a confirmed BSE positive cow from Alabama, United States of America. This mutation is identical to the E200K pathogenic mutation found in humans with a genetic form of CJD. This finding represents the first report of a confirmed case of BSE with a potential pathogenic mutation within the bovine Prnp gene. We hypothesize that the bovine Prnp E211K mutation most likely has caused BSE in "the approximately 10-year-old cow" carrying the E221K mutation.

http://www.plospathogens.org/article/info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.ppat.1000156

http://www.plospathogens.org/article/fetchObjectAttachment.action?uri=info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.ppat.1000156&representation=PDF

Saturday, August 14, 2010

BSE Case Associated with Prion Protein Gene Mutation (g-h-BSEalabama) and VPSPr PRIONPATHY

(see mad cow feed in COMMERCE IN ALABAMA...TSS)

http://prionpathy.blogspot.com/2010/08/bse-case-associated-with-prion-protein.html

2009 UPDATE ON ALABAMA AND TEXAS MAD COWS 2005 and 2006

http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2006/08/bse-atypical-texas-and-alabama-update.html

Monday, October 19, 2009

Atypical BSE, BSE, and other human and animal TSE in North America Update October 2009

http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2009/10/atypical-bse-bse-and-other-human-and.html

Tuesday, September 14, 2010

Feed Safety and BSE/Ruminant Feed Ban Support Project (U18)

http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2010/09/feed-safety-and-bseruminant-feed-ban.html

Tuesday, August 03, 2010

Variably protease-sensitive prionopathy: A new sporadic disease of the prion protein

http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2010/08/variably-protease-sensitive-prionopathy.html

Monday, August 9, 2010

Variably protease-sensitive prionopathy: A new sporadic disease of the prion protein or just more PRIONBALONEY ?

http://prionunitusaupdate2008.blogspot.com/2010/08/variably-protease-sensitive-prionopathy.html

***+++***

Thursday, July 10, 2008

A Novel Human Disease with Abnormal Prion Protein Sensitive to Protease update July 10, 2008 Friday, June 20, 2008

http://cjdmadcowbaseoct2007.blogspot.com/2008/07/novel-human-disease-with-abnormal-prion.html

[Terry S. Singeltary Sr. has added the following comment:

"According to the World Health Organisation, the future public health threat of vCJD in the UK and Europe and potentially the rest of the world is of concern and currently unquantifiable. However, the possibility of a significant and geographically diverse vCJD epidemic occurring over the next few decades cannot be dismissed.

The key word here is diverse. What does diverse mean?

If USA scrapie transmitted to USA bovine does not produce pathology as the UK c-BSE, then why would CJD from there look like UK vCJD?"

SEE FULL TEXT ;

http://www.promedmail.org/pls/apex/f?p=2400:1001:568933508083034::NO::F2400_P1001_BACK_PAGE,F2400_P1001_PUB_MAIL_ID:1000,82101

.57 The experiment which might have determined whether BSE and scrapie were caused by the same agent (ie, the feeding of natural scrapie to cattle) was never undertaken in the UK. It was, however, performed in the USA in 1979, when it was shown that cattle inoculated with the scrapie agent endemic in the flock of Suffolk sheep at the United States Department of Agriculture in Mission, Texas, developed a TSE quite unlike BSE. 32 The findings of the initial transmission, though not of the clinical or neurohistological examination, were communicated in October 1988 to Dr Watson, Director of the CVL, following a visit by Dr Wrathall, one of the project leaders in the Pathology Department of the CVL, to the United States Department of Agriculture. 33 The results were not published at this point, since the attempted transmission to mice from the experimental cow brain had been inconclusive. The results of the clinical and histological differences between scrapie-affected sheep and cattle were published in 1995. Similar studies in which cattle were inoculated intracerebrally with scrapie inocula derived from a number of scrapie-affected sheep of different breeds and from different States, were carried out at the US National Animal Disease Centre. 34 The results, published in 1994, showed that this source of scrapie agent, though pathogenic for cattle, did not produce the same clinical signs of brain lesions characteristic of BSE.

32 Clark, W., Hourrigan, J. and Hadlow, W. (1995) Encephalopathy in Cattle Experimentally Infected with the Scrapie Agent, American Journal of Veterinary Research, 56, 606-12

33 YB88/10.00/1.1

http://web.archive.org/web/20040823105233/www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/yb/1988/10/00001001.pdf

Docket APHIS-2006-0026 Docket Title Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Animal Identification and Importation of Commodities Docket Type Rulemaking Document APHIS-2006-0026-0001 Document Title Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Minimal-Risk Regions, Identification of Ruminants and Processing and Importation of Commodities Public Submission APHIS-2006-0026-0012 Public Submission Title Comment from Terry S Singletary

http://www.regulations.gov/fdmspublic/component/main?main=DocumentDetail&o=09000064801e47e1

Docket APHIS-2006-0041 Docket Title Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Minimal-Risk Regions; Importation of Live Bovines and Products Derived from Bovines Commodities Docket Type Rulemaking Document APHIS-2006-0041-0001 Document Title Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Minimal-Risk Regions; Importation of Live Bovines and Products Derived From Bovines Public Submission APHIS-2006-0041-0028 Public Submission Title Comment from Terry S Singletary

Comment 2006-2007 USA AND OIE POISONING GLOBE WITH BSE MRR POLICY

THE USA is in a most unique situation, one of unknown circumstances with human and animal TSE. THE USA has the most documented TSE in different species to date, with substrains growing in those species (BSE/BASE in cattle and CWD in deer and elk, there is evidence here with different strains), and we know that sheep scrapie has over 20 strains of the typical scrapie with atypical scrapie documented and also BSE is very likely to have passed to sheep. all of which have been rendered and fed back to animals for human and animal consumption, a frightening scenario. WE do not know the outcome, and to play with human life around the globe with the very likely TSE tainted products from the USA, in my opinion is like playing Russian roulette, of long duration, with potential long and enduring consequences, of which once done, cannot be undone. These are the facts as I have come to know through daily and extensive research of TSE over 9 years, since 12/14/97. I do not pretend to have all the answers, but i do know to continue to believe in the ukbsenvcjd only theory of transmission to humans of only this one strain from only this one TSE from only this one part of the globe, will only lead to further failures, and needless exposure to humans from all strains of TSE, and possibly many more needless deaths from TSE via a multitude of proven routes and sources via many studies with primates and rodents and other species.

MY personal belief, since you ask, is that not only the Canadian border, but the USA border, and the Mexican border should be sealed up tighter than a drum for exporting there TSE tainted products, until a validated, 100% sensitive test is available, and all animals for human and animal consumption are tested. all we are doing is the exact same thing the UK did with there mad cow poisoning when they exported it all over the globe, all the while knowing what they were doing. this BSE MRR policy is nothing more than a legal tool to do just exactly what the UK did, thanks to the OIE and GW, it's legal now. and they executed Saddam for poisoning ???

go figure. ...

http://www.regulations.gov/fdmspublic/component/main?main=DocumentDetail&o=09000064801f8151

Docket APHIS-2006-0041 Docket Title Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Minimal-Risk Regions; Importation of Live Bovines and Products Derived from Bovines Commodities Docket Type Rulemaking Document APHIS-2006-0041-0001 Document Title Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Minimal-Risk Regions; Importation of Live Bovines and Products Derived From Bovines Public Submission APHIS-2006-0041-0028.1 Public Submission Title Attachment to Singletary comment

January 28, 2007

Greetings APHIS,

I would kindly like to submit the following to ;

BSE; MRR; IMPORTATION OF LIVE BOVINES AND PRODUCTS DERIVED FROM BOVINES [Docket No. APHIS-2006-0041] RIN 0579-AC01

http://www.regulations.gov/fdmspublic/ContentViewer?objectId=09000064801f8152&disposition=attachment&contentType=msw8

SEE where sporadic cjd in the USA went from 59 cases in 1997, to 216 cases in 2009. a steady increase since 1997. ...TSS

Monday, August 9, 2010

National Prion Disease Pathology Surveillance Center Cases Examined (July 31, 2010)

Year Total Referrals2 Prion Disease Sporadic Familial Iatrogenic vCJD

1997 114 68 59 9 0 0

to

2009 425 259 216 43 0 0

http://www.cjdsurveillance.com/pdf/case-table.pdf

(please watch and listen to the video and the scientist speaking about atypical BSE and sporadic CJD and listen to Professor Aguzzi)

http://prionunitusaupdate2008.blogspot.com/2010/08/national-prion-disease-pathology.html

Wednesday, August 18, 2010

Incidence of CJD Deaths Reported by CJD-SS in Canada as of July 31, 2010

http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2010/08/incidence-of-cjd-deaths-reported-by-cjd.html

Tuesday, September 14, 2010

Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies Advisory Committee; Notice of Meeting October 28 and 29, 2010 (COMMENT SUBMISSION)

http://tseac.blogspot.com/2010/09/transmissible-spongiform_14.html

Friday, September 24, 2010

USA Blood products, collected from a donor who was at risk for vCJD, were distributed SEPTEMBER 2010

http://vcjdtransfusion.blogspot.com/2010/09/usa-blood-products-collected-from-donor.html

Wednesday, September 08, 2010

Emerging Infectious Diseases: CJD, BSE, SCRAPIE, CWD, PRION, TSE Evaluation to Implementation for Transfusion and Transplantation September 2010

http://vcjdtransfusion.blogspot.com/2010/09/emerging-infectious-diseases-cjd-bse.html

TSS